

16-867 Human-Robot Interaction

Safety & Uncertainty in Human-Robot Interaction

Carnegie
Mellon
University

abajcsy@cmu.edu



intent
ROBOTICS LAB

Last Time

[√] game-theoretic HRI

This Time

[] final project + presentation logistics
[] safety & uncertainty in HRI

At a glance

Final presentations due 12/2

** All presentation slides must be uploaded*

Presentation talks 12/3 & 12/5

Final report due 12/12

← Note: Extended deadline by 2 days!
No late days allowed.

Final Report (30% | Dec 12)

Conference-style paper

~6 pages

IEEE templates in LaTeX and
Overleaf (*click image on right to go
to Overleaf template*)

<https://www.overleaf.com/latex/templates/ieee-conference-template/grfzhhnscfqn>

Conference Paper Title*

*Note: Sub-titles are not captured in Xplore and should not be used

1st Given Name Surname
dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
name of organization (of Aff.)
City, Country
email address or ORCID

2nd Given Name Surname
dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
name of organization (of Aff.)
City, Country
email address or ORCID

3rd Given Name Surname
dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
name of organization (of Aff.)
City, Country
email address or ORCID

4th Given Name Surname
dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
name of organization (of Aff.)
City, Country
email address or ORCID

5th Given Name Surname
dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
name of organization (of Aff.)
City, Country
email address or ORCID

6th Given Name Surname
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Abstract—This document is a model and instructions for L^AT_EX. This and the IEEEtran.cls file define the components of your paper [title, text, heads, etc.]. *CRITICAL: Do Not Use Symbols, Special Characters, Footnotes, or Math in Paper Title or Abstract.

Index Terms—component, formatting, style, styling, insert

II. INTRODUCTION

This document is a model and instructions for L^AT_EX. Please observe the conference page limits.

II. EASE OF USE

A. Maintaining the Integrity of the Specifications

The IEEEtran class file is used to format your paper and style the text. All margins, column widths, line spaces, and text fonts are prescribed; please do not alter them. You may note peculiarities. For example, the head margin measures proportionately more than is customary. This measurement and others are deliberate, using specifications that anticipate your paper as one part of the entire proceedings, and not as an independent document. Please do not revise any of the current designations.

III. PREPARE YOUR PAPER BEFORE STYLING

Before you begin to format your paper, first write and save the content as a separate text file. Complete all content and organizational editing before formatting. Please note sections III-A–III-E below for more information on proofreading, spelling and grammar.

Keep your text and graphic files separate until after the text has been formatted and styled. Do not number text heads—L^AT_EX will do that for you.

Identify applicable funding agency here. If none, delete this.

A. Abbreviations and Acronyms

Define abbreviations and acronyms the first time they are used in the text, even after they have been defined in the abstract. Abbreviations such as IEEE, SI, MKS, CGS, ac, dc, and rms do not have to be defined. Do not use abbreviations in the title or heads unless they are unavoidable.

B. Units

- Use either SI (MKS) or CGS as primary units. (SI units are encouraged.) English units may be used as secondary units (in parentheses). An exception would be the use of English units as identifiers in trade, such as "3.5-inch disk drive".
- Avoid combining SI and CGS units, such as current in amperes and magnetic field in oersteds. This often leads to confusion because equations do not balance dimensionally. If you must use mixed units, clearly state the units for each quantity that you use in an equation.
- Do not mix complete spellings and abbreviations of units: "Wb/m²" or "webers per square meter", not "webers/m²". Spell out units when they appear in text: "... a few henries", not "... a few H".
- Use a zero before decimal points: "0.25", not ".25". Use "cm³", not "cc".

