On Parameterized Complexity of **Network Modifications** for **Binary Networked Public Goods Games**

M. Tech-I Project
Amatya Sharma

Mentor : Dr. Palash Dey
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur

Problem Definition



BNPG (Binary Networked Public Goods) Games

Given:

- Network as Undirected graph with players as vertices
- Each player i can either invest ($x_i = 1$) or not ($x_i=0$)
- Utility of i^{th} player :

$$U_i(x) = U_i(x_i, n_i^x) = g_i(x_i + n_i^x) - c_i x_i$$

where :

- n_i^x := #neighbors investing
- $g_i(.)$:= non − negative non − decreasing

x_i := Strategy played by i^{th} player
x = (x1, ..., xn) := Joint pure strategy profile of all players





PSNE (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria) of BNPG Games

A Joint Pure Strategy Profile x ∈ $\{0, 1\}^n$ such that:

- $U_i(x_i, n_i^x) > U_i(1 - x_i, n_i^x)$, or
- $U_i(x_i, n_i^x) = U_i(1 - x_i, n_i^x)$ and xi = 1

Who Invests?? PSNE Classes

all: every player invests i.e. $x = (1, 1, \ldots, 1)$

= S: only set S invests

⊇ S: superset of set S invests

≥ r: at least r players invest

What's the Problem then???



- A few "diligent" workers may bear all the load
- Detrimental for a long-term perspective
- Turns out to be unfair



Not ENOUGH to find PSNE of BNPG

Network Modifications: Tackling Unfairness

A central mechanism (algorithm) ensuring:

- A specified set of players invest
- Break existing connections (delete edges)
- Make new connections (add edges)
- Bribe them!!!

Edge Edition!!
Addition
+
Deletion

$g_i(\cdot)$: what forms it can take?

- Captures how a player behaves w.r.t increasing investment of its neighbors
- Non − negative, Non − decreasing

Can be :

- general
- convex (increasing returns)
- concave (diminishing returns)
- sigmoid (first increasing then diminishing returns)



Investment Degree Set (D_i)

A unique set $D_i \subseteq \{0, 1, ..., n - 1\}$ such that:

- $x_i = 1$ is a best response $\Leftrightarrow$ $n_i^x \in Di$

Interesting property:

- g_i is concave $\Leftrightarrow$ D_i is downward-closed interval
- g_i is convex $\Leftrightarrow$ D_i is upward-closed interval
- g_i is sigmoid $\Leftrightarrow$ D_i is an interval

NDDS(P,X) (Network Design for Degree Sets)

Given :

- BNPG instance := (Graph & utilities $U_{i \in [n]}$)
- D_i := investment degree sets for all players $i \in [n]$
- $\gamma_{e \in nC2}$:= Edge costs
- X := desired PSNE class (all, $= S$, $\supseteq S$, $\geq r$)
- P := Property of $g_i(\cdot)$ (convex, concave, sigmoid, or general)
- k := budget k

Goal :

Decide whether there exists an edge set S with:

- $\sum_{e \in E \ominus S} \gamma_e \leq k$
- $\exists\ I \in X$ of investing players such that in the modified graph $G'(V, E' = E \ominus S)$

$$|N_i^{G'} \cap I| \in D_i \quad \forall i \in I$$
$$|N_i^{G} i \cap I| \notin D_i \quad \forall i \notin I.$$

Homogeneity: NDDS$^{\alpha}$ (P,X)

NDDS (P,X) with extra constraint:

$$\alpha = \alpha_i = \min\{z \mid s.t.\ z \in Di\}$$



No Budget !! (k=0)

$\gamma_{e \in nC2} > 0$

NDDS reduces to :

- Finding PSNE for BNPG
- Without any modifications allowed



Preliminaries

Parameterized Algorithms

Parameterized problem : Language L ⊆ $\Sigma^* \times N$, where Σ is a fixed, finite alphabet. For an instance $(x, k) \in \Sigma* \times N$, k is called the parameter.

Parameterized Algorithms

- **Fixed Parameter Tractable [FPT] :** Running time $f(k)n^c$
- **Slice-wise Polynomial [XP] :** Running time $f(k)n^{g(k)}$



Parameterized Hardness

NP-Hard for a "Slice" of the parameter

Parameterized Hardness

- **Para-NP-Hard** : NP-Hard for a constant value of parameter

WCS?? Weighted Circuit Satisfiability

- **W[t]:** There is a parameterized reduction to $WCS[C_{t,d}]$ for some $d > 1$

  W[t]-Hard: Every problem in W[t] can be reduced to P



Parameters Under Consideration

- k := input budget
- r := NDDS (P, **r**)
- α := $\min_{v \in V[G]}$ lower bound(D_v)
- δ := diameter of input graph
- n_U := number of distinct utility functions
- tw := treewidth of graph*
- D := $\max_{v \in V[G]} |D_v|$
- Δ := max degree of input graph'
- vc := vertex cover number



Skipping over the Prior Results . . .

