



DYNAMIC PRICING UNDER COMPETITION IN AN E-COMMERCE SCENARIO: A DEMAND LEARNING AND PRICE OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUE

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OUTLINE

- ① Contributions
- ② Dynamic pricing
 - Advantages;
- ③ Problem description
 - Dynamic pricing competition;
- ④ Experiment design
 - Demand learning;
 - Value iteration;
 - Runtime efficiency;
- ⑤ Results
- ⑥ Conclusions



GOAL AND CONTRIBUTIONS

GOAL

Predicting prices automatically by adapting to variations within the market;

CONTRIBUTIONS

- The approximation of consumer demand and competitors' strategies;
- The continuous recalculation of the demand variables;
- The construction of a price optimization algorithm;



DYNAMIC PRICING

"It is the study of deciding ideal prices of products or services in a setting where prices can frequently be adjusted."

Van de Geer R. et al.¹

ADVANTAGES

- Reducing prices updating costs;
- More accurate pricing decisions;
- Increase revenues;

BASIC POINTS

- ① Treatment of historical data;
- ② Processing a demand function or learning it;
- ③ Use of mathematical processes for price optimization;


¹Dynamic pricing and learning with competition, Journal of Revenue Pricing Management 18, 185–203, 2019.



DYNAMIC PRICING COMPETITION

• Dynamic Pricing Competition, Haensel AMS ^a

^a<https://dynamic-pricing-competition.com/>



- Demand mechanism unknown: *demand uncertainty*;
- Heterogeneous customer behavior;
- Demand mechanism resembles a competitive e-commerce market;

SIMULATIONS SETTINGS

- Time period: $T = 1000$, indexed by $t = 0, 1, 2..T$;
- n competitors;
- Merchant could set price $p_{i,t} \in 0, 0.001, 0.002..100$ and no costs were involved.
- After each period, sales, $s_{i,t}$ and revenues, $p_{i,t}s_{i,t}$ are generated;
- The merchant could observe his sales, his price and competitors' prices from 0 to $t - 1$;



DEMAND LEARNING

- *Exploration phase*: 150 periods
 - Random prices from a Uniform discrete distribution $[1,100]$
- With historical data: Regression model

REGRESSION VARIABLES

- 1 x_0 : intercept;
- 2 x_1 : our price;
- 3 x_2 : $\min (p_{1t}, p_{2t}, p_{3t} \dots p_{nt})$;
- 4 x_3 : $\text{mean} (p_{1t}, p_{2t}, p_{3t} \dots p_{nt})$;
- 5 x_4 : $\max (p_{1t}, p_{2t}, p_{3t} \dots p_{nt})$;
- 6 Interactions: $x_2 \cdot x_3$; $x_2 \cdot x_4$; $x_3 \cdot x_4$;



REGRESSION MODEL

$$\hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta}) = \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1 x_1^3 + \hat{\beta}_2 x_2^3 + \hat{\beta}_3 x_3^3 + \hat{\beta}_4 x_2 \cdot x_3 + \hat{\beta}_5 x_2 \cdot x_4 + \hat{\beta}_6 x_3 \cdot x_4$$


WHY REGRESSION?

- Time requirements: 0.12 secs per iteration;
- Good compromise between accuracy and timing;

WHY POLYNOMIAL?

- Avoid linear relationship between prices and quantity: *heterogeneous customers*;





SALES PROBABILITIES

Schlosser R. and Boissier M.^a

$$P(s, a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta}) = e^{-\hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta})} \cdot \frac{\hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta})^s}{s!}$$

^aDynamic Pricing under Competition on Online Marketplaces, International Conference on Knowledge Discovery Data Mining, 2018.

- $\hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta})$: mean sales per period;
- $s = [0, 100]$ is the number of maximum sales per period;

EFFECTS

- 1 Customer buying behavior;
- 2 Customer arrivals;
- 3 Competitor pricing strategies;

MODEL FORMULATION

MARKOV DECISION PROCESS

- State space: $\vec{S} = \{0, 1, 2, 3..100\}$;
- Actions: $A_t \in [1, 100]$;
- Sales probabilities: $P(s, a|\vec{p}, \vec{\beta})$;
- Reward: $R(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta}) = [a \cdot \hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta})]$;
- Transition probability: $P_{s,s'}(s, s', a|\vec{p}, \vec{\beta})$;



VALUE ITERATION ALGORITHM

- The optimal value of each state s is find by performing the following update on all states:

$$V(s) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{s'=0}^{100} [P_{s,s'}(s, s', a | \vec{p}, \vec{\beta}) + (a \cdot \hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta})) + \gamma V(s')]$$

- The optimal pricing decision for each state is find:

$$a^*(s) = \arg \max_{a \in A} \sum_{s'=0}^{100} [P_{s,s'}(s, s', a | \vec{p}, \vec{\beta}) + (a \cdot \hat{Y}_{sales}(a, \vec{p}, \vec{\beta})) + \gamma V(s')]$$

OPTIMAL POLICY

The greatest value function among all states will be chosen:

the corresponding action will be the optimal price.

RUNTIME EFFICIENCY

- Reduction in number of prices;
- Increase theta value;

```

1 repeat
2   foreach  $s \in S$ : do
3      $v \leftarrow V(s)$ ;
4      $V(s) \leftarrow \max_a \sum_{s', r} p(s', r|s, a) + [r + \gamma V(s')]$ ;
5      $\Delta \leftarrow \max(\Delta, |v - V(s)|)$ ;
until  $\Delta < \theta$ ;
```

Value	Average runtime in ms
$\theta = 0.01$	21.94
$\theta = 0.05$	12.31
$\theta = 0.5$	11.87
$\theta = 1$	10.56



COMPETITION RESULTS

- Top half of participants;
- Competition results not fully available;




FIGURE 1: Merchant's average prices per simulation




FIGURE 2: Average price per competitor among all simulations



COMPETITION RESULTS




FIGURE 3: Prices trend in simulation 6




FIGURE 4: Average prices vs average revenues



CONCLUSIONS

REMARKS

- ① Ability to set prices and generate revenues;
- ② Ability to compete in different situations and market contexts;
- ③ What seems reasonable in a simulated market may not be in a real one;

FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS

- Model customer behavior differently;
- Prediction of competitors' pricing strategies;
- Different transition probabilities;
- Lower θ value;
- Use all the available prices;



*Thank You
for your attention*