

Three Essays on Sanctions of Politicians in Brazil

A proposal submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Public Policy

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Abstract

This dissertation project will investigate the relationship between legal sanctions and politics in Brazil. In the first paper, I look at the effect of convictions for electoral infractions on electoral performance in four municipal elections between 2004 and 2016. The second paper tests whether State Court judges significantly rule in favor of politicians involved in small claim court cases. Finally, the last paper investigates whether active and passive transparency simultaneously improve government performance and increase the number of legal sanctions for government wrongdoing. These papers contribute significantly to the literature in political science, economics, and law by exploring the relationship between legal sanctions and local political dynamics in developing countries. In addition, I also contribute new data sources in the form of judicial decisions and innovative identification strategies using institutional features of Brazilian electoral and judicial systems.

Keywords: political economy of development; electoral politics; judicial politics; transparency; economics of crime.

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1 Active and Passive Transparency in Brazilian Municipalities

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Institutional Background

1.3 Data

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Condition

	<i>Active Transparency</i>			<i>Passive Transparency</i>			<i>Active and Passive Transparency</i>		
	Control (1)	Treatment (2)	Diff. (3)	Control (1)	Treatment (2)	Diff. (3)	Control (1)	Treatment (2)	Diff. (3)
Share Urban (Pop.)	0.632	0.626	0.006 (0.411)	0.625	0.631	-0.007 (0.405)	0.630	0.629	0.002 (0.890)
Share Female (Pop.)	0.505	0.505	0.000 (0.463)	0.505	0.505	-0.001 (0.178)	0.505	0.506	-0.001 (0.513)
Illiteracy Rate	0.170	0.181	-0.010 (0.001)	0.179	0.171	0.007 (0.039)	0.172	0.185	-0.013 (0.013)
Income Per Capita (ln)	9.150	9.046	0.104 (0.000)	9.052	9.140	-0.089 (0.000)	9.132	9.030	0.102 (0.004)
Gini Coefficient	0.510	0.512	-0.002 (0.250)	0.512	0.510	0.003 (0.269)	0.510	0.511	-0.001 (0.767)
Human Development Index	0.653	0.645	0.008 (0.000)	0.645	0.652	-0.007 (0.007)	0.652	0.644	0.008 (0.030)
Share Poor (Pop.)	0.249	0.270	-0.021 (0.000)	0.270	0.251	0.019 (0.003)	0.253	0.270	-0.017 (0.081)
Presence of AM Radio	0.204	0.199	0.005 (0.685)	0.203	0.203	0.000 (0.990)	0.204	0.189	0.015 (0.466)
Presence of Health Council	0.759	0.776	-0.017 (0.203)	0.767	0.762	0.004 (0.781)	0.761	0.801	-0.040 (0.067)
Presence of Ed. Council	0.973	0.968	0.005 (0.326)	0.971	0.972	-0.001 (0.868)	0.973	0.959	0.014 (0.203)
Seat of Judiciary Branch	0.500	0.501	-0.001 (0.968)	0.486	0.503	-0.017 (0.346)	0.498	0.538	-0.041 (0.133)
<i>N</i>	4,177	1,326		960	4,543		5,137	366	

Note: This table displays means for all observations in each treatment arm against all other. Thus, the sum of observations is larger than the total sample size (5,503). Columns (1)-(3) are the means for the control group, the treatment group, and difference across means; *p*-values are displayed in parentheses.

Table 2: Observations by Transparency Condition

<i>Active</i>	<i>Passive</i>		Total
	Pre-LAI	Post-LAI	
Not Audited	-	4,177	4,177
Audited	960	366	1,326
Total	960	4,543	5,503

Table 3: The Effect of Passive Transparency on Corruption

	Acts of Corruption (ln)		Acts of Mismanagement (ln)		No. of Irregularities (ln)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Passive Transparency	−.132*** (.010)	−.142*** (.006)	.426*** (.046)	.429*** (.046)	−.098*** (.008)	−.106*** (.005)
Municipal Controls	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	1,326	1,326	1,326	1,326	1,326	1,326
R ²	.012	.258	.040	.052	.007	.227
Adjusted R ²	.011	.251	.040	.044	.006	.220

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

1.4 Theory

1.5 Empirical Strategy

1.6 Preliminary Results

1.7 Further Development