Crossing Categorical Boundaries: A Study of Diversification by Social Movement Organizations

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Abstract

When do protest organizations borrow issues or claims that are outside their traditional domains? Sociologists have examined the consequences of borrowing claims across movement boundaries, but not the antecedents of doing so. We argue that movement boundaries are strong when there is consensus about the core claims of a social movement, which we measure by *cohesion* and *focus.* Cohesion and focus enhance the legitimacy of a movement and impede member organizations from adopting claims associated with other movements. Analyzing movement organizational activity at U.S.-based protest events from 1960 to 1995, we find that a social movement organization is less likely to adopt claims from other movements when the social movement in which it is embedded exhibits high cohesion and focus. However, when movement organizations do borrow claims, they are more likely to do so by borrowing from movements that themselves exhibit high cohesion and focus. We describe the application of our findings to organization theory, social movements, and field theoretic approaches to understanding social action.

Keywords

organizations, categories, boundaries, social movements, social network analysis

On January 21, 2017, the Women's March attracted nearly 3 million individuals to public demonstrations across cities in the United States to protest following the presidential inauguration of Donald Trump (Crowd Counting Consortium 2019). Participants represented organizations working on behalf of not only women's issues, but also issues ranging from anti-police brutality to environmental protection. Formal social movement organizations that were typically not associated with the women's movement were even made official event partners. For example, the Sierra Club's supporters of the Women's

March publicly declared that "climate change is a women's issue" (Becktold 2017). As a protest event, the Women's March was unique because of its scale (Fisher, Jasny, and Dow 2018), but the participation by a diverse set of organizations raises a long-standing puzzle in

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social movement research: When do social movement organizations adopt claims that are outside their traditional issue domains?

This question is one instance of a far broader sociological concern about categorical boundaries. Lamont and Molnár (2002:168) define boundaries as "conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space" that "separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership." This definition joins similar descriptions of boundaries and categories as socially constructed partitions that provide a system for understanding the meaning of various social phenomena (e.g., Durkheim 1965; Glynn and Navis 2013; Negro, Koçak, and Hsu 2010; Rosa et al. 1999).

A core question raised in this broader literature on boundaries and categories is how the strength of a boundary influences the actions and interpretations of the entities within. For example, Barth (1969:15) proposes that it is the categorical "boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses," and he urged researchers to pay attention to how boundary strength shapes the actions of members of the category. Prior work has examined how boundary strength shapes the decisions of chefs to develop innovative cuisines outside their domains (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005), the valuation of publicly-traded firms that span market categories (Zuckerman 1999), the tendency of researchers to cite across fields (Baron and Hannan 1994; Pfeffer 1993), and the creation of new industries out of the life sciences (Powell and Sandholtz 2012). In the same spirit, we seek to understand how boundary strength influences the propensity of social movement organizations to make claims that are not traditionally part of the social movements in which they are embedded.

Research on social movements has long documented cases of boundary-spanning (for a recent review, see Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018). From the involvement of women's groups in the temperance movement in the early twentieth century (Gusfield 1955) to the cross-fertilization of labor union and civil rights movement issues in the 1960s (Ferguson, Dudley, and Soule 2018; Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006), it is not uncommon for movement organizations to adopt claims from other movements. Although there are rich studies of the consequences of movement organizations adopting new claims, researchers have yet to systematically investigate the broader forces that compel social movement actors to cross categorical boundaries.

To build our argument, we examine the case of *social movement organizational diversification*, which is a specific form of organizational boundary-spanning (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and McCarthy 1979). We argue that organizational diversification is less likely when the boundaries separating movements are strong. We suggest the strength of a movement boundary is strong when there is *consensus* about the issues associated with the movement because consensus increases the legitimacy of the movement. We identify two key sources of consensus: the *cohesion of claims* espoused at protests events, and the *degree of focus* among these claims.

In our analysis of U.S.-based protest events from 1960 to 1995, we find that a social movement organization is less likely to diversify when the movement in which it is embedded exhibits high cohesion and focus. However, when movement organizations do diversify, they are more likely to do so by borrowing claims from other movements that themselves exhibit high cohesion and focus. We use legislative agenda-setting records in Congress to show that cohesion and focus in a movement inhibits diversification by conferring greater socio-political legitimacy on the movement. In a supplementary analysis in our Appendix, we also demonstrate the generality of our arguments by showing that cohesion and focus, as sources of consensus, play similar roles in the decisions of movement organizations to participate in *alliances* or *coalitions*. We conclude by reconnecting these findings to broader sociological questions about organizational boundary-spanning and legitimacy.

CROSSING CATEGORICAL BOUNDARIES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In their series of influential essays, McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Zald and McCarthy (1979) describe *social movement organizations* as belonging to *social movement industries*. A *social movement organization* is a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals." A *social movement industry* is the collection of all movement organizations "that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement" (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1219). As such, the movement industry is the organizational analog of a *social movement*, which for McCarthy and Zald (1977:1217) is the "set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society."

These essays inspired a tradition of social movement scholarship that elucidates how various social movement industry-level dynamics affect the individual organizations composing an industry. For example, scholars have found that competition and industry concentration influence the survival and adaptation of movement organizations (Greve, Pozner, and Rao 2006; Minkoff 1997; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Soule and King 2008), and that collaboration between movement organizations within and across movement industries influences tactical choice (Wang and Soule 2012), tactical innovation (Wang and Soule 2016), subsequent protest levels (Larson and Soule 2009), and movement success (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010).

A given movement organization might belong to one movement industry—which we call its *home* movement industry—but some movement organizations may be seen "as conglomerates in that they span" industries (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1220). We characterize this type of boundary-spanning as

diversification, which occurs when a movement organization invokes claims, issues, or causes espoused in different movement industries as it seeks to mobilize resources from additional pools of potential supporters. McCarthy and Zald encouraged researchers to study movement organization diversification, with an eye toward understanding its antecedents.

Despite McCarthy and Zald's call, much of social movement scholarship has focused on the consequences of diversification, the results of which are decidedly mixed. In terms of positive outcomes, organizations that adopt issues outside their traditional issue domains can sometimes mobilize greater resources or recruit more participants (Carroll and Ratner 1996; Heaney and Rojas 2014). Coalitions between movement organizations can also facilitate the transfer of knowledge and resources (Levi and Murphy 2006; Wang and Soule 2012), which can lead to tactical innovations (Wang and Soule 2016). Alternatively, diversification has also been linked to internal conflict within movements, as it can obfuscate the core messages of a movement (Croteau and Hicks 2003; Gillham and Edwards 2011). Recent evidence also shows that staging protest events that bring together issues from across different movements might attract less attention to any one issue (Fassiotto and Soule 2017) or hinder the achievement of clear objectives against organizational targets (Piazza and Wang forthcoming). Thus, diversifying comes with trade-offs, precipitating outcomes that can lead to both growth and setbacks in a movement.

On the origins of organizational diversification in social movements, prior work has looked mainly to the political environment to explain boundary-spanning. Namely, openness in the political opportunity structure tends to facilitate diversification, such as when activist groups across different movements joined the public debate on U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, which divided the U.S. government (McAdam [1982] 2010). Furthermore, periods of resource constraint or opposition from a ruling authority can also

compel organizations to adopt new causes in an effort to generate solidarity across different fields of activism (Van Dyke 2003).

Rather than investigating external political conditions or resource environments as a cause, we approach the question of diversification by examining key characteristics of social movement industries themselves. Specifically, we treat movement industries as *categories* that give meaning to the actions of the organizations therein (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Categories embody social and symbolic boundaries. Thus, membership in a given category can legitimate the identity of social actors (DiMaggio 1997; Douglas 1986; Lamont and Molnár 2002; Mohr and Duquenne 1997; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Zerubavel 1997). With strong boundaries, legitimacy is obtained by conforming to the expectations that constitute the category. When there is consensus on members' expectations, norms, and obligations, outsiders (e.g., critics) can evaluate whether organizations conform to or deviate from a category (Ruef and Scott 1998; Suchman 1995). Conformity to categorical imperatives is necessary lest members face role conflict, confuse critics, and receive penalties (Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman and Kim 2003).

We draw on a growing body of work to suggest that consensus in a social movement industry, as one type of category, has two foundations: the *cohesion* and *focus* of the individual claims that define the movement industry. Because a movement organization's growth depends on the legitimacy of the movement industry in which it is embedded, an organization is less likely to adopt claims from other social movements when its home movement has greater cohesion and focus, two key features that confer legitimacy on a movement.

Cohesion and Boundary Strength

Network theorists have long argued that *cohesion* among the elements of a category is a precursor to consensus (Friedkin and Johnsen 2011; Moody 2004). High cohesion among the constituent elements of a category conveys greater identification of those elements with the category. These component elements of a category can be described as a "catnet," in which objects share ties and embody a collective entity (White [1992] 2008). As a result, members can observe the fates of others and use them as prisms to construct inferences about the category (Leifer and White 1987:86).

Cohesion among objects in a category is usually measured by the extent to which they are connected through meaningful relationships. In social networks, the more connected individuals are through interpersonal ties, the easier it is to exchange information and reduce uncertainty (Reagans and McEvily 2003). Likewise, the more that symbolic objects are associated with one another within a category, the more defined and coherent is the category, and the more circumscribed are representations of what is conceivable and what meanings they convey (Ruef and Scott 1998:877). For instance, Cattani and colleagues (2009) measured cohesion in the film industry by observing the connectivity of collaborative ties between producers and distributors who worked together on a film, showing that greater cohesion reduced the exit rates of producers. Similarly, machine-learning approaches to identifying meaning categories among texts do so by finding dense clusters among words that are connected on the basis of their proximity to one another (Gerlach, Peixoto, and Altmann 2018).

High cohesion among the claims that define a social movement industry presents a common schema through which its member movement organizations can express grievances. Claims are highly cohesive in an industry when they are frequently invoked together in protest events. For example, the civil rights movement achieved greater cohesion when separate claims about segregation, housing discrimination, and fair wages were more frequently invoked together at protest events led by African American civil rights groups across the U.S. South in the 1960s (Morris 1993). When different claims are

made at the same protest event, their co-occurrence signals the protestors' approval that they align as part of a broader coherent goal (Wang and Piazza 2016; Wang and Soule 2016). When the claims associated with a movement industry are frequently paired with one another in many protest events, the movement industry as a whole is perceived as a more coherent, and thus a more legitimate, category.

Hence, belonging to a highly cohesive movement industry makes the incorporation of causes or goals from other industries a deviation, thereby risking the loss of approval from donors, members, participants, and volunteers in the home movement industry. Indeed, when a social movement organization makes claims associated with other movement industries, constituents may wonder about whether the movement organization is committed to the home industry or is seeking to divert resources to other ends that distract attention from the movement industry's core causes. As Gillham and Edwards (2011:439) remind us, social movement organizations "that communicate in ways that are literally unintelligible to many observers thwart their ability to educate and persuade bystanders, potential and actual supporters, and targets of influence." Movement organizations are therefore highly sensitive to how undertaking any new actions that depart from their traditional goals—such as through diversification—might alienate their current supporters (Elsbach and Sutton 1992).

By contrast, when cohesion among the claims of a movement industry is low, fewer common expectations or norms are dominant among members about what constitutes "the movement." As a result, disagreements become more pervasive, destabilizing the legitimacy of the movement, which in turn lessens the penalty of invoking causes from outside the movement. Conversely, greater cohesion in the claims of an organization's home industry creates a common schema for members to proclaim their identity. This, in turn, imposes a greater demand for explanation and justification for deviations

from a common script to both members and outsiders. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

> *Hypothesis 1:* The higher the cohesion of claims within a home movement industry, the lower the level of claim diversification by the movement organizations therein.

