Global Lessons from Climate Change Legislation and Litigation

Shaikh Eskander1,2 , Sam Fankhauser1,\* and Joana Setzer1

Paper for the

2nd Annual NBER Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy Conference

6 June 2020

***Keywords*:** Climate change; laws; litigation.

***JEL Classifications*:** K32, Q54, Q58.

**Acknowledgements**

We acknowledge financial support from the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment, and from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through its support of the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP). We are grateful to Caterina Gennaioli, Matthew Kotchen and Michal Nachmany for their insights and feedback. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and disclosure of the authors’ material financial relationships, if any, please see https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/environmental-and-energy-policy-and-economy-volume-2/global-lessons-climate-change-legislation-and-litigation.

1 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP), London School of Economics. Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, UK

2 Kingston University London, Penrhyn Road, Kingston Upon Thames, Surrey KT1 2EE, UK.

\* Corresponding author: s.fankhauser@lse.ac.uk.

**Abstract**

There is no country in the world that does not have at least one law or policy dealing with climate change. The most prolific countries have well over 20, and globally there are 1,800 such laws. Some of them are executive orders or policies issued by governments, others are legislative acts passed by parliament. The judiciary has been involved in 1,500 court cases that concern climate change (over 1,100 of which in the US). We use *Climate Change Laws of the World* (CCLW), a publicly accessible database, to analyze patterns and trends in climate change legislation and litigation over the past 30 years. The data reveal that global legislative activity peaked around 2009-14, well before the Paris Agreement. Accounting for effectiveness in implementation and the length of time laws have been in place, the UK and South Korea are the most comprehensive legislators among G20 countries and Spain within the OECD. Climate change legislation is less of a partisan issue than is commonly assumed: the number of climate laws passed by governments of the left, center and right is roughly proportional to their time in office. We also find that legislative activity decreases in times of economic difficulty. Where courts have got involved, judges outside the US have ruled in favor of enhanced climate protection in about half of the cases (US judges are more inclined to rule against climate protection).

# **Introduction**

The international climate change architecture commits nations to accelerate their actions on climate change. Under the Paris Agreement, countries are obliged to ratchet up their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris process in 2020. According to climate scientists, current emission reduction commitments are likely to result in a global mean temperature rise of around 3°C by 2100, rather than the “well below 2°C” envisaged under Paris (Rogelj et al. 2016).

We observe that national climate action is accelerating. Between 1990 and 1999, only 110 laws and significant policies were passed that directly or indirectly addressed climate change. Between 2010 and 2019 the flow of new laws had grown tenfold to about 1,100 laws and policies. The total stock of climate change laws and policies worldwide now stands at 1,800 and continues to grow.

Our awareness of those initiatives is improving at the same time. In 2013, climate change legislation was tracked in just 33 countries (Townshend et al. 2013). By 2015 the number had risen to 66 countries (Fankhauser et al. 2015a, b). Today coverage is global at the level of nation states. In the course of the data gathering, understanding also grew about the breadth of actions that are relevant to climate change, which brought additional laws into the count. This was the case especially for adaptation laws, where the delineation with related activities, such as disaster risk management, is necessarily fuzzy.

Climate legislation is an essential part of climate change governance, as successful action against climate change requires a legal basis. Emissions pledges are not credible unless the targets, and the measures enacted to achieve them, are rooted in law. Although climate laws and policies vary greatly in scope and ambition (that is, at the intensive margin), their growing number (the extensive margin) is an important indicator of countries’ ambition on climate change.

In addition to the laws, edicts and policies passed by executive and legislative bodies, we are observing an increasing participation by the judiciary in the governance of climate change. About 1,500 climate change-related court cases have so far been identified worldwide, three quarters of which in the United States.

The relationship between climate legislation and litigation is still unclear (Setzer and Vanhala 2019), but broadly the two appear to serve complementary functions. The judiciary is implementing government policy prescriptions, interpreting climate legislation and filling enforcement gaps. While “regulation through litigation” can compensate for deficits in the volume or quality of legislation, the judiciary is also mobilized in countries with progressive climate change legislation. In fact, legal mobilization for climate change—using the courts and legal techniques as an instrument for obtaining wider collective objectives—often occurs combination with other forms of mobilization, such as legislative activity, but also political pressure and grassroots activism (Setzer and Vanhala, 2019).

One of the best tools for tracking global trends in climate change policy, legislation and litigation is *Climate Change Laws of the World* (CCLW), a searchable, publicly accessible database created and maintained by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics.[[1]](#endnote-2) [[2]](#endnote-3) The database is a joint initiative with the Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School. At the end of 2019 it featured 1,800 climate laws in 198 jurisdictions, alongside 355 court cases in 36 jurisdictions.[[3]](#endnote-4) The aim is to provide transparency about the actions of individual countries in addressing global climate change, the ultimate collective action problem.

This paper uses CCLW to analyze patterns and trends in national climate change legislation and litigation over the past 30 years. It provides an overview of what countries are already doing—and what countries that are not yet doing it could potentially do—to implement the objectives of the Paris Agreement. We look at the contribution of governments (the executive), parliaments (the legislature) and courts (the judiciary).

Our interest is in high-level patterns. We do not aspire to provide detailed case studies or carefully identified statistical relationships. There is an emerging literature that is aiming to do this (cited below). We restrict ourselves to a few simple statistics and correlations. The data reveal that global legislative activity peaked before the Paris Agreement in around 2009–14. We find that climate change legislation is in most countries a bipartisan concern and that legislative activity decreases in times of economic difficulty. The UK and South Korea are the most comprehensive legislators among the G20, and Spain is the most comprehensive legislator within the OECD. Where courts have got involved, judges outside the US have ruled in favor of enhanced climate protection in about half of the cases.

The next section briefly introduces the CCLW database, including its history, scope, shortcomings and a few descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses some key findings that may be gleaned from the data. Section 4 concludes.

# **The *Climate Change Laws of the World* Database**

## *2.1 Background*

The *Climate Change Laws of the World* database has been compiled over a decade with the help of international partners such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the global organization of national parliaments, and the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE), an international legislators’ forum. The impetus for the initiative was a desire to document national climate action following the 2009 Copenhagen summit and debunk the myth that each country was acting alone (Townshend et al. 2011). Over the years, reporting grew from a handful of major emitters to global coverage. Collaboration with the Sabin Center on Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School from 2015 onward (when the database acquired its current name) allowed the extension of the database from climate change legislation to climate change litigation.

Data are collected in real time from official sources such as government websites, parliamentary records and court documents. There is an internal protocol to ensure new entries conform with CCLW’s definition and interpretation of what constitutes climate change legislation and litigation. Most entries contain a link to the actual text of the law or the filing and court decision.

This is the first academic synthesis of the main patterns and trends that the CCLW data reveal. So far, the data have mostly served to assess global progress in adopting climate policies (Dubash et al. 2013; Iacobuta et al. 2018; Townshend et al. 2013), understand the political economy of passing climate laws (Fankhauser et al. 2015a, b), identify good practice in climate change governance (Averchenkova et al. 2017; Jordan *et al.* 2018) and assess the environmental impact of climate legislation (Eskander and Fankhauser 2020). The litigation data have been used to assess trends in climate litigation (Burger et al. 2017; Setzer and Bangalore 2017; Wilensky 2015) and to analyze particular aspects of climate litigation, such as litigation in the financial sector (Solana 2020) and in the Global South (Peel and Lin 2019; Setzer and Benjamin 2019).

## *2.2 Climate change legislation*

The main part of the CCLW database concerns climate change legislation. The legislation database aspires to be a globally comprehensive record of legislation activities in 198 jurisdictions (197 countries and territories, plus the European Union as a block). It adopts a broad definition of climate legislation, including legislative acts, executive orders and policies of equivalent importance. Legislative acts, passed by parliaments, account for about 40 percent of entries and executive orders and policies, issued by governments, for about 60 percent (see Table 1). For simplicity, we refer to all these interventions as “laws”.

The laws included in CCLW either specifically refer to climate change or promote the sectoral measures required to reduce emissions and increase climate resilience. As such, the database covers the full range of interventions that is relevant to climate change, including:

* overarching policies like carbon pricing schemes (e.g., New Zealand’s *Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment*),
* energy sector policies (e.g., Germany’s *Renewable Energy Sources Act*),
* transport interventions (e.g., Brazil’s *Mandatory Biodiesel Requirements*),
* forestry interventions as relate to climate (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo’s *Law on Protection of the Nature*), and
* adaptation interventions (e.g., Japan’s *Climate Change Adaptation Act*).

A particularly important category is strategic framework laws, which aim to create a unifying institutional structure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or address physical climate risks, or often both. An instructive example is the UK *Climate Change Act* of 2008, which (i) sets a legally binding long-term mitigation goal (since strengthened to net-zero by 2050), (ii) legislates intermediary short-term targets (or carbon budgets), (iii) creates an independent advisory body (the Committee on Climate Change), (iv) establishes a continual process of adaptation planning, and (v) mandates regular government reporting on progress (Averchenkova et al. 2020; Muinzer 2018).[[4]](#endnote-5) Many of these features have been replicated in other framework laws, for example Mexico’s *General Law on Climate Change* 2012,[[5]](#endnote-6) New Zealand’s *Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Bill* 2019,[[6]](#endnote-7) and the climate change acts of several European countries (Nash and Steurer 2019). South Korea’s *Framework Act on Low-Carbon Growth* 2010 stands out because it couches climate action in a wider green growth narrative, combining environmental with industrial policy.[[7]](#endnote-8)

However, the majority of climate laws concern sector-specific interventions, in particular on energy. About 60 percent of laws contain provisions on energy supply, such as the promotion of renewable energy, and / or energy demand, such as industrial or residential energy efficiency. Interventions on transport and forestry are less frequent. About a third of all laws concern climate resilience and adaptation to climate risks. CCLW now also covers disaster risk management, that is, laws concerned with the impacts of current climate variability, rather than future climate change.

