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PAKISTAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

Hasan-Askari Rizvi

There has been a general realization amongst the scholars of International politics and diplomats for the last two decades that the defense and foreign policies of the "small" and "weak" states do contribute to shaping regional and international politics. This is the outcome of the subtle changes which have taken place in the international system during the 20th century. From a Europe centric and then, Europe-North America centric international system, it came to be dominated by two super powers in the post-World War II period. There were a number of states which endeavored to stay aloof from the super power rivalry and maintained a non-aligned posture but the most outstanding characteristic of this period was the Cold War. The super powers' impact on international politics was so profound that the other forces shaping world politics appeared secondary and dependent. This bias in favour of the super powers and their major allies made it difficult to give due recognition to the role of other actors in the international system. The behavior-pattern of other actors (state as well as non-state) was often studied with reference to, or from the standpoint of, the super powers' policies.

The hierarchical pattern of the international system with two super powers at its apex and pulling the strings of international politics could not sustain itself over a long period of time. The two super powers continued to maintain their preponderance in military power including nuclear-weapons technology, but there emerged cracks in both the blocs. New regional power centres began to emerge. These included Western Europe, Japan, China, and the Non-Aligned Movement. None of the new actors in the international system could displace the two super powers from their positions of eminence but these actors made it increasingly difficult for the super powers to dominate the International system the way they used to do in the period immediately after the conclusion of World War II. This

transformation contributed to multipolarity or what was sometimes described as bi-multipolarity, in the international system.¹

The polycentric trends in the international system were reinforced by the increase in the number of actors in the international system. This was mainly due to the process of decolonization which brought into being a large number of independent and sovereign states in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. These new nations crowded the major international organizations, created several new ones, and revived others from the state of dormancy. The activism of the "small" and "weak" states received an impetus by the successful enforcement of the 1973-74 oil embargo by the OPEC, the substantial rise in oil prices since then, the growing interdependence of the actors in the international system, and the decline of American power beginning with its withdrawal from Indo-China in 1975. The change in the character of the international system can be identified by the fact that only five Asian and no African states participated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The League of Nations had only seven Afro-Asian states as original members. In the case of the U.N. only twelve original members came from Asia and Africa.² Now, almost two-thirds of the U.N. members are ex-colonial and Third World states. They dominate the proceedings of the General Assembly and most of its organs (Security Council excepted) and the specialized agencies.³

The overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran (1979) in the wake of a mass upsurge led by the ayatollahs despite the fact that the former Shah was a staunch ally of the US, showed that there was a limit to what a super power could do in the Third World. Similarly the two super powers were unable to bring an end to the Iraq-Iran war (1980-82). These events demonstrated that many issues and conflicts had their regional and local dynamics which could not always be manipulated by the super powers to their satisfaction because the international system had become polycentric, multilayered and complex. There emerged numerous discontinuities in the international system which made it imperative to examine the role of actors other than the super powers to fully appreciate the dynamics of international politics.

¹ R. N. Rosecrance, 'Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future', in Rosenau, J.N. (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, revised edition, New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 325-335.

² Bull, Hedley, 'The Third World and International Society', *The Year Book of World Affairs*, 1979, London, The London Institute of World Affairs, 1979, pp. 15-31 (p. 15).

³ For a study of the role of the Third World states in the U.N., see J. Rosen, 'How the Third World Runs the U.N.', *Times*, New York, 16 December 1979.

The late sixties and the seventies witnessed a gradual shift in the focus of study i.e. from the super power orientation to a multi-targeted perspective. Some devoted attention to regional sub-systems as an important unit of international politics, its relationship with the international system and the dynamics of regional politics.⁴ Others examined relationships between the weak and the powerful states.⁵ Still others examined the factors which made a state a regional power or a middle power. They also endeavored to identify several states which, in their estimation, qualified to be known as the middle powers.⁶

A good number of studies now focus on the policy-outputs of the "small" and "weak" states in the international system.⁷ These studies recognize the fact that the small and weak states are not always on the receiving end of the international system. Their policies cannot be dismissed simply as reflexes to the policies of the super/major powers. The experience of the last decade suggests that the policy-outputs of the "small" and "weak" states merit a detailed examination because these states have not only become quite active in international politics but have also collectively attempted to make the international system more responsive to their demands and concerns. Their goals and aspirations; strengths and vulnerabilities; human and material resources; patterns of interaction with other small states, the middle powers and the super powers; and the roles the power elite perceive for their states in the international system are interesting facets of international politics. The study of behavior patterns of the "small" and "weak" states is useful for another reason. There are enumerable ethnic, dynastic, ideological, territorial and economic disputes amongst these states. These sources of tensions have profound impact on their domestic politics as well as external policies.

An important aspect of the behavior pattern of a small state in the international system is its defense policy. This becomes an interesting aspect of a small state's posture in international politics because of the limited human and material resources at its disposal and the numerous systemic

⁴ W. R. Thompson, 'The Regional Subsystem', *International Studies Quarterly*, March 1973, pp. 89-117.

⁵ M. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationship*, New York, The Free Press, 1972.

⁶ S. P. Cohen, 'Toward A Great State in Asia', in O. Marwah, and J.D. Pollack, (eds.) *Military Power and Policy in Asian States : China, India, Japan*, Boulder, Westview, 1980, pp. 9-41.

⁷ A. T. Mugomba, 'Small Developing States and the External Operational Environment', *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1979*, London, The Institute of World Affairs, 1979, pp. 201-216.

constraints under which it has to formulate policies to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, reinforce its foreign policy strategies and improve its bargaining position in dealings with other states, especially the middle powers and the states in the immediate neighbourhood.

Numerous factors shape a country's defense policy. The major among these include geo-strategic location of a country, nature of its territorial boundaries and pattern of relations with its neighbours. Though there have been revolutionary changes in means of communication, geography still plays quite an important role in influencing decisions on strategic options. Natural resources, i.e., minerals, power, energy and food production, do have a bearing on a country's defense policy. In addition to these factors, industrial development and the nature of military establishment (quantity and quality of manpower, weapons and equipment) are also important determinants of defense policy.

Geo-strategic Milieu

The geo-strategic milieu has caused serious defense concerns for Pakistan as it is situated in the region described as the Fulcrum of Asia⁸—a region where the Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan meet. The politics of this region is characterized by several discontinuities, intra-region conflicts based on discrepancies in ideology, national objectives, territorial disputes and political rivalries. The super powers also maintain direct and indirect interest in the region and its politics. While devising its defense and foreign policy Pakistan has to take into account the geo-strategic realities and intra-region discontinuities as well as the policy-postures of the super powers towards the region.

