



# The Soviet Nuclear Program to 1949

Jake Hecla 3/18/21

# It all started with a letter









# Wartime Soviet nuclear research was disorganized








# Wartime Soviet nuclear research was disorganized





# Molotov's term of management was not a success





# Potsdam, July-August 1945





## Stalin knew about the bomb, but didn't understand Truman



"What one side (for example, the United States) chooses to reveal to its opposite number is subjected to a series of questions: Was this an honest revelation? What was left out? Why tell specifically this piece of information? Why tell us now?"

Gordin, Michael D.. Red Cloud at Dawn (p. 15).


# Late 1945: Project re-organized with Beria at the head





# Limiting reagents: Uranium and labor






Scramble for U left USSR without easy sources

# Under Beria, work accelerated dramatically





- Special committee convened: August 1945
- First criticality of graphite pile: October 1946

#### Post-46 structure



Stalin
Council of Ministers



L.P. Beria, Minister of Internal Affairs



#### **First Chief Administration**

Gen. Boris Vannikov

I.V. Kurchatov

#### KB-11 design bureau (VNIIEF/Arzamas-16/Sarov)

Lt. Gen. Pavel Zernov (production)

**Production staff** 

I.B. Khariton (scientific)

Scientific staff

#### Laboratory No. 2

F-1 reactor (exp.)

#### **Novouralsk**

D-1 Gaseous diffusion enrichment

#### Mayak

Production reactors (3)

#### **Tomsk**

Production reactor

#### **NKVD, later MGB**

NKVD Special Dept. "S"



Vladimir Barkovsky (NY Consulate)



Couriers Harry Gold, Saville Sax



Atomic Spies (Hall, Fuchs, etc.)

# Model of the device with instrumentation mounts









# First bomb was a copy, not so with subsequent designs







- Paraphrasing Sig Hecker "(I.B. Khariton) said that he knew from '45 onward how to build a far better bomb than Fat Man, but could not explore this until after the first test"
- Beria had promised to execute scientists if not successful -- > copy rather than innovate

# Atomic Spies











Agents with access to information









Couriers with access to both agents and official-cover officers








Intelligence officers at Soviet New York Embassy

### Espionage activities were hampered by excessive paranoia






- Stalin and Beria feared that the Manhattan project documents extracted by Hall, Wheeler, Fuchs and others were compromised
- As a result, they were examined at extreme length by technical experts, delaying them and diminishing their effectiveness

# So, did it matter?





Схематический чертеж составленный овы эчета масштаба.

