

Formal Verification Report of Gsm

Summary

This document describes the specification and verification of GHO Stability Module using the Certora Prover. The work was undertaken from August 9, 2023 to December 7, 2023. The latest commit that was reviewed and run through the Certora Prover is f368bef

The scope of our verification includes the following contracts:

- Gsm.sol
- Gsm4626.sol
- FixedPriceStrategy.sol
- FixedPriceStrategy4626.sol
- FixedFeeStrategy.sol
- OracleSwapFreezer.sol

The Certora Prover proved the implementation correct with respect to the formal rules written by the Certora team. During verification, the Certora Prover discovered bugs in the code which are listed in the tables below. All issues were promptly addressed. The fixes were verified to satisfy the specifications up to the limitations of the Certora Prover.

List of Main Issues Discovered

Standard GSM Issues

Severity: Info	ormational

Issue:	getAssetAmountForSellAsset is slightly unfair to user
Violated property:	getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality
Description:	When user wants to swap assets for x GHO, getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) should report, among other values, the amount of assets to sell. In some cases the system recommends selling more asset (and receive more GHO) than necessary, i.e., the system encourages users to spend more assets than needed. The recommended amount might also result in higher percentual fees than the real minimum. The error can be in the range of 10^-17 GHO.
Example:	priceRatio = 1, sellFee = 49%. getAssetAmountForSellAsset(36) = $(x=71, 71, 35)$. When calling sellAsset $(x, _, _)$ they receive $36*10^-18$ GHO for any $70 <= x <= 71$.
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	Inconsistency in the amount of GHO user asks to sell and how much GHO is actually deducted from their account.
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R4_sellGhoUpdatesAssetBuyerGhoBalanceGe
Description:	When swapping GHO for underlying asset, gsm requires user to specify an amount of underlying asset asset_amount they would like to get in buyAsset(asset_amount). The function computes the amount of GHO needed to be sold in order to acquire the desired amount of asset. The API does not provide a function for buying underlying asset that takes the amount of GHO to be sold. For the case where a user wants to sell a specific amount of GHO, gho_amount, the contract provides a view function, getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(gho_amount), which supposedly returns the amount of assets that needs to be passed to buyAsset() in order to sell exactly gho_amount. Since the precision (number of decimals) of the asset is fixed, it is possible that there is no amount of GHO that would correspond to a given asset_amount. In these cases gsm behaves inconsistently: for some values, gsm charges more than user specifies and for some others, less.

Issue:	Inconsistency in the amount of GHO user asks to sell and how much GHO is actually deducted from their account.
Example:	 Let gho_amount = 6, price ratio PR = 4, underlying asset units UAU = 1, buy fee in BP buyFeeBP = 0. The change in GHO balance after buyAsset is 8, which is greater than gho_amount. Let GHO amount gho_amount = 3*10^36+5, price ratio PR = 1*10^36+2, underlying asset units UAU = 1, buy fee in BP buyFeeBP = 0. The change in GHO balance after buyAsset is 2*10^36+4, which is less than gho_amount
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	getAssetAmountForBuyAsset exceeds user-given bound
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R1_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV2
Description:	The user may ask the amount of assets a to provide for buyAsset(a) by calling getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(max), where max is the maximum amount of GHO user is willing to pay. One of the return values of getAssetAmountForBuyAsset is the exact amount of GHO that will be deducted. This value can be higher than max by at most 2*10^-18 GHO.
Example:	priceRatio = 1, buyFee = 25.01% , getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(4) = $(2,6,4,2)$, i.e., user wants to spend at most $4*10^-18$ GHO, gsm tells him they should buy 2 assets and they will pay $4*10^-18$ GHO + $2*10^-18$ GHO fee.
Mitigation/Fix:	Fix rounding directions in fee strategy. Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	Collected buy fees are rounded down and can be 0 in extreme cases
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	collectedBuyFeeIsAtLeastAsRequired

