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Research interests

Primary fields: Financial economics; Open-economy macroeconomics

Secondary fields: Monetary economics; Trade; Development

Education

Ph.D. International Economics, The Graduate Institute (IHEID), Geneva	2014–20
ESSAYS IN BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY (<i>summa cum laude</i>)	
Committee: Ugo Panizza (supervisor), Cédric Tille & Steven Ongena	
M.Sc. Economics, University College London	2011–12
B.A. (Hons) Economics, University of Delhi	2008–11

Research

Job market paper

In the dangerzone! Regulatory uncertainty and voluntary bank capital surpluses (with [Peter Eckley](#) and [William Francis](#), Bank of England). Available [ONLINE](#).

Publications

Playing it safe: Global systemically important banks after the crisis, *BIS Quarterly Review*, September 2019 (with [Ulf Lewrick](#) and [Tirupam Goel](#), BIS). Available [ONLINE](#).

Working papers

Analysing the RBI's monetary policy communication, *IHEID Working Papers 08-2019*, May 2019 (with [Rajeshwari Sengupta](#), IGIDR). Media coverage by [BLOOMBERG](#).
A fistful of dollars: Channels of transmission of global funding shocks to emerging markets, *IHEID Working Papers 04-2020*, Mar 2020 (with [Shekhar Hari Kumar](#), IHEID)
Risky business: Corporate governance in Indian banks
Zombie lending (with [Ryan Banerjee](#), BIS and Bipul Ghosh, RBI)
Credit frictions and monetary policy transmission (with Cristina Manea, UPF)

Policy

The role of trade in ending poverty, *World Bank Group and WTO* 2015. [ONLINE VERSION](#).
Economic Survey of India 2013–14, *Ministry of Finance*, Government of India 2014.
Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Committee Report, *Government of India* 2012. [ONLINE VERSION](#).

Work experience

Bank for International Settlements	Mar–Sep 2019
Senior Associate, Monetary and Economic Department	
Bank of England	2019, 2018, 2017, 2015
Researcher, Prudential Policy Directorate PhD analyst, Prudential Policy Directorate	
World Trade Organisation	Feb–May 2015
PhD analyst, Economic Research and Statistics	

Teaching

IHEID, Geneva

2015-18

Advanced quantitative methods (Spring 2017-18; 2016-17)
Quantitative methods (Autumn 2017-18; 2016-17; 2015-16)
Political economy of development (Autumn 2015-16)
Water management (Spring 2015-16)
Global health post-Ebola (Spring 2015-16)

Seminars and conferences (incl. scheduled)

2020 IIT Kanpur, Bank of Lithuania, University of Bristol, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, University of Bonn, Ashoka University, Reserve Bank of India

2019 7th Bordeaux Workshop in International Economics & Finance, 8th EFI Network Workshop (KU Leuven), Bank of England, BIS Research meeting, IHEID Brown Bag Lunch, University of Basel Economics Lunch, Young Swiss Economists Meet

2018 IHEID Brown Bag Lunch (2), EconAlanya

2017 Bank of England

2016 IHEID Brown Bag Lunch, Development Therapy

Skills and languages

IT: L^AT_EX, MATLAB, R, Stata, Eviews, Microsoft Office & Excel

Languages: English (C2); Hindi (C2); French (A2; actively learning)

References

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Appendix: Paper abstracts

In the dangerzone! Regulatory uncertainty and voluntary bank capital surpluses *(with Peter Eckley and William Francis)*

JOB MARKET PAPER

Banks voluntarily hold substantially more capital than required by regulators. Understanding why is important for forecasting the extent to which banks would use this surplus to support lending in a crisis, and for calibrating macro-prudential policy. This paper studies the role of uncertainty about the requirements themselves, which could heighten any precautionary motive to avoid accidental breach of minimum requirements. We construct two measures of regulatory uncertainty: one at bank-level based on confidential regulatory data; another at sector-level based on news-media text. These correlate with more general uncertainty measures from the literature, but also contain distinct information. Using regulatory data on UK banks between 1989-2013, we find that a one standard deviation increase in regulatory uncertainty – by either measure – increases banks’ voluntary capital surpluses by 0.8 to 2 percentage points on average. This effect is three times stronger when surpluses are smaller, that is, for banks in the “dangerzone”. Given a Basel I minimum capital requirement of 8%, our results are economically meaningful.

Playing it safe: Global systemically important banks after the crisis *(with Tirupam Goel and Ulf Lewrick)*

BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2019

Post-crisis reforms aim to mitigate the systemic risks that arise from global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Based on our estimates of G-SIBs’ probability of distress, we find that their resilience has improved in recent years on the back of higher capital ratios. Furthermore, by benchmarking G-SIBs’ balance sheet adjustments against those of other major banks, we show that these adjustments accord with the incentives set by the post-crisis regulatory framework. This suggests that the systemic importance of G-SIBs has declined in recent years.

Analysing the RBI’s monetary policy communication *(with Rajeswari Sengupta)*

IGIDR WORKING PAPERS 2019-012; IHEID WORKING PAPERS 08-2019

In this paper we quantitatively analyse monetary policy statements of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) between 1998 – 2017, across five governor regimes. Using natural language processing tools, we show that there has been a persistent semantic shift in RBI’s monetary policy communication since the adoption of inflation targeting. Next, we construct measures of linguistic and structural complexity that capture governor-specific trends in communication. RBI’s communication is linguistically complex on average, but the length of monetary policy statements has gone down and readability has improved significantly in recent years. Finally, we show that lengthier, less readable statements are linked to both higher trading volumes and higher returns volatility in equity markets.

A fistful of dollars: Channels of transmission of global funding shocks to emerging markets *(with Shekhar Hari Kumar)*

IHEID WORKING PAPERS 04-2020

In this paper, we study transmission of global funding shocks to emerging economies (EMs) from the perspective of interbank markets. Money markets enable banks to engage in risk-sharing against liquidity shocks and are sensitive to global funding conditions. Accordingly, we first show that interbank rates better reflect the magnitude of transmission of foreign liquidity shocks to EMs as compared to benchmark short-term bond yields. Next, we disentangle the transmission into its various channels, focusing in particular on two pull factors associated with the domestic banking microstructure: dependence on wholesale funding and share of foreign banks. Our results indicate that money market rates in EMs react to global shocks, and that in particular dependence on wholesale funding has a significant role to play. Finally, we provide evidence that tools of macro-prudential policy like reserve requirements can help alleviate liquidity shocks to the EM banking system, weakening this global transmission.

Risky business: Corporate governance in Indian banks

In India, dual regulation of public sector banks has been identified as a major external constraint that prevents a level playing field between private and public sector banks. In this paper, I study corporate governance of major listed banks in India using a new and unique dataset on board members. I identify several major external constraints for public banks, specially on tenure and compensation. Next, I investigate whether bank valuations respond significantly to appointments and resignations of chief executive officers (CEOs) and independent directors. I observe that shareholders consider turnover of CEOs to be positive news in public banks, but not in private banks. Gender of the CEO plays an important role. For public banks, appointments of independent directors are also considered positively; their resignations negatively. I also show that increasing CEO tenure and age, and decreasing the variable component of pay for CEOs is linked to lower bank risk in public banks.

Updated: March 3, 2020