Insert Table 1 here (Descriptive legislation statistics)

## *2.3 Climate change litigation*

The litigation database within CCLW is different from the legislation database in that it does not aspire to be comprehensive in its geographic coverage or in the number of cases it contains.

CCLW adopts a broad definition of litigation in terms of actors (governmental and non-governmental), jurisdictional levels (local, regional, national and international) and the profile of the case (climate as central or peripheral). Included in the database are lawsuits brought before administrative, judicial and other investigatory bodies that raise issues of law or fact regarding the science of climate change and climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts (Markell and Ruhl 2012; Burger et al. 2017). The case files contain keywords such as climate change, global warming, global change, greenhouse gas, GHGs, and sea level rise. Cases that make only passing reference to the fact of climate change, its causes or its effects are excluded if they do not address in direct or meaningful fashion the laws, policies or actions that compel, support or facilitate climate mitigation or adaptation. Cases that seek incidentally to accomplish (or prevent) climate change policy goals without reference to climate change issues are not included (Burger et al. 2017). Thus, for example, the database does not include cases in which the parties seek to limit air pollution from coal-fired power plants but do not directly raise issues of fact or law pertaining to climate change.

The identification of climate change litigation also involves characterizing the centrality of climate change issues to the case (Peel and Osofsky 2015; Bouwer 2018). Climate change can range from being a *central* issue in a case, to *peripheral*, that is, litigation that was brought in part over climate change issues but focuses on other grounds (for example, disputes over the siting of wind farms or about subsidies for renewable energy). Litigation that is *not explicitly* tied to climate change arguments but is within the context of climate change (for instance, disputes relating to insurance and risk, or intellectual property rights) has been underappreciated by the literature, but has important strategic, policy and governance implications because it could implicitly impact on accessibility of finance or new technologies to support climate change (Bouwer 2018).

The vast majority of climate change litigation cases (1,154) has been filed in the United States, and these are contained in a separate database. The material difference between US and non-US cases makes cross-country analysis and the comparison of US and non-US trends impracticable. We focus our analysis on the 355 cases that have been filed in 36 non-US jurisdictions (as of end-2019). The majority of them are in Australia (96 cases) and in the European Union (57 cases). The database also includes 18 cases that have been brought before supranational tribunals such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. (See Appendix Table A4 for details).

Over 80 percent of the non-US cases have been brought against governments, and typically the plaintiff is either a private company or a non-governmental organization (NGO). Lawsuits against private defendants are still relatively rare (Table 2; see also Wilensky 2015). Most cases are routine and concern the application, interpretation and enforcement of lawssuch as planning law or the operation of emissions trading schemes (Markell and Ruhl 2012; Bouwer 2018).

Climate change is at the core of the legal argument in less than 40 per cent of cases (138 out of 355). A smaller number of these lawsuits can be described as strategic cases. The delineation is not firm, but these are high-profile claims brought either against governments, where plaintiffs seek increased mitigation ambition, or against large emitters, where plaintiffs seek compensation for damages caused by, or costs incurred due to, climate change. Their aim is to advance policy outcomes and to drive behavioral shifts by key actors (Peel and Osofsky 2015). Table 3 contains summaries of three landmark cases (*Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands*; *Leghari v Federation of Pakistan*;and the *Carbon Majors Inquiry*), which received considerable media attention and have inspired similar cases in other jurisdictions.

Insert Table 2 here (Descriptive litigation statistics)

Insert Table 3 here (Strategic litigation cases)

## *2.4 Limitations*

While CCLW is arguably the most comprehensive database of its kind, it has some limitations. In terms of legislation data, an important issue is that the database is silent about the quality of different laws. Stringent and comprehensive framework laws like the UK *Climate Change Act*, which has been praised for its innovative features (Averchenkova et al. 2020; Muinzer 2018), are treated in the same way as unsuccessful laws such as Indonesia’s various attempts to combat deforestation.

The delineation of what does and does not constitute a climate change law can be difficult. Although CCLW errs on the side of inclusion, by restricting the collection to certain categories of climate‐related laws and policies, the dataset presents an incomplete picture of regulatory efforts relating to climate change (Scotford and Minas 2019). The issue is perhaps most pertinent in the areas of adaptation and land-use change, but similar definitional issues also affect the litigation database.

The legislation database focuses on national climate policy, which means initiatives at the sub-national level and by non-state actors are not covered. State, province and city-led initiatives are particularly significant in countries with federal structures or where national engagement with climate change has been intermittent, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States. In each of these countries, climate policy at sub-national level is fairly advanced and often ahead of the national discourse.

Conversely, in EU member states a focus on national climate policy would ignore the important role of the European Union in national climate policy. The EU has passed 33 climate laws, including legislation to set up an EU-wide emissions trading scheme and establish ambitious targets on renewable energy, which are legally binding for its member states. Fortunately, there is a relatively easy fix to this bias, which is to add all EU laws to the tally of member states (Eskander and Fankhauser 2020).

A potential problem for time series or panel data analysis is that when laws are amended the database only records the latest version, thus omitting earlier activities. Legal provisions are often tightened over time (as for example Switzerland did when revising its *CO2 Act* in 2013), but there are also cases of reversal (such as the repeal of Canada’s *Kyoto Implementation Act* in 2012 and Australia’s *Clean Energy Act* in 2014). In each case, these events supersede earlier database entries.

The litigation dataset has its own limitations. Perhaps the most important one concerns data collection. While the CCLW dataset is the largest one compiled to date, it cannot be deemed representative or comprehensive. Rather, the dataset consists of cases from a limited number of countries, dictated by data accessibility and language considerations. The case list heavily relies on partners of the data providers and on media reports, predominantly in English—ultimately meaning we cannot be sure of the full extent of unidentified litigation cases. Moreover, due to different regulation and litigation cultures, the database is highly uneven, with the majority of the cases attributable to a few jurisdictions. Finally, the CCLW dataset does not include litigation in the US, where the majority of cases has been brought and where, due to relative advantages in procuring information about the cases, the data is closer to being comprehensive.

# **Insights**

## *3.1 The peak in climate change legislation predates the Paris Agreement*

Practically all climate change laws have been passed over the last 30 years (Figure 1). In 1990, there were only 35 laws with relevance to climate change worldwide (Table 1 above). As there was little awareness of the climate issue at that time, most of these laws had related objectives such as energy efficiency (e.g. Costa Rica’s *Energy Law* 1990). Other early laws had wider environmental objectives that were later applied to climate change. For example, the US *Clean Air Act* 1963 is concerned with air pollution, but after a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court (*Massachusetts vs Environmental Protection Agency*), the Obama administration used it as the legal basis to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.

Insert Figure 1 here (Climate change legislation over time)

By the mid-1990s the number of climate laws began to rise. Prominent early examples are Sweden’s *Carbon Tax Act* 1991 and Japan’s *Act on Promotion of Global Warming Counter Measures* 1998. Law making reached a peak in the period 2009-14, when over 120 new laws were passed each year. During this heyday, significant framework laws were passed for example in the UK (2008), South Korea (2010) and Mexico (2012). The European Union’s *2020 Climate and Energy Package* with its 20-20-20 targets (for emissions, renewable energy and energy efficiency) was also passed in this period. In the United States, a law of similar standing, the *American Clean Energy and Securities Act 2009*, known as the Waxman-Markey Bill after its sponsors, was approved by the House of Representatives, but not tabled in the Senate. After 2014, legislative activity began to tail off.

The 2009-14 peak was supported by increased activity in developing countries, sometimes with the support of development agencies. Many of these interventions concerned adaptation, which was a bigger legislative focus than in the industrialized world. Most of them were policy documents, such as Ethiopia’s *Climate-resilient Green Growth Strategy* 2011. Legislative acts passed by parliament are much rarer (Table 1 above), although there are notable exceptions such as Kenya’s *Climate Change Act* of 2016.

Climate change litigation cases peaked at around the same time, although the rise was more sudden, with very few cases before the mid-2000s (Figure 2). Litigation was spearheaded in industrialized countries (EU and OECD member states, including the US), with a much slower ramp up of cases elsewhere.

Insert Figure 2 here (Climate change litigation over time)

It is difficult to discern an impact of external factors, such as the international climate negotiations, on national climate legislation or litigation. Fankhauser *et al.* (2015b) found a statistically significant difference in legislative activity between Annex 1 (industrialized) and non-Annex 1 (developing) countries in the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol, which imposed binding obligations on the former. However, the effect was temporary and relatively small.

The impact of the Paris Agreement appears equally limited. The peak in legislative activity clearly pre-dates the Agreement, which was signed in December 2015. Only about 230 climate-relevant laws were passed in the subsequent four years, which is less than half the annual rate than during the peak years.

The more significant impact of the Paris Agreement was perhaps on the ambition of new laws (the intensive margin), rather than their number (the extensive margin). Several countries, including Sweden (2017), France (2019), New Zealand (2019) and the UK (2019) have passed acts to put into law an economy-wide net-zero emissions target (that is, a balance between emissions and their removal from the atmosphere) in line with the Paris objectives. However, analysis has shown that very few of the emissions pledges contained in countries’ NDCs are matched by legislated national emissions targets (Nachmany and Mangan 2018). The legislative implementation of the Paris Agreement is still far from complete.

## *3.2 Spain, the UK and South Korea are the most comprehensive legislators*

Every country in the world now has at least one climate law, as defined by CCLW, and in some jurisdictions the number is well over 20 (Figure 3a). The median country has passed eight climate change laws and policies (Table 1).

Insert Figure 3 here (Map of climate legislation and litigation by countries)

The number of climate laws a country has passed tells us something about the interest of its law makers in climate change. However, it is not a perfect indicator of climate action. Simply counting the number of laws ignores the considerable heterogeneity that exists in countries’ legislative approaches to climate change (Averchenkova et al. 2017). What is covered in one overarching piece of legislation in one country may require several separate interventions in another. China, for example, only has 8 climate change laws, but this includes powerful provisions incorporated in the 12th and 13th *Five Year Plan*. In comparison, Brazil has 28 recorded climate change laws, including 8 interventions trying to halt deforestation. In Europe, Sweden has 11 climate change laws, compared with 20 laws in the UK. Yet both countries are seen as leaders in the fight against climate change.