Pakistan shares an approximately 1,400 miles long border with India,⁹ running from the Rann of Kutch on the Arabian Sea to the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north east. In addition to this there is a long cease-fire line in the state of Jammu and Kashmir which divides the state into Pakistan- and Indian-held Kashmir. There are no natural barriers on most of the Indo-Pakistani border which makes it convenient for troops and heavy armor of either side to cross the frontiers.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border (the Durand Line) has a mountainous terrain and is about 1,200 miles long. It runs from the Sherial range of the

⁸ Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia*, New York, Peagusus, 1970.

⁹ It may be pointed out that before the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971, East Pakistan also shared border with India. East Pakistan was surrounded by India from three sides which caused additional defense problems. We are not discussing the security problem arising out of the geographic location of East Pakistan during 1947-71.

Pamirs in the north to the Iranian border at the Koh-i-Malik Siah. The main transit and trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan are through a number of passes in the mountain ranges dividing the two countries. These passes are also strategically important as military movement across the Durand line has traditionally taken place through these passes. One of the passes, the Khyber pass, was the traditional invasion route to India. All foreign troops, except those of Europeans, primarily used the Khyber pass route.

Pakistan has about 590 miles of common frontier with Iran which stretches from the Koh-i-Malik Siah (where the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iranian frontiers meet) to Gwader in the Arabian Sea. In the south, Pakistan is bounded by about 450 miles of coastline of the Arabian Sea stretching from the Rann of Kutch/Indian border to Iran in the west. Pakistan does not share borders with the Soviet Union but at one point in the north (Wakhan area) the Durand line is about 25-30 miles from the Soviet border. Pakistan has a common frontier of about 400 miles with China in the Kashmir-Xirjiang region. It stretches from the tri-junction of Afghanistan, Pakistan and China to the Karakorum pass.

Pakistan was faced with a generally hostile strategic environment because of the pattern of its relationship with India and Afghanistan. There were periods during the last 35-36 years when Indo-Pakistan relations could be described as 'correct and cordial' but generally their relations were characterized by mutual distrust, hostility and serious disagreements on regional and international political issues. This was partly due to the legacy of the pre-independence period and partly due to the compounding impact of the developments immediately before and after independence in 1947. The distrust and hostility that developed between the Muslim League and the Congress Party leaderships in the last phase of the struggle for independence transformed into hostility between the two states after independence. Several disputes concerning the process of partition further spoiled their relations. These disputes included, *inter alia*, the influx of refugees, communal riots, the problem of minorities, the distribution of assets of the Indian Government and the former Indian military, the canal water dispute, the evacuee property issue, the concentration of Indian troops on the Punjab border in 1950-51, and the unilateral suspension of trade by India in 1950.¹⁰ It was generally believed in Pakistan that India did not want to solve these problems amicably in order to 'strangle' the new state of Pakistan soon after its inception. This perception of India's

¹⁰ For an extended study of these disputes, see: G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations With India 1947-66*, London, Pall Mall, 1978. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.

intentions was reinforced by the war in Kashmir (1947-48) and India's 'military action' in Junagadh and Hyderabad. Many in Pakistan interpreted India's 'military action' as a warning that the same might happen to Pakistan in the future.

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have mostly been far from cordial. When the Afghanistan Government came to know in 1947 that the British had finally decided to wind up their rule over India and that the state of Pakistan would be created, they laid claims on North West Frontier Province and parts of Baluchistan. This claim, though never clearly spelled out by Afghanistan,¹¹ has continued to be the major irritant in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. On more than one occasion Pakistan and Afghanistan reached the brink of war on this issue in the late fifties and early sixties. Twice they severed diplomatic relations. Afghanistan was able to obtain Soviet support for its claims on Pakistan's territory.¹² This made the Afghan Government more vocal in its demands. India also pampered Afghanistan by extending support on the "Pukhtoonistan" issue.¹³ This was bound to cause serious concern in Pakistan. A large section of public opinion as well as the government circles feared a two front war i.e., armed clashes erupting simultaneously on the Pakistan-India and the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders.

What intensified Pakistan's feeling of insecurity *vis-a-vis* its neighbours, especially India, were a number of security handicaps Pakistan had to face. Pakistan's territory lacked depth and the main communication line ran parallel to the Indo-Pakistan border. A number of major cities were so close to the border that India's troops had to be confronted at the border. This required a well equipped, a highly mobile and hard hitting Army. Pakistan lacked all this in its formative years. It inherited a small, weak and loosely organized military which hardly had the necessary arms and equipment. India declined to transfer a good part of Pakistan's share of armament and equipment of the former British Indian Army. There was no ordnance factory in Pakistan at the time of independence.¹⁴ India, on the other hand, inherited a stronger and larger military, all ordnance factories and

¹¹ Mujtaba Razvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan*, Karachi, National Publishing House, 1971, pp. 145-163. S. Tahir-Kheli, 'Pakhtoonistan and its International Implications', *World Affairs*, Winter, 1974-75, pp. 233-245.

¹² S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 206-207.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁴ Fazal Muqem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 34. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1976 (Rev. ed.), pp. 36-37.

quite a substantial quantity of arms and equipment. India, thus, had a clear military edge over Pakistan.

Objectives of Defense Policy and Defense Strategies

The unfavourable geo-strategic environment and the security concerns developed in the early years of independence shaped Pakistan's worldview. It was characterized by a deep sense of insecurity inspired by external threats to its independent existence. The major goal of Pakistan's defense policy has, therefore, been the search for security. This practically meant two things: First, the augmentation of security of Pakistan against "threats" primarily from India and secondarily from Afghanistan. Second, the offsetting of India's military superiority in South Asia by strengthening Pakistan's defense arrangements and, at times, by using diplomacy as a countervailing measure.

Defense requirements enjoyed the top priority in Pakistan. Each successive government has allocated a large part of the national budget to defense. Pakistan had civilian governments during 1947-58 and 1971-77 by different political parties. The leaders of these governments often criticised their predecessors but all of them attached equal importance to the maintenance of strong defense. Pakistani Governments whether led by civilians or military officials, allocated the maximum possible resources to the military. The national legislature, whenever it was allowed to function, generally underlined the need for maintaining a strong defense posture and supported the high budgetary allocations for defense.

