Homework 3 Graded Student Kevin Vuong View or edit group **Total Points** 24.75 / 25 pts Question 1 Question #1 3 / 3 pts ✓ - 0 pts Correct - 0.25 pts Incorrect unique prime factorization for 1b - 0.5 pts Did not include unique prime factorization for 1b **- 1 pt** See comment Question 2 Question #2 4 / 4 pts ✓ - 0 pts Correct - 0.25 pts No check in python for #2a - 0.5 pts #2b incorrect should be positive 147 -- work is correct **Question 3** Question #3 2 / 2 pts ✓ - 0 pts Correct - 0.25 pts gave negative values for #3b Question 4 Question #4 3 / 3 pts ✓ - 0 pts Correct **Question 5** Question #5 3 / 3 pts ✓ - 0 pts Correct - 0.25 pts did not make positive

✓ - 0 pts Correct

Question 6	
Question #6	<b>4</b> / 4 pts
✓ - 0 pts Correct	
- 0.25 pts Incorrect generators for Z7	
<b>– 0.25 pts</b> Incorrect generators for Z9	
<b>– 0.5 pts</b> 6b incorrect	
Question 7	
Question #7	<b>2</b> / 2 pts
✓ - 0 pts Correct	
- 0.25 pts #7 incorrect	
Question 8	
Question #8	<b>1.75</b> / 2 pts
- 0 pts Correct	
<ul> <li>✓ - 0.25 pts #8 incorrect</li> </ul>	
● 14328 is correct final answer	
Question 9	
Question #9	<b>2</b> / 2 pts

Questions assigned to the following page:  $\underline{1}$  and  $\underline{2}$ 

## Homework 3

**Instructions:** Solutions must be typed using I⁴TEX. All work and the link to any accompanying Python code should be uploaded to Gradescope by 11:59PM on Friday, February 9, 2024.

- 1. (3 pts) Write (or find) Python code that determines if a number is prime. Use your code to state whether each of the following is prime or composite. If the number is composite, write its unique prime factorization.
  - (a) 7,349

- (b) 127, 483, 237
- (a) 7,349 is a prime. (PYTHON CODE HERE)
- (b) 127, 483, 237 is not a prime. It's prime factorization is 7 \* 281 \* 648411. (PYTHON CODE HERE)
- 2. (4 pts)
  - (a) Use the Euclidean Algorithm to find gcd(42823,6409) by hand. Check your answer in Python.
  - (b) Use the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find u, v such that  $gcd(42823, 6409) = u \cdot 42823 + v \cdot 6409$ .
  - (a)

$$42823 = 6409 * 6 + 4369$$

$$6409 = 4369 * 1 + 2040$$

$$4369 = 2040 * 2 + 289$$

$$2040 = 289 * 7 + 17$$

$$289 = 17 * 17 + 0$$

We look at the second to last row and see that the remainder is 17. Thus, gcd(42823, 6409) = 17. This is Python Verified. (PYTHON CODE HERE)

(b)

we first solve for the remainders.

$$4369 = 42823 - 6409 * 6$$

$$2040 = 6409 - 4369$$

$$289 = 4369 - 2040 * 2$$

$$17 = 2040 - 289 * 7$$

Then compute

$$17 = 2040 - 289 * 7$$

$$= 6409 - 4369 - (4369 - 2040 * 2) * 7$$

$$= 6409 - 4369 - 7 * 4369 + 14 * 2040$$

$$= 6409 - 8 * 4369 + 14(6409 - 4369)$$

$$= 15 * 6409 - 22 * 4369$$

$$= 15 * 6409 - 22(42823 - 6409 * 6)$$

$$= 147 * 6409 - 22 * 42823$$

Questions assigned to the following page:  $\underline{3}$ ,  $\underline{5}$ , and  $\underline{4}$ 

- 3. (2 pts)
  - (a) Give two negative values of x such that  $x \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$ .
  - (b) Give two positive values of x such that  $x \equiv 3 \pmod{5}$ .
  - (a) x = -5, x = -12
  - (b) x = 8, x = 13
- 4. (3 pts) Reduce each of the following.
  - (a)  $72 \pmod{60}$