C. Equations

Number equations consecutively. To make your equations more compact, you may use the solidus (/), the exp function, or appropriate exponents. Italicize Roman symbols for quantities and variables, but not Greek symbols. Use a long dash rather than a hyphen for a minus sign. Punctuate equations with commas or periods when they are part of a sentence, as in:

$$a + b = \gamma \quad (1)$$

Be sure that the symbols in your equation have been defined before or immediately following the equation. Use "(1)", not

Final Presentations (10%)

- Slides uploaded to Canvas Dec. 2, 11:59pm ET
 - *Upload Format: ppt, pptx, key, zip, pdf*
- Only one submission per team is required as long as all team members are clearly identified.
- **Please check grading rubric for what we will be looking for!**



| Oral Project Presentation Rubric | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--------|--|
| Criteria | Ratings | | | | Pts | |
| Motivation Does the talk establish a connection to the broader topics / context of the class? Does the talk offer a clear introduction of the chosen problem or topic of study, and a compelling justification of its importance? | 25 pts Full Marks | 20 pts Minor details missing | 15 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Motivation | 25 pts | |
| Problem Statement / Research Question Does the talk clearly state the core research problem? Is there a clear definition of the scope and goals of the project? | 25 pts Full Marks | 20 pts Minor details missing | 15 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Problem Statement / Research Question | 25 pts | |
| Why It's Hard Does the talk clearly state what the open challenges are about the problem statement in the context of prior work? | 15 pts Full Marks | 10 pts Minor details missing | 5 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Description of Why It's Hard | 15 pts | |
| Key Insight or Hypothesis Does the talk clearly state the key technical insight OR the key hypothesis that we hope will "fix" the stated problem? | 15 pts Full Marks | 10 pts Minor details missing | 5 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Key Insight or Hypothesis | 15 pts | |
| Results How valuable are the results of the contribution, in terms of novel research or understanding of existing knowledge? Does the audience walk away from your talk with meaningful new insights? | 10 pts Full Marks | 8 pts Minor details missing | 6 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Results | 10 pts | |
| Presentation Style Does the speaker speak clearly and understandably, using the presentation to complement verbal delivery? Are the slides free of visual clutter? Are the slides *more informative* than just a sequence of bullet points that the speaker is reciting? | 10 pts Full Marks | 8 pts Minor details missing | 6 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Marks | 10 pts | |

Final Presentations (10%)

Conference-style “spotlight talk”

Format:

10 minute presentation **<-- strictly enforced!**
+ 3 minute Q&A / transition

For groups of N > 1 all students must speak

Whole must be class present and in-person!

| Oral Project Presentation Rubric | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|--------|--|
| Criteria | Ratings | | | | Pts | |
| Motivation Does the talk establish a connection to the broader topics / context of the class? Does the talk offer a clear introduction of the chosen problem or topic of study, and a compelling justification of its importance? | 25 pts Full Marks | 20 pts Minor details missing | 15 pts Major details missing | 0 pts No Motivation | 25 pts | |
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Day 1 (Dec 3)

Presenter(s)

Allison Chu, Cherry Bhatt, Sheen Cao

Yizhuo (Ethan) Di

Haoze He

Louis Plottel, Yingxin Zhang

Will Heitman

Jasmine Kim

Day 2 (Dec 5)

Presenter(s)

Lyuxing He, Lingkan Wang

Ellen Lee

Taiming Zhang

Arthur Fender Bucker

Diana Frias Franco

Safety & Uncertainty in HRI



[Waymo, 2023]



[Ren, AZ et al., 2023]

AI is enabling autonomous robots + agents to **interact with people at scale**



[Skydio, 2023]



[DeepMind, 2023]

This widespread **human—AI interaction**
has also increased **safety** concerns

 **Reuters** My News ≡

Autos & Transportation | Product Liability | Manufacturing | Regulatory & Policy | Products

US agency probes pedestrian risks at GM's self-driving unit Cruise

By David Shepardson and Nick Carey
October 17, 2023 3:19 PM EDT · Updated 10 months ago

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 **Google DeepMind** ≡ Search