Bearing this caveat in mind, we calculate three statistics that we believe are informative about countries’ determination to act on climate change. The first indicator is the number of laws that were on the statute book (or more accurately, in the CCLW database) by the end of 2019. The second indicator accounts for government effectiveness. The presumption is that laws passed by effective governments are more likely to be implemented, and therefore have a higher real-world impact, than those passed by ineffectual governments. Our effectiveness indicator is the Rule of Law variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by Kaufman et al. (2010). The variable captures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the court” (Kaufman et al. 2010). [[8]](#endnote-9)

The third indicator factors in the date when a law was passed, by calculating the number of law-years in a country. For example, the UK *Climate Change Act,* which was passed in 2008 has a weight of 12. The presumption is that laws that were passed early on have had a longer and therefore bigger impact on climate policy. Law-years are again weighted by the level of government effectiveness to account for differences in implementation.

Table 4 reports the top and bottom five performers among three (overlapping) sets of countries, the G20 group of leading economies, the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the member states of the European Union during the period of interest. The full set of results can be found in Appendix Table A1.

The three indicators lead to very consistent results, with rank correlations of 0.88 or more between them. However, for individual countries there can be interesting deviations, related to the effectiveness with which laws are implemented. European countries like Spain, Italy and the UK are among the most prolific legislators, with over 20 laws each (not counting EU-level laws, which also apply to member states). Spain and the UK, and to a lesser extent Italy also score well in the other two indicators, as European countries tend to have relatively effective governments and many of their climate laws are several years old. However, government effectiveness makes a difference in Brazil and Indonesia. Both countries are in the top-five G20 countries in terms of number of laws, but controlling for government effectiveness and law-years, the best G20 performers are the UK and South Korea.

Insert Table 4 here (Country-law statistics)

## *3.3 Climate legislation is less of a partisan issue than commonly assumed*

A striking feature of the climate change debate, particularly in anglophone countries like Australia, Canada and the United States, is the strong party-political divide. There is evidence that left-of-center governments are generally more inclined to legislate on the environment (Neumayer 2003), but the issue appears particularly pronounced for climate change, where we observe a notable undercurrent of climate skepticism on the political right (McCright and Dunlap 2011a, b; and Painter and Ashe 2012). However, the effect of party politics on environmental policy is complex (Carter *et al.* 2018), and it has also been suggested that that right-wing climate skepticism may primarily be an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon (Fankhauser et al. 2015a). There may also be a gender dimension (Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 2019).

To shed more light on this debate we look at climate change legislation in the democratic countries of the sample, defined as countries with a democracy score of 6 or more in the Polity IV dataset (a standard measure of democratic quality).[[9]](#endnote-10) For each of these countries we calculate the fraction of climate change laws that was passed by administrations of a particular political orientation (right, left or center), divided by the share of years they have been in power. Algebraically, the indicator for partisanship has the form:

where, denotes number of laws passed, denotes years in power and subscript denotes political orientation, *.* Data on party-political orientation was taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI).[[10]](#endnote-11)

The indicator has a straightforward interpretation: A score greater than one suggests that governments of political persuasion are disproportionately inclined to pass climate change legislation. Their share of climate laws is greater than their relative time in power. A score less than one suggests a comparative reluctance to legislate on climate change.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of scores across the 99 democratic countries we considered, split by legislative acts (passed by parliament) and executive orders (issued by governments). For the country-level results of combined (parliamentary and executive) activity see Appendix Table A2. We would expect the distribution for the right-wing index to be to the left of one (i.e., most countries score less than one) and those for left and center parties to be to the right of one. However, this is not what we find. For most distributions we cannot reject the hypothesis that their mean is equal to one (Table 5). In industrialized countries (OECD and European Union members), and for all countries in the case of legislative acts, there is no statistical evidence that the number of climate laws passed by governments of the left, center and right is not proportional to their time in office. Only in the case of executive orders issued by governments outside the OECD / EU does the political right appear to be less inclined to act on climate change.

Although we do not control for confounding factors, this suggests that the task of passing climate change legislation is less of partisan issue than the public debate in countries like the Australia, Canada and United States would make us believe.

Of course, indicators like equation (1) mask important political dynamics, and the left-right divide does not always mirror a divide on environmental matters (Carter 2018; Carter et al. 2018). The UK, for example, has a low right-wing party score of 0.6 (Appendix Table A2), but climate policy has mostly transcended party lines. The opposition Conservatives supported many of the laws put forward by Labour governments, most notably the *Climate Change Act* 2008. The US score of 1.3 reflects the fact that the legislative and executive are often controlled by different parties. President Obama’s flagship *Clean Power Plan*, for example, was an executive order passed in 2015, when Congress was in Republican hands.

Insert Figure 4 here (Histogram of political orientation scores)

Insert Table 5 here (Statistical tests of political orientation)

## *3.4 Climate legislation slows during difficult economic times*

Climate change requires persistent policy intervention over decades and as such it should cut across the business cycle. Nevertheless, there is a question about countries’ determination to pursue climate policy in difficult economic times.

There are two sides to the argument. On the one hand, concern for the environment may have less political traction during a recession, when issues like growth and employment take center stage. Kahn and Kotchen (2010) found that interest in the environment tends to wane in difficult economic times. On the other hand, green investment—or a “green deal”—can be an effective fiscal stimulus, as argued by Barbier (2010) and Zenghelis (2012). In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, governments in Europe and elsewhere saw climate investment as a promising way to kick start an ailing economy (Bowen and Stern 2010). The same call is now being made with respect to the Covid-19 recovery (Hepburn et al 2020).

CCLW can help to shed some light on the link between climate legislation and the business cycle (see Doda 2014 for a related application). We use Hodrick-Prescott decomposition to calculate the cyclical component of GDP and identify the periods during 1990 to 2017 when national economies were performing above trend (HP > 0) and below trend (HP < 0).[[11]](#endnote-12) Using the same structure as equation (1), we then calculate the share of climate laws passed while the economy is underperforming, divided by the fraction of years when this was the case.

Countries where legislative activity slowed down in difficult economic times will have a score of less than one, while countries that sought to implement green deal-style policies may have a score greater than one. Figure 5 displays the distribution of scores across countries (the full results reproduced in Appendix table A3). The scores are skewed slightly to the left, suggesting a majority of countries legislates less in difficult economic times. This is confirmed by statistical tests (Table 6).

We conclude that the business cycle has had a material impact on the pace of climate change legislation, notwithstanding the fact that the peak in climate legislation coincided with the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Figure 1). This raises questions about the likelihood of ratcheting up NDCs in accordance with the Paris Agreement, as the next round of NDC reviews will likely occur during a global recession, caused by Covid-19.

Insert Figure 5 here (Histogram of business cycle scores)

Insert Table 6 here (Statistical tests of business cycle scores)

## *3.5 Non-US judges tend to rule in favor of climate action*

The role of the judiciary in climate change governance does not just depend on the number of cases brought, but also on their outcomes. We are therefore interested in the extent to which judges rule against or in favor of tighter climate action. CCLW contains this information for most cases where a ruling has been issued.

The way judges rule is particularly material in the case of strategic court cases (such as those in Table 3), which play an important supporting role in ensuring the national implementation of international emission-reduction commitments and the alignment of national laws with the Paris Agreements (Peel and Osofsky 2015; Setzer and Vanhala 2019). However, we are interested in the broader role of courts beyond just high-profile cases.

To inform this issue, court rulings have been classified as either strengthening climate action or weakening climate action. The distinction is similar to another classification found in the literature, which splits court cases into “pro” and “anti” regulatory suits, depending on the aims of the plaintiffs (Markell and Ruhl 2012; Hilson 2012). “Pro” (also known as “favorable”) cases are brought with the objective of increasing regulation or liability associated with climate change; and “anti” (also known as “con” or “hindering”) cases aim to decrease regulation or liability (Wilensky 2015). However, here we are interested in the ruling of the judge, rather than the objective of the plaintiff.

In the United States, an earlier analysis of cases brought between 1990 and 2016 found that outcomes favored anti-regulatory litigants compared with pro-regulatory litigants by a ratio of 1.4 to 1 (McCormick et al. 2018). We re-examined 534 of these cases and found that judges ruled in favor of more climate regulation in 225 (42%) of them (Table 7). Examined by topic, pro-regulation litigants have tended to win renewable energy and energy efficiency cases, but frequently lost coal-fired power plant cases (McCormick et al. 2018). This win ratio seems to have been enough to shape some policy outcomes. According to Osofsky (2012) climate litigation has brought about credible steps to increase the share of renewable energy in the US electricity mix.

Outside the United States, judges appear more inclined to support climate action. There are 355 non-US court cases where a judgement has been reached and the climate change outcome has been assessed. Among these, the ruling has been supportive of climate change action in 187 cases, or about half of the time (Table 7). The number is slightly lower than in Setzer and Byrnes (2019), who found that judges favored pro-regulatory litigants over anti-regulatory litigants by a ratio of 1.6 to 1. In Australia, the country with the highest number of cases outside the US, these court rulings have apparently been instrumental in forcing administrative decision-makers to consider climate change impacts in the approval of certain large-scale projects (Preston 2011; Peel 2011; Hughes 2019).

Insert Table 7 here (Judicial rulings)

# **Conclusions**

This paper uses *Climate Change Laws of the World* (CCLW), a publicly accessible, searchable database hosted by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change at the London School of Economics, to identify trends in climate change legislation and litigation over the past 30 years.

