

Active and Passive Transparency: Substitutes or Complements?*

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Abstract

(TBU)

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1 Introduction

Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Experimental Conditions

	Pre-FOIA	Post-FOIA
No Audit	Control Group [1,950; 1,363]	Passive Treatment [3,513; 1,816]
Audit	Active Treatment [1,320; 897]	Active + Passive Treatment [366; 217]

Note: The first number in squared brackets is the total number of observations in each group; the second number is the number of unique observations in each group.

Table 1: Summary Statistics Across Experimental Groups

	Active + Passive Transparency ($n = 217$)			Active Transparency ($n = 897$)			Passive Transparency ($n = 1,816$)		
	Mean	Diff.	p -value	Mean	Diff.	p -value	Mean	Diff.	p -value
Share Urban (Pop.)	.626	-.008	.585	.627	-.005	.743	.636	.005	.771
Share Female (Pop.)	.506	.001	.699	.505	.000	.895	.505	.001	.556
Share Illiterate	.183	.009	.174	.179	.007	.342	.168	-.004	.549
Income Per Capita (ln)	9.044	-.105**	.021	9.052	-.113**	.017	9.167	.002	.960
Gini Coefficient	.508	.000	.986	.512	-.004	.364	.510	-.006	.186
Share Poor (Pop.)	.265	.010	.412	.269	.003	.787	.246	-.020	.138
Presence of AM Radio	.190	-.011	.685	.201	-.009	.750	.212	.002	.945
Presence of Health Council	.787	.012	.667	.760	.032	.274	.760	.032	.299
Presence of Education Council	.958	-.010	.462	.970	-.009	.513	.972	-.007	.630
Seat of Judiciary Branch	.517	.048	.169	.488	.022	.532	.512	.046	.222

Note: This table displays means for all covariates for observations in each treatment condition (column 1 in each group). Column 2 is the mean difference between observations in the treatment group vs. each control group. For the active and passive transparency intervention, the control group is composed of unaudited municipalities before 2012 ($n = 1,363$); for the active transparency intervention, the control group are unaudited municipalities after 2012 ($n = 1,816$); for the passive transparency intervention, the control group are the audited municipalities before 2012 ($n = 897$). Column 3 displays the p -values from t -tests performed on these variables across samples.

Table 2: The Effect of Active Transparency on Performance

Table 3: The Effect of Active Transparency on Performance

	MUDP Adoption		Municipal Development Index (MDI)		Sanctions Imposed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Active + Passive Transparency	-.159*** (.032)	-.157*** (.036)	-.001 (.007)	-.014*** (.005)	-.023 (.014)	-.016 (.017)
Active Transparency	.087*** (.017)	.114*** (.019)	-.020*** (.004)	.012*** (.003)	.005 (.008)	.006 (.010)
Passive Transparency	.195*** (.014)	.198*** (.016)	.055*** (.003)	.068*** (.003)	.010* (.006)	.007 (.009)
Municipal Controls	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	7,149	7,149	7,149	7,149	7,149	7,149

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: The Effect of Active Transparency on Corruption

	Acts of Mismanagement (ln)		Acts of Corruption (ln)		Number of Irregularities (ln)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Passive Transparency	.423*** (.055)	.420*** (.065)	-.171*** (.032)	-.168*** (.033)	-.135*** (.030)	-.131*** (.032)
Municipal Controls	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	1,686	1,686	1,686	1,686	1,686	1,686
F-stat	58.4***	7.0***	28.7***	50.7***	19.9***	42.1***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: The Effect of Active Transparency on Information

	FOIA Request (time)		FOIA Request (accuracy)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Active Transparency	-.148*** (.023)	-.040 (.031)	-.160*** (.023)	-.036 (.031)
Municipal Controls	-	Yes	-	Yes
Year Fixed-Effects	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	3,879	3,879	3,879	3,879
F-stat	42.3***	39.1***	47.3***	39.2***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 2: Figure Template