For organizations that aim to diversify, we argue that the cohesion of a target movement industry also matters. When a target industry is characterized by high cohesion, there is likely to be high consensus, which signals greater legitimacy in being associated with that industry. Such movement industries will arguably be more attractive targets for borrowing by movement organizations. This argument resonates with research on paradigms in scientific fields, which demarcate categories of scholarship and scholars in ways that are similar to how movement industries draw boundaries around protest activity and organizations (Shwed and Bearman 2010). Kuhn (1962) defined a "paradigmatic" discipline as one with consensus over core knowledge, questions, and methods, and that consequently enjoys greater legitimacy than non-paradigmatic disciplines that lack such consensus. Because of this dynamic, the borrowing of knowledge between disciplines is often asymmetric: non-paradigmatic disciplines tend to build on knowledge from paradigmatic disciplines, rather than the reverse.[1]

Scientific fields and movement industries are similar insofar as they both are composed of and demarcated by sets of abstract and often subjective ideas. Membership in a scientific field or a movement industry is signaled by adherence to the ideas typically associated with that field or industry. Thus, in extending the logic of asymmetric knowledge exchange between scientific fields to the case of movement industries, these arguments imply that movement industries in which claims are highly cohesive are more likely to be perceived as more legitimate and are thus more likely to be targets for borrowing by organizations external to the industry. Moreover, these perspectives resonate with the idea that

perceptions of categorical boundary strength are important as a "screening" function for evaluators—in our case, social movement organizations—to make decisions about seizing an exchange opportunity—in our case, whether to adopt a claim from an outside social movement industry (Zuckerman 2017:33). This leads us to Hypothesis 2:

> *Hypothesis 2:* When movement organizations diversify, movement industries with greater claim cohesion are more attractive as targets of diversification.

Focus and Boundary Strength

The second foundation of consensus derives from internal and external perceptions of the salient features or members of a category (Smith and Hogg 2008). Social psychologists hold that categories are represented as prototypes in the eyes of observers; a prototype is a set of attributes that define the category and distinguish it from others. Thus, prototypes accentuate intragroup similarities and intergroup differences and submerge intra-category variability and diversity in a single representation that characterizes an entire group (Smith and Hogg 2008).

We characterize the *focus* of a movement industry as the extent to which it has a prototypical claim. Like cohesion among a category's constituent elements, a prototype in a category can also capture similarities within the category, leading to perceptions of consistency and clarity (Smith and Hogg 2008), which in turn enhance legitimacy. As such, researchers have emphasized focus as a source of consensus and boundary strength, arguing that when diverse characteristics are competing to be prototypical, there is fuzziness in the category (Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll 2007). In the context of social movements, during the 1960s and 1970s, a prototypical claim of the U.S. peace movement was the call to end U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War. In a more contemporary example, in the broader movement for African American civil rights and equality, a prototypical claim in recent years concerns police brutality amid the rise of Black Lives Matter groups.

Implicitly drawing on this idea, the organizational categories literature shows that for a category's boundaries to be sharp, there must be a focus on a singular prototype of membership (Pontikes and Hannan 2014). In effect, greater focus in a field gives rise to clearer perceptions of a prototype in the field, distinguishing the field from others and consequently strengthening the field's boundaries.

Taken together, these examples suggest that a greater concentration of protest activity in a single prototypical claim or a handful of claims in a movement industry indicates a higher degree of focus in the industry. Greater focus strengthens the industry's boundaries and therefore raises the costs of diversification for its member movement organizations.

> *Hypothesis 3:* The greater the focus of claims within a home movement industry, the lower the level of claim diversification by individual organizations therein.

The degree of focus of a potential target industry is also critical to the decision-making of movement organizations that choose to diversify. We argue that greater focus in an industry can make it more appealing as a target of diversification. When a target industry concentrates its protest activity in a small set of claims, it signals the existence of a well-defined prototype of what it means to belong to the movement industry, and the legitimacy thereof. In other words, greater claim focus brings the issues and meanings attached to an industry into sharp relief with those from other industries. When movement organizations look to diversify, we argue that they derive greater benefit from associating themselves with industries that have clearer goals and messages, which in turn confers legitimacy on a movement organization's own efforts to press for social and political change. Various studies show how an organization's affiliation with more coherent categories can

lead to the spillover of greater legitimacy and status, which can then elevate the visibility or prominence of the organization (Podolny 2010).

Examples from women's rights activists in the twentieth-century United States are especially illustrative of this reasoning. Gusfield (1955), for example, chronicled the effort of women's groups at the turn of the twentieth century to gain a greater political voice. Specifically, to express grievances about their challenges in the household, women activists adopted claims associated with the temperance movement, which at the time was more unified and powerful, reaching its apex just before the passage of Prohibition. Similarly, Meyer and Whittier (1994) document the strategic necessity of women's groups, such as the National Organization of Women (NOW), to adopt anti-war claims in the 1970s to gain greater relevance, given that the anti-war movement at the time was almost solely focused on ending U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (an example we discuss and contextualize in greater detail below). These cases suggest that when movement organizations diversify, they are more likely to adopt claims from an industry with a clearer prototype of what it means to be part of it.

> *Hypothesis 4:* When movement organizations do diversify, industries with greater claim focus are more attractive as targets of diversification.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

To test our hypotheses, we use data on the reported *claims* and *social movement organizations* (hereafter, SMOs) at over 23,000 protest events in the United States covered by *The New York Times* (NYT) between 1960 and 1995. We define a protest event as activity that involves more than one person and is carried out with the explicit purpose of articulating a claim against (or expressing support for) a target. Data on the descriptive features of protest events (e.g., number of participants, claims articulated, names of SMOs, or police presence and activity) were drawn from daily editions of the NYT as part of the Dynamics of Collective Action Project (DoCA). Because these data have been used in numerous publications over the past 15 years, and because the project's website includes robust documentation on the data collection, we refer interested readers to our Appendix for a brief overview of the DoCA project, and we focus here on the facets of the dataset that are most germane to our article.[2]

Our principal reason for drawing on the DoCA project is that it is the most comprehensive dataset on U.S. protest events over the longest time range available. Also, because it is publicly available, researchers can build on our analyses to further investigate related questions with the same data. Finally, the data contain detailed information on not only the claims articulated at protest events, but also the social movement organizations associated with each protest event—features central to our analysis. Despite the breadth and depth of these data, we caution readers that the use of protest event data derived from newspaper sources can suffer from inherent biases. Beyerlein and colleagues (2018), for example, suggest that although description bias is relatively minimal when comparing newspaper sources to other means of coding protests, newspapers tend to suffer from more geographic bias in coverage than do other sources. Our Appendix describes several robustness checks to test the representativeness of our sample, but we acknowledge that supplementing our data with other sources might alter the magnitude of the effects we estimate in our analyses.

Most relevant for our analysis, coders recorded up to four claims from a list of 156 possible claims and up to four SMOs that are mentioned by name for each protest event. We use these data to generate our main variables of interest. Importantly, we associate a given SMO with a given claim if they were both mentioned in an article about a single protest event. In other words, if the NAACP

was the only SMO coded as a participant in a protest event in which the "affirmative action" claim was also reported, we assume the NAACP expressed claims about affirmative action. We make this inference based on the specific procedures given to coders regarding the identification of claims and SMOs. The coder instructions underscore that in a protest event, "the actors instigating [the event] are likely to be social movement groups, organizations, quasi-organizations, ad hoc associations of activities, or spontaneous participants acting collectively to express some claim" (p. 2 of DoCA coding manual). Coders only coded claims if they were made explicitly by participants in the protest, and they only coded SMO names if they were reported as participants of the protest (p. 11 of DoCA coding manual). SMOs are thus coded in a protest event only if they are participants who expressed the reported claims. We used machine-assisted and manual methods to clean our data's information on SMO names, which reduced the number of uniquely-named SMOs from over 7,000 in the raw, uncleaned data to 5,778 in the cleaned data.[3]

Unit of Analysis

To test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we examine whether an SMO i belonging to a home social movement industry (hereafter, SMI) h diversifies during a given protest event k. Our unit of analysis is therefore the SMO-event, which allows us to observe variables related to the SMO's home movement industry, h, prior to when the protest event k takes place. We analyze the SMO-event because SMOs tend to participate in multiple events, which allows us to control for any unobservable differences between SMOs that might serve as alternative explanations for our results by including a dummy variable for each SMO in our regression models. Therefore, we interpret our results as the within-SMO effects of our main independent variables, which are at the level of the SMO's home movement industry. To identify a within-SMO effect, we can only include an SMO in our analysis that has

participated in at least two protest events across at least two years, because we measure year-to-year changes in the cohesion and focus of an SMI. Because we aim to analyze the within-SMO effect of SMI cohesion and focus on an SMO's tendency to diversify, SMOs that have only participated in protest events in a single year would not exhibit any variation in home SMI cohesion and focus. This restriction leaves us with a total of 442 unique SMOs distributed across 4,432 SMO-events.[4]

Following the logic of Soule and King (2008:1579), we define social movement industries based on claims made at protest events. To determine an SMO's home SMI, we first categorized the claims in our dataset into 15 distinct SMIs, each of which contain at least four unique claims (Table 1).

We categorized claims into industries based on the process described in Wang and Soule (2016:529) for the same dataset. Our main goal was to adhere closely to the DoCA's original categorization of claims into broader social movements, which contains 23 categories of claims.[5] The DoCA coding, however, produced some categories that had just one unique claim (e.g., "animal rights" or "civil rights – senior citizens") and other categories that are best described as residual sets of claims (e.g., "social" and "other"). We therefore identified categories from the DoCA's original coding that contained at least four unique claims as our initial set of social movement industries. From there, for each claim that was not included in the initial set, we determined whether the claim belonged to either (1) a social movement industry from our initial set (e.g., we combined the "abortion" category's only claim with claims from the "women's movement" category) or (2) a new social movement industry we created (e.g., we brought together the "anti-nuclear power" movement category's only claim and four anti-nuclear weapons claims from the "peace" movement category to create a new "anti-nuclear movement" industry). The first and third author undertook this categorization process independently and cross-checked

Table 1. Categorization of Claims into Social Movement Industries

Social Movement Industry	Number of Unique Claims	Example Claims	Codes for Unique Claims in SMI[a]	Count of Events with Primary Claims in SMI[b]	As a Percentage of All Events in Dataset
Anti-Nuclear	5	Anti-Atomic Testing, Anti-Nuclear Plant Construction	200, 702, 703, 704, 705	719	3.04%
Anti-Free Trade	4	Anti-NAFTA, Anti-UN	500, 501, 502, 503	43	.18%
Women's Movement	10	Anti-Violence Against Women, Equal Pay	600, 603, 604, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 61, 2400	1,159	4.91%
Peace Movement	16	Anti-Draft, Anti-Military Infrastructure	700, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 721, 722, 723, 726, 727, 728, 729, 740, 741	1,854	7.85%
Environmental Movement	14	Soil Protection, Air Quality Protection	400, 1100, 1103, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 2600	834	3.53%
African American Civil Rights	10	Black Pride, Anti-Police Brutality	1500, 1501, 1502, 1505, 1506, 1509, 1517, 1518, 1519, 1520	5,340	22.60%
Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights	11	Pro-Same Sex Marriage, Gay Rights, Lesbian Rights	1600, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1605, 1606, 1608, 11609, 1610, 1611, 1612	485	2.05%
Hispanic Civil Rights	18	Affirmative Action for Mexican Americans, Pan-Latino Bicultural Education	1800, 1803, 1804, 1805, 1807, 1808, 1809, 1810, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2007, 2020, 2021, 2022	643	2.72%
Native American Civil Rights	9	Anti-Land Seizures, Anti-Environmental Racism	1700, 1705, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711, 1712, 1713, 1720	249	1.05%
Asian American Civil Rights	8	Positive Media Depictions, Compensation for WWII Japanese Internment	1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1912	43	.18%
Disabled Civil Rights	6	Anti-Discrimination in Housing/ Employment, Access for Disabled	2100, 2101, 2102, 2104, 2105, 2106	132	.56%
Anti-Ethnic/Immigrant	12	Anti-Semitism, English-Only Policies	300, 2500, 2502, 2503, 2508, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2510, 2525, 2517	1,998	8.46%
Pro-Democracy/Human Rights	6	Democratization, Victims' Rights	1000, 1006, 1343, 1344, 1340, 1345, 1334	1,730	7.32%
Government Programs/ Social Welfare	14	Social Security Benefits, Medicaid/ Medicare Benefits	1300, 1302, 1305, 1306, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1329, 1330, 1335, 1338, 1341, 1342, 2900	3,806	16.11%
Affordable Housing/ Homelessness	4	Housing Issues, Homelessness	1318, 1311, 1331, 1333	797	3.37%

[a]Corresponding descriptions of each claim code can be found in the coding manual, available at http://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/CLAIMS%20LIST.docx (last accessed July 24, 2018).