RESPONSIBILITY & SAFETY

Introducing the Frontier Safety Framework

17 MAY 2024

Anca Dragan, Helen King and Allan Dafoe

Share



 **WH.GOV** ≡ Search

OCTOBER 30, 2023

Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence

BRIEFING ROOM PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. Artificial intelligence (AI) holds extraordinary potential for both promise and peril. Responsible AI use has the potential to help solve urgent challenges while making our world more prosperous, productive, innovative, and secure. At the same time, irresponsible use could exacerbate societal harms such as fraud, discrimination, bias, and disinformation; displace and disempower workers; stifle competition; and



Even if safety specification is “simple”, decision-making is hard

Unsafe early braking (Tesla, 2023)




Source: <https://abc7news.com/>

...but safety can also be much more

Knowing that falling into water is dangerous




Understand that its unsafe to put metal or plastic in microwave




Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ax0UK9ZRxww>

[Ren, et al., "KnowNo". CoRL 2023]


Robots should “know when they don’t know”



The safety of an AI model *cannot* be determined in isolation:
it is entangled with the behavior of human users over time



Let's use formalisms from **control & dynamical systems** to model **human–robot/AI feedback loops** influenced by **robot decisions**




Let's use formalisms from **control & dynamical systems** to model
human–robot/AI feedback loops influenced by **robot decisions**

$$\phi_R: \mathcal{O}_R \rightarrow \Phi_R$$



$$\mathbf{o}_R = [o_R^0, \dots o_R^t] \in \mathcal{O}_R$$



$$\phi_H: \mathcal{O}_H \rightarrow \Phi_H$$



$$\mathbf{o}_H = [o_H^0, \dots o_H^t] \in \mathcal{O}_H$$

Aligning Human and Robot Representations

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ABSTRACT

To act in the world, robots rely on a *representation* of salient task aspects: for example, to carry a coffee mug, a robot may consider movement efficiency or mug orientation in its behaviour. However, if we want robots to act *for and with people*, their representations must not be just functional but also reflective of what humans care about, i.e. they must be *aligned*. We observe that current learning approaches suffer from *representation misalignment*, where the robot's learned representation does not capture the human's representation. We suggest that because humans are the ultimate evaluator of robot performance, we must *explicitly* focus our efforts on aligning learned representations with humans, *in addition* to learning the downstream task. We advocate that current representation learning approaches in robotics should be studied from the perspective of how well they accomplish the objective of representation alignment. We mathematically define the problem, identify its key desiderata, and situate current methods within this formalism. We conclude by suggesting future directions for exploring open challenges.

CCS CONCEPTS

- Computing methodologies → Learning latent representations; Inverse reinforcement learning; Learning from demonstrations.

KEYWORDS






Figure 1: We formalize representation alignment as the search for a robot task representation that is *easily able* to capture the true human task representation. We review four categories of current robot representations and summarize their key takeaways and tradeoffs.

a coffee mug, the robot considers efficiency, mug orientation, and distance from the user's possessions in its behaviour. There are two paradigms for learning representations: one that *explicitly* builds in structure for learning task aspects, e.g. feature sets or graphs, and

Let's use formalisms from **control & dynamical systems** to model
human–robot/AI feedback loops influenced by **robot decisions**




*physical action, generations
for human to rank, ...*




*physical action, preference
feedback, text prompt...*

Let's use formalisms from **control & dynamical systems** to model **human–robot/AI feedback loops** influenced by **robot decisions**




- 1 How can we **formalize** interactive robot safety?
- 2 How can robots adapt their **safety strategies under uncertainty**?



- 3 How can robots learn safety **representations** from **humans**?

- 1 How can we **formalize** interactive robot safety?
- 2 How can robots adapt their safety strategies under uncertainty?



- 3 How can robots learn safety representations from humans?

How can we formalize interactive robot safety?

 *designer*

I want a safe autonomous car

i.e., “don’t collide”



Question: How do we design a **safety strategy** for the autonomous car?

