# Zero Knowledge Proofs

601.642/442: Modern Cryptography

Fall 2020

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- Shafi and Silvio won the 2012 Turing Award for work on encryption and proof systems.

## Scenario: Where's Waldo?







A "Hey Bob, I found Waldo!"

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







- A "Hey Bob, I found Waldo!"
- B "That was way too fast, I don't believe you."

## Scenario: Sudoku




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- A "This one has a solution, trust me."

### Scenario: Authentication



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- A "Can I have access to the database? It's me, Alice."
- B "OK, send me your password so I know it's you."

### Scenario: Nuclear Disarmament







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- A "Hey Bob, As per our treaty, I have dismantled my nuclear warheads."
- B "What if you dismantled fake or obsolete warheads and are still keeping high quality fissile material? I don't believe you."

### A Problem of Trust and Information

### Alice wants to convince Bob of something

- Waldo is in the picture
- Sudoku puzzle has a solution
- Alice is not an imposter
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- Sudoku solution
- Alice's password
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What might a possible solution look like?










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


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
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
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- E.g., Proof that there are infinitely many primes should not simply be a list of all the primes. Not only would it take forever to generate that proof, it would also take forever to verify it

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- Question 2: Must a proof be <u>non-interactive</u>?
  - Or can a proof be a conversation? (i.e., <u>interactive</u>)

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- $\mathsf{View}_{M_i}(e)$ : View of  $M_i$  in an execution e consists of its input, random tape, auxiliary input and all the protocol messages it sees.

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<u>Remark</u>: In the above definition, prover is not required to be efficient. Later, we will also consider efficient provers.

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So why use interactive proofs after all?

Two main reasons for interaction:

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  - Zero knowledge: Verifier learns nothing from the proof beyond the validity of the statement!

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
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
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
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
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 $\bullet$  Graph Non-Isomorphism is in  ${\bf co\text{-}NP},$  and not known to be in  ${\bf NP}$ 

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- How to design an efficiently verifiable interactive proof?

### Interactive Proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism

Common Input:  $x = (G_0, G_1)$ 

**Protocol** (P, V): Repeat the following procedure n times using fresh randomness

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- V(x, b, b'): V outputs 1 if b' = b and 0 otherwise

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- Soundness: If  $G_0$  and  $G_1$  are isomorphic, then H is isomorphic to both  $G_0$  and  $G_1$ ! Therefore, in one iteration, any (unbounded) prover can correctly guess b with probability at most  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Since each iteration is independent, prover can succeed in all iterations with probability at most  $2^{-n}$ .

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#### Definition

An interactive proof system (P, V) for a language L with witness relation R is said to have an <u>efficient prover</u> if P is PPT and the completeness condition holds for every  $w \in R(x)$ 

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#### Definition

An interactive proof system (P, V) for a language L with witness relation R is said to have an <u>efficient prover</u> if P is PPT and the completeness condition holds for every  $w \in R(x)$ 

• Main Goal: Zero Knowledge, i.e., ensuring that verifier does not gain any knowledge from its interaction with prover beyond learning the validity of the statement x (e.g., P's witness w remains private from V)

### Towards Zero Knowledge

• Q. 1: How to formalize "does not gain any knowledge?"

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- Q. 2: What is knowledge?

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That is, by learning the result of a random process or result of a polynomial time computation, we gain no knowledge

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Think: Should you accept any of these offers?

We can generate 100-bit random string for free by flipping a coin, and we can also multiply on our own for free. But an exponential-time computation is hard to perform on our own, since we are PPT. So we should reject first and second offers, but seriously consider the third one!

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- <u>Intuition for ZK</u>: V can generate a protocol transcript on its own, without talking to P. If this transcript is indistinguishable from a real execution, then clearly V does not learn anything by talking to P
- Formalized via notion of <u>Simulator</u>, as in definition of semantic security for encryption

## Zero Knowledge: Definition I

### Definition (Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge)

An interactive proof (P, V) for a language L with witness relation R is said to be <u>honest verifier zero knowledge</u> if there exists a PPT simulator S s.t. for every non-uniform PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible function  $\nu(\cdot)$  s.t. for every  $x \in L$ ,  $w \in R(x)$ ,  $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ , D distinguishes between the following distributions with probability at most  $\nu(n)$ :

- $\bullet \ \left\{ \mathsf{View}_V[P(x,w) \leftrightarrow V(x,z)] \right\}$
- $\bullet \left\{ S(1^n, x, z) \right\}$

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- Problem: However, the above is promised only if verifier V follows the protocol
- What if V is malicious and deviates from the honest strategy?
- Want: Existence of a simulator S for every, possibly malicious (efficient) verifier strategy  $V^*$

## Zero Knowledge: Definition II

### Definition (Zero Knowledge)

An interactive proof (P, V) for a language L with witness relation R is said to be <u>zero knowledge</u> if for every non-uniform PPT adversary  $V^*$ , there exists an (expected) PPT simulator S s.t. for every non-uniform PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible function  $\nu(\cdot)$  s.t. for every  $x \in L$ ,  $w \in R(x)$ ,  $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ , D distinguishes between the following distributions with probability at most  $\nu(n)$ :

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- $\bullet \left\{ S(1^n, x, z) \right\}$
- $\bullet$  If the distributions are statistically close, then we call it  $\underline{\text{statistical}}$  zero knowledge
- If the distributions are identical, then we call it <u>perfect zero</u> knowledge

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To understand why there is no paradox, consider the following story:

• Alice and Bob run (P, V) on input x where Alice acts as P and Bob as V

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- Eve: "Oh really?"
- Bob: "Yes, you can see this accepting transcript"
- Eve: "That doesn't mean anything. Anyone can come up with such a transcript without knowing a witness for x!"
- Bob: "But I computed this transcript by talking to Alice who answered my challenge correctly every time!"

# Reflections on Zero Knowledge (contd.)

### Moral of the story:

• Bob participated in a "live" conversation with Alice, and was convinced by how the transcript was generated

# Reflections on Zero Knowledge (contd.)

### Moral of the story:

- Bob participated in a "live" conversation with Alice, and was convinced by how the transcript was generated
- But to Eve, who did not see the live conversation, there is no way to tell whether the transcript is from real execution or produced by simulator