ALL BLOGS

Building a Home Lab to Become a Malware Hunter - A Beginner's Guide

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compromised websites. Add to these tactics the concerns about Domain Generations Algorithms (DGA), Fast Flux and Dynamic DNS, and you complicate the mix even further. Tracking all of these elements might be difficult, but in all honesty, you don't need 10 years of experience in malware analysis and a bunch of certificates to help you win this battle. You just need to experiment. One great way to learn about malware is to build your own home lab and play with actual malware samples within this environment. This can be a fun and educational project even if

As time goes by, criminals are developing more and more complex methods of obscuring how their

maiware operates, making it increasingly difficult to detect and analyze. The list of tactics used is

seemingly endless and can include obfuscation, packers, executing from memory with no file drop,

and P2P botnet architecture with frontline command and control servers (C2s) and gateways being

you are not an InfoSec pro. If you do happen to be an InfoSec pro, the things you learn in your home lab just might help you do your job more effectively. So how do you set one up? A few simple So what are the essential components of a home lab? There is no right or wrong answer here. You can setup a virtual machine and make that your lab. As long as you sandbox the malware you're analyzing, you should consider your set-up a laboratory environment in my opinion.

would also recommend starting your virtual lab with multiple boxes, which increases security. Using the PFsense firewall is a fantastic start and having an IDS box (Snort/Suricata/Bro) is an additional bonus. I won't go into too much detail about virtual network security because my good friend Tony Robinson (@da_667) already has this well documented in a blog: https://blindseeker.com/blahg/?

p=375 (no longer available). Personally, I do not have an overly sophisticated lab setup. It is mostly boxes here and there, but each box has a specific purpose. My home lab currently consists of the following components: Windows 7 Virtual Machine (home network) Windows 10 Virtual Machine (home network) Ubuntu 15.10 Virtual Machine (home network) Ubuntu 14.04 SSH Honeypot (VPS) Windows Server 2012 R2 (VPS)

I feel as though I cover a lot of ground with this setup. I have collectors to harvest malware automatically, which I can then pull down to my virtual machines on my home network for further

Various email spam traps for collecting macro malware & other specimens (such as phishing

- analysis. I also have my Windows VPS to accomplish a 'Malware analysis in the cloud' kind of thing. My current setup allows me to analyze pretty much any piece of malware I come across. However,

Security Onion on an empty server which I'm still configuring

attempts or malware which may be hosted on a link in an email).

- for the purpose of this post, I'll be discussing my toolset and my approach to analyzing malware on Windows systems.
- Figure out What You're Looking For
- results, we first need to answer some questions: What exactly are you are looking for?

Before we run all of our tools and start clicking on malware links in spam hoping to see some

extracted from our analysis session? What is your end goal? My end goal is to pass on my results to security and threat intelligence vendors, such as AlienVault, as well as other researchers so that they can add these to their blacklists/rulesets in an attempt to shut down the malware we've discovered. My end goal is to raise awareness and shut things down before the attackers really get the ball rolling. Even if you are only blacklisting newly discovered C2s, sharing your information helps the InfoSec community.

On To the Toolset!

The tools in this list have become my Swiss army knife for basic malware analysis. You should definitely spend time trying out various tools so that you can build a Swiss army knife to suit your own needs.

- infection traffic to give us an indication of how our malware specimen is operating. PeStudio - A great tool for analyzing Portable Executable (PE) files. Provides information such as what functions/APIs are being called, imported libraries, VirusTotal information if it's currently in

RegShot / TotalCommander - RegShot is a tool for taking snapshots of the machine's registry

• ProcessExplorer - This is part of the SysInternals Suite from Microsoft. This is essentially a

"Task Manager on Steroids" and includes a lot of great features. One of my favorite features is

the color coding of processes, which makes it easy to identify rogue processes spawned by

ProcessMonitor - Another tool from the SysInternals Suite. ProcessMonitor allows you to track

processes. It also provides some basic network information (useful for if your packet capture

I/O operations on the machine and view what's happening to your registry, file system,