`car_action = {`

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| <code>brake</code> | <code>if d(you, front_car) < car_len</code> |
| <code>speed</code> | <code>else</code> |


`}`

Question: How do we mathematically represent a **safety hazard**?


$$dist(car1_{xy}, car2_{xy}) \leq 0$$




Env. topology



Relative speed



Weather



Many drivers



```
car_action = {  
    brake      if d(you, front_car) < car_len  
    speed     else  
}
```

On a Formal Model of Safe and Scalable Self-driving Cars

Shai Shalev-Shwartz, Shaked Shammah, Amnon Shashua

Definition 1 (Safe longitudinal distance — same direction) A longitudinal distance between a car c_r that drives behind another car c_f , where both cars are driving at the same direction, is safe w.r.t. a response time ρ if for any braking of at most $a_{\max,\text{brake}}$, performed by c_f , if c_r will accelerate by at most $a_{\max,\text{accel}}$ during the response time, and from there on will brake by at least $a_{\min,\text{brake}}$ until a full stop then it won't collide with c_f .

In reality, the parameters in the definition depend on the vehicle's dynamics and the environment, and we assume that even if the parameters change over time, the safe longitudinal distance remains constant.

Lemma 2 Let c_r be a vehicle which is behind c_f on the longitudinal axis. Let $\rho, a_{\max,\text{brake}}, a_{\max,\text{accel}}, a_{\min,\text{brake}}$ be as in Definition 1. Let v_r, v_f be the longitudinal velocities of the cars. Then, the minimal safe longitudinal distance between the front-most point of c_r and the rear-most point of c_f is:

$$d_{\min} = \left[v_r \rho + \frac{1}{2} a_{\max,\text{accel}} \rho^2 + \frac{(v_r + \rho a_{\max,\text{accel}})^2}{2a_{\min,\text{brake}}} - \frac{v_f^2}{2a_{\max,\text{brake}}} \right]_+,$$

where we use the notation $[x]_+ := \max\{x, 0\}$.



NVIDIA

The Safety Force Field

David Nistér, Hon-Leung Lee, Julia Ng, Yizhou Wang

A green and white diagram showing a circular field around a central point, representing the safety force field of a self-driving car.



waymo.com/safety/

Rides Technology About Safety Community

Waymo's Safety Methodologies and Safety Readiness Determinations

Nick Webb, Daniel Smith, Chris Ludwick, Trent Victor, Qi Hanmer, Francesco Favaro, George Ivanov, Tom Hwang, and Michael S. Soderstrom

Our Safety Framework – the careful and multilayered approach to safety that has made it possible to deploy fully autonomous driving technology on public roads.

[Read more](#)

Collision Avoidance Effectiveness of an Automated Driving System Using a Human Driver Behavior Reference Model in Reconstructed Fatal Collisions

John M. Sonzon, Kristoffer D. Kusano, John Engström, Trent Victor


A study examining how well the Waymo Driver avoids collisions by using a human behavior reference model to predict the response time and evasive action of a human driver that is non-impaired, with eyes always on the road.

[Read more](#)

An omni-directional model of injury risk in planar



How can we *automatically* generate robot safety strategies?



Idea from robust control:

Zero-sum dynamic games!



Kobuki

The Four Ingredients for Safety




(1) State Space $x \in \mathbb{R}^4$


xy-position, velocity, heading




The Four Ingredients for Safety




The Four Ingredients for Safety



The Four Ingredients for Safety



$$\left\{ \begin{matrix} x \\ f \\ D \end{matrix} \right.$$

Let's cook up a safety strategy!



x
 f
D
 \mathcal{F}

Let's cook up a safety strategy!




Encode Failure Set

$$\mathcal{F} = \{x: \ell(x) \leq 0\}$$



x
 f
 D
 \mathcal{F}

Let's cook up a safety strategy!



