
# One-Way Functions (II)

601.642/442: Modern Cryptography

Fall 2020

# Recap: One Way Functions



- A function is one-way if it "easy to compute," but "hard to invert"
- Necessary for the existence of most cryptographic primitives (e.g., multi-message encryption, digital signatures)
- Also sufficient for some cryptographic primitives (e.g., pseudorandom generators, secret-key encryption, digital signatures).

# Recap: One Way Functions (Definition)

### Definition (One Way Function)

A function  $f: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$  is a <u>one-way function</u> (OWF) if it satisfies the following two conditions:

• Easy to compute: there is a polynomial-time algorithm C s.t.  $\forall x \in \{0,1\}^*$ ,

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{C}(x) = f(x)\right] = 1.$$

• Hard to invert: there exists a <u>negligible</u> function  $\nu : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$  s.t. for every non-uniform PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$ :

$$\Pr\left[x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n, x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^n, f(x)) : f(x') = f(x)\right] \leqslant \nu(n).$$

• The above definition is also called **strong** one-way functions.

# Recap: Factoring Assumption

### Definition (Factoring Assumption)

For every non-uniform PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\nu$  such that

$$\Pr\left[p \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \Pi_n; q \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \Pi_n; N = pq : \mathcal{A}(N) \in \{p, q\}\right] \leqslant \nu(n).$$

$$f_{\times}(x,y) = \begin{cases} \bot & \text{if } x = 1 \lor y = 1\\ x \cdot y & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

• Recall: multiplication function  $f_{\times} : \mathbb{N}^2 \to \mathbb{N}$ .

$$f_{\times}(x,y) = \begin{cases} \bot & \text{if } x = 1 \lor y = 1\\ x \cdot y & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

• Observation 1 (follows from factoring assumption): If randomly chosen x and y happen to be primes, no PPT  $\mathcal{A}$  can invert (except with negligible probability). Call it the GOOD case.

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- If GOOD case occurs with probability  $> \varepsilon$ ,
  - $\Rightarrow$  every PPT  $\mathcal{A}$  must fail to invert  $f_{\times}$  with probability at least  $\varepsilon$ .

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- If GOOD case occurs with probability > ε,
  ⇒ every PPT A must fail to invert f<sub>×</sub> with probability at least ε.
- Now suppose that  $\varepsilon$  is a **noticeable function** (say e.g. an inverse polynomial, i.e.,  $\frac{1}{p(\cdot)}$ )
  - $\Rightarrow$  every  $\mathcal{A}$  must fail to invert  $f_{\times}$  with **noticeable** probability.

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- This is already useful!
- Usually called a **weak** OWF.

#### Noticeable Functions

These are functions that are at most polynomially small.

## Definition (Noticeable Function)

A function  $\nu(n)$  is noticeable if  $\exists c, n_0$  such that  $\forall n > n_0, \ \nu(n) \geqslant \frac{1}{n^c}$ .

# Weak One Way Functions

### Definition (Weak One Way Function)

A function  $f:\{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$  is a weak one-way function if it satisfies the following two conditions:

• Easy to compute: there is a polynomial-time algorithm C s.t.  $\forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ,

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{C}(x) = f(x)\right] = 1.$$

• Somewhat hard to invert: there is a noticeable function  $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$  s.t. for every non-uniform PPT  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$ :

$$\Pr\left[x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^n, f(x)) : f(x') \neq f(x)\right] \geqslant \varepsilon(n).$$

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#### Theorem

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- Proof Idea: The fraction of prime numbers between 1 and  $2^n$  is noticeable!
- Chebyshev's theorem: An n bit number is a prime with probability  $\frac{1}{2n}$

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
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- But if  $\Pr[(x,y) \in \mathsf{GOOD}]$  is noticeable, then overall, the adversary can only invert with some bounded noticeable probability.
- Formally: Let  $q(n) = 8n^2$ . Will show that no non-uniform PPT adversary can invert  $f_{\times}$  with probability greater than  $1 \frac{1}{q(n)}$

**Goal:** Given an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that breaks weak one-wayness of  $f_{\times}$  with probability at least  $1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}$ , we will construct an adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  that breaks the factoring assumption with noticeable probability

