

JT STRAT APRC-2022

(GENERAL CONVENTIONAL WAR – PAS ENVMT)

STRAT ENVMT

*“Our object should **be peace within, and peace without**. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with the world at large”*

*(Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah)*

Gen

1. Power potential hitherto residing in US is becoming more diffused and distributed. The nature of strategic environment is blurring and blending due to teetering world order, amorphous future and change in US highest office with cards closer to the chest. Formation of new alliances / ententes, global power contestation and atomized environment is posing strategic response dilemma for today’s strategists. Studded with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (**VUCA**), the strategic environment remains mk with dynamic instability or “chaos.”
2. Decades long conflict-ridden instability in Afghanistan is not receding despite Taliban’s takeover of the country, with resurgence of Islamic State of Khorisan, posing challenges to Pakistan. The security concerns in near future will necessitate oscillated commitment of forces on two fronts, besides maintaining law & order in Balochistan and safeguarding CPEC.
3. In the absence of National Security Policy of Pakistan, this Defence Policy has been formulated based on Quaid’s Vision, Article 2-A of Objective Resolution, which elucidates ‘safeguarding sovereign right’, Article 245 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which governs the ‘role of Armed Forces’ and guidance provided through national purpose, interests, objectives formulated in NSWC 21-22 (Anx A). With no aggressive designs, our Defence Policy is governed by a legitimate desire of assuring National Security by threat mitigation.
4. Therefore, Ideal role of the policy maker is to exercise influence over volatility, manage uncertainty, simplify complexity and resolve ambiguity, all in terms favourable to the interests of the state.

5. **Global Environment**

- a. Global Order remains a competing chessboard of Sino-US interests. Formulation of new alliances / ententes and increased ft prints in Indo-Pacific to rein-in China amplifies Indian stature and relevance.
- b. Geo-economics has gained currency over geo-politics as the world is aversive to conventionalism. Interdependence, connectivity, MNCs' interests and globalization has led to Non-Kineticism and Indir Apch.
- c. The Strat and political impasse on Afghanistan favours Eastern Adversary, scapegoats Pakistan and afflicts Pakistan with spillover.
- d. Change in White House policy post US's wdr from Afghanistan is affecting balance of power in South Asia. Arenas of conflict are like to emerge due to China's souring eco initiatives and Pakistan's role in line with China's policies.
- e. Pak-Arab relations are under stress due to ongoing schism b/w Arab and Non-Arab Blocks, inc pressure on Pak to recognize Israel and economy backed Indian exterior maneuver in GCC.
- f. European Union (EU), embroiled in financial crises and security imperatives is fast losing the capacity to influence developments beyond its borders.
- g. UN conts its chequered legacy; preferential treatment by rule based intl sys and unilateralism is the hallmk of the world body, denting any prospect for resolution of disputes like Kashmir.
- h. Transitioning from hard to smart power, state to VNSAs, Law-fare and R2P are emerging trends of intervention in state affairs. FATF conts to be Sword of Damocles and leverage by IFIs against Pakistan.
- i. Rise of intra-state wars, based on identity crisis and the very provision of a vent to China in shap of OBOR's Flagship proj CPEC, subject Pakistan to Hybrid onslaught having US with "Lead from Behind Strat".
- j. Pakistan's Nuc capability doesn't bode well with Intl Estb. Tools like nuc proliferation and managed chaos are likely to remain coercive aces up the sleeves.

3. **Regional Envmt**

- a. US' asg role to India in IOR, enhanced security and disruptive technologies pacts will lead to a serious strategic imbal in South Asian's context – ***Stability / Instability paradox.***
- b. Recent overarching use of disruptive techs discerned in Armenia-Azerbaijan suggests a thing or two on emergent grs. Pakistan must leverage convergence of interests with China to address pitfalls.
- c. Success of Intra-Afghan dialogue remains a farfetched cry due to India being the chief spoiler. Effects will likely afflict erstwhile FATA in particular and Pakistan in general, blemishing the notions of lasting peace.
- d. Frustration to veil failings in IIOJ&K, utter humiliation after Pulwama's showdown, revelations of Indian Chronicles, irrefutable terror dossier by Pakistan and inc domestic tremors incl Farmers' protest which may tempt fascist regime for strat misadventure incl conventional war.
- e. China will remain as strat partner of Pakistan, however, in wake of conflict, diplomatic, moral and logistic support will be the only lettings for Pakistan.
- f. Indian opposition and US misgivings about CPEC could potentially derail or retard progress necessitating formulation of a 'joint action plan' and transforming CPEC from mere trade to "Strat Trade and Def Pact".
- g. Pakistan has gained prominence in Russian security due to mil diplomacy, however, strat tilt towards India is understandable and has resulted in procurement of S-400 by India.
- h. Alliances and ententes like QUAD, RCEP and others will have significant bg on the nature of conflicting interest and state's leverages over the other in active conflict.

4. **Domestic Envmt**

a. **India**

- (1) **Political.** Despite humiliation in Feb 2019, BJP cashed face off with Pakistan. CAA and current Framers' agitation is spiralling out of con. Turning tide in Indian Political arena has stooped to demonizing Muslims and beating war drums against Pakistan.

- (2) **Psycho-social**. Inept handling of Pandemic and poor governance of Modi's regime has retarded India's progress. Shining India seems to be a lost cause and deprivation, esp amongst minorities incl Sikh, Muslims and Dalits are at all time high. Reports about rights abuse, minorities' issue, RSS laden saffron ideology and fascism has exposed the feigning secular face of India.
- (3) **Economic**. Pandemic, flawed policies and souring instability has reeled back Indian progress to a palpable extent. Sustained eco growth is dir linked with enhanced def budget which may not be a matter of routine and incrementally inc as seen in the past.
- (4) **Public Will / Morale**. Recent spate of Hindu extremism and political rhetoric has created strong anti-Pakistan sentiment among segments of Indian society. However, this has led to polarization of a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious society. Indian intelligentsia and civil society, together with international media, have started to express their concerns over these negative trends.
- (5) **Military**. Indian military build-up has been diverted in two directions i.e. China and Pakistan. In the larger strat context, US is seen coming for rescue by allowing access to niche technologies. Repeated violation of Cease Fire along Line of Control and classic use of Non Kinetic Warfare may be replaced by a conventional war below perceived nuc threshold under the ambit of PAS.

b. **Pakistan**

- (1) **Political**. Emphasis on foundational amends, accountability drive and inc polarity has led to tremors like PDM somewhat in concert with international agenda / adversary. Colour revolutions may be only a matter of time if not intercepted, managed and necessary steps taken in desired dir.
- (2) **Psycho-social**. The society is divided on ethnic, sectarian and sub-nationalistic lines, however, remains cognizant of the ills of extremism, terrorism and social injustices. National unity/ cohesion

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would evolve against overt external threats especially India or natural calamities.