CCLW documents the explosion of national climate change legislation over this period, although global action on climate change still falls short of what the Paris Agreement requires. By the end of 2019, the database contained 1,800 climate change laws and policies of similar status worldwide, compared with 35 laws in 1990 and 145 laws in 1999. Only about 40 percent of these laws are legislative acts passed by parliaments. The remainder are executive orders, decrees or significant policies issued by governments.

The judiciary got involved in 1,500 court cases in which climate change was a concern, three quarters of which in the US. In about half of the non-US cases for which there is a ruling, the judges strengthened or upheld climate change concerns. Earlier (pre-2017) evidence for the US suggests that the odds of a pro-climate outcome are lower in the United States.

There is no country in the world that does not have at least one law or policy dealing with climate change, and the most prolific countries have well over 20 such laws. Accounting for government effectiveness and the length of time a law has been in effect, Spain, the UK and South Korea are the most comprehensive legislators on climate change.

Global legislative activity peaked in the period 2009-14, when jurisdictions like the EU, Mexico, South Korea and the UK passed their flagship framework laws on climate change. While unable to ascertain causality, the fact that climate legislation peaked before the 2015 Paris Agreement suggests that a push in national climate legislation could have facilitated the Paris Agreement, rather than the other way round.

The Paris Agreement has probably influenced national climate legislation more with respect to the ambition of climate laws, rather than their number. Following Paris, several countries—most notably, France, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK—have adopted binding net-zero emissions targets that are consistent with the Paris objectives. However, most of the emissions pledges contained in NDCs have yet to be translated into legislated targets.

Without going into careful statistical identification, the data reveal some interesting and perhaps surprising patterns. We find that climate change legislation is much less of partisan issue worldwide than the debate in countries like the Australia, Canada and United States would suggest. In industrialized countries (OECD plus European Union members), the number of climate laws passed by governments of the left, center and right is proportional to their time in office. Only in democracies outside this group is the political right less inclined to legislate on climate change.

We further find that legislative activity fluctuates with the business cycle and slows down in times of economic difficulty. This is despite the fact that the peak in climate change legislation coincided with the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. It suggests that the pace of climate action may decline in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic.

CCLW has so far mainly been aimed at policy audiences, where it has helped to build trust among international policy makers and support legislators in drafting their own climate laws. It is only now starting to be utilized in academic research. Initial applications have used the data to assess global progress in adopting climate policies, understand the political economy of passing climate laws, identify good practice in climate change governance, assess the environmental impact of climate legislation, and identify general trends in climate litigation. It is hoped that this paper will stimulate other scholars to use the data in their own research.

**Appendix**

Insert Tables A1, A2, A3, and A4 here

# **References**

Averchenkova, A., S. Fankhauser, and J. Finnegan. 2020. “The Impact of Strategic Climate Legislation: Evidence from Expert Interviews on the UK Climate Change Act.” *Climate Policy*, under revision.

Averchenkova, A, S. Fankhauser, and M. Nachmany. eds. 2017. *Trends in Climate Change Legislation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Averchenkova A., and S. Guzman Luna. 2018. Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change: Key Achievements and Challenges Ahead. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Policy\_brief\_Mexico%E2%80%99s-General-Law-on-Climate-Change-Successes-and-challenges\_8pp\_AverchenkovaGuzman-2.pdf

Barbier, E. B. 2010. *A Global Green New Deal: Rethinking the Economic Recovery*. Cambridge University Press.

Bouwer, K. 2018. “The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation.” *Journal of Environmental Law* 30 (3): 483–506. https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqy017

Bowen, A., and N. Stern. 2010. “Environmental Policy and the Economic Downturn.” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 26 (2): 137–63.

Burger, M., J. Gundlach, A. Kreilhuber, L. Ognibene, A. Kariuki, and A. Gachie. 2017. *The Status of Climate Change Litigation. A Global Review*. New York, NY: United Nations Environment Programme. http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CC-Litigation.pdf

Carter, N., 2018. *The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy*. Cambridge University Press.

Carter, N., R. Ladrech, C. Little, and V. Tsagkroni. 2018. “Political Parties and Climate Policy: A New Approach to Measuring Parties’ Climate Policy Preferences.” *Party Politics* 24 (6): 731–42.

Doda, B. 2014. “Evidence on Business Cycles and CO2 Emissions.” *Journal of Macroeconomics* 40: 214–27.

Dubash, N. K., M. Hagemann, N. Höhne, and P. Upadhyaya. 2013. “Developments in National Climate Change Mitigation Legislation and Strategy.” *Climate Policy* 13 (6): 649–64.

Eskander, S., and S. Fankhauser. 2020. “Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions by National Climate Laws and Policies.” *Nature Climate Change*, forthcoming.

Fankhauser, S., C. Gennaioli, and M. Collins. 2015a. “The Political Economy of Passing Climate Change Legislation: Evidence from a Survey.” *Global Environmental Change* 35: 52–61.

Fankhauser, S., C. Gennaioli, and M. Collins. 2015b. “Do International Factors Influence the Passage of Climate Change Legislation?” *Climate Policy* 16 (3): 318–31.

Hepburn, C., B. O’Callaghan, N. Stern, J. Stiglitz, and D. Zenghelis. 2020. “Will COVID-19 Fiscal Recovery Packages Accelerate or Retard Progress on Climate Change?” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 36.

Hilson, C. J. 2012. “UK Climate Change Litigation: Between Hard and Soft Framing.” In *Criminological and Legal Consequences of Climate Change*, edited by S. Farrall, T. Ahmed, and D. French. Oxford: Hart 2010.

Hodrick, R. J., and E. C. Prescott. 1997. “Postwar US Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation.” *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* 29 (1): 1–16.

Hughes, L. 2019. “The Rocky Hill Decision: A Watershed for Climate Change Action?” *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law*, https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2019.1600272

Iacobuta, G., N. K. Dubash, P. Upadhyaya, M. Deribe, and N. Höhne. 2018. “National Climate Change Mitigation Legislation, Strategy and Targets: A Global Update.” *Climate Policy* 18 (9): 1114–32.

Jodoin, S., R. Faucher, and K. Lofts. 2018. “Look Before You Jump: Assessing the Potential Influence of the Human Rights Bandwagon on Domestic climate Policy.” In *Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and Climate Governance*, 167–82. Routledge.

Kahn, M., and M. Kotchen. 2010. “Environmental Concern and the Business Cycle: The Chilling Effect of Recession. NBER Working Paper 16241. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Kaufman, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues.”World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1682130

Markell, D. L., and J. B. Ruhl. 2012. “An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A new Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?” *Florida Law Review* 64 (1): 15–86.

Mavisakalyan, A., and Y. Tarverdi. 2019. “Gender and Climate Change: Do Female Parliamentarians Make Difference?” *European Journal of Political Economy* 56: 151–64.

McCormick, S., R. L. Glicksman, S. J. Simmens, L. Paddock, D. Kim, and B. Whited. 2018. “Strategies in and Outcomes of Climate Change Litigation in the United States.” *Nature Climate Change* 8: 829–33.

McCright, A., and R. Dunlap. 2011a. “The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010.” *The Sociological Quarterly* 52 (2): 155–94.

McCright, A., and R. Dunlap. 2011b. “Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Change among Conservative White Males in the United States.” *Global Environmental Change* 21 (4): 1163–72.

Muinzer, T. L. 2018. *Climate and Energy Governance for the UK Low Carbon Transition: The Climate Change Act 2008.* Cham: Palgrave Pivot.

Nachmany, M., and E. Mangan. 2018. “Aligning National and International Climate Targets.” Policy Brief, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publication/targets/

Nash, S., and R. Steurer. 2019. “Taking Stock of Climate Change Acts in Europe: Living Policy Processes or Symbolic Gestures?” *Climate Policy* 19 (8): 1052–106.5

Neumayer, E. 2003. “Are Left-wing Party Strength and Corporatism Good for the Environment? Evidence from Panel Analysis of Air Pollution in OECD Countries.” *Ecological Economics* 45 (2): 203–20.

Osofsky, H. M. 2012. “Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut.” *Valparaiso University Law Review* 447–457. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty\_articles/187

Painter, J., and T. Ashe. 2012. “Cross-national Comparison of the Presence of Climate Scepticism in the Print Media in Six Countries, 2007–10.” *Environmental Research Letters* 7 (4): 044005.

Peel, J. 2011. “Issues in Climate Change Litigation.” *Carbon and Climate Law Review* 5 (1): 15–24. https://doi.org/10.21552/CCLR/2011/1/162

Peel J., and J. Lin. 2019. “Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South.” *American Journal of International Law* 113 (4): 679–726.

Peel, J., and H. M. Osofsky. 2015. *Climate Change Litigation Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Preston, B. J. 2011. “Climate Change Litigation (part 1).” *Carbon & Climate Law Review* 5 (1): 3–14.

Rogelj, J., M. Den Elzen, N. Höhne, T. Fransen, H. Fekete, H. Winkler, R. Schaeffer, F. Sha, K. Riahi, and M. Meinshausen. 2016. “Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well Below 2 C.” *Nature* 534 (7609): 631–9.

Scotford, E., and S. Minas. 2019. “Probing the Hidden Depths of Climate Law: Analysing National Climate Change Legislation.” *Review of European,* *Comparative and International Environmental Law* 28 (1): 67–81.

Setzer, J., and M. Bangalore. 2017. “Regulating Climate Change in the Courts.” In *Trends in Climate Change Legislation*, edited by A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, and M. Nachmany, 175–92. London, Edward Elgar.

Setzer, J., and L. Benjamin. 2019. “Climate Litigation in the Global South: Constraints and Innovations.” *Transnational Environmental Law* 1–25.

Setzer, J., and R. Byrnes. 2019. *Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2019 Snapshot*. Policy report. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ GRI\_Global-trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2019-snapshot.pdf

Solana, J. 2020. “Climate Litigation in Financial Markets: A Typology.” *Transnational Environmental Law* 1–33.