Pakistan's defense expenditure has ranged from about 73% to 34% of total expenditure during 1947-83. On average it was 53.48%. The 1982-83 budget has provided Rs 22,095.3 million for defense services. This is the highest defense allocation made so far. It comes to 47.1% of total expenditure for 1982-83, and shows a 12.8% rise over the revised defense expenditure for 1981-82. The details of defense expenditure of Pakistan since 1947 have been given in the appendix.

It must also be pointed out here that, in addition to the overt allocation for defense, some expenditure on defense and security i.e., defense-related projects come under other heads, i.e., civil works, road and highways, law and order. To this we should also add the military hardware and equipment which Pakistan has obtained as a part of aid arrangements with a number of countries, especially the U.S.

Special attention was given to the re-organization and modernization of the armed forces. Reorganization of the three services of the military

was undertaken in the first couple of years after independence. Their modernization was, however, an on-going process. Reorganization was necessitated due to the division of the former Indian military at the time of independence in 1947. The regiments with common traditions, recruiting areas and class composition were amalgamated. The gaps were filled by fresh recruitments. The competent officers were given accelerated promotions. A reasonable number of non-commissioned officers of the three services were promoted to the commissioned ranks. Moreover, the personnel released from the military during the last few years were given a choice to rejoin the service. A good number of them availed of this offer. All releases from the three services were stopped except in special cases. The qualified personnel of the military of the princely states acceding to Pakistan were also absorbed in the Pakistan Army.

The modernization of the armed forces is a continuous process in an age of rapid technological advancement. A nation having a smaller and weaker military than its neighbouring adversary will have to make serious and repeated endeavours to improve the quality of its fighting forces so that its numerical handicap can be overcome by the superior quality of manpower as well as equipment. There were three major aspects of modernization of the Pakistan military. First, while the process of reorganization was underway Pakistan got involved in the first Kashmir war (1947-48) with India. This made it imperative for Pakistan to speed up the process of reorganization and modernization, meet with the immediate needs of armament, and take steps to meet with the long-range requirements of weapons and equipment. Second, in order to provide the necessary training Pakistan established new training schools, including the Military Academy at Kakul, to replace the institutions lost to India at the time of independence. A number of selected officers were sent to England, the U.S. and some of the Commonwealth countries for specialized and technical training. After Pakistan's participation in the West-sponsored security arrangements, American military experts were based in Pakistan to provide necessary training and technical advice to Pakistani officers in Pakistan. Since the late 1960s Pakistan military personnel were also sent to France and China for training.

Third, modernization also involves the provision of arms and ammunition in necessary quantity and quality. Pakistan was especially handicapped in this field as it did not inherit a single ordnance factory and most of its share of arms and ammunition belonging to the British Indian Army was withheld by India after the outbreak of the Kashmir war.¹⁵ Pakistan

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

speeded up a plan to erect an ordnance factory and by the end of 1951, the first ordnance factory was inaugurated at Wah. Pakistan also obtained arms, equipment, aircraft, and naval ships and communication gear from abroad. Part of it was purchased on cash or against loans, and the rest was obtained as aid. Pakistan relied heavily on western sources of supply especially the US and Great Britain. Later it diversified its sources of supply by purchasing defense equipment from France, West Germany and arms markets in Europe. It also secured arms and military hardware including helicopters, tanks, and aircraft from the Soviet Union (1968-70) and China.

The desire to enhance Pakistan's security was one of the major reasons¹⁶ that Pakistan joined the west-sponsored security arrangements in 1954-55. Pakistan and the US signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty in May 1954. Under this treaty, the US agreed to provide military equipment and training to Pakistani armed forces. This was followed by the establishment of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. Besides Pakistan, this organization included Thailand, the Philippines, USA, United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand. One year later Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact.¹⁷

Pakistan and the US were operating from two different perspectives. For the US the underlying considerations were global; for Pakistan regional consideration was important. For the US the major concern was the containment of the Soviet Union and China; for Pakistan, India was the major adversary. The US was obsessed with Communism and it wanted to contain its impact on Asian countries. Pakistan wanted to offset India's military superiority by obtaining military and economic assistance from the west.

Pakistan obtained over \$900 million worth of military equipment under the Mutual Defense Agreement, the CENTO and SEATO.¹⁸ This included tanks and other small arms and transportation equipment, aircraft including F-104, B-57, F-86 and C-130 aircraft, equipment for the Navy, radar and other communication equipment. An American Advisory Mission was set up in Pakistan to help Pakistani senior commanders in their endeavours to modernize the armed forces and improve their overall disposition

¹⁶ Economic consideration also compelled Pakistan to enter into defense arrangements with the US. Pakistan was facing economic crisis, especially grain shortage, during these years. The American willingness to make grain available to Pakistan created goodwill which facilitated Pakistan's entry into the defense pacts.

¹⁷ Burke, *Op. cit.*, pp. 164-170.

¹⁸ W. H. Wriggins, 'The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy', in L. Ziring, R. Braibanti, and W. H. Wriggins, (eds.), *Pakistan: The Long View*, Durham, Duke University Centre for Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 1977, p. 312.

and efficiency. The US-Pakistan cooperation during the 1950s and the early 1960s proved very useful for making up considerable deficiencies in the defense arrangements of Pakistan. It accelerated the modernization process and enabled the air force and the navy to improve its efficiency and acquire valuable experience by participation in CENTO's joint exercises. Though the over-all balance of power in South Asia still remained in favour of India, these security pacts gave Pakistan the much needed confidence that it could now withstand India's military and diplomatic pressures. The American aid also strengthened the position of the military in the domestic political system as it had, in addition to having substantial domestic resources at its disposal, got external aid which made it the most modernized segment of society characterized by cohesion, hierarchy, discipline and *esprit de corps*.¹⁹ The US also benefitted from this relationship. It obtained the support of the second largest non-Communist Asian state. The US also enjoyed communication, intelligence gathering facilities and related services in Pakistan. These were useful for America's global strategy against the Soviet Union.

Changes in the Defense Policy

The basic goal of Pakistan's defense policy, i.e., the provision of security against external threats, did not change but the strategies to achieve this goal were revised in the late 1960s and 1970s. Three major developments in this period made the defense planners review their defense strategies. These were the supply of arms to India after the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, the September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and the war on the Bangladesh question between India and Pakistan in November-December 1971.

India was provided with substantial military assistance by the US, the UK, Canada and Australia in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border conflict, 1962. The assistance programme included the supply of arms and ammunition, aircraft and communication equipment. Several western military missions visited India in order to appraise India's long term defense requirements and provide necessary advice to refurbish its defense arrangements.²⁰ The Indian Air Force also held joint air exercises with the Air Forces of the US, the UK and Australia. Throughout this period India was

¹⁹ For an analysis of US-Pakistan alliance system, see N. D. Palmer, *South Asia and United States Policy*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966. W. J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, New York, Praeger, 1972.