Issue:	Collected buy fees are rounded down and can be 0 in extreme cases
Description:	In extreme cases, for sufficiently small amounts of bought asset, the fee collected by the contract can be zero even if the fee expressed in basic points is non-zero.
Example:	buyFee = 0.02% , underlyingAssetDecimals = 10^13 , price_ratio = $14,995,000,000,000$. BuyAsset(minAmount=3) \rightarrow _calculateGhoAmountForBuyAsset(3) \rightarrow (2, 3001, 3001, 0).
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#369

Issue:	<pre>getGrossAmountFromTotalSold does not revert when _sellFee = 100% .</pre>
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	getGrossAmountFromTotalSold_isMonotoneInTotalAmount
Description:	For $x != 0$, there's no correct return value of getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(x) with _sellFee = 100%. Returning 0 is arbitrary and may lead to unexpected behaviour on the side of the caller.
Example:	For _sellFee = 100%, getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(10) = 0. It is never possible to receive 10*10^-18 GHO for selling any amount of assets. With _sellFee = 100%, sellAsset(x) always provides 0 GHO.
Mitigation/Fix:	Prevent 100% sell fee. Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	getAssetAmountForBuyAsset provides incorrect information
Violated property:	R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV_vs_GhoBalance
Severity:	Informational
Description:	Note: this issue is similar to the one called getAssetAmountForBuyAsset exceeds user-given bound, but on an earlier version of gsm. The method getAssetAmountForBuyAsset informs the user how much asset they should buy in order to spend a specified amount of GHO. It can mislead the user by telling them they will be charged x

Issue:	getAssetAmountForBuyAsset provides incorrect information
	GHO while actually charging them (x+1). I.e., it can be off by at most 1 in favor of the protocol.
Example:	priceRatio = 1, buyFee = 50% , getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(4) = (3, 3, 1), i.e., user wants to spend $4*10^-18$ GHO, gsm tells they should buy 3 assets and they will pay $3*10^-18$ GHO + $1*10^-18$ GHO fee. When calling buyAsset(3, _, _) the user is charged $5*10^-18$ GHO instead of $4*10^-18$.
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#369

Issue:	Inconsistency between the reported and accrued fees when swapping
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetNeBuyAssetFee, R4_estimatedBuyFeeGeActualBuyFee, R3_estimatedSellFeeCanBeHigherThanActualSellFee
Description:	When a swap takes place in gsm, the contract may collect a fee. The fee is represented in basic points. When a concrete transaction takes place the fee in basic points is used to obtain a concrete fee in GHO. The API exposes the fee in three different ways. (1) Directly based on BP through $getBuyFee(x)$ and $getSellFee(x)$, (2) As the fee reported by $getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)$ and $getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x)$, (3) As the fee accrued through $buyAsset(a)$ and $sellAsset(a)$. The fee reported by $getBuyFee(x)$ and $getSellFee(x)$ can be less than, greater than, or equal to the fee accrued by $buyAsset(a)$ and $sellAsset(a)$. In addition, the fee reported by $getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x)$ can be less than, greater than, or equal to the fee accrued by $buyAsset$.
Mitigation/Fix:	ections. Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	User may pay slightly more GHO than the maximum they requested
Severity:	Informational

Issue:	User may pay slightly more GHO than the maximum they requested
Violated property:	R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV_vs_GhoBalance
Description:	The user may ask the amount of assets a to provide for buyAsset(a) by calling getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(max), where max is the maximum amount of GHO user is willing to pay. When the return value is provided to buyAsset, it is possible that the user is charged slightly more than max GHO.
Mitigation/Fix:	Fix rounding directions in fee strategy. Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	Bad rounding may steal small amounts of asset from the contract
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	totalAssetsNotIncrease
Description:	User can sell GHO and get more underlying asset than they should due to a rounding error. As a result, a user can obtain assets from the system or get preferential treatment in comparison to other users. The value of stolen asset is at most 9*10^-19 GHO
Example:	Consider the following problem with the buyAsset() function. Let UNDERLYING_ASSET_DECIMALS=19 (i.e., _underlyingAssetUnits = 10^19) and PRICE_RATIO=10^18 . We assume zero fees. Then • getAssetPriceInGho(amount=11) returns 1 meaning that a user needs 1*10^-18 GHO to buy 11 underlying assets (since floor(11*10^18/10^19) = 1). However, the user can buy up to 19 underlying assets for 1*10^-18 GHO. • Consider Alice and Bob, both selling 10 underlying assets and obtaining 1*10^-18 GHO. After these transactions there are exactly 20 underlying assets in the system. Alice buys 19 assets for 1*10^-18 GHO. Then Bob cannot buy back 10 underlying assets for 1*10^-18 GHO since only 1 underlying asset remain in system.
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#369