- (3) **Economic**. Widespread corruption, inconsistent policies, mismanagement of resources/ institutions and precarious FDI/ business friendly atmosphere has clogged economic stability. Though macroeconomic indicators are positively poised yet frail economic base may adversely impact the application of all EoNP during war.
- (4) **Public Will / Morale**. National resilience has braved what fewer could do once confronted with such host of issues. Despite divisive agenda of leading political parties, the nation stands united behind the political and military leadership to thwart any kinetic threat.
- (5) **Military**. Force development goals are not fully realized due to economic difficulties and involvement in internal security. Sustenance of defence needs and triple stretch on the armed forces is a daunting challenge. Armed forces, together with the political leadership and popular support, are at perpetual war against Hybrid onslaught/ Non Traditional Security Threats (NTST).

5. **Mil Envmt.** Incumbent military environment in the region is contemplated as:-

a. **India**

- (1) Due to enhanced strategic partnership with US, traditionally Russia and Israel; India is ready to embolden its mil bicep esp aiming at ctr strat cap and disruptive technologies.
- (2) Indian strat apparatus is soliciting Pakistan's behavioural change and Regime Re-tweak through non-kinetic and limited application of military means.
- (3) Propagating a two-front war scenario, India intends to drum beat dooms day's prognosis and acqn of support from US/ West.

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- (4) India's recently brokered deals with US such as BECA, COMCASA and Russia (S-400) is detriment to strat stability of the region. This entails dir eff on strat thresholds.
- (5) Enhanced infrastructure development and logistics has resulted in increase of India's war stamina.

b. **Pakistan**

- (1) Pakistan does not maintain formal military alliance with any country; however, defence collaboration with China and exploring avenues of opportunities with Turkey will remain a viable option, esp in absence of total or insignificant sp of Gulf Ctys.
- (2) Interest based preferential treatment and sel application of laws on military exports limits avenues for Pakistan's essential and niche capability development.
- (3) Pandemic's clogging eff, fiscal constraints, limited indigenization capacity and uncertain external support would affect capacity to sustain war against India.
- (4) Protracted employment of Pak Army in SCW has tapered off its conventional focus, though cbt worthiness has certainly enhanced.
- (5) Presence of VNSAs and HIAs in Afghanistan / along Pak-Afghan border regions, ever simmering has the potency to precipitate in Bln, erstwhile FATA and adjoining districts incl Kci, imposing a binary streth.
- (6) Concentration of Naval infrastructure at a single location make it vulnerable and is likely to stretch PN's logistic and support efforts during war.
- (7) Eroding first shot capability in the air domain will seriously jeopardize success of own air operations.
- (8) Armed forces lack joint-ness, integration, joint training and common capacity development due to inhibitions of services and absence of joint services platform.

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- c. **ERF**. In case of any Indo-Pak conflict, presence of ERF in IOR especially, adds to response complexities in air and naval domain.

6. **Nuc Envmt**

- a. Credible nuclear capability limits space for an all-out conventional war, yet, strategic miscalculation post fake surgical strike I & II can't be precluded as a limited war, precipitating all along IB, under perceived below nuclear thresholds under the PAS strategy.
- b. India has apparently declared No First Use Policy, while **Pakistan's strategic parity lies in First Use and ambiguous nuclear thresholds.**
- c. Dev and depl of LYNW (Hatf IX – Nasr) by Pakistan and her pursuance of assured second strike capability lend credence to deterrence.
- d. India is endeavouring to establish nuclear triad, assured second strike capability through development of sea based capability, antiballistic missile defence and enhancing her strategic and operational surveillance capabilities.
- e. Pakistan nuclear capability will continue to remain under sharp focus and surveillance by US, her allies and India with possible attempt to neutralize Command and Control infrastructure.

7. **Concls from Envmt**

- a. **Space of War**. Aversion to war and effective deterrence leaves no space for conventional war. However, deflecting spot light from internal situation and as a result of strategic miscalculation, India may carve out space for short / limited war, with tacit understanding of the concerned players, like Pulwama standoff.
- b. **Causes of War**. Certain important causes of war in Indian context are as under:-
- (1) Inability to attain politico military aim through non-kineticism.
  - (2) A major terrorist activity / False Flag ops (FFO) of VNSAs inside India, especially the mainland, followed by alleging Pakistan for it.
  - (3) Surge in Kashmir freedom struggle and Indian inability to control it.

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- (4) Tacit approval by concerned powers fol by strat miscalculation or a deliberate Indian attempt to change the status quo, under the perceived nuc thresholds (PAS strat).
- c. **Triggers of War.** Terrorist attacks in India with cultivated linkage/ construed footprints in Pakistan. Deterioration of security situation in IIOJ&K and mainland in India. Indian's IOs to build perception of Pakistan's involvement and thereby seeking all important, legitimacy.
- d. **Character of War.** Key chars of likely war are as under:-
- (1) War is likely to be a combination of direct application of military instrument in synchronization with indirect strategy.
  - (2) Achievement of strategic surprise will be difficult by both sides. Aim would be to achieve objectives remaining below nuclear threshold and carving out notion of victory in cognitive domain through information operations.
  - (3) War will be short notice and short duration, characterized by high intensity, high tempo operations under relatively transparent battle space.
  - (4) Dominant application of air power to create decisive effects and use of force multipliers.
  - (5) Increased reliance on network centricity, information operations and conduct of operations under the glare of media.
- e. **Liberty of Action**
- (1) **India**
    - (a) **Enhanced by**
      - i. Strategic / economic relevance to the West / US.
      - ii. Conventional Force differential.
      - iii. Global aversion to militancy / terrorism.
      - iv. Pol expediency – ultra nationalistic mindset – Saffron ideology - casus belli.
      - v. Strong diaspora and effective information operations capability.



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vi. Initiative to start hostilities.

(b) **Curtailed by**

- i. Nuc overhang and ambiguous thresholds..
- ii. LYNW – cold strat in cold storage..
- iii. India's global aspirations and economic trajectory.
- iv. Aversion to conventional war due economic cost.
- v. Vulnerability of SLOCs in the Persian Gulf.

(2) **Pakistan**

(a) **Enhanced by**

- i. Strategic balance.
- ii. FSD incl LYNWs against Indian PAS.
- iii. Relevance in Afghanistan.
- iv. Superior strategic orientation.
- v. Strong public support against any external aggression, especially from India.

(b) **Curtailed by**

- i. India's numerical / technological edge especially Navy and Air Force.
- ii. Weak economy and lesser logistic stamina.
- iii. Image deficit and limited international support.
- iv. Commitment in war on terror/ internal security - causing binary stretch.
- v. Incumbent pol tremors – bg on national cohesion.
- vi. Presence of ERF and its possible support to India.

f. **External Factors affecting Fighting Potential.** International sanctions and heavy reliance on external military hardware is likely to adversely impact on Pakistan war fighting potential. Only limited moral/ diplomatic support from China, Turkey and sparingly from Islamic countries may be expected.

g. **War Initiation.** Shaping intl envmt by exploiting aversion to militancy / terrorism, projecting Pakistan as epicenter of terrorism, an incidental or

stage-managed act of terrorism (casus belli) may be exploited by India to initiate war – tacit approval as a rider clause.