²⁰ For a summary of western military assistance to India in the post-Sino-Indian border conflict, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *South Asia and Indian Military Build-up*, Progressive Series No. 14, Lahore Progressive Publishers, 1973, pp. 9-10, 15-16.

also obtaining weapons and aircraft from the Soviet Union. For some time it appeared as if the western countries and the Soviet Union were competing with each other for the supply of weapons to India, ostensibly to fight China.

There was a clear shift in India's domestic economic priorities. More resources were made available for defense by diverting these from economic development. This re-ordering of the priorities was clearly visible from the defense allocations in the national budget which registered a rapid increase during 1963-72 decade. India also embarked on a Five Year Defense Plan for the comprehensive modernization of the three services and defense production programme. This plan was revised and up-dated several times later or was financed partly from domestic resources and partly from the help and cooperation of the western countries and the Soviet Union.²¹

India's military build-up in the 1960s accentuated Pakistan's security anxieties because it widened the already existing military disparity in South Asia to the detriment of Pakistan. The ruling elite of Pakistan seemed convinced that India would use its newly acquired military power against Pakistan. They claimed that India had no intention of fighting China but was simply using the China 'bogey' to amass sophisticated weapons from the West.²²

Pakistan, upset over the extensive military assistance to India by the US and other western powers, gradually revised its defense and foreign policy to deal effectively with the growing military imbalance in South Asia. It started playing down its membership of the West-sponsored defense pacts and improved its ties with the countries of the socialist bloc. The defense planners started thinking in terms of diversifying the sources of supply of defense hardware and weapons. Before they could really do this, a war broke out between India and Pakistan in September 1965. The US imposed an arms embargo on India and Pakistan. This decision seriously undermined Pakistan's combat effectiveness because its defense procurement was primarily America-oriented. Pakistan Air Force was equipped almost entirely with American aircraft. One Pakistani writer commented that the American embargo had "serious repercussions on Pakistan's defence capability and was one of the factors which contributed to its dismemberment" in 1971.²³ In March 1966, the embargo was partly eased by

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

²² Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 135, 136, 143. See also Ayub Khan's interview: *The Sunday Times* (London), 20 October 1963. Ayub Khan's press conference: *Dawn*, Karachi, 23 February 1964.

²³ Khurshid Hyder, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Early Seventies', in Masuma Hasan, (ed.), *Pakistan in a Changing World*, Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978, p. 106.

America's decision to allow the sale of 'non-lethal' military equipment (i.e. trucks, medical and engineering supplies and communication items). One year later the embargo was further eased by the American decision to sell spare parts for military equipment supplied in the past. No new combat equipment was allowed to be sold to either country. Pakistan was provided with some arms and equipment during 1970-71 as a "special one-time exception" extended by President Nixon. All supplies and provision of non-lethal equipment was suspended after the outbreak of the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971. It was not earlier than February 1975 that embargo on the sale of lethal arms was lifted and South Asian countries were allowed to purchase arms and equipment on 'cash and carry' basis.²⁴

The American embargo of 1965 compelled Pakistan to procure arms and equipment, including aircraft, tanks and submarines, radar and communication equipment, from several non-American sources. China was the most important source of supply of weapons in the post-1965 war period. Pakistan also obtained weapons through Iran and Turkey. Later it secured weapons from the UK, West Germany, France, Italy and the international arms markets in Europe. The Soviet Union also supplied military equipment including helicopters and tanks to Pakistan during 1968-70.²⁵

A negative implication of the earlier supply of Western arms aid to Pakistan was that a low priority was assigned to indigenous production of arms and weapons. As Pakistan was getting arms and equipment in sufficient quantity from the West in the late 1950s, the pace of development in the field of defense production was rather slow. In the late 1960s, more so in the 1970s, self-sufficiency in arms and ammunition became a popular theme with defense and economic planners. A Defence Production Division was set up in the Ministry of Defence in 1973 to encourage the indigenous production of arms and ammunition. The Wah Ordnance Factory was expanded and modernized. Three new ordnance factories were set up around Wah. By mid-seventies Pakistan became self-sufficient in several types of small arms. Technical and financial assistance was sought from China and the Soviet Union to set-up a heavy mechanical complex and a steel mill respectively. A *Mirage* rebuild and overhaul factory was set up under permission from France. Similarly a F-6 rebuild complex and a tank rebuild factory were set-up with the co-operation of China. Plans were underway to

²⁴ For details, see: S. P. Cohen, 'U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis'. *Pacific Affairs*, Spring, 1976, pp. 49-69.

²⁵ A valuable source of information on arms supplies to Pakistan is *The Arms Trade Register*, Published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). See also another publication by the same institute: *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook*.

produce tanks, aircraft, frigates and other sophisticated equipment locally to make Pakistan as self-sufficient as possible. It would be several years before all these projects become fully operational.

Establishment of Bangladesh and Security of Pakistan

The establishment of Bangladesh, no doubt, relieved Pakistan of the security responsibilities of what was hitherto East Pakistan, but this did not bring about a significant change to the advantage of Pakistan (West Pakistan) in the over-all strategic environs. In fact, the defense problems were aggravated in several respects. As Bangladesh was created with the support and cooperation of India, the troops India used to deploy on the East Pakistani borders during 1947-71 could now be moved to Pakistan-India border when, and if, needed; thereby increasing military pressure on Pakistan. Even after the August and November 1975 coups in Bangladesh and the end of the Indo-Bangladesh "honey-moon" period, India did not need to concentrate so many troops on that border as was the case when the Eastern Wing of Pakistan had not seceded. The Bangladesh military was too weak to pose any serious threat to India.

Pakistan's military debacle in East Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh with India's active support confirmed India's military and political preponderance in South Asia. India wanted to give permanence to the power structure which emerged out of the 1971 war in South Asia. It, therefore, continued with its efforts to strengthen its military muscle by obtaining weapons of all kinds, including aircraft, tanks, warships, submarines, missiles, radar and communication equipment from the Soviet Union as well as Western countries. It also accelerated the pace of defense production in the country. By the early eighties India had one of the strongest defense and defense-oriented industrial base in the Third World. It was producing locally, *inter alia*, tanks, armoured cars and aircraft of different types, frigates, electronic and communication equipment.