[b]Coders could code up to four claims for each protest event. They were instructed to identify one claim as a "primary" claim. This summary therefore only counts the number of events in which the primary claim was identified as one of the SMI's component claims. In other words, anti-nuclear SMI claims, for example, were reported at more events beyond the 719 in which the primary claim was identified as an anti-nuclear SMI claim. For the purposes of our analysis, we count an event as part of an SMI if a claim from the SMI was reported at the event regardless of whether it was a primary claim.

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afterward; claims were only assigned to categories when both authors agreed.

Of the 156 unique claims in the protest event data, nine could not be categorized as neatly falling into one of our movement industry categories. We therefore settled on 15 unique movement industries among which there were 147 claims.[6] Although our categorization scheme largely follows Wang and Soule's (2016:529) approach, we departed in our categorization of claims because four of their categories contained two or fewer unique claims, which would artificially constrain variation in our key explanatory variables—claim cohesion and claim focus—each of which assume the presence of several items in a category.

For a given SMO-event, we examine the set of protest events in which the SMO took part prior to the focal protest event. From this set of prior protest events, we then determined, for each SMI, the number of events reporting claims that belonged to that SMI. At the end of this process, the SMI that has the highest number of events is the SMO's home SMI. For example, consider SMO i in protest event k. Prior to protest event k, SMO i had participated in 10 other protest events. Of these events, seven reported claims belonging to the women's movement, and five reported claims belonging to the environmental movement (note that more than one claim can be made at a single protest event). As such, we determine SMO i's home SMI to be the women's movement. One attractive feature of this coding procedure is that the SMO's home movement can change over time, which mirrors dynamic categorization processes documented by various studies of social movement organizations. For example, Soule and King (2008) note that Women Strike for Peace, although espousing issues related to both the women's and peace movements throughout its existence, initially identified with the anti-war movement in the 1970s before turning its attention to broader women's rights issues later in the decade.

To test Hypotheses 2 and 4, we examine the extent to which the characteristics of a target SMI influence a diversifying SMO's tendency to adopt a claim from that SMI. Here, we structure our data to follow past studies of firm diversification that analyze how a target industry's characteristics affect a given firm's likelihood of diversifying into it (Zhou 2011). Specifically, our unit of analysis refers to the SMO-event for every potential target SMI. To format our data, we first collected all SMO-events in which at least one claim reported at the protest event belongs to an SMI outside the associated SMO's home SMI. For each SMO-event in this set, we paired it with each of the 14 other SMIs that were *not* the SMO's home SMI. This allows us to observe whether diversifying SMO i belonging to home movement industry h adopts a claim from target SMI j in a given protest event k. This approach enables us to enter variables at the levels of the SMO, home SMI, and target SMI.

Dependent Variables

Social movement organizational diversification. For Hypotheses 1 and 3, we operationalize diversification using a binary indicator of whether SMO i participated in protest event k and made claims outside of those belonging to its home SMI h, with two important restrictions. Because multiple claims can be made at a single event, an SMO could participate in an event containing claims from both within and outside its home SMI. These cases make it difficult to suggest that an SMO i is actually diversifying. Thus, we code diversification as occurring at protest event k if and only if *all* claims reported at the event do not belong to the SMO's home SMI h. Also, because we distinguish diversification from alliance formation, we code a focal SMO i as having diversified at an event only if it is the *only* SMO present at the event, or if other SMOs are present, the other SMOs must *all* be members of the focal SMO's home SMI.[7] As a stricter test, we also report a set of results coding diversification at event k if and only if SMO i is the only SMO present at the event.

SMO diversification into target SMI. In Hypotheses 2 and 4, we use a binary indicator to measure whether a diversifying SMO i belonging to home SMI h adopts a claim from target SMI j at protest event k. Because there are 15 total SMIs, we created a dataset following the procedure outlined in the previous section such that each SMO-event appears 14 times to reflect the 14 potential *other* SMIs into which the SMO might diversify.

Independent Variables: Claim Cohesion and Claim Focus

Claim cohesion. *Claim cohesion* refers to the extent to which there is consensus in the SMI about the set of claims that define the SMI. We capture claim cohesion for an SMI in a given year by first creating a network composed of any claims belonging to the SMI (see Table 1) made at protest events in the three years prior. Claims share a tie if they were reported at the same protest event together at least once in the prior three years. This three-year window allows us to account for the possibility that the association between two claims might weaken over time if they are not repeatedly expressed together at the same protest events.

Our approach to measuring cohesion using a claim network takes inspiration from Shwed and Bearman's (2010) study of scientific consensus, which uses a co-citation network to operationalize consensus. Just as there is a greater association between papers if they are often cited together in published work, claims exhibit consensus when they are often paired together in protest events. If two claims frequently appear together in protest events, this signals that protest actors position them within the same cognitive space. The result is a network of claims, wherein different claims are connected via the protest events that commonly articulate them.

Using the network of claims for an SMI, our main measure of claim cohesion follows Cattani and colleagues' (2009) approach to measuring cohesion among movie producers

by using the *node connectivity* of a network. Node connectivity refers to the (1) number of all possible node pairs in a network, in which one node in a pair can reach the other node through some number of paths, divided by (2) the total number of possible node pairs in a network (Krackhardt 1994). Thus, values of connectivity in an SMI's claim network can range from 0 to 1. In other words, for any collection of objects or people among which we can observe their relationships, node connectivity measures the extent to which each object is connected to every other object. Greater interconnectedness signals stronger cohesion among the objects.[8]

We use node connectivity as a measure of cohesion because it has several advantages over other measures. For example, one common measure uses the *proportional size of the largest component in a network* (Wasserman and Faust 1994).[9] A weakness of this approach is that if there are many other disconnected components in a network, the size of its largest component might overestimate cohesion in the entire network, whereas if there is only one other highly interconnected component in the network, the size of the largest component would be an underestimate of cohesion. Node connectivity overcomes this weakness by accounting for the possible paths between all nodes in an entire network, rather than simply observing the size of the largest component. Operationalizing network cohesion using measures such as *density*—the number of ties in a network divided by the number of possible ties—is also inadequate because density is often inversely proportional to the size of the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Connectivity scales to networks of different sizes because it "can change freely, [given that] the number of mutually reachable pairs depends only on the topology of the network and the rules of attachment that underpin it" (Cattani et al. 2009:158).

Claim focus. Our measure of the *claim focus* of an SMI relies on past work in organizational ecology that has used the Herfindahl index to measure the concentration of elements

in a category. In our context, within a given SMI, some claims that belong to the SMI are invoked at protest events more frequently than others. We can therefore calculate a measure of the concentration of claims in an SMI's protest events for a defined period of time. To do so, we first collect the distribution of protest event appearances for each claim in an SMI in the past three years in the set $C = [c_1, c_2, …, c_n]$, in which c_j refers to the number of protest events in which claim j was mentioned in the past three years. From there, we calculate claim focus S using the Herfindahl index formula, $\sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j^2$, where $p_j = \dfrac{c_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} c_j}$. Values of S closer to 0 indicate less focus, as protest claims are distributed more uniformly across protest events; values of S closer to 1 indicate greater focus. Importantly, the range of S varies with n as the minimum value of S, given the formula is equal to $1/n$. Thus, the number of protest events in an SMI is, by design, negatively correlated with S. Therefore, we use a normalized version S^*, which is equal to $\dfrac{S - (1/n)}{1 - (1/n)}$, and ranges from 0 to 1 regardless of n's value.

Our primary reason for measuring concentration using a Herfindahl index is to follow past work on categorization, which uses the index to capture the distribution of grades of membership as a measure of the concentration of organizations in a given sector or category (Pontikes and Hannan 2014; Simpson 1949). In these studies, the greater the concentration of organizations in a category, the more salient the existence of a prototype, making the definition of a category sharper while strengthening the category's boundaries. Such measurement also meshes well with literature in the sociology of science, in which studies have operationalized how paradigmatic a given field is with the extent to which key terms are concentrated across the body of its publications (Evans, Gomez, and McFarland 2016). Another possibility would be to calculate an entropy index. A disadvantage of the entropy index, however, is that its scale is unrestricted, which makes it difficult

to compare the focus of different movements across different years (Acar and Sankaran 1999; Jacquemin and Berry 1979).

Control Variables

We control for several time-varying features at the home SMI, target SMI, and SMO levels. At the target and home SMI levels, we control for *the number of all unique claims* articulated at protest events in which the SMI's claims were reported in the three years prior to the SMO-event. We include this control variable to make sure our main independent variables are not simply proxies for the overall size of the SMI or artifacts of the number of claims (including the squared number of unique claims does not alter our main results). We also control for *the number of SMOs in a target and home SMI* in the three years prior to the SMO-event. This accounts for the extent to which an SMI is professionalized through the presence of formal organizations. Professionalization in a movement can lead actors to focus on a narrower set of issues (Staggenborg 1988), which in turn might deter them from adopting claims from other movements. Finally, SMIs likely vary in the tendency of their component SMOs to diversify, which might influence the future behavior of SMOs. Therefore, we include a control variable for *the proportion of SMO-led events in a home SMI in the past three years that reported claims from outside the home SMI*.

At the SMO level, we control for the alliances an SMO has formed with other SMOs in the past three years. We observe an alliance between two SMOs if they were reported to be present at the same protest event together in the past three years (Wang and Soule 2012). Specifically, we first count the number of alliance ties a focal SMO has to other SMOs that are in the same home SMI as the focal SMO. We refer to this control variable as *home SMI alliance centrality*. Second, we count the number of alliance ties a focal SMO has to all SMOs, including SMOs within and outside its home SMI. We refer to this variable as *total*

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Regression Analysis

	Mean	SD
SMO-Event Level (*n* = 4,432)		
Dependent Variable		
SMO diversification (= 1)	.206	
Independent Variables		
Home SMI claim cohesion	.886	(.179)
Home SMI claim focus	.328	(.126)
Control Variables		
Prop. of SMO-led events in home SMI with claims from other SMIs	.264	(.122)
Number of SMOs in home SMI events	109.101	(80.289)
Number of unique claims in home SMI events	29.736	(11.869)
SMO's home SMI alliance centrality	16.014	(11.532)
SMO's total alliance centrality	18.288	(21.259)
SMO-Event-Target-SMI Level (*n* = 27,660)		
Dependent Variable		
Diversify into target SMI (= 1)	.103	
Independent Variables		
Target SMI claim cohesion	.718	(.315)
Target SMI claim focus	.414	(.236)
Control Variables		
Home SMI claim cohesion	.887	(.169)
Home SMI claim focus	.321	(.120)
Prop. of SMO-led events in home SMI with claims from other SMIs	.293	(.129)
Number of SMOs in home SMI events	103.384	(74.563)
Number of unique claims in home SMI events	30.730	(12.295)
Number of SMOs in target SMI events	39.172	(50.357)
Number of unique claims in target SMI events	17.051	(13.361)
SMO's home SMI alliance centrality	14.111	(11.514)
SMO's total alliance centrality	15.915	(19.075)
Relatedness between target and home SMI	.023	(.061)

alliance centrality. These two measures proxy for the level of organizational resources an SMO can access through formal connections, as SMOs that are well-resourced might be better poised to diversify. In addition, SMOs with greater centrality arguably have a higher baseline preference for forming alliances, which helps rule out an SMO's predisposition to forging SMO ties as a potential alternative explanation for their propensity to diversify. Summary statistics for our variables at the SMO-event and SMO-event-target-SMI levels can be found in Table 2.

