


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**POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE 1980s**

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE 1980S

Currently political participation, especially voter registration and turnout, varies substantially with ethnicity. Blacks and non-Hispanic whites participate at roughly equal rates, while Latinos and Asian-Americans are substantially less active. This variation may reflect cultural factors, or it may be the spurious product of differences in the distribution of non-ethnic determinants of participation, including socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, variables reflecting immigration history, including citizenship, and measures of group identification. Using data collected in 1984 on samples of California's black, Latino, Asian-American, and non-Hispanic white populations, we conclude that these other variables fully account for lower Latino participation rates. Even with such controls, however, Asian-Americans remain less likely to vote. Although non-citizens participate less than citizens, they do engage in non-electoral activities. Finally, we speculate on the future political impact of Latinos and Asian-Americans, by projecting participation rates under several scenarios.

#### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE 1980s \*

The combination of recent changes in immigration and differential birthrates have significantly altered the ethnic balance in the United States. While blacks have remained about twelve percent of the population, two other ethnic minorities, Latinos and Asian-Americans, have grown dramatically in size. In the fifties, Europeans constituted 59 percent of legal immigrants, Latinos, 22 percent, and Asians, 6 percent. Two decades later the figures were 18 percent, 41 percent, and 36 percent, respectively. While non-Hispanic white women average 1.7 births each, the birthrate for Latinas is 2.8 and for black women is 2.3. The population shifts have been concentrated in large, politically competitive states, such as Texas, Florida, Illinois, and especially California. In fact, the California population is expected to be less than half non-Hispanic white by the year 2010, after having dropped from 87 percent non-Hispanic white in 1960 to 67 percent in 1980.

The increase in minority populations could prove to be politically important. However, for political effects to appear, two conditions must hold: first, the minority populations must have distinctive political views, and, second, they must participate in politics so that their views make an impact. In this paper we address the second of these issues and examine the current and anticipated levels of political participation by members of ethnic minority groups.<sup>1</sup> Before proceeding, we note that whether or not members of these groups hold distinctive views, the level of their political participation indicates the degree of their integration into the American polity.

There does exist an extensive literature on black-white differences in political activity (e.g. Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Orum, 1966; Olsen, 1970;

Verba and Nie, 1972; London and Hearn, 1977; Danigelis, 1978; Shingles, 1981; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1981; Welch and Secret, 1981; Brown, Jackson, and Bowman, 1982; Miller, 1982; Danigelis, 1982; Gutberock and London, 1983) and a growing literature on Latino political participation (Welch, Conner, and Steinman, 1975; Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Tavlik, 1976; Loverich and Marenin, 1976; Welch, 1977; Guzman, 1976; Buehler, 1977; Rodriguez, 1978; MacManus and Cassel, 1982; Brischetto and de la Garza, 1983; de la Garza and Weaver, 1984). With important exceptions (Kitano, 1969), much less is known about Asian-American political participation. Large national surveys have not been very helpful in this regard because they usually include few Latinos and even fewer Asian-Americans (de la Garza, 1987).<sup>2</sup> Most of the studies that have been done of non-black ethnic minorities have been restricted to a single group and often are based on a local sample. Few (e.g., Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Loverich and Marenin, 1976) make comparisons across ethnic minority groups. The present study is based upon survey interviews conducted in late 1984 with samples of blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and non-Hispanic whites. It thus allows for comparisons among all major ethnic groups and thereby makes an important contribution to the present state of knowledge of ethnic patterns of political participation in the United States.

Another important contribution of this study is to examine the political behavior of non-citizens. Even before attaining citizenship, non-citizens may participate in the political process in various ways. Indeed, under the one-person, one-vote court rulings they are considered equal to citizens in the apportionment of legislative districts. Moreover, under the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, several million more non-citizens, primarily of Latino descent, are expected to begin the process of attaining citizenship by becoming legal alien residents. Over

half of these persons are thought to reside in California. Non-citizens comprise an important yet little-studied pool of current, and potential, participants.

Outside the realm of practical politics, the theoretical debates on the determinants of political participation pose a number of questions which can be addressed by examining the behavior of ethnic populations. Over and above the correlation between socioeconomic resources and participation, various forms of group affiliation can increase activity. Race and ethnicity have historically been important sources of group organization in contemporary America -- does the same apply to the newer immigrant groups?

Finally, these various ethnic groups appear to be culturally distinctive, and the recent immigrants among them come from varied political systems. To the extent that these differences carry over into American experience, they may contribute to differences in political activity among the groups.

Both the practical and the theoretical perspectives lead us to ask certain questions about the political participation of various minority groups. First, how active are members of various ethnic and racial groups in different forms of political participation? Secondly, do differences between the groups simply reflect socioeconomic differences, or does ethnicity itself matter? Thirdly, do we see any signs of group-based mobilization? Finally, how much activity might one expect to see in the future under different scenarios of demographic and political change, and in light of the behavior of non-citizens?

The demographic changes have been most dramatic in California, making California a good site for the study of minorities. To answer the questions posed above, this paper draws upon a California-wide survey of 574 Latinos, 335 blacks, 308 Asian-Americans, and 317 non-Hispanic whites. (For ease of exposition, in the remainder of the text we will refer simply to "whites"

when we mean "non-Hispanic whites," to "Asians" when we mean "Asian-Americans," to "Japanese" for "Japanese-Americans," and so forth. See Appendix B for more detail on the sampling design and sample.<sup>3</sup> We consider a range of participatory activities. Registering and voting have the most direct electoral consequences, but various campaign activities, the contacting of officials, the direct transmission of opinions to news media, and community action may indirectly affect elections and, perhaps more important, may influence the opinions of others and affect policy.<sup>4</sup>

We first examine the level of political activity across the different ethnic groups. Then we sketch the theoretical framework which shapes our central analysis, the examination of the determinants of participation levels among citizens and non-citizens. Finally, we use the estimated models to forecast participation rates under several alternative scenarios of the future.

#### LEVELS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION WITHIN ETHNIC GROUPS

Studies of black participation have shown that blacks currently participate at levels very near those of whites; for at least twenty years the rates of black activity have been virtually the same as whites, or higher, once income and education are controlled (Verba and Nie, 1972; Olsen, 1970). Most studies of Latinos and Asian-Americans conclude that they participate less often than members of the majority population. For example, self-reported turnout was twenty percent less for Mexican-Americans in the 1984 National Election Study than it was for non-Hispanic whites. Our data are consistent with these general conclusions.

Table 1 reports the percentages participating. It shows that the ethnic groups differ substantially from each other in the percentage of people engaging in various political activities. Overall, the predominantly

native-born groups — blacks and whites — are more politically active than Latinos and Asians.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The differences across groups are particularly striking for registration and voting. Compared with blacks and whites, less than two-thirds as many Latinos and Asians reported they were registered to vote or voted.<sup>5</sup> Once we take account of the disparities between the racial and ethnic groups in the proportion of their members who are citizens, the differences in participation rates diminish substantially.<sup>6</sup> The second and fourth rows of Table 1 indicate that the registration and voting rates for Latino and Asian citizens come much closer to those for whites and blacks. Moreover, restricting attention to citizens brings white rates nearer to the black level.

For registration and voting, lack of citizenship constitutes an absolute bar to participation. Although non-citizens are legally eligible to participate in most of the other forms of political activities in Table 1 (with the exception of political contributions), we might reasonably expect non-citizens to be less likely to do so. We thus report separately the percentages in each group who are active for citizens, for non-citizens, and for the total sample. Consider the next four activities, all of which are some form of campaign participation (*i.e.*, contributing money, exhibiting a campaign poster or sticker, working for a party or candidate, and attending a political meeting or rally). Virtually identical proportions of whites and blacks report having done these things, while Latinos and Asians say they are less active. When we separate citizens from non-citizens, we find that some non-citizens do participate politically, and that the Latino and Asian citizens are almost as active as whites and blacks.

The next three items concern various types of non-electoral activity. The rough parity between white and black participation breaks down when it comes to contacting elected officials, with whites clearly more likely to do so than blacks. This result is consistent with Verba and Nie's finding (1972, pp. 160-170) that blacks contact officials less than whites, even with controls for group consciousness and social class. On the other hand, blacks in our sample are slightly more likely than whites to say that they have worked with a community group to solve a problem.

As with the electoral activities, controlling for citizenship of Latinos and Asians greatly reduces the disparity between their activity rates and those of whites and blacks. Latino and Asian citizens are about equally likely to contact elected officials and do so less than whites; this similarity among all three groups of ethnic minorities is consistent with Verba and Nie's explanation of their results for blacks. Latino and Asian citizens differ on the last two items; Latino citizens are less likely than blacks or whites to work in groups but contact news media at about the same rate as they do while Asian citizens are as likely as whites to work in groups and more likely than anyone to convey opinions to news media. Although non-citizens are more active than one might expect — one-tenth to one-fifth of them take part in these activities — they are still much less active than citizens (see also Brischetto and de la Garza, 1983).

To check our impression that there is a first-order relationship between ethnicity and participation even after allowing for differential rates of citizenship, we ran estimations of the various participation variables on dummy variables for ethnicity, among citizens only. Because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, probit analysis was used to estimate this model. (In these and later estimations we omit the three campaign activities other than contributing money due to the low frequency

of activity.) These results are reported in Table 2. The top number in each entry is the maximum likelihood estimate, the bottom number the standard error. Dividing the estimate by the standard error yields the associated t-statistic. All of the ethnic minority groups contact officials less than whites, while there are no differences for contacting media. For all of the other activities, blacks and whites participate at the same rate, while Latinos participate less. Although Asians participate in some activities as much as whites (contacting media and contributing money), on the whole they are less active.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Finally, one might object to grouping all of the Asian respondents into a single category. The Asian sample includes approximately equal numbers of respondents of Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean descent, with a scattering of Vietnamese-Americans and others. We recognize that these groups do not think of themselves as a single "Asian" ethnicity. To see whether their participation rates differ substantially from each other, we repeated the estimation on ethnic dummies breaking the Asian category down into the groups above (with the Vietnamese-Americans grouped with anyone not otherwise classified). We do find some differences by nationality. (See Appendix Table A.1 for the coefficients.) The data suggest that the Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos are all less likely to register and to vote than whites, while the Chinese are much nearer to whites in their turnout pattern. Japanese are slightly more likely to contribute money than whites, while Filipinos (and perhaps the Other Asian-Americans) are more likely to contact news media.<sup>7</sup> All of the Asian groups are less likely to contact officials than are whites. An apparent surprise is the low coefficient, indicating low participation, for the Japanese on every activity except

contributing money. The Japanese-Americans are economically successful and in many respects highly assimilated into American life (Kitano, 1969).

If we had sufficient cases, we would like to carry through the analysis separately for the various Asian groups. Since we do not have many cases in each separate category, we emphasize that these results are at best suggestive. Beyond statistical necessity, however, we believe there is some justification for aggregating these respondents into a single Asian category. First, the cultural differences between Asian-Americans on the basis of nationality are still relatively small compared to those between native-born and immigrant individuals and between Asian immigrants and those from Latin America. Second, the political environment may be placing pressure on these individuals to think of themselves as "Asian" in a similar fashion to the way Sicilians, Neapolitans, and Florentines became "Italian" in the United States. We think enough can be learned from analysis of the Asians as an aggregated category to proceed.

We have seen that there are differences across groups in amount of political participation. Most notably, Latinos and Asians participate less in politics than do whites or blacks even when we restrict attention to American citizens. We do not yet know, however, whether these differences are related to ethnicity in any meaningful way, or whether instead they are the spurious product of differences in the distribution of non-ethnic determinants of participation. These determinants include demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education, and birth abroad. In addition, we suspect that the levels of activity reflect varying levels of group identification or group mobilization. These questions will be addressed by developing and estimating a fuller model of political participation.

#### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: PREVIOUS THEORY AND RESEARCH

A large body of previous research has repeatedly shown that political participation is positively associated with several related demographic and economic variables. These variables have been hypothesized to influence decisions regarding participation in several different ways. Some theorists see them as factors which reduce the informational and other costs of participation or increase the stakes of acting. Other theorists emphasize psychological payoffs (e.g., satisfying a sense of civic duty) correlated with these factors. These variables have also been viewed as indicating the level of resources (money, knowledge, free time, etc.) which a person can spend on political activity.<sup>8</sup> In short, interpretations given for why people participate in politics vary considerably more than how the determinants are operationalized.<sup>9</sup>

Whatever one's theoretical predilections, a central task in our analysis is to determine how much of the observed variation in participation among major ethnic groups can be accounted for by variation in background socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Our survey thus included several questions about respondents' socioeconomic characteristics. Chies among these variables are education and income (Conway, 1985; Campbell, et.al., 1960; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).

Previous studies have shown that these factors can account for significant differences in minority and white participation rates (Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Brischetto and de la Garza, 1983; Buehler, 1977). Respondents are, however, often reticent about reporting income; in this survey 17 percent declined to answer the family income question. For purposes of this analysis we therefore used responses to three other questions which reveal

differences in financial well-being: whether the respondent's family owned or rented their home, whether or not the head of the respondent's household had been unemployed in the previous year, and whether or not the respondent was a single mother. Unemployment has been found to depress turnout in congressional elections (Rosenstone, 1982), although others argue the effect of unemployment is spurious (Schlozman and Verba, 1979). Being a single mother, of course, probably is indicative of lacking free time as well as income.