Pose Safety Critical Game


$$V(x) := \max_{\pi_u} \min_{\pi_d} \left(\min_{t \geq 0} \ell(\zeta_x^{u,d}(t)) \right)$$

V "remembers" the closest system got to failure under best robot strategy π_u and worst opponent strategy π_d



x
 f
 D
 F

Let's cook up a safety strategy!




Solve Safety Game

$$V(x) := \max_{\pi_u} \min_{\pi_d} \left(\min_{t \geq 0} \ell(\zeta_x^{u,d}(t)) \right)$$

Many solvers: exact grid-based PDE solvers [1],
adversarial RL [2,3], self-supervised learning [4]

- [1] Mitchell, Journal of Scientific Computing 2008
- [2] Pinto, et al. ICML 2017
- [3] Hsu, et al. L4DC 2023
- [4] Bansal & Tomlin, ICRA 2021

Let's cook up a safety strategy!




Safety Policy

$$\pi^\ddagger, \quad S^\ddagger = \{x : V(x) \geq 0\}$$

Safe Set (i.e., "Monitor")

Let's cook up a safety strategy!



Safety Policy

$$\pi^{\blacklozenge}, \quad \mathcal{S}^{\blacklozenge} = \{x : V(x) \geq 0\}$$

Safe Set (i.e., "Monitor")

*Safety Filter**

$$a = \begin{cases} \pi^{\blacklozenge}, & x \text{ near bdry } \mathcal{S}^{\blacklozenge} \\ [\text{any policy here}], & x \in \mathcal{S}^{\blacklozenge} \end{cases}$$

*Note: there are many filtering variants!

[Wabersich, et al. "Data-driven safety filters." Control Systems Magazine, 2023]

[Hsu, et al. "The Safety Filter." Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems, 2023]


Vision-Based Robot *Without* Safety Strategy



Third-Person POV



Goal



Top-Down




Robot POV

Robot *With* Safety Strategy



Safety strategies applied to interaction ...




Safety Game

$$V(x) := \max_{\pi_R} \min_{\pi_H} \left(\min_{t \geq 0} \ell(\zeta_x^{u_R, u_H}(t)) \right)$$

Zero-sum games give us robustness but...

Without much knowledge of the real world,
traditional safety strategies can be too pessimistic



1


How can we formalize
interactive robot safety?

2

How can robots adapt
their **safety strategies**
under uncertainty?

3


How can robots learn safety
representations from humans?



Good to be robust, but humans aren't always adversaries




[Bajcsy* & Fisac* et al, RSS 2018]




[Bobu, Bajcsy, et al. T-RO 2020]

Let's use zero-sum games for robustness, but inform them with (data-driven) human predictions



Human prediction-informed robot safety strategies



| Metric/Method | Opponent policy | Robust (w/o learning) | Deception Game (ours) |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Failure rate | 0 % | 0 % | |
| Completion time (s) | Modeled ($\epsilon_\theta = 0.2$) | 6.27 ± 0.86 | 4.73 ± 0.97 |

[Hu*, Zhang*, Nakamura, Bajcsy, Fisac. "Deception Game." CoRL 2023]


Robustness via zero-sum game, but actions we safeguard against are informed via *human behavior model*

$$V(x) := \max_{\pi_R} \min_{\pi_H \in \Pi_H} \left(\min_{t \geq 0} \ell(\zeta_x^{u_R, u_H}(t)) \right)$$

$$\Pi_H := \{u_H : \underbrace{P(u_H | x^{\text{hist}})}_{\text{human behavior model}} \geq \epsilon\}$$

Predict complex scene-conditioned behavior via
Motion Transformer [Shi et al. NeurIPS, 2022]

