	Panel A: Individual Covariate Models			*Panel B: Individual Covariate and Fixed-Effects Models*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
	$R^2_{ur}+(R^2_{ur}-R^2_r)$	$2\cdot R^2_{ur}$	R^2 for $\beta_{ols}=\beta_{iv}$	$R^2_{ur}+(R^2_{ur}-R^2_r)$	$2\cdot R^2_{ur}$	R^2 for $\beta_{ols}=\beta_{iv}$
Probability of Election	1.05	0.63	-	1.69	1.49	-
	(.23)	(.29)	(.46)	(.96)	(1.00)	(3.07)
Vote Share	0.68	0.48	-	2.05	2.05	-
	(.64)	(.74)	(.99)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(3.01)
Vote Distance to Cutoff	7.74	6.05	-	20.51	20.51	-
(City Councilor)	(.21)	(.23)	(2.11)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(24.86)
Vote Distance to Cutoff	2.64	1.56	-	1.21	1.21	-
(Mayor)	(.23)	(.29)	(.64)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.51)

Note: In each panel, I compare the unrestricted coefficient for the model in the panel title ($\tilde{\beta}$) against the restricted coefficient for the bivariate model (β^0). The different outcomes are summarized across rows. Columns 1 and 2 in each panel display conditions for $R_{\max}$ calculations in the row just above table content. The first value in each cell is the δ for each model. R^2 values are reported inside parentheses. While I cap R^2 at one for δ calculations, I do not cap it for calculations of the necessary R^2 to yield $\beta_{ols}=\beta_{iv}$; therefore, some nonsensical $R^2>1$ appear in column 3 in each panel.