We also ascertained respondents' age and gender. Older people have consistently been found to be more active politically, although there appears to be a slight drop-off in activity among the very elderly. The usual explanations suggest that as people get older, they get into the habit of political activity, or that experience reduces the costs, or that their stakes in the outcomes increase along with their increasing wealth,<sup>10</sup> property, and families. The very old, however, confront new costs in the form of difficulties getting around. Although gender differences in participation appear to have largely disappeared in recent years, results from earlier studies often found women participated less than men. It is also possible that even if gender differences have declined in the overall population, such differences may persisted in some minority group populations.

Several other factors which affect a potential participant's resources are especially important in analyzing heavily immigrant populations. Not speaking English as a primary language inhibits the acquisition of information and increases the difficulty of certain activities. For those born abroad, longer residence in the United States corresponds to greater opportunities for inexpensive acquisition of political information. In addition, speaking English and living in the U.S. for a greater percentage

of one's life may indirectly measure a greater degree of integration into mainstream American society.

The distribution of these variables across ethnic groups is reported in Table 3. As the figures in this table indicate, Latino citizens are a relatively younger, less well educated population. Latino participation rates could also be depressed by incomplete integration into the American mainstream; approximately one out of seven Latinos in our sample had been born outside of the United States, and over 40 percent retained Spanish as their primary language.

The data on Asians, in contrast, pose something of a puzzle. Their relatively low rates of participation in various political activities are all the more remarkable in light of their high levels of employment, educational attainment, and homeownership, and extremely low number of single mothers. Perhaps, in the case of Asians, the effects associated with these variables, which we would expect to be positive, are swamped by the presumably dampening effects of being born abroad (47 percent of the Asian citizens in our survey were immigrants) or poor English skills. In short, the figures in Table 3 pose more questions than they answer. A multivariate analysis may shed some light on these matters.

The second major component in our analysis considers the effects of an explicit sense of group identification upon ethnic minority political participation. Such effects could compensate for a lack of socioeconomic resources, (as in the case of Latinos or blacks) or detract from them (as is perhaps the case for Asians). A number of researchers have pointed to the role of "group consciousness" in increasing activity (Miller et al., 1981; Verba and Nie, 1972). Others find effects associated with membership in particular cleavage

groups, such as different religions, in the Netherlands, or class/religious groupings, in Austria (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978). In both instances the groups in question are politically meaningful (members are presumed to share some significant preferences or to be treated as though they did), and the group resources are hypothesized to substitute for individual resources. In addition, a number of studies show that membership and activity in organizations increase activity (Lipset, 1960; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969; Verba and Nie, 1972) although this effect likely reflects the learning of transferable skills and attitudes. Group effects, especially those based on the political role of the group, may help explain political mobilization of ethnic minorities (Welch, 1977; Pavlik, 1976; Miller et al., 1981; Brown, Jackson, and Bowman, 1982; Jackson, 1987).

However, this research has not accounted precisely for the link between group interest or group identity and the individual's motive to act. Rational actor theories, on the other hand, provide the possibility of linking group interests and individual action. These theories posit that people act if the benefits of action are greater than the costs. If people are assumed to be expected utility maximizers, the benefit of one candidate winning rather than another is discounted by the (low) probability that an individual's action will alter an outcome (e.g. his or her vote change an election winner). It follows that in a mass election few people would vote (Downs, 1957). The problem has the same form as the general collective action problem (Olson, 1971); namely, when members of large groups each derive only a small benefit from some collective endeavor, group action is liable to founder on the free-rider problem. Consumption goods (roughly equivalent to selective incentives in Olson's terminology) are often proposed to solve the problem of predicted levels of activity far below observed amounts (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968), but Barry (1970) and others argue

that this solution amounts to throwing away the politics in political activity.<sup>10</sup>

Whatever the case, we concur that the low odds of an individual being pivotal to a political outcome imply that instrumental benefits, including perception of a group interest, will rarely outweigh the costs of action. Thus consumption benefits will usually be needed to produce action. We outline here another approach, based upon the observation that an important subset of the consumption goods look like instrumental benefits and perform like them within the larger political system.<sup>11</sup> These consumption goods depend upon the existence both of group affiliations, such as ethnic identities, and of group-specific leaders.<sup>12</sup> Although the vote of one Latino has little influence on an election, both a candidate and a Latino leader can see a non-negligible effect on the probability of winning from a several percent increase in Latino turnout. Intermediary elites can increase turnout by increasing the consumption benefits of action to their members.

They will invest resources to do so if the candidate provides enough benefits (policy positions or patronage) in exchange for more support. Thus, the consumption benefits that at the margin bring an individual to act rest upon political trades and promises, instead of simply reflecting early socialization. The net result is that participants motivated by consumption benefits may appear to act out of instrumental motivations, and may in fact ultimately receive instrumental payoffs for their actions. As members of minority groups see their ethnicity as more salient to their identity and see politics as more salient to the group, and if there exists a set of leaders identified with the group, one would expect participation to increase. Our data provide what we believe to be a useful indicator of group consciousness.<sup>13</sup> After being asked what they believed to be the most important problem facing people in this country today, respondents were then

asked to name problems which they felt were of special concern to members of their racial or ethnic group. Persons who named such a problem, we argue, are conscious of their ethnic group as a politically salient identity connected to a common political interest.

An additional component of an analysis of the impact of group identification upon participation decisions is the existence of competing loyalties. A Catholic Latino working on an assembly line, for instance, might not be naturally inclined to give ethnic interests precedence over occupational or religious ones. Political leadership can enhance a sense of group loyalties. This is essentially what many partisan (e.g., elected officials) and nonpartisan (e.g., the Southwest Voter Registration Drive) minority leaders have attempted to do in recent years. Issues before the legislature can facilitate this process. The prospect of immigration reform, for example, probably heightened the salience of group identity among many Latinos in recent years.<sup>14</sup>

To realistically gauge the impact of ethnic group identification we must also gauge the influence of other, possibly competing, group loyalties. We therefore asked respondents whether there was some other group, in addition to a racial or nationality group, that they felt part of, and that makes them more concerned about certain problems. In Table 4 we report the percentage of each ethnic group, citizens and noncitizens, who said that there were problems of special concern to people of their racial or national background, and also the percentage of each group who named a second, non-ethnic identity. These figures indicate that two out of three blacks and nearly half the Latino citizens reported a problem which they felt was particularly troublesome for people of their race or ethnicity. The actual problems they mentioned, furthermore, appeared to reflect the circumstances of their respective groups. The vast majority of blacks referred to either

unemployment, discrimination, crime, or drug abuse. Latinos, on the other hand, were especially likely to refer to the need for more and better education. Far fewer respondents named a second, non-ethnic identity which makes them more concerned about particular problems. Whites were most likely to do so, while Latinos and Asians were least likely.

Aside from the question of the relative effect of ethnic and non-ethnic identifications, both of these measures of group-identity correspond to bases for political mobilization, as described above. To the extent that either measure is related to participation, we believe there is some indication of group-based activity. If the ethnic-identity measure functions this way, then there is evidence for an ethnic effect via ethnic group mobilization.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Finally, we consider the interpretation of any effects associated with ethnicity which cannot be accounted for by either our battery of exogenous socioeconomic and demographic variables or by our indicators of group consciousness. Although the significant amount of measurement error which are associated with survey research may well be the source of such residue, we feel that it is important to consider additional culture-based explanations. Almond and Verba (1963), for instance, found that varying proportions of citizens in the five nations they studied had either "parochial," "subject," or "participant" orientations, with each orientation associated with a complex of beliefs and a specific level of political activity. Latino immigrants come from polities with more "parochials," and may therefore be less active (see also, Buehler, 1977). A cost-benefit argument leads to a similar prediction; many Asian and Latino immigrants come from countries with a single dominant party where elections produce little party alternation. (See McDonough, 1971, on effects of party competition.)

Additionally, there have been suggestions of variations in cultural norms with respect to integration into the larger society (Kitano, 1969). In the analysis to follow we do not explicitly investigate culturally derived attitudes which might be associated with different levels of participation. However, we do allow for the presence of residual cultural differences by retaining the ethnic group dummy variables in the equations we estimate.

#### ESTIMATION

The previous discussion of the common factors associated with political participation leads us to propose estimating a model of the following form:

$$\Pr[Y=1] = F[X, G, Z]$$

where

$X$  is a vector of the individual characteristics, including age, education, homeownership, which were reported in Table 3. These variables all enter the equation as [1,0] dummies except for age and for the percentage of his or lifetime that the respondent had spent in the U.S.

$G$  is a pair of variables indicating group identifications, either ethnic or nonethnic, as reported in Table 4. These variables also enter the equation as dummies which take on the value of 1 if the respondent named a problem of special concern to his or her group, 0 otherwise.

$Z$  is a vector of ethnicity variables coded as [1,0] dummies. These variables had been included in the previous analysis reported in Table 2.

$Y$  is a vector of political activities coded as [1,0] dummies.

As before, this model is estimated with probit analysis. Results are reported in Table 5. The various demographic variables perform pretty much as expected. Older people are generally more active, except for the very old who are less so. Activity is higher among the college-educated and those who own homes.

**15 Single mothers vote less and are less likely to contribute money, while living in a household with an unemployed head has a negative, although statistically insignificant, effect.** We do find a gender difference for two forms of participation; men are more likely to contribute money and to say they have worked in a community group.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The immigration-linked indicators also behave as expected. The greater the percentage of one's life spent outside the United States, the lower the likelihood of participating (except for a small effect in the other direction for contributing money). Even controlling for that percentage, persons who do not use English as their primary language are less active.

Both the measure of ethnic identity and that of non-ethnic group identity are positively related to all activities except voting. Naming an ethnic-group related problem or having a non-ethnic identity is related to registration; actually going to the polls entails something else. That the ethnic problem measure of group identity is positively related to activity suggests that there may be some mobilization on ethnic lines. That the non-ethnic identity variable matters suggests that other group-related phenomena also matter.

We are cautious about inferring direction of causality for some of our participation items. One might plausibly argue that persons who choose to work in a community group might as a consequence develop more awareness of

ethnic-group related problems. That a relationship exists is clear; we think it plausible that the causality often runs from the group-identity to participation instead of the reverse.

Does ethnicity still matter after controlling for other factors? With some qualifications, the answer is that the significance of the ethnic intercept disappears for Latinos, while the Asian-American ethnic intercept remains significant. Except for contacting officials, which retains a negative coefficient for all of the minority ethnic groups, once we control for the factors discussed above, no effect remains for a "Latino" variable. That is, the lower levels of participation we observed for Latinos can be explained by the other variables in our probit estimation. Thus, we conclude that no residual cultural factor is needed to explain Latinos' lower levels of participation; the set of demographic and group identity variables suffices.

The Asians, however, present a different picture. Even after all of the controls above, they remain less likely than whites to register, vote, and contact elected officials. In fact, since they are relatively high on the various socio-economic variables, the controls do little to reduce the disparity between them and the other groups. To further explore their situation, we repeated the estimation splitting the Asians into nationality groups, as before. (The coefficients are reported in Appendix Table A.2) Again, in light of the few cases in each category, these results are at best suggestive. The Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans are among the less likely to contact officials. The Filipinos and Other Asian-Americans are somewhat more likely than whites to make their opinions known through the news media, balancing out a statistically insignificant negative effect in the other groups.

With respect to voting and registration, the data indicate that it is Japanese who are particularly unlikely to register and to vote, with some of the same effect among Filipinos. Let us be clear on what this finding means. The negative effect among Japanese is accentuated by our demographic controls, since they are high on these independent variables. Our finding is consistent with Kitano's: "If we use knowledge of political issues, active participation in political organizations, and the like as criteria . . . the Japanese American, at least at this stage of his acculturation, is an apolitical population." (Kitano, 1969, p. 138). The result suggests that the lower electoral participation rates observed among Asians will not simply go away as a result of economic advances and length of time in the United States. A full explanation requires in-depth examination of the role of electoral politics within these communities.

The results reported above for Latinos, on the other hand, suggest that their case resembles that of blacks. Namely, once one compares persons of similar socioeconomic position, differences in participation evaporate (again, parallel to blacks, with the exception of contacting officials). Of course, in the case of Latinos, unlike that of blacks, speaking English and having been in the United States for a while also increase participation. Thus, citizens are more active as they are older, but not too old, better educated, better off, and longer resident in the U.S.<sup>16</sup> Ethnicity matters after controlling for demographics and for group consciousness for Asians but not for Latinos. Ethnicity matters for all of the minority groups as a basis for mobilization, as captured in the "ethnic problem" measure of group consciousness.

#### WHO ARE THE PARTICIPATING NON-CITIZENS?

As our sample contains 261 non-citizens, it provides a unique opportunity to examine their behavior. Non-citizens do participate, especially in activities in which they directly present their views or work on some issue. What differentiates the active non-citizens from those who do not take part in American politics?

