	MUDP Adoption		Municipal Human Development Index (MDI)		Sanctions Imposed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Active + Passive Transparency	.419*	.323	.093*	.107***	−.121	−.133
	(.241)	(.246)	(.048)	(.033)	(.103)	(.119)
Active Transparency	.130***	.151***	−.044***	−.009	−.015	−.017
	(.033)	(.036)	(.009)	(.006)	(.012)	(.017)
Passive Transparency	.143	.207**	.073***	.037***	.278***	.285***
	(.141)	(.091)	(.028)	(.013)	(.068)	(.078)
Time Trend Interactions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal Controls	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	7,149	7,149	7,149	7,149	7,149	7,149
F-stat	44.9***	156.3***	107.2***	1037.6***	7.5***	29.1***

Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of each transparency condition on three municipal outcomes: whether the administration adopts an urban development plan, their human development score, and whether the mayor or anyone in their team has been sanctioned by law enforcement authorities. Columns 1, 3, and 5 estimate the models without covariates. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include municipal covariates and time trends interactions to control for observable differences across municipalities that could simultaneously explain the outcomes. All standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. A municipality could have been audited or sampled to form the artificial control group more than once, thus the sample size (7,149) is larger than the number of unique municipalities in the study (4,316). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.