

Mongol invasions of Vietnam

Four major military campaigns were launched by the Mongol Empire, and later the Yuan dynasty, against the kingdom of Đại Việt (modern-day northern Vietnam) ruled by the Trâ n dynasty and the kingdom of Champa (modern-day central Vietnam) in 1258, 1282-1284, 1285, and 1287-88. The campaigns are treated by a number of scholars as a success due to the establishment of tributary relations with Đại Việt despite the Mongols major military defeats. [14][15][16] suffering contrast, modern Vietnamese historiography regards the war as a major victory against the foreign invaders. [17][14]

The first invasion began in 1258 under the united Mongol Empire, as it looked for alternative paths to invade the Song dynasty. The Mongol general Uriyangkhadai was successful in capturing the Vietnamese capital Thang Long (modern-day Hanoi) before turning north in 1259 to invade the Song dynasty in modern-day Guangxi as part of a coordinated Mongol attack with armies attacking in Sichuan under Möngke Khan and other Mongol armies attacking in modern-day Shandong and Henan. [18] The first invasion also established tributary relations between the Vietnamese kingdom, formerly a Song dynasty tributary state, and the Yuan dynasty. In 1283, Kublai Khan and the Yuan dynasty launched a naval invasion of Champa that also resulted in the establishment of tributary relations.

Intending to demand greater tribute and direct Yuan oversight of local affairs in Đại Việt and Champa, the Yuan launched another invasion in 1285. The second invasion of Đại Việt failed to accomplish its goals, and the Yuan launched a third invasion in 1287 with the intent of replacing the uncooperative Đại Việt ruler Trâ n Nhân Tông with the defected Trâ n prince Trâ n Ích Tắ c. By the end of the second and third invasions, which

Mongol invasions of Đại Việt and Champa^[a]

Part of the Mongol invasions and Kublai Khan's campaigns



Mongol <u>Yuan</u> campaigns against kingdoms of Southeast Asia. [1]

Date 1258, 1283–1284, 1285 and 1287–88

Location Champa and Đại Việt (modern-day

Vietnam)

Result See Aftermath section

Belligerents

Mongol Empire (1258) Yuan dynasty (1283–85 and 1287–88) Đại Việt
Champa
Chinese exiles and
deserters

Commanders and leaders

1257-1258:

Möngke Khan Uriyangkhadai **1257–1258:** Trần Thái Tông

Lê Tần

involved both initial successes and eventual major defeats for the Mongols, both Đại Việt and Champa decided to accept the nominal supremacy of the Yuan dynasty and became tributary states to avoid further conflict. [19][20]

Background

The conquest of Yunnan

By the 1250s, the Mongol Empire controlled large tracts of Eurasia including much of Eastern Anatolia, North China, Mongolia, Europe, Manchuria, Central Asia, Tibet and Southwest Asia. Möngke Khan (r. 1251-59) planned to attack the Song dynasty in southern China from three directions in 1259. [21] To avoid a costly frontal assault on the Song, which would have required a risky forced crossing of the lower Yangtze, Möngke decided to establish a base of operations in southwestern China, from which a flank attack could be staged. [21] At the Kurultai of the summer of 1252, Möngke ordered his brother Kublai to lead the southwest campaign against the Song in Sichuan. In the autumn of 1252, 100,000 Mongols advanced to the Tao River, then penetrated the Sichuan Basin, defeating a Song army and established a major base in Sichuan. [21][22]

When Mongke learned that the king <u>Duan Xingzhi</u> of <u>Dali</u> in <u>Yunnan</u> (a kingdom ruled by the Duan dynasty) refused to negotiate and that his prime minister <u>Gao Xiang</u> murdered the envoys that Möngke had sent to Dali to demand the king's surrender, Möngke ordered Kublai and Uriyangkhadai to attack Dali in summer 1253. [23]

In September 1253, Kublai launched a three-pronged attack on Dali. [22] The western army led by Uriyangkhadai, marching from modern-day Gansu through eastern Tibet toward Dali; the eastern army led by Wang Dezhen marched south from Sichuan, and passed just west of Chengdu before reuniting briefly with Kublai's army in the town of Xichang. Kublai's army met and engaged

Aju	1283–1285 : Trần Thánh
Qaidu ^[b]	Tông
Chechegtu	Trần Nhân Tông
Oncorrogia	Trần Hưng Đạo
1283–1285:	Trần Quang Khải
Kublai Khan	Trần Quốc Toản †
Sogetu †	Trần Bình Trọng †
Nasr ad-Din	Trần Ích Tắc
Yiqmis	Phạm Ngũ Lão
Li Heng †	Nguyễn Khoái Đỗ Hành
Toghon ^[2]	Zhao Zhong
Qutuq ^[3]	Indravarman V
Ariq Qaya	Prince Harijit
Omar	
	1287–1288:
Liu Gui	1207-1200.
<u>Liu Gui</u> Agatai	Trần Nhân Tông
<u>Liu Gui</u> <u>Aqatai</u>	
	Trần Nhân Tông
Aqatai	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo
Aqatai 1287–1288:	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon Omar (POW)	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon Omar (POW) Trần Ích Tắc	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon Omar (POW) Trần Ích Tắc Abači †	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon Omar (POW) Tràn Ích Tắc Abači † Liu Chun-Ching	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon Omar (POW) Trần Ích Tắc Abači † Liu Chun-Ching Fan Yi	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư
Aqatai 1287–1288: Toghon Omar (POW) Trần Ích Tắc Abači † Liu Chun-Ching Fan Yi & Esen-Temür	Trần Nhân Tông Trần Hưng Đạo Trần Quang Khải Trần Khánh Dư

Strength

First	inv	asion
(1258):	•	-3,000
Mongols	8	
10,000		people
(Atwood	l estimat	e)[4]
5,000	Mongol	and
20,000	Yunn	anese
troops	((Taylor
estimate	e) ^[5]	

~30,000 Mongols
2,000 Yi people
(Vietnamese estimate)^[6]
Second invasion
(1285): ~80,000–300,000

(1285): ~80,000–300,000 (some speak of 500,000) **Second invasion of Đại Việt and Champa (1283–1285):**30,000 Chams^[10]
c. 100,000

