|  | Acts of Mismanagement (ln) | | Acts of Corruption (ln) | | Number of Irregularities (ln) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Passive Transparency | .114 (.097) | .104 (.116) | $-.228^{***}$ (.057) | $-.223^{***}$ (.062) | $-.218^{***}$ (.054) | $-.215^{***}$ (.060) |
| Time Trend Interactions | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Municipal Controls | - | Yes | - | Yes | - | Yes |
| Observations | 1,686 | 1,686 | 1,686 | 1,686 | 1,686 | 1,686 |
| $F$-stat | $38.7^{***}$ | $10.5^{***}$ | $10.1^{***}$ | $43.1^{***}$ | $8.7^{***}$ | $36.4^{***}$ |

*Note:* The regressions here estimate the effect of passive transparency (FOI laws implemented across Brazil) on three corruption outcomes: whether the municipal administration has mismanage public funds, engaged in corruption, and the number of violations to sound spending according to federal law. Columns 1, 3, and 5 estimate the models without covariates. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include municipal covariates and time trends interactions to control for observable differences across municipalities that could simultaneously explain the outcomes. All standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. A municipality could have been audited more than once, thus the sample size (1,686) is larger than the number of unique municipalities in the study (1,114). $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.