 Fakenet / ApateDNS - Honorable mentions for these tools, which I sometimes use. Both of (127.0.0.1 maybe? You can then run a malware specimen and capture all DNS requests (and

number of malware investigations, I feel it should still be included within a toolkit like this.

it will then break that file down into the resources that make up the file. This is useful for

Resource Hacker – Resource hacker allows you to feed in a file (an executable for example) and

extracting malicious files that have been embedded within another file. As an example, I have

- seen legitimate executables repackaged with a malicious executable. This was identified in resources and extracted with Resource Hacker. Let's Begin! (Basic Static Analysis)
- File creation date Compile date File size (useful for comparison to other samples later on) File appearance (Anything suspicious? .exe with a Word icon?)

Here's the checklist you should always cover before investigating a malware specimen further

(using PeStudio in our case, although other tools exist for this, too):

Filename

Hash of the file

W MinecraftServerFreePortForwarder

about this file.

Resources (14) abc Strings (26/2129) Manifest (admir Version (1/13) Certificates (0)

altered version.

□ Sections (4)

- C Exceptions (0)

□ Imported libraries (1)

□ Imported symbols (1)

☐ Exported symbols (0)

results=1&start=42&by-date=false Step 1: First Appearance

1/2/2016 9:04 AM

due to how easy and obvious this is, it makes for some quick learning.

To begin with we will look at a malware sample called "MinecraftServerFreePortForwarder". Mainly

Upon first inspection, we can see that it appears to be a Word icon but it's actually an Application

(.exe) – our first red flag. The other indicator is that this file is 425KB which is a little smaller than

the usual malicious files you will come across, but is a pretty good sign that there is something off

Application

425 KB

http://malwarejake.blogspot.co.uk/search?updated-max=2016-01-02T10:07:00-08:00&max-

Note: Most malware I've run into is generally 1MB or smaller. We will now move this file over to PeStudio so that we can dive deeper to see what is going on. MD5 E263C5B306480143855655233F76DC5A — □ DOS Stub (64 bytes) Imphash F34D5F2D4577ED6D9CEEC516C1F5A744 DOS Header (64 bytes) CPU 32-bit — □ File Header (20 bytes) Size (bytes) 434688 □ Optional Header (224 bytes) File description Microsoft Word 2010 — □ Directories (6/15) 1.0.0.0 - □ Sections (4) File date 02:01:2016 - 09:04:50 — □ Imported libraries (1) Executable — □ Imported symbols (1) subsystem GUI — □ Exported symbols (0) signature Microsoft Visual C# / Basic .NET — □ Exceptions (0) — □ Thread Storage (n/a) □ Relocations (2)

The introduction screen displays the properties of the file along with the MD5, SHA1 and Import

have provided the hash, you can use it to verify if you have the same version or if you have an

hash (Imphash) of the file which is essentially a unique identifier of the file. Hashes of files are used

to verify the integrity of files; if you were to download a certain piece of software where the writers

We can also see other useful information here such as file description, which at this point we know

is fake. We have already established that this is an executable and the "type" field also verifies that

for us. PeStudio will also highlight sections on the left. The coloring is exactly what you think it is.

Red means that the file has exceeded the malicious indicator threshold, and orange means that

malicious indicators exist but there are not enough of them to conclude whether or not the file is

The file is not signed with a Digital Certificate

The indicators section is usually what I review before moving any further, since it gives a quick

The manifest identity name (MyApplication.app) is different than the file name (minecrafts...

The debug file name (youareanidiot.pdb) is different than the file name (minecraftserverfre...

The original filename (YouAreAnIdiot.exe) is different than the file name (minecraftserverfre...

The file is scored (20/54) by virustotal The file is a fake Microsoft executable The Manifest requires Administrative per The file references a URL (http://youareanidiot.org/youare.swf) scored (5/53) by virustotal The file references a URL (http://youareanidiot.org/youare.swf) scored (5/53) by virustotal

```
some cases will not be so obvious.
digitally signed by Microsoft. Always remember this as you will run into malware that masquerades
as other legitimate software which SHOULD be digitally signed by the company publishing the
software.
The most important pieces of information here are the references to the URL (youareanidiot.org)
```

URL may not be called for, but we have nothing else as of yet, so note it!

increase the difficulty of analysis.

