

1 Electoral Crime Under Democratic Rule: Evidence from Brazil

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	9,469	46.343	11.024	17	86
Male	9,469	.793	.405	0	1
Political Experience	9,469	.091	.287	0	1
Campaign Expenditures	9,469	144,722	456,532	0	20,000,000
Convicted at Trial	9,469	.641	.480	0	1
Convicted on Appeal	9,469	.537	.499	0	1
Probability of Election	9,441	.191	.393	0.000	1
Vote Distance to Elected Candidates (in p.p.)	9,441	-4.091	9.551	-92.820	12.83
Total Vote Share (in p.p.)	9,441	10.131	17.983	0.000	100

Table 2: First Stage Regressions of Convictions at Trial and on Appeal

	Outcome: Convicted on Trial	
	First-Stage (1)	First-Stage (2)
Convicted on Appeal	.766*** (.006)	.757*** (.007)
Individual Controls	-	Yes
Observations	9,469	9,469
R ²	.633	.649
Adjusted R ²	.633	.648
Residual Std. Error	.290 (df = 9467)	.285 (df = 9452)
F Statistic	16,356*** (df = 1; 9467)	1,092*** (df = 16; 9452)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:

Table 3: The Effect of Electoral Crimes on the Probability of Election

	Outcome: Probability of Election					
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	Reduced-form (3)	Reduced-form (4)	IV (5)	IV (6)
Convicted at Trial	-.208*** (.009)	-.173*** (.009)			-.272*** (.011)	-.288*** (.010)
Convicted on Appeal			-.209*** (.008)	-.182*** (.008)		
Individual Controls	-	Yes	-	Yes	-	Yes
Observations	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441
R ²	.065	.123	.070	.133	.059	.055
Adjusted R ²	.065	.122	.070	.131	.058	.055
Residual Std. Error	.380 (df = 9439)	.368 (df = 9424)	.379 (df = 9439)	.366 (df = 9424)	.381 (df = 9439)	.382 (df = 9439)
F Statistic	652.4*** (df = 1; 9439)	82.9*** (df = 16; 9424)	715.4*** (df = 1; 9439)	90.0*** (df = 16; 9424)		

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: The Effect of Electoral Crimes on the Vote Distance to Elected Candidates

	Outcome: Vote Distance to Elected Candidates (in p.p.)					
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	Reduced-form (3)	Reduced-form (4)	IV (5)	IV (6)
Convicted at Trial	-.308 (.199)	-.736*** (.206)			-.519** (.254)	-.315 (.251)
Convicted on Appeal			-.399** (.196)	-.751*** (.200)		
Individual Controls	-	-	-	-	-	-
Observations	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441
R ²	0.000	.028	0.000	.028	0.000	0.000
Adjusted R ²	0.000	.026	0.000	.026	0.000	0.000
Residual Std. Error	9.550 (df = 9439)	9.426 (df = 9424)	9.549 (df = 9439)	9.425 (df = 9424)	9.551 (df = 9439)	9.550 (df = 9439)
F Statistic	2.3 (df = 1; 9439)	16.7*** (df = 16; 9424)	4.1** (df = 1; 9439)	16.9*** (df = 16; 9424)		

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: The Effect of Electoral Crimes on the Total Vote Share

		Outcome: Total Vote Share (in p.p.)				
		OLS	OLS	Reduced-form	Reduced-form	IV
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
∞	Convicted at Trial	−12.935*** (.418)	−10.629*** (.396)			−16.795*** (.478)
	Convicted on Appeal			−12.924*** (.364)	−11.117*** (.339)	−17.865*** (.479)
Individual Controls		-	-	-	-	-
Observations		9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441	9,441
R ²		.119	.237	.128	.253	.109
Adjusted R ²		.119	.236	.128	.252	.108
Residual Std. Error		16.879 (df = 9439)	15.721 (df = 9424)	16.790 (df = 9439)	15.558 (df = 9424)	16.980 (df = 9439)
F Statistic		1,277.094*** (df = 1; 9439)	183.026*** (df = 16; 9424)	1,390.251*** (df = 1; 9439)	199.319*** (df = 16; 9424)	17.044 (df = 9439)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				