India's decision to explode a nuclear device in May 1974, described as Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) by the Indian Government, had far-reaching implication for South Asia. India not only made a 'gate crash' entry into the 'nuclear club' but also injected new variables in the politics of regional security. It made the policy planners of other South Asian states, especially Pakistan, perceive of a scenario wherein India was brandishing its nuclear 'sword' to force the non-nuclear states of South Asia to abide by India's priorities in regional politics.

Pakistan responded to the political and security environment and the power structure in South Asia in the post-1971 period by adopting a two-pronged strategy. The first was meant to deal with the problems relating to the outcome of the 1971 war. These included the return of Pakistani POWs, recovery of the territory lost to India on the (West) Pakistan-India front, and the rehabilitation of war affected areas and people. A process to solve these problems was set in motion when the former Pakistani Prime Minister and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met at Simla in July 1972 and signed a peace document, popularly known as the Simla Accord.²⁶ These efforts were accompanied by steps to deal with the long term defense and security issues. Pakistan was not aiming at parity with India; rather it wanted to muster enough military and diplomatic clout that would discourage India from using its military preponderance to restrict Pakistan's policy options. It was not, therefore, surprising that the pattern of high defense expenditure, the purchase of defense equipment from abroad, and efforts aiming at improvement of mobility and striking power of the military continued unabated. The numerical strength of the military was increased by fresh recruitment and special attention was given to their training at the time of induction into the service and during the subsequent years so that a very high level of efficiency could be maintained. Modern weapons were obtained from diverse sources on cash and against loans. Some funds for the purchase of military hardware were made available by a number of friendly Arab states.

So far as the additional defense worry, i.e. India's nuclear explosion, was concerned, Pakistan adopted a three-point strategy to counter what it described as India's nuclear 'threat'. First, the programme for peaceful uses of nuclear technology was expanded. More funds were made available for this purpose in the backdrop of India's nuclear explosion. Pakistan, however, made it clear that it wanted to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and that it had no intentions of embarking on a nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan's plea of pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme is rejected by India and other nations are also sceptical about Pakistani profession, because of reports about Pakistan's efforts to obtain reprocessing technology in bits and pieces from Europe and North America after France refused to supply the promised nuclear reprocessing plant. Secondly Pakistan sought international guarantees through the UN for the non-nuclear weapons states against any possible nuclear 'threat' so that small states could live in peace and would not need to acquire directly or indirectly nuclear weapons for their security. Thirdly, Pakistan put forward

²⁶ For a detailed study of the Simla Accord, see the special issue of *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 3rd Quarter 1972.

a proposal at the UN General Assembly that South Asia should be declared a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Since 1974 this proposal had been endorsed by the General Assembly several times.²⁷

Pakistan's diplomatic efforts, i.e., guarantees for the non-nuclear weapons states and the concept of a nuclear weapons free zone, stemmed from the belief that if the international community did not dissuade India from pursuing its so called PNE programme and, if adequate safeguards were not provided to the non-nuclear states, these states might be tempted to follow India's example. The environment of uncertainty and insecurity could induce the small and weak states to divert their peaceful nuclear programmes to non-peaceful purposes.

The Afghanistan Crisis

The direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 was a highly disturbing development for Pakistan because it worsened its security and defense problems. Pakistan was uneasy ever since the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan which brought Noor Mohammad Taraki to power. This government had strong Marxist orientations and it revived Afghanistan's irredentist claim on Pakistani territory. The Soviets had stormed Afghanistan with around eighty thousand troops, killed the incumbent President (Hafizullah Amin) and installed Babrak Karmal as President.²⁸ These developments added several new dimensions to Pakistan's defense and security environment.

First, no doubt, the Taraki and Amin governments were Moscow-oriented and a reasonable number of Soviet military and civil advisers were attached with these two governments, but, never in the past, had Soviet troops marched south across the Soviet-Afghan border in such a large number. The continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan brought the Soviet Union practically to the Pak-Afghan border. Afghanistan now ceased to serve as a buffer between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

²⁷ There has been a proliferation of literature on the nuclear question in the South Asian context since the Indian detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974. For more information on the issues raised in this study: Zalmay Khalizad, 'Pakistan: The Making of a Nuclear Power'. *Asian Survey*, June 1976, pp. 580-592. Akhtar Ali, 'Indian Nuclear Alibi', *Pakistan and Gulf Economist*, 10-16 April 1982, pp. 8-17. Safdar Akhund and M. Ahmed, 'Nuclearization: The Politico-military and economic case for Pakistan'. *Pakistan Economist*, 24 November 1979, pp. 14-25. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Politics of the Bomb in South Asia*, Progressive Series No. 23, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1975.

²⁸ For internal developments in Afghanistan L. Dupree, 'Afghanistan Under the Khalq' *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979, pp. 34-50. Kuldip Nayar, *Report on Afghanistan*, New Delhi, Allied, 1981. K. P. Misra, (ed.), *Afghanistan Crisis*, New Delhi, Vikas, 1981.

Second, the Soviet participation in counter-insurgency measures against the Afghan insurgents (*Mujahideens*) proved counter-productive. Instead of containing the conflict it gave greater determination to the Afghan resistance groups to take up arms against the Soviet-installed Kabul regime. As these guerrilla groups had ethnic, linguistic, cultural and ideological linkages in Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas of Pakistan, their resistance activities evoked a positive popular response there. The Government of Pakistan also made no secret of its sympathies for these resistance groups. This further strained the already chilled Pakistan-Soviet relations.

Third, the influx of 2.8 million Afghan refugees into Pakistan has caused serious economic, social and political problems. International relief agencies and individual states extended assistance for meeting with the expenses of refugees. This assistance comes to about half of the total expenditure on refugee maintenance. Out of the daily expenditure of Rs. 10 million, Pakistan is spending Rs. 5 million from its domestic sources for extending humanitarian assistance to these refugees.²⁹ The economic cost of the maintenance of refugees will increase in the future because there are as yet very little prospects of an early settlement of the internal strife in Afghanistan—the major cause of their flight to Pakistan.³⁰

Fourth, the Soviet and Afghan authorities suspect the bona-fides of the refugee camps and relief operations in Pakistan. They maintain that there is a deep connection between the insurgent activities in Afghanistan and refugee camps in Pakistan. They also accuse Pakistan of providing sanctuary, military training and supply of weapons to the nationalist and Islam-oriented Afghan resistance groups. Pakistan's denial of these charges hardly convinces the Soviet authorities. They retaliated in the past by encouraging the Afghan troops and aircraft to intrude into Pakistan and attack refugee camps. There were 62 violations of Pakistani territory by Afghan soldiers and 415 instances of air space violations by the Soviet supplied aircraft of the Afghan Air Force since April 1978 after the first marxist coup. Nine persons, mostly refugees, were killed and several more were injured during these attacks.³¹ If the present insurgency intensifies in the future the Soviet and Afghan authorities might be tempted to resort to

²⁹ Statement of Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees: *The Muslim* (Islamabad), 16 May 1982.