- h. **War Termination.** Capitalizing on initial gains, India may announce a unilateral ceasefire and carve out the notion of victory projected through an effective media campaign. However, Pakistan will endeavour to achieve parity in effects, stature at the bargaining table, dominating escalation ladder at every potential exit pt, preserving notion of victory. Strat capability overhang and adroit exterior mnvr will be the mainstay of the War Termination policy.

i. **Availability of Military / Diplomatic Support**

- (1) **US.** US is likely to use its influence to prevent war between Indian and Pakistan, however, will help India to achieve its politico-military objectives below Pakistan's nuclear threshold in case of war.
- (2) **EU.** In case of any conflict between India and Pakistan, EU is likely to pursue early end to hostilities with leaning towards India due to eco reasons / intl relevance.
- (3) **Russia.** In case of conflict, Russia is not likely to remain neutral due to the evolving world order. Membership of both belligerents in SCO and China factor will limit any overt sp of India.
- (4) **Turkey.** Turkey is likely to play a proactive role to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan, however, is likely to provide diplomatic and ltd material support to Pakistan due to its fraternal ties.
- (5) **GCC.** Pakistan's relations with Turkey, Qatar and Iran are the irritants. In case of a conflict between India and Pakistan, GCC are likely to provide diplomatic support to Pakistan, however, material support seems remote due to inc leaning towards India and Israel.

j. **Impact of Internal Dynamics in Support of War**

- (1) War sustenance will be challenging phenomenon owing to fragile economy and inadequate indigenization.
- (2) Pulling out of forces from Western theatre remains a challenge, especially in the PAS settings and sensitivities.

- (3) Pol schism is a question mark; however, societal cohesion, resilient national psyche against external aggression will be instrumental.
- (4) Vibrant media is likely to play a positive role during any conflict, and if used effectively can play significant role in pre, intra and post war dynamics.
- k. **Effects of Nuclear Deterrence**
  - (5) Nuc overhang, notion of MAD and global intervention depletes chances of conventional war.
  - (6) Inherent strength of Pakistan's ambiguous thresholds.
  - (7) Space for war is effectively deterred through LYNWs and Pakistan's resolve.
  - (8) Indian nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation lacks credibility.
- l. **Impact of ERF**. Presence of ERF in IOR and relative surge of terrorists' acts in Afghanistan merits adequate safeguards on the Western border while fighting a conventional war in the Eastern theatre.

## **AIM ANALYSIS**

### **Political Objectives and Strategic Effects Desired**

- 8. **Indian Politico-Military Aim Against Pakistan**
  - a. **Political Aim.** Force Pakistan for **Regime Re-tweet** aiming regression on core issues and elicit pliant regional policies.
  - b. **Military Aim.** Discredit and embarrass Armed Forces of Pakistan and degrade economic potential by capturing sensitive spaces in shallow depth.
  - c. **Indian Strategic Objectives.** While gaining a status of regional power with global aspirations, Indian strategic objectives are:-
    - (1) (Dominate Indian Ocean Region assuming status of net security provider.

- (2) Maintain influence in Indo-Pacific Region countering China in wake of shifting global order.
- (3) Develop economic and military capabilities seeking asst from US posing two front dilemma.
- (4) Secure permanent seat in United Nations Security Council.

d. **Indian Strategic Aspirations against Pakistan.** Indian aspirations against Pakistan can be summarized as under:-

- (1) Discredit, isolate, marginalize and cause regression on policy issues leading to pliancy.
- (2) Post illegal annexation of Kashmir, suppress freedom struggle, consign unfinished agenda of partition in cold storage and make AJ&K/ GB (CPEC) controversial in concert with concerned powers.
- (3) Undermine “Two Nations Theory” and exploit faultlines through indir strat/ Hybrid war eroding national will.
- (4) Stability / instability paradox, acqn of niche technologies to widen conventional asymmetry, enabling nuc triad / strat imbal, thus making Pakistan pliant through strat browbeating.
- (5) Labeling Pakistan as rogue state abetting terrorism, nuclear proliferation and souring concerns for strat capability.
- (6) Impasse in Intra Afghan dialogue, using Afghan soil for proxy war and ensuing inextricable involvement of Pakistan on Western theatre.

9. **Pakistan’s Politico-Military Aim**

- a. **Defence Policy Statement.** Pakistan shall safeguard her sovereignty and territorial integrity including, AJ&K and Gilgit – Baltistan, by maintaining comprehensive deterrence and effective military system. The

Armed Forces of Pakistan shall continue to render necessary assistance to other EoNP's when called upon and contribute towards global peace.

- b. **Defence Aim.** Deter war, should deterrence fail, defend territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan including AJ&K and Gilgit – Baltistan against entire spectrum of threat.
- c. **Strategic Concept.** The cardinals of Strategic Concept are:-

(1) **Deterrence and Defence**

- (a) Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities (FSD).
- (b) In case of any aggression, defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

(2) **Security through Crises Management.** When called in aid of civil power, assist civilian authorities in restoring normalcy against threats emanating from hostile intent or natural calamities.

(3) **Force Development.** The concept of Force Development revolves around addressing the existing inadequacies to maintain conventional/ sourcing technological imbal and remain responsive to entire spectrum of threat.

**Analysis of Political and Defence Aim**

10. **Analysis of Politico - Military Aim**

a. **Deter War**

- (1) Maintain strategic capability.
- (2) Ambiguous threshold.
- (3) International relevance.
- (4) Political resolve.
- (5) Strategic communication.
- (6) Maintain a strong / viable military structure.

b. **Defence Against External Aggression or Threat of War**

- (1) Defend territorial integrity including seaward defence and airspace of the country.
- (2) Maintain parity in effects at all stages of war.
- (3) Diplomacy and other EoNP should also play their part.
- (4) Curtail eco-mil degradation.

c. **Act in Aid of Civil Power**. Assist state internal security apparatus.

11. **Implications of Politico - Military Aim**

- a. Maintain full spectrum deterrence capability in line with credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
- b. Develop commensurate capabilities for effective response against envisaged conventional and sub-conventional threats.
- c. Evolve procedures, in consultation with other ministries, for optimal employment of all EoNP against any aggression.
- d. Progressively enhance capabilities with a view to conduct full spectrum information operations, including cyber warfare in mid to long term.
- e. Assist in peaceful resolution of all disputes, including Kashmir.
- f. Maintain proactive military diplomacy, including contribution in international peace and stability operations as provisioned under United Nations' Charter.
- g. Diversify military hardware and technologies.
- h. Contribute towards nation building including provision of security for decisively significant national projects.