Issue:	Overbacking when selling asset.
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	systemBalanceStabilitySell
Description:	When asset is sold for GHO, the value of the minted GHO is not ex equal to the value of the asset. The GHO minted may be smaller the asset value, which will result in overbacking.
Example:	Consider the following settings: PRICE_RATIO=10^18, _underlyingAssetUnits = 10^15, PercentageMath.PERCENTAGE_FACTOR=10000 and _sellFee=9984. we call sellAsset(maxAmount=1) , from which GsmcalculateGhoAmountForSellAsset(assetAmount=1) is called Inside the function following computation happens: 1. PriceStrategy.getAssetPriceInGho(assetAmount=1) return: 10^18/10^15 = 1000 (which is correct). 2. FeeStrategy.getSellFee(grossAmount=1000) returns 1000*9984/10000 = 998.4 ~= 999 , 3. FeeStrategy.getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(totalAmount=(1 999)) returns 1*10000/(10000-9984) = 625 4. PriceStrategy.getGhoPriceInAsset(ghoAmount=625,roundUpreturns 625*10^15/10^18~=1 . Finally _calculateGhoAmountForSellAsset(assetAmount=1) returns (1,1,625,624) . So 625*10^-18 GHO is minted and user receives 1*10^-18 GHO selling 1 asset which is actually worth 1000*10^ GHO.
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#369

GSM4626 Issues

Issue:	Gsm4626: Breaking up transactions slightly decreases total cost.
Severity:	Informational
Description:	When buying assets user can pay slightly less by splitting the purchase into smaller transactions. To obtain meaningful financial gain, the number of transactions needs to be in the order of 10^19.

Issue:	Gsm4626: Breaking up transactions slightly decreases total cost.
Violated property:	R1_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV2
Example:	<pre>Using previewRedeem(shares) = RoundDown((shares*5)/3), previewWithdraw(shares) = RoundUp((shares*3)/5). price ratio = 10000000000000000002, buyFee = sellFee = 0, underlyingAssetDecimals = 17, we have: getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(43) = (3, 51, 51, 0), getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(33) = (2, 31, 31, 0), getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(11) = (1, 11, 11, 0)</pre>
Mitigation/Fix:	PR#369

Issue:	Gsm4626: getGhoAmountForBuyAsset reports a slightly higher amount than necessary
Severity:	Informational
Violated property:	getGhoAmountForBuyAsset_optimality
Description:	When user wants to swap at least min GHO to assets, getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(min) should report the lowest amount of asset that will cost at least min GHO. In some cases the system recommends buying more assets (for more GHO) than what is necessary, i.e., the system encourages users to spend more GHO than needed. The error can be in the range of 10^-11 GHO.
Example:	<pre>Using previewRedeem(shares) = RoundDown((shares*5)/3), previewWithdraw(shares) = RoundUp((shares*3)/5). price ratio = 1000000000000001, buyFee = 0, underlyingAssetDecimals = 22, we have getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(6) = (600000, 1, 1, 0), getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(600000) = (1200000, 2, 2, 0)</pre>
Mitigation/Fix:	Fixed in PR#369

Disclaimer

The Certora Prover takes as input a contract and a specification and formally proves that the contract satisfies the specification in all scenarios. Importantly, the guarantees of the Certora Prover are scoped to the provided specification, and the Certora Prover does not check any cases not covered by the specification.

We hope that this information is useful, but provide no warranty of any kind, explicit or implied. The contents of this report should not be construed as a complete guarantee that the contract is secure in all dimensions. In no event shall Certora or any of its employees be liable for any claim, damages or other liability, whether in an action of contract, tort or otherwise, arising from, out of or in connection with the results reported here.

