	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	β_{trial}	β_{appeals}	$\beta_{\mathrm{difference}}$	Std. Error	$t ext{-stat}$	p-value
Elected to Office	247	291	.044	.075	.593	.55
Age	002	000	002	.003	436	.663
Male	.020	.013	.007	.037	.187	.85
Political Experience	102	027	075	.075	-1.010	.313
Campaign Expenditures (in R\$)	000	000	000	.000	233	.810
Marital Status:						
Divorced	009	.022	031	.040	779	.430
Legally Divorced	.069	.030	.039	.047	.822	.41
Single	002	.048	050	.040	-1.271	.20
Widowed	.033	008	.041	.063	.648	.51
Educational Levels:						
Completed ES/MS	242	314	.072	.094	.766	.44
Incomplete ES/MS	197	338	.141	.122	1.162	.24
Can Read and Write	154	372	.218	.165	1.323	.180
Completed HS	280	347	.067	.088	.758	.448
Incomplete HS	202	356	.154	.141	1.093	.27
Completed College	323	404	.081	.105	.777	.43'
Incomplete College	282	374	.092	.143	.642	.52
Note: In this table, I report the opposability of receiving an unfavorate recover the distributions of the diff the regressions (columns 3-6). Rot level (equivalent to the judge-level election period); party-fixed effects	able ruling erences in oust stand error sha	g at trial (o betas and ard errors ared by all	column 1) and test H0: β_c are clustered candidates	d on appeals $_{\text{difference}} = 0$ fd at the munification in one municipal in the second states of the second st	(column 2) for all cova icipal-elect cipality du). I then riates in ion pair ring one