12. **Guidelines/ Tasks of Armed Forces**

a. **Specific Tasks**

- (1) Contribute to deter war.
- (2) Defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, in case of war.
- (3) Assist in internal security/ stabilization of internal threats, when called upon in aid of civil power.

b. **Implied Tasks**

- (1) Maintain strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically agile armed forces to reinforce deterrence.
- (2) Develop an efficient and comprehensive system of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance along with counter intelligence.
- (3) Develop and maintain fully prepared, modern and arrayed conventional capability to fight a successful war.
- (4) Intimate coordination, at highest level, for employment of military instrument in synchronization with other EoNP.
- (5) Optimal realization of Information Operations with requisite protection against Cyber Warfare.
- (6) Sustainable war stamina for a short and intense war.
- (7) End the war with denial of politico-military aim to the adversary.
- (8) Ensure a robust interface for employment of strategic assets as Intra War Deterrence.
- (9) Develop and maintain a responsive military system to address entire spectrum of threat.
- (10) Be prepared to prosecute a successful war with binary stretch.
- (11) Be prepared to fight under nuclear, biological and chemical environment.

c. **Essential Tasks**

- (1) Maintain strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically agile armed forces to reinforce deterrence.
- (2) Develop an efficient and comprehensive system of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance along with counter intelligence.
- (3) Develop and maintain fully prepared, modern and arrayed conventional capability to fight a successful war.
- (4) Intimate coordination, at highest level, for employment of military instrument in synchronization with other EoNP.

- (5) Optimal realization of Information Operations with requisite protection against Cyber Warfare.
- (6) Sustainable war stamina for a short and intense war.
- (7) End the war with denial of politico-military aim to the adversary.
- (8) Ensure a robust interface for employment of strategic assets as Intra War Deterrence.
- (9) Develop and maintain a responsive military system to address entire spectrum of threat.

13. **Determination of Strategic Objectives**

a. **Space Oriented.** Objectives of psycho – social importance; in various sectors are:-

- (1) **LAC/ LOC/ WB**
  - (a) Road Dras – Kargil.
  - (b) Punch.
  - (c) Nowshera.
  - (d) Chamb
- (2) **Ravi – Chenab Corridor**
  - (a) Jammu.
  - (b) Road Samba – Kathua.
  - (c) Madhopur HW.
- (3) **Ravi Beas/ Ravi Sutlej Corridor**
  - (a) Amritsar.
  - (b) Harike HW.
  - (c) Khemkaran.
  - (d) Ferozpur.
- (4) **South of Sutlej**
  - (a) Fazilka.
  - (b) Suratgarh.
  - (c) Bhatinda.
- (5) **Desert Sector**
  - (a) Ramgarh.
  - (b) Barmer.
  - (c) Jaisalmer.

b. **Force Oriented**

- (1) Armoured/ mechanised component.



- (2) Aircraft Carrier.
- (3) Airbases supporting ground offensive.

c. **Economic**

- (1) Industrial and commercial complexes.
- (2) Communication infrastructure.
- (3) SLOCs originating from the Gulf.
- (4) POL storage and processing facilities.

14. **Decisive Zone of Operation and Desired Strategic Effects from Military.**

River corridors present decisive zones of operation to create equitable gains and parity of effects to affect a favourable war termination.

- a. **Decisive Zones of Operations.** Considering the conceptual contours of Indian current war fighting concepts vis-à-vis her politico-military objective, following objective zones can create equitable strategic effects at different stages and contribute towards favourable war termination:-

- (1) **Most Preferred.** River corridors.
- (2) **Preferred.** Kashmir.
- (3) **Least Preferred.** Desert sec.

b. **Strategic Objectives**

- (1) Creation of early effects in sensitive objective zones.
- (2) Sustainable gains till favourable war termination.
- (3) Degradation of Indian Armed Forces.
- (4) Denial of clear cut victory to Indian Armed Forces.

15. **Military Aim.** Maintain conventional balance to contribute towards comprehensive deterrence, assist in internal stability, if war is forced upon, ensure sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan and deny the adversary her politico-military aim.

**THREAT**

17. After presenting the environment, now panel will zoom onto threats being faced by Pakistan.

18. **Threat Spectrum.** Threat to Pakistan lies in overarching hybrid domain and ranges from internal to external, kinetic to non-kinetic, direct to indirect, and traditional to non-traditional having strands which are closely intertwined. Despite multiple sources; India remains main repository of threat to Pakistan's security. Threat to Pakistan will be presented in the sequence as flashed:-

- a. **External Threat**
  - (1) Direct Threat.
  - (2) Indirect Threat.
- b. **Internal Threat**
  - (1) Kinetic threats.
  - (2) Non Kinetic threats.
- c. Military assessment of threat.
- d. Threat scenarios and JHs.

19. **In External Domain, first Direct Threat**

- a. **India.** Principal direct threat to Pakistan emanates from India due to unresolved disputes, history of conflict and perpetual enmity. Pakistan's credible deterrence has precluded the use of direct strategy by India, yet India continues to carve out space for war. Rising internal discord due to recent Citizenship Amendment Bill and expected surge in Kashmir Freedom Movement may compel India for some misadventure against Pakistan to divert attention of domestic as well as international community.
- b. **Afghanistan.** Considering prevalent environment and spike in terrorist acts in Afg, spillover of terrorism by Intl Terrorist orgs cannot be ruled out.

20. **Indirect external threats** emanates from multiple actors and include

- a. **Coercion** in political, diplomatic, economic, law fare and water domain (PDEL&WC) by global and regional players through International Institutions and Information operations aimed at marginalizing Pakistan in the international community and targeting *Government-People-Armed*

*Forces trinity of Pakistan.*

- b. Indirect threat can also materialize through **cyber-attacks** against critical military and civilian command and control and public service systems.
- c. Indirect threats in **maritime domain** include Sub Conventional threat and Quarantine Operations by India.
- d. India in connivance with global powers has engaged Pakistan in a perpetual Hybrid War to shape the environment, wherein Pakistan's will to resist is being undermined, thus creating conditions for application of direct strategy.

21. **Internal Threat.** Internal threat mostly emanating from ethno–religious fissures, extremism, weak governance, socio-economic deprivations and friction amongst institutions is being exploited by external forces. HIAs and NSAs have become main drivers of internal instability. Although, Pakistan has achieved degree of success against complex hybrid threat in internal domain, however, these threats with varying intensity are likely to continue as:-

- a. **Kinetic threats** in form of terrorism, sub-nationalism, sectarianism and ethno-political militancy.
- b. **Non kinetic threats** as subversion, media exploitation due to lack of strict code of conduct, Non Traditional Security Threats emanating from natural disasters and strain on Ideology/ culture etc.

22. **Moving to Assessment of Threat**

- a. **Indian Political Aim** is to seek Pakistan's **behavioural/ policy change** on core issues.
- b. **Likely Indian Minimum Military's Aims is to embarrass** Armed Forces of Pakistan – Whereas **Maximum Military Aim** is to **discredit** Armed Forces of Pakistan and **degradation of its eco-military potential**.

23. To achieve her politico- military aims, India is rapidly increasing her Defence Budget which reveals her intentions. Indian current defence budget is **9 times** more than that of Pakistan.

24. India's current force structure is shown on the slide. It has a clear force differential with regards to Pakistan.

25. **Indian Force Development Goals.** Despite already having a clear force differential with Pakistan, India is spending substantial amount on development of its military under “Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan” (LTIPP) 2012–27. Under growing Indo-US strategic partnership, India is gaining maximum military benefits from US through agreements like COMCASA, LEMOA, BECA and STA etc. Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF-17) emphasizes on jointness, special operations and force multipliers to enhance Indian Armed Forces’ combat potential. Recent appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), planned articulation of joint commands, restructuring of Armed Forces and technological advancement is a step towards this goal. These organizational, conceptual and doctrinal changes **merit consideration** by Pakistan.