Vietnamese^[11]

with Dali forces along the Jinsha River. [23] After several skirmishes in which Dali forces repeatedly turned back the Mongol raids, Kublai's army crossed the river on inflated rafts of sheepskin in the night, and routed Dali defensive positions. [24] With Dali forces in disarray, three Mongol columns quickly captured the capital of Dali on December 15, 1253, and even though its ruler had rejected Kublai's submission order, the capital and its inhabitants were spared. [25] Duan Xingzhi and Gao Xiang both fled, but Gao was soon captured and beheaded.[26] Duan Xingzhi fled to Shanchan (modern-day Kunming) and continued to resist the Mongols with aid from local clans until autumn 1255 when he was finally captured. [26]

in March 1285^[7] Third invasion (1288): Remaining forces from the second invasion, Reinforcements: 70,000 Yuan troops 21,000 tribal auxiliaries 500 ships^[8] Total: 170,000^[9]

Casualties and losses

1285: 50.000 captured^[12] Unknown

1288: 90.000 killed or

drowned^[13]

As they had done during other invasions, the Mongols left the native dynasty in place under the supervision of Mongolian officials. [27] Bin Yang noted that the Duan clan was recruited to assist with further invasions of the Burmese Pagan Empire and the initial successful attack on the Vietnamese kingdom of Dai Viêt. [26]

Mongol approach to Đại Việt

At the end of 1254, Kublai returned to Mongolia to consult with his brother about the khagan title. Uriyangkhadai was left in Yunnan, and from 1254 to 1257 he conducted campaigns against local Yi and Lolo tribes. In early 1257 he returned to Gansu and sent messengers to Mongke's court informing his sovereign that Yunnan was now firmly under Mongolian control. Pleased, the emperor honored and generously rewarded Uriyangkhadai for his fine achievement. [27] Uriyangkhadai subsequently returned to Yunnan and began preparing for the first Mongolian incursions into Southeast Asia. [27]

The Đại Việt kingdom, or Annam, emerged in the 960s as the Vietnamese had carved up their territories in northern Vietnam (the Red River Delta) from the local Tang remnant regime since the fall of the Tang empire in 907. The kingdom had gone through four dynasties, all of which had kept a regulated peaceful tributary relationship with the Chinese Song empire. In the autumn of 1257, Uriyangkhadai sent two envoys to the Vietnamese ruler Trâ n Thái Tông (known as Trâ n Nhật Cảnh by the Mongols) demanding submission and a passage to attack the Song from the



Dali and Dai Viet in 1142



Kublai Khan, the fifth Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, and the founder of the Yuan dynasty

south. [28] Trâ`n Thái Tông opposed the encroachment of a foreign army across his territory to attack their ally, therefore the envoys were imprisoned, [29] and soldiers on elephants were prepared to deter the Mongol troops. [30] After the three successive envoys were imprisoned in the capital Thang Long (modern-day Hanoi) of Đại Việt, Uriyangkhadai invaded Đại Việt with generals Trechecdu and Aju in the rear. [31][4]

First invasion of Đại Việt (1258)



First Mongol–Vietnamese war (1257-1258)



Mongol warrior on horseback, preparing a mounted archery shot.

Mongol forces

In early 1258, a Mongol column under <u>Uriyangkhadai</u>, the son of <u>Subutai</u>, entered Đại Việt via Yunnan. According to Vietnamese sources, the Mongol army consisted of at least 30,000 soldiers of whom at least 2,000 were <u>Yi</u> troops from the <u>Dali Kingdom</u>. [6] Modern scholarship points to a force of several thousand Mongols, ordered by Kublai to invade with Uriyangkhadai in command, which battled with the Viet forces on 17 January 1258. [32] Some Western sources estimated that the

Mongol army consisted of about 3,000 Mongol warriors with an additional 10,000 Yi soldiers. [4]

Campaign

In the <u>Battle of Bình Lệ</u> <u>Nguyên</u>, the Vietnamese used war elephants. Emperor <u>Trâ`n Thái Tông</u> even led his army from atop an elephant. [33] Mongol general

Aju ordered his troops to fire arrows at the elephants' feet. [33][30] The animals turned in panic and caused disorder in the Vietnamese army, which was routed.[33][30] The Vietnamese senior leaders were able to escape on preprepared boats, while part of their army was destroyed at No Nguyen (modern Việt Trì on the Red River). The remainder of the Đại Việt army again suffered a major defeat in a fierce battle at the Phú Lô bridge the following day. This led the Vietnamese monarch to evacuate the capital. The Dai Việt annals reported that the evacuation was carried out "in an viewed orderly manner"; however, this is embellishment, because the Vietnamese had to retreat in disarray, leaving their weapons behind in the capital. [33]

Emperor Trâ`n Thái Tông fled to an offshore island, [34][27] while the Mongols occupied the capital city, Thăng Long



Vietnamese elephant, extracted from the Truc Lam Mahasattva scroll



13th-century sword *đao* and iron-hooks.

<u>Trần dynasty</u> period, <u>National Treasure</u>,

Vietnam Military History Museum

(modern-day Hanoi). They found their envoys in prison, with one of them already deceased. In revenge, Mongols massacred the city's inhabitants. [29] Although the Mongols had successfully captured the capital, the provinces around the capital were still under Vietnamese control. [33] While

Chinese source material is sometimes misinterpreted as saying that Uriyangkhadai withdrew from Vietnam due to poor climate, [35][36] Uriyangkhadai left Thang Long after nine days to invade the Song dynasty in modern-day <u>Guangxi</u> in a coordinated Mongol attack, with some armies attacking in <u>Sichuan</u> under <u>Möngke Khan</u> and other armies attacking in modern-day <u>Shandong</u> and <u>Henan</u>. [18] The Mongol army gained the popular local nickname of "Buddhist enemies" because they did not loot or kill while moving north to <u>Yunnan</u>. [37] After the loss of a prince and the capital, emperor Trâ`n Thái Tông submitted to the Mongols. [30]


One month after fleeing the capital in 1258, emperor Trâ`n Thái Tông returned and commenced regular diplomatic relations and a <u>tributary relationship</u> with the Mongol court, treating the Mongols as equals to the embattled Southern Song dynasty without renouncing Đại Việt's ties to the Song. [38][27] In March 1258, emperor Trâ`n Thái Tông retired and let his son, prince <u>Trâ`n Hoảng</u>, succeed to the throne. In the same year, the new emperor sent envoys to the Mongols in <u>Yunnan. [29][27]</u> Having the submission and assistance of the new emperor of Đại Việt, Uriyangkhadai immediately assembled an army of 3,000 Mongol cavalry and 10,000 Dali troops upon his return to Yunnan. Via Đại Việt, he launched a new assault on the Song in the summer of 1259, moving into <u>Guilin</u> and reaching as far as <u>Tanzhou</u> (in modern-day <u>Hunan Province</u>) in a joint offensive led by <u>Möngke</u>. [39]