Assumptions and Simplifications Made During Verification

We made the following assumptions during our verification:

- The buy and sell fees have been assumed to be between 0 and 50%
- Unless specified otherwise, the decimals of gsm's underlying asset have been assumed to range from 5 to 27
- We assume that PRICE_RATIO between GHO and underlying is in the inclusive range \$[10^{16}, 10^{20}]\$
- In the case of the gsm's underlying asset being a 4626 share token:
 - The index used to convert shares into the 4626 underlying asset is 5/3. We use this under-approximation to allow modeling non-trivial rounding behaviour of an erc4626 token while reducing the technical complexity.
 - We assume that the 4626 token never collects fees
 - We assume that previewWithdraw and previewMint round up, and that convertToShares and convertToAssets round down
- While proving the properties, we assume that
 - Gsm 's GHO token is implemented by GhoToken.sol
 - Gsm 's fee strategy is implemented by FixedFeeStrategy.sol
 - Gsm 's price strategy is implemented by FixedPriceStrategy.sol and
 Gsm4626 's price strategy is implemented by FixedPriceStrategy4626.sol
- The implementation of openzeppelin's node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol was assumed to be correct
- We assume that buyAsset and sellAsset are not called with Gsm or its inheriting contracts as msg.sender

- We unroll loops. Violations that require executing a loop more than once will not be detected.
- We do not verify the cryptographic correctness of functions that involve calls to the keccak256() function.
- We do not verify function calls at block.timestamp == 0

Notations

- ✓ indicates the rule is formally verified on the latest reviewed commit.
- 🗙 indicates that the rule was violated under one of the tested versions of the code.

Properties of Aave Gsm

Common Properties of Gsm and Gsm4626

Optimality of buy

1. X getGhoAmountForBuyAsset_optimality

getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(minAsset) returns finalAssetAmount value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.

- ✓ Verified after PR#369
- 2. **√** getAssetAmountForBuyAsset_optimality

getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGhoAmount) returns assetAmount value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.

Optimality of sell

3. ✓ getGhoAmountForSellAsset_optimality

getGhoAmountForSellAsset(maxAssetAmount) returns finalAssetAmount value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.


4. × getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality

getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGhoAmount) returns assetAmount value that is as close as possible to user specified amount.

✓ Verified after PR#369

Balances when buying

Fig. 1: Balances when buying



- 5. X R1_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV2 The exact amount of GHO y returned by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x) is less than or equal to x (Fig. 1)
 - Verified after PR#369
- 6. X R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetRV_vs_GhoBalance The exact amount of GHO y returned by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x) matches the GHO amount Dg taken from user at buyAsset(a) (Fig. 1)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#369
- 7. ✓ R3_buyAssetUpdatesAssetBuyerAssetBalanceLe The increase in asset amount on user's account after buyAsset(a), Da, is greater than or equal to a (Fig. 1)
- 8. X R4_sellGhoUpdatesAssetBuyerGhoBalanceGe The amount of GHO Dg taken from user's account at buyAsset(a) is less than or equal to the value x passed to getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x) (Fig. 1)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#369
- 9. **✓ getGhoAmountForBuyAsset_correctness** getGhoAmountForBuyAsset never drops below the given bound

(finalAssets, _, _, _) = getGhoAmountForBuyAsset(minAssetAmount) ->
minAssetAmount <= finalAssets</pre>

Balances when selling

Fig. 2: Balances when selling




- 10. ✓ R1_getAssetAmountForSellAsset_arg_vs_return The exact amount xe of GHO returned by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) is greater than or equal to x (Fig. 2)
- 11. ✓ R2_getAssetAmountForSellAsset_sellAsset_eq The exact amount of GHO xe returned by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) is equal to the amount Dg obtained by the receiver after sellAsset(a) (Fig. 2)
- 12. ✓ R3_sellAssetUpdatesAssetBalanceCorrectly The asset amount Da taken from the user's account at sellAsset(a) is less than or equal to a (Fig. 2)
- 13. ✓ R4_buyGhoUpdatesGhoBalanceCorrectly The GHO amount Dg added to the user's account at sellAsset(a) is greater than or equal to the value x passed to getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) (Fig. 2)
- 14. ✓ getGhoAmountForSellAsset_correctness getGhoAmountForSellAsset never exceeds the given bound