(b)  $-4 \pmod{6}$ 

(c)  $-19 \pmod{12}$ 

(a)

$$72 \pmod{60} \equiv 12 \pmod{60}$$

(b)

$$-4 \pmod{6} \equiv 2 \pmod{6}$$

(c)

$$-19 \pmod{12} \equiv 5 \pmod{5}$$

5. (3 pts) Find  $13^{-1} \pmod{35}$  by hand using the Euclidean Algorithm. Check your answer in Python. We first factor  $\gcd(35, 13)$ . Via Euclidean Algorithm.

$$35 = 13 * 2 + 9$$

$$13 = 9 * 1 + 4$$

$$9 = 4 * 2 + 1$$

$$4 = 4 * 1 + 0$$

We look at the 2nd to last equation and see that the remainder is 1. Thus gcd(35, 13) = 1. We now factor 1 into its Bezout Identity. We first solve for the remainder.

$$9 = 35 - 13 * 2$$

$$4 = 13 - 9 * 1$$

$$1 = 9 - 4 * 2$$

Then,

$$1 = 9 - 2 * 4$$

$$= 9 - 2(13 - 9)$$

$$= 9 - 2 * 13 + 2 * 9$$

$$= 3 * 9 - 2 * 13$$

$$= 3 * (35 - 2 * 13) - 2 * 13$$

$$= 3 * 35 - 8 * 13$$

Thus, 1 = 3 \* 35 - 8 \* 13. We now apply (mod 35).

$$1 (\bmod \ 35) \equiv 3*35 - 8*13 (\bmod \ 35)$$

Questions assigned to the following page:  $\underline{5}$ ,  $\underline{6}$ ,  $\underline{7}$ ,  $\underline{8}$ , and  $\underline{9}$ 

$$\implies 1 \pmod{35} \equiv -8 * 13 \pmod{35}$$

$$\implies 13^{-1} \pmod{35} \equiv -8 \pmod{35}$$

$$\implies 13^{-1} \pmod{35} \equiv 27 \pmod{35}.$$

Thus,

$$13^{-1} \pmod{35} \equiv 27 \pmod{35}$$

This answer was verified in Python. (PYTHON CODE HERE)

- 6. (4 pts) Assume addition for the following.
  - (a) List the generators of  $Z_7$  and  $Z_9$ .
  - (b) In general, what are the generators of  $Z_n$ ?
  - (a) The generators of  $Z_7$  are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Furthermore the generators of  $Z_9$  are 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8
  - (b) In general, we define the generators of  $Z_n$  to be all numbers co-prime to n.
- 7. (2 pts) Suppose you choose p=19 and q=17 for your private key with the RSA Cryptosystem. Using e=283 as your encryption exponent, calculate d.

We first calculate n and  $\phi$ .

$$n = pq = 323$$
  
 $\phi = (p-1)(q-1) = 288$ 

we want to solve  $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{288}$  (PYTHON CODE HERE)

$$d = 115 \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{288}$$

8. (2 pts) Suppose you know that Alice and Bob are using the RSA Cryptosystem with public key (n, e) = (179329, 28473). You intercept Bob's ciphertext message to Alice, c = 120159. Decrypt it and recover his plaintext message.

We factorize n with pollard's p-1 algorithm. We get

$$p = 461, q = 389.$$

$$\implies \phi = 178480$$

Then, using the Euclidean Algorithm

$$ed \equiv 1 \pmod{178480}$$
  
 $\implies d = 44147 \pmod{178480}$   
 $\implies m \equiv 120159^{44147} \pmod{178480}$ 

- 9. (2 pts) Explain two ways that an attacker could universally break RSA.
  - (1). One way an attacker could universally break RSA is if they could find a way to efficiently factor n into p and q in a reasonable amount of time. (Thus, she'd be able to derive the private key on her own). This could likely be done with a Quantum Computer, but not a classical one (Since integer factorization is presumed to be NP-Hard)
  - (2). Another way an attacker could break RSA is if they could come up with their own way to undo the encryption without the decryption algorithm. i.e., the attacker would find an easy way to compete  $f^{-1}$ , if f is the one-way/encryption function of RSA.