The sudden death of Möngke in August 1259 halted the Mongol efforts to conquer Song China. In Mongolia, prince Ariq Böke proclaimed himself as ruler of the Mongol Empire. In China, prince Kublai also declared himself as the ruler of the empire. In the following years, the Mongols were preoccupied with the succession struggle between Ariq Böke and Kublai, and the two kingdoms in Vietnam were left in peace. [39]

Invasion of Champa (1283)

Background and diplomacy

With the defeat of the Song dynasty in 1276, the newly established Yuan dynasty turned its attention to the south, particularly Champa and Đại Việt. [41] Kublai was interested in Champa because, by geographical location, it dominated the sea routes between China and the states of Southeast Asia and India. [41] The Mongol court viewed Champa as a key region to control trade in Southeast Asia. [42] The position of Historian Geoff Wade is that they would be able to gain access to commodities from the states across the Indian Ocean through Arab and Persian merchants managing trade from Champa. [43] Although the king of Champa accepted the status of a Mongol protectorate, [44] his submission was unwilling. In late 1281, Kublai issued the edict ordering the mobilization of a hundred ships and ten thousand men, consisting of official Yuan forces, former Song troops and sailors, to invade Sukhothai, Lopburi, Malabar and other countries, and Champa "will be instructed to furnish the food supplies of the troops." [45] However, his plans were canceled, as the Yuan court discussed that they would send envoys to these countries to make them submit to the Yuan. This suggestion was successfully adopted, but these missions all had to pass by or stop at Champa. Kublai knew that pro-Song sentiment was strong in Champa, as the Cham king had been sympathetic to the Song cause. [45]



Mongol Yuan campaigns against Burma, Champa, and Dai Viet and the route of Marco Polo.

Drawn by German archaeologist Albert Herrmann. The location of Cangigu (i.e., Caugigu, which was Tung-king, or Kiao-chi, or Annam) was too far to the west, inside the Mien (Burma) country, contrary to the interpretation of the great French sinologist Paul Pelliot and modern Marco-Polo scholars. See the Yule-Cordier map version below.

A large number of Chinese officials, soldiers and civilians who fled from the Mongols were refugees in Champa, and they inspired and incited to hate the Yuan. [46] Thus, in the summer of 1282, when Yuan envoys He Zizhi, Hangfu Jie, Yu Yongxian, and Yilan passed through Champa, they detained and were



Modern-day remains of Vijaya (Đồ Bàn)

imprisoned by the Cham <u>Prince Harijit</u>. [46] In summer 1282, Kublai ordered <u>Sogetu</u> of the <u>Jalairs</u>, the governor of <u>Guangzhou</u>, to lead a punitive expedition to the Chams. Kublai declared: "The old king (Jaya Indravarman V) is innocent. The ones who oppose to our order are his son (Harijit) and a Southern Chinese." [46] In late 1282, Sogetu led a maritime invasion of Champa with 5,000 men, but could only muster 100 ships and 250 landing crafts because most of the Yuan ships had been lost in the invasions of Japan. [47]

Campaign

Sogetu's fleet arrived on Champa's shore, near modern-day <u>Thi Nai Bay</u>, in February 1283. [48] The Cham defenders had already prepared a fortified wooden palisade on the west shore of the bay. [46] The Mongols landed at midnight of the 13th February and attacked the stockade on three sides. The Cham defenders opened the gate,


marched to the beach and met the Yuan with 10,000 men and several scores of elephants. [10] Undaunted, the highly experienced Mongol general selected points of attack and launched an assault so fierce that they broke through. [48] The Yuan eventually routed their enemy and captured Cham forts and their vast supplies. Sogetu arrived in the Cham capital Vijaya and captured the city two days later, but then withdrew and set up camps outside the city. [10] The aged Champa king Indravarman V abandoned his temporary headquarters in the palace, and set fire to his warehouses and retreated out of the capital, avoiding Mongol attempts to capture him in the hills. [10] The Cham king and prince Harijit both refused to visit the Yuan camp. The Cham executed two captured Yuan envoys and ambushed Sogetu's troops in the mountains. [10]

As the Cham delegates continued to offer excuses, the Yuan commanders gradually began to realize that the Chams had no intention of coming to terms and were only using the negotiations to stall for time. From a captured spy, Sogetu knew that Indravarman had 20,000 men with him in the mountains; he had summoned Cham reinforcements from Panduranga (Phan Rang) in the south, and also dispatched emissaries to Đại Việt, the Khmer Empire and Java to seek aid. 90 n 16 March, Sogetu sent a strong force into the mountains to seek and destroy the hideout of the Cham king. It was ambushed and driven back with heavy losses. 150 His son would wage guerrilla warfare against the Yuan for the next two years, eventually wearing down the invaders.

The Yuan withdrew to the wooden stockade on the beach to await reinforcements and supplies. Sogetu's men unloaded the supplies, cleared fields farming rice so he was able to harvest 150,000 piculs of rice that summer. Sogetu sent two officers to threaten the king of the Khmer Empire, Jayavarman VIII, but they were detained. Stymied by the withdrawal of the Champa king, Sogetu asked Kublai for reinforcements. In March 1284 another Yuan fleet with more than 20,000 troops in 200 ships under Ataqai and Ariq Qaya anchored off the coast of Vijaya. Sogetu presented his plan to have reinforcements to invade Champa marching through the vassalised Đại Việt. Kublai accepted his plan and put his son Toghan in command, with Sogetu as second in command.

Second invasion of Đại Việt (1285)

Interlude (1260-1284)



Marco Polo's itinerary in South West China and South East Asia in the Yule-Cordier edition of Marco Polo's Travels. The location of Caugigu (which was a different name for the kingdom of Dai Viet, i.e., Kiao-chi, or Tung-King, or Annam) in this map is more accurate than in the map by A. Herrmann above.