(finalAssets, _, _, _) = getGhoAmountForSellAsset(maxAssetAmount) ->
finalAssets <= maxAssetAmount</pre>

Fees when buying

Fig 3: Fees when buying




- 15. ✓ R1_getBuyFeeGeGetAssetAmountForBuyAsset The fee f1 reported by getBuyFee(x) is greater than or equal to the fee f2 reported by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x+f1) (see Fig. 3)
- 16. X R2_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetNeBuyAssetFee The fee f2 reported by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x+f1) is equal to the fee f3 accrued by buyAsset(a) (see Fig. 3)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#369
- 17. X R4_estimatedBuyFeeGeActualBuyFee The fee f1 reported by getBuyFee(x) is greater than or equal to the fee f3 accrued by buyAsset(a) (see Fig. 3)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#369

Fig. 4: Fees when buying 2

- 18. ✓ R3_getAssetAmountForBuyAssetFeeEqGetBuyFee The fee f1 reported by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x) is equal to the fee f2 reported by getBuyFee(g) where g is the gross GHO amount (see Fig. 4)
- 19. ✓ NonZeroFeeCheckBuyAsset If buyFee percentage \$\gt\$ 0 then amount of underlying received by user from buyAsset is less than GHO spent / price ratio

Fees when selling

Fig. 5: Fees when selling



- 20. ✓ R1_getAssetAmountForSellAssetFeeGeGetSellFee The fee f2 reported by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) is greater than or equal to the fee f1 reported by getSellFee(x) (Fig. 5)
- 21. ✓ R2_getAssetAmountForSellAssetVsActualSellFee The fee f2 reported by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) is greater than or equal to the fee f3 accrued by sellAsset(a) (Fig. 5)
- 22. **X R3_estimatedSellFeeCanBeHigherThanActualSellFee** The fee f1 reported by getSellFee(x) is less than or equal to the fee f3 accrued by sellAsset(a) (Fig. 5)
 - ✓ Verified after PR#369
- 23. ✓ R4_getSellFeeVsgetAssetAmountForSellAsset The fee f1 reported by getSellFee(x) is less than or equal to the fee f2 reported by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x) (Fig. 5)

24. ✓ NonZeroFeeCheckSellAsset If sellFee percentage \$\gt\$ 0 then GHO received by user from sellAsset is less than underlying amount * price ratio

Frozen state

- 25. ✓ cantBuyOrSellWhenFrozen, cantBuyOrSellWhenSeized Buying/selling is not possible when the gsm is frozen and/or after it has been seized.
- 26. ✓ rescuingGhoKeepsAccruedFees Rescuing GHO never results in there being less GHO available (as an ERC-20 balance) in the gsm than _accruedFees .
- 27. ✓ rescuingAssetKeepsAccruedFees Rescuing the underlying asset never results in there being less of the underlying (as an ERC-20 balance) than _currentExposure .

Exposure

- 28. ✓ sellingDoesntExceedExposureCap It is not possible for _currentExposure of a gsm to exceed the _exposureCap as a result of a call to sellAsset .
- 29. ✓ cantSellIfExposureTooHigh If the _currentExposure exceeds the _exposureCap , sellAsset reverts until the _currentExposure is reduced below the _exposureCap .
- 30. ✓ buyAssetDecreasesExposure When calling buyAsset successfully (i.e., no revert), the _currentExposure always decreases.
- 31. ✓ sellAssetIncreasesExposure When calling sellAsset successfully (i.e., no revert), the _currentExposure always increases.
- 32. ✓ giftingGhoDoesntAffectStorageSIMPLE Gifting GHO does not affect storage.
- 33. **✓ giftingUnderlyingDoesntAffectStorageSIMPLE** Gifting underlying asset does not affect storage.
- 34. **X totalAssetsNotIncrease** For price ratio == 1, the total assets of a user do not increase, where total assets is defined as the sum of balances of the underlying asset and GHO converted to same units.
 - ✓ Verified after PR#369
- 35. ✓ whoCanChangeExposureCap Only updateExposureCap, initialize and seize methods can change exposureCap.