We used a slightly different model to examine this question than we used for citizen participation. Some variables we omitted simply because there was little variance (for instance, only 15 of the non-citizens were single mothers, and about the same number mentioned a non-ethnic identity: even fewer are older than 65). The main variable we added was one intended to capture the extent to which these individuals had commitments to their country of origin. Non-citizens were coded one on this dummy variable if they have social links to their country of origin, or send money there, or have considered going back there to live (as opposed to being pretty sure they will always live in the United States). Finally, since all of these respondents were born outside of the United States, we reversed the variable on the percentage of time spent abroad so that it now reflects the percentage of their life which they have lived in the United States.

Because non-citizens are barred by law from registering, voting, and contributing money, we estimate the models only for working in groups, contacting officials, and contacting news media.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Table 6 reports the results of the estimations. A number of the standard socioeconomic variables are not especially significant, although the signs go in the appropriate directions. The most interesting, and most consistent,

effect comes from the variable measuring percentage of life spent in the United States. The greater the proportion of his or her life a non-citizen has spent in the United States, the more likely he or she is to take part in one of these activities. This conclusion holds especially for working in groups and contacting news media; the effect is much smaller for contacting elected officials. Once length of stay in the country is controlled, language has an additional effect only for contacting news media; non-English speakers are less likely to do so.

Non-citizens who believe that they do have a problem related to their ethnicity are clearly more likely to report having worked in a community group to solve a problem. We can interpret this finding two ways: non-citizens are active if they have group consciousness or if they have interests to pursue, or both. Non-citizens with ethnic problems are also more likely to contact officials; again, either interpretation could hold. Those non-citizens who are linked to their country of origin, in the ways discussed above, are less likely to express their views to news media.

Finally, and in contrast to citizens, older non-citizens are less likely to contact either the media or officials than are younger ones. Note that age is not simply picking up cohort differences in language or education, as we control for those variables explicitly. In addition, we control for percentage of life spent in the U.S. We speculate that the age result reflects a greater willingness by young people to try out new behaviors.<sup>17</sup> Overall, it appears that non-citizens participate in part for the same reasons as citizens. Beyond that, though, non-citizens appear to be more active as they perceive that they have group-specific problems in need of solution, as they have been residents longer, as they are less closely linked to their country of origin, and as they are younger.

#### PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PARTICIPATION RATES

Finally, what levels of participation might we expect to see in the future? Social scientists are notoriously poor prognosticators; however, our estimations allow us to suggest what activity levels might look like under several different scenarios. We are particularly interested in what may happen to registration, to voting rates, to the likelihood of contacting elected officials, and to working in groups.

The first scenario we label "Americanization;" if the flow of immigration were to stop, the Latino and Asian populations would become older, would have resided longer on average in the United States, and would contain fewer non-English speakers and non-native born. We assume that socioeconomic levels do not shift. In our second scenario, "Party Recruitment," we assume that nothing changes except that the parties work hard and engender loyalty among Asians and Latinos. The demographic factors we assume remain the same; a continued flow of immigration has kept the numbers of new arrivals and non-English speakers up, and social mobility has not increased. Consider, next, the possibility that socio-economic mobility occurs without assimilation; the minorities enjoy upward economic and educational mobility while remaining young and non-English speaking (for example, by developing a successful parallel economy with continuing immigration flows). Under our fourth scenario we assume that the demographic changes of Americanization occur as well as the party recruitment of the second scenario, but despite these changes economic and educational mobility are blocked. Finally, we consider the possibility that assimilation works; all the elements of the Americanization scenario take place and in addition the minorities experience upward economic and educational mobility. Under this scenario, parties are assumed not to be any more active than currently.

We emphasize that our projections are a ceteris paribus exercise; all of our projections depend upon the restrictive assumption that the coefficients in the estimation remain unchanged in the face of these transformations. Some of them are in fact likely to change. For instance, under the Americanization scenario, if the numbers of non-English speakers dropped radically, a similar estimation might well yield a different coefficient for that variable.

We begin by looking at citizens only. Because we think parties could be important agents of change, we re-estimated our equations including dummy variables for strong and weak party identifiers (reported in Appendix Table A.3). We used the coefficients to construct projections as follows. For most of the independent variables, we used whites as a reference group; for percentage of strong partisans blacks defined the reference category. Then, for each other group we calculated the difference between their mean score on the variable and that of the reference group. We multiplied these differences by the probit coefficient. The result tells us how far along the normal density function that much of a shift in the independent variable would take the group. The corresponding increase in area under the curve corresponds to the additional percentage of group members who would take part in the activity, under our assumptions. The magnitude of the increase in proportion depends upon where we start on the curve; for each group, that will be the position corresponding to their current activity rate.<sup>18</sup>

#### TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Table 7 summarizes our projections. We did not calculate projections for Asians under scenarios III or V as their mean education and mean score on the income indicators are already above those of the white sample. We did consider what might happen to white participation if partisanship were to

increase, and we considered how a change in the age structure (under I) or an increase in socioeconomic level (scenario III) would alter black activity. Our projections show, first, that scenario I, Americanization, would be sufficient to bring Latino electoral participation rates close to those of blacks and whites; the addition of either stronger partisanship or socioeconomic advances, virtually wipes out the remaining differences. The same scenarios bring the rate of contacting officials up to the black rate, and then beyond it. Either Americanization or socioeconomic mobility increases the probability of working in groups; the combination of the two in the fifth scenario brings these rates to white levels. Among Asians, either the Americanization scenario or an increase in partisanship brings registration rates up to black and white levels; combining the two brings registration beyond white and black rates and voting up to that level. The Americanization scenario brings contacting and working in groups up past black levels.

Of course, the world does not change suddenly, and the proportion of non-English speakers will not instantaneously drop to zero. However, these projections lead us to believe that either normal demographic processes or the politicization of these electorates would be sufficient to raise participation rates substantially.

#### CONCLUSION

The rise in numbers of non-black minority groups in the United States has led to speculation about possible changes in American politics. Some foresee a "Rainbow Coalition," whether or not led by Jesse Jackson; others anticipate advantages for the Democrats, still others for the Republicans; some seers predict policy shifts of various kinds. A precondition for any of these changes to occur is that the members of these groups take part in politics.

We began this paper by establishing that Latinos and Asian-Americans do, in fact, participate less in politics than do non-Hispanic whites or blacks. One factor important in this difference is the large proportion of Latinos and Asian-Americans who are not citizens; since these people are not eligible to vote, inclusion of them in the base for calculating turnout provides a misleading impression of the activity of the eligibles. However, even restricting attention to citizens, Latinos and Asian-Americans register and vote at lower rates than whites and blacks.

This difference in activity could be due to cultural factors, such as a community norm to avoid political involvement, or a learned attitude that electoral politics are a waste of time. On the other hand, the difference in activity could be spuriously related to ethnicity and instead reflect differences across groups in the distribution of other characteristics which lead to participation. In the latter case, one could expect political activity to increase naturally as the distribution of these characteristics became more favorable. In the former case, the differences in activity would persist, until and unless assimilation occurred or the norms of the community changed; neither of these contingencies can be expected to occur as a matter of course.

The analysis showed that the Asian-Americans fit the non-spurious case; even with the controls, Asian-Americans are less active. We do not believe that one can simply offer "culture" as an explanation; clearly we would like to know what it is about being Asian-American that depresses political activity. What we can say is that whatever it is comes from outside of this set of determinants of activity. Until we know what this effect comes from, it seems likely that the linear extrapolation involved in our projections most likely yields predictions that are too high.

Latinos, on the other hand, fit the spurious relationship case; controlling for demographic and related determinants of activity wipes out the effect of Latino ethnicity, confirming the results of Antunes and Gaitz (1975). In the case of Latinos, then, our projections have some plausibility. If the population ages and becomes more native born, more English speaking, if its education and income level increases, then we do expect to see substantial increases in activity. Ethnicity per se has no independent effect.

Group consciousness does, however, matter, for activities other than voting. Persons who believe that their ethnic group has specific problems, as well as those who have some non-ethnic group identity, are more likely to give money, to contact, or to work in groups. Ethnicity may provide a basis for the mobilization of activity. In this sense, ethnicity does matter. Moreover, these data support the theoretical argument that group affiliation matters.

In this regard, we find suggestive one difference between Latinos and blacks, on the one hand, and Asian-Americans, on the other. Members of the first two groups have entered politics as self-identified representatives of their racial or ethnic group and, once in office, have interacted extensively with community leaders. Partly due to differences in residential concentration, Asian-American politicians rarely represent predominantly Asian districts and infrequently make their ethnicity central to their politics. Although causality probably goes in both directions, we suspect the leadership structures and patterns of participation are related.

Our projection exercise suggests that the parties can play an important role in shaping the political future. Even with little change in the demographic characteristics of the population, successful party recruitment can result in significantly higher rates of activity. The consequences for

politics will depend upon which party gets there first. Our projections are not meant to imply that politics are independent of economic mobility.

Political organization by parties, especially if it does in fact increase activity as we project can be a tool used to increase access of minorities to the fruits of economic mobility.

**Table A.1 Probit Estimations of Citizens' Participation on Ethnicity (Asian category disaggregated)**

Independent Variables	Registered in 1984	Voted in 1984	Contributed Money	Worked in Groups	Contacted Media	Contacted Officials
Latino	-.56* (.11)**	-.59 (.10)	-.26 (.11)	-.32 (.10)	-.07 (.11)	-.57 (.10)
Black	.11 (.13)	.06 (.12)	-.12 (.12)	.12 (.10)	-.09 (.11)	-.27 (.10)
Chinese	-.02 (.25)	-.28 (.21)	-.07 (.23)	-.23 (.21)	-.09 (.23)	-.52 (.21)
Japanese	-.47 (.20)	-.28 (.19)	.21 (.19)	.15 (.18)	-.07 (.20)	-.39 (.18)
Korean	-.14 (.06)	-.15 (.05)	.03 (.06)	-.04 (.05)	.01 (.06)	-.23 (.06)
Filipino	-.56 (.25)	-.36 (.25)	-.10 (.27)	-.08 (.24)	.45 (.24)	-.41 (.24)
Other Asian	-.38 (.34)	-.09 (.34)	.19 (.33)	-.18 (.32)	.34 (.32)	-.29 (.31)
Constant	1.14 (.09)	.85 (.08)	-.78 (.08)	-.41 (.07)	-.77 (.08)	.01 (.07)
Log likelihood						
Initial	-830	-830	-826	-830	-831	-829
At convergence	-554	-677	-575	-734	-614	-768
N	1197	1198	1191	1197	1199	1196
Percent participating	81	73	19	32	21	37

\* Probit coefficient

\*\* Standard error of coefficient

Table A.2 Probit Estimations of Citizens' Participation (Asian-American Category Disaggregated)

Table A.2 Probit Estimations of Citizens' Participation (Asian-American Category Disaggregated)									
Independent Variables	Registered in 1984	Voted in 1984	Contributed Money	Worked in Groups	Contacted Media	Contacted Officials			
Latino	-.10* (.14)**	-.11 (.13)	.01 (.13)	-.11 (.12)	.02 (.13)	-.28 (.11)			
Black	-.16 (.15)	.12 (.14)	-.10 (.13)	.02 (.12)	-.15 (.13)	-.33 (.11)			
Chinese	.26 (.28)	-.03 (.24)	-.18 (.26)	-.21 (.24)	-.11 (.24)	-.38 (.23)			
Japanese	-.59 (.21)	-.43 (.21)	.19 (.20)	.15 (.18)	-.07 (.20)	-.44 (.19)			
Korean	-.04 (.07)	-.05 (.07)	-.00 (.07)	.04 (.07)	.05 (.07)	-.16 (.07)			
Filipino	-.37 (.28)	-.16 (.27)	-.17 (.30)	.08 (.27)	.56 (.26)	-.25 (.26)			
Other Asian	-.07 (.38)	.23 (.37)	.11 (.36)	-.00 (.37)	.49 (.34)	-.06 (.33)			
Age	.035 (.004)	.040 (.004)	.020 (.004)	.008 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	.014 (.003)			
65 or older	-.49 (.24)	-.75 (.21)	-.21 (.17)	-.24 (.16)	-.01 (.18)	-.31 (.16)			
Some college	.64 (.10)	.64 (.09)	.48 (.10)	.57 (.09)	.44 (.09)	.42 (.08)			
Homeowner	.24 (.10)	.23 (.09)	.36 (.10)	.12 (.09)	.04 (.09)	.18 (.08)			
Head unemployed	-.03 (.11)	-.11 (.12)	-.05 (.14)	.04 (.12)	-.07 (.13)	-.15 (.11)			
Single mother	-.02 (.16)	-.27 (.14)	-.36 (.16)	.00 (.13)	.09 (.14)	.02 (.12)			
Male	-.01 (.10)	-.05 (.09)	.27 (.10)	.27 (.09)	.09 (.09)	-.03 (.08)			
Pct. life not in U.S.	-.006 (.003)	-.006 (.003)	.003 (.003)	-.007 (.003)	-.005 (.003)	-.003 (.003)			
Non-English lang.	-.14 (.13)	-.22 (.12)	-.11 (.14)	-.25 (.12)	-.10 (.13)	-.34 (.12)			
Ethnic problem	.10 (.10)	.08 (.09)	.21 (.10)	.41 (.09)	.22 (.09)	.16 (.08)			
Non-ethnic identity	.37 (.17)	.08 (.14)	.23 (.13)	.34 (.12)	.19 (.13)	.19 (.12)			
Constant	-.76 (.21)	-.22 (.19)	-2.42 (.22)	-1.47 (.18)	-1.13 (.19)	-.97 (.17)			
Log likelihood									
Initial	-830	-830	-826	-830	-831	-829			
At convergence	-475	-567	-521	-672	-589	-728			
N	1197	1198	1191	1197	1199	1196			
Percent participating	81	73	19	32	21	37			

