AIR-BENCH 2024: Safety Evaluation Based on Risk Categories from Regulations and Policies

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Abstract

Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response to the risks of foundation models (FMs). However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based solely on previous literature or researchers' intuitions, leading to risk categorizations that do not correspond to existing regulation or developers' own policies and that make it challenging to compare FMs across benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-BENCH 2024, among the first AI safety benchmarks explicitly drawn from government and company policies. AIR 2024 decomposes *8* government regulations and *16* company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with *314* granular risk categories in the lowest tier. We examine the gap between the risks considered by leading AI safety benchmarks and those included in government and company policies, finding that these safety benchmarks address at most *71%* of the higher level risk categories explicitly referenced in government and company policies and do not address risks related to discrimination, NCII, or automated decision-making in high-risk economic sectors. In an effort to close this gap, we evaluate leading language models on AIR-BENCH 2024,[1] providing insights into how sensitive content is treated in different jurisdictions.

1 Background and Findings

AIR-BENCH 2024 leverages the four-tiered risk categorization developed in the AI Risk Taxonomy (AIR 2024) [46]. AIR 2024 was constructed by manually extracting and organizing risk categories from a diverse set of AI governance documents, including 8 government regulatory frameworks from the European Union, United States, and China [3, 14, 15, 7–9, 28, 10] and 16 corporate policies from 9 leading AI companies worldwide [30, 31, 1, 27, 17, 4–6, 29, 36, 12, 11, 2]. As shown in Figure 1, AIR 2024 organizes risks into a hierarchical structure. The most granular level-4 contains 314 specific risk categories, which are grouped into 45 more general level-3 risk categories, 16 level-2 risk categories, and four level-1 categories (System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights-Related Risks). We use the AIR 2024 taxonomy to demonstrate gaps in existing safety benchmarks with respect to discrimination and automated decision-making, and clarify the need for safety evaluations that are relevant to government and company policies.

To assess the alignment between leading AI safety benchmarks and real-world regulations, we mapped three benchmarks—HEx-PHI [32], HarmBench [24], and SALAD-Bench [22]—against AIR 2024's 45 level-3 risk categories in Figure 2. These benchmarks were selected for their rigorous risk categorization, high-quality data management, and human-in-the-loop curation pipeline design.[2] We focus on level-3 risk categories as they provide a balance between specificity and generality, allowing for meaningful comparisons across benchmarks while avoiding being overly broad or granular.

HEx-PHI identifies 11 major risk categories influenced by the acceptable use policies of OpenAI and Meta [30, 26, 21], while HarmBench defines seven risk categories referencing four corporate use policies and recent literature on LLMs' potential for misuse [43, 18]. SALAD-Bench integrates eight public benchmarks (HH-harmless, HH-red-teaming [16], AdvBench [47], Multilingual [13],

[1] Hugging Face repository with full data will be provided after blind review.

[2] While other safety benchmarks exist [19, 44], their lack of detailed risk categorization or inclusion in SALAD-Bench suggests that further mapping may offer limited additional insights.



Figure 1: Comparison of covered risk categories in leading benchmarks published in 2024 versus the 314 unique risks detailed in AIR-BENCH 2024 across 45 mid-level categories, based on AIR 2024.

Do-Not-Answer [41], ToxicChat [23], Do Anything Now [35], and GPTFuzzer [45]), labeling them with detailed risk categories derived from [42] alongside OpenAI and Meta's policies.

Despite these benchmarks' depth in comparison to many others, our analysis reveals significant gaps in coverage, even just at level-3. HEx-PHI covers 51% (23/45) of these categories, with a focus on fraud, adult content, and privacy; HarmBench covers 26% (12/45), with a unique focus on CBRN risks; and SALAD-Bench, the most comprehensive, covers 71% (32/45) with broader coverage of toxic content, defamation, and representational harms. All three benchmarks do not consider critical risk categories such as Automated Decision-Making, Non-consensual Nudity, Deterring Democratic Participation, Unfair Market Practices, and Discrimination towards Protected Characteristics. The omission of Automated Decision-Making is particularly concerning, as the risks associated with AI-driven decision-making in criminal justice, lending, and housing are recognized in regulations across the EU, US, and China.

These gaps in safety benchmarks' risk categorization limit the insights and relevance of such benchmarks when companies seek to adhere to internal or governmental policies or simply to mitigate harms associated with these safety risks [42, 34]. To address this gap, we propose AIR-BENCH 2024, which directly builds on the granular 314 risks in 8 government policies and 16 company policies. By aligning with the risk categories specified in real-world regulations and policies, AIR-BENCH 2024 aims to provide a more extensive evaluation tool for AI safety. We encourage the ML community to build upon this work to address multifaceted safety challenges in an increasingly regulated landscape.



Figure 2: The gap between existing safety benchmarks and the list of risks specified in regulation/policy (see [46]). We show the normalized distribution within each benchmark, highlighting the biased distribution of each. The joint set of these top benchmarks still cannot fill the gap, and 21 of 45 level-3 risk categories (or 46%) are covered by at most one of the three benchmarks.

2 Limitations

Many of the government policies considered in [46] have yet to take full effect. Drawing on the limitations stated in [46]: China is in the process of finalizing the implementing regulations for its Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services [9]; the Codes of Practice that will determine how the EU AI Act is enforced have yet to be drafted [14]; and the extent to which the 2023 US Executive Order on AI has been implemented remains opaque [25]. Companies regularly change their policies, as evidenced by a shift in OpenAI's Usage Policies in 2024 [31]. We hope this taxonomy is updated as government and company policies evolve.

Similarly, as a static benchmark, AIR-BENCH 2024's risk categories require periodic updates to keep pace with emerging risk categories specified in new regulations and policies. Future work could explore dynamic benchmarking approaches that automatically adapt to evolving safety concerns, as well as automated pipelines for aggregating new risk categories from recent policy documents.

There are many other safety benchmarks that we do not directly address in this work [20, 33, 37–40]. We prioritized benchmarks that, like AIR-BENCH 2024, rely on both human and language model-generated data, have a well-defined risk taxonomy, and feature high-quality data management. We hope to expand the coverage of this analysis to additional benchmarks in future work.

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