Fees


- 37. **CollectedBuyFeeIsAtLeastAsRequired**, **collectedSellFeeIsAtLeastAsRequired** The fee actually collected (after rounding) is at least the required percentage.
 - Verified after PR#369

- 38. ✓ whoCanChangeAccruedFees _accruedFees never decrease, unless fees are being harvested by Treasury using distributeFeesToTreasury.
- 39. ✓ accruedFeesLEGhoBalanceOfThis _accruedFees \$\le\$ ghotoken.balanceof(this) is preserved by all methods.

Properties specific to non-4626 Gsm

Optimality of buy

Fig. 6: optimality of buy




- 40. ✓ R2_optimalityOfBuyAsset_v2 non-4626: If user wants to sell at most x GHO, there is no better value a' to pass to buyAsset than the one given by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x). In Fig. 6 above, there is no value a' such that Da' >= Da and Dx' < x, or Da' > Da and Dx' <= x
- 41. ✓ getAssetAmountForBuyAsset_optimality. non-4626:

 getAssetAmountForBuyAsset returns a value as close as possible to user specified amount. Let (AssetAmount, _, _, _) = getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGho) . Then it is not possible to buy strictly more assets than AssetAmount while still paying less or equal to maxGho .
- 42. ✓ R6_externalOptimalityOfBuyAsset non-4626: The GHO sold by buying asset using values from getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGho) is at least maxGho 2*oneAssetInGho + 1. The lower bound is tight.

Optimality of sell

Fig. 7: Optimality of sell



- 43. \checkmark * R4_optimalityOfSellAsset_v2 non-4626: If user wants to buy at least x GHO, there is no better value a' to pass to sellAsset than the one given by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x). In Fig. 7 above, there is no value a' such that Dx' <= x and Da > Da' [1].
- 44. ✓ getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality non-4626:

 getAssetAmountForSellAsset returns a value as close as possible to user specified amount. Let (AssetAmount, _, _, _) = getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGho) . Then it is not possible to sell strictly less assets than AssetAmount while still receiving more or equal to minGho .
- 45. ✓ R5_externalOptimalityOfSellAsset non-4626: The GHO received by selling asset using values from getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGho) is upper bounded by minGho + oneAssetinGho 1. The upper bound is tight.

Balances when buying

46. ✓ monotonicityOfBuyAsset non-4626: buyAsset is monotone (more asset bought <-> more GHO paid)

Balances when selling

47. ✓ monotonicityOfSellAsset non-4626: sellAsset is monotone (more asset sold <-> more GHO gained)

Selling and buying

48. **✓ buySellInverse** non-4626: For price ratio == 1 and zero fees, buyAsset and sellAsset are inverse to each other.

Exposure

- 49. ✓ enoughULtoBackGhoBuyAsset non-4626: At every buyAsset , the insolvency of the contract will increase by at most 10^-18 GHO non-4626: gsm is always solvent getAssetPriceInGho(_currentExposure) + 1 \$\ge\$ ghoMinted
- 50. ✓ exposureBelowCap non-4626: currentExposure <= exposureCap is preserved by all methods except updateExposureCap and initialize.
- 51. **x** systemBalanceStabilitySell non-4626: The balance of the contract (difference between GHO minted and assets held by the contract converted to GHO value) can decrease by at most 10^-18 GHO after sellAsset.
 - Verified after PR#369
- 52. ✓ whoCanChangeExposure non-4626: Only sellAsset, and sellAssetWithSig can increase exposure. Only buyAsset, seize and buyAssetWithSig methods can decrease exposure.

OracleSwapFreezer

- 53. ✓ freezeExecutable Freeze action is executable if gsm is not seized, not frozen and price is lower than the freeze lower bound or higher than the freeze upper bound.
- 54. **v** unfreezeExecutable Unfreeze action is executable if gsm is not seized, frozen, unfreezing is allowed and price is inside the unfreeze bounds.
- 55. **✓ boundsAreContained** Unfreeze boundaries are contained in freeze boundaries

```
freezeLowerBound < unfreezeLowerBound
unfreezeUpperBound < freezeUpperBound</pre>
```

56. ✓ **freezeAndUnfreezeAreExclusive** There is no oracle price that allows both freeze and unfreeze.