26. **Actualization of Indian Force Development Goals will manifest as**

- a. Superiority in the domains of decision making, battlefield transparency, information and real time I2SR.
- b. Enhanced IAF’s offensive potential for degradation of Pakistan Military.
- c. Ascendency in TSR matrix through strategic airlift capability. **AND**
- d. Aggressiveness in Indian war-fighting concept due to enhanced mobility and firepower.

27. India’s national COG is its “**Democracy**”, whereas COG with regards to each service is shown on the slide.

28. Major strengths of Indian Military are – India’s force differential and logistic stamina, her Strategic surveillance and air lift capability and dominance in Information operations.

29. **Whereas** vulnerable SLOCs and delay in actualizing the force development goals are major weaknesses.

30. **Now moving to Threat Scenarios and Joint Hypotheses (JH).** There are four threat scenarios identified in the defence policy. Out of these; scenario related to Nuclear Threat is not being discussed here. On this slide, a key showing different color codes is given at the top For better understanding.

31. **Three scenarios** being presented are; Not War – Not Peace, Limited War and All Out Conventional War. **Hybrid and Nuclear overhang** remain pervasive in all scenarios.

a. **In Not War – Not Peace Scenario**

- (1) While Deterrence remains effective, Pakistan is subjected to regulated hybrid war by India in all domains; enabled by internal vulnerabilities and fault lines.
- (2) Exploiting international aversion to terrorism, India undertakes exterior manoeuvre and conducts selected mobilization of armed forces to accentuate drain on Pakistan's economic resources. Scenario carries a risk of escalating into a limited or all out conventional war.
- (3) **As an End State** it aims at making Pakistan internally divided, diplomatically isolated and economically squeezed.

b. **In scenario 2 & 3**, India wages a limited war or all out conventional war, under overarching hybrid construct, with a view to embarrass and discredit Armed Forces of Pakistan and cause eco-military degradation while remaining below nuclear threshold. *However, all out conventional war carries Nuclear Risk.*

32. Within these scenarios, panel has formulated 7 x Joint Hypothesis which are shown on the slide.

Ser	Scenarios	JHs	Summary
a.	<b>Not War, Not Peace</b>	JH – 1	<b>SCW</b> and Politico- Diplomatic, Economic, Law fare Coercion – <b>PDELC</b>
		JH – 2	<b>Heightened SCW</b> and Politico-Military, Diplomatic, Economic, Law fare & Water Coercion – <b>PMDELC / PMDELWC</b> Isolated Strike, Phantom Strike/ HPOs Quarantine
b.	<b>Limited War</b>	JH – 3	Air Strike (s) / Air Skirmish (s) / Msls Strike (s)
		JH – 4	Military Conflict Limited to Kashmir – <b>MCLK</b>
		JH – 5	Military Conflict Limited to Disputed Zones ( <i>Siachin, Kashmir, Sir Creek</i> )
	<b>All Out Conventional</b>	JH – 6	Hit and Mobilize

c.	<b>War</b> <i>(under intense Hybrid &amp; Nuclear overhang)</i>	JH – 7	Mobilize and Hit
d	Nuclear Threat	-	Being dealt by SPD

33. **Transition Possibilities.** Owing to volatility and uncertainty of environment, these hypotheses have the potential to transit from one to other in linear or non-linear pattern.

34. **Out of these**, Joint Hypothesis–4 that is Military Conflict Limited to Kashmir and JH–6 will be discussed in detail.

35. **Most Likely Hypothesis : JH-4 (War Limited to Kashmir)**

- a. **Preamble.** India's current force structure and deployment in IOK provides the leverage to conduct short, intense and high tempo war with synchronized bi service application. Concurrently, India will heighten SCW inside Pakistan. Her military strength lies in its accretion potential and air force. Probability of this hypothesis increases due to Indian political and military leadership's desire/ resolve and increasing capacity of its military. Adroit exterior maneuver and intense IOs remain overarching.
- b. **Design.** While taking requisite safeguards along working boundary and international border, launch offensive against number of objectives across LOC with a view to capturing areas of politico-military sensitivities for redrawing boundaries. Through adroit exterior maneuver and speedy mobilization; limit response options for Pakistan thus keep the war limited to Kashmir. Having achieved the ascendancy and caused embarrassment to Pakistan Armed Forces; end the war through unilateral ceasefire. *Scarlet thread remains calibrated force application to maintain ascendancy in gains and intensive IOs.*
- c. **Politico-Military Objective** in this case will be to embarrass Pakistan's Armed Forces.
- f. **To achieve this aim,** India will try to keep the war limited to Kashmir only.
- g. **In this hypothesis,** it would be a short, intense and high tempo war.

- h. **Victory** will be crafted through projecting effectiveness of own actions and gains through extensive Information Operations; and will rest largely in notional domain.
36. Although India will try to keep the war limited to Kashmir, there are chances of escalation to an All Out Conventional war.

37. **All Out Conventional War – JH-6 (Hit and Mobilize)**

- a. **Preamble.** India's current force structure vis-à-vis actualization of force development goals provides the leverage to conduct PAO. Under heightened SCW inside Pakistan to affect its mobilization/ disengagement from Western border, India initiates the war with PAS. Her military strength lies in qualitative and quantitative edge in military hardware. Adroit exterior maneuver and intense IOs remain overarching.
- b. **Design.** Under PAS, launch high tempo Bi/ Tri service offensive on multiple thrust lines for early gains and saturating Pakistan's response at all tiers inducing an early imbalance in system of forces and creating psychological effects. Orchestrate swift operations, regulate the scale and tempo of operations to remain below nuclear threshold. Dominate all stages of war to retain multiple exit points for war termination at position of clear military advantage. Scarlet thread remains the synchronized application of forces to achieve early effects and ascendancy at every stage.
- c. **Manifestation of JH – 6**
  - (1) This hypothesis can be triggered by a terrorist incident/ false flag operation in mainland or as a consequence of India's inability to control KFM/ internal unrest. With tacit approval of US/ West, India blaming Pakistan for fueling KFM, will resort to swift air strikes/ naval operations. Hence, escalation of situation could be a consequence of strategic miscalculation from Scenario-1 or as a consequence of limited war i.e transition from JH-4 or JH-5.
  - (2) It entails extensive employment of IAF and long range vectors to disrupt mobilization and degrade Pakistan's Armed Forces.