**Table A.3** Probit Estimations of Participation Used in Projections (Citizens Only)

Table A.3 Probit Estimations of Participation Used in Projections (Citizens Only)							
Independent Variables	Registered in 1984	Voted in 1984	Contributed Money	Worked in Groups	Contacted Media	Contacted Officials	
Latino	-.18*	-.17	.02	-.09	.03	-.30	
Black	(.14)**	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)	(.11)	
Asian-American	.04	.01	-.16	.02	-.18	-.40	
Age	(.16)	(.14)	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)	(.11)	
65 or older	-.27	-.19	.07	.06	.12	-.36	
Some college	(.17)	(.15)	(.15)	(.14)	(.15)	(.14)	
Homeowner	.030	.039	.019	.009	-.003	.013	
Head unemployed	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	
Single mother	.64	.63	.47	.56	.44	.40	
Male	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)	(.08)	
Pct. life not in U.S.	.05	-.06	-.04	.03	-.08	-.13	
Non-English lang.	(.13)	(.12)	(.14)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)	
Ethnic problem	.08	.07	.20	.40	.22	.16	
Non-ethnic identity	.42	.11	.25	.33	.19	.20	
Strong partisan	.85	.69	.26	-.09	.01	.30	
Weak partisan	.44	.34	-.07	-.20	-.29	.01	
Constant	-.98	-1.44	-2.47	-1.38	-1.02	-1.02	
Log likelihood	(.22)	(.204)	(.22)	(.19)	(.19)	(.18)	
Initial Convergence	-830	-826	-830	-831	-588	-829	
N	1197	1198	1191	1197	1199	1196	
Percent participating	81	73	19	31	21	37	

\* Probit coefficient  
\*\* Standard error of coefficient

\*\* Standard error of coefficient

#### APPENDIX B: SAMPLE DESIGN

The major problem we faced in designing the survey was that of efficiently reaching large numbers of adult individuals from the three major racial and ethnic minorities in California—Latinos (primarily Mexican Americans), blacks, and Asians, who, according to the 1980 Census, constituted 19%, 8%, and 5% of the state population respectively. Because of the younger age structure of the groups, black and Latino percentages of adults are somewhat smaller than their percentages of the total population.

Given a large enough budget, say several hundred thousand dollars, we would probably have preferred a Michigan style areal sampling framework with a field staff going door-to-door to interview respondents in their own homes. Most comparisons between in-person interviews and telephone interviews indicate that the former technique entails a lower refusal rate and less bias in the resultant sample of completed interviews. However, one worries how well in-person interviews would work in neighborhoods with large proportions of recent Asian or Latino arrivals, as undocumented residents might be extremely suspicious of interviewers coming to their doors. Telephone interviews seem less obtrusive, and possibly preferable for that reason. The main reason we chose to do telephone interviews, however, was cost, as budget constraints ruled out the expense of in-person interviews. With telephone interviewing the most common sample selection technique is random digit dialing. RDD is not without problems. In many areas there still exists some bias resulting from the not-quite-complete saturation of telephone ownership. And, although we have seen no reference to this problem in the literature on polling, we suspect that an increasingly important source of bias here is the growing use of telephone answering machines to

screen incoming phone calls. More serious, of course, is the unavoidable selection bias in any opinion survey resulting from the fact that participation is voluntary. The potential for biases resulting from the differential incidence of telephone ownership and differential refusal rates is likely to be more serious in surveys in which minority group members constitute a large portion of the target population. Whatever the case, the virtues of sampling via random digit dialing have made it the standard choice in telephone surveys.

In large part because of its sampling virtues, however, RDD is an extremely inefficient method for contacting members of minority groups, at least in California. Ideally one could draw a sample of telephone exchanges via probability weights which would yield the desired minority group proportions. In fact, if one were interested only in oversampling blacks, this technique would suffice. For Latinos and for Asians, however, the high level of residential segregation and resultant strong correlation between telephone exchange areas and census units (the necessary demographic data are not available for telephone exchanges) which is needed for this technique to be effective simply do not exist. This problem is bad enough for contacting Latinos. Asians, however, are an extreme case in this regard. Of the 5050 census tracts in California in the 1980 Census, only 33 (0.6%) were 40% or more Asian. Even if telephone exchanges could be weighted in a skewed enough fashion to increase significantly the probability of contacting Asian respondents (something of which we are not altogether sure) the resultant sample of Asians interviewed would be problematic. Most blacks live in neighborhoods which are predominately black. The vast majority of Asians, however, do not live in

predominately Asian neighborhoods, and so a sample based primarily on those who do would likely be quite unrepresentative.

Given these problems, we decided that the least problematic way of generating the Latino and Asian subsamples would be on the basis of surnames. Oversampling of blacks, on the other hand, could be done on the basis of residence. We therefore began by randomly selecting a list of 300 census tracts in California. DialAmerica Corporation of Cleveland, Ohio provided us with the names, current phone numbers, and addresses of 80-100 individuals per tract for approximately 90% of the tracts, thus yielding a list of 24,523 names. We ran these through Hispanic and Asian surname dictionaries, yielding subsample Ns of 3306 and 1170, respectively. We then drew a 20% sample of the remaining 20,047 names, weighting the census tracts corresponding to each name so as to generate another subsample which would contain roughly equal proportions of whites and blacks. (We doubled the selection probability for tracts in which 50% or more of the residents are black.) Because of this sampling procedure, we use weights on the white and black subsamples when calculating marginal percentages. (The weights give double weight to respondents residing outside the heavily black tracts but are adjusted to keep the total subsample unchanged.)

As indicated earlier, one of our chief interests was to compare the experiences and attitudes of Asians who had recently immigrated to this country with those of recently arrived Latinos. In order to increase our sample of recent Asian immigrants, we drew a supplemental sample of Korean surnames from the 1984 Korean Telephone Directory of Southern California. The creators of this directory believe that it contains the telephone numbers and addresses of over 75% of all Koreans in Southern California. We ultimately conducted interviews with 80 Korean Americans via this supplemental sample.

According to Leuthold and Scheele (1971), samples which are derived from telephone directories will, relative to RDD, undersample blacks, individuals who are separated or divorced, and city dwellers. Although the percentage of individuals in our base sample of 25,523 who were Asian--4.8%--was almost identical to the 1980 Census figures, the number of Latino names drawn was definitely less than that in the background population--13.5%, compared to 19% in the 1980 sample. The fact that we ultimately interviewed about 25% more whites than blacks also suggests that there were fewer blacks in the base sample than there should have been.

By itself, of course, the only problem caused by this undersampling is that our subsample Ns were not as large as we might have desired. A far greater potential problem is that the individuals we interviewed, regardless of whether they were white, black, Asian, or Latino, all had listed telephone numbers and addresses. This could make them somewhat unrepresentative sets of people (less likely to be poor, more likely to be legal residents).

As we have intimated, however, we were more worried about refusal rates than many other potential sources of bias. Given the large number of minority group members in our target population, we expected relatively high refusal rates. This in fact turned out to be the case--only 44% of the individuals we contacted who were eligible to be interviewed agreed to do so. Although we cannot be sure about the characteristics of the people who refused to be interviewed, it appears that refusal rates were particularly high among Asians and those who were likely to be black. As far as we could tell, however, refusal rates were no higher among Latinos than among whites.

Given the potential problems we faced, we were understandably interested in how well the characteristics of the people we interviewed matched up with data from the 1980 Census. The figures reported in Table 1 indicate that in

some respects the individuals in our four subsamples were quite representative, while in other respects they were somewhat unrepresentative.

In all four subsamples the reported figures for family income and country of birth were quite consistent with figures derived from the 1980 Census. There are, however, some discrepancies. The percentages of blacks and Latinos in our sample who reported being homeowners were higher than the Census figures. We also tended to oversample Asian men and black women. Reported education, though, was the source of the largest discrepancies. Individuals in all four subsamples were considerably more likely to report having attended college than the 1980 Census figures indicate should be the case. However, we are inclined to blame very little of the education bias we observed on our use of a telephone directory sample versus RDD. Warren Miller indicates that the sample of individuals interviewed in the 1984 Michigan Rolling Cross-section (which was a telephone survey) had a considerably higher average education than those interviewed in person in the traditional post-election survey.

Because participation in opinion surveys is voluntary (at least in liberal democratic societies) we believe that regardless of the sampling framework employed there is an irreducible element of self-selection bias generated by the differential propensity of different types of people to submit to the interview. In political polls this self-selection bias is quite naturally related to the extent to which the potential respondent is intellectually involved with things political--people are more likely to talk to strangers about subjects they care about and know something about than about subjects they don't know about or care about. This bias will yield us samples which are, compared to the population at large, more educated, more literate, more interested, and more knowledgeable about ongoing political

issues. Any incidental bias deriving from telephone directory versus RDD sampling was at least for us, apparently minimal.

TABLE B.1

## COMPARISON OF SAMPLE AND CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS

	White	Black	Latino	Asian
<b>Percent Male</b>				
Sample 1984	49%	38%	49%	60%
Census 1980	49	49	51	48
<b>Percent Owner Occupiers</b>				
Sample 1984	66	64	52	64
Census 1980	62	45	44	62
<b>Family Income &lt; 10K</b>				
Sample 1984	12	25	21	9
Census 1980	16	34	27	14
<b>Family Income 10-25K</b>				
Sample 1984	44	41	47	35
Census 1980	40	40	48	37
<b>Family Income over 25K</b>				
Sample 1984	44	33	32	56
Census 1980	44	26	25	49
<b>Percent Native Born</b>				
Sample 1984	94	98	60	38
Census 1980	90	98	63	42
<b>Percent Some College or Greater</b>				
Sample 1984	60	53	34	77
Census 1980	44	36	20	54

Table 1. Percent Participating in Political Activities (by Ethnic Group)

	Non-Hispanic Whites	Blacks	Latinos	Asian- Americans
<b>Voted in 1984</b>				
All	76	80	44	48
Citizens	80	81	60	69
<b>Registered</b>				
All	82	87	53	55
Citizens	87	88	72	77
<b>Contributed money</b>				
All	20	17	12	18
Citizens	-	-	15	24
Non-citizens	-	-	6	4
<b>Displayed poster/sticker</b>				
All	8	10	10	6
Citizens	-	-	11	4
Non-citizens	-	-	9	6
<b>Worked on campaigns</b>				
All	6	5	3	3
Citizens	-	-	4	4
Non-citizens	-	-	1	2
<b>Attended political rally</b>				
All	15	16	9	8
Citizens	-	-	12	11
Non-citizens	-	-	3	4
<b>Contacted officials</b>				
All	47	37	25	26
Citizens	-	-	29	31
Non-citizens	-	-	18	20
<b>Contacted media</b>				
All	22	20	18	25
Citizens	-	-	20	25
Non-citizens	-	-	11	23
<b>Worked with group to solve community problem</b>				
All	33	38	19	24
Citizens	-	-	24	32
Non-citizens	-	-	11	11
<b>Number of respondents</b>				
All	317	335	574	308
Citizens	300	313	387	199
Non-citizens	14	4	159	84

Table 2 Probit Estimations of Participation on Ethnicity (Citizens Only)

Independent Variables	Registered in 1984	Voted in 1984	Contributed Money	Worked in Groups	Contacted Media	Contacted Officials
Latino	-.56*	-.59	-.26	-.32	-.07	-.57
	(.11)**	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)
Black	.11	.06	-.12	.12	-.09	-.27
	(.13)	(.12)	(.12)	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)
Asian-American	-.41	-.35	.08	-.07	.09	-.51
	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)
Constant	1.14	.85	-.78	-.41	-.77	.01
	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.07)
Log likelihood	-830	-830	-826	-830	-831	-829
Initial	-556	-678	-576	-736	-617	-771
At convergence	1197	1198	1191	1197	1199	1196
N	81	73	19	32	21	37
Percent participating						

\* Probit coefficient

\*\* Standard error of coefficient

Table 3 Distribution of Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables by Ethnicity (Citizens Only)\*

	Non-Hispanic Whites	Blacks	Latinos	Asian-Americans
Mean age (years)	45	44	35	38
65 or older	20	17	6	7
Some college	58	57	40	77
Homeowner	64	61	58	74
Head unemployed	12	17	17	7
Single mother	11	25	12	4
Male	48	38	46	59
Non-English lang.	7	2	42	37
Foreign born	4	1	15	47
N	300	313	387	199

\* All numbers are percentages except where indicated.