Townshend, T., S. Fankhauser, A. Matthews, C. Feger, J. Liu, and T. Narciso. 2011. “Legislating Climate Change at the National Level.” *Environment* 53 (5): 5–16.

Townshend, T., S. Fankhauser, R. Aybar, M. Collins, T. Landesman, M. Nachmany, and C. Pavese. 2013. “How National Legislation Can Help to Solve Climate Change.” *Nature Climate Change* 3 (May): 430–2.

Verschuuren, J. 2019. “The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation: The Hague Court of Appeal Upholds Judgment Requiring the Netherlands to Further Reduce Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 28 (1): 94–8.

Wilensky, M. 2015. “Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate Litigation.” *Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum* 26 (1): 131–79.

Zenghelis, D. 2012. “A Strategy for Restoring Confidence and Economic Growth through Green Investment and Innovation.” Policy Brief. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/ publication/a-strategy-for-restoring-confidence-and-economic-growth-through-green-investment-and-innovation/

Endnotes

## Table 1: Descriptive statistics on climate change legislation

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All countries  [N=198] | OECD-EU countries  [N=42] | Other countries  [N=156] |
| **Total number of laws** |  |  |  |
| Total | 1,800 | 605 (33.6% of all laws) | 1,195 (66.4%) |
| Pre-1990 | 35 | 24 (68.6%) | 9 (31.4%) |
| 1990-1999 | 110 | 38 (34.6%) | 72 (65.4%) |
| 2000-2009 | 554 | 203 (36.6%) | 351 (63.4%) |
| 2010-2019 | 1,101 | 340 (30.9%) | 771 (69.1%) |
| **Laws by topic** (1990-2019) |  |  |  |
| Framework laws | 238 | 85 (35.7%) | 153 (64.3%) |
| Laws addressing GHG emissions (mitigation laws) | 1,620 | 549 (33.9%) | 1,071 (66.1%) |
| Mitigation laws focused on energy (energy laws) | 1,055 | 395 (37.4%) | 660 (62.6%) |
| Laws addressing climate resilience (adaptation laws) | 641 | 143 (22.3%) | 498 (77.7%) |
| **Laws by type** (1990-2019) |  |  |  |
| Executive orders or policies | 1,023 | 244 (23.9%) | 799 (76.1%) |
| Legislative acts | 742 | 337 (45.4%) | 405 (54.6%) |
| **Number of laws by country** (1990-2019) |  |  |  |
| Mean | 8.9 | 13.8 | 7.6 |
| Standard deviation | 6.3 | 7.5 | 5.2 |
| Median | 8 | 12 | 6 |
| Minimum | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Maximum | 38 | 38 | 28 |

Notes: All data from *Climate Change Laws of the World*. Some laws deal with multiple issues, hence the higher totals for “laws by topic”.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics on climate change litigation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All jurisdictions (excl US)  [N=36] | OECD-EU (excl. US)  [N=21] | Other jurisdictions  [N=15] | US |
| **Total number of cases** |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 355 | 300 (85%) | 55 (15%) | 1,154 |
| Pre-1990 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 1990-1999 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| 2000-2009 | 117 | 109 | 8 | 231 |
| 2010-2019 | 234 | 187 | 47 | 916 |
| **Number of climate-centric cases** |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 138 | 103 (75%) | 35 (25%) |  |
| 1990-1999 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| 2000-2009 | 28 | 25 | 3 |  |
| 2010-2019 | 110 | 78 | 32 |  |
| **Number of cases by jurisdiction** (1990-2019) |  |  |  |  |
| Mean | 9.9 | 14.3 | 3.7 |  |
| Standard deviation | 20.1 | 25.3 | 4.7 |  |
| Median | 2 | 2 | 2 |  |
| Minimum | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| Maximum | 96 | 96 | 18 |  |
| **Court cases by type** (1990-2019) |  |  |  |  |
| Plaintiff=Public; Defendant=Public | 48 | 32 | 16 | 59 |
| Plaintiff=Public; Defendant=Private | 17 | 14 | 3 | 27 |
| Plaintiff=Public; Defendant=NGO | 10 | 9 | 1 | 8 |
| Plaintiff=Private; Defendant=Public | 117 | 116 | 1 | 90 |
| Plaintiff=Private; Defendant=Private | 6 | 6 | 0 | 3 |
| Plaintiff=Private; Defendant=NGO | 10 | 10 | 0 | 7 |
| Plaintiff=NGO; Defendant=Public | 141 | 107 | 34 | 563 |
| Plaintiff=NGO; Defendant=Private | 24 | 19 | 5 | 65 |
| Plaintiff=NGO; Defendant=NGO | 4 | 4 | 0 | 16 |

Table 2 notes: Cases by type involves the following three parties: Public (federal, state/local and tribal government and different departments of the governments), Private (corporations and businesses) and NGO (non-profit organizations and individuals). There were multiple types of plaintiffs in 10 cases, whereas 12 cases had multiple types of defendants. Data for the US come from McCormick *et al.* (2018) who studied 838 cases between 1990-2016. The totals under “Court cases by type” therefore differ from the total numbers reported at the top of the table. This list includes cases with international and regional jurisdictions, with EU-jurisdiction cases included in total EU cases.

*Source:* Authors based on *Climate Change Laws of the World,* Sabin Center data and McCormick *et al.* (2018).

## Table 3: Prominent strategic litigation cases

| **Case** | **Year started** | **Plaintiff** | **Defendant** | **Summary and status** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands* | 2013 | Dutch environmental group, the Urgenda Foundation, and 900 Dutch citizens | State of the Netherlands | The first case to argue successfully for the adoption of stricter emissions reduction targets by a government. In December 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld earlier rulings, which required the Netherlands to reduce its emissions by at least 25 percent on 1990 levels by 2020. Even before the final decision by the Supreme Court, the case triggered substantial changes in government policy, including the adoption of the *Climate Act* 2019 and the decision to phase out coal-fired power generation by 2030 (Verschuuren 2019; Jodoin *et al.* 2018). The case motivated a wave of Urgenda-inspired climate change litigation across the world. |
| *Leghari v Federation of Pakistan* | 2015 | Ashgar Leghari | Federation of Pakistan | An appellate court in Pakistan granted the claims of Ashgar Leghari, a Pakistani farmer, who had sued the national government for failure to implement the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 and the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030). The court, citing domestic and international legal principles, determined that "the delay and lethargy of the State in implementing the Framework offend the fundamental rights of the citizens." |
| *Carbon Majors Inquiry* | 2015 | Greenpeace Southeast Asia, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement and 12 NGOs, 20 individuals, and 1,288 Filipinos (signatories of a petition) | 50 investor-owned Carbon Majors (largest producers of crude oil, natural gas, coal and cement) | A group of plaintiffs led by Greenpeace Southeast Asia filed a petition asking the Philippines Commission on Human Rights to investigate “the human rights implications of climate change and ocean acidification and the resulting rights violations in the Philippines”, and “whether the investor-owned Carbon Majors have breached their responsibilities to respect the rights of the Filipino people.” The Commission found that fossil fuel companies have a clear moral responsibility, and the onus falls on individual countries to pass strong legislation and establish legal liability in their courts. The Commission further found that existing civil law in the Philippines provided grounds for action, and that it may be possible to hold companies criminally accountable where they have been clearly proved to have engaged in acts of obstruction and willful obfuscation. |

Table 3 Source:Authors based on *Climate Change Laws of the World*.

## Table 4: Legislative activity by countries

1. G-20 Countries

|  | Laws | | Quality-adjusted laws | | Lifetime quality-adjusted laws | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ranking | ISO Code | Number | ISO Code | Number | ISO Code | Number |
| 1 | BRA | 28 | GBR | 16.85 | GBR | 209.68 |
| 2 | ITA | 24 | AUS | 15.41 | KOR | 204.77 |
| 3 | IDN | 22 | KOR | 15.25 | ITA | 184.01 |
| 4 | KOR | 22 | DEU | 15.03 | DEU | 163.00 |
| 5 | GBR | 20 | JPN | 15.01 | AUS | 138.48 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 | CAN | 10 | IND | 5.14 | ZAF | 58.17 |
| 16 | IND | 10 | RUS | 4.09 | RUS | 40.94 |
| 17 | MEX | 10 | MEX | 3.97 | MEX | 28.81 |
| 18 | CHN | 8 | CHN | 3.25 | CHN | 26.08 |
| 19 | SAU | 3 | SAU | 1.61 | SAU | 13.45 |

Table 4 continued

1. OECD Countries

|  | Laws | | Quality-adjusted laws | | Lifetime quality-adjusted laws | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ranking | ISO Code | Number | ISO Code | Number | ISO Code | Number |
| 1 | ESP | 38 | ESP | 27.20 | ESP | 234.21 |
| 2 | CHL | 26 | CHL | 19.65 | GBR | 209.68 |
| 3 | ITA | 24 | GBR | 16.85 | KOR | 204.77 |
| 4 | KOR | 22 | AUS | 15.41 | NOR | 186.10 |
| 5 | GBR | 20 | KOR | 15.25 | ITA | 184.01 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 31 | CZE | 9 | ISL | 5.93 | ISL | 57.91 |
| 32 | ISL | 7 | SVN | 4.92 | SVN | 43.58 |
| 33 | SVN | 7 | MEX | 3.97 | MEX | 28.81 |
| 34 | EST | 3 | EST | 2.23 | EST | 17.81 |
| 35 | LTU | 2 | LTU | 1.34 | LTU | 10.34 |

Table 4 concluded

1. EU countries

|  | Laws | | Quality-adjusted laws | | Lifetime quality-adjusted laws | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ranking | ISO Code | Number | ISO Code | Number | ISO Code | Number |
| 1 | ESP | 38 | ESP | 27.20 | ESP | 234.21 |
| 2 | ITA | 24 | GBR | 16.85 | GBR | 209.68 |
| 3 | GBR | 20 | DEU | 15.03 | ITA | 184.01 |
| 4 | DEU | 18 | IRL | 14.95 | DEU | 163.00 |
| 5 | IRL | 18 | ITA | 14.57 | DNK | 139.93 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 | SVN | 7 | SVN | 4.92 | SVN | 43.58 |
| 25 | EST | 3 | EST | 2.23 | EST | 17.81 |
| 26 | LTU | 2 | LTU | 1.34 | LVA | 11.42 |
| 27 | LVA | 2 | LVA | 1.31 | LTU | 10.34 |
| 28 | CYP | 1 | CYP | 0.71 | CYP | 4.92 |

Table 4 Notes: Data on climate laws and policies come from Climate Change Laws of the World. See Appendix Table A.1 for the full list of countries and detailed statistics. Quality-adjusted laws are derived by multiplying each law by the Rule of Law score of Kaufman *et al.* (2010) in the year it was passed. Life-time quality adjusted laws are calculated as the number of years a law has been in force, multiplied by the rule-of-law score in each year. All calculations are done over the period 1990-2019.