□ DOS Header (64 bytes)

File Header (20 bytes)

- □ Directories (6/15)

□ Imported libraries (1)

Imported symbols (1)

--

Exported symbols (0)

- Sections (4)

evil malware.

Indicators (5/11) Virustotal (20/54 - 11.02.2016) □ DOS Stub (64 bytes)

☐ DOS Header (64 bytes)

- □ Directories (6/15)

Imported symbols (1)

- D Exported symbols (0)

— □ Sections (4) - Imported libraries (1)

Indicators (4/10)

DOS Stub (64 bytes) DOS Header (84 bytes) File Header (20 bytes)

Sections (4)

Virustotal (20/54 - 11.02.2016)

Optional Header (224 bytes)
Directories (6/15)

10

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

ascii

.text:0x...

.text:0x... .text:0x...

.text:0x...

.text:0x... .text:0x... .text:0x...

.text:0x... .text:0x...

.text:0x...

goal of malware analysis).

□ File Header (20 bytes)
 □ Optional Header (224 bytes)

— □ Optional Header (224 bytes)

- D Exceptions (0) --

Thread Storage (n/a) System Image false Dynamic-link library □ Relocations (2) Resources (14) Debug information stripped etc Strings (26/2129) If on a removable media, copy and run from the swap Manifest (adm If on a Network, copy and run from the swap Version (1/13) - Overlay (n/a) I have skipped **DOS Stub** and **DOS Header** because I don't consider them useful in this exercise. File Header, however, is incredibly useful for building the bigger picture of what this file is or more what it is targeting. We can see that this piece of malware is targeting 32bit Intel (x86)

The file should be run only on a uniprocessor computer

mscoree.dll C/\Users\KenYue\docs Jest 0s. http://youareanidiot.org/youare.swf This program cannot be run in DOS mode. rces, ResourceReader, mscorlib, Version:: 4.0.0.0, Culture:::neutral, PublicKeyT., "Strings" is what I consider to be the most interesting tab available. Just be sure to ignore the blacklisted field because there will often be a lot of information hidden in the rest of the strings output as you can see below. MyProject MyForms ascii .text:0x... ascii 13 .text:0x... MyWebServices ThreadSafeObjectProvider'1 ascii 26 .text:0x... 17 .text:0x... InternalXmlHelper ascii ascii 32 .text:0x... RemoveNamespaceAttributesClosure .text:0x... HAHA ascii 13 .text:0x... YouAreAnIdiot ascii .text:0x... Resources YouAreAnIdiot.My.Resources .text:0x...

MySettings

Microsoft.VisualBasic.ApplicationServices

WindowsFormsApplicationBase

Question

.cctor

value

List'1 WeakReference

__ENCList

Object

get_Computer

get_Application m_AppObjectProvider

OnCreateMainForm

Microsoft.VisualBasic.Devices

m_ComputerObjectProvider

_ENCAddToList

Since our little Minecraft port forwarder is nothing spectacular, I'll give you the result of what it does right here so that we can move onto something juicier.

0 0 0

picture, you will have to reverse engineer the malware specimen (which is what I consider the end

I'm happy for anyone to reach out if help is required or if you just want a friendly conversation. You can reach me on Twitter @sudosev or via email sevaara@protonmail.ch. About the Author

through research will give you ideas on how to improve your own analysis methodology, and it'll

also teach you some of the tips and tricks that malware authors tend to use in their campaigns.

About the Author: @sudosev, Guest blogger Computer & Network Security student, Intern IT Security Analyst and Malware hunter/analyst hobbyist. Read more posts from @sudosev >

TAGS: home malware lab, malware hunting

However, I would also like to state that just because you are analyzing within a sandbox

 Why are you doing this? Once you have analyzed the malware specimen, what do you plan to do with the information

 Wireshark - Incredibly powerful packet analysis tool which we use for monitoring any additional payloads our malware specimen may be attempting to download. It also highlights post-

their database, strings found in the specimen, packer used (if any) and so on.