- (3) Disruption of SLOCs to deny Pakistan essential war material.
  - (4) Operations on multiple thrust lines to achieve early ascendancy in gains to terminate the war with advantageous politico-mil position.
- AND**
- (5) Extensive Information Operations (IOs) by projecting physical and moral dominance.
- d. **Military Objectives of War.** Discredit Pakistan's Armed Forces by making significant spatial gains and degrading its eco-military potential.
- e. **India's Decisive Strategic Objective Zones**
- (1) **Most Preferred.** Desert/ Semi Desert Sector.
  - (2) **Preferred.** Kashmir.
  - (3) **Less Preferred.** River Corridors (RBC & RCC).
- f. **Indian War Fighting Concept & Strategy.** Combination of direct and indirect strategy and high tempo war with Pro Active Strategy.
- b. **Likely Effects Sought through Force Multipliers** are shown on the slide. These include, inducing imbalance and disruption in Armed Forces while denying efforts for achieving surprise.
- g. **War Initiation and Termination Strategy**
- (1) **War Initiation Strategy will be**
    - (a) US/ West as key enablers, India shapes environment by stage managing terrorist act (s) in its mainland, creates war hysteria and undertakes swift surgical strikes with concurrent speedy mobilization.
    - (b) Undertakes adroit diplomatic mnvr and extensive I.Os to ensure international support.
  - (2) India will articulate **War Termination** through:-
    - (a) Maintaining ascendancy in gains during all stages for exit at the time of own choosing.
    - (b) Having achieved politico-military objectives, seeks war termination through international intervention.



h. **Victory**

- (1) In physical domain, **Victory** would be crafted on accumulated gains.
- (2) In psychological domain, extensive information operations will be undertaken for domestic as well as international audience justifying the war as legitimate act while portraying Pakistan as an irresponsible and terrorism sponsoring state.

38. **Rider Clauses would remain**

- a. Shaping of environment through adroit exterior/ diplomatic maneuver.
- b. Intense IOs and Cyber Warfare.
- c. Causing stretch through heightened SCW.

**RESPONSE**

43. After reviewing environment and threat, this part will focus on response in a new format.

44. **Mission of Armed Forces.** Deter war, if imposed, defend territorial integrity of Pakistan including AJK & GB and end the war with parity of effects. When called upon, assist in stabilization of inner front **and contribute towards global peace.**

45. **Strategic Concept**

- a. **Strategic Posture.** Defensive – Offensive<sup>1</sup>.
- b. **Dominant Strategy.** *Land-Air Strategy* will be the dominant.
- c. **Strategy for Sub Conventional Domain.** *‘Integrate, Prevent, Secure, Assist and Transfer’.*
- d. **Duration of War.** Upto 2 weeks.
- e. **Strategic Appraisal of Ends, Ways and Means.** Complexity of threat and economic constraints affect the **Ends, Ways and Means paradigm.** Stretched land forces, lack of strategic surveillance capability, emerging technological ascendancy of IAF and Indian qualitative and quantitative edge in maritime domain imply **prudent and innovative yet bold** response for achievement of assigned mission.

46. After laying out the broad contours of strategic concept, let’s now talk about available means.

47. **Structure of Armed Forces.** Pakistan’s military system<sup>2</sup> is based on volunteer, Standing National Armed Forces configured to respond entire spectrum of threat. Land forces will continue to form the largest component of military strategy<sup>3</sup>. Force structure of Armed Forces is as flashed on the screen. Armed forces have **30 x days’ logistic stamina**<sup>4</sup>. Endeavors should continue to improve **tooth-to-tail ratios.**

**Lets Now See Scenario wise response**

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<sup>1</sup> Due to log build up, comm infra, resources mob, force disposns, fire power, res and air power, **msn**, envmt and geo-pol ltds and time factor. P 2-66 MM Book NDU.

<sup>2</sup> Mil sys of a country encompasses all those aspects of national power that have an influence on the actual and potential mil str of a state, together with the means used to develop and control actual and potential military forces. It’s deeply influenced by geography, policy, sociology, economy, science, technology and national policy.

<sup>3</sup> Draft PDD – 2019.

<sup>4</sup> Visit to JS HQ

48. **Scenario – 1 : Not War Not Peace - JH 1 & JH 2**

a. **Identification of Decisive Strategic Objectives / Objective Zones**

(1) **Non-kinetic**

- (a) Ideology based narrative
- (b) Terrorist funding
- (c) Cyber space

(2) **Kinetic**

(a) **VNSAs**

- i. Western Zone – Erstwhile FATA and Balochistan
- ii. Karachi

- (b) Selected objectives against - SS / HPO by India on pretext of CT

b. **Own COG**

- (1) **National Level.** Resilience.

- (2) **Military Level.** Public support.

- c. **Design.** Adopting 'whole of Nation' approach, **contribute towards national security.** Foil **non-kinetic threats in sync** with other institutions of the state and strategic community. Thwart **internal kinetic threats** by following **people centric approach** and **preventing** resurgence of VNSAs through effective border management and intelligence-based operations. **Secure** military assets and **assist** in capacity enhancement of LEAs. Ultimately **transfer** responsibilities to civil administration for continuation of normal state functions. Frustrate **external kinetic threats from India** by initiating a notch above response to prevent enemy from further escalating the conflict.

**Information ascendancy** remain scarlet thread of response.

d. **Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

(1) **Risks**

- (a) Rise of politico-religious and pseudo-liberal movements.
- (b) Collision of state institutions.
- (c) Escalation in state-province rifts.

(d) Escalation of conflict to limited or all-out conventional war.

(2) **Mitigation Strategy**

(a) Adopt people centric approach in the trouble Zs.

(b) Work in harmony with other organs of the state.

(c) Maintain operational preparedness.

49. **Scenario 2 - Limited War (JHs 3, 4 & 5)**

a. **Identification of Decisive Strategic Objectives / Objective Zones**

(1) **Space Oriented**

(a) IOJ&K (objectives of psycho-socio importance - closer to LOC)

(b) Sir Creek (within zone of operation)

(c) Siachen (QPQ Plus)

(2) **Force Oriented**

(a) **Indian Army**. Fwd posts / log instls / HQs in AOO.

(b) **Indian Navy**. MARCOS lift capability.

(c) **Indian Air Force**. Comm nodes.

(3) **Cyber, NCW and IO**

(a) **Strategic nodes, C<sup>2</sup>**.

(b) Economic Commercial Systems and public services.

b. **Own COG**

(1) **National Level**. Resilience

(2) **Military Level**

(a) **Pak Army**. Troops maintaining sanctity of LOC / rfts.

(b) **Pak Navy**. Marine Creeks Battalions.

(c) **Pak Air Force**. Hi-tech ac.

c. **Design**. Deny information advantage to enemy during **heightened SCW scenario** by effective intelligence and strategic communication; simultaneously maintaining defensive safeguards. If war is imposed, **PAF** should create **enabling environment** for application of land component and conduct of eco-military **degradation** of enemy while **defending** national air space within Zone of operation. The **land forces** should

undertake bold and aggressive operations for achieving **sensitive spatial gains** and denying the same to the enemy. The maritime forces should defend creeks area, **protect** SLOCs while remaining poised for further escalation. Seek war termination after achieving parity of effects.