In testing whether the cohesion and focus of a target SMI influences a diversifying SMO's tendency to adopt claims from the SMI, we also account for *the relatedness between an SMO's home SMI and target SMI*.

Some SMIs are more related to one another than others, which might blur the boundaries between them. For example, in our data, protestors from the peace and environmental SMIs frequently took part in protest events together during the 1970s, whereas those from the peace and Asian American civil rights SMIs rarely did so. One implication is that diversifying SMOs might be more likely to adopt claims from target SMIs that are more related to a home SMI. To calculate our relatedness variable, we build on past studies of firm diversification that have examined the similarity in resources between a firm's industry and a target industry for diversification (e.g., Silverman 1999; Zhou 2011). We first identify all protest events reporting claims associated with the SMI in the three years prior

to the SMO-event. From this set, our measure of relatedness is then the proportion of protest events in which claims from both the home and the target SMI were jointly reported.

In our regression models, we also include *dummy variables for the SMO* and *the home SMI*.[10] For our analysis of Hypotheses 2 and 4, wherein each SMO-event is paired with a target SMI, we also include a *dummy variable for each target SMI*. This controls for time-invariant differences across home and target SMIs, as well as across SMOs, that might be associated with our main independent variables. Because we include each set of these dummy variables simultaneously in our model, the identification of the effects of our main independent variables—claim cohesion and focus of an SMO's home and target SMIs—comes from their variation over time for a given home or target SMI. This enables us to rule out alternative explanations of our findings that result from systematic variation in an SMO's selection into a given home SMI.

Note that we do not include dummy variables for year because this would require us to interpret the estimated effect of claim cohesion, for example, as simultaneously within-SMO, within-year, and within-SMI, which limits the amount of variation we would observe in our key independent variables.[11] However, because changing factors related to the political opportunity structure might promote or inhibit SMO diversification, we include dummy variables for whether the House, Senate, and presidency is under Republican majority control (as opposed to Democrat) in each model. Taken together, this means we interpret our results as how changes in claim cohesion and focus *within an SMI* might lead to changes in an SMO's likelihood of diversification.

Modeling Strategy

To test Hypotheses 1 and 3, which concern the effect of a home SMI's cohesion and focus on its SMO's probability of claim diversification, we estimate logistic regression models by maximum likelihood with the following functional form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
f\left(\Pr\left(Y_{ihk} = 1\right) \mid X_1, X_2, \ldots\right) = \\
\beta_0 + \beta_1 Cohesion_{hk} + \beta_2 Focus_{hk} \quad (1) \\
+ \text{controls} + i + h
\end{aligned}
$$

In Equation 1, f refers to the logit transformation of $\Pr(Y_{ihk})$, in which Y takes a value 1 if SMO i belonging to home SMI h adopts a claim from outside h in event k. $Cohesion_{hk}$ is the claim cohesion of SMI h for the three-year range prior to event k, and $Focus_{hk}$ is the claim focus of SMI h for the same three-year range. The terms i and h in Equation 1 represent fixed effects for the SMO and home SMI, respectively.

We use a conditional logit model to test Hypotheses 2 and 4 with the following specification:

$$
\begin{aligned}
f\left(\Pr\left(Y_{ihjk} = 1\right) \mid X_1, X_2, \ldots\right) = \\
\beta_0 + \beta_1 Cohesion_{jk} + \beta_2 Focus_{jk} \quad (2) \\
+ \text{controls} + i + h + j
\end{aligned}
$$

In Equation 2, Y refers to an indicator for whether SMO i belonging to home SMI h adopts a claim from target SMI j in event k. In the logic of the conditional logit model, a focal SMO is presented with all target SMIs (in our dataset) and can choose or not choose a given target SMI from which to adopt a claim. $Cohesion_{jk}$ and $Focus_{jk}$ therefore refer to the claim cohesion and focus, respectively, of target SMI j. In addition, i, h, and j in Equation 2 refer to fixed effects for the SMO, home SMI, and target SMI, respectively.

Because our dataset is derived from protest events covered in the NYT from 1960 through 1995, there are persistent issues of sample selectivity due to selection and coverage biases in news media (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Ortiz et al. 2005). Typically, the news media report protest events of large sizes, with large durations, or that include

Figure 1. Comparison of Claim Cohesion and Focus for Selected SMIs over the Study Period

violence (see Wouters 2013). We account for such selectivity by using bootstrapped estimates of standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani 1994). Bootstrapping means we resample with replacement from the original sample of SMO-events to obtain robust estimates of standard errors and confidence intervals of a population parameter, such as a regression coefficient, using point estimates from the repeated samples to conduct hypothesis tests. As a non-parametric approach, it is a simpler and more generalizable alternative to inference based on parametric assumptions.[12]

RESULTS

Figure 1 compares our measures of claim cohesion and focus for four selected social movement industries from 1965 to 1995: the African American civil rights movement, the environmental movement, the peace movement, and the women's movement. To contextualize our theoretical predictions, we refer to Figure 1 to situate and describe two historical examples of diversification that have been scrutinized in prior work. These examples are not meant to contradict existing explanations of diversification, but

instead to complement them with interpretations of our theoretical mechanisms of cohesion and focus at work.

First, as shown in Figure 1, cohesion in the African American civil rights movement was high from 1960 to 1995, but the movement lacked focus. This observation resonates with McAdam's ([1982] 2010) account of the sources of decline in this movement: the persistent lack of consensus among prominent organizations over goals. In the early 1960s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) largely defined the movement's agenda as the pursuit of de-segregation and integration, two goals that often accompanied other issues articulated in the movement's protest campaigns. Indeed, as McAdam ([1982] 2010:152) notes, even though the movement was still gaining momentum between 1960 and 1965, "broad-based issue consensus . . . prevailed within the movement during this period." However, by the middle of the decade, organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) increasingly expressed goals related to black self-determination and separatism. The rise of "black power" issues

divided the focus of the movement, weakening its power by publicizing the movement's internal ideological conflicts (Barkan 1986; McAdam [1982] 2010), and hindering its ability to mobilize resources.

As these intramural divisions persisted, civil rights leaders began speaking out about other issues with the intent of aligning themselves to causes that had greater prominence among the public and media. Above all other matters, the Vietnam War captured the most attention from civil rights activists. As early as 1966, members of SNCC and CORE began to criticize the decision to send U.S. troops to Vietnam (Lucks 2014:3). Some scholars argue that civil rights organizations sought extra-movement affiliations with anti-war groups as a way of attracting greater attention to their own cause (Barkan 1986:198; Snow and Benford 1988) and regaining the legitimacy they lost due to the publicization of their internal conflict (Hall 2011).

Throughout our study period, organizations in the African American civil rights movement diversified into other movements because the movement lacked focus. Organizations associated with the women's movement, however, followed a different path. Figure 1 shows that (like the civil rights movement) cohesion was high and focus was low in the women's movement throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. However, in 1984, cohesion in the women's movement began a precipitous decline. What explains this change? The women's movement was highly unified in the 1970s, mobilizing for many different causes related to women's issues, all of which were organized under a collective effort to pass the Equal Rights Amendment. However, when passage of the ERA failed in 1982, individual women's rights groups, which had previously supported each other's grievances through protest, splintered away from the larger movement (Gelb and Paley 1982; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Soule and King 2008; Staggenborg 1991). Most notably, abortion rights activists and feminist organizations took to promoting their own causes, often fomenting conflict and criticism within the women's movement (Staggenborg 1988).

With neither cohesion nor focus, the women's movement became balkanized, making it difficult to sustain a univocal campaign throughout the 1980s (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005).

This fragmentation of the movement prompted a revitalization of women's groups that had historical linkages with the peace movement. As Cold War tensions rose throughout the 1980s, activists from around the world engaged in a global campaign to halt the development of nuclear arms. In the United States, organizations such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND) led a number of highly visible "direct action" campaigns (Meyer and Whittier 1994). Even long-standing generalist organizations, such as the National Organization for Women (NOW), witnessed local chapters championing causes related to nuclear disarmament. In all of these instances, the goal of diversification was to forge connections to a more prominent issue outside the women's movement to attract attention and resources to ensure survival. Meyer and Whittier (1994) convincingly argue that women's "two-tiered" involvement in the peace movement prior to the 1970s, through institutional and non-institutional tactics, made them especially poised to integrate the causes of the women's movement with the peace movement in the 1980s. Our theory suggests that an additional reason for the diversification of women's organizations into the peace movement is that internal fracturing and "the absence of burning issues" put pressure on women's rights SMOs to adopt issues outside their typical issue domains to sustain their mobilization and survival (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005:44; Taylor 1989).

Model Estimation Results: Home SMI Cohesion and Focus

Table 3 reports results of a set of logistic regression models to test Hypotheses 1 and 3. Model 1 includes only control variables, Model 2 includes control variables and the home SMI's claim cohesion, Model 3 includes control variables and the home SMI's claim

Table 3. Estimated Coefficients from Logistic Regression of SMO Diversification

	Dependent Variable: SMO diversification, in which *other* SMOs from focal SMO's home SMI are also present				Dependent Variable: SMO diversification, in which *focal SMO is only SMO reported at event*			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Home SMI claim cohesion		−.191**		−.186*		−.200**		−.199*
		(.069)		(.082)		(.678)		(.081)
Home SMI claim focus			−.230**	−.177*			−.307***	−.255**
			(.078)	(.081)			(.076)	(.079)
Prop. of SMO-led events in home SMI with claims from other SMIs	1.228**	1.431**	1.190**	1.316**	1.306**	1.509**	1.153*	1.289**
	(.462)	(.472)	(.472)	(.478)	(.455)	(.463)	(.465)	(.471)
Number of SMOs in home SMI events	−.006***	−.006***	−.006***	−.006	−.007***	−.007***	−.007***	−.007***
	(.001)	(.00)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Number of unique claims in home SMI events	.035***	.042***	.028**	.034**	.033**	.041***	.021*	.028**
	(.010)	(.010)	(.011)	(.011)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.011)
SMO's total alliance centrality	.017**	.017**	.015**	.015**	.027***	.026***	.026***	.025***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
SMO's home SMI alliance centrality	−.032***	−.032***	−.031***	−.030***	−.039***	−.038***	−.036***	−.035****
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
Republican control of presidency	.249*	.257*	.191	.217	.328**	.333**	.241	.266*
	(.128)	(.128)	(.129)	(.129)	(.126)	(.126)	(.126)	(.127)
Republican control of Senate	−.038	−.057	−.059	−.081	−.004	−.022	−.026	−.046
	(.156)	(.156)	(.155)	(.155)	(.153)	(.154)	(.152)	(.153)
Republican control of House	.584	.512	.544	.485	.561	.485	.497	.430
	(.375)	(.377)	(.373)	(.375)	(.374)	(.376)	(.372)	(.373)
Intercept	2.781**	2.316*	2.815**	4.152***	3.852***	3.368**	3.941***	3.541***
	(1.007)	(1.020)	(1.012)	(1.026)	(1.028)	(1.039)	(1.035)	(1.047)
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	−1619.04	−1615.283	−1610.137	−1690.536	−1699.119	−1694.861	−1687.783	−1684.667
N (SMO-events)	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

focus, and Model 4 includes the home SMI's claim cohesion and focus simultaneously. Models 5 through 8 follow the same specifications as Models 1 through 4 but use our more conservative operationalization of SMO diversification. Specifically, in Models 1 through 4, SMO diversification is observed if (a) all the claims reported do not belong to the focal SMO's home SMI, and (b) any *other SMOs reported are all members of the focal SMO's home SMI*. In Models 5 through 8, the first condition remains the same, but we only observe diversification if *the focal SMO is the only SMO reported at the event*. Results from the two sets of models are largely similar, so we focus our discussion on Models 1 through 4.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that greater cohesion among the claims that compose a social movement industry deters diversification by the SMOs that belong to that SMI. Models 2 and 4 indicate support for this prediction. Specifically, according to Model 2, as the claim cohesion of an SMO's home SMI increases by one standard deviation, the odds that an SMO diversifies at a given protest event by adopting a claim from another SMI drops by 17 percent ($exp[-.191] = .826$, $p < .01$, Model 2, Table 3). The standard deviation of claim cohesion in our data is equal to .179, which suggests that if claim cohesion were to increase by .500 units, which is close to the difference in claim cohesion between the peace movement and environmental movement in 1969 (see Figure 1), this would lower the odds of SMO diversification by 41 percent ($exp[-.191 \times (.500/.179)] = .587$). When the home SMI's claim focus is included in the model, the coefficient of claim cohesion diminishes almost imperceptibly in magnitude but remains statistically significant ($\beta = -.186$, $p < .05$, Model 4, Table 3).