³⁰ For a detailed study of the Afghan refugee problem in Pakistan, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'The Afghan Refugees', *The Muslim*, 19 March 1982. 'Search For a Solution', *Pakistan and Gulf Economist*, 3-9 April 1982, pp. 10-24.

³¹ *Daily Jang* (Lahore), 11 December 1981. *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 13 September 1981. *Dawn*, 11 February 1982.

border skirmishes with Pakistan and air-raids on refugee camps more often. This would widen the scope of the internal strife in Afghanistan and, thus, intensify military pressure on Pakistan.

A large number of people and the political elite in Pakistan regard the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a watershed. The South Asian region as a whole is now vulnerable to Soviet penetration.³² It is seen as a part of the Soviet 'Grand Design' to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and oil resources of the Gulf region.³³ There are those who look at the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the backdrop of the history of this region. They claim that in the past whichever power emerged from the Central Asian region and consolidated its hold over Kabul, did not stop there. They also came down to the Indian sub-continent and held away over it. If the Soviets were not dissuaded from consolidating their position in Kabul, it is argued, history can repeat itself and, then, nobody in Iran and South Asia will be able to withstand the onward march of the Soviet Union.³⁴ At times the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is interpreted as a threat by Communism to Islam, and could pose a serious threat to the future of Islam in the international system.³⁵ There are only a small number of people who view the Soviet intervention as a defensive move: protection of Soviet security interests in Afghanistan and a response to the stepped-up presence of the US in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area.

Leaving aside that merits and demerits of these explanations advanced in Pakistan—the Grand Design strategy, the prospects of repetition of history or an ideological war—when we examine the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the context of history of the Pak-Soviet relations, the Soviet role in the Bangladesh crisis, and the improved ties between the Soviet Union and India, what emerges with crystal clarity is that Pakistan's security dilemma has become extremely acute.

³² A. R. Siddiqi, 'Afghanistan: A Geopolitical Watershed', *Defence Journal*, Karachi, June-July 1982, pp. 1-8, M.B. Naqvi, 'Pakistan's Dilemma over Afghanistan', *ibid.*, pp. 23-27.

³³ K.M. Azhar Khan, 'Threats and Dangers Faced by Pakistan,' *MAJ Weekly*, Karachi, 7-13 May 1981, pp. 4-5. Sultan Muhammad Khan, 'Pakistani Geopolitics: The Diplomatic Perspective', *International Security*, Summer, 1980, pp. 26-36.

³⁴ See for example, Fatch Naseeb Chaudhury, '*Islamabad aur Delhi Ka Mahafaz: Kabul*'. (Urdu), *Qaumi Digest*, (Lahore), October 1981, pp. 130-140. See also Lt. General Fazle Haq's (Governor N.W.F.P.) interview, *ibid.*, p. 30.

³⁵ Lt. General Fazle Haq (Governor N.W.F.P.)'s statement: *Dawn*, 26 September 1981. See the letter of Maulana Tufail Mohammad, Leader of the *Jamaat-i-Islami* of Pakistan published in *Afghan Mujahid*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 1980. (A publication of a Pakistan-based Afghan resistance group in Urdu language. This ceased publication after some time.)

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was interpreted by the US as a clear threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. More so, because this came about within less than one year of the fall of the Shah in Iran, whose was the staunchest pro-American regime in the region. These two developments were seen as the major extra-regional and intra-regional threats respectively to the security and stability in the Persian Gulf.³⁶ The US not only put forward the Carter Doctrine (1980) but also decided to set up the Rapid Deployment Force to give "teeth" to the Carter Doctrine and reassure the pro-America Gulf states that the US was capable of coming to their rescue at the time of crisis.³⁷ The US also decided to shore up defenses of the states exposed to potential Soviet penetration. As Pakistan shared a long border with the Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, Pakistan acquired geo-political relevance in America's global strategy.³⁸ The US also felt that Pakistan could be useful for its policy-goals in the Persian Gulf due to Pakistan's proximity and linkages with the region. Pakistan was, therefore, now considered a frontline state in the new geopolitical strategy and firm security assurances were made to Pakistan against any Soviet incursions into its territory.³⁹ The US agreed to provide a \$3.2 billion package of economic assistance and military sale credits spread over a period of five years 1982-83 to 1987-88. Under this arrangement Pakistan would purchase tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, helicopters and other military equipment from the US. In addition to this Pakistan would get 40 F-16 fighter-bomber aircraft. This reversed the pattern of US-Pakistan relations characterized by strains due to the serious differences on the nuclear question, the stoppage of all American economic assistance in Spring 1979, and the burning down of the American embassy at Islamabad in November 1979.

³⁶ Many in the West regard the ideology of Iranian revolution as a greater immediate threat to the Persian Gulf than the direct Soviet military intervention in the region. To them the security of Persian Gulf also means the preservation of the conservative and pro-American regimes vis-a-vis Iran's anti-west and radical Islamic ideology.

³⁷ The Pentagon's Guidance Document says, "Our principal objectives are to assure continued access to Persian Gulf oil and to prevent the Soviets from acquiring political-military control of the oil directly or through proxies". The reliable sources assert that the RDF will also strengthen the friendly nations "politically and militarily". This will include "security assistance, such as the sales of weapons and equipment, response to requests for training and advice, and military construction". *The New York Times*, 25 October 1982.

³⁸ In an interview with a Pakistani weekly, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Ronald I. Spiers, said, "...Our major interest and pre-occupation is to prevent an extension of Soviet power...The Soviet move in Afghanistan has changed the strategic environment in this part of the world. Pakistan is now a frontline state, under direct threat from the Soviet Union". *MAG Weekly*, 18-24 February 1982, p. 4.

³⁹ See President Carter's address to the nation: *The New York Times*, 5 January 1980.

The renewed cooperation between Pakistan and the US in the military field does not really solve Pakistan's defense problem.⁴⁰ The assistance package has been spread over five years with the renewal of Congress approval every year. One is not sure if this assistance programme will run smoothly through the next five years. Even if it proceeds without any serious snag, the military equipment secured by Pakistan under these arrangements will not cause a significant change in the existing balance of power in the region. Given the military sales by Soviet Union to India over the last couple of years, procurement of sophisticated aircraft and other military equipment from other sources, and the expanding indigenous production of arms and equipment, India will continue to maintain a comfortable and safe margin over Pakistan. So far as the Soviet "threat" to Pakistan is concerned, it will be naive to think that the procurements of weapons from the US will enable Pakistan to withstand any direct Soviet military intervention in Pakistan.