## Table 5: Statistical tests of political orientation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Legislative Acts | | | Executive Orders | | |
| Null Hypothesis | Alt. Hypo. | All countries | OECD-EU countries | Other countries | All countries | OECD-EU countries | Other countries |
| **One-sample t test** | | | | | | | |
| Left-wing score = 1 | < 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Rejected | Not rejected |
|  | ≠ 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Rejected | Rejected |
|  | > 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Rejected |
| Center score = 1 | < 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected |
|  | ≠ 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected |
|  | > 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected |
| Right-wing score = 1 | < 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Rejected | Not rejected | Rejected |
|  | ≠ 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Rejected | Not rejected | Rejected |
|  | > 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected |
| **Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test** | | | | | | | |
| Left-wing score:  OECD-EU countries = Other countries | ≠ | Not rejected |  |  | Rejected |  |  |
| Center score:  OECD-EU countries = Other countries | ≠ | Not rejected |  |  | Not rejected |  |  |
| Right-wing score:  OECD-EU countries = Other countries | ≠ | Not rejected |  |  | Rejected |  |  |

Notes. Data on climate laws and policies come from *Climate Change Laws of the World*. Data on political orientation come from the World Bank’s *Database of Political Institutions*. All calculations are done over the period 1990-2017.

## Table 6: Statistical tests of business cycle effects

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Decision | | |
| Null Hypothesis | Alternative Hypothesis | All countries | OECD-EU countries | Other countries |
| **One-sample t test** |  |  |  |  |
| Economic crisis = 1 | < 1 | Rejected | Rejected | Rejected |
|  | ≠ 1 | Rejected | Rejected | Rejected |
|  | > 1 | Not rejected | Not rejected | Not rejected |
| **Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test** | |  |  |  |
| OECD-EU countries= Other countries | ≠ |  | Rejected |  |

Notes: Data on climate laws and policies come from *Climate Change Laws of the World* database. Data on business cycles are calculated from real GDP data from the World Development Indicators database. All calculations are done over the period 1990-2017 for 169 countries.

## Table 7: Pro-climate rulings by the judiciary

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Non-US cases | | | US cases |
| **Time period** | All non-US  [N=36] | OECD-EU  [N=21] | Non-OECD/EU  [N=15] |  |
| Total cases with a ruling | 355 | 300 | 55 | 534 |
| Cases with a pro-climate ruling | 187 (53%) | 153 (51%) | 34 (62%) | 225 (42%) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Pro-climate cases over time |  |  |  |  |
| 1990-1999 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| 2000-2009 | 68 | 62 | 6 |  |
| 2010-2019 | 119 | 91 | 28 |  |

Notes: Outside the US, a court ruling has been issued in 355 cases between 1990 and 2019. These are contained in *Climate Change Laws of the World*. For the US we re-examined 534 court rulings during 1990-2016 from McCormick *et al* (2018); here a ruling is pro-climate if judges supported a “pro-regulation” plaintiff or ruled against an “anti-regulation” plaintiff.

*Source:* Authors based on *Climate Change Laws of the World* and McCormick *et al.* (2018). For results by country see Appendix Table A4.

# **Appendix tables**

## Table A1: Legislative activity by countries

| Country Name | ISO Code | G20 | OECD | EU | Number of climate laws | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number | Quality-adjusted number | Lifetime Quality-adjusted number |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Afghanistan | AFG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1.47 | 12.03 |
| Angola | AGO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 5.55 | 31.98 |
| Albania | ALB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.17 | 10.36 |
| United Arab Emirates | ARE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3.78 | 20.88 |
| Argentina | ARG | 1 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 7.09 | 72.17 |
| Armenia | ARM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 3.33 | 47.92 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | ATG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3.23 | 21.16 |
| Australia | AUS | 1 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 15.41 | 138.48 |
| Austria | AUT | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 7.87 | 99.38 |
| Azerbaijan | AZE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.39 | 13.97 |
| Burundi | BDI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.08 | 8.16 |
| Belgium | BEL | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 8.53 | 105.21 |
| Benin | BEN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.17 | 9.34 |
| Burkina Faso | BFA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 4.82 | 35.74 |
| Bangladesh | BGD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3.30 | 31.55 |
| Bulgaria | BGR | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 5.24 | 66.73 |
| Bahrain | BHR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1.18 | 15.25 |
| Bahamas, The | BHS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2.67 | 25.22 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | BIH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.46 | 1.27 |
| Belarus | BLR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 4.30 | 57.70 |
| Belize | BLZ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.19 | 10.81 |
| Bolivia | BOL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 5.00 | 53.87 |
| Brazil | BRA | 1 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 12.86 | 117.33 |
| Barbados | BRB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2.91 | 30.56 |
| Brunei Darussalam | BRN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2.45 | 15.90 |
| Bhutan | BTN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 4.46 | 45.17 |
| Botswana | BWA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3.11 | 34.96 |
| Central African Republic | CAF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.43 | 4.95 |
| Canada | CAN | 1 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 8.52 | 91.32 |
| Switzerland | CHE | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 7.86 | 102.59 |
| Chile | CHL | 0 | 1 | 0 | 26 | 19.65 | 172.26 |
| China | CHN | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 3.25 | 26.08 |
| Co´te d'Ivoire | CIV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 4.62 | 26.82 |
| Cameroon | CMR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.41 | 13.33 |
| Congo | COG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1.78 | 21.10 |
| Cook Islands | COK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.25 | 11.79 |
| Colombia | COL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 9.88 | 62.92 |
| Comoros | COM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.32 | 1.80 |
| Cabo Verde | CPV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 4.23 | 40.21 |
| Costa Rica | CRI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 14.40 | 116.34 |
| Cuba | CUB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3.36 | 46.91 |
| Cyprus | CYP | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.71 | 4.92 |
| Czech Republic | CZE | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 6.09 | 78.76 |
| Germany | DEU | 1 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 15.03 | 163.00 |
| Djibouti | DJI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2.65 | 28.08 |
| Dominica | DMA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3.10 | 26.58 |
| Denmark | DNK | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 10.70 | 139.93 |
| Dominican Republic | DOM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3.82 | 43.95 |
| Algeria | DZA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4.63 | 54.79 |
| Ecuador | ECU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 3.88 | 28.00 |
| Egypt | EGY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.42 | 20.15 |
| Eritrea | ERI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.48 | 9.13 |
| Spain | ESP | 0 | 1 | 1 | 38 | 27.20 | 234.21 |
| Estonia | EST | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2.23 | 17.81 |
| Ethiopia | ETH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4.54 | 64.95 |
| Finland | FIN | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 10.76 | 95.86 |
| Fiji | FJI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2.22 | 22.73 |
| France | FRA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 11.84 | 77.17 |
| Micronesia | FSM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.96 | 14.37 |
| Gabon | GAB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 2.81 | 25.73 |
| United Kingdom | GBR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 20 | 16.85 | 209.68 |
| Georgia | GEO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1.13 | 3.88 |
| Ghana | GHA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4.41 | 60.59 |
| Guinea | GIN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0.76 | 9.60 |
| Gambia | GMB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.38 | 25.48 |
| Guinea-Bissau | GNB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.48 | 4.08 |
| Equatorial Guinea | GNQ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.21 | 1.11 |
| Greece | GRC | 0 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 8.75 | 101.63 |
| Grenada | GRD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3.17 | 33.68 |
| Guatemala | GTM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2.34 | 22.26 |
| Guyana | GUY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.22 | 10.11 |
| Honduras | HND | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2.86 | 32.53 |
| Croatia | HRV | 0 | 0 | 1 | 15 | 8.18 | 66.52 |
| Haiti | HTI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.44 | 3.40 |
| Hungary | HUN | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 7.24 | 76.95 |
| Indonesia | IDN | 1 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 8.51 | 75.77 |
| India | IND | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 5.14 | 64.64 |
| Ireland | IRL | 0 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 14.95 | 125.94 |
| Iran | IRN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3.26 | 45.52 |
| Iraq | IRQ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.16 | 1.99 |
| Iceland | ISL | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 5.93 | 57.91 |
| Israel | ISR | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 11.68 | 156.05 |
| Italy | ITA | 1 | 1 | 1 | 24 | 14.57 | 184.01 |
| Jamaica | JAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.73 | 19.09 |
| Jordan | JOR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.72 | 18.04 |
| Japan | JPN | 1 | 1 | 0 | 19 | 15.01 | 118.29 |
| Kazakhstan | KAZ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 3.57 | 55.53 |
| Kenya | KEN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 5.11 | 32.87 |
| Kyrgyzstan | KGZ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1.97 | 21.48 |
| Cambodia | KHM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.65 | 17.46 |
| Kiribati | KIR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5.93 | 57.65 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | KNA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2.44 | 18.88 |
| South Korea | KOR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 22 | 15.25 | 204.77 |
| Lao PDR | LAO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.55 | 13.83 |
| Lebanon | LBN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.35 | 7.28 |
| Liberia | LBR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2.12 | 21.85 |
| Libya | LBY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.54 | 5.16 |
| Saint Lucia | LCA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3.24 | 32.02 |
| Liechtenstein | LIE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4.78 | 51.09 |
| Sri Lanka | LKA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 4.04 | 46.33 |
| Lesotho | LSO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2.30 | 24.59 |
| Lithuania | LTU | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1.34 | 10.34 |
| Luxembourg | LUX | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 10.27 | 73.37 |
| Latvia | LVA | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1.31 | 11.42 |
| Morocco | MAR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 6.55 | 48.20 |
| Monaco | MCO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1.38 | 8.14 |
| Moldova | MDA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.57 | 27.53 |
| Madagascar | MDG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3.52 | 26.35 |
| Maldives | MDV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 3.06 | 35.33 |
| Mexico | MEX | 1 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 3.97 | 28.81 |
| Marshall Islands | MHL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2.41 | 13.25 |
| Macedonia, FYR | MKD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.73 | 23.57 |
| Mali | MLI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 9.44 | 74.51 |
| Malta | MLT | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 6.10 | 48.38 |
| Myanmar | MMR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1.64 | 10.35 |
| Montenegro | MNE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.96 | 16.73 |
| Mongolia | MNG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 5.57 | 59.91 |
| Mozambique | MOZ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 4.08 | 41.16 |
| Mauritania | MRT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.06 | 14.08 |
| Mauritius | MUS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4.02 | 29.45 |
| Malawi | MWI | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 4.98 | 50.79 |
| Malaysia | MYS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3.56 | 43.27 |
| Namibia | NAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 6.03 | 56.27 |
| Niger | NER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.50 | 27.67 |
| Nigeria | NGA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.47 | 10.28 |
| Nicaragua | NIC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 3.95 | 48.24 |
| Niue | NIU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2.75 | 24.30 |
| Netherlands | NLD | 0 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 13.82 | 131.05 |
| Norway | NOR | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 15.22 | 186.10 |
| Nepal | NPL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1.67 | 22.70 |
| Nauru | NRU | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.77 | 18.61 |
| New Zealand | NZL | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 8.75 | 101.82 |
| Oman | OMN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2.36 | 19.61 |
| Pakistan | PAK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 3.78 | 28.66 |
| Panama | PAN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 4.83 | 49.56 |
| Peru | PER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 6.22 | 56.19 |
| Philippines | PHL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 6.73 | 88.86 |
| Palau | PLW | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5.08 | 57.22 |
| Papua New Guinea | PNG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 3.37 | 25.05 |
| Poland | POL | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 7.49 | 79.69 |
| Korea, North | PRK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0.95 | 12.06 |
| Portugal | PRT | 0 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 10.78 | 101.29 |
| Paraguay | PRY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 3.98 | 45.47 |
| Qatar | QAT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1.24 | 18.83 |
| Russia | RUS | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 4.09 | 40.94 |
| Rwanda | RWA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 3.30 | 32.94 |
| Saudi Arabia | SAU | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.61 | 13.45 |
| Sudan | SDN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.23 | 3.14 |
| Senegal | SEN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 7.59 | 80.31 |
| Singapore | SGP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 7.42 | 84.86 |
| Solomon Islands | SLB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.38 | 18.94 |
| Sierra Leone | SLE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2.54 | 21.96 |
| El Salvador | SLV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2.93 | 30.66 |
| San Marino | SMR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2.06 | 18.32 |
| Serbia | SRB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2.21 | 15.15 |
| South Sudan | SSD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.26 | 1.54 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | STP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.69 | 5.58 |
| Suriname | SUR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.39 | 10.98 |
| Slovakia | SVK | 0 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 10.30 | 103.58 |
| Slovenia | SVN | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 4.92 | 43.58 |
| Sweden | SWE | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 9.80 | 108.61 |
| Swaziland | SWZ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.58 | 19.89 |
| Seychelles | SYC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 3.64 | 26.11 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | SYR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.20 | 9.77 |
| Chad | TCD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0.72 | 3.88 |
| Togo | TGO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 4.68 | 42.32 |
| Thailand | THA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 4.71 | 50.84 |
| Tajikistan | TJK | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1.72 | 26.44 |
| Turkmenistan | TKM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.22 | 1.65 |
| Tonga | TON | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3.04 | 28.81 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | TTO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.92 | 37.79 |
| Tunisia | TUN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1.99 | 19.58 |
| Turkey | TUR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 7.13 | 67.31 |
| Tuvalu | TUV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5.35 | 56.71 |
| Taiwan | TWN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3.48 | 27.78 |
| Tanzania | TZA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 5.80 | 48.16 |
| Uganda | UGA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2.56 | 30.54 |
| Ukraine | UKR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 4.18 | 63.17 |
| Uruguay | URY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 10.71 | 96.72 |
| United States of America | USA | 1 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 9.03 | 102.86 |
| Uzbekistan | UZB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.50 | 16.99 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | VCT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1.97 | 14.80 |
| Venezuela | VEN | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0.69 | 7.76 |
| Vietnam | VNM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 6.09 | 58.11 |
| Vanuatu | VUT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 3.96 | 34.29 |
| Samoa | WSM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 5.85 | 56.28 |
| Yemen | YEM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1.56 | 20.45 |
| South Africa | ZAF | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 6.23 | 58.17 |
| Zambia | ZMB | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 6.42 | 52.84 |
| Zimbabwe | ZWE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1.68 | 14.45 |