**Synergetic bi / tri-service application in sync with force multipliers and IOs is the scarlet thread.**

d. **Manifestation of Design (Back Up)**

- (1) Use effective IOs and strat comm for denying information space and expose the real agenda of enemy.
- (2) Maintain operational preparedness.
- (3) Counter effects of enemy air in disputed zone through effective CAOs and causing eco-military degradation to enemy.
- (4) Land forces should undertake defensive and offensive operations to achieve early parity of effects.
- (5) Naval forces should protect SLOCs while maintaining readiness for further escalation.
- (6) Synergetic application of bi-svc and Force multipliers will help achieve desired effects in contested AOO.

e. **Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

(1) **Risks**

- (a) **Protracted PAF / single service stand-off (no active fighting).**
- (b) Conflict escalates to all-out conventional war.

(2) **Mitigation**

- (a) **Improve capacity for PAF deployment.**
- (b) Maintain safeguards in selected zones.

50. **Scenario 3 - All Out Conventional War (JHs 6 & 7)**

a. **Identification of Decisive Strategic Objectives / Objective Zones**

(1) **Space Oriented (For Offensive Operations)**

- (a) River Corridors.
- (b) Desert sector.
- (c) Gulf SLOC.

(d) Northern Zone.

(2) **Force Oriented**

(a) **Indian Army**. Mechanized Forces.

(b) **Indian Navy**. CVBGs.

(c) **Indian Air Force**. Selected air bases and critical AD nodes.

(3) **Economic Degradation**

(a) **Indian SLOC originating from Gulf.**

(b) POL processing distribution and storage facilities.

(c) Communication Infrastructure and national power grids.

(4) **Cyber, NCW and IO**

(a) **Strategic nodes, C<sup>2</sup>.**

(b) Economic Commercial Systems and public services.

b. **Own COG**

(1) **National Level**. Resilience.

(2) **Military Level**

(a) **Pak Army**. Strategic reserves (mechanized forces).

(b) **Pak Navy**. LRMPs.

(c) **Pak Air Force**. Hi-tech AC.

(3) **Measures to Protect COG**

(a) Enhanced strategic surveillance.

(b) Effective CAOs and dispersion.

c. **Design**. Deny information advantage to enemy during **heightened SCW scenario** by effective intelligence, strategic communication and notch above responses; simultaneously maintaining defensive safeguards. If war is imposed, **PAF** should create **enabling environment** for operations of land component and conduct eco-military **degradation** of enemy while **defending** national VAs / VPs. **Land forces** should conduct **defensive** and **offensive** operations to create strategic effects in synchronization with PAF. While ensuring seaward defence, **PN** should undertake selected

offensive operations and disrupt enemy's vital gulf SLOC. Seek war termination after achieving parity of effects.

**Achieving favorable TSR in decisive zones through synergetic and synchronized application of bi / tri-services is the scarlet thread.**

d. **Manifestation of Design (Back Up)**

- (1) Use effective IOs and strat comm for denying information space and expose the real agenda of enemy.
- (2) Maintain operational preparedness.
- (3) Counter effects of enemy air through effective counter air operations and causing eco-military degradation to enemy and protection of national air space in sync with Army Air Defence.
- (4) Land forces should undertake defensive and offensive operations to achieve early parity of effects.
- (5) Naval forces should protect SLOCs while maintaining readiness for further escalation.
- (6) Synergetic application of tri-svc and Force multipliers will help achieve desired effects at decisive points.

e. **Risk Assessment and Mitigation - All Out Conventional War**

(1) **During Armed Conflict**

(a) **Risks**

- i. Timely availability of conventional forces from Western Border.
- ii. Aerial Strikes by ERF on the pretext of CT.
- iii. Conventional armed conflict escalating to nuclear exchange – accidental or strategic miscalculation.
- iv. Imposition of international sanctions.
- v. Creation of international shipping safety zones.

(b) **Mitigation**

- i. Articulating effective mobilization for early availability of troops from Western border with effective AD coordination at tri-services level.

- ii. Increased CT related cooperation and intelligence sharing with ERF with necessary safeguards in place.
- iii. Strategic communication.
- iv. Impart CBRNE training to armed forces.
- v. Proactive military diplomacy with support of allies.

(2) **Termination of Armed Conflict**

(a) **Risks**

- i. Inability to achieve desired effects.
- ii. Diplomatic pressures from allies to end war on a position of military disadvantage.

(b) **Mitigation**

- i. Early and favourable termination of the conflict.
- ii. Increase the cost of war for enemy through optimal economic-military degradation.

51. **War Termination**. Will be sought through re-assertion of deterrence, achieving sensitive spatial gains along LOC and effective strategic communication. With parity of effects in military domain, political leadership should request for deployment of UN fact finding mission and resumption of UNMOGIP in IOJ&K and seek support of international community for termination war.

52. **Victory**. Will mean projecting **spatial gains, attrition of enemy forces, denial of politico-military aim** to enemy and stalemate through effective IOs. In absence of clear victory for either side, it would mostly reside in notional domain.

**Guidelines for Services and Other Organizations**

53. **Tasks - Pakistan Army**

- a. Defend land frontiers of Pakistan.
- b. Retain forces on a high degree of combat readiness to deter aggression.
- c. In case of war, achieve parity in effects through defensive and offensive operations.
- d. Act in aid of civil power, when ordered.
- e. Contribute towards global peace.

54. **Tasks - Pakistan Navy**



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**RESTD**

- a. Ensure seaward defence of Pakistan.
- b. Keep vital SLOCs open.
- c. Sea denial to enemy forces.
- d. Undertake quarantine when ordered.
- e. Undertake selective offensive operations.
- f. Provide support to counter terrorism tasks.
- g. Protect naval VAs / VPs.
- h. Act in aid of civil power, when ordered.

55. **Tasks - Pakistan Air Force**

- a. Ensure ground / air based effective AD of National VAs / VPs.
- b. Create favourable air situation for air, land and sea operations.
- c. Create strategic effects through eco-mil degradation.
- d. Provide all out support to crucial land and sea operations.
- e. Act in aid of civil power, when ordered.
- f. Be prepared for precision and area engagement in SCW.
- g. Remain viable to undertake strategic strike, when ordered.

56. **Tasks - ISI**

- a. Provide assessment of threat to assist timely strategic decision making.
- b. Undertake operations with a view to condition the operational environment to assist own military operations.
- c. Assist other EoNP for maintenance of internal stability, especially during war.
- d. Retain capability to galvanize local support to disrupt move and assembly of Indian armed forces in IOJ&K.
- e. Provide technical assistance against terrorist networks.

57. **Tasks – ISPR**

- a. Create NoV in perception domain.
- b. Assist in maintaining national morale and countering enemy propaganda.
- c. Project own victory.
- d. Undertake IOs in concert with Mol&B to support national war effort.
- e. Maintain regular communication with masses.

**RESTD**

- f. Assist all services in operationalization of information operations in respective domains.

**DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

58. **Prevailing Scenario.** GM, In view of the complexity of threat faced by Pakistan and compounding fiscal constraints, force development has to be prioritized to strike a balance between ends and available means. Few aspects influencing developmental strategy for force development are:-

- a. RAFDP is running out of steam and is falling short of commitments, impacting payment schedules
- b. Warfighting equipment is hitting obsolescence and spares are becoming increasingly unavailable.
- c. Numbers of platforms need enhancement to cater additional threat scenarios.
- d. Additional infrastructure is needed to support short-noticed ops & enhanced flexibility.
- e. NCW hardware require hardening to EMP attack.
- f. There are restrictions on technology / capability release to Pakistan
- g. Our indigenization capabilities are nascent and require further improvement.
- h. There is limited defense industrial base and R&D in-country.