Our Results





Summary of Our Results

Problem Variant	Parameter	Result
all, general	k (budget)	W[1]-Complete Theorem 15
$\{= S, \supseteq S, \geqslant r\}$, general	k	W[1]-Complete Theorem 16
$\{\supseteq S, \geqslant r\}$, concave	k	W[1]-Complete Theorem 17
$\{\supseteq S, \geqslant r\}$, sigmoid	k	W[1]-Complete Theorem 18
$\geqslant r$, {concave, convex, sigmoid}	$r + k$	W[1]-Complete Theorem 19
$\geqslant r$, convex	$k + r + \alpha$	W[1]-Hard Theorem 23
$\geqslant r$, sigmoid	$r + k$	para-NP-hard Section 3.1
$\{\geqslant r, \supseteq S\}$, general	$\|I\|$	W[2]-Hard Observation 2
$\{\geqslant r, \supseteq S\}$, general	$n - \|I\|$	W[2]-Hard Observation 2
$\{\geqslant r, \supseteq S\}$, general	treewidth	W[1]-Hard Observation 3
$\{\geqslant r, \supseteq S\}$, general	Δ	para-NP-hard Observation 4
$\{\geqslant r, \supseteq S\}$, general	(δ, n_U)	para-NP-hard Observation 6, 5
{−any−, −any−}, -any-	k	$n^{O(k)}$ XP Theorem 28



Summary of Our Results

Homogeneous Variant: $\mathcal{NDDS}^\alpha$		
$\geqslant r$, {convex, sigmoid, general}	$k + r + \alpha$	W[1]-Hard Corollary 24
$\geqslant r$, {convex, sigmoid, general}	$r + k$	para-NP-hard Corollary 27
$c = \left\lceil \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v \in V(H)} \mathrm{df}(v) \right\rceil$		$k \in [c, 2c]$ Theorem 30
$\mathcal{NDDS}^\alpha(\text{convex}, \geqslant r) \leqslant_{\mathrm{FPT}}$ Edge-k-Core		Theorem 31
Forests: $\geqslant r$, convex	α	$O(\alpha n^2)$ Observation 8
$\geqslant r$, convex	vc	FPT Observation 9
$\geqslant r$, convex	$tw + \alpha$	FPT Observation 10





Hardness Results

Result1 : NDDS (general, all) - W[1]-C w.r.t k

Thm. The problem of NDDS (general, all) is W[1]−Complete w.r.t the parameter k (budget).

Even when the input graph is unweighted

Black Box

r-regular Clique
W[1]-Complete

+

Reduction

r-regular Clique

⇓

NDDS
(general, all)

=

NDDS
(general, all)

W[1]-C

w.r.t the
parameter k

r-regular Clique

Input : (G(V, E), k)

- ➢ G is r-regular undirected graph

Goal : Decide whether there exists a k-clique as a subgraph of G



Main Reduction

- ▷ $V'[G'] = V[G] \cup Z$, where $Z = \{z_1, ..., z_k\}$;
- ▷ $E'[G'] = E[G] \cup \{(v_i, z_j) \mid \forall v_i \in V[G], \ , j \in [k]\}$;
- ▷ $\gamma_e = 1, \quad \forall e \in E'[G']$;
- ▷ $D_{v_i} = \{r - k - 1, \ r + k\}, \quad \forall v_i \in V[G]$;
- ▷ $D_{z_j} = \{n - k\}, \ \forall j \in [k]$;
- ▷ $k' = k^2 + \binom{k}{2}$.



Result2 : NDDS (convex, ≥ r) - W[1]-C w.r.t (k + r + α)

Thm. NDDS (convex, ≥ r) is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter k + r + α.

W[1]-hard w.r.t parameter k+r even when α = 3 even when the graph is unweighted.