Table 4 Distribution of Group References by Ethnicity

	Non-Hispanic Whites	Blacks	Latinos	Asian- Americans
Percent naming a racial, ethnic, or nationality problem				
Citizens	25	67	46	32
Non-citizens	16	-*	50	45
Percent naming a second, non-ethnic identity				
Citizens	17	14	8	9
Non-citizens	24	-*	5	5
Percent with a non-english primary language				
Citizens	7	2	42	37
Non-citizens	52	-*	88	86

\* insufficient cases

Table 5 Probit Estimations of Citizens' Participation

	Independent Variables	Registered in 1984	Voted in 1984	Contributed Money	Worked in Groups	Contacted Media	Contacted Officials
Latino	-13* (.14)**	-13 (.13)	.02 (.13)	-10 (.12)	.02 (.12)	-.30 (.11)	
Black	.15 (.15)	.12 (.14)	-.10 (.13)	.02 (.12)	-.15 (.13)	-.33 (.11)	
Asian	-.30 (.16)	-.22 (.15)	.04 (.15)	.05 (.14)	.11 (.14)	-.38 (.14)	
Age	.03 (.004)	.04 (.004)	.02 (.004)	.01 (.003)	.01 (.003)	.01 (.003)	.01 (.003)
65 or older	-.44 (.23)	-.72 (.21)	-.23 (.17)	-.25 (.16)	-.25 (.18)	-.30 (.16)	
Some college	.64 (.10)	.64 (.09)	.47 (.10)	.56 (.09)	.44 (.09)	.41 (.08)	
Homeowner	.26 (.09)	.24 (.09)	.35 (.10)	.11 (.09)	.03 (.09)	.17 (.08)	
Head unemployed	-.03 (.13)	-.11 (.12)	-.04 (.14)	.05 (.12)	-.06 (.13)	-.14 (.12)	
Single mother	-.03 (.16)	-.27 (.14)	-.35 (.16)	.01 (.13)	.09 (.14)	.02 (.12)	
Male	-.02 (.10)	-.05 (.09)	.28 (.10)	.27 (.09)	.10 (.09)	-.02 (.08)	
Pct. life not in U.S.	-.005 (.003)	-.005 (.003)	.002 (.003)	-.006 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	
Non-English lang.	-.11 (.13)	-.20 (.12)	-.12 (.14)	-.26 (.12)	-.11 (.13)	-.35 (.12)	
Ethnic problem	.12 (.10)	.09 (.09)	.20 (.10)	.40 (.09)	.22 (.09)	.16 (.08)	
Non-ethnic identity	.37 (.17)	.08 (.14)	.23 (.13)	.34 (.12)	.19 (.13)	.19 (.12)	
Constant	-.70 (.21)	-1.20 (.19)	-2.44 (.22)	-1.47 (.18)	-1.13 (.19)	-.98 (.17)	
Log likelihood							
Initial	-830	-830	-826	-830	-831	-829	
At convergence	-478	-569	-522	-673	-593	-729	
N	1197	1198	1191	1197	1199	1196	
Percent participating	81	73	19	31	21	37	

\* Probit coefficient

\*\* Standard error of coefficient

Table 6 Probit Estimates of Non-Citizens' Participation

Independent Variables	Worked in Groups	Contracted Groups	Contracted Officials	Scenario I	Scenario II	Scenario III	Scenario IV	Scenario V
Age	-0.006*	-0.015	-0.015	Races	I.	II.	III.	IV.
Some College	1.19	1.18	0.04	Register Non-Hispanic Whites	87	-	90	-
Head Unemployed	-4.9	-2.7	-1.19	Blacks	88	88	-	88
Male	1.12	1.14	1.16	Latinos	72	81	78	86
Pct. Ille in U.S.	.008	.009	.005	Asian-Americans	77	85	84	-
Non-English Lang.	1.12	-.60	-.21	Vote Non-Hispanic Whites	80	-	84	-
Ethnic problem	.78	.19	.33	Blacks	81	82	-	-
Linked to country of origin	1.19	-.58	-.29	Latinos	60	74	66	65
Constant	-2.16	-.10	-.44	Asian-Americans	69	77	76	-
Log likelihood	-180	-180	-179	Contract Officials Non-Hispanic Whites	47	-	-	-
At convergence	259	259	258	Blacks	37	37	38	-
N	259	259	258	Latinos	29	37	32	40
Percent participating	11	15	18	African-Americans	31	40	34	-
* Standard error of coefficient				Work in Groups Non-Hispanic Whites	33	-	-	-
** Standard error of coefficient				Blacks	38	-	-	-
				Latinos	24	30	-	28
				African-Americans	24	32	42	-
				Latinos	-	-	-	34
				Asian-Americans	-	-	-	-
				V.				

Table 7 Projected Participation Rates of Citizens under Various Scenarios

Independent Variables	Worked in Groups	Contracted Groups	Contracted Officials	Scenario I	Scenario II	Scenario III	Scenario IV	Scenario V
Age	-0.006*	-0.015	-0.015	Races	I.	II.	III.	IV.
Some College	1.19	1.18	0.04	Register Non-Hispanic Whites	87	-	90	-
Head Unemployed	-4.9	-2.7	-1.19	Blacks	88	88	-	88
Male	1.12	1.14	1.16	Latinos	72	81	78	86
Pct. Ille in U.S.	.008	.009	.005	Asian-Americans	77	85	84	-
Non-English Lang.	1.12	-.60	-.21	Vote Non-Hispanic Whites	80	-	84	-
Ethnic problem	.78	.19	.33	Blacks	81	82	-	-
Linked to country of origin	1.19	-.58	-.29	Latinos	60	74	66	65
Constant	-2.16	-.10	-.44	Asian-Americans	69	77	76	-
Log likelihood	-180	-180	-179	Contract Officials Non-Hispanic Whites	47	-	-	-
At convergence	259	259	258	Blacks	37	37	38	-
N	259	259	258	Latinos	29	37	32	40
Percent participating	11	15	18	African-Americans	31	40	34	-
* Probit coefficient				Work in Groups Non-Hispanic Whites	33	-	-	-
** Standard error of coefficient				Blacks	38	-	-	-
				Latinos	24	30	-	28
				African-Americans	24	32	42	-
				V.				

I. Americanization (Aging, Language)  
 II. Party Recruitment  
 III. Socio-Economic Mobility  
 IV. Americanization and Party Recruitment  
 V. Americanization and Socio-Economic Mobility

NOTES

4. For discussions of the definition of political participation, see Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 2 and Geraint Parry, 1972, pp. 18-31.
5. The high reported black turnout reflects the abnormally high education and income levels of our black sample. Sample and census characteristics for the other groups match better. (See Appendix B, Table B.1.) In addition, some evidence indicates that blacks tend to over-report their voting (Abramson and Claggett, 1984, 1986).
6. We made no attempt to determine which of our respondents were undocumented alien residents; such a question would quickly have terminated interview. We presume that our sample tends toward legal, documented aliens, as they are more likely to have listed telephone numbers and to be willing to give an interview.
7. Unfortunately, we did not establish which media. Other aspects of our analysis suggest that these people are probably expressing opinions in the ethnic press, which is well-developed in certain Asian-American communities.
8. Other theorists focus upon the structural factors which facilitate or impede participation. In rational actor terms, these factors are components of the cost term. Burnham (1970, pp. 71-90) points to the introduction of registration, literacy requirements, and nonpartisan ballots to account for long-term changes in turnout. Wolfgang and Rosenstone (1980, pp. 61-89) have carefully analyzed the contemporary effect of different states' registration requirements upon levels of voting. These effects are clearly important, but provide little leverage here, as we deal with only one time point within one state.
9. The one major variable suggested by the rational actor tradition, which we omit is perceived closeness of an election outcome. Despite its theoretical plausibility, "closeness" has performed only weakly in empirical analyses. See Foster (1984) for a review of the studies and Grofman (1983)
- This paper was prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, San Francisco, California, July 4-7, 1987. The project was funded by a grant from the Seaver Institute. We thank Amita Shastri and Chris Gallant for their assistance in the research. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Anaheim, California.
- We would like to thank the discussants and also the participants in the Southern California Political Behavior Seminar and the Harvard American Politics Seminar for their comments.
1. In another paper we take up the question of similarities and differences in issue preferences.
2. In the 1980 National Election Study, 147 black respondents but only 48 Latinos reached the turnout questions in the interview; in 1984 the numbers were higher but too low still for detailed analysis (115 Latinos and 222 blacks). Oversampling has been used at times to increase the number of black respondents, although rarely for the other groups. Analyses based upon Census data, like Wolfgang and Rosenstone (1980), have sufficient numbers of respondents but a very limited set of political variables. Studies which target particular communities can by appropriate selection of sites capture large numbers of minority respondents (Brownning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) is one of the best such studies); the admirable depth gained in such studies comes at some cost in generalizability.
3. One consequence of the design is that the sample is not representative of the state population, per se. Thus, frequencies can only be interpreted within each of the four sampled groups.

and Uhlaner and Grofman (1986) for a discussion of the difficulties in using measures of closeness.

10. Other theorists have managed to produce a prediction of activity; Ledyard (1981, 1984) uses a general equilibrium approach, while Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974, 1975) posit minimax-regret rationality. Ledyard's solution breaks down in large electorates. Minimax-regret has not been embraced by other theorists as the solution.
11. The following argument has been developed in considerably more detail elsewhere by one of the authors (Uhlaner, 1980, 1986a, 1986b).
12. This argument rests upon the existence of group affiliations, and depends, in the argument about normative benefits, upon people caring about maintaining their group affiliation. These issues are addressed, and "relational goods" proposed as part of a solution, in Uhlaner, 1986b.
13. Our approach differs from that of the NES. The 1984 studies asked: "Sometimes people think about other groups of people in society when they think about their own economic well-being, people who are being helped or hurt by economic conditions. When it comes to economic matters, what groups of people do you feel closest to? (IF R DOESN'T KNOW WHAT WE MEAN BY "GROUPS": Some people have mentioned farmers, the elderly, teachers, blacks, and union members.)" The pre/post study also repeated the by-now standard group identification items: "Here is a list of groups. Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularly close to — people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things" followed by: "Look at the list again. Of the groups you just mentioned, which one do you feel closest to?" The new item asks about identification with respect to the economic sphere, which may or may not be the one most salient to respondents. Thirty percent of respondents reply "poor," "middle class," or "working class." The old item focuses on

subjective similarity and has consistently yielded significant numbers of men identifying with women, whites with blacks, young with elderly, and so forth. Our item has a more specifically political referent than the old NES item, but a broader one (not restricted to economics) than the new one. We also used various other items in some of the estimations, such as perception of one's group as relatively disadvantaged or as discriminated against; results were not substantially different.

14. To take another example, census enumeration can strengthen ethnic and racial identity. Latino leaders lobbied very hard for a special category designated "Hispanics" in the 1980 census so that Latinos would get their "fair" share of federal program allocations and district boundaries that more fairly reflected their potential political strength.
15. For education, we did a number of estimations using years of schooling, but found that most of the play came from the split between those who had no college education and those who had at least some. We thus use a dummy variable coded 1 for those who have at least some college education; one advantage of using such a dummy is that we need not assume a linear effect from years of schooling.
16. We ran some estimations separately for each ethnic group, thereby permitting coefficients to vary between the groups. The most interesting findings from these estimations concern gender; for most activities, black women are more active than black men, while Latino and Asian men are more active than women of the same ethnicity. These gender effects are reassuringly consistent with our other information on the culture of the groups in question. One other finding has no obvious explanation; education, measured as years in school, had negligible effects upon Asian participation rates.

17. That is, we see the negative age coefficient as supporting Converse's (1969) argument about increased resistance to learning as people age. Black, Niemi, and Powell (forthcoming), however, get contradictory results with a sample of Toronto immigrants.

18. For example, currently thirty percent fewer Asians than blacks identify strongly with a political party. The probit coefficient on strong partisanship in the estimation of registration is .85. If strong partisanship among Asians increases by .30, .26 (.85 x .30) will be added to the estimated probit value. As 77 percent of Asian citizens are currently registered, the group begins .74 of a standard deviation above the normal distribution mean. Moving from .74 to 1.00 corresponds to an increase of .07 in area under the curve, or an increase of 7 percent in persons registered. Thus, we would project that if as many Asians become strong partisans as is currently the case among blacks, then Asian registration rates would increase from 77 percent to 84 percent.

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A Comparative Study of Ethnic Minorities in CA

QUESTIONNAIRE: CALTECH ETHNICITY STUDY #51-2562

Hello, is this [ ]? My name is (FULL NAME),  
and I'm with the California Institute of Technology. We  
are conducting a study on how people feel about a number  
of current events, and for scientific purposes it is  
important for me to talk to someone at this number who is  
at least 18 years old.

Of those persons who are over 18, I am supposed to talk to  
the person whose birthday will be next to come up. Would  
that be you?

INTERVIEWER HIT RETURN FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

VAR: [801]

FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS:

IF RESPONDENT IS ONLY PERSON IN HOUSEHOLD (REMEMBER 18+ AGED).

INTERVIEW RESPONDENT.

IF RESPONDENT'S BIRTHDAY IS NEXT, INTERVIEW RESPONDENT.

IF ADULT WHOSE BIRTHDAY IS NEXT IS NOT RESPONDENT, ASK TO  
SPEAK TO THAT PERSON, IF THEY ARE UNAVAILABLE SCHEDULE

CONVENIENT CALLBACK TIME.