FeeStrategy

- 57. **√ feelsLowerThanGrossAmount** getBuyFee(amount) \$\leq\$ amount
- 58. **√ feelsLowerThanGrossAmount** getSellFee(amount) \$\leq\$ amount
- 59. **✓ GetSellFeeNeverReverts, GetBuyFeeNeverReverts** getBuyFee and getSellFee never revert
- 60. **✓ getFeelsMonotone** getBuyFee and getSellFee are monotone

```
(x1 \ll x2) \rightarrow (getBuyFee(x1) \ll getBuyFee(x2))
(x1 \ll x2) \rightarrow (getSellFee(x1) \ll getSellFee(x2))
```

61. ✓ getGrossAmountFromTotalBought_isMonotoneInTotalAmount getGrossAmountFromTotalBought is monotone

```
(x1 <= x2) ->
(getGrossAmountFromTotalBought(x1) <=
getGrossAmountFromTotalBought(x2))</pre>
```

62. ✓ getGrossAmountFromTotalSold_isMonotoneInTotalAmount

getGrossAmountFromTotalSold is monotone

```
(x1 <= x2) ->
(getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(x1) <= getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(x2))</pre>
```

63. ✓ getGrossAmountFromTotalSold_isCorrect getGrossAmountFromTotalSold is inverse of getSellFee

```
y = getGrossAmountFromTotalSold(x) -> y - getSellFee(y) = x
```

64. ✓ getGrossAmountFromTotalBought_isCorrect

getGrossAmountFromTotalBought is inverse of getBuyFee

```
y = getGrossAmountFromTotalBought(x) \rightarrow y + getBuyFee(y) = x + Delta
```

where Delta is either -1, 0 or 1

Properties specific to Gsm 4626

Optimality of sell and buy

65. ✓ getAssetAmountForBuyAsset_optimality 4626:

getAssetAmountForBuyAsset returns a value as close as possible to user specified amount. Let (AssetAmount, _, _, _) = getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(maxGho), Then it is not possible to buy strictly more assets than AssetAmount while still paying less or equal to maxGho.

66. **✓** getAssetAmountForSellAsset_optimality 4626:

getAssetAmountForSellAsset returns a value as close as possible to user
specified amount. Let (AssetAmount, _, _, _) =
getAssetAmountForSellAsset(minGho) , Then it is not possible to sell strictly less
assets than AssetAmount while still receiving more or equal to minGho .

Balances when buying

67. ✓ R1_optimalityOfBuyAsset_v1 4626: For asset values a given by getAssetAmountForBuyAsset(x), the user can only get more assets by paying more GHO

Balances when selling

68. ✓ R3_optimalityOfSellAsset_v1 4626: For values a given by getAssetAmountForSellAsset(x), the user can only gain more GHO by selling more assets

Changes in 4626 value

- 69. ✓ backWithGhoDoesntCreateExcess,
 backWithUnderlyingDoesntCreateExcess 4626: Sending GHO or the underlying
 asset via backWith does not result in a state where the asset immediately has
 yield to harvest.
- 70. ✓ giftingGhoDoesntCreateExcessOrDearth 4626: Gifting GHO doesn't create excess or dearth.
- 71. ✓ giftingUnderlyingDoesntCreateExcessOrDearth 4626: Gifting underlying asset doesn't create excess or dearth.

Exposure

- 72. ✓ yieldNeverDecreasesBacking 4626: Excess yield harvesting never results in previously-minted GHO becoming under-backed.
- 73. ✓ exposureBellowCap 4626: currentExposure <= exposureCap is preserved by all methods except updateExposureCap, initialize and backWithUnderying.
- 74. ✓ whoCanChangeExposure 4626: Only sellAsset, sellAssetWithSig and backWithUnderlying methods can increase exposure. Only buyAsset, seize and buyAssetWithSig methods can decrease exposure.
 - 1. Not shown when the number of decimals in the underlying asset is 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 17