

ter•ror•ism (noun)

a violent act
by non-governmental actors
to create fear
for political purposes

"terrorism from below" vs. "terrorism from above"



c.1880 - c.1920

examples:

1881 Narodnaya Volya assassinates Tsar Alexander II

1901 Leon Czolgosz assassinates US President McKinley

1905 Terrorist Brigade operates in Switzerland and Finland

1914 Archduke Ferdinand's assassination starts World War I



c.1880 - c.1920

wave 2: anti-colonial

c.1910 - c.1960

examples:

1928-66 Muslim Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus in British Egypt

1931-48 Irgun fights to create Israel out of British Palestine

1955-59 EOKA fights for Cyprus' independence from Britain

1954-62 FLN fights for Algerian independence from France



c.1880 - c.1920

wave 2: anti-colonial

c.1910 - c.1960

wave 3: revolutionary c.1960 - c.2000

examples:

PLO in Palestinian territories 1964+

1970-90 "Contras" in Nicaragua

1970-93 Red Army Faction in West Germany

1980-92 Shining Path in Peru

tacit encouragement from USSR and USA



c.1880 - c.1920

wave 2: anti-colonial

c.1910 - c.1960

wave 3: revolutionary

c.1960 - c.2000

wave 4: religious

c.1980 - present

examples:

1976-09 Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Hindu)

1984-00 Aum Shinrikyo in Japan (Cult)

1987+ Hamas in Palestinian territories (Islamic)

1991+ Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda (Christian)

1994+ Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan (Islamic)

1880

1910

1940

1970

2000

	tactics	targets	
wave I	assassinations, dynamite, suicide missions	government, heads of business	
wave 2	assassinations, firearms, guerrilla attacks	government, military	
wave 3	hostages, firearms, high explosives, guerrilla attacks, assassinations	mainly military, some civilians	
wave 4	suicide bombs, improvised explosives, firearms, unconventional methods	mainly civilians, some military	
1880	1910 1940 1	970 2000	

conventional studies of terrorism

- · historical, descriptive, policy-oriented
- focused on incidence and strategy (spoiler effects, substitution, public support)
- correlations
 (democracies, political motivation, strategic opportunities, alliances, material support)
- mainly use aggregate measures (totals, binary variables)
- general linear model (regressions)

thus

 theories of rational behavior, context and strategic issues

 (a la economics)

- severity of events typically ignored
- theories rarely mechanistic (but often psychological)
- · few general "laws"
- little hope of forecasting (context, context, context)



MIPT TERRORISM

KNOWLEDGE BASE™

incident profile

ABU HAFS AL-MASRI BRIGADE AND SECRET ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAEDA IN EUROPE ATTACKED TRANSPORTATION TARGET (JULY 7, 2005, UNITED KINGDOM)

Incident Date: July 7, 2005

Terrorist Organization(s): Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade ,

Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe

Target: Transportation

City: London

Country: United Kingdom

Region: Western Europe

Tactic: Bombing

Weapon: Explosives


Fatalities: 27

Injuries: 0




RAND-MIPT data


- •40 years (1968-2008)
- domestic + international
- 5000+ cities, 187 countries
- 36,018 events (37% deadly)





deaths per million people, USA 2007


terrorism	0	
lightning	0.15	
bee sting	0.18	×1.2
airplane crash	0.23*	×1.5
homicide	61.74*	×408.3
car crash	124.43	×829.5











comments

- individual events no worse, on average
- number of fatal events increased exponentially
- odd lulls in 1992, 2006

severe events ("outlier" events)


- relatively few casualties (automobiles > terrorism)
- very infrequent
- disproportionate economic, political effects

For example: major re-organization of US/UK national security apparatus after 9.11.2001


- 21 Dec. 1988: Pan Am Flight 103, Lockerbie Scotland (270 deaths)
- 19 Apr. 1995: Oklahoma City bombing (168 deaths)
- 11 Sept. 2001: World Trade Center (2749 deaths)
- 12 Oct. 2002: Bali nightclub bombing (202 deaths)
- 26 Nov. 2008: Lashkar-e-Taiba attack in South Mumbai (173 deaths)




13,274 deadly attacks, 1968-2008



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testing the power law

	\hat{x}_{\min}	\hat{lpha}	\hat{n}_{tail}	p	
deaths	10	2.4 ± 0.2	1024	0.44	←

power-law is plausible model for deaths

- no fundamental difference, big vs. small
- \hat{x}_{\min} marks "severe event" range
- could estimate risk of future severe events (additional validation needed for this)
- can use power-law model for additional analysis

variations

how does frequency-severity distribution vary with

- time
- weapon type
- economic development

variation with time

study events in each 24 month interval

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
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
Injuries: 0



variation with time


- ave. log-severity largely stable over 40 years
- apparent periodicity in ave. log-severity at years $\tau \approx 13$





variation with time

- scaling exponent largely stable over 40 years
- suggests severity distribution largely stable
- main difference today: many more events



variation by weapon

- · chem/bio
- explosives
- fire/arson
- firearms
- knives
- other/unconventional

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
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variation by weapon

- more apparent power-law behavior
- but different \hat{lpha} , \hat{x}_{\min}
- not ubiquitous: no power laws by region
- explosives most deadly, overall



variation by economy



- 30 countries (USA, Japan, France, UK, Turkey...)
- tracks economic statistics and data for these 30 + 70 others

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
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economy alone?

$x \ge x_{\min}$	of total	
335	26.9%	
201	16.2%	
109	8.8%	
98	7.9%	other factors must be
93	7.5%	involved
76	6.1%	
73	5.9%	
62	5.0%	
1047	84.2%	
	335 201 109 98 93 76 73 62	$ \begin{array}{ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

comments

power-law pattern holds for

- different decades (70s, 80s, 90s, 00s)
- different types of weapon (guns, fire, bombs, etc.)
- different levels of economic development (OECD)
- but not for "regions" or suicide attacks

open questions

- what creates this simple and robust pattern?*
- what does this mean for long-term planning? (can we make accurate statistical forecasts?)

generating the power law

model I:

 competition between states and terrorists leads to exponential sampling (a la Reeds & Hughes)
 [Clauset, Young & Gleditsch (2007)]

model 2:

 population density fluctuations + densitydependent targeting (a la Reed & Huges)
 [Clauset, Young & Gleditsch (2010)]

model 3:

 self-organized critical, fission-fusion model of group dynamics leads to power-law in cell sizes [Johnson et al. (2009), Clauset & Weigel (2010)]

tuesday:

terrorist organizations or civil wars



