

Building a Security OS With Software Defined Infrastructure

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Outline

1 Background

2 Objectives

3 Design

4 Evaluation

5 Summary

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Current Approach for Security

Security as Reactive Add-ons




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


Consequences from Security as Reactive Add-ons

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
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Security Mechanism

- 1 Coupled with legacy systems
- 2 Fragmented
- 3 Hard to configure
- 4 Hard to reason about

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
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
Security Policy

- 1 Specified w/ low-level artifacts (e.g., processes, IP addrs, port nums)
- 2 Hard to debug
- 3 Hard to be consistent

Software Defined Infrastructure (SDI)



Software Defined Infrastructure (SDI)



- 1 **Isolation**
- 2 Encapsulation
- 3 **Interposition**
- 4 Migration
- 5 Replication
- 6 Multiplexing
- 7 Portability
- 8 Scalability
- 9 Sandboxing
- 10 Elasticity
- 11 ...

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
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
S²OS:

Introducing SDI Defined Security OS




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
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
Key objectives



- 1 Abstracts **security** capabilities and **primitives** at both host OS and network levels
- 2 Offers an easy-to-use and **programmable security** model for monitoring and dynamically securing applications

S²OS:

It could unlock a range of unprecedented security opportunities



- 1 Fine-grained, dynamic security **programmability** at entire infrastructure scale
- 2 **Information flow tracking** across an entire data center
- 3 Easily translating global security goals into local OSes and network **policies** securing applications

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
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S²OS:

Hardware Layer

I. Host Building Blocks

- 1 Providing process virtualization (e.g., using Open Container Interface)
- 2 Providing configurable process-level virtualization (in support of multiple library OS interfaces)

Infrastructure
Layer

Device Drivers (Control Agents)



Compute



Network



Storage

Hardware Layer

II. Networking Building Block

- 1 Extending OpenFlow-enabled Switches with Custom Functions
- 2 Extending OVS w/ App and Context Awareness on Hosts and Mobile Devices

Infrastructure
Layer

Device Drivers (Control Agents)



Compute



Network



Storage

Control Layer

Security APIs

- Strong Isolation
- Least Privilege
- Complete Mediation
- Holistic Programmability
- Complete Visibility

- High Flexibility
- Full Automation
- Trustworthiness
- Maneuvering
- Diversity

Control
Layer



Application Layer

Developing Security Applications w/ the Abstractions (APIs)

- Application Development Script Language
- Example Security Applications
 - 1 Fine-grained Access Control
 - 2 Application Hardening
 - 3 Deception
 - 4 Moving Target Defense

Application
Layer

Fine-grained
access control

App
Hardening

Deception

Moving Target
Defense

Research Challenges

Control layer vs. infrastructure layer/plane separation

1 Computing/OS

- ▶ Control Plane: Reference monitors
- ▶ Data Plane: I/O paths (IPC, net, storage)

2 Networking

- ▶ Similar to SDN

3 Storage

- ▶ Control Plane: VFS, Ref. Monitor, Storage Servers
- ▶ Data Plane: I/O path through hypervisor, over SDN channels to device

Research Challenges

Challenges stem from virtualizations

1 Trust

- ▶ The root of trust
- ▶ Discovering of usable policies and abstractions for non-binary trust

2 Introspection

- ▶ The semantic-gap

3 Practical information flow tracking

- ▶ Enforce useful policies without choking on “label creep”

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Outcome and Evaluation

1 Outcome

- ▶ The security OS, S²OS, and a set of components/modules
- ▶ A set of example security apps on top of S²OS

2 Testbed

- ▶ CloudLab
- ▶ Campus SDN/Internet 2/GENI platform

3 Metrics

- ▶ Performance Overhead
- ▶ Effectiveness
- ▶ Scalability
- ▶ Usability

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The source code related to this project will be released at
<http://success.cse.tamu.edu/S2OS/>

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
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
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S²OS: SDI Defined Security OS



Thank You



Q&A

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