
model-based planning I: motivations and methods

ccnss 2018.07.06


slides and references available at

http://aaron.bornstein.org/ccnss/

(p)review: mdps + tdrl



(p)review: mdps + tdrl




$$Q(S,A) = Q(S,A) + \alpha[R - Q(S,A)]$$

(p)review: multi-armed bandit, action selection



(p)review: selection policy - decide how to decide



(p)review: q-learning with stochastic action selection

```
Q-learning (off-policy TD control) for estimating \pi \approx \pi_*
Algorithm parameters: step size \alpha \in (0, 1], small \varepsilon > 0
Initialize Q(s, a), for all s \in S^+, a \in A(s), arbitrarily except that Q(terminal, \cdot) = 0
Loop for each episode:
   Initialize S
   Loop for each step of episode:
       Choose A from S using policy derived from Q (e.g., \varepsilon-greedy)
       Take action A, observe R, S'
      Q(S, A) \leftarrow Q(S, A) + \alpha [R + \gamma \max_a Q(S', a) - Q(S, A)]
       S \leftarrow S'
   until S is terminal
```

outline

I. motivations

II. behavioral signatures


III. neural substrates

IV. if time: open questions


outline

- I. motivations
- II. behavioral signatures
- III. neural substrates
- IV. if time: open questions


multi-step decisions




multi-step decisions




outcome devaluation




tdrl is "devaluation insensitive"




outcome-sensitive




"online planning" with simulated experience




"offline planning" update via simulated outcomes



dyna-q: "offline" updates using previous experience





"overtraining"



(adams 1982; dickinson et al 1998)

"overtraining"





interim summary

internal model simulated experience

decision-time ("online") planning background ("offline") planning

- allows sensitivity to changes in outcome value ("devaluation-sensitive")
 - even with no direct experience!
 - animals are, mostly, devaluation-sensitive
 - inference: they are using a "flexible" "action-outcome" (A-O) representation
 - ... *unless* they are "overtrained"
 - inference: some other "stimulus-response" (S-R) representation takes over


outline

- I. motivations
- II. behavioral signatures
- III. neural substrates
- IV. if time: open questions


signatures of model-based planning

- sensitivity to outcome devaluation is one signature of model-based planning
- but not the most useful, in practice:
 - difficult to elicit overtraining / devaluation insensitivity in healthy humans
 - blocked tasks with coarse behavioral transition between "overtrained" and non-
 - would like a task that can elicit model-based and/or model-free behaviors, repeatedly
- another idea: test the model *update*

the "two-step task"



the "two-step task"




$$ModelFreeIndex = P(stay|RC) + P(stay|RU) - P(stay|OC) - P(stay|OU) \\ ModelBasedIndex = P(stay|RC) - P(stay|RU) - P(stay|OC) + P(stay|OU)$$

(daw et al 2011; decker et al 2016)

the "two-step task"


■ Common Transition on Previous Trial

1.0 First-Stage Stays Proportion of .5



Rare Transition on Previous Trial









(daw et al 2011; decker et al 2016)


No Reward

models in development




"implicit" model-based





"implicit" model-based


70% Probability (Common Transition) 30% Probability





uncertainty-based arbitration

- if these are to be combined, how might they be combined?
- idea: "uncertainty-based arbitration" (daw et al 2005)
 - at state S, each controller (mb, mf) produces a candidate action A
 - these are **Bayesian**, not point estimates they carry distributions over Q(s,a)
 - thus they code for the **uncertainty** of each controller
- the source of the uncertainty depends on the controller
 - model-free uncertainty arises from little experience
 - width of the posterior of Q(s,a)
 - model-based uncertainty arises from
 - estimation variance, e.g. width of the posterior of the transition function, due to computational "noise" presumed heuristics (such as tree search strategies) of online planning
- explains transition from flexible to inflexible behavior



"model-basedness" as a personality trait


- "model-based" index correlates with a variety of stable or semi-stable personality traits
 - working memory span (otto et al 2014)
 - moral judgements (crockett 2016)
 - negatively with compulsion disorders (gillan et al 2015, 2016; voon et al 2015)
 - negatively with schizophrenia symptoms (culbreth et al 2016)
 - patience in *deliberative* (not reflexive) intertemporal choice (shenhav et al 2016; hunter, bornstein, hartley in prep; cf solway et al 2017)

one back stay/switch


$$ModelFreeIndex = P(stay|RC) + P(stay|RU) - P(stay|OC) - P(stay|OU) \ ModelBasedIndex = P(stay|RC) - P(stay|RU) - P(stay|OC) + P(stay|OU) \$$



n-back to the future




model-free looks model-based in less-stochastic task




"slow" model-free can look model-based

One-Trial-Back Analysis substantially affected by learning rate



n-back to the future




n-back to the future

$$egin{aligned} log\left(rac{P_{left}(t)}{P_{right}(t)}
ight) &= \sum_{ au=1}^{T}eta_{RC}(au)*RC(t- au) \ &+ \sum_{ au=1}^{T}eta_{RU}(au)*RU(t- au) \ &+ \sum_{ au=1}^{T}eta_{OC}(au)*OC(t- au) \ &+ \sum_{ au=1}^{T}eta_{OU}(au)*OU(t- au) \end{aligned}$$