Hypothesis 3 also receives support from the model estimates in Table 3. Specifically, according to Model 3, a one standard deviation increase in a home SMI's focus leads to a 21 percent decrease in the odds that an SMO in the SMI diversifies at a given protest event ($exp[-.230] = .795$, $p < .001$, Model 3, Table

3). In Model 4, which enters home SMI cohesion and focus simultaneously, the magnitude of the coefficient for claim cohesion diminishes slightly and remains statistically significant ($\beta = -.177$, $p < .05$, Model 4, Table 3). It is important to note that because claim cohesion and focus are positively correlated ($r = .19$), it is possible that they are somewhat conflated as far as the variance they explain in SMO diversification.

Model Estimation Results: Target SMI Cohesion and Focus

Table 4 reports the estimates of four logit models that incorporate variables at the target SMI level to test Hypotheses 2 and 4. Because our sample can only consist of SMO-events in which the SMO has adopted claims outside of its home SMI, we include an additional control variable to account for selection of SMO-events into this subsample. Specifically, we use a probit specification of Model 4 of Table 3 to calculate an inverse Mills ratio, which measures the propensity of an SMO-event to diversify, and we include it as a control variable in our models testing Hypotheses 2 and 4 (Dubin and Rivers 1989).[13] In Table 4, Model 9 includes only control variables and the inverse Mills ratio, Model 10 adds the claim cohesion of the target SMI, Model 11 replaces the claim cohesion of the target SMI with the target SMI's claim focus, and Model 12 includes the target SMI's claim cohesion and focus simultaneously. All models indicate that SMOs are more likely to adopt claims from target SMIs that have a greater presence of SMOs and champion a wider range of claims in their protest events. Furthermore, an SMO is more likely to diversify into target SMIs that are more closely related to the SMO's home SMI.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that diversifying SMOs will be more likely to adopt a claim from an SMI that exhibits greater claim cohesion. Model 10 in Table 4 offers strong support for this prediction. Specifically, as the claim cohesion of a target SMI increases by one standard deviation, a diversifying SMO's

Table 4. Estimated Coefficients from Logistic Regression of SMO Diversification in a Target SMI

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Target SMI claim cohesion		.354***		.318***
		(.045)		(.049)
Target SMI claim focus			.094*	.004
			(.046)	(.048)
Home SMI claim cohesion	.048	.027	.038	−.454
	(.068)	(.068)	(.068)	(.472)
Home SMI claim focus	−.002	−.022	.007	<.001
	(.066)	(.066)	(.066)	(.011)
Prop. of SMO-led events in home SMI with claims from other SMIs	−.412	−.444	−.465	−.454
	(.473)	(.472)	(.473)	(.473)
Number of SMOs in home SMI events	−.001	−.002	−.001	<.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.011)
Number of unique claims in home SMI events	−.001	−.001	−.002	−.002
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.002)
Number of SMOs in target SMI events	.005***	.005***	.005***	.013*
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.005)
Number of unique claims in target SMI events	.021***	.014**	.022***	.005***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.001)
SMO's total alliance centrality	.003	.003	.003	.004
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)
SMO's home SMI alliance centrality	−.002	−.002	−.002	−.002
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
Relatedness between target SMI and home SMI	.206***	.200***	.206***	.200***
	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)	(.018)
Inverse Mills ratio	.476	.496	.439	.499
	(.674)	(.674)	(.674)	(.674)
Intercept	−3.349***	−3.389***	−3.353***	3.686***
	(.563)	(.563)	(.564)	(.611)
Target SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	−6995.203	−6963.336	−6971.123	−6973.439
N (SMO-event-target-SMIs)	27,660	27,660	27,660	27,660

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation. Control variables for Republican control of the House, Senate, and presidency were included in the models but are not shown to conserve space.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

odds of adopting a claim from the target SMI also increase by 42 percent ($exp[.354] = 1.424$, $p < .001$, Model 10, Table 4).

Hypothesis 4 also receives support from Model 11 in Table 4. A standard deviation increase in a target SMI's claim focus leads to an almost 10 percent increase in the odds that

an SMO will adopt a claim from the target SMI ($exp[.094] = 1.099$, $p < .05$, Model 11, Table 4). In Model 12, which includes both target SMI claim cohesion and focus, the coefficient of target SMI claim cohesion remains positive and significant ($\beta = .318$, $p < .001$, Model 12, Table 4), but

the coefficient of target SMI claim focus diminishes greatly in magnitude and does not reach statistical significance ($\beta = .004$, $p = .927$, Model 12, Table 4). We speculate that their positive correlation ($r = .24$) creates multicollinearity, which is likely responsible for the coefficient of target SMI claim focus losing significance.

Legitimacy as a Mediating Mechanism

Our principal argument behind Hypotheses 1 and 3 is that greater cohesion and focus in a movement industry leads to perceptions of greater legitimacy, raising the cognitive cost of deviating from the movement's core issues. Our measures, however, do not allow us to examine the validity of legitimacy as a possible mediating mechanism in our analysis.

To assess whether cohesion and focus are positively related to the legitimacy of a movement industry, we collected data from Baumgartner and Jones's (2002) *Policy Agendas Project*, which allow us to observe whether the claims reported in the protest events in our data correspond to the issues covered by U.S. congressional activity during the same time period. Past scholarship has taken a similar approach by treating the extent to which the legislative agenda reflects the issues espoused by a social movement as an indicator of the legitimacy or prominence of the movement. For example, King, Bentele, and Soule (2007) found that in a given year, the volume of protest activity around issues related to civil rights was positively related to the number of congressional hearings around the issue the next year. Other work has found similar evidence for the relationship between protest activity and legislative agenda-setting in the environmental movement and the women's movement (Olzak and Soule 2009; Soule and King 2008).

Using Baumgartner and Jones's data, we measure the legitimacy of a social movement industry using the proportion of articles in the annual *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (CQ) related to claims that belong to the movement industry.[14] We call this variable *SMI socio-political legitimacy*. The *CQ* is published at the end of each year and documents each legislative initiative undertaken in Congress in the past year, including hearings, meetings, and reports issued. The *CQ* essentially serves as an internal newspaper recording all the important events related to legislative activity in the United States. Our measure follows past work that uses the incidence of certain issues in the *CQ* as a measure of salience of that issue in the public sphere (Edwards and Wood 1999; Soule et al. 1999).

To test whether SMI socio-political legitimacy can be construed as a mechanism driving the positive effect of SMI cohesion and focus on SMO diversification, we conduct a mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986). A mediation analysis allows us to decompose the direct and indirect effects of an independent variable on a dependent variable. An indirect effect refers to the extent to which an independent variable has an effect on an outcome through a separate mediator variable. If there is statistical evidence of both a direct and an indirect effect, we can rule in that the relationship between an independent and dependent variable is at least partially mediated by the third variable. In effect, a mediation analysis can be interpreted as a statistical test for the existence of a mechanism, which is measured by a mediator variable. In our case, we test for the existence of the direct effects of movement industry cohesion and focus on movement organization diversification and their indirect effects through movement industry socio-political legitimacy as a mediator variable.

The Sobel method for testing mediation assumes that the outcome variable under study is continuous. However, given that our outcome variable—SMO diversification—is a dummy variable, we follow MacKinnon's (2008) approach for when the dependent variable is binary and the key independent and mediator variables are continuous. In such cases, to implement a test for mediation, MacKinnon (2008) recommends using a specific formula to weight the standard errors

used to compute test-statistics.[15] In addition, we estimate the standard errors for the coefficients of the independent and mediator variables using 100 bootstrap simulations, following VanderWeele's (2016) recommendation to avoid parametric distributional assumptions when testing for mediation.

Table 5 reports results of two sets of models for our mediation analysis of SMI cohesion and focus. Model 13 is a linear regression of SMI socio-political legitimacy on SMI cohesion and our full set of control variables (using the SMO-event as the unit of analysis). Model 14 is a linear regression of SMO diversification on both SMI social-political legitimacy and SMI cohesion. Model 15 replicates Model 14 as a logistic regression. Models 15, 16, and 17 report the equivalent set of coefficients for the mediation analysis for SMI focus.

Model 13 reveals that each standard deviation increase in SMI cohesion boosts SMI socio-political legitimacy by close to a quarter of a standard deviation ($\beta = .231$, $p < .001$). In Model 15, a standard deviation increase in the socio-political legitimacy of a home SMI decreases the odds of SMO diversification by 14 percent ($exp[-.1565] = .855$, $p < .05$), which supports the notion that the legitimacy of a movement creates stronger categorical boundaries that diminish the adoption of extra-movement claims. Including SMI socio-political legitimacy in Models 15 and 18 does not substantively affect the magnitude or statistical significance of the negative effects of SMI cohesion and focus on SMO diversification, as compared with logit models that do not include SMI socio-political legitimacy (see Models 2 and 3 in Table 3).

Figure 2 summarizes the key relationships found in our mediation analysis. The models in Table 5 offer support for a partial mediation effect ($t = -18.400$, $p < .001$).[16] We obtained similar results for our test of the mediation of the relationship between SMI focus and SMO diversification through SMI socio-political legitimacy ($t = -6.423$, $p < .001$). These results suggest that a possible

mechanism for the negative relationship between a movement organization's tendency to diversify and the cohesion and focus of its home movement industry is that greater cohesion and focus (e.g., consensus) in an industry can elevate the legitimacy of the movement.

Robustness Checks

Relatedness between home SMI and target SMI. In Hypotheses 2 and 4, we argue that greater cohesion and focus in an SMI makes it a more attractive target for diversification, because these features increase the legitimacy of an SMI in the eyes of SMOs. To test this mechanism, we draw from literature in organizational theory suggesting that under conditions of information uncertainty, the status and legitimacy of a category become more important factors for an audience's evaluation of it (Podolny 2010). As a consequence, those who are more distant from a category are more likely to affiliate with it on the basis of the category's legitimacy rather than actual knowledge of its values, meanings, and internal organization (Podolny 2010; Zuckerman 2017). In our context, this implies that when an SMO's home SMI is *less related* to a potential target SMI, there is greater uncertainty about the target SMI. Thus, the cohesion and focus of a less related target SMI become more important signals of legitimacy. We therefore expect the positive effects of target SMI cohesion and focus to be stronger for an SMO whose home SMI is less related to a target SMI.