Instead of a full-fledged invasion of Pakistan or stepping-up attacks on refugee camps or border skirmishes, the Soviet Union has another option available to pressurize Pakistan to reduce its support to the *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan. It can cultivate the dissident elements in Baluchistan. If the Soviets decide to extend active political and military support to disgruntled elements in the province, Pakistan's security and integrity will come under heavy stress.

The Indian Ocean Question

It was not until the late sixties that the Indian Ocean acquired salience in Pakistan's defense policy. This was mainly due to the decision of the British Government—a friendly government—to gradually reduce their presence east of the Suez, and the desire of the two super powers and a few littoral states either to step into the British shoes or, at least, assume a dominant position in the region.

The US and the Soviet Union gradually increased their presence in the Indian Ocean in the sixties and the seventies and competed with each other to bring more and more states in their orbit of influence. The super power conflict in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf region became sharper than ever in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution (1979), the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979) and the US decision to develop new security relations with some states of the region and to set-up the Rapid Development Force.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'Pakistan's Security Dilemma—III', *The Muslim*, 24 May 1982.

In addition to this, a few relatively powerful states—The middle powers—especially India and Indonesia, showed a deep interest in the post-British withdrawal power structure in the Indian Ocean. They undertook a series of steps to expand and modernize their naval forces so as to assume the role of powers of regional significance.

Pakistan holds the view that the increased presence of the super powers and their mutual rivalry will increase tension in the region. This will not only have adverse implications for the peace and tranquillity of the area but will also restrict the policy-options of the smaller littoral and hinterland states. Pakistan also maintains that any attempt by a regional power to establish its dominance in the Indian Ocean or a part of it, will be as dangerous as the super power rivalry. This will promote mutual distrust and directly threaten the security of other smaller states which do not want, or cannot afford, to enter the power struggle in the Indian Ocean.⁴¹

Pakistan's concern over the assumption of a dominant role by a littoral state of the Indian Ocean stems from a strong belief that India is making a bid for becoming a regional influential in the Indian Ocean area. This belief, shared by some other states of the area and a number of military experts and scholars, is sustained by India's massive efforts to modernize and expand its navy in the post-British withdrawal period. By the mid-eighties India will have the strongest naval forces amongst the littoral states falling in the category of the Third World. Pakistan is perturbed by this development because it feels that India will use its naval superiority (along with its powerful Army and the Air Force) to bring the smaller states of region under its influence. This will breed tension and conflict in the area as all the small states will not necessarily accept India's *diktat* on regional and international problems.

A country like Pakistan which has a strong aversion to the idea of India's domination because of the factors discussed in the earlier sections of this article, is bound to express strong opposition to the efforts of any littoral state (especially India) to become a power of eminence in the Indian Ocean region.

Pakistan took several steps to enhance its defense and security in the Indian Ocean. It embarked on a modest programme of modernization of its navy. This part of the Pakistan Armed Forces was relatively neglected in the past. This policy was revised in the early 1970s and more resources

⁴¹ For a detailed discussion, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'Pakistan and the Indian Ocean'. *Strategic Studies*, Islamabad, Summer 1981, pp. 30-42.

were made available for the expansion and modernization of the Navy, though the Army and the Air Force still obtained the larger share of funds allocated for defense. Pakistan used diplomacy at the international level and mobilized international support for the provision of security for the weaker and smaller states *vis-a-vis* the super powers and the middle level powers or the regional powers. It joined hands with other small states in their efforts to designate the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace and a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.⁴²

While supporting the Peace Zone concept for the Indian Ocean, Pakistan did not limit its criticism to the super power presence in the region. It also underlined the dangers posed to the small states by the efforts of some littoral states to make the Indian Ocean an area of their exclusive influence. Pakistan proposed on several occasions that, in addition to the exclusion of the super powers from the Indian Ocean, there should be some equilibrium of naval forces of the littoral and hinterland states. These states should respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and settle their disputes through amicable means.⁴³ Pakistan has adopted the position that until the possibilities of some powerful regional state acquiring a hegemonial or near hegemonial position are not excluded and, unless there develops mutual trust and confidence amongst the littoral and hinterland states, the mere exclusion of the super powers will not make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

Defense and Security in the Eighties

Pakistan's defense policy can be described as the search for security by a "small" and "weak" state in a world characterized by the unequal distribution of material resources, technology, power and influence. No doubt, Pakistan's survival is not at stake the way it was in the first couple of years after independence but the over-all security environment has not improved very significantly during the last 35-36 years.

Pakistan's major concern in the eighties will continue to be India. After establishing its military primacy in South Asia in 1971, India continued to work towards enhancing its military power in all its dimensions.

⁴² For an extended analysis of the concept of Peace Zone, see S. Chawla and D.R. Sardesai, (eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, New York, Praeger, 1980, pp. 179-191.

⁴³ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'Superpowers, India, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean'. *Defence Journal*, September 1981, pp. 7-16.

This has increased military disparity between India and Pakistan reinforcing Pakistan's fears of India. It has been predicted that this military imbalance is going to increase in the future and Pakistan will be facing an extremely powerful India by the end of this decade. Pakistan will, therefore, constantly search for political and military ways and means to allay its sense of insecurity *vis-a-vis* India.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the intense civil strife that followed the intervention, and its ramifications on regional and international politics will be another set of problems needing serious attention in this decade. Whatever happens in Afghanistan—whether the Soviets withdraw completely, reduce their presence or Soviet military presence continue on its present scale with continuing civil strife—all these possibilities will have bearings on Pakistan's defense and security. Despite the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan mainly due to the Afghanistan crisis, there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union will either play the 'Baluchistan card' or invade Pakistan in the near future. But, if the civil strife intensifies in Afghanistan, border skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan or raids by the Soviet supplied Afghan gunships (helicopters) on Pakistani territory become more frequent and intense, it will complicate Pakistan's security situation. Pakistan will, then, have to revise its defense strategy. Instead of the Indo-Pakistan border, the Durand Line might, in such a situation, become the most serious security concern. A graver security problem can arise if India, on its own or on the advice of the Soviets, starts applying military pressures on Pakistan and/or clashes on the Durand Line coincide with tension on the Indo-Pakistan border.