In 1261, Kublai enfeoffed Trâ`n Thánh Tông as "King of Annam" (*Annan guowang*) and began operating a nominal *darughachi* (tax collector) in Dai Viet. [52] The darughachi, Sayyid Ajall, reported that the Vietnamese king had corrupted him occasionally. [53] In 1267, Kublai was dissatisfied with



King <u>Trần Nhân Tông</u>, the political leader of Đại Việt during the Mongol invasion, ruled from 1278 to 1293

the tributary arrangement, which granted the Yuan dynasty the same amount of tribute that the former Song dynasty had received, and demanded larger payments. [38] He sent his son Hugaci to the Vietnamese court with a list of demands, [53] such as both monarchs submitting in person, censuses, taxes in both money and labor, incense, gold, silver, cinnabar, agarwood, sandalwood, ivory, tortoiseshell, pearls, rhinoceros horn, silk floss, and porcelain cups – requirements that neither of the two kingdoms had met. [38] Later that year, Kublai required that the Đại Việt court send two Muslim merchants, whom he believed to be in Đại Việt, to China, in order for them to serve on missions in the Western regions, and designated the heir apparent of the Yuan as "Prince of Yunnan" to take control of Dali, Shanshan (Kunming) and Đại Việt. This meant that Đại Việt would be incorporated into the Yuan Empire, which the Vietnamese found totally unacceptable. [54]

In 1278, Trâ`n Thái Tông died. King Trâ`n Thánh Tông retired and made crown prince <u>Trâ`n Khâm</u> (known as Trâ`n Nhân Tông, and to the Mongol as Trâ`n Nhật Tôn) his successor. Kublai sent a mission led by Chai Chun to Đại Việt, and once again urged the new king to come to China in person, but the king refused. [55] The Yuan then refused to recognize him as king, and tried to place a Vietnamese defector as king of Đại Việt. [56] Frustrated with the failed diplomatic missions, many Yuan officials urged Kublai to send a punitive expedition to Đại Việt. [57] In 1283,

Khublai Khan sent Ariq Qaya to Đại Việt with an imperial request for Đại Việt to help attack Champa through Vietnamese territory, and demands for provisions and other support for the Yuan army, but the king refused. [58][38]

In 1284, Kublai appointed his son <u>Toghon</u> to command an overland force to assist Sogetu. Toghan demanded that the Vietnamese allow his passage to Champa, in order to attack the Cham army from both north and south, but they refused, and concluded that this was the pretext for a Yuan conquest of Đại Việt. Nhân Tông ordered a defensive war against the Yuan invasion, with Prince <u>Trâ n Quô c Tuâ n</u> in charge of the army. A Yuan envoy recorded that the Vietnamese had already sent 500 ships to help the Cham. In fall 1284, Toghon began moving his troops to the borders with Đại Việt, and in December an envoy reported that Kublai had ordered Toghon, Pingzhang Ali and Ariq Qaya to enter Đại Việt under the guise of attacking Champa, but instead to invade Đại Việt. Southern Song Chinese military officers and civilian officials who had intermarried with the Vietnamese ruling elite then went to serve the government in Champa, as recorded by Zheng Sixiao. Southern Song soldiers were part of the Vietnamese army prepared by King <u>Trâ n Thánh Tông</u> against the second Mongol invasion. Also in the same year, the Venetian traveler <u>Marco Polo</u> almost certainly visited Đại Việt (Caugigu) ellc almost when the Yuan and the Vietnamese were ready for war, then he went to Chengdu via Heni (Amu).

War



Second Mongol invasion of Vietnam (1284–1285)

Mongol advance (January – May 1285)

The Yuan land army invaded Đại Việt under the command of prince Toghon and Uighur general Ariq Qaya, while Tangut general Li Heng and Muslim general Omar led the navy. [67] Another Yuan column entered Đại Việt from Yunnan, led by Nasr ad-Din bin Sayyid Ajall — the Khwarezmian general who was appointed to govern Yunnan and lead the second campaign against the Kingdom of Bagan in winter 1277 — while Yunnan was left to the hands of Yaghan Tegin. The Vietnamese forces were reported to number 100,000. [11] Yuan troops crossed the Nam Quan Pass on 27 January 1285, divided in

six columns while working their way down the rivers. [11] After defeating Vietnamese troops at the battles of Khå Ly and Nội Bàng (in present-day Luc Ngạn), Mongol forces under Omar reached Prince Quố c Tuấ n's stronghold at Vạn Kiế p (modern-day Chí Linh) on 10 February, and three




Portrait of Prince <u>Trần</u> <u>Quốc Tuấn</u> (1228–1300), who was known to the Mongol as *Hưng Đạo đại Vương*, the military hero of Đại Việt during the second and third Mongols invasions

days later they broke the Vietnamese defenses to reach the north bank of the <u>Câ`u River</u>. On 18 February, the Mongols used captured boats and defeated the Vietnamese, successfully crossing the river. All captured soldiers found to have the words "Sát Thát" ("Death to the Mongols") tattooed on

their arms were executed. Instead of advancing further south, the victorious Yuan forces remained on the north bank of the river, fighting daily skirmishes but making few advances against the Vietnamese in the south. [11]

Toghon sent an officer name Tanggudai to instruct Sogetu, who was in <u>Huê´</u>, to march north in a <u>pincer movement</u> while at the same time sending frantic appeals for reinforcements from China, and wrote to the Vietnamese king that the Yuan forces had come in, not as enemies but as allies against Champa. [11] In late February, Sogetu's forces marching north



Vietnamese sailing boat, 1828, image by John Crawfurd

through the pass of Nghệ An, capturing the cities of Vinh and Thanh Hoá, as well as Vietnamese supply bases in Nam Định and Ninh Bình, and taking prisoner 400 Song officers who had fought alongside the Vietnamese. Prince Quố c Tuấ n divided his forces in an effort to prevent Sogetu from joining with Toghon, but this effort failed and they were overwhelmed. Phạm Ngũ Lão fought against the Mongols in this second Mongol invasion as well as in the third Mongol invasion.

In late February, Toghon launched a full offensive against Đại Việt. A Yuan fleet under the command of Omar attacked along the Đuố ng River, captured Thang Long and drove king Nhân Tông to the sea. [67] Many Vietnamese royals and nobles were frightened and defected to the Yuan, including prince Trâ n Ích Tặ c. [70] Having successfully captured the Viet capital, the Yuan found that the city's grain had been taken to deny Yuan access to supplies and therefore Yuan forces could not turn the occupying capital into a strategic gain. [51] The following day, Toghon entered the capital and found nothing but an empty palace. [71] Trâ n Nhân Tông and his army managed to escape to his royal estates in Nam Định, and regrouped there. [59] The Yuan forces under Omar launched two naval offensives in April and drove the Vietnamese forces further south. [67]

Vietnamese counterattack (May – June 1285)

In May 1285, the situation began to change, as the Yuan had overextended their supply network. Toghon ordered Sogetu to lead his troops in an attack on Nam Định (the main Vietnamese base) to seize supplies. [72] In Thăng Long, the situation of the Yuan forces grew desperate. Shortage of food, starvation, summer heat and disease began to drain both manpower and morale. Mongol and Turkic heavy cavalry units were insufficient in such hostile environments which proved suitable only for infantry and naval forces. In a naval battle in Hàm Tử (in modern-day Khoái Châu District) in late May 1285, a contingent of Yuan troops was defeated by a partisan force consisting of former Song troops led by Zhao Zhong under prince Nhật Duật and native militia. [70] On 9 June 1285, Mongol troops evacuated Thang Long to withdraw to China. [72]



Vietnamese military officers during Lý-Trần dynasties.