Edge-k-Core

Input : (G(V, E), k)

- Simple, undirected graph $G = (V, E)$
- Integers k, α, and r

Goal : Decide if there exists $H \subseteq V[G]$ such that:

- Adding at most k edges to G
- In modified graph G', every $v \in H$ has $deg_{G'[H]}[v] \geq \alpha$



Main Reduction

1. $G^* = G$ i.e. $V^* = V$ and $E^* = E$;
2. $D_v = \{\alpha, \ \ldots, \ n - 1\} \ \forall v \in V^*$;
3. $r^* = r$
4. $k^* = k$



Result3 : NDDS (sigmoid, ≥ r) - para-NP-hard w.r.t r+k

Thm. NDDS (sigmoid, ≥ r) is para-NP-hard w.r.t parameter r + k

even when $\max(|D_v|) = 1$, $k=0$, and the graph is unweighted

Black Box

r-regular Subgraph
para-NP-hard
w.r.t r

+

Reduction

r-regular Subgraph

⇓

NDDS
(sigmoid, ≥ r)

=

NDDS

(sigmoid, ≥ r)

para-NP-hard

w.r.t

r+k

r-regular Subgraph

Input : (G(V, E), r)

- Simple, undirected graph G = (V, E)
- Positive Integer r

Goal : Decide whether there exists a $H \subseteq V[G]$, such that-

- Subgraph G[H] is r-regular



Idea of Reduction

1. $G^* = G$ i.e. $V^* = V$ and $E^* = E$;
2. $D_v = \{r\} \; \forall v \in V^*$;
3. $r^* = r$
4. $k^* = 0$
5. weight of each edge $= 1$.



Algorithmic Results



Result4 : XP w.r.t k

Thm.

All versions of NDDS can be solved in XP time $n^{O(k)}$

We already:

- Established W[1]-Completeness results w.r.t k
- Ruling out any FPT-Algorithm
- Designed the next best : XP

Introducing Homogeneity



Result5: Deficiency

Thm. For a solution subgraph H:

$$\left\lceil \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v \in V(H)} \mathrm{df}(v) \right\rceil \leqslant k \leqslant \sum_{v \in V(H)} \mathrm{df}(v)$$

df>0 df>0

Good Edge

df>0 df=0

Bad Edge

df=0 df=0

Useless Edge

Result6: The Reduction to Edge-k-Core

Thm.

NDDS$^{\alpha}$(convex, > r) $\leqslant_{FPT}$ Edge-k-Core

1. $G^* = G$ i.e. $V^* = V$ and $E^* = E$;
2. $D_v = \{\alpha, \ \ldots, \ n-1\} \ \forall v \in V^*$;
3. $r^* = r$
4. $k^* = k$



Result7: Deficiency & Forests

Thm. For a tree H:

$$\left\lceil \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v \in V(H)} \mathrm{df}(v) \right\rceil = k$$

Thm.

NDDS$^{\alpha}$(convex, $\geq r$) is solvable in time $O(\alpha n^2)$ for **forests**.

Thm.

NDDS$^{\alpha}$(convex, $\geq r$) admits an **FPT algorithm** w.r.t. **tw+α**.

Result8: FPT w.r.t. vertex cover

Thm.

NDDS$^{\alpha}$(convex, ≥ r) admits a $2^{\mathcal{O}(\mathrm{vc}\cdot 3^{\mathrm{vc}})} \cdot n^{\mathcal{O}(1)}$ **FPT algorithm**



We:

- Established W[1]-Completeness results w.r.t r+k+α
- Designed FPT for combination of params tw+α, vc
- Designed the next best : XP

Conclusions & Significance of Our Work

- ➢ Notched up the results taking into account the parameterized complexity w.r.t key natural as well as structural parameters
- ➢ Crucial role in computer science, economics, game theory and network design
- ➢ Lower Bound by W[1]-hardness
- ➢ Upper bound by XP, FPT-algorithms, making the analysis complete

Future Directions

- ➢ Approximate, i.e., ε-PSNE for the problem...
- ➢ More structural parameters like FVS, FAS...
- ➢ Problem formulation on line-graph of the input graph...
- ➢ XP algorithms w.r.t treewidth or maximum degree...
- ➢ Color/Chromatic coding
- ➢ Parameterization by distance to trees, paths or cluster graphs…
- ➢ The 2-approximation Heuristic

Practical Implications





- Modeling **Behavioral Response to Vaccination** Using Public Goods Game *by Ben-Arieh et al.*
- Vaccination as a **Social Contract** *by Korn et al.*

Game Theory of **Social Distancing** in **Response to an Epidemic** *by Rulega*



Manipulating **opinion diffusion** in **social networks** *by Bredereck et al.*



Election Control in Social Networks using **Edge edition** by *Castiglioni et al.*



Maximizing **spread of cascades** using **Network Design** by *Sheldon et al.*



THANK YOU

Q&A



Presenter

Amatya Sharma
Indian Institute of Technology
Kharagpur

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