

Markets for Visas:

A Radical and Fair Approach to Immigration

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- Super Bowl vs. USCIS example.
- Gary Becker: **immigration markets**.
- Javier Hidalgo: ***public* sale of citizenship**.
- Christopher Freiman: ***private* sale of citizenship**.
- This paper:
 - ① Shifts the emphasis from citizenship to **visa markets**;
 - ② **Develops the utilitarian argument** for visa markets.

Argument 1: Visa markets are no less discriminatory than existing policies

- ① A market for visas is a discriminatory policy.
- ② Some forms of immigration discrimination are permissible.
- ③ In fact, there are certain discriminatory immigration policies currently enacted.
- ④ A market for visas does not excessively discriminate beyond certain existing immigration policies.
- ⑤ Therefore, the adoption of a market for visas is morally equivalent to current discriminatory immigration policies.

Argument 2: Visa markets create compensation mechanisms for negatively-affected communities

- ① A spatially concentrated flow of immigrants can impose harm on the residents of receiving communities.
- ② In the presence of harm, immigrants should compensate non-migrants.
- ③ Markets for visas create an additional source of government revenue which can be used to compensate for immigration harms with no effect on other expenditures.
- ④ Therefore, markets for visas are welfare-increasing for immigrant-receiving communities.

Argument 3: Visa markets quickly increase social welfare for sending and receiving communities

Empirical claims:

- 1 Immigration increases productivity and scientific innovation (destination countries).
- 2 Immigration increases remittances and investments in human capital (source countries).
- 3 Immigration increases trade flows (source and destination countries).

Visa markets:

- 1 Incentivize immigration (bring SMg closer to PMg).
- 2 Allow for quicker realization of welfare gains (from long to short term benefits).

Argument 4: Visa markets are compatible with both open and closed borders approaches to immigration

- **Positive prices:** right to exclude is preserved.
 - The establishment of loan and tax liabilities programs prevents unfair discrimination against the poor.
- **Zero prices:** right to exclude is absent.

Conclusion

- This paper is **not**. . .
 - ① . . . asking for **all immigration** policies to be replaced by markets.
 - ② . . . an argument in favor of **unregulated, free markets** for visas.
 - ③ . . . suggesting any specific **market design**.
- This paper is. . .
 - ① . . . claiming that **visa markets are better** than some existing immigration policies.
 - ② . . . bringing together **normative and utilitarian** arguments for visa markets.
 - ③ . . . suggesting **visa markets should be seriously considered** as immigration policies.

Thank you!

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