$$ModelFreeIndex = \sum_{ au=1}^{T} \left[eta_{RC}(au) + eta_{RU}(au)
ight] - \sum_{ au=1}^{T} \left[eta_{OU}(au) + eta_{OC}(au)
ight] \\ PlanningIndex = \sum_{ au=1}^{T} \left[eta_{RC}(au) - eta_{RU}(au)
ight] + \sum_{ au=1}^{T} \left[eta_{OU}(au) - eta_{OC}(au)
ight]$$

model-free can look model-based





"slow" model-free can look model-based


One-Trial-Back Analysis substantially affected by learning rate





Many-Trials-Back Analysis less affected by learning rate

















interim summary

- "model-based" behavior can be distinguished by:
 - a. **outcome-sensitivity**: quick response to outcome devaluation
 - b. **offline updating**: value function updates that reflect knowledge of transition structure
 - c. <u>online evaluation</u>: use of transition function to make online decisions with novel rewards
- model-based and model-free behavior can "trade off" based on computational demands of the current task
 - model-free: simple structure, lots of experience
 - model-based: complex structure, little experience

outline


- I. motivations
- II. behavioral signatures

III. neural substrates

IV. if time: open questions


neural substrates: striatal subdivisions

- muscimol inactivations to dorsolateral striatum impair overtraining (yin et al 2004)
- inactivations to dorsomedial striatum enhance devaluation-insensitivity (yin et al 2005)
- interpretation:
 - neural ensembles in DLS reflect "stimulus-response" (S-R) associations
 - in DMS, "action-outcome" (A-O) associations




neural substrates: RPE


- ventral striatum is a primary target of the midbrain dopaminergic nuclei
- BOLD signal in vStr tracks RPE (mcclure et al 2004; daw, o'doherty et al 2006)
- in *repeated* choice tasks, RPE reflects a mixture of model-based and model-free influence (daw et al 2011; simon & daw 2011)
- in planning-based tasks, RPE reflects solely model-based influence (bornstein & daw 2013)



multiple model-based




only hippocampus predicts planning for reward





only hippocampus predicts planning for reward



where is are the model<u>s</u>?

- cerebellum (doya et al 2002)
- lateral PFC/prelimbic (PL) cortex:
 - inactivations impair A-O learning (balleine et al 1998)
 - "state prediction errors" (glascher et al 2010)
 - muscimol inactivation impairs transitive reward inference (pan et al 2018)
- dorsomedial striatum/SMA:
 - inactivation impairs sensitivity to outcome-devaluation (yin et al 2005)
 - "ramping" predicts decisions (ding, gold 2010)
 - fast-timescale S-S transition learning (bornstein & daw 2012, 2013)
- MTL/hippocampus:
 - (right, but not left) MTL lesion patients are "model-free" in 2-step task (vikbladh et al 2018a)
 - slow-timescale S-S transition learning (bornstein & daw 2012, 2013)
 - "cognitive map" / replay (foster & wilson 2006; johnson & redish 2007; pfeiffer & foster 2013)

summary


- "model-based" **planning**...
 - allows fast adaptation to changes in both rewards and contingencies
 - relies on a **value function**, just like "model-free" methods
 - but augments this with a **model** that can be used to update the value function via simulated experience
- multiple **representations** can be used to make decisions
 - these reflect various physical (motor, sensory) and latent (cognitive) structure(s)
 - the influence of each representation may depend on the uncertainty in that representation
- model use can be "online" or "offline"
 - these can be mutually beneficial


outline

- I. motivations
- II. behavioral signatures
- III. neural substrates
- IV. open questions

open q: is anything truly "model-free"?


- pretty much every healthy behavior/neural signal reflects model use (doll et al 2012)
- model-based/model-free == goal-directed/habit?





open q: is anything truly "model-free"?

- pretty much every behavior/neural signature model-based (doll et al 2012)



open q: underlying representations

- computational RL: many varieties of "model"
 - *sample* models v *distribution* models

open question: sample updates or expected updates?

- distribution models can be used to generate samples, or to compute entire expectations
- this can be difficult to distinguish experimentally, at the level of aggregate behavior
- can even be difficult to distinguish at the level of neural activity! (beck et al 2008; berkes et al 2010)

- neuroscience: a continuum of representations

- full state-space (daw et al 2005; glascher et al 2010; smittenar et al 2013; wilson et al 2016)
- flexible action sequences (doya et al 2002; bornstein & daw 2012)
- flexible stim-stim sequences (dayan 1993; bornstein & daw 2012, 2013)
- episodes (lengyel & dayan 2008; bornstein & daw 2013; bornstein et al 2017a,b; vikbladh et al 2018a,b; ritter et al 2018)

- further frontiers

- not just states or plans (e.g. categories http://www.j-paine.org/dobbs/why-be-interested-in-categories.html)
- general principles apply across representations: learning incrementally, by experience, direct or simulated

open q: trajectory sampling?

- no one has yet decoded *multi*-step decisions, either offline or online

- thus it's an open question whether planning is trajectory sampling, or single-step value-function updates

tomorrow

- state inference

- decisions by sampling (from memory)

- the episodic memory route to model-based planning

further reading

- all cited papers are at: http://aaron.bornstein.org/ccnss/
 - plus some others i think are worth reading

- 2nd edition of sutton & barto book (latest update 2018.<u>07.03</u>): http://incompleteideas.net/book/the-book-2nd.html

- forthcoming book: "goal-directed decision making: computations and neural circuits" ask for pdfs in a couple months
 - table of contents: http://aaron.bornstein.org/cv/pubs/2018 gdcnc/
- happy to talk about research any time \implies <u>aaron@bornstein.org</u>