We test this possibility by using our relatedness measure, which we included in our models as a control variable, to create two subsamples of our dataset. In the first, we only pair SMO-events with target SMIs with a value of relatedness less than the 33rd percentile. This essentially creates a dataset in which SMO-events are paired with target SMIs that have "low relatedness" to the SMO's home SMI. The environmental and Asian American civil rights movements, for example, have low relatedness to each other: no protest events in our dataset jointly made

Table 5. Estimated Coefficients from Models Testing Mediation of Socio-political Legitimacy

	Model 13 (OLS) Dependent Variable: Home SMI Socio-political Legitimacy	Model 14 (OLS) Dependent Variable: SMO Diversification	Model 15 (Logit) Dependent Variable: SMO Diversification	Model 16 (OLS) Dependent Variable: Home SMI Socio-political Legitimacy	Model 17 (OLS) Dependent Variable: SMO Diversification	Model 18 (Logit) Dependent Variable: SMO Diversification
Home SMI socio-political legitimacy		-.027**	-.157*		-.028**	-.142*
		(.009)	(.066)		(.009)	(.063)
Home SMI claim cohesion	.230***	-.026**	-.161*			
	(.014)	(.008)	(.070)			
Home SMI claim focus				.067***	-.020*	-.239**
				(.015)	(.008)	(.077)
Prop. of SMO-led events in home SMI with claims from other SMIs	.018	.181**	1.423**	.111	.147*	1.151*
	(.108)	(.062)	(.471)	(.112)	(.063)	(.470)
Number of SMOs in home SMI events	.001*	-.001***	-.006***	.001*	-.001***	.031**
	(<.001)	(<.001)	(.002)	(.003)	(<.001)	(.010)
Number of unique claims in home SMI events	-.015***	.005***	.040***	-.010***	.005**	.031**
	(.002)	(.001)	(.010)	(.002)	(.001)	(.010)
SMO's total alliance centrality	.005***	.004***	.017***	.004***	.003***	.016**
	(.001)	(<.001)	(.005)	(.001)	(.001)	(.005)
SMO's home SMI alliance centrality	.013***	-.004***	-.023***	.015***	-.004***	-.029***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.005)	(.001)	(.001)	(.005)
Intercept	-1.139***	.847***	2.065*	-1.645***	.916***	2.599*
	(.238)	(.137)	(1.023)	(.245)	(.137)	(1.018)
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood			-1612.407			-1609.282
Adjusted R-squared	.625	.249		.529	.244	
N (SMO-events)	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432	4,432

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation. Control variables for Republican control of the House, Senate, and presidency were included in the models but are not shown to conserve space.
$*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

Figure 2. Visualization of Mediation Analysis Results
Note: A Sobel test with bootstrapped standard errors, adjusted for an outcome model with dichotomous dependent variables, revealed that home SMI socio-political legitimacy partially mediates the direct effect of home SMI cohesion on SMO diversification ($t = -2.673$, $p < .01$). We obtained similar results for a Sobel test of partial mediation of the relationship between SMI focus and SMO diversification through SMI socio-political legitimacy ($t = -7.506$, $p < .001$).

claims from both movements. In the second subsample, we pair SMO-events with target SMIs with values of relatedness above the 66th percentile, indicating "high relatedness" between the home and target SMIs in the consideration set. The gay and lesbian movement and women's movement had high relatedness: out of all protest events in 1972 that made claims from either SMI, 13 percent reported claims from both at the same event. We expect SMOs are more sensitive to the cohesion and focus of a target SMI if the consideration set of target SMIs have lower relatedness to the SMO's home SMI.

Table 6 reports results of two sets of logit models that follow the specification of Models 10 and 11 in Table 4, which test Hypotheses 2 and 4. In Table 6, Models 19 and 20 use the subset of SMO-events paired with less related target SMIs, and Models 21 and 22 use the subset paired with highly related target SMIs. Target SMI cohesion (Model 19, Table 6) and focus (Model 20, Table 6) are positive and statistically significant when

constraining the analysis to target SMIs with low relatedness to an SMO's home SMI. By contrast, for target SMIs with high relatedness, the effect size of target SMI claim cohesion is a third of its effect size for target SMIs with low relatedness (Model 21, Table 6). Likewise, the coefficient of target SMI focus does not reach statistical significance for target SMIs with high relatedness (Model 22, Table 6). In other words, although we find evidence that the consensus of a target SMI influences a diversifying SMO's probability of adopting a claim from it, SMOs are more sensitive to the cohesion and focus of other SMIs that are less related to their home SMIs.

Additional robustness checks. We performed additional analyses that we report in our Appendix. First, with subsample analyses, we ruled out the possibility that our findings are driven by SMOs that are particularly active in protest or SMOs that might identify with two different movement industries simultaneously. We also conducted sensitivity

Table 6. Estimated Coefficients from Logistic Regression of SMO Diversification in Specific Target SMI, with Different Sets of SMIs

	Relatedness between Home and Target SMIs			
	Low		High	
	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
Target SMI claim cohesion	.478**		.157**	
	(.150)		(.048)	
Target SMI claim focus		.411**		.070
		(.170)		(.044)
Target SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	−558.431	−555.52	−4126.225	−4128.111
N (SMO-event-target-SMIs)	10,121	10,121	10,082	10,082

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All control variables are included but are omitted from the table to conserve space. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation.

$*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

analyses related to the size of the SMIs in our data as well as potential coverage and selection bias in newspaper reporting. In addition, we verified whether unobservable factors associated with cohesion and focus drive our results using a two-stage residual inclusion analysis (Greve and Rao 2012; Terza, Basu, and Rathouz 2008). Finally, we replicated our results for Hypotheses 1 and 3 using cross-movement alliance formation as a dependent variable.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A cursory examination of the websites of many prominent social movement organizations shows there is much variation in how willing they are to espouse claims outside of their traditional issue domain. For example, the NAACP lists a number of issues on which they currently work, ranging from education to health to media representation, all of which are tied to their core mission to "ensure the political, educational, social, and economic equality of rights of all persons and to eliminate race-based discrimination."

We might contrast this with the website of NOW, where one can find over 20 pages of current issues on which they work, ranging from traditional women's issues to issues such as gun control, immigration reform, and the protection of voting rights. Similarly, the website of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the historic African American civil rights organization, highlights "sex trafficking" as one of its three most important causes.[17]

What leads social movement organizations to adopt claims that are outside their traditional issue domains? We treat the question of movement diversification as an instance of a more general process of categorical boundary-crossing, implicating boundary strength as an underlying mechanism and legitimacy as a mediating mechanism. Our article demonstrates that the tendency to borrow claims from other movements is lower when the categorical boundaries between social movements are stronger, as indicated by claim cohesion and claim focus. Movement industries with high cohesion and focus deter the diversification of their member SMOs. However, in the case of movement industries as

targets for diversification, both cohesion and focus increase entry into the industry.

By examining the origins of social movement organizational diversification, our study makes a timely contribution. Recent scholarship spotlights anti-Trump activism in the United States as distinct in its sheer "issue diversity" compared to "prior waves . . . which were defined more clearly by a specific movement and its demands" (Andrews, Caren, and Browne 2018:395). Past studies of the factors that facilitate issue diversity in protest have looked to political process theory (McAdam [1982] 2010) and resource mobilization (Van Dyke 2003). More recent work has raised intersectional identities as a pathway to multi-issue mobilization and coalition formation (Fisher et al. 2018; Terriquez 2015). Instead, we focus on the level of consensus in the social movement industry, as measured by cohesion and focus of the claims therein, as a predictor of organizational diversification.

Our results make several contributions to sociological theory. First, our findings suggest that social movement industries may be stratified on the strength of their categorical boundaries, which contributes to a greater understanding of social fields as a way of making sense of disruption and continuity in social order (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). In our case, strategic action fields are structured by the crossover of claims from fields with strong boundaries to fields with weak boundaries. Such crossover continues until a given field or movement industry becomes cohesive and focused—and thereby, autonomous or relatively insulated from the influence of other fields—except as a target of borrowing. This observation allows for an explanation of Jung, King, and Soule's (2014) finding that fledgling movement issues become central to the entire social movement sector.

Second, our findings raise an alternative view of Bourdieu's notion of "field autonomy," which refers to the means by which a field creates its own meanings, values, and signals of status (Bourdieu [1986] 2013; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Autonomy is

important to a field because it provides a system of meaning that guides its members' actions and releases a field from dependence on the values of other cognate fields. Our work suggests that one basis of field autonomy might be found in the cohesion and focus of the symbolic elements that compose a field. Moreover, whereas Bourdieu suggests that fields tend to gain autonomy over time, our measurement accounts for how fields might lose autonomy as well.

Third, our results demonstrate how the cognitive foundations of claim cohesion and focus also spawn legitimacy, and thereby constrain boundary-spanning. Since Thompson (1967), a core premise of organization theory is that any change to the scope of an organization must be explained and justified to external audiences, and the extent of the justification needed hinges on the degree of consensus regarding the claims of the organization. Organizational ecologists have studied focus (e.g., Hannan et al. 2007), but they have paid less attention to cohesion. Herein, we study both focus and cohesion, and we demonstrate that they are both connected to the socio-political legitimacy of a movement industry.

Fourth, and related, organizational sociologists routinely distinguish between socio-political legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy (e.g., Hannan and Carroll 1992; Scott [2001] 2008). Socio-political legitimacy consists of endorsement by legal authorities, governmental bodies, and other powerful organizations. By contrast, cognitive legitimacy implies that an organization is desirable, valid, and appropriate within a widely shared system of norms and values. In our context, social movement organizations in industries with low cohesion and low focus borrow claims from industries with high claim cohesion and focus in a bid to secure cognitive validity for the claims of their individual organizations. This result resonates with Jung and colleagues' (2014) observation that movement organizations may strategically engage in issue spanning. Indeed, both cognitive and socio-political legitimation can refer to the "process by

which cultural accounts from a larger social framework in which a social entity is nested are construed to explain and support the existence of that social entity, whether that entity be a group, a structure of inequality, a position of authority or a social practice" (Berger et al. 1998:380).

Fifth, although consensus is widely agreed to be an antecedent of legitimacy, research has found little direct evidence. One way to do so would be to show that the cognitive foundations of claim cohesion and focus lead to cognitive legitimacy. For example, Hsu and Grodal (2015) measure the legitimacy of light cigarettes in the United States as a product category with the extent to which news media describe light cigarettes in detail. For Hsu and Grodal (2015), shorter descriptions denote a taken-for-grantedness, and therefore greater cognitive legitimacy, of the category. An alternative way is to demonstrate that the cognitive primitives of claim cohesion and focus lead to greater socio-political legitimacy. In our case, the results from our mediation analysis show that claim cohesion and focus in a movement industry are positively correlated with socio-political legitimacy (as measured by congressional attention), which partially accounts for lower rates of diversification. These results suggest there is spillover between the cognitive channels and socio-political channels of legitimacy. Zucker (1987:446) points out that legitimacy grows through contagion-like processes; our results provide an account of the contagion of legitimacy that spills over from cognitive channels to socio-political channels. An interesting question for future research would be to discern whether there is turn-taking or a relay between one channel and another.

These contributions are significant, but it is also important to recognize some areas for extension and improvement in our work. First, despite our attempts to determine the sensitivity of our results to alternative explanations, our findings are derived from observational data, which precludes a level of causal inference reachable through experimental approaches. Although exogenous political

and social events—such as the assassination of key figures or the declaration of war—can affect the cohesion and focus of an SMI, these features are not always subject to random variation. In addition, it is possible that SMO diversification engenders a negative feedback loop with the focus and cohesion of SMIs. Although we control for the past tendency of SMOs to diversify in a given home SMI, we urge researchers to further explore the mutualistic relationship between the boundary-crossing activity of protest organizations and the ideological make-up of their affiliated movements.

Finally, our analysis does not capture the myriad of meso-level organizational factors that might lead organizations to diversify. For example, brand new organizations might be more prone to diversify, net of the level of cohesion or focus in their industries, because their identities may still be forming. Or, failing organizations may be more likely to diversify because they are looking for ways to survive. Such questions are well beyond the scope of this article; however, future research should explore meso-organizational antecedents of diversification.