Human prediction-informed robot safety strategies



| | Collision rate | Completion rate | Completion Time (s) |
|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| NoSafety | 28.5% | 71.5% | 3.5 ± 1.8 |
| SSA | 19.1% | 52.3% | 8.9 ± 4.7 |
| Robust-RA | 1.4% | 97.0% | 2.6 ± 2.1 |
| Marginal-RA | 1.5% | 98.0% | 2.5 ± 1.3 |
| SLIDE (ours) | 1.9% | 98.1% | 1.9 ± 0.8 |


Robustness via zero-sum game, but actions we safeguard against are informed via *human behavior model*

$$V(x) := \max_{\pi_R} \min_{\pi_H \in \Pi_H} \left(\min_{t \geq 0} \ell(\zeta_x^{\textcolor{orange}{u}_R, u_H}(t)) \right)$$


$$\Pi_H(u_R^{\text{plan}}) := \{u_H : P(u_H | u_R^{\text{plan}}, x^{\text{hist}}) \geq \epsilon\}$$

Model *robot influence* via
Conditional Behavior Predictors

Safety strategies applied to interaction ...






Zero-Sum Dynamic Game



General-Sum Dynamic Game, Neural Network, etc...

Data-driven models can fail under out-of-distribution human interactions






Idea:

Use the **human data** observed [online](#) to adapt
the conservativeness of the robot's safety strategy


Confidence-Aware Game-Theoretic Safety Strategies



Example: Stackelberg Game Predictor

$$P(\mathbf{u}_H | x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta) \propto \begin{cases} e^{-R_H(x^0, \mathbf{u}_H, \mathbf{u}_R)} & \text{if } \lambda = \text{follower} \\ e^{-R_H(x^0, \mathbf{u}_H, \mathbf{u}_R^*(\mathbf{u}_H))} & \text{if } \lambda = \text{leader} \end{cases}$$

Human's rationality
(also referred to as *model confidence*)




[Sadigh, et al., RSS 2016], [Schwarting et al, PNAS 2019], [Fisac et al, ICRA 2019], ...

[Fisac et al RSS 2018], [Bajcsy et al, ICRA 2019], [Carreno-Medrano et al, RO-MAN 2019]

Infer confidence of the predictor &
role of human in game

$$P(\mathbf{u}_H | x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta) \quad \text{-----} \quad b^{t+1}(\beta, \lambda) \propto P(\hat{\mathbf{u}}_H | x^0, \hat{\mathbf{u}}_R; \lambda, \beta) b^t(\beta, \lambda)$$




$$P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta) \quad \xrightarrow{\text{-----}} \quad b^{t+1}(\beta, \lambda) \propto P(\hat{\mathbf{u}}_H|x^0, \hat{\mathbf{u}}_R; \lambda, \beta) b^t(\beta, \lambda)$$

Infer confidence of the predictor

Online update of the robot's safety strategy


Predict likely human trajectories.

$$P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R) = \mathbb{E}_{\beta, \lambda} P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta)$$



$$P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta) \quad \xrightarrow{\hspace{1cm}} \quad b^{t+1}(\beta, \lambda) \propto P(\hat{\mathbf{u}}_H|x^0, \hat{\mathbf{u}}_R; \lambda, \beta) b^t(\beta, \lambda)$$

Infer confidence of the predictor




Online update of the robot's safety strategy

Predict likely human trajectories.

$$P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R) = \mathbb{E}_{\beta, \lambda} P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta)$$

Set of sufficiently likely control trajectories.

$$\mathbb{U}_H(\mathbf{u}_R) = \{\mathbf{u}_H : P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R) > \epsilon\}$$



$$P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta) \quad \xrightarrow{\text{-----}} \quad b^{t+1}(\beta, \lambda) \propto P(\hat{\mathbf{u}}_H|x^0, \hat{\mathbf{u}}_R; \lambda, \beta) b^t(\beta, \lambda)$$

Infer confidence of the predictor



Online update of the robot's safety strategy

Predict likely human trajectories.


$$P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R) = \mathbb{E}_{\beta, \lambda} P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R; \lambda, \beta)$$

