

# New Directions in Secure Multi-Party Computation: Techniques and Information Disclosure Analysis

*Dissertation Defense*

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
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- Quantifying information leakage
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## Background and Motivation

# What *is* secure multi-party computation?




## Secure multi-party computation (SMC)

Multiple participants jointly evaluating a function on secret inputs

- **No information is disclosed other than the output**
- Applications in healthcare, ML, **data analytics**
- Homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, **secret sharing**



# Secret sharing




- ( $n, t$ )-threshold scheme,  $n \geq 2$  and  $t < n$ 
  - $\leq t$  **cannot** recover a secret
  - $> t$  **can** reconstruct a secret
- Setting: **semi-honest, honest majority** ( $n = 2t + 1$ )

# Secret sharing (SS) techniques

- Fields  $\mathbb{F}_p$ 
  - Shamir SS [Sha79]
  - **Modular reduction**
  - **Multiplicative inverses** needed for interpolation
  - **Large-number libraries** (e.g., GMP)
- Rings  $\mathcal{R}$ 
  - **Replicated SS** (RSS) [ISN87]
  - Compatible with **native CPU instructions**
  - Existing frameworks limited to **three or four parties**
  - No comprehensive ring-based framework for **integer** and **floating-point** computation



# Broader (unanswered) questions?



- Guaranteed to not leak any private information throughout the computation
- What about **after** the function is evaluated?
- Does the **output itself** leak any sensitive information?
- Can we **measure** this leakage in a meaningful way?

# Dissertation overview

## Part I. Complete RSS framework over a ring

- Comprehensive RSS framework for  $n$  parties over a ring
- Integer and floating-point compatibility
- Extensive benchmarks against field equivalent and state-of-the-art


## Part II. Information disclosure analysis of statistical functions

- Develop an information-theoretic approach to measure disclosure
- Study a practically significant function (average salary)
- Extend our analysis to complex statistical functions

# An $n$ -party RSS Framework


# Replicated secret sharing (RSS)

- Shamir  $\implies$  one share per party
- RSS:
  - Split  $x$  into  $\binom{n}{t}$  shares
  - Distribute  $\binom{n-1}{t}$  shares per party
- $t + 1$  parties have access to **all shares**



# Building blocks

- Addition, multiplication by a **public** value are non-interactive (local)



- All single-round operations


## Binary-to-arithmetic conversion (B2A)

- Convert shares from  $\mathbb{Z}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$
- Prior works use **randBit** [Dam+19]  $\implies$  temporarily in  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{k+2}}$  
- Blanton et al. [BGY23] **eliminated this requirement** for 3PC RSS


### Generalization to *any n*

1.  $t$  parties locally XOR some (or all) of their shares, Input result into computation
  2. Remaining  $t + 1$  parties locally reshare the “last” share (all but one share is nonzero)
  3. Compute XOR (in  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ ) of inputted secrets(s) and the last share as a tree
- **Optimization:** one XOR is with a secret with one **nonzero share**
- Can use a cheaper multiplication!

# B2A Performance



3-party B2A



5-party B2A

- Inferior performance for 7 parties
- ... but don't have to switch rings

# Experimental evaluation

- Many more protocols in the dissertation (comparisons, truncation, division, ...)
- RSS superior to field-based equivalents for 3, 5, 7 parties (10-33 $\times$  improvement)





Figure: 3PC comparisons ( $a \stackrel{?}{<} b$ )

# Floating-point protocols

- Prior protocols designed for **integers**
- But what about **floating-point**?




# Operations

- Arithmetic protocols from [Ali+13; Rat+22; Cat20]
- Most operations conceptually “similar” to integer equivalents...
  - Comparisons  $\tilde{a} \stackrel{?}{<} \tilde{b}$  (LT, EQ)
  - Multiplication  $\tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{b}$  (LT, Trunc)
  - Division  $\tilde{a}/\tilde{b}$  (LT, Trunc)
- ... except for **Addition**  $\tilde{a} + \tilde{b}$  (LT, EQ, Trunc, Pow2, PrefixOR, ...)
  - Exponents must be **aligned**
  - **Left shift** larger input’s mantissa
  - Truncate and round the result
- **Rounding** rules
  - **Directed** rounding to  $-\infty$   $\text{Trunc}([a], m)$
  - Rounding to **nearest**, ties to **even**  $\text{RNTE}([a], m)$
- Implementation: WIP 

## Information disclosure analysis

# Formal setting

- How do we differentiate participants from one another?



# Metric?

- Model participant  $i$ 's input by a random variable  $X_{P_i}$
- How should we **measure** the **information** disclosed from the output?

## Entropy!

Shannon (discrete)  
 $H(X)$

Differential (continuous)  
 $h(X)$

# Putting it together

- Attackers  $\vec{X}_A$ , targets  $\vec{X}_T$ , and spectators  $\vec{X}_S$
- Treat the **output** as a random variable:  $f(\vec{X}_A, \vec{X}_T, \vec{X}_S) = O$

## Attackers' weighted average entropy [AH17]

$H(\vec{X}_T | \vec{X}_A = \vec{x}_A, O) \implies$  how much information is learned about the target, given  $\vec{x}_A$  and  $O$

- Equivalent expression for differential entropy

# Where to begin?

- 2016 Boston gender pay gap survey [Cou17]
- Analyzed the **private** wages based on gender and race **using SMC**
- **Average salary computation**
- Average  $\implies$  reduces to a **sum**:

$$f_{\mu}(\vec{x}) = \frac{1}{n} (x_1 + x_2 + \cdots + x_n) \implies \boxed{x_1 + x_2 + \cdots + x_n}$$


## **Mayor Walsh & Boston Women's Workforce Council Release 2016 Gender Wage Gap Report; New Partnership with BU**

**Thursday, January 5, 2017** – Mayor Martin J. Walsh and the Boston Women's Workforce Council (BWWC) released the 2016 gender wage report and announced a new academic partnership with Boston University, where the BWWC will now be hosted within the BU Hariri Institute for Computing.

