



Markets for Visas

A Radical and Fair Approach to Immigration

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- Super Bowl vs. USCIS example.
- Gary Becker: **immigration markets**.
- Javier Hidalgo: ***public* sale of citizenship**.
- Christopher Freiman: ***private* sale of citizenship**.
- This paper:
 1. Shifts the emphasis from citizenship to **visa markets**;
 2. **Develops the utilitarian argument** for visa markets.



Visa markets are no less discriminatory than existing policies

1. A market for visas is a discriminatory policy.
2. Some forms of immigration discrimination are permissible.
3. In fact, there are certain discriminatory immigration policies currently enacted.
4. A market for visas does not excessively discriminate beyond certain existing immigration policies.
5. Therefore, the adoption of a market for visas is morally equivalent to current discriminatory immigration policies.



Visa markets create compensation mechanisms for negatively-affected communities

1. A spatially concentrated flow of immigrants can impose harm on the residents of receiving communities.
2. In the presence of harm, immigrants should compensate non-migrants.
3. Markets for visas create an additional source of government revenue which can be used to compensate for immigration harms with no effect on other expenditures.
4. Therefore, markets for visas are welfare-increasing for immigrant-receiving communities.

Argument 3: Visa markets quickly increase social welfare for sending and receiving communities



Empirical claims:

1. Immigration increases productivity and scientific innovation (destination countries).
2. Immigration increases remittances and investments in human capital (source countries).
3. Immigration increases trade flows (source and destination countries).

Visa markets:

1. Incentivize immigration (bring SM_g closer to PM_g).
2. Allow for quicker realization of welfare gains (from long to short term benefits).

Argument 4: Visa markets are compatible with both open and closed borders approaches to immigration



- **Positive prices:** right to exclude is preserved.
 - The establishment of loan and tax liabilities programs prevents unfair discrimination against the poor.
- **Zero prices:** right to exclude is absent.



- This paper is **not**. . .
 1. . . asking for **all immigration** policies to be replaced by markets.
 2. . . an argument in favor of **unregulated, free markets** for visas.
 3. . . suggesting any specific **market design**.

- This paper is. . .
 1. . . claiming that **visa markets are better** than some existing immigration policies.
 2. . . bringing together **normative and utilitarian** arguments for visa markets.
 3. . . suggesting **visa markets should be seriously considered** as immigration policy options.

Thank you!



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