IF THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED WON'T TALK NOW, BUT WILL  
TALK AT A MORE CONVENIENT TIME, ALSO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO  
CALL BACK LATER.

IF REACH RESPONDENT AT THIS NUMBER HIT RETURN AND CONTINUE.  
IF CALLBACK IS NECESSARY

VAR: [801]

CONTINUE INTERVIEW:

Because of the scientific nature of this poll your  
opinions are very important to us.

The interview will take about 15 minutes. Your answers  
will be kept completely confidential, so please feel free  
to express whatever opinion you may have.

(\*\*\*\*\* HIT RETURN TO CONTINUE WITH Q.1 \*\*\*\*\*)

VAR: [801]

Q.1 In talking to people about elections, we often find  
that many people are not able to vote because they

were ill, they weren't registered, or they just didn't have time. How about you -- did you vote in the election this November?

807 1 1 YES

807 2 2 NO

807 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

81 (IF NO IN Q.1)

82a Were you registered to vote?

82 B08 1 1 REGISTERED

83 B08 2 2 NOT REGISTERED

84 B08 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

85

86 (IF YES IN Q.1 OR YES IN Q.2a)

87 ✓ 8.2b Are you registered as a Democrat, a Republican, under some other party, or as an Independent?

88 B09 1 1 DEMOCRAT

89 B09 2 2 REPUBLICAN

90 B09 3 3 INDEPENDENT

91 B09 4 4 OTHER

92 B09 5 5 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

93

94 Q. What is the name of the other party you are registered with?

95 \*\* ENTER PARTY NAME. YOU HAVE BEEN ALLOTTED 20 SPACES. \*\*

96 MFL 05/1/201

97

98

99 Q. During the past year did you contribute money to a party, candidate, or some other political organization?

100 B11 1 1 YES

101 B11 2 2 NO

102 B11 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

103

104

105

106 Q. 5. During the past year did you put a political bumper sticker on your car or a campaign sign on your lawn?

107 B12 1 1 YES

108 B12 2 2 NO

109 B12 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

110

111

Q 6 During the past year did you do any work either for  
pay or on a volunteer basis for a party or candidate's  
campaign office?

B13 1 1 YES

B13 2 2 NO

B13 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q 7 During the past year did you attend a political rally  
for a party or candidate, or a meeting or fund-raiser?

B14 1 1 YES

B14 2 2 NO

B14 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q.8a Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself  
as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or  
something else?

B15 1 1 REPUBLICAN

B15 2 2 DEMOCRAT

B15 3 3 INDEPENDENT

B15 4 4 OTHER

B15 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q Please specify the other way you classify yourself.

\*\*\* ENTER OTHER. YOU HAVE BEEN ALLOTTED UPTO 20 COLUMNS. \*\*\*

VAR: [5/21.20]

IF REPUBLICAN IN Q.8a)

Q.8b Would you consider yourself a strong  
Republican or a not very strong Republican?

B16 1 1 STRONG

B16 2 2 NOT STRONG

B16 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

IF DEMOCRAT IN Q.8a)

Q.8c Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or  
a not very strong Democrat?

B17 1 1 STRONG

B17 2 2 NOT STRONG

B17 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

1 IF INDEPENDENT IN Q.8a)

Q.8d Would you say you lean more toward the Republicans  
or more toward the Democrats?

1 B18 1 1 LEAN REPUBLICAN

2 B18 2 2 LEAN DEMOCRAT

3 B18 3 3 NO LEAN

4 B18 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12 Q.9 Many people often contact their congressman or other  
13 elected officials -- either by letter or phone or in  
14 person -- to register complaints or express their  
15 opinions. How about you? Would you say that contacting  
16 an elected official is something that you frequently  
17 do, seldom do, or never do?

17 B19 1 1 FREQUENTLY

18 B19 2 2 SELDOM

19 B19 3 3 NEVER

20 B19 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

21

22 Q.10. How about writing letters to the editor of a newspaper  
23 or magazine? Is this something you do frequently,  
24 or seldom, or never?

25 B20 1 1 FREQUENTLY

26 B20 2 2 SELDOM

27 B20 3 3 NEVER

28 B20 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

29  
30  
31  
32 Q.11. Have you ever joined or worked in an organization to  
33 do something about a problem in your community, or a  
34 state or national level problem?

35 B21 1 1 YES

36 B21 2 2 NO

37 B21 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

38

39 Q.12 (IF YES IN Q.11)

40 Q.12 The last time you did this, what was the particular  
41 problem you were concerned about?

42 BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE ONE PROBLEM IN THE

43 40 COLUMNS OF FREE SPACE.

44 VAR1 15/41.463

ANSWER REQUIRED IN Q.12, HIT RETURN TO CONTINUE.

3 VAR: [801]

8 ✓ Q.14a Now we'd like to ask you a few questions about  
9 yourself for statistical purposes. First, what is  
10 your religious background: Roman Catholic, Jewish,  
11 Protestant, or something else?

13 B32 1 1 CATHOLIC

14 B32 2 2 JEWISH

15 B32 3 3 PROTESTANT

16 B32 4 4 OTHER

17 B32 5 5 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

18 B32 6 6 NONE

19

20

21 1

22

23 \*\*\* ENTER OTHER RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND

24 YOU HAVE UPTO 20 SPACES TO RECORD \*\*\*

26 VAR: [6/1.20]

28

29

30 JUST PROTESTANT IN Q.14a?

31 ✓ Q.14b What church or denomination is that, or is it  
32 just Protestant in general?

34 \*\* ENTER APPROPRIATE 2-DIGIT CODE AS FOLLOWS \*\*

35 \*\*\* HIT RETURN TO ACCESS LIST \*\*\*\*\*

37 VAR: [801]

38

39

42 34 BYTERIAN , 09 PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLY OF GOD

43 35 10 AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL (AME)

44 11 CONGREGATIONAL 11 CHURCH OF CHRIST

45 12 SCOPALIAN 12 SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST

46 13 METHODIST 13 MORMON, LATTER DAY SAINTS (LDS)

47 14 BAPTIST 14 UNITARIAN

48 15 SOUTHERN BAPTIST 15 JEHOVAH'S WITNESS

49 16 CHURCH OF GOD 16 OTHER

50 77 JUST PROTESTANT IN GENERAL

51 98 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

54 \*\* ENTER IN 2-DIGIT CODE \*\*

55 NUM: [2/34.2]

56 NUMBER MUST BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 16.00 OR EQUAL 77.00

57 VALID ALPHA CODES ARE + - .

~~ENTER IN OTHER PROTESTANT DENOMINATION~~

TEXT POINTER STORED IN [2/36]

8 Q15 What is the highest grade of school or year of  
9 college you have completed? (READ LIST)

- 10 B37 1 1 0-8 Years  
11 B37 2 2 Some High School  
12 B37 3 3 High School Grad  
13 B37 4 4 Some College  
14 B37 5 5 Some Training of Trade School After High School  
15 B37 6 6 Completed College  
16 B37 7 7 Graduate Work (INCL PHD)  
17 B37 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED (DO NOT READ)

18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23 Q16 As for your marital status, are you single, married,  
24 ~~divorced, widowed, or something else?~~ (DO NOT READ LIST)

- 25 B38 1 1 SINGLE  
26 B38 2 2 MARRIED  
27 B38 3 3 DIVORCED  
28 B38 4 4 WIDOWED  
29 B38 5 5 LIVING TOGETHER  
30 B38 6 6 OTHER  
31 B38 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37 Q17a Do you have any children?

- 38 B39 1 1 YES  
39 B39 2 2 NO  
40 B39 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46 Q17b How many children?

47  
48 \*\* ENTER ACTUAL NUMBER.  
49 IF REFUSED/DK, HIT CARRIAGE RETURN \*\*

- 50 B40 1 1 CHILD  
51 B40 2 2 CHILDREN  
52 B40 3 3 CHILDREN  
53 B40 4 4 CHILDREN  
54 B40 5 5 CHILDREN  
55 B40 6 6 OR MORE CHILDREN  
56 B40 8 8 REFUSED/NO ANSWER

(IF YES IN Q.17a)

Q.17a How many children currently enrolled in elementary,

high or night schools? \*

ENTER ACTUAL NUMBER

IF REFUSED/DK., HIT CARRIAGE RETURN. \*\*

6 B41 0 NO CHILDREN OF SCHOOL AGE

7 B41 1 1 CHILD

8 B41 2 2 CHILDREN

9 B41 3 3 CHILDREN

10 B41 4 4 CHILDREN

11 B41 5 5 CHILDREN

12 B41 6 6 OR MORE CHILDREN

13 B41 9 REFUSED/NO ANSWER

17 CHILDREN IN SCHOOL > TOTAL CHILDREN IN FAMILY

HIT RETURN AND YOU WILL BE RESET TO RE-ASK

19 THOSE TWO QUESTIONS.

\*\* HIT RETURN TO CONTINUE

22 VAR: [80]

26 (IF CHILDREN IN SCHOOL).

Q.17d Do you expect that your children will go to college,

or do you think they probably will not?

31 B42 1 1 WILL GO

32 B42 2 2 SOME WILL, SOME WON'T

33 B42 3 3 WON'T GO

34 B42 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

39 Q.19a These days many families rely upon more than

one source of income. Who would you say is the

most important source of income for your household?

Is it you, or someone else?

44 ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING 2-DIGIT CODES

46 01 RESPONDENT

47 02 SOMEONE ELSE

48 03 BOTH RESPONDENT AND SOMEONE ELSE

49 04 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

50 05 LD1 [2243.23]

52 (IF SOMEONE ELSE IN Q.19a)

Q.19b Who is that?

ENTER UPTO 40 CHARACTERS (1 WORD ANSWER). ACTUAL RESPONSE.

PROBE FOR RELATIONSHIP TO RESPONDENT, NOT NAME.

56 VAR: [6/21.20]

1 IF RESPONDENT IN Q.19a)

2 Now we need to know about your employment situation.  
3 Are you working now, unemployed, or temporarily laid  
4 off, a housewife, a student, retired, or something else?

5  
6 NOTE: WORKING STATUS TAKES PRIORITY OVER OTHER  
7 I.E. STUDENT OR HOUSEWIFE WORKING PART-TIME  
8 WOULD BE CONSIDERED WORKING.

9 B50 1 1 WORKING

10 B50 2 2 UNEMPLOYED/LAID OFF

11 B50 3 3 HOUSEWIFE

12 B50 4 4 STUDENT

13 B50 5 5 RETIRED

14 B50 6 6 OTHER

15 B50 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

16 (IF WORKING IN Q.19c)

17 Q.19d What sort of work do you do?

18 NOTE: WE WANT THEIR OCCUPATION, NOT EMPLOYER.

19 CATEGORIZE TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY AND  
20 IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE  
21 CATEGORY, ENTER 0 FOR OTHER AND YOU WILL  
22 PROMPTED TO SPECIFY.

23 B51 1 1 PROFESSIONAL/TECHNICAL - I.E. DOCTORS, LAWYERS, TEACHERS

24 B51 2 2 MANAGERS - I.E. BANK OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATORS, SELF-EMPLOYED

25 B51 3 3 SALES - I.E. REAL ESTATE OR INSURANCE AGENTS, SALES WORKERS

26 B51 4 4 CLERICAL - I.E. BANK TELLERS, SECRETARIES, MAIL PEOPLE

27 B51 5 5 CRAFTSMEN - I.E. BAKERS, MECHANICS, PLUMBERS

28 B51 6 6 OPERATIVES - I.E. ASSEMBLERS, BUS OR TRUCK DRIVERS

29 B51 7 7 SERVICE WORKER - I.E. CHILD CARE, BARBER, POLICE

30 B51 8 8 LABORER -CONSTRUCTION HELPERS, GARDENERS

31 B51 9 9 OTHER - CAN'T CATEGORIZE

32 B51 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

33 Q ENTER IN ACTUAL OCCUPATION

34 TEXT POINTER STORED IN 12/521

35 (IF WORKING IN Q.19c)

36 Q.19e Have you been laid off or unemployed during the  
37 past 12 months?

38 B53 1 1 YES

39 B53 2 2 NO

40 B53 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

41 (IF RESPONDENT IN Q.19a)

42 Q.19f Are you a member of a labor union or teachers' association? (NOTE: ONLY ONE AFFILIATION ACCEPTABLE)

574 1 1 UNION  
574 2 2 TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION  
574 3 3 NEITHER AFFILIATION  
574 8 9 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

58 (IF SOMEONE ELSE IN Q.19a)

Q.19g Now we need to know about your (FROM Q.19b)'s employment situation.

Are they working now, unemployed, or temporarily laid off, a housewife, a student, retired, or something else?

59 NOTE: WORKING STATUS TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER OTHER  
60 I.E. STUDENT OR HOUSEWIFE WORKING PART-TIME  
61 WOULD BE CONSIDERED WORKING.

62 B55 1 1 WORKING  
63 2 2 UNEMPLOYED/LAID OFF  
64 3 3 HOUSEWIFE  
65 4 4 STUDENT  
66 5 5 RETIRED  
67 6 6 OTHER  
68 8 9 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

69 (IF WORKING IN Q.19g)

Q.19h What sort of work does your (FROM Q.19b) do?