Table A1 Notes: Data on climate laws and policies come from *Climate Change Laws of the World*. Quality-adjusted laws are derived by multiplying each law by the Rule of Law score (Kaufman et al 2010) in the year it was passed. Life-time quality adjusted laws are calculated as the number of years a law has been in force, multiplied by the Rule of Law score in each year. All calculations are done over the period 1990-2019.

## Table A2: Climate laws and political orientation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ISO code | Right-wing score | Left-wing score | Center score | ISO code | Right-wing score | Left-wing score | Center score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ALB | 0.718 | 1.244 |  | KGZ | 1.000 |  |  |
| ARG | 0.800 | 1.400 | 0.000 | KOR | 1.193 |  | 0.742 |
| AUS | 0.659 | 1.394 |  | LBN | 1.067 |  | 0.000 |
| AUT | 0.444 | 1.185 |  | LKA |  | 1.455 | 0.000 |
| BEL | 0.884 | 1.852 |  | LSO |  | 1.000 |  |
| BFA | 0.000 | 0.000 | 7.500 | LUX |  |  | 1.000 |
| BGR | 1.111 | 0.000 |  | LVA | 1.636 |  | 0.000 |
| BHS | 0.467 |  | 1.615 | MDA | 0.000 | 0.902 | 1.533 |
| BLZ | 1.000 |  |  | MDV | 1.000 |  |  |
| BOL | 0.700 | 1.422 | 0.250 | MEX | 0.778 |  | 1.167 |
| BRA | 0.000 | 1.077 | 4.308 | MKD |  | 1.000 |  |
| BRB | 1.500 | 0.500 |  | MLI |  |  | 1.000 |
| BWA | 1.000 |  |  | MLT | 0.795 | 1.750 |  |
| CAN | 1.197 | 0.830 |  | MWI | 1.000 |  |  |
| CHL |  | 0.971 | 1.071 | NAM |  | 1.000 |  |
| COL | 3.250 |  | 0.000 | NGA | 0.900 | 1.800 |  |
| COM |  |  | 1.000 | NIC | 0.971 | 1.012 |  |
| CPV |  | 1.333 | 0.750 | NLD | 1.263 | 0.444 |  |
| CRI | 0.117 | 1.663 |  | NOR | 1.140 | 0.878 |  |
| CYP | 0.000 | 4.800 |  | NPL |  | 1.000 |  |
| CZE | 0.500 | 1.250 |  | NZL | 0.194 | 2.450 |  |
| DEU | 1.111 | 0.667 |  | PAK | 0.000 | 1.333 |  |
| DNK | 1.313 | 0.583 |  | PAN | 1.000 |  |  |
| DOM | 0.000 | 1.400 | 1.318 | PER | 0.170 | 2.036 | 0.622 |
| ECU |  | 1.000 |  | PHL |  | 0.000 | 1.045 |
| ESP | 1.314 | 0.686 |  | POL | 1.643 | 0.348 | 1.533 |
| FIN | 1.867 | 0.333 | 1.021 | PRT | 0.828 | 1.149 |  |
| FRA | 1.091 | 0.909 |  | PRY | 1.116 | 0.467 |  |
| GBR | 0.560 | 1.508 |  | ROU | 0.000 | 2.500 | 0.000 |
| GHA | 0.617 | 1.215 |  | RUS |  |  | 1.000 |
| GNB |  | 1.000 |  | SEN | 1.917 | 0.000 |  |
| GRC | 0.701 | 1.205 |  | SLE |  | 1.000 |  |
| GRD | 0.519 | 1.867 |  | SLV | 0.525 | 2.188 |  |
| GTM | 0.600 | 3.000 |  | SVK |  | 1.000 |  |
| GUY |  | 1.000 |  | SVN | 0.000 | 0.863 | 1.533 |
| HND | 1.000 |  |  | SWE | 1.620 | 0.599 |  |
| HRV | 0.568 | 0.600 | 2.880 | TTO | 0.622 | 1.436 |  |
| HUN | 1.157 | 0.898 |  | TUN |  | 0.758 | 2.778 |
| IND | 1.037 | 0.982 |  | UKR |  | 0.833 | 1.042 |
| IRL | 1.556 |  | 0.737 | URY | 0.110 | 2.027 |  |
| ISL | 1.438 |  | 0.000 | USA | 1.273 | 0.795 |  |
| ISR | 0.961 | 1.235 |  | VUT | 0.917 | 1.048 |  |
| ITA | 1.165 | 0.971 | 0.809 | ZAF | 0.000 | 1.217 |  |
| JAM | 2.800 | 0.609 |  | ZMB |  | 1.000 |  |
| JPN | 1.111 | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A2 Notes: Data on climate laws and policies come from *Climate Change Laws of the World*. Data on political orientation come from the World Bank’s *Database of Political Institutions*. All calculations are done over the period 1990-2017.