Vietnamese Imperial
Guards during Lý-Trần
dynasties. The medieval
Vietnamese army
consisted mostly of lightlyarmored troops, but were
capable of maritimewarfare.

Taking advantage, the Vietnamese force under Prince Quô´c Tuâ´n sailed north and attacked the Yuan camp at Van Kiê´p, and further severed Yuan supplies. [68] Many Yuan generals were killed in the battle, among them the senior Li Heng, who was struck by a poisoned arrow. [9] The Yuan forces collapsed into disarray, and Sogetu was killed in the Battle of Chương Dương near the capital by a joint force of Trâ`n Quang Khải, Phạm Ngũ Lão and Trâ`n Quô´c Tuâ´n in June 1285. [73] To protect Toghon, the Yuan soldiers made a copper box in which they hid him inside until they were able to retreat to the Guangxi border. [74] Yuan generals Omar and Liu Gui ran to the sea and escaped to China in a small boat. The Yuan remnants retreated to China in late June 1285, as the Vietnamese king and royals returned to the capital in Thăng Long following six-month conflict. [74][75]

Third invasion of Đại Việt (1287–1288)



Third Mongol invasion of Vietnam (1287-1288)

Background and preparations

In 1286, Kublai appointed <u>Trâ n Thánh Tông</u>'s younger brother, Prince <u>Trâ n Ích Tá c</u>, as the King of Đại Việt from afar with the intent of dealing with the uncooperative incumbent <u>Trâ n Nhân Tông. [76][77]</u> Trâ n Ích Tá c, who had already surrendered to the Yuan, was willing to lead a Yuan army into Đại Việt to take the throne. [76] The Khan cancelled plans underway for a third invasion of Japan in August to concentrate military preparations in the south. [78][79] He accused the Vietnamese of raiding China, and pressed the efforts of China should be

directed towards winning the war against Đại Việt. [80]

In October 1287, the Yuan land forces commanded by Toghon (assisted by Nasr al-Din and Kublai's grandson Esen-Temür; Esen-Temur meanwhile was fighting in Burma) moved southwards from Guangxi and Yunnan in three divisions led by general Abači and Changyu, with the naval expedition led by generals Omar, Zhang Wenhu, and Aoluchi. The army was complemented by a large naval force that advanced from Qinzhou, with the intent to form a large pincer movement against the Vietnamese. The force was composed of 70,000 Mongols, Jurchen, Han Chinese from Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Guangdong; 6,000 Yunnanese troops; 1,000 former Song troops; 6,000 Guangxi troops; 17,000 Li troops from Hainan; and 18,000 crewmen. Total Yuan forces raised up to 170,000 men for this invasion.

Campaign

The Yuan were successful in the early phases of the invasion, occupying and looting the Đại Việt capital. [76]

In January 1288, as Omar's fleet passed through the <u>Ha Long Bay</u> to join Toghon's forces in Van Kiê´p, followed by Zhang Wenhu's supply fleet, the Vietnamese navy under prince <u>Trâ`n Khánh Du</u> attacked and destroyed Wenhu's fleet. [82][78] The Yuan land army under Toghon and naval fleet under Omar, both already in Van Kiê´p, were unaware of the loss of their supply fleet. [82] Despite that, in February 1288 Toghon ordered to attack the Vietnamese forces. Toghon returned to the capital Thăng Long to loot food, while Omar destroyed king Trâ`n Thái Tông's tomb in Thái Bình. [78]

Due to a lack of food supplies, Toghon and Omar's army retreated from Thăng Long to their fortified main base in Van Kiê p northeast of Hanoi on 5 March 1288. [83] They planned to withdraw from Đại Việt but waited for the supplies to arrive before departing. [82] As food supplies ran low and their position became untenable, on the 30th March 1288 Toghon ordered a retreat to China. [83] He boarded a large warship while Prince Hung Đạo, aware of the Yuan retreat, prepared to attack. The Vietnamese destroyed bridges and roads and created traps along the route of the retreating Yuan army. They pursued Toghon's forces to Lang Son, where on April 10th, [13] Toghon himself was struck by a poisoned arrow, [2] and was forced to abandon his ship and avoid highways as he was escorted back through the forests to Siming in Guangxi, China by his few remaining troops. [13] Most of Toghon's land force were killed or captured. [13] Meanwhile, the Yuan fleet commanded by Omar was retreating through the Bach Đǎ ng river. [83]



Wooden stakes from the Bach Dang river in Museum of Vietnam

At the <u>Bach Dā</u> ng <u>River</u> in April 1288, Prince Hung Dao commanding the Vietnamese forces staged an ambush on Omar's Yuan fleet in the <u>third Battle of Bach Dā</u> ng. [76] The Vietnamese placed hidden metal-tipped wooden stakes in the riverbed and attacked the fleet once it had been impaled on the stakes. [82] Omar himself was taken prisoner. [78][13] The Yuan fleet was destroyed and the army retreated in disarray without supplies. [82] A few days later, Zhang Wenhu, who believed that the Yuan armies were still in Van Kiê p and was unaware of the Yuan defeat, sailed his transport fleet



Bạch Đằng River

into the Bach Đă ng river and was destroyed by the Vietnamese navy. [13] Only Wenhu and a few Yuan soldiers managed to escape. [13] Phạm Ngũ Lão fought against the Mongols in this third Mongol invasion as well as in the second Mongol invasion mentioned above. [h][g]

Several thousand Yuan troops, unfamiliar with the terrain, were lost and never regained contact with the main force. [76] An account of the battle by Lê Tǎ c, a Vietnamese scholar who defected to the Yuan in 1285, said that the remnants of the army followed him north in retreat and reached Yuan-controlled territory on the Lunar New Year's Day in 1289. [76] When the Yuan troops were withdrawn before malaria season, Lê Tǎ c went north with them. [85] Many of his companions, ten thousand died between the mountain passes of the Sino-Viet borderlands. [76] After the war Lê Tǎ c got permanently exiled in China, and was appointed by the Yuan government to the position of Prefect of Pacified Siam ($Tongzhi\ Anxianzhou$). [85]

Aftermath

Yuan dynasty

The Yuan dynasty was unable to militarily defeat the Vietnamese and the Cham. [86] Kublai, angry over the Yuan defeats in Đại Việt, banished prince Toghon to $\underline{\text{Yangzhou}}^{[87]}$ and wanted to launch another invasion, but was persuaded in 1291 to send Minister of Rites Zhang Lidao to induce Trâ n Nhân