70 NOTE: WE WANT THEIR OCCUPATION, NOT EMPLOYER.  
71 CATEGORIZE TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY AND  
72 IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE  
73 CATEGORY, ENTER 0 FOR OTHER AND YOU WILL  
74 PROMPTED TO SPECIFY.

75 B57 1 1 PROFESSIONAL/TECHNICAL - I.E. DOCTORS, LAWYERS, TEACHERS  
76 2 2 MANAGERS - I.E. BANK OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATORS, SELF-EMPLOYED  
77 3 3 SALES - I.E. REAL ESTATE OR INSURANCE AGENTS, SALES WORKERS  
78 4 4 CLERICAL - I.E. BANK TELLERS, SECRETARIES, MAIL PEOPLE  
79 5 5 CRAFTSMEN - I.E. BAKERS, MECHANICS, PLUMBERS  
80 6 6 OPERATIVES - I.E. ASSEMBLERS, BUS OR TRUCK DRIVERS  
81 7 7 SERVICE WORKER - I.E. CHILD CARE, BARBER, POLICE  
82 8 8 LABOURER -CONSTRUCTION HELPERS, GARDENERS  
83 9 9 OTHER - CAN'T CATEGORIZE  
84 0 0 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

85 Q ENTER IN ACTUAL OCCUPATION

86 TEXT POINTER STORED IN [2/58]

87 (IF WORKING IN Q.19g)

88 Q.19i Has your (FROM Q.19b) been laid off or unemployed  
89 during the past 12 months?

85 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

1 IF SOMEONE ELSE IN Q.19a)

Q.19b) Is your (FROM Q.19b) a member of a labor union  
or teachers' association?

[NOTE: ONLY ONE AFFILIATION ACCEPTABLE]

86 1 1 UNION

86 2 2 TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION

86 3 3 NEITHER AFFILIATION

86 4 4 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

17 Q.21a We also want to know your racial background. Are  
18 you American Indian, White, Black, Asian, Pacific  
19 Islander, or something else?

[NOTE: ONLY ONE RESPONSE ALLOWED]

22 B61 5 1 AMERICAN INDIAN

23 B61 1 2 WHITE

24 B61 2 3 BLACK

25 B61 3 4 ASIAN

26 B61 4 5 PACIFIC ISLANDER

27 B61 6 6 OTHER

28 B61 7 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

*probably inflated; no hard & pure between American*

32 (IF WHITE, ASIAN, PACIFIC ISLANDER IN Q.21a)

33 Q.21b Besides being an American, what would you consider  
34 to be your nationality?

[NOTE: IF RESPONDENT MENTIONS SMALL COUNTRY,  
35 LOCALIZE IT TO ONE OF THE AVAILABLE, MORE  
36 GENERAL NATIONALITIES OR ENTER AS 'OTHER'  
37 AND RECORD SPECIFICS.]

41 01 Black

42 02 American Indian

43 03 Mexican

44 04 Filipino

45 05 Chinese

46 06 Japanese

47 07 Korean

48 08 Vietnamese

49 09 Indian (From India)

50 10 Iranian

51 11 Israeli

52 12 Armenian

53 13 Palestinian

54 14 Western European

55 15 Other

56 16 NO ETHNIC OR NATIONAL ID (ONLY IF OFFERED)

57 58 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

*var 36 =*

*16, 98 : DK, NA*

Please specify Western European ancestry.  
[YOU HAVE UP TO 20 COLUMNS OF FREE TEXT SPACE]

VARI: [6/41.20]

Please specify other nationality.  
[YOU HAVE UP TO 20 COLUMNS OF FREE TEXT SPACE]

VARI: [6/61.20]

Q. 22a We are interested in finding out what problems people  
are most concerned about. What would you say is the  
most important problem facing people in this  
country today? (ONE RESPONSE ONLY)

[A LIST IS SUPPLIED BELOW PLEASE TRY TO LOCATE  
PROBLEM AS DESCRIBED BY RESPONDENT, IF UNABLE TO  
LOCATE, ENTER '43' FOR OTHER AND SPECIFY]

\*\* HIT RETURN TO CONTINUE AND VIEW LIST \*\*

VARI: [80]

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1 THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR                       | 23 RACIAL/ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION            |
| 2 ARMS RACE                                   | 24 RACE RELATIONS                          |
| 3 SOVIET/COMMUNIST THREAT                     | 25 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION                     |
| 4 RELATIONS W/SOV. UNION                      | 26 WOMEN DISCRIMINATION                    |
| 5 TOO MUCH DEFENSE SPENDNG                    | 27 HIGH COST OF LIVING                     |
| 6 TOO LITTLE DEFENSE SPENDNG                  | 28 INFLATION                               |
| 7 WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA                      | 29 HIGH TAXES                              |
| 8 WAR IN MIDDLE EAST                          | 30 HIGH INTEREST RATES                     |
| 9 WORLD HUNGER                                | 31 UNEMPLOYMENT                            |
| 10 THIRD WORLD LOAN DEFAULTS                  | 32 HIGH GOVT. DEFICIT                      |
| 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS (GENERAL)                  | 33 TRADE, IMPORT/EXPORT BAL. (GDP)         |
| 12 CRIME                                      | 34 PROTECTIONISM                           |
| 13 YOUTH GANGS                                | 35 SOCIAL SECURITY/MEDICARE PROBS          |
| 14 DRUGS                                      | 36 ECONOMY (IN GENERAL)                    |
| 15 SELFISHNESS                                | 37 ENVIRONMENT/POLLUTION                   |
| 16 LACK OF RELIGION/MORALITY                  | 38 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS                    |
| 17 TOO MUCH WELFARE                           | 39 UTILITY BANKRUPTCIES                    |
| 18 ABORTION                                   | 40 BIG BUSINESS/CORPORATION                |
| 19 RELIGION INTERFERENCE<br>IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | 41 LABOR UNIONS                            |
| 20 POOR QUALITY EDUCATION                     | 42 RONALD REAGAN                           |
| 21 POOR QUALITY MASS TRANSIT                  | 43 ANY OTHER PROBLEMS<br>(TO BE SPECIFIED) |
| 22 POOR QUALITY HOUSING                       | 48 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER                    |

NUM: [2/64.2]

PLEASE SPECIFY (OTHER) MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM  
MENTIONED ABOVE. YOU HAVE 40 COLUMNS OF FREE SPACE

VAP: [7/11.40]

Q.22b How about (FROM Q.21b) Americans, Do you think  
there are problems today of special concern  
to (FROM Q.21b) Americans?

B66 1 1 YES

B66 2 2 NO

B66 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q How about American Indians, Do you think  
there are problems today of special concern  
to American Indians?

B66 1 1 YES

B66 2 2 NO

B66 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

*Please*

Q How about people of your racial or national  
background. Do you think there are problems  
today of special concern to people of your  
racial or national background?

B66 1 1 YES

B66 2 2 NO

B66 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

(IF YES IN Q.22b)

Q.22c Thinking of those problems which are of  
special concern to [ ] Americans,  
what would you say is the most important?

HIT RETURN TO ACCESS LIST OF PROBLEMS.

VAP: [803]

1 THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

23 RACIAL/ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

2 ARMS RACE

24 RACE RELATIONS

3 SOVIET/COMMUNIST THREAT

25 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

4 RELATIONS W/SOV. UNION

26 WOMEN DISCRIMINATION

5 TOO MUCH DEFENSE SPENDNG

27 HIGH COST OF LIVING

6 TOO LITTLE DEFENSE SPENDNG

28 INFLATION

7 WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA

29 HIGH TAXES

8 WAR IN MIDDLE EAST

30 HIGH INTEREST RATES

9 WORLD HUNGER

31 UNEMPLOYMENT

10 THIRD WORLD LOAN DEFAULTS

32 HIGH GOVT. DEFICIT

11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS (GENERAL)	33 TRADE, IMPORT/EXPORT BAL.(GNP)
12 CRIME	34 PROTECTIONISM
13 YOUTH GANGS	35 SOCIAL SECURITY/MEDICARE PROBS
14 DRUGS	36 ECONOMY (IN GENERAL)
15 SELFISHNESS	37 ENVIRONMENT/POLLUTION
16 LACK OF RELIGION/MORALITY	38 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
17 TOO MUCH WELFARE	39 UTILITY BANKRUPTCIES
18 ABORTION	40 BIG BUSINESS/CORPORATION
19 RELIGION INTERFERENCE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	41 LABOR UNIONS
20 POOR QUALITY EDUCATION	42 RONALD REAGAN
21 POOR QUALITY MASS TRANSIT	43 ANY OTHER PROBLEMS (TO BE SPECIFIED)
22 POOR QUALITY HOUSING	98 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

12 NUM: 12/67.23

18 Q Thinking of those problems which are of  
19 special concern to people of your racial  
20 or national background, what would you  
21 say is the most important?

22 HIT RETURN TO ACCESS LIST OF PROBLEMS.

25 VARI: [80]

30 1 THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR	23 RACIAL/ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION
31 2 ARMS RACE	24 RACE RELATIONS
32 3 SOVIET/COMMUNIST THREAT	25 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
33 4 RELATIONS W/SOV. UNION	26 WOMEN DISCRIMINATION
34 5 TOO MUCH DEFENSE SPENDNG	27 HIGH COST OF LIVING
35 6 TOO LITTLE DEFENSE SPENDNG	28 INFLATION
36 7 WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA	29 HIGH TAXES
37 8 WAR IN MIDDLE EAST	30 HIGH INTEREST RATES
38 9 WORLD HUNGER	31 UNEMPLOYMENT
39 10 THIRD WORLD LOAN DEFAULTS	32 HIGH GOVT. DEFICIT
40 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS (GENERAL)	33 TRADE, IMPORT/EXPORT BAL.(GNP)
41 12 CRIME	34 PROTECTIONISM
42 13 YOUTH GANGS	35 SOCIAL SECURITY/MEDICARE PROBS
43 14 DRUGS	36 ECONOMY (IN GENERAL)
44 15 SELFISHNESS	37 ENVIRONMENT/POLLUTION
45 16 LACK OF RELIGION/MORALITY	38 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
46 17 TOO MUCH WELFARE	39 UTILITY BANKRUPTCIES
47 18 ABORTION	40 BIG BUSINESS/CORPORATION
48 19 RELIGION INTERFERENCE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS	41 LABOR UNIONS
49 20 POOR QUALITY EDUCATION	42 RONALD REAGAN
50 21 POOR QUALITY MASS TRANSIT	43 ANY OTHER PROBLEMS (TO BE SPECIFIED)
51 22 POOR QUALITY HOUSING	98 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

52 NUM: 12/67.23

1 (IF A PROBLEM WAS MENTIONED IN Q.22c)

2 Q.22d Which of the following two statements best  
3 describes your views about this problem?

- 4 1. Substantial progress can be made on this  
5 problem without involving the government.  
6  
7 2. In order to make substantial progress on this  
8 problem, some action on the part of the  
9 government will be required.

10 B69 1 1 NO GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED

11 B69 2 2 GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED

12 B69 8 3 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

13 (IF GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED IN Q.22d)

14 Q.22e When you say that government action is needed to  
15 deal with this problem, do you have in mind the  
16 federal government in Washington, the state  
17 government in California, the local government  
18 in your community, or do you mean all levels of  
19 government. (MULTI ARE ACCEPTABLE BUT RECODED)

20 B70 1 1 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

21 B70 2 2 STATE GOVERNMENT

22 B70 3 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

23 B70 4 4 ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

24 B70 6 6 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

25 B70 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

26 (IF NO GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED IN Q.22d)

27 Q.22f In your opinion, what organization would best  
28 deal with the problem: private business,  
29 [ ] Americans working together,  
30 or something else? Or do you think the best  
31 course is to let individual people deal  
32 with this problem on their own?  
33 (MULTI OK - WILL BE RECODED)

34 B71 1 1 PRIVATE BUSINESS

35 B71 2 2 GROUP WORKING TOGETHER

36 B71 3 3 SOMETHING ELSE-WILL PROBE FOR SPECIFICATION

37 B71 4 4 INDIVIDUALS

38 B71 7 7 PRIVATE BUSINESS, GROUP, AND INDIVIDUALS

39 B71 9 9 PRIVATE BUSINESS AND INDIVIDUALS

40 B71 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q In your opinion, what organization would best deal with the problem: private business, people of your national background working together, or something else? Or do you think the best course is to let individual people deal with this problem on their own?  
(MULTI OK - WILL BE RECODED)

- B71 1 1 PRIVATE BUSINESS  
B71 2 2 GROUP WORKING TOGETHER  
B71 3 3 SOMETHING ELSE WILL PROBE FOR SPECIFICATION  
B71 4 4 INDIVIDUALS  
B71 7 7 PRIVATE BUSINESS, GROUP AND INDIVIDUALS  
B71 9 9 PRIVATE BUSINESS AND INDIVIDUALS.  
B71 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

SK

Q ENTER IN UPTO 20 COLUMNS OF FREE SPACE TEXT  
TO SPECIFY OTHER COURSE OF ACTION TO BEST  
DEAL WITH PROBLEM MENTIONED LAST QUESTION.