TotalCommander for the same thing, which I'll explain more later on.

from Wireshark is HUGE and you need a bit of help).

allowing you to compare the registry before infection and after infection. I also use

- these allow you to essentially "blackhole" your outbound traffic to an address that you specify more with Fakenet), in order to identify C2s ready for reporting. Hexinator – Hexinator is an incredibly powerful Hex editor, and while this is only used in a small
- environment, we can skip a lot of incident response practices, such as taking an image of the disk and creating a memory dump. However, depending on your findings, memory dumps may still be useful for a home user. The beauty of analyzing in a sandbox / virtualized environment is that you can restore to a snapshot and run it again for anything you may have missed. This is especially useful when multiple C2s are involved.

Considering that this blog is aimed at hobbyists rather than security professionals in a business

the authors of the malware, especially if an attack is politically-driven. This is especially true when the malware you are looking at is responsible for crippling an Industrial Control System (ICS). For example, @malwarejake recently conducted some analysis on the Ukrainian power malware in which he discusses the significance of the compile time stamp. You can read more about that here

File creation date/compile date are interesting pieces of data when investigating malware, as they

can provide insights. This information can prove to be crucial in investigations and/or for identifying

-- at Indicators (5/11)
-- Virustotal (20/54 - 11.02.2016) □ DOS Stub (64 bytes) DOS Header (64 bytes) □ File Header (20 bytes) ☐ Optional Header (224 bytes) The file opts for Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) as mitigation technique □ Directories (6/15) The file checksum (0x00000000) is invalid

malicious. You can get a summary of this information in the "Indicators" section.

summary of the findings. As you can see from this information, the file we are analyzing has already been submitted to VirusTotal. We can also see that PeStudio has detected that this file is attempting to masquerade as a Microsoft Word file, which was easy to identify in this case, but in Administrative privileges are required, but you could argue that this would be expected for a port forwarder (THE FILE IS STILL MALICIOUS!). In other circumstances, this is a nice indicator. For example, this file could be masquerading as a resume/CV which would not require administrative privileges. The last indicator on this list is also extremely useful. Software without a digital certificate should be looked into and anything masquerading as Microsoft software should be

and the original filename (YouAreAnIdiot.exe). The URL reference should immediately be noted

and you should be looking for this in Wireshark later on when you run the specimen. Of course, this

The final thing I see here is more for when you start reverse engineering. The reference to **Address**

BackDoor.Generic14.WQQ

Backdoor.Win32.Z.Agent.434688(h)

MSIL/BadJoke.Agent.AP potentially unsafe

Backdoor, Genericle

Backdoor, Trojan

JOKE/Agent.434688

RDN/Generic BackDoor

RDN/Generic BackDoor

Backdoor.SuspectCRC

Date (dd.mm.y...

11.02.2016

11.02.2016

11,02,2016

11.02.2016

11.02.2016

11.02.2016

11.02.2016

11,02,2016

0x4CBA7178 (Sun Oct 17 03:46:00 2010)

0x000000000 0x0000 (0)

CC4F744172565721EF860609469AD5EF

064D6830442624EBA41E6F429EEE5691 1FEFA8178615E1672AC71848FF8C1006

7BADB62B8FC303E4368184909674B28C 43B1D34BD13916C48D5E2D77B420DC5B

DFD5548DFC608F9DF44CE8A6A9A3E6A7 038183563C43ED73A41AE52756050D6A

7D84AB20441483F5CF5C8875C7FAAD73 998EA536454974C28A64F95B31E1DC9F EF618A085F3F98411631C39B3FA001A3 3542FB71919C48A4539BD9ACB795A9C7

Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is important because it's a mitigation technique used to

AegisLab

Symantec

ViRobot

McAfee

Property

NumberOfSections

PointerToSymbolTable

SizeOfOptionalHeader

NumberOfSymbols

Relocation stripped

malware, which you can see in the **TimeDateStamp** field.

quick analyses of a file i.e. can this file do X? Yes or no.