<u>Tông</u> to come to China. The Yuan mission arrived at the Vietnamese capital on 18 March 1292 and stayed in a guesthouse, where the king made a protocol with Zhang. Trâ n Nhân Tông sent a mission with a memo to return with Zhang Lidao to China. In the memo, Trâ n Nhân Tông explained his inability to visit China. The detail said that of ten Vietnamese envoys to Dadu, six or seven of them died on the way. He wrote a letter to Kublai Khan describing the death and destruction the Mongol armies had wrought, vividly recounting the brutality of the soldiers and the desecration of sacred Buddhist sites. Instead of going to Dadu himself, the Vietnamese king sent a golden statue to the Yuan court and an apology for his "sins". [13][2]

Another Yuan mission was sent in September 1292. As late as 1293, Kublai Khan planned a fourth military campaign to install Trâ`n Ích Tă´c as the King of Đại Việt, but the plans for the campaign were halted when Kublai Khan died in early 1294. The new Yuan emperor, Temür Khan announced that the war with Đại Việt was over, and sent a mission to Đại Việt to restore friendly relations between the two countries.

Đai Việt

Three Mongol and Yuan invasions devastated Đại Việt, but the Vietnamese did not succumb to Yuan demands. Eventually, not a single Trâ`n king or prince visited China. [91] The Trâ`n dynasty of Đại Việt decided to accept the supremacy of the Yuan dynasty in order to avoid further conflicts. In 1289, Đại Việt released most of the Mongol prisoners of war to China, but Omar, whose return Kublai particularly demanded, was intentionally drowned when the boat transporting him was contrived to sink. [78] In the winter of 1289–1290, King Trâ`n Nhân Tông led an attack into modern-day Laos, against the advice of his advisors, with the goal of preventing raids from the inhabitants of the highlands. [92] Famines and starvations ravaged the country from 1290 to 1292. There were no records of what caused the crop failures, but possible factors included neglect of the water control system due to the war, the mobilization of men away from the rice fields, and floods or drought. [92] Although Đại Việt repelled the Yuan, the capital Thăng Long was razed, many Buddhist sites were decimated, and the Vietnamese suffered major losses in population and property. [86] Nhân Tông rebuilt the Thăng Long citadel in 1291 and 1293.

In 1293, Kublai detained the Vietnamese envoy, Đào Tử Kí, because Trâ`n Nhân Tông refused to go to Khanbaliq in person. Kublai's successor <u>Temür Khan</u> (r.1294-1307), later released all detained envoys and resumed their <u>tributary relationship</u> initially established after the first invasion, which continued to the end of the Yuan. [19]

Champa

The Champa Kingdom decided to accept the supremacy of the Yuan dynasty and also established a tributary relationship with the Yuan. [19] In 1305, Cham King Chê´ Mân (r. 1288 – 1307) married the Vietnamese princess Huyê n Trân (daughter of Trâ n Nhân Tông) as he ceded two provinces Ô and Lý to Đại Việt. [17] What following next was a series of chronic Cham–Vietnamese fighting and major wars over the disputed control of ceded provinces for the rest of the 14th century.

Transmission of gunpowder

Before the 13th century, gunpowder in Vietnam was used in the form of firecrackers for entertainment. [93] During the Mongol invasions, an influx of Chinese immigrants from the Southern Song fleeing to Southeast Asia brought gunpowder weapons with them, such as fire arrows and fire lances. The Vietnamese and the Cham developed these weapons further in the next century; [94] when the Ming dynasty conquered Đại Việt in 1407, they found that the Vietnamese were skillful in making a type of fire lance that fires an arrow and a number of lead bullets as co-viative projectiles. [95][96]

Legacy

Despite the military defeats suffered during the campaigns, they are often treated as a success by historians for the Mongols due to the establishment of tributary relations with Đại Việt and Champa. [14][15][16] The initial Mongol goal of placing Đại Việt, a tributary state of the Southern Song dynasty, as their own tributary state was accomplished after the first invasion. [14] However, the Mongols failed to impose their demands of greater tribute and direct <u>darughachi</u> oversight over Đại Việt's internal affairs during their second invasion and their goal of replacing the uncooperative <u>Trâ</u> n Nhân Tông with <u>Trâ</u> n Ích Tǎ c as the King of Đại Việt during the third invasion. [38][76] Nonetheless, friendly relations were established and Dai Viet continued to pay tribute to the Mongol court. [97][98]

Vietnamese historiography emphasizes the Vietnamese military victories. [14] The three invasions, and the Battle of Bach Đa`ng in particular, are remembered within Vietnam and Vietnamese historiography as prototypical examples of Vietnamese resistance against foreign aggression. [38] Prince Tra`n Hung Đạo is greatly remembered as a national hero who secured Vietnamese independence. [87]

See also

- Mongol invasions
- History of the Cham–Vietnamese wars
- Trần dynasty military tactics and organization
- Mongol military tactics and organization



References

Notes

- a. or the Mongol-Viet wars and the Mongol-Cham war
- b. (Tsutsumi 1989: 130) A imperial son-in-law (fuma 駙馬) of Kublai, an Khongirad, not to be confused with Qaidu Khan of the Chagatai Khanate.
- c. See the detailed documentation on Marco Polo's Caugigu (or Đại Việt) by well-known scholars and how to use the chart From Marco Polo to Pham Ngu Lao, 1284 in *Marco Polo's Caugigu Phạm Ngũ Lão's Đại Việt 1285.* (https://archive.org/details/marco-polo-caugigu-pham-ngu-lao-da i-viet-1285)^[65]
- d. Marco Polo's "account is in almost perfect agreement with what we know from Chinese sources on the production or imports, forms, values and exchange rates, weights, denominations as well as use of these currencies in public and private domains. These findings support the argument of