In conclusion, our results embed SMO diversification in categorical boundaries external to the organization, rather than internal boundaries that govern resource allocation. They trace the strength of categorical boundaries to claim cohesion and focus as the mechanisms underlying diversification, but they show that socio-political legitimacy is an important mediating mechanism. In doing so, our study shows that cohesion and focus, which have a virtual existence in the minds of movement actors, also translate into the world of resources.

APPENDIX

Dynamics of Collective Action Dataset

The Dynamics of Collective Action (DoCA) Project is now a well-known resource for scholars of social movements. The

data collection was funded by the National Science Foundation; data were collected by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak, and Sarah Soule and are publicly available. The dataset includes information content-coded from daily editions of the *New York Times* (NYT) on all U.S. public protest events recorded in the newspaper from 1960 to 1995. For a particular protest event to be included in the dataset, the event must have occurred in the public sphere or have been open to the public. Private or closed meetings by social movement actors are not included, but events within organizations (e.g., schools or churches) are included if they were open to the public.

These data were collected in two stages. First, researchers read every page of all daily issues of the NYT from 1960 to 1995 searching for any mention of protest events. By not using an index, they found events that were embedded in articles on other related topics. The second stage of data collection involved content coding of each event; a single article can discuss multiple events, each of which was coded separately. Project personnel coded information on event size and location, the tactics protestors used, the claims (or issues) that protestors articulated, the targets of the event, organizational presence, and police presence. Intercoder reliability for most items was consistently at or above 90 percent agreement.

Collecting data on protests using newspaper articles can engender two forms of bias. Selection bias refers to the notion that news articles do not constitute a representative sample of all protest events that take place (Andrews and Caren 2010). Coverage bias refers to the notion that of the events reported in newspapers, those that are more newsworthy tend to receive more detailed coverage (Davenport 2009). Coders read through the entirety of each issue of the newspaper rather than searching through newspaper indices, reducing the probability that protest events that were covered but not indexed properly would be missed. In addition, most of our variables are informed by the "who, what

when, where, and why of the event," which are less subject to coverage bias and "tend to be relatively accurate" (Earl et al. 2004:72). Although it is almost impossible to completely rid newspaper-based protest event data of these two forms of bias, we undertook additional checks, as reported in the next section.

Coverage and Selection Bias in Newspaper Data

We conducted several protest event subsample analyses to address potential issues related to selection and coverage bias in the newspaper coverage of protest events. With regard to selection bias, some scholars argue that even national newspapers such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* tend to focus their reporting on events that are regionally proximate to their headquarters (Beyerlein et al. 2018; Ortiz et al. 2005). We therefore generated our main variables using a subsample of protest events that took place only in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, or Washington, DC, and a subsample of events that took place outside those regions. Our main results are consistent in both subsamples.

Regarding coverage bias, the major concern is that one or more of our variables might be a function of the amount of coverage certain types of protest events receive. For example, SMOs in more cohesive SMIs might participate in protest events that receive limited coverage, which would appear in our raw data as articles that are shorter in length and therefore lack the space to report on the complete range of claims observed at the event. To address this concern, we re-created our variables using subsamples of protest events that came from articles below the 90th percentile in terms of article length, and subsequently, the 80th, 70th, and 60th, an approach described by Wang and Soule (2012). In each subsample, the results of our model estimates remain consistent with our main findings.

Unobserved Heterogeneity across and within SMIs

An important concern in our analysis is that our main models in Table 3 suffer from omitted variable bias. In other words, it is possible that the cohesion and focus of home SMIs are correlated with factors that might affect SMO diversification but are not observable in our data. Such a concern stems from the nature of our research design, which relies on observational data, making it difficult to rule out whether any unobserved heterogeneity renders our cohesion and focus variable endogenous.

One solution to this issue is to find an instrumental variable that is correlated with our independent variables but has no correlation with our dependent variables other than through its effect on our independent variables. The instrumental variable can be included in a first-stage linear regression to generate predicted values of an independent variable, which can then be included in a second-stage model of the dependent variable to obtain the unbiased local average treatment effect of the independent variable. However, this approach, known as two-stage least squares (2SLS), requires dependent variables that are continuous valued, because the second-stage model must be estimated by OLS. Because our models are logistic regressions due to the binary nature of our dependent variables, using 2SLS would result in biased coefficients.

To deal with this constraint, we adopt a similar approach called *two-stage residual inclusion* (2SRI), which is suitable for nonlinear models like logistic regression (Greve and Rao 2012; Terza et al. 2008). Like 2SLS, 2SRI requires instrumental variables as predictor variables in a first-stage model of an independent variable of interest. In our case, the endogenous variables are the cohesion and focus of an SMO's home SMIs. In the first-stage model, however, *only* the instrumental variables are included. The model is then used to calculate the residuals, which are included in the second-stage model as an additional control variable, which serves to correct the potential bias exhibited in the coefficients of the independent variables. A residual for a given observation refers to, for example, the actual value of home SMI cohesion minus the predicted value of SMI cohesion from the first-stage model. The logic for including only the instrumental variables in the first-stage model is that such a parsimonious model would maximize the chances of the residuals accounting for any unobserved heterogeneity associated with the independent variables of interest. In essence, the residuals from the first-stage model proxy for unobserved heterogeneity. If the inclusion of these residuals substantially weakens the magnitude of the SMI cohesion and focus coefficients in our second-stage models, this would suggest the effects of SMI cohesion and focus are endogenous.

To implement 2SRI in our context, we first identify three candidate instrumental variables in our analysis: the proportion of past protest events in an SMI that exhibited violence, the proportion of protest events in which counterdemonstrators were reported, and the number of states in which past protest events took place. To measure all three instrumental variables, we use the past protest events in an SMI from a three-year window to be consistent with measurement of our independent variables. We argue that more violence in an SMI signals the use of radical tactics, which can reflect ideological conflicts within a movement, lowering SMI cohesion and focus (McAdam [1982] 2010). Similarly, the presence of counterdemonstrators can also neutralize a movement's strategies, causing confusion and division within a movement (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Finally, the geographic spread of protest events in an SMI can reflect the greater prominence of a movement, which can unite the distinct claims of an SMI under a more cohesive agenda or bring focus to a singular cause (Tarrow and McAdam 2005). We do not see any plausible direct connection between an SMO's tendency to diversify and violence, counterdemonstrator presence, or geographic spread

Table A1. Estimated Coefficients from Linear Regression Models of Claim Cohesion and Focus on Instrumental Variables (Stage 1 of 2SRI Analysis)

	Dependent Variable: Home SMI Claim Cohesion	Dependent Variable: Home SMI Claim Focus
	Model A1	Model A2
Proportion of events in home SMI with counterdemonstrators reported	−.195**	−.913***
	(.063)	(.060)
Proportion of events in home SMI with violence reported	−.066***	−.007
	(.014)	(.013)
Number of states in which events with home SMI claims took place	.009***	.005***
	(<.001)	(<.001)
Intercept	.594***	.176***
	(.008)	(.007)
Adjusted *R*-squared	.326	.134
N (SMO-events)	4,432	4,432

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

in a movement industry's past protest events, other than through their effects on the focus and cohesion of the movement.

Table A1 reports the first-stage models of SMI cohesion and focus, each of which only includes SMI violence, repression, and geographic spread as predictor variables. As expected, as an SMI's past protest events take place across more states, focus and cohesion in the SMI also increase (Models A1 and A2, Table A1). Greater rates of violence and counterdemonstration in an SMI's past protest events are negatively associated with SMI cohesion (Model A1, Table A1). However, whereas the rate of counterdemonstration is negatively associated with SMI focus, the coefficient for the rate of violence is negative but not statistically significant (Model A2, Table A1).

Table A2 reports estimates of our second-stage models of SMO diversification, which include residuals from the relevant first-stage models in Table A1. According to Model A3, the coefficient of home SMI cohesion is negative and remains statistically significant, consistent with our main results in Table 3. We found the same result in Model A4 for the effect of SMI focus on SMO diversification.

Structural Cohesion versus Connectivity as Measures of Claim Cohesion

A potential weakness of our measure for claim cohesion using Krackhardt's (1994) connectivity measure is that our operationalization might be an underestimate because it does not account for redundant pathways between claims in our network. As mentioned in our description of our independent variables, we developed an alternative version of our claim cohesion measure using Moody and White's (2003) calculation of structural cohesion, which relies on decomposing a network into *k*-components and finding the average maximal *k*th-component of which a node is a member. Whereas Krackhardt's connectivity measure is conceptually linked to the notion of reachability between nodes, Moody and White's measure of structural cohesion takes into account the redundancy of reachability as well.

Specifically, Moody and White's (2003) measure builds on the idea that in any given network, nodes can be part of differently-sized *k*-components. A *k*-component refers to a group of nodes, in which each node can reach every other node through at least *k* different unique paths. One hundred nodes in a

Table A2. Estimated Coefficients from Models of SMO Diversification Including Residuals from Stage 1 (Stage 2 of 2SRI)

	Dependent Variable: SMO Diversification	
	Model A3	Model A4
Home SMI claim cohesion	−.201*	
	(.08)	
Home SMI claim focus		−.241**
		(.081)
Residuals from claim cohesion model	.124	
	(.066)	
Residuals from claim focus model		−.183**
		(.066)
Intercept	3.408**	3.880
	(1.042)	(1.039)
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	−1688.304	1683.819
N (SMO-events)	4,432	4,432

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation. All control variables were included in the models but omitted from the table to conserve space.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

1-component are therefore less cohesive than 100 nodes in a 2-component (also called a bicomponent). Thus, all nodes in a bicomponent are also part of a 1-component that is at least as a large as the bicomponent.

To calculate the structural cohesion of an SMI's claim network, we first assign each claim to its maximal *k*-component—for instance, if claim *a* were part of a 3-component in a claim network but not a 4-component, claim *a* would be assigned a value of 3. Isolate claims are assigned a value of zero. We then take the average of each claim's assigned maximal *k*-component value to measure structural cohesion. Higher values suggest the claims in the SMI are more cohesive because they share multiple common associations with one another.

Table A3 reports results of our models testing Hypotheses 1 and 2—which concern the effect of an SMI's claim cohesion—using Moody and White's structural cohesion to measure claim cohesion rather than connectivity. Consistent with our results using the connectivity operationalization, the standardized coefficient of Home SMI claim cohesion (using the Moody and White measure) in Models A5 and A6 has a negative and significant effect on SMO diversification. Likewise, the standardized coefficient of target SMI claim cohesion in Models A7 and A8 is positive and significant for models that predict from which target SMI an SMO will adopt a claim—again, this is consistent with our model estimates that use the connectivity operationalization of claim cohesion.

Fringe SMOs

Another possible explanation for our findings is that our coefficient estimates might be driven by SMOs that tend to sit at the fringes of their home SMIs. In other words, some SMOs might be appropriately categorized in multiple SMIs, such as the group "Women Strike for Peace," which was actively involved in both the peace and the women's movements in the 1970s and 1980s (Soule and

Table A3. Estimated Coefficients from Logistic Regressions of SMO Diversification, Using Moody-White Operationalization of SMI Claim Cohesion

	DV: SMO Diversification (Binary Logistic Regression)		DV: Diversification into Target SMI (Conditional Logistic Regression)	
	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8
Target SMI claim cohesion (Moody-White operationalization)			.274*** (.042)	.242*** (.043)
Target SMI claim focus				.093* (.046)
Home SMI claim cohesion (Moody-White operationalization)	−.359*** (.080)	−.291*** (.082)	−.075 (.048)	−.069 (.048)
Home SMI claim focus		−.174* (.081)	.024 (.059)	.011 (.060)
Intercept	1.863 (1.031)	2.193* (1.035)	−3.332*** (.569)	−3.353*** (.570)
Target SMI dummies	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	−1608.713	−1610.531	−6980.142	6949.504
N (SMO-event-target-SMIs)	4,432	4,432	27,660	27,660

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation. All control variables were included in the models but omitted from the table to conserve space.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

King 2008). Our coding scheme, however, forces categorization into a single home SMI based on the distribution of the SMO's claims across SMIs. It is plausible, however, that such fringe SMOs are not only more likely to diversify by adopting various SMIs' claims, but are also more likely to belong to SMIs that tend to have low cohesion and focus in their goals. To address this concern, we identify fringe SMOs as those that changed their SMI affiliations during our period of study. As mentioned, we observe an SMO switching into a different home SMI if, over time, a plurality of its claims at protest events become affiliated with an SMI other than its initial home SMI. We argue that SMOs that switch are mostly likely to be fringe SMOs. When we remove SMOs that changed their home SMI affiliations from our sample, our overall results do not change substantially.