Large Address Aware

TimeDateStamp

McAfee-GW-Edition

Agnitum Riskware.Agent! 10.02.2016 -- D Exceptions (0) TrendMicro TROJ_GEN.R08OC0ELQ15 11.02.2016 --

Thread Storage (n/a) Trojan.Agent.Win32.593851 Zillya ☐ Relocations (2) Resources (14) NANO-Antivirus Trojan.Win32.FKOG2729.dzskix 11.02.2016 abc Strings (26/2129) Trojan.Win32.GenericIBT VIPRE 11.02.2016 Manifest (adm K7GW Unwanted-Program (004c21531) 11,02,2016 Wersion (1/13) K7AntiVirus Unwanted-Program (004c21531) 11.02.2016 W32/Backdoor.FKOG-2729 11.02.2016 Cyren Overlay (n/a) Win32.Trojan.Er.Mnnw Tencent MicroWorld-eScan 11.02.2016 nProtect 11.02.2016 The VirusTotal tab is incredibly useful, but just to make this clear, do not rely exclusively on this. I've analyzed this malware file before and I've also seen it in action on other systems, it is in fact just a bad joke which will throw smiley faces all over your screen and play audio that laughs at you. Also note that several antivirus vendors do not have a signature for this file. Especially with huge malware threats such as ransomware and banking trojans such as Dridex – we are hunting some

238C2CC44DC14A5F313204BC11DAA53C 1D046E52D1DF3DA32AF03BF022B6560D Thread Storage (n/a) I'll skip past a bunch of the reverse engineering-ish tabs here, since there is a lot more left to cover. The resources tab will tell you what items/objects are present in the file i.e., icons, but most importantly, you can sometimes come across other executable files embedded within this primary file - the resources tab will inform you if that is the case. We'll extract an embedded executable later on when we use some other tools. File Header (20 bytes) Optional Header (224 bytes) Directories (6/15) Imported symbols (1) .text:0x... RuntimeHelpers Microsoft-VisualBasic.C System.Reflection

.text.0x...

Aust Ox.

GetResourceString

YouAreAnldiot.exe

This is a perfect example of why analyzing the entire strings output is something you should always do. Step 2: Make some realistic predictions In the previous section, we skipped **Imported Libraries and Imported Symbols**. This is due to the fact that this specimen has one entry for each. Those two tabs are where you should be spending most of your time and should conclude your PeStudio investigation. It's there that you will find the dynamic-link libraries and the functions/API calls being requested by the malware. While it's incredibly difficult to guess what the malware can possibly do from a list of functions, it can sometimes give you an indication. Certain dynamic-link libraries will eliminate some possibilities and bring others into the spotlight. By process of elimination, you can make a good guess at what you think the file is going to do before you run it. You can then run the specimen and do your checks while cross-referencing the results of the test with the functions listed in PeStudio. You can do this multiple times, but in order to get the perfect

 Just starting out with malware analysis? - Practical Malware Analysis Deep DFIR/Malware forensics - Malware Forensics Field Guide for (Windows/Linux) Systems Advanced malware analysis/heavy RE - Malware Analysts Cookbook & DVD Aside from these books, it is always good to read reports about current malware threats. Reading

Findings from our basic static analysis match exactly what we see here, but remember, the goal of

In part 2 of this blog post, we will use all of the tools listed above, we will analyze various malware

samples and I will provide in-depth detail of how I use these tools and what indicators I look for

most malware is to install silently and hide. This one is quite the opposite.

be useful if malware analysis is something you feel you may enjoy.

LEARN MORE: Reverse Engineering Malware How to Prepare to Take the OSCP Malware Analysis using Osquery Part 1

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
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hunter/analyst hobbyist.



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
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Certain entries in this strings output suggest that this piece of malware will launch a form or application on our screen. This is guite odd since most malware wishes to remain hidden, and you may have been expecting PowerShell launch commands to hide the window while code executes.

when investigating suspected malware. For now, I will leave you with a short reading list that may

Resources

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