## Table A3: Climate laws and business cycle

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ISO Code | Score | ISO Code | Score | ISO Code | Score | ISO Code | Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BIH | 0 | ISL | 0.533 | PHL | 0.750 | MYS | 0.933 |
| COM | 0 | JPN | 0.538 | SGP | 0.750 | SWZ | 0.933 |
| GNB | 0 | SLV | 0.538 | NOR | 0.760 | VEN | 0.933 |
| KGZ | 0 | TUR | 0.538 | BHR | 0.778 | ZAF | 0.955 |
| KWT | 0 | LUX | 0.545 | ERI | 0.778 | MNG | 0.972 |
| LBR | 0 | MOZ | 0.545 | LBN | 0.778 | BWA | 0.988 |
| LBY | 0 | MAR | 0.574 | MEX | 0.778 | AZE | 1.000 |
| LTU | 0 | SVK | 0.581 | KAZ | 0.783 | IRN | 1.000 |
| SSD | 0 | BLZ | 0.583 | MDV | 0.800 | NER | 1.000 |
| TKM | 0 | EST | 0.583 | SVN | 0.800 | SLE | 1.000 |
| TLS | 0 | MRT | 0.583 | ZWE | 0.800 | TJK | 1.000 |
| TUN | 0 | PAK | 0.599 | FJI | 0.800 | FRA | 1.018 |
| CZE | 0.207 | THA | 0.600 | NGA | 0.800 | LAO | 1.018 |
| MLI | 0.240 | AGO | 0.614 | NPL | 0.800 | NAM | 1.018 |
| VNM | 0.249 | ARE | 0.622 | NZL | 0.808 | MKD | 1.050 |
| ESP | 0.267 | ECU | 0.622 | BRN | 0.824 | OMN | 1.077 |
| YEM | 0.275 | FIN | 0.622 | LVA | 0.824 | RWA | 1.077 |
| GAB | 0.286 | GIN | 0.622 | NLD | 0.824 | SLB | 1.077 |
| RUS | 0.292 | SUR | 0.622 | ROU | 0.824 | UKR | 1.089 |
| TTO | 0.311 | KOR | 0.636 | URY | 0.824 | GTM | 1.094 |
| USA | 0.318 | AFG | 0.655 | IND | 0.830 | CMR | 1.120 |
| CIV | 0.333 | BOL | 0.656 | DNK | 0.848 | COG | 1.143 |
| BLR | 0.339 | MLT | 0.656 | MMR | 0.848 | CPV | 1.143 |
| PNG | 0.346 | TUV | 0.656 | MWI | 0.848 | ARM | 1.167 |
| BFA | 0.359 | TZA | 0.663 | SAU | 0.848 | BEN | 1.167 |
| KEN | 0.359 | GRC | 0.667 | IRL | 0.857 | BHS | 1.167 |
| HUN | 0.364 | GHA | 0.667 | ATG | 0.862 | LKA | 1.167 |
| AUS | 0.380 | GRD | 0.667 | COD | 0.862 | BGD | 1.200 |
| IDN | 0.381 | HRV | 0.688 | NIC | 0.862 | ALB | 1.244 |
| LSO | 0.400 | ITA | 0.696 | ETH | 0.862 | TCD | 1.244 |
| TGO | 0.424 | DOM | 0.700 | PRT | 0.862 | BEL | 1.292 |
| UZB | 0.424 | UGA | 0.718 | BDI | 0.875 | MUS | 1.292 |
| CHL | 0.449 | BRA | 0.718 | BTN | 0.875 | BRB | 1.400 |
| DZA | 0.462 | AUT | 0.732 | EGY | 0.875 | GUY | 1.436 |
| ISR | 0.471 | CHE | 0.732 | POL | 0.875 | VUT | 1.436 |
| COL | 0.500 | MDG | 0.737 | PRY | 0.897 | SDN | 1.750 |
| CRI | 0.500 | QAT | 0.737 | HND | 0.915 | CYP | 1.867 |
| GBR | 0.500 | PAN | 0.747 | CAF | 0.933 | JAM | 1.867 |
| ARG | 0.509 | PER | 0.747 | CHN | 0.933 | JOR | 1.867 |
| SWE | 0.509 | ZMB | 0.747 | GMB | 0.933 | GEO | 2.000 |
| DEU | 0.519 | BGR | 0.749 | KHM | 0.933 | GNQ | 2.000 |
| CAN | 0.519 | SEN | 0.749 | MDA | 0.933 | IRQ | 2.333 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | HTI | 2.545 |

Table A3 Notes: Data on climate laws and policies come from *Climate Change Laws of the World*. Data on business cycles are calculated from real GDP data from the *World Development Indicators* database. All calculations are done over the period 1990-2017.

## Table A.4: Number of climate litigation cases by jurisdiction

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ISO Code | Total Number | Cases with a pro-environment decision | ISO Code | Total Number | Cases with a pro-environment decision |
| ARG | 1 | 0 | IRL | 3 | 2 |
| AUS | 96 | 56 | JPN | 3 | 0 |
| AUT | 1 | 1 | KEN | 1 | 1 |
| BEL | 1 | 0 | LUX | 1 | 0 |
| BRA | 6 | 4 | MEX | 1 | 1 |
| CAN | 20 | 7 | NGA | 1 | 1 |
| CHE | 2 | 1 | NLD | 2 | 1 |
| CHL | 2 | 0 | NOR | 1 | 0 |
| COL | 2 | 2 | NZL | 17 | 6 |
| CZE | 1 | 0 | PAK | 4 | 2 |
| DEU | 5 | 2 | PER | 1 | 0 |
| ECU | 1 | 1 | PHL | 2 | 1 |
| ESP | 13 | 5 | POL | 2 | 0 |
| EUU | 57 | 37 | SWE | 1 | 0 |
| FRA | 11 | 6 | UGA | 1 | 0 |
| GBR | 60 | 28 | UKR | 2 | 1 |
| IDN | 1 | 8 | USA | 1,154 | n/a |
| IND | 10 | 0 | ZAF | 4 | 2 |
| INT | 18 | 11 |  |  |  |

Notes: This list includes the European Union (EUU) and International (INT) cases.

Chapter 2: Shaik Eskander et al.

Figure 1: Climate change legislation over time

Source: Authors based on Climate Change Laws of the World.

Figure 2: Climate change litigation over time

Source: Authors based on Climate Change Laws of the World and Sabin Center data.

Figure 3: Climate legislation and litigation by country

Source: Authors based on Climate Change Laws of the World.

Figure 4: Climate laws and political orientation

Notes: Countries with a democracy score of 6 or more in the Polity IV dataset only. Data on political orientation is taken from the World Bank dataset of political institutions (DPI). Orientation scores greater than one suggest political parties of that orientation are disproportionately inclined to pass climate laws, relative to their time in power. Median (Mean) right-wing scores for all, OECD-EU and other countries are 0.961 (0.891), 1.111 (0.923) and 0.8 (0.813); whereas the respective left-wing scores are 1.0 (1.141), 0.909 (1.118) and 1.012 (1.160), and center-government scores are 1.0 (1.234), 1.0 (0.961) and 1.0 (1.431).

Figure 5: Climate laws and economic crises

Source: Author’s own calculations, using World Bank GDP data and Hodrick-Prescott decomposition. Countries with scores less than one are less inclined to pass climate laws in difficult economic times.

1. *Climate Change Laws of the World* can be accessed at https://climate-laws.org. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
2. There are other databases, which focus on particular policy processes, sectors or subsets of countries. The Climate Policy database project (http://climatepolicydatabase.org) gathers information on which countries are implementing good-practice policies or policies to reduce carbon emissions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) Policies and Measures Database (https://www.iea.org/policies) provides access to information on past, existing or planned government policies and measures to reduce GHG emissions, improve energy efficiency and support the development and deployment of renewables and other clean energy technologies. ClimateWatch (https://www.climatewatchdata.org) tracks progress with Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
3. Information on climate change litigation in the United States is contained in a separate database maintained by the Sabin Centre. The data can be accessed at http://climatecasechart.com/us-climate-change-litigation/. The database is maintained in collaboration with the law firm Arnold & Porter, to which the Sabin Center has close links. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
4. Full text and summary available at: https://climate-laws.org/cclow/geographies/united-kingdom/laws/climate-change-act-34405aa9-396e-4a78-a662-20cad9696365. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
5. Full text and summary available at: https://climate-laws.org/cclow/geographies/mexico/laws/general-law-on-climate-change. For challenges in implementing the law, see Averchencova and Guzman Luna (2018). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
6. Full text and summary available at: https://climate-laws.org/cclow/geographies/new-zealand/laws/climate-change-response-act-2002-as-amended-by-the-climate-change-response-zero-carbon-amendment-act. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
7. Full text and summary available at: https://climate-laws.org/cclow/geographies/south-korea/laws/framework-act-on-low-carbon-green-growth-regulated-by-enforcement-decree-of-the-framework-act-on-low-carbon-green-growth. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
8. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are collected by the World Bank and available on https://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/. The indicators reflect the views of a large number of enterprises, citizens, and experts on different aspects of governance, including *inter alia* the rule of law. The original scale was converted into a [0,1] range as follows: . [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
9. Polity IV is an annual, cross-national time-series which assesses democratic and autocratic patterns of authority and regime changes in all independent countries. The data are available on https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
10. DPI contains data on institutional and electoral factors, such as checks and balances, tenure and stability of the government, party affiliations and ideology, among others. The data are available on https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/ dataset/wps2283-database-political-institutions. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
11. The Hodrick-Prescott filter (after Hodrick and Prescott 1997) is a common decomposition method used in macroeconomics. It is calculated in statistical packages like STATA (using the command “tsfilter hp”). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)