Highly Active SMOs

Related, our results might also be driven by particularly active SMOs. Specifically, SMOs that frequently take part in protest events might be more sensitive to changes in claim cohesion or focus of their home SMIs. This might be because highly active SMOs are exposed to a broader range of information or more timely news about protest activity within their SMIs, giving them more opportunities to react. To assess this possibility, we removed the top 25 percent most active SMOs from our analysis sample. The coefficients of claim cohesion and focus on SMO diversification remain negative and statistically significant, but the magnitudes of their effects diminish, offering some evidence that highly active SMOs are more sensitive to changes in the cohesion and focus of their affiliated SMIs.

Table A4. Estimated Coefficients from Logistic Regression of SMO Cross-Movement Alliance Formation

	Dependent Variable: SMO Cross-Movement Alliance Formation		
	Model A9	Model A10	Model A11
Home SMI claim cohesion	−.262***		−.276**
	(.070)		(.085)
Home SMI claim focus		−.378***	−.310***
		(.078)	(.081)
Intercept	3.477**	4.129***	3.668**
	(1.117)	(1.115)	(1.124)
SMO dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Home SMI dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	−1605.587	−1600.771	−1592.034
N (SMO-events)	4,432	4,432	4,432

Note: Some SMO-events were dropped because we begin our analysis in 1963, given that the calculation of some of our independent variables, such as SMI cohesion, require observing protest events in a prior three-year window. All continuous variables were standardized before model estimation. All control variables were included in the models but omitted from the table to conserve space.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

SMI Size

Our measures of an SMI's claim cohesion and focus might also co-vary with the number of unique claims in the SMI—that is, the total scope of claims in the SMI—which in turn affects the propensity for an affiliated SMO to diversify. Although our models control for the total number of claims reported at events in an SMO's home SMI, our results are only valid if we assume that the true relationship between the total number of claims and claim cohesion and focus is linear. A separate analysis also controls for the quadratic effect of the total number of claims, which did not affect our results. In addition, we created a subsample of SMOs that belonged to large SMIs and a subsample of SMOs that belonged to small SMIs. A large SMI is one in which the number of claims in a given year is above the median number of claims made in an SMI that same year; a small SMI is defined as the opposite. Our main results are substantively similar for each subsample.

Cross-Movement Alliance Formation

Our operationalization of movement organizational diversification is relatively conservative, but there might be other organizational activity that could be considered diversifying behavior that our outcome variable would not qualitatively capture. Namely, Van Dyke and McCammon (2010) suggest that alliance formation between social movement organizations constitutes a strategy for resource mobilization by increasing the breadth of a component organization's issue spectrum (see also McCammon and Moon 2015). For example, when environmental groups and women's movement groups join together in protest, their alliance can be indicative of an attempt from either side to diversify. Therefore, although in such a case a protest organization might not adopt an issue from a different movement as its own, a cross-movement alliance suggests the organization is at least sympathetic to and willing to embrace the causes of other movements.

To investigate this alternative measurement of diversification, we created a new outcome variable, *cross-movement alliance formation*, which indicates whether a focal movement organization participated in a protest event in which there was also participation by another movement organization that belonged to a different social movement industry. Cross-movement alliance formation occurred in 21.9 percent of the SMO-events in our sample. Table A4 reports results of three logistic regression models with the sample specifications as in Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3. The results show that greater claim cohesion and claim focus in a home SMI decreases the likelihood that a focal SMO participates in a protest event with at least one other SMO from a different SMI. In other words, just as greater cohesion and focus constrain SMO diversification when construed conservatively as the adoption of claims outside a home SMI, these factors also limit diversification through alliance formation.

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Notes

1. Pfeffer (1993:606) succinctly puts it as follows: "because paradigm development is associated with power, it affects patterns of citations . . . there is more tendency, when cross-citations are observed, for citations in low-paradigm fields to come from fields that are more paradigmatically developed. For instance, there are many more citations to economics in both the sociology and organizations literature than there are citations in economics to either organizations or sociology." Empirically, Baron and Hannan (1994) report a 650 percent increase in citations to articles in economics journals in the *American Sociological Review* and a 1,100 percent increase in the *American Journal of Sociology* between 1970 and 1980.

2. For the DoCA coding manual, please see: http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/COLLECTION%20&%20CODING%20MANUAL.docx (last accessed July 24, 2018).

3. Because coders recorded information by hand, one SMO could be found under different recorded labels. For example, in the raw protest event data, the NAACP could appear as "N.A.A.C.P.," "The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," or any number of iterations. This presents a major challenge in our empirical analysis, because failing to disambiguate SMO names accurately can lead to measurement error. We therefore follow and further improve on Wang and Soule's (2012) effort to reduce errors in the labeling of SMOs. An additional SMO name-cleaning project was undertaken by Jennifer Earl and collaborators for the DoCA dataset and produced a list of 5,297 unique SMOs (see https://jearl.faculty.arizona.edu/content/social-movement-organizations-meta-data, last accessed July 24, 2018). In comparing our SMO name lists, the Earl and colleagues list combines local chapters into singular organizations in situations whereas our list does not. We present our results using Wang and Soule's (2012) SMO name list, but we also conducted our analyses using Earl and colleagues' version; this did not generate any substantial differences in our findings.

4. Although there are over 23,000 events in the full dataset, 10,114 protest events actually contained mention of an SMO. Because we could only analyze SMOs that were mentioned in at least two protest events, our final sample contained 7,211 protest events, which excludes protest events containing *only* mentions of SMOs that appear at *only one* protest event. The final sample of protest events we used to generate our data did not differ largely from the full sample in terms of key characteristics such as protest size, geographic distribution, distribution across movement industries, intended target type, or reports of police action. However, violent activity was reported at higher rates for the full sample (14.9 percent of events) compared with our analysis sample (10.0 percent of events). In addition, whereas in the full sample 34.5 percent of the events took place in the 1960s,

43.5 percent of the events in our analysis sample occurred in the 1960s.

5. See pg. 21 of the DoCA Coding Manual for full categorization (http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/COLLECTION%20&%20CODING%20MANUAL.docx) (last accessed July 24, 2018).

6. The eight other claims we could not categorize into our SMIs were "civil rights—farm workers/migrant farmers" (claim code 2200), "civil rights—undifferentiated minority groups" (claim code 2300), "drug control" (claim code 1326), "gun control" (claim code 1327), "drunk driving" (claim code 1328), "political figure" (claim code 1336), "anti-crime movement" (claim code 1337), and "misc. religious claims" (claim code 1351).

   Because we categorized claims into industries based on the fixed definitions of each claim, the set of claims associated with each industry does not change throughout our study period. Note, too, that the DoCA data do not include data on union events, so any protest events that included claims about labor, but which were not organized by unions, are included in the "other" claim code (1400), which we could not categorize into our SMIs.

7. We also estimated our models by coding diversification as 1 regardless of the number of SMOs present or whether claims from the focal SMO's home SMI were reported. Coefficient estimates for our main independent variables in this scenario are greater in magnitude but are not statistically significantly different from what we report in our main results. In addition, it is plausible that the *first* instance in which an SMO diversifies in our dataset is not necessarily a strong indicator of diversification, especially if it is the *only* instance in which the SMO adopts a claim from outside its home SMI. To address this possibility, we created a version of our dependent variable in which we only coded diversification as 1 for an SMO-event if there was at least *one* prior event in which the SMO diversified. We also created versions that raised the threshold to *two, three, four*, and *five* prior events in which the SMO diversified.

8. To rule out misspecification, in supplementary analyses in our Appendix, we also use a secondary measurement approach that comes from Moody and White's (2003) conceptualization of *structural embeddedness*, which incorporates tie redundancy in measuring network cohesion. We also describe how our node connectivity measure has advantages over other measures of network connectedness in our context.

9. A component in a network refers to the largest subgraph in which each node can reach another node through some combination of paths; thus, a network can be composed of multiple components of different sizes.

10. Although controlling for home SMI can account for time-invariant differences across SMIs in the baseline tendencies of the SMOs therein to diversify, it does not control for how these baseline tendencies change over time. We therefore also estimated our models testing Hypotheses 1 and 3 by including an additional control variable—specifically, SMO-led events in the prior three years making at least one claim in an SMO's home SMI, and we measure the proportion that also included claims from other SMIs. This measure accounts for the past tendency of SMOs in a given SMI to participate in movement-spanning events. Controlling for this variable does not substantially affect our main results.

11. We estimated a model with dummy variables for decade (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s), which do not alter our main results.

12. Bootstrapping draws on the theory underpinning Monte Carlo methods but uses resamples of the original data. As the number of repetitions increases, the bootstrapped estimates converge to the true parameters. Our bootstrapped estimates are based on 2,000 iterations. We implemented our bootstrap estimation using the "boot" package in R (Davison and Kuonen 2002).

13. The probit specification of the model does not have any substantial differences with the logit specification in Model 4 of Table 3. Although unreported, the probit model results are available from the authors. The calculation of the inverse Mills ratio from the probit model uses the following formula: $\frac{\phi(\widehat{Y_i})}{\Phi(\widehat{Y_i})}$, where $\widehat{Y_i}$ refers to the predicted probability of diversification for SMO-event *i* according to the probit model, and ϕ and Φ refer to the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) for a standard normal variable, respectively. This approach follows Dubin and Rivers's (1989) method of calculating the inverse Mills ratio from a first-stage probit selection model to include in a second-stage logistic regression model.

14. The *Policy Agenda Project* data are available at: https://www.comparativeagendas.net/datasets_codebooks (last accessed January 10, 2019). We take advantage of a "cross-walk" that coders and research assistants on the Dynamics of Collective Action Project developed to connect the claims coded in each protest event to the most relevant policy agenda subtopic codes that denote the content of a bill under consideration by Congress. For example, in the 1963 issue of the *CQ*, an article was published documenting a report issued by the Civil Rights Commission, the agenda subtopic code for which corresponds to the protest event claim code for African American civil rights. For more information on the coding scheme and procedure, please see: http://www.stanford.edu/group/

collectiveaction/POLICY%20AGENDA%20
CODE%20PROCEDURES.docx (last accessed
December 25, 2018).

15. See MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993:150). Iacobucci
(2012) also offers a generalization of the weighting
formula to categorical dependent variables more
broadly. See also guidelines offered by Mustillo,
Lizardo, and McVeigh (2018).

16. Given that our outcome variable is binary, we fol-
lowed MacKinnon and Dwyer's (1993) solution
to the situation in which the dependent variable is
binary and the key independent and mediator vari-
ables are continuous. In such cases, to implement
the Sobel test for mediation, MacKinnon and Dwyer
recommend using a specific formula to weight the
standard errors used to compute test-statistics. See
also Iacobucci (2012) for a generalization of the
weighting formula to categorical dependent vari-
ables more broadly.

17. https://www.naacp.org/about-us/ (last accessed
November 14, 2018); https://now.org/issues/ (last
accessed July 24, 2018); http://nationalsclc.org/cat-
egory/justice-for-girls/ (last accessed July 24, 2018)

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