- Haw^[62] and others that Marco Polo's account of the itinerary from Cambaluc to Yunnan, Myanmar and Annam [Đại Việt or Caugigu] is so good (and so much better than has ever previously been appreciated) that he almost certainly undertook it himself."^{[63][c]}
- e. Caugigu refers to *Giao Chỉ*, or Đại Việt, or Annam at the time, the northern part of modern-day Vietnam. [64]
- f. "At the same time [late 1284], Tran Quoc Tuan and his son-in-law Pham Ngu Lao led a force in several hundred war boats through the rivers back to Van Kiep, the headquarters for Togan's supply line from the border to Thang Long." [68]
- g. "Trận Bạch-đằng-giang đánh vào tháng ba năm mậu-tí (1288) lấy được chiến-thuyền của quân Nguyên hơn 400 chiếc và bắt được quân-sĩ rất nhiều. 5. HƯNG-ĐẠO-VƯƠNG ĐẠI PHÁ NGUYÊN-BINH. Thoát Hoan nghe tin quân thủy vỡ tan rồi, dẫn bọn Trình bằng Phi, A bát Xích, Áo lỗ Xích, Trương Quân, Trương Ngọc, đi đường bộ chạy về đến ải Nội-bàng, bỗng gặp quân phục của Phạm ngũ Lão đổ ra đánh." [69] In this classic 1920 Vietnam-history book, [69] it was explicitly stated that Phạm ngũ Lão participated in the battle against the Mongols in 1288.
- h. "Tran Quoc Tuan's son-in-law Pham Ngu Lao, who gained fame for laying ambushes for Togan in the northern mountains, actively led soldiers on the frontiers until just before his death in 1320." [84]

Citations

- 1. Rossabi 2006, p. 486.
- 2. Anderson 2014, p. 129.
- 3. Lo 2012, pp. 289-292.
- 4. Atwood 2004, p. 579.
- 5. Taylor 2013, p. 124.
- 6. Hà & Phạm 2003, pp. 66-68.
- 7. Man 2012, p. 350.
- 8. Atwood 2004, pp. 579–580.
- 9. Anderson 2014, p. 127.
- 10. Lo 2012, p. 288.
- 11. Lo 2012, p. 292.
- 12. Man 2012, p. 351.
- 13. Lo 2012, p. 302.
- 14. Baldanza 2016, p. 17.
- 15. Weatherford 2005, p. 212.
- 16. Hucker 1975, p. 285.
- 17. Aymonier 1893, p. 16.
- 18. Haw 2013, pp. 361–371.
- 19. Bulliet et al. 2014, p. 336.
- 20. Baldanza 2016, p. 17-26.
- 21. Allsen 2006, p. 405.
- 22. Anderson 2014, p. 116.
- 23. Herman 2020, p. 47.
- 24. Anderson 2014, p. 117.
- 25. Allsen 2006, pp. 405-406.
- 26. Anderson 2014, p. 118.

- 27. Allsen 2006, p. 407.
- 28. Sun 2014, p. 206.
- 29. Sun 2014, p. 207.
- 30. Baldanza 2016, p. 18.
- 31. Vu & Sharrock 2014, p. 84.
- 32. Anderson 2014, p. 121.
- 33. Vu & Sharrock 2014, p. 85.
- 34. Lo 2012, p. 284.
- 35. Buell 2009.
- 36. Haw 2013, p. 361-371.
- 37. Vu & Sharrock 2014, p. 86.
- 38. Baldanza 2016, p. 19.
- 39. Anderson 2014, p. 122.
- 40. Rossabi 2006, pp. 422-423.
- 41. Lo 2012, p. 285.
- 42. Anderson 2022, p. 880: "Momoki Shiro notes that the establishment of a foothold in Champa by an official of this position, entrusted with the administration of conquered territory, is evidence that the Yuan court regarded Champa as a pivotal region for the dominance of trade between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean."

- 43. Anderson 2022, p. 880: "Geoff Wade contends that Arab and Persian traders operating in the South China Sea could have been the managers of trade from several of the Cham polities, gaining access to commodities from Africa, the Persian Gulf, as well as Island Southeast Asia."
- 44. Grousset 1970, p. 290.
- 45. Lo 2012, p. 286.
- 46. Lo 2012, p. 287.
- 47. Delgado 2008, p. 158.
- 48. Purton 2010, p. 201.
- 49. Lo 2012, pp. 288-289.
- 50. Lo 2012, p. 289.
- 51. Delgado 2008, p. 159.
- 52. Taylor 2013, p. 128.
- 53. Taylor 2013, p. 128, ibid.
- 54. Sun 2014, p. 208.
- 55. Sun 2014, p. 212.
- 56. Haw 2006, p. 105.
- 57. Sun 2014, p. 213.
- 58. Anderson 2014, p. 123.
- 59. Taylor 2013, p. 133.
- 60. Lo 2012, p. 291.
- 61. Anderson 2014, p. 124.
- 62. Haw 2006, p. 47.
- 63. Vogel 2013, p. 420.
- 64. Polo 2008, p. 354.
- 65. Vu-Quoc-Loc 2023.
- 66. Haw 2006, p. 107.
- 67. Lo 2012, p. 293.
- 68. Taylor 2013, p. 134.
- 69. Trần Trọng Kim 1920.
- 70. Anderson 2014, p. 126.

- 71. Anderson 2014, p. 125.
- 72. Lo 2012, p. 294.
- 73. Stone 2017, p. 76.
- 74. Lo 2012, p. 295.
- 75. Taylor 2013, p. 135.
- 76. Baldanza 2016, p. 24.
- 77. Lo 2012, p. 296.
- 78. Taylor 2013, p. 136.
- 79. Li 2022, p. 909: "Qubilai Qa'an prepared for a third invasion, planned for August 1286, but this was cancelled due to the defeat of the Mongols in their Vietnam campaign. Internal unrest also made later plans impossible to carry out.".
- 80. Lo 2012, p. 281.
- 81. Lo 2012, p. 297.
- 82. Baldanza 2016, p. 26.
- 83. Lo 2012, p. 301.
- 84. Taylor 2013, p. 139.
- 85. Baldanza 2016, p. 25.
- 86. Miksic & Yian 2016, p. 489.
- 87. Man 2012, p. 353.
- 88. Sun 2014, p. 221.
- 89. Sun 2014, p. 223.
- 90. Lo 2012, p. 303.
- 91. Sun 2014, p. 227.
- 92. Taylor 2013, p. 137.
- 93. Baldanza 2016, p. 42.
- 94. Needham 1987, p. 313.
- 95. Needham 1987, p. 240.
- 96. Needham 1987, p. 311.
- 97. Simons 1998, p. 53.
- 98. Walker 2012, p. 242.