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The input of  $\mathcal{B}$  is a product of two random n-bit **primes** while that of  $\mathcal{A}$  is the product of two random n-bit **numbers**. Passing the input directly to  $\mathcal{A}$  would not emulate the distribution of the inputs given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

# Analysis of $\mathcal{B}$

• Since  $\mathcal{A}$  is non-uniform PPT, so is  $\mathcal{B}$  (using polynomial-time primality testing)

$$\begin{split} \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ fails}] &= \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ passes input to } \mathcal{A}] \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ fails to invert } f_{\times}] \\ &+ \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ fails to pass input to } \mathcal{A}] \\ &\leqslant \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ fails to invert } f_{\times}] + \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ fails to pass input to } \mathcal{A}] \\ &\leqslant \frac{1}{8n^2} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{4n^2}\right) \leqslant \left(1 - \frac{1}{8n^2}\right) \end{split}$$

•  $\mathcal{B}$  succeeds with probability at least  $\frac{1}{8n^2}$ : Contradiction to factoring assumption!

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- Yao's Hardness Amplification: YES!

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Strong OWFs exist if and only weak OWFs exist

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- This is called hardness amplification: convert a somewhat hard problem into a really hard problem
- <u>Intuition</u>: Use the weak OWF many times
- Think: Is f(f(...f(x))) a good idea?

#### Theorem

For any weak one-way function  $f:\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ , there exists a polynomial  $N(\cdot)$  s.t. the function  $F:\{0,1\}^{n\cdot N(n)} \to \{0,1\}^{n\cdot N(n)}$  defined as

$$F(x_1,...,x_N(n)) = (f(x_1),...,f(x_N(n)))$$

is strongly one-way.

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- To convert weak OWF to strong, use the weak OWF on many (say N) inputs independently
- In order to successfully invert the new OWF, adversary must invert ALL the N outputs of the weak OWF
- If N is sufficiently large and the inputs are chosen independently at random, then the probability of inverting all of them should be small

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- Nevertheless, it can be shown via a non-trivial proof that hardness does amplify for one-way functions (albeit not all the way to exponentially small inversion probability there are counterexamples to this!)
- In fact, hardness amplification is not a general phenomenon; for other cases such as interactive arguments (we will study later), hardness does not amplify in general

## Weak to Strong OWFs: Example

- $\bullet$  We will show that Yao's hardness amplification works for  $f_{\times}$
- The general case requires a different and careful proof; see lecture notes for details

# Hardness Amplification for $f_{\times}$

#### Theorem

Assume the factoring assumption and let  $m = 4n^3$ . Then,  $\mathcal{F}: (\{0,1\}^{2n})^m \to (\{0,1\}^{2n})^m$  is a strong OWF:

$$\mathcal{F}((x_1,y_1),\ldots,(x_m,y_m)) = (f_{\times}(x_1,y_1),\ldots,f_{\times}(x_m,y_m)).$$

• Intuition: Recall that by Chebyshev's Thm, a pair of random n-bit numbers are both primes with prob  $\frac{1}{4n^2}$ 

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
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- Intuition: Recall that by Chebyshev's Thm, a pair of random n-bit numbers are both primes with prob  $\frac{1}{4n^2}$
- When we choose  $m = 4n^3$  pairs, then the prob that no pair consists of primes is at most  $e^{-n}$ , which is negligible

# Hardness Amplification for $f_{\times}$ : Proof Details

- Let  $N = 2n \cdot 4n^3 = 8n^4$ . Let  $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = (x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_m, y_m)$
- Suppose  $\mathcal{F}$  is not a strong OWF. Then,  $\exists$  a non-uniform PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that inverts  $\mathcal{F}$  with prob at least  $\varepsilon(2n)$  for some non-negligible function  $\varepsilon(\cdot)$
- We will use  $\mathcal{A}$  to construct a non-uniform PPT adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  that breaks the factoring assumption

# Hardness Amplification for $f_{\times}$ : Reduction



 $\bullet$  Easy to verify that  $\mathcal{B}$  is PPT

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- Overall,  $\mathcal B$  fails with prob at most  $(1 \varepsilon(2n)) + e^{-n} < (1 \frac{\varepsilon(2n)}{2})$
- Thus,  $\mathcal{B}$  succeeds with prob at least  $\frac{\varepsilon(2n)}{2}$ , which is a contradiction to the factoring assumption.