59. **Desired Attributes.** GM, Requirement of '*Notch Above Response*' coupled with complexity of threat and character of war faced by Pakistan, requires **capability** based development of forces. Therefore, desired attributes of the armed forces would be:-

- a. **Army**
  - (1) Hard-hitting, agile and zone based ground forces, with enhanced mobility, precision, firepower and embedded force protection, capable of operating efficiently both, in conventional & hybrid scenario.
  - (2) A force having real time surveillance and target acquisition capability and,
  - (3) Communication / Logistics infrastructure for speedy Inter and Intra corridor movement.

b. **Navy**

- (1) Combat ready, green water, multi-dimensional Naval force, embedding superior technology and contributing effectively to credible deterrence.
- (2) A naval force with capability for safeguarding Pakistan's maritime interests while radiating influence in the region with global outlook.

c. **Air Force**

- (1) An all-weather Air force capable to operate effectively under degraded environment, detect and engage lo-RCS / stealth platforms and undertake strategic operations once ordered.
- (2) Expansion of capabilities in all spheres for full spectrum operations from low intensity operations to all-out war.

60. **Inter Service Integration and Synergy**

- a. An assured, impermeable and reliable cyber capability capable to undertake both offensive and defensive cyber operations, established under a Cyber command, represented by all three services and civil sector.
- b. Highly motivated, educated & well trained human resource, capable to face challenges of technology and contemporary warfare.
- c. Joint, net-aided operations capability.

61. **Implementation Strategy.** GM Development of forces require implementation strategy for which three core principles have been identified i.e. selective modernization, consolidation and up-gradation. Other guiding principles would be:-

- a. Follow a balanced approach towards indigenization and off the shelf procurements.
- b. Concentrate on R&D in denied core capabilities.
- c. Follow Space based solutions to gain assured & exclusive services.
- d. Develop Industry-Academia linkage for meaningful and focused research in defence industry.
- e. Collaborate with allied countries in developing complex military systems.

- f. Commercialize non-sensitive products / technologies to gain economic viability.
  - g. Basic military training embracing modern concepts of HRD and development of joint operations doctrine to support synergy amongst three services, aiming to achieve joint and integrated operations.
62. **Manifestation and Prioritization.** GM Desired core competencies would manifest in the form of capability enhancement, however under resource constraints, prospective planning in the order of priority would be required. It may also remain under cognizance that limited fiscal space prevents categorization of capabilities on time-based scale i.e Short, Medium or Long term. Hence entire development requirements have been categorized into three categories:-
- a. Critical capabilities.
  - b. Essential capabilities.
  - c. Advantageous capabilities.
63. **Integrated Priority List.** Integrated priority list would therefore include:-
- a. **Critical Capabilities**
    - (1) First shot capability (air)
    - (2) Enhanced Aviation Capability for land / naval forces
    - (3) HIMADS / LOMADS
    - (4) Enhanced fire power (hi-tech air, land, surface and sub-surface platforms)
    - (5) Joint Cyber / NCW capability
    - (6) Construction of additional infrastructure (air and naval bases)
  - b. **Essential Capabilities**
    - (1) Upgradation of aging platforms
    - (2) Stealth detection & engagement
    - (3) Enhanced surveillance capability in all domains (manned / unmanned)
    - (4) Enhanced early warning and terminal AD elements with mobility
    - (5) Enhanced mobility of surface forces

c. **Advantageous Capabilities**

- (1) Force protection (peace / wartime)
- (2) Point air defence of VAs/VPs (all services)
- (3) R & D (Hypersonic weapons, autonomous vehicles etc)
- (4) Satellite based services (Positioning, Navigation, Timing)

64. **Support from Ministries.** GM Support required from other ministries would be as follows:-

a. **MoFA**

- (1) Assist in procurement of high tech defence equipment from foreign sources besides engaging US for supportability of existing US origin equipment.
- (2) Play role in reducing simmering tensions in Middle East in order to mitigate spillover effects on Pakistan.
- (3) Facilitate Afghan peace process while managing own strategic interests.
- (4) Manage international opinion to augment deterrence and avert war.
- (5) In case of war, internationalize the issue at the earliest and assist in war termination strategy.

b. **MoFin**

- (1) Requisite and timely availability of budget allocations for RAFDP.
- (2) In case of war, provide finances to meet war effort.

c. **MoDP**

- (1) Optimize indigenization and standardization of weapons and equipment in line with developmental strategy.
- (2) Support export oriented defence industry through joint ventures and create additional fiscal space in foreign exchange.

d. **Ministry of Industries and Production**

- (1) Identify existing industrial base that can contribute towards defence production in coordination with MoDP.
- (2) Incentivizing selected industries that can support defence industry.

- (3) Assist and coordinate in developing nexus of academic institutions, Defence Industry and public sector to enhance R&D.

e. **Mol**

- (1) Timely implementation of *National Action Plan* including capacity building of LEAs to relieve Army from IS duties.
- (2) Plans for swift transition from peace to war in terms of internal and rear area security.

f. **Mol&B / ISPR**

- (1) Expose hegemonic Indian designs manifested in her ambitious military expansion and intimidating attitude in the region.
- (2) Promote own narrative of peace loving and responsible nuclear state with no aggressive designs and a resolve to mount befitting response in case sovereignty is threatened.
- (3) During war, dominate information space to project own stance while counter enemy propaganda and maintain national morale.

g. **Ministry of Railways**

- (1) Acquisition and development of new cargo wagons for swift mobilization as per the operational requirement.
- (2) Timely availability of rolling stock in case of mobilization.

65. **Recommendations**. Having completed the JSD aspects, the panel has following recommendations to make for kind consideration at appropriate level.

- a. Keeping in view of the rapid changes in environment, review period of JMD may be reduced from five to three years. Existing and recommended format for JMD is as flashed.
- b. In order to enhance synergy in C<sup>4</sup>I domain, establish an interface between tri-services in the short term while developing a Joint C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup>SR Command at JSHQ in the mid term.
- c. Concepts of joint force employment like erstwhile JAAT may be re-studied at tri-service level. PAF ACE may be utilized for such studies.
- d. Enhance joint training and streamline CS procedures under prevalent concept of JTAC by NATO.

**RESTD**

- e. Conduct regular tri-svc war game for joint planning and lesson learning.
- f. Owing to the complexity and novelty of threat, JSD format may be changed as being presented.
- g. Joint warfare concept of Indian Armed forces may be studied in detail for implications on own response and mitigation measures may be initiated.

66. **Conclusion.** In the end I would conclude by saying that Pakistan is confronted with a wide range of threats in the transforming regional and global environment. Complexity of these threats and the shrinking fiscal space warrants dynamic employment and development strategy. Response to these challenges and threats encompasses all EoNP. Military, however, as a vital instrument of national security, should configure response within the ambit of Defence Policy dictates, living up to the Nation's expectations.