Pakistan will continue to assign the top priority to its defense requirements. The present trend of high budgetary allocations for defense will continue in the eighties and, perhaps, the nineties. Pakistan will endeavour to maintain a credible defense posture so as to increase the cost of invasion on Pakistan or border skirmishes to a high level for the adversary. The emphasis will be on the quality of manpower, military technology, greater mobility and strike power so that it quickly responds to any security threat either on the Indo-Pakistan border or on the Durand Line. This will also require more attention to the improvement of means of communication and transportation to enable Pakistan to quickly shift and switch its troops from the Indo-Pakistan border to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and *vice versa* in case such a need arises. At the moment the main communication link is on the east of the Indus river. In addition to the improvement of this route and other roads and railways, the proposal approved and partly implemented by the Government, to establish

a new south-north road link west of the Indus river, needs to be reactivated so that there is a relatively safe alternate route to the present road link from Karachi to the northern areas.

Pakistan will have to give more attention to the expansion and modernization of the Navy in the future. The growing naval activity in the Indian Ocean region by the extra-regional as well as regional powers underlines the importance of strengthening naval forces in order to protect Pakistan's maritime interests including coastal defense. Besides improving the naval defense arrangements at Karachi and Port Qasim, Gwadar can be developed into a naval base. This can play a useful role in the naval defense of the country as well as play a role in enhancing the security of the Gulf region. A massive allocation of funds will be required to turn Gwadar into a functional port/naval base and establish road and air links with Quetta and Karachi.

Pakistan has asserted time and again that its nuclear programme is peaceful but if Pakistan's security situation worsened from what it is at present, and Pakistan faces serious difficulties in obtaining weapons and military equipment from external sources, or if Pakistan begins to feel that the international community is incapable of providing it with security, guarantees, it may be constrained to exercise the 'nuclear option'.

Pakistan's experience suggests that the acquisition of weapons from one major external source can give leverage to the supplier-state over the recipient which it may use for its political convenience. Pakistan's defense capability was seriously undermined when, during the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, one major source of arms supply imposed arms embargoes. Therefore, the policy of diversification of sources of supply, undertaken since the first embargo in 1965, could be pursued more effectively in the eighties.

More important than the diversification of sources of procurement of weapons is their indigenous production. Efforts should also be made to set up more defense oriented industries in Pakistan with necessary technological and financial cooperation from international sources. Once strong defense oriented industrial enterprises are established, these will contribute to Pakistan's industrial development as well as reduce, if not eliminate, Pakistan's over-reliance on external sources of arms procurement.

A small country like Pakistan will also have to continuously employ skilful and patient diplomacy at the bilateral, multilateral and international

levels to offset its military inferiority *vis-a-vis* its powerful adversaries. The existing international and regional organizations, i.e., the UN, the OIC, NAM, need to be strengthened and their forums persistently used to ensure defense and security. A skilful use of diplomacy can also reduce tension and facilitate amicable settlement of contentious problems. It is in this context that the improved economic ties between India and Pakistan in the early eighties, travel facilities to each other's citizens and the efforts during 1982-83 to evolve a framework for a No-War Pact appear meaningful. Given the long history of conflict and distrust and a wide discrepancy in their outlooks on regional and international issues, it may be too optimistic to suggest that the 1980s will see the transformation of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent into an arena of perpetual peace and tranquillity. The improved ties between these two countries can, however, generate goodwill and identify areas of cooperation. This will ease tension and contribute to reducing some security pressures on Pakistan.

Efforts continue to find a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan crisis. The first round of indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan were held in June 1982 in Geneva under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's representative. The thread of these talks was picked up during Pakistan's Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow in September 1982 and, then, during the regular session of the General Assembly in the Fall of 1982. The major goal of these diplomatic efforts is to identify common grounds for negotiating a settlement of the internal war in Afghanistan and the return of Afghan refugees to their homes. Only a negotiated settlement can ensure Pakistan's security on the Durand Line and protect the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests on its southern flank. Any intensification of the internal strife in Afghanistan will not only compound Pakistan's already complex security problems but will also result in a heavy diplomatic, military and financial cost for the Soviet Union, including a threat of the stepped up involvement of the other super power in the civil strife in Afghanistan.

APPENDIX

Defense Expenditure of Pakistan: 1947-48 to 1982-83

In million Rs.			
Year	Defense Expenditure	Total Expenditure met from Revenue	Defense Expenditure Percentage of Total Expenditure
1947-48	153.8	236.0	65.16
1948-49	461.5	647.0	71.32
1949-50	625.4	856.0	73.06

Year	Defense Expenditure	Total Expenditure met from Revenue	Defense Expenditure Percentage of Total Expenditure
1950-51	649.9	1,266.2	51.32
1951-52	779.1	1,442.3	54.01
1952-53	783.4	1,320.1	59.34
1953-54	653.2	1,108.7	58.91
1954-55	635.1	1,172.6	54.16
1955-56	917.7	1,433.4	64.02
1956-57	800.9	1,330.7	60.18
1957-58	854.2	1,521.8	56.13
1958-59	996.6	1,956.5	50.93
1959-60	1,043.5	1,846.5	56.51
1960-61	1,112.4	1,894.2	58.72
1961-62	1,108.6	1,986.8	55.79
1962-63	954.3	1,795.3	53.15
1963-64	1,156.5	2,337.2	49.48
1964-65	1,262.3	2,736.2	46.13
1965-66	2,855.0	4,498.1	63.47
1966-67	2,293.5	3,765.5	60.09
1967-68	2,186.5	4,077.1	53.62
1968-69	2,426.8	4,371.0	55.52
1969-70	2,749.1	5,109.4	53.80
1970-71	3,201.5	5,751.3	55.66
1971-72	3,725.5	6,303.8	59.09
1972-73	4,439.6	7,480.7	59.34
1973-74	4,948.6	11,724.6	42.02
1974-75	6,914.2	16,139.6	42.83
1975-76	8,103.4	17,613.5	46.00
1976-77	8,120.6	18,161.5	44.71
1977-78	9,674.5	22,781.9	42.46
1978-79	10,167.6	29,851.8	34.06
1979-80	12,654.8	34,845.1	36.31
1980-81			
Revised	15,283.9	39,592.5	38.06
1981-82			
Revised	19,592.9	38,090.0	51.43
1982-83			
Budget	22,095.3	46,910.0	47.01
Average Annual Percentage of Defense Expenditure: 53.48			

Source: Compiled from Pakistan Economic Survey, an annual publication of Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance.