

Jieqiong (Cicy) Jin

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EDUCATION

Purdue University	West Lafayette, IN
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>M.S. in Economics</i> <i>Ph.D. Candidate in Economics</i> 	2019
Committee: Tim Cason (Chair), Yaroslav Rosokha, Colin Sullivan	2018 - 2024 (expected)
University of Amsterdam	Amsterdam, Netherlands
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>M.S. in Economics</i> <i>B.S. in Economics and Business</i> 	2016 - 2017
	2013 - 2016

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Applied Microeconomics

WORKING PAPERS

[1] Behavioral Spillover in Cooperation Games (*Job Market Paper*)

Abstract: In daily life, people interact with members from different groups in similar strategic settings. Sometimes the interaction involves a whole group while sometimes only with one individual. Previous literature has established that spillover effect exists when multiple games are played simultaneously, whether facing the same partner(s) or not. This study experimentally investigates behavioral spillovers between two social dilemma type games. In our experiments, subjects play Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD) and Public Goods game (PGG) simultaneously where the opponents of the two games do not overlap. We vary the basin of attraction to defect in PD game and test how this would affect subject's contributing behavior in PGG, which stays the same across treatments. We find that behavioral spillover exists in our setting and comes in an asymmetric form. When people are in an environment where cooperation is easy to sustain in the PD game, the PGG contribution would not increase much, comparing to the baseline treatment when the PGG is played alone. However, when they are in the setting where cooperation is hard to sustain in the PD game, their PGG contribution would decrease significantly.

[2] The Effect of Private Judgement System on Cooperation: An Experimental Test

Abstract: Cooperation is difficult to achieve among agents who are confronted with a social dilemma but cannot identify each other or effectively build reputations. In large communities, it is neither feasible for an agent to retrieve the complete history of his/her current partner nor possible to enforce cooperation by punishing the partner immediately, especially when the frequency of interaction is rather rare. This study examines cooperation and the impact of bribery in an extended version of indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the Law Merchant system stage game, by experimentally testing the model proposed by Milgrom et al. (1990). According to theory, the presence of a disinterested third party that could both keep records and adjudicate disputes would increase the level of cooperation within the community. However, when this third party is prone to bribery, the community will cooperate less when no such institution is present. This study contributes to the literature on bribery experiments by studying bribery's impact on the overall level of cooperation in markets and constraining a community network for the potential bribe-givers. Main results of this study: 1) With the presence of the third party, whether bribery is

possible, the cooperation has a decreasing trend; 2) The possibility of the third-party requesting bribery will decrease cooperation.

CONFERENCE TALKS

Ostrom-Smith Conference, Bloomington/IU, IN	Spring 2023
ESA North-American Meeting, Santa Barbara/UCSB, CA	Fall 2022
ESA World Meeting, Boston, MA	Summer 2022
Ostrom-Smith Conference, West Lafayette/Purdue, IN	Fall 2021
ESA North American Regional Meeting, Tucson, AZ	Fall 2021

HONORS & AWARDS

Krannert Doctoral Student Research Fund Awards (\$3K, \$4K, \$4k)	2021, 2022, 2023
Krannert Certificate for Outstanding Teaching for Econ 251	Summer 2020
Krannert Certificate for Outstanding Recitation Teaching for Econ 210	Fall 2020

TEACHING & RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Instructors

Purdue University	West Lafayette, IN
Online TA Instructor: Microeconomics (Econ 251)	Summer 2020
Recitation Instructor: Principles of Economics (Econ 210)	Fall 2018

Research Assistants

Purdue University	West Lafayette, IN
Cathy Zhang OTree programming, Robustness check in Stata	Fall 2021- Present
Colin Sullivan Data analysis in R	Spring 2023 – Summer 2023
Tim Cason OTree programming, Chats coding	Fall 2021 – Fall 2022
Farid Farrokhi Data analysis in Stata	Fall 2020
University of Amsterdam	Amsterdam, Netherlands
Simin He Experimental session assistance, Chats coding	Spring 2016

Teaching Assistants

Macroeconomic Theory II (ECON 611, PhD)	Spring 2022, Spring 2023
Behavioral Economics (ECON 585, Masters, Online)	Spring 2022
Intermediate Macroeconomics (ECON 352, Undergraduate)	Fall 2021, Fall 2022
International Economics (ECON 590, Masters, Online)	Summer 2021
International Economics (ECON 466, Undergraduate)	Spring 2021
Mathematical Analysis for Economists (ECON 615, PhD)	Fall 2019
Intermediate Microeconomics (ECON 511, Masters, Online)	Fall 2019, Spring 2020
Intermediate Microeconomics (ECON 340, Undergraduate)	Spring 2019
Microeconomics (ECON 251, Undergraduate)	Fall 2018 – Fall 2019
Principals of Economics (ECON 210, Undergraduate)	Fall 2018

REFERENCES

Tim Cason
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Collin Sullivan
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