Sources

- Allsen, Thomas (2006), "The rise of the Mongolian empire and Mongolian rule in north China", in Franke, Herbert; Twittchet, Denis C. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China Volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907—1368, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 321–413
- Anderson, James A. (2014), "Man and Mongols: the Dali and Đại Việt Kingdoms in the Face of the Northern Invasions", in Anderson, James A.; Whitmore, John K. (eds.), China's Encounters on the South and Southwest: Reforging the Fiery Frontier Over Two Millennia, United States: Brill, pp. 106–134, ISBN 978-9-004-28248-3

- Anderson, James A. (2022), "The Outer Limits of Steppe Power. Mongol excursions in Southeast Asia", in May, Timothy; Hope, Michael (eds.), <u>The Mongol World</u> (https://books.google.com/books?id=1adnEAAAQBAJ), United States: Taylor & Francis, pp. 872–889, ISBN 978-1-351-67631-1
- Atwood, Christopher Pratt (2004). Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire. New York: Facts of File. ISBN 978-0-8160-4671-3.
- Aymonier, Etienne (1893). The History of Tchampa (the Cyamba of Marco Polo, Now Annam Or Cochin-China). Oriental University Institute.
- Baldanza, Kathlene (2016). Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia.
 Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-316-53131-0.
- Biran, Michal; Kim, Hodong, eds. (2023). The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire.
 Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316337424 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2F9781316337424). ISBN 978-1-31633-742-4.
- Buell, P. D. (2009), "Mongols in Vietnam: End of one era, beginning of another", First Congress of the Asian Association of World Historian, Osaka University Nakanoshima-Center, 29-31 May 2009.
- Bulliet, Richard; Crossley, Pamela; Headrick, Daniel; Hirsch, Steven; Johnson, Lyman (2014). The Earth and Its Peoples: A Global History. Cengage Learning. ISBN 9781285965703.
- Chapuis, Oscar (1995). A history of Vietnam: from Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-313-29622-7.
- Connolly, Peter; Gillingham, John; Lazenby, John, eds. (1998). The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient & Medieval Warfare. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-57958-116-9.
- Delgado, James P. (2008). Khubilai Khan's Lost Fleet: In Search of a Legendary Armada. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre. ISBN 978-0-520-25976-8.
- Dutton, George; Werner, Jayne; Whitmore, John K., eds. (2012). Sources of Vietnamese Tradition. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-51110-0.
- Grousset, René (1970). The Empire of the Steppes. Rutgers University Press. ISBN 978-0-8135-1304-1.
- Hà, Văn Tấn; Phạm, Thị Tâm (2003). "III: Cuộc kháng chiến lần thứ nhất" [III: The First Resistance War]. *Cuộc kháng chiến chống xâm lược Nguyên Mông thế kỉ XIII* [The resistance against the Mongol invasion in the 13th century] (in Vietnamese). People's Army Publishing House. ISBN 978-604-89-3615-0.
- Haw, Stephen G. (2013). "The deaths of two Khaghans: a comparison of events in 1242 and 1260". Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 76 (3): 361–371. doi:10.1017/S0041977X13000475 (https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0041977X13000475). JSTOR 24692275 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/24692275).
- Haw, Stephen G. (2006), Marco Polo's China: A Venetian in the Realm of Khubilai Khan, Taylor & Francis
- Herman, John E. (2020), Amid the Clouds and Mist China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200–1700,
 Harvard University Asia Center, ISBN 978-0-674-02591-2
- Hucker, Charles O. (1975). China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture.
 Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804723534.
- Li, Narangoa (2022), "The Mongol Invasions of Japan and their Legacy", in May, Timothy; Hope, Michael (eds.), <u>The Mongol World</u> (https://books.google.com/books?id=1adnEAAAQBAJ), United States: Taylor & Francis, pp. 907–920, ISBN 978-1-351-67631-1
- Lo, Jung-pang (2012). Elleman, Bruce A. (ed.). China as a Sea Power, 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan Periods. Singapore: NUS Press. ISBN 9789971695057.
- Man, John (2012). Kublai Khan. Transworld.

- Miksic, John Norman; Yian, Go Geok (2016). Ancient Southeast Asia. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-317-27903-7.
- Needham, Joseph (1987), Science & Civilisation in China, vol. V:5 pt. 7: The Gunpowder Epic,
 Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-30358-3
- Purton, Peter (2010), A History of the Late Medieval Siege 1200-1500, The Boydell Press
- Rossabi, Morris (2006), "The reign of Khubilai Khan", in Franke, Herbert; Twittchet, Denis C. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China Volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907—1368, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 414–489
- (2009). Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times. University of California Press.
- Simons, G. (1998). The Vietnam Syndrome: Impact on US Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stone, Zofia (2017). Genghis Khan: A Biography. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-93-86367-11 2.
- Sun, Laichen (2014), "Imperial Ideal Compromised: Northern and Southern Courts Across the New Frontier in the Early Yuan Era", in Anderson, James A.; Whitmore, John K. (eds.), China's Encounters on the South and Southwest: Reforging the Fiery Frontier Over Two Millennia, United States: Brill, pp. 193–231
- Taylor, Keith W. (2013). A History of the Vietnamese. Cambridge University Press.
- Trần Trọng Kim (1920), Việt Nam Sử Lược (https://vi.wikisource.org/wiki/Vi%E1%BB%87t_Nam_s%E1%BB%AD_I%C6%B0%E1%BB%A3c), Trung Bắc Tân Văn, Hà Nội, retrieved 19 Jun 2023. Tome I, Part III, Chapter VIII, The Mongol Invaders (1284-1288) (https://vi.wikisource.org/wiki/Vi%E1%BB%87t_Nam_s%E1%BB%AD_I%C6%B0%E1%BB%A3c/Quy%E1%BB%83n_I/Ph%E1%BA%A7n_III/Ch%C6%B0%C6%A1ng_VIII)
- Vogel, Hans Ulrich (2013). Marco Polo was in China: New evidence from currencies, salt and revenue. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, the Netherlands.
- Vu, Hong Lien; Sharrock, Peter (2014). Descending Dragon, Rising Tiger: A History of Vietnam. Reaktion Books.
- Walker, Hugh Dyson (2012). East Asia: A New History. AuthorHouse. ISBN 978-1477265161.
- Vu-Quoc-Loc (2023), Marco Polo's Caugigu Phạm Ngũ Lão's Đại Việt 1285 (https://archive.org/details/marco-polo-caugigu-pham-ngu-lao-dai-viet-1285), retrieved 23 Apr 2023, Internet Archive, CC-BY-SA 4.0.
- Weatherford, Jack (2005). Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. Three Rivers Press. ISBN 978-0-609-80964-8.

Primary sources

- Polo, Marco (2008). The travels of Marco Polo. Translated by W. Marsden and revised by T.
 Wright, newly revised and edited by Peter Harris, with an introduction by Colin Thubron. New York, London, Toronto: Everyman's Library, Alfred A. Knopf.
- Lê, Tắc (1961), An Nam chí lược, A brief history of Annam, University of Hue
- Rustichello da Pisa, The Travels of Marco Polo
- Song Lian (宋濂), *History of Yuan* (元史)
- Rashid-al-Din Hamadani, Jami' al-tawarikh

External links

-			