Set of sufficiently likely control trajectories.


$$\mathbb{U}_H(\mathbf{u}_R) = \{\mathbf{u}_H : P(\mathbf{u}_H|x^0, \mathbf{u}_R) > \epsilon\}$$


New control bounds for safety monitor.

$$\tilde{U}_H := [\underline{u}_H(\mathbf{u}_R), \overline{u}_H(\mathbf{u}_R)]$$




$$V(x) := \max_{\pi_R} \min_{\pi_H \in \Pi_H} \left(\min_{t \geq 0} \ell(\zeta_x^{\mathbf{u}_R, \mathbf{u}_H}(t)) \right)$$







Worst-case Safety Monitor




Confidence-aware Game-theoretic Safety
(modelled human)




Confidence-aware Game-theoretic Safety
(unmodelled human)






Worst-case Safety Monitor



Confidence-aware Game-theoretic Safety
(modelled human)



Confidence-aware Game-theoretic Safety
(unmodelled human)

| Human type | Worst-case Safety | | Confidence-aware Game-theoretic Safety | | |
|------------------|-------------------|------|--|------|------------------------------------|
| | CR | SOR | CR | SOR | RIP(Full) |
| <i>modeled</i> | 0 | 23.3 | 0 | 4.7 | 27.75 ± 4.03 |
| <i>noisy</i> | 0 | 29.8 | 0 | 7.3 | 18.26 ± 3.96 |
| <i>unmodeled</i> | 0 | 42.1 | 0 | 41.7 | 0.06 ± 0.19 |

Collision rate

Safety override rate

Reward Improvement %
(w.r.t worst-case safety)

1


How can we formalize
interactive robot safety?

2


How can robots adapt
their safety strategies
under uncertainty?

3


How can robots learn safety
representations from **humans**?



So far, the safety representations we have seen are....



Proximity to agents



Easy-to-sense obstacles



$$\mathcal{F} = \{x : \|x_R - x_H\|_2 \leq \epsilon\}$$


$$\mathcal{F} = \{x : \|x - \text{SLAM}(x)\|_2 \leq \epsilon\}$$

But in the open world, there are many more constraints....

Brazil – caution tape



Germany – graffiti artist's setup



Pittsburgh – road work



I shouldn't cut under caution tape



I should stay away from ladders



I should keep off sidewalk



Real images taken by my students!

But in the open world, there are many more constraints....


Brazil – caution tape



Germany – graffiti artist's setup



Pittsburgh – road work



Spills



Accidents



Fragile objects



Sensitive personal areas




MPPI




How can we encode – and continually update –
these **semantically-meaningful safety constraints**?

Language Feedback



Vision-language models enable a flexible way to communicate safety constraints to the robot

Offline



Online



Human



Robot

Avoid the area surrounded by caution tape.



RGB


OWL-ViT

Detection




π^*_R

Semantic Failure Set



$\hat{\mathcal{F}}_E^t$



Safety Filter

$\mathcal{S}^{,t}, \pi^{,t}$

Warm-Start HJ Reachability




Updated Safe Set & Policy

From the human's POV...

Language Feedback




From the robot's POV...







“avoid the dog toys and the laundry”




On the Robustness to Language Feedback Timing



From HSSD-HAB home dataset + Habitat 3.0 simulator

- 1 How can we **formalize** interactive robot safety?
- 2 How can robots adapt their **safety strategies under uncertainty**?



- 3 How can robots learn safety **representations** from **humans**?



[Waymo, 2023]



[Ren, AZ et al., 2023]

More work to be done so autonomous robots can **interact safely at scale**



[Kedia et al., 2023]



[DeepMind, 2023]


Safety & Uncertainty in Human-Robot Interaction

1

Formalize safety during interaction via **zero-sum dynamic games**

2

Adapt robot safety strategies based on **confidence in predictive human models**



3

Robots can learn more nuanced safety **representations** from **natural language feedback**