Source: [Boston University, 2017](#)

# Single evaluation

- Information disclosure is **independent** of:
  - the attackers' input(s)  $\Rightarrow H(\vec{X}_T \mid \vec{X}_A = \vec{x}_A, O) = H(\vec{X}_T \mid O)$
- $O = X_T + X_S + X_A$  “ = ”  $X_T + X_S$
- the input distribution (Poisson, uniform, **Gaussian**, log-normal [CG05]) and its parameters



Absolute loss

= Target's initial entropy  
– remaining entropy


- Disclosure is **proportional** to the number of spectators

Elephant in the room...

“Have you considered using  
**DIFFERENTIAL  
PRIVACY???**”



# Differential privacy



- Useful for large databases (think  $n \geq 10,000$ )...
- ... but **absolutely destroys** the utility of the result (up to 100% error!)
- Our goal: **determine** if a function discloses too much information

## Two evaluations


- Does the wage gap change over time?
- That's what the BWWC wanted to find out!

### **Mayor Walsh & BWWC Release 2017 Wage Gap Report**

The Boston Women's Workforce Council released its 2017 report this morning, which uses real employer wage information to assess the pay gap in Boston. The 2017 report


**BOSTON WOMEN'S WORKFORCE COUNCIL REPORT 2017**

Source: Boston University, 2018




- Spectators present in the first, second, and both evaluation(s)

# Two evaluations



# Two evaluations

- Participating **once** vs. **twice**
- Largest protection at **50% overlap**
- Undesirable disclosure at extrema



# Next steps

- Advanced statistical functions:

$$\text{maximum} \quad f_{\max}(\vec{x}) = \max_{i \in [1, n]} x_i \quad (\text{equiv. for min})$$

$$\text{median}^* \quad f_{\text{med}}(\vec{x}) = \begin{cases} x_{\frac{n+1}{2}} & \text{odd } n \\ \min(x_{n/2}, x_{n/2+1}) & \text{even } n \end{cases}$$

$$\text{variance} \quad f_{\sigma^2}(\vec{x}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - f_{\mu}(\vec{x}))^2 \Rightarrow$$

**mean and var**  
 $f_{(\mu, \sigma^2)}(\vec{x})$

# New functions $\implies$ new challenges

- **No closed-form expressions** of the entropy anymore 😭
  - Output RV could be **discrete**, while the input RVs are **continuous**
  - Look to **data-driven techniques** [Gao+17]
- 

## Estimating Mutual Information for Discrete-Continuous Mixtures

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mutual information




↔

absolute loss


# Some intuitive observations...

## Maximum

Adversary **maximizes** information learned by **minimizing** their influence.



(a) Uniform  $\mathcal{U}(0, 7)$



(b) Normal  $\mathcal{N}(0, 4.0)$


—●—  $A$  participates  
----  $A$  not present

—●—  $|S|=1$       —●—  $|S|=4$   
—●—  $|S|=2$       —●—  $|S|=5$   
—●—  $|S|=3$

... and not so intuitive ones

## Variance and mean release

The total disclosure from **individual** function outputs  $f_\mu$  and  $f_\sigma$  is **at least** the amount of information disclosed from a **joint release**  $f_{(\mu,\sigma)}$ ?




Target's initial entropy

... and not so intuitive ones

## Variance and mean release

The total disclosure from **individual** function outputs  $f_\mu$  and  $f_\sigma$  is **at least** the amount of information disclosed from a **joint release**  $f_{(\mu,\sigma)}$ ?



- **Gap** between the curves
- Possible to learn **more** information about the target

—●—  $H_{f_\mu} + H_{f_{\sigma^2}}$     -\*\*-  $H_{f_{(\mu,\sigma^2)}}$


—●—  $|S| = 2$   
—○—  $|S| = 5$

(a) Abs. entropy loss, Normal  $\mathcal{N}(0.0, 2.0)$  (lower is better)

... and not so intuitive ones

## Variance and mean release

More information is revealed from the **joint release**  $f_{(\mu,\sigma)}$  than from **individual** function outputs  $f_\mu$  and  $f_\sigma$  (under summation).



## Conclusions

# Conclusions and future directions

- RSS framework
  - Constructed a comprehensive  $n$ -party framework
  - Integer and floating-point operations
  - Additional operations (e.g., square-root, logarithm)
  - Weaker security assumption
- Information Disclosure analysis
  - Comprehensively analyzed disclosure from the output of the average salary
  - Recommendations for computation designers
  - Studied advanced descriptive statistics
  - Derive closed-form expressions for complex functions

# A few acknowledgments...




Marina Blanton




Shaofeng Zou

Good luck at ASU!




Ziming Zhao

Good luck at Northeastern!



# Thank you!

Questions?



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