

Homework 8

Deadline: December 1, 2020; 11:59 AM

1. **(10 points)** Let Alice and Bob be two parties with inputs $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, respectively. They wish to check if their inputs are equal, i.e., whether $a = b$. They want to do this while making sure that they do not learn any other information about the other party's input. In other words, if $a \neq b$, then Alice should not learn b and Bob should not learn a .

Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of prime order q with generator g . They run the following protocol:

- Alice samples a random value $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$. It then computes $X = g^r$ and $Y = g^{ar}$. It sends (X, Y) to Bob.
- Bob computes X^b . It outputs 1 if $X^b = Y$, and 0 otherwise.


Is this protocol secure against semi-honest Alice and Bob? Prove your claim.

2. **(15 points)** Let Alice and Bob have inputs a and b , respectively. They want to securely send $(a + b)$ to a third-party Carol. Devise a protocol where Alice and Bob are only allowed to send **at most one message to each other** and **at most one message each to Carol**. Your protocol should satisfy all of the following security properties:

- *Security against Semi-honest Alice:* Alice should not learn b .
- *Security against Semi-honest Bob:* Bob should not learn a .
- *Security against Semi-honest Carol:* Carol should not learn a and b .

Argue that your protocol indeed satisfies all three security conditions, and gives the correct output to Carol (you don't need to give a formal proof).

3. **(15 points)** Let C be a Boolean circuit as shown in the following figure.



Let $(\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ be the garbling scheme discussed in class. Recall that the $\text{Garble}()$ function, when given this Boolean circuit C as input, outputs the following:

$$(\hat{G} = \{\hat{g}_1, \hat{g}_2, \hat{g}_3\}, \hat{\text{In}} = \{K_0^1, K_1^1, K_0^2, K_1^2, K_0^3, K_1^3, K_0^4, K_1^4\}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C),$$

where \hat{G} is the set of 3 garbled gates and $\hat{\text{In}}$ is the set of wire keys for the 4 input wires in this circuit. In this question, we will show that the privacy of inputs in a garbled circuit only holds if the adversary has exactly one-key for each wire.

Consider an adversary who is given the gate composition of circuit C , garbled gates \hat{G} and input wire keys $\{K_0^1, K_1^1, K_a^2, K_b^3, K_c^4\}$. Note that the adversary gets both the input wire keys for the first input wire, and only one key for each of the remaining 3 input wires. Also note that the values a, b, c are not known to the adversary.

Show how this adversary can use this information to learn at least one of a, b or c .

4. (10 points) Recall the garbled circuit construction discussed in class. Let k_b^w be the key for the w^{th} wire corresponding to input b . For every gate g in C with input wires (i, j) , output wire ℓ , the garbled gate is computed as follows:

First Input	Second Input	Output
k_0^i	k_0^j	$z_1 = \text{Enc}_{k_0^i}(\text{Enc}_{k_0^j}(k_{g(0,0)}^\ell))$
k_0^i	k_1^j	$z_2 = \text{Enc}_{k_0^i}(\text{Enc}_{k_1^j}(k_{g(0,1)}^\ell))$
k_1^i	k_0^j	$z_3 = \text{Enc}_{k_1^i}(\text{Enc}_{k_0^j}(k_{g(1,0)}^\ell))$
k_1^i	k_1^j	$z_4 = \text{Enc}_{k_1^i}(\text{Enc}_{k_1^j}(k_{g(1,1)}^\ell))$

The garbled gate is set as $\hat{g} = \text{RandomShuffle}(z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4)$. Note that in this construction, each key is used to encrypt two messages. For example key k_0^i is used when computing both z_1 and z_2 . Hence, the encryption scheme used in this construction cannot be a one-time secure encryption scheme.

Now consider the following modified construction using one-time pads, which is a one-time secure encryption scheme, where each key $k_b^w = k_b^{w,0} || k_b^{w,1}$. For every gate g in C with input wires (i, j) , output wire ℓ , the garbled gate is now computed as follows:

First Input	Second Input	Output
$k_0^{i,0}$	$k_0^{j,0}$	$z_1 = k_0^{i,0} \oplus k_0^{j,0} \oplus k_{g(0,0)}^\ell$
$k_0^{i,1}$	$k_1^{j,0}$	$z_2 = k_0^{i,1} \oplus k_1^{j,0} \oplus k_{g(0,1)}^\ell$
$k_1^{i,0}$	$k_0^{j,1}$	$z_3 = k_1^{i,0} \oplus k_0^{j,1} \oplus k_{g(1,0)}^\ell$
$k_1^{i,1}$	$k_1^{j,1}$	$z_4 = k_1^{i,1} \oplus k_1^{j,1} \oplus k_{g(1,1)}^\ell$

The garbled gate is set as $\hat{g} = \text{RandomShuffle}(z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4)$. In this modified construction, since each half of the key is only used once, it suffices to use the one-time pad encryption.

Calculate the ratio between the length of an input wire key and the length of a wire key on the last layer, when garbling a circuit of depth d , using this modified construction.