VARI: [8/1.20]

Q23a In addition to a racial or nationality group,  
is there any other kind of group --  
people in a particular occupation or religion,  
for example -- that you feel part of, and that  
makes you more concerned about certain problems?

C07 1 1 YES

C07 2 2 NO

C07 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

(IF YES IN Q.23a)

✓ Q.23b What group is that?

\*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP IF LISTED BELOW  
OR ENTER IN '41' AND SPECIFY. \*\*

01 MEN	15 TEACHERS	29 JEWS
02 WOMEN	16 STUDENTS	30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS
03 BLACKS	17 TAXPAYERS	71 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
04 WHITES	18 HOMEOWNERS	32 VETERANS
05 WHITE MEN	19 RETIRED/ELDERLY	33 VIETNAM VETERANS
06 WHITE WOMEN	20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC	34 LIBERALS
07 BLACK MEN	21 THOSE ON WELFARE	35 CONSERVATIVES
08 BLACK WOMEN	22 THE UNEMPLOYED	36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.
09 DISABLED	23 THE EMPLOYED	37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS
10 BUSINESSMEN	24 WORKING WOMEN	38 SINGLE PARENTS
11 HOUSEWIVES	25 ASIAN AMERICANS	39 YUPPIES
12 UNION PEOPLE	26 MEXICAN AMERICANS	40 BABY BOOMERS
13 FARMERS	27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG	41 OTHER
14 IMMIGRANTS	28 CATHOLICS	98 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q PLEASE SPECIFY OTHER GROUP

\*\* YOU HAVE 20 COLUMNS TO ENTER TEXT \*\*

VAR: [8/21,20]

(IF GROUP AFFILIATION REPORTED IN Q.23b)

Q.23c Thinking of those problems which are of special concern to (FROM Q.23b), what would you say is the most important?

HIT RETURN TO COME UP WITH LIST OF PROBLEMS

VAR: [80]

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1 THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR                       | 23 RACIAL/ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION            |
| 2 ARMS RACE                                   | 24 RACE RELATIONS                          |
| 3 SOVIET/COMMUNIST THREAT                     | 25 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION                     |
| 4 RELATIONS W/SOV. UNION                      | 26 WOMEN DISCRIMINATION                    |
| 5 TOO MUCH DEFENSE SPENDNG                    | 27 HIGH COST OF LIVING                     |
| 6 TOO LITTLE DEFENSE SPENDNG                  | 28 INFLATION                               |
| 7 WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA                      | 29 HIGH TAXES                              |
| 8 WAR IN MIDDLE EAST                          | 30 HIGH INTEREST RATES                     |
| 9 WORLD HUNGER                                | 31 UNEMPLOYMENT                            |
| 10 THIRD WORLD LOAN DEFAULTS                  | 32 HIGH GOVT. DEFICIT                      |
| 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS (GENERAL)                  | 33 TRADE, IMPORT/EXPORT BAL.(GNP)          |
| 12 CRIME                                      | 34 PROTECTIONISM                           |
| 13 YOUTH GANGS                                | 35 SOCIAL SECURITY/MEDICARE PROBS          |
| 14 DRUGS                                      | 36 ECONOMY (IN GENERAL)                    |
| 15 SELFISHNESS                                | 37 ENVIRONMENT/POLLUTION                   |
| 16 LACK OF RELIGION/MORALITY                  | 38 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS                    |
| 17 TOO MUCH WELFARE                           | 39 UTILITY BANKRUPTCIES                    |
| 18 ABORTION                                   | 40 BIG BUSINESS/CORPORATION                |
| 19 RELIGION INTERFERENCE<br>IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS | 41 LABOR UNIONS                            |
| 20 POOR QUALITY EDUCATION                     | 42 RONALD REAGAN                           |
| 21 POOR QUALITY MASS TRANSIT                  | 43 ANY OTHER PROBLEMS<br>(TO BE SPECIFIED) |
| 22 POOR QUALITY HOUSING                       | 98 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER                    |

NUM: [3/10,23]

Q PLEASE SPECIFY 'OTHER' MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM  
MENTIONED ABOVE. YOU HAVE 40 COLUMNS OF FREE SPACE.

VAR: [8/41,40]

(IF A PROBLEM WAS MENTIONED IN Q.23c)

Q.23d Which of the following two statements best describes your views about this problem?

1. Substantial progress can be made on this problem without involving the government.

2. In order to make substantial progress on this problem, some action on the part of the government will be required.

4 C12 1 1 NO GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED

5 C12 2 2 GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED

6 C12 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

10 (IF GOVERNMENT ACTION IS REQUIRED IN Q.23d)

11 Q.23e When you say that government action is needed to  
12 deal with this problem, do you have in mind the  
13 federal government in Washington, the state  
14 government in California, the local government  
15 in your community, or do you mean all levels of  
16 government. (MULTI ARE ACCEPTABLE - WILL BE RECODED)

18 C13 1 1 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

19 C13 2 2 STATE GOVERNMENT

20 C13 3 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

21 C13 4 4 ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

22 C13 5 5 FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

23 C13 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

7 (IF NO GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED IN Q.23d)

28 Q.23f In your opinion, what organization would best  
29 deal with the problem -- private business,  
30 (FROM Q.23b) working together,  
31 or something else? Or do you think the best  
32 course is to let individual people deal  
33 with this problem on their own?  
34 (MULTI OK - WILL BE RECODED)

36 C14 1 1 PRIVATE BUSINESS

37 C14 2 2 GROUP WORKING TOGETHER

38 C14 3 3 SOMETHING ELSE-WILL PROBE FOR SPECIFICATION

39 C14 4 4 INDIVIDUALS

40 C14 0 0 GROUP AND INDIVIDUALS

41 C14 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

47 Q In your opinion, what organization would best  
48 deal with the problem private business,  
49 (FROM Q.23b) working together,  
50 or something else? Or do you think the best  
51 course is to let individual people deal  
52 with this problem on their own?  
53 (MULTI OK - WILL BE RECODED)

Why Th  
Rept

55 C14 1 1 PRIVATE BUSINESS

56 C14 2 2 GROUP WORKING TOGETHER

57 C14 3 3 SOMETHING ELSE-WILL PROBE FOR SPECIFICATION

C14 4 4 INDIVIDUALS

C14 0 0 GROUP AND INDIVIDUALS

014 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

2  
3  
4 Q ENTER IN UPTO 20 COLUMNS OF FREE SPACE TEXT  
5 TO SPECIFY OTHER COURSE OF ACTION TO BEST  
6 DEAL WITH PROBLEM MENTIONED LAST QUESTION.

7  
8 YAR: [9/1/20]  
9

10  
11  
12  
13 Q.24a Do you think there are any groups of people in  
14 the United States today who get fewer opportunities  
15 than they deserve?  
16

17 C15 1 1 YES

18 C15 2 2 MAYBE, DEPENDS

19 C15 3 3 NO

20 C15 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

21  
22  
23 (IF YES OR MAYBE IN Q.24a)

24 Q.24b What group is that?

25 \*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP LISTED BELOW,  
26 ONLY ONE ENTRY ALLOWED \*\*

27 01 MEN 15 TEACHERS 29 JEWS  
28 02 WOMEN 16 STUDENTS 30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS  
29 03 BLACKS 17 TAXPAYERS 31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE  
30 04 WHITES 18 HOMEOWNERS 32 VETERANS  
31 05 WHITE MEN 19 RETIRED/ELDERLY 33 VIETNAM VETERANS  
32 06 WHITE WOMEN 20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC. 34 LIBERALS  
33 07 BLACK MEN 21 THOSE ON WELFARE 35 CONSERVATIVES  
34 08 BLACK WOMEN 22 THE UNEMPLOYED 36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.  
35 09 DISABLED 23 THE EMPLOYED 37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS  
36 10 BUSINESSMEN 24 WORKING WOMEN 38 SINGLE PARENTS  
37 11 HOUSEWIVES 25 ASIAN AMERICANS 39 YUPPIES  
38 12 UNION PEOPLE 26 MEXICAN AMERICANS 40 BABY BOOMERS  
39 13 FARMERS 27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG 41 OTHER  
40 14 IMMIGRANTS 28 CATHOLICS 98 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED  
41 FLDI [3/16.23]

42 1

43 Q.24b Any other groups?

44 \*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP LISTED BELOW,  
45 ONLY ONE ENTRY AT EACH PROMPT. \*\*

46 01 MEN 15 TEACHERS 29 JEWS  
47 02 WOMEN 16 STUDENTS 30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS  
48 03 BLACKS 17 TAXPAYERS 31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE  
49 04 WHITES 18 HOMEOWNERS 32 VETERANS  
50 05 WHITE MEN 19 RETIRED/ELDERLY 33 VIETNAM VETERANS  
51 06 WHITE WOMEN 20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC. 34 LIBERALS  
52 07 BLACK MEN 21 THOSE ON WELFARE 35 CONSERVATIVES  
53 08 BLACK WOMEN 22 THE UNEMPLOYED 36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.  
54 09 DISABLED 23 THE EMPLOYED 37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS  
55 10 BUSINESSMEN 24 WORKING WOMEN 38 SINGLE PARENTS  
56 11 HOUSEWIVES 25 ASIAN AMERICANS 39 YUPPIES

12 UNION PEOPLE 26 MEXICAN AMERICANS 40 BABY BOOMERS  
13 FARMERS 27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG 41 OTHER  
14 IMMIGRANTS 28 CATHOLICS 98 NO MORE

FLD: [3/18.2]

Q. 24b Any other groups?

\*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP LISTED BELOW,  
ONLY ONE ENTRY AT EACH PROMPT. \*\*

01 MEN	15 TEACHERS	29 JEWS
02 WOMEN	16 STUDENTS	30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS
03 BLACKS	17 TAXPAYERS	31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
04 WHITES	18 HOMEOWNERS	32 VETERANS
05 WHITE MEN	19 RETIRED/ELDERLY	33 VIETNAM VETERANS
06 WHITE WOMEN	20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC.	34 LIBERALS
07 BLACK MEN	21 THOSE ON WELFARE	35 CONSERVATIVES
08 BLACK WOMEN	22 THE UNEMPLOYED	36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.
09 DISABLED	23 THE EMPLOYED	37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS
10 BUSINESSMEN	24 WORKING WOMEN	38 SINGLE PARENTS
11 HOUSEWIVES	25 ASIAN AMERICANS	39 YUPPIES
12 UNION PEOPLE	26 MEXICAN AMERICANS	40 BABY BOOMERS
13 FARMERS	27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG	41 OTHER
14 IMMIGRANTS	28 CATHOLICS	98 NO MORE

FLD: [3/20.2]

Q. 24b Any other groups?

\*\*HIT RETURN TO GET PROMPT TO ENTER APPROPRIATE  
2 DIGIT CODE FROM LIST BELOW\*\*

01 MEN	15 TEACHERS	29 JEWS
02 WOMEN	16 STUDENTS	30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS
03 BLACKS	17 TAXPAYERS	31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
04 WHITES	18 HOMEOWNERS	32 VETERANS
05 WHITE MEN	19 RETIRED/ELDERLY	33 VIETNAM VETERANS
06 WHITE WOMEN	20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC.	34 LIBERALS
07 BLACK MEN	21 THOSE ON WELFARE	35 CONSERVATIVES
08 BLACK WOMEN	22 THE UNEMPLOYED	36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.
09 DISABLED	23 THE EMPLOYED	37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS
10 BUSINESSMEN	24 WORKING WOMEN	38 SINGLE PARENTS
11 HOUSEWIVES	25 ASIAN AMERICANS	39 YUPPIES
12 UNION PEOPLE	26 MEXICAN AMERICANS	40 BABY BOOMERS
13 FARMERS	27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG	41 OTHER
14 IMMIGRANTS	28 CATHOLICS	98 NO MORE

VAR: [80]

FLD: [3/22.2]

Q ENTER IN OTHER(S) FROM ABOVE. YOU ONLY HAVE  
20 SPACES OF FREE SPACE.

VAR: [9/21.201]

than they deserve

- Q26 1 1 YES  
Q26 2 2 MAYBE, DEPENDS  
Q26 3 3 NO  
Q26 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

(IF YES OR MAYBE IN Q.25a)

Q.25b What group is that?

\*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP IF LISTED BELOW \*\*

HIT RETURN AND THEN ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE

01 MEN	15 TEACHERS	29 JEWS
02 WOMEN	16 STUDENTS	30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS
03 BLACKS	17 TAXPAYERS	31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
04 WHITES	18 HOMEOWNERS	32 VETERANS
05 WHITE MEN	19 RETIRED/ELDERLY	33 VIETNAM VETERANS
06 WHITE WOMEN	20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC.	34 LIBERALS
07 BLACK MEN	21 THOSE ON WELFARE	35 CONSERVATIVES
08 BLACK WOMEN	22 THE UNEMPLOYED	36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.
09 DISABLED	23 THE EMPLOYED	37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS
10 BUSINESSMEN	24 WORKING WOMEN	38 SINGLE PARENTS
11 HOUSEWIVES	25 ASIAN AMERICANS	39 YUPPIES
12 UNION PEOPLE	26 MEXICAN AMERICANS	40 BABY BOOMERS
13 FARMERS	27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG	41 OTHER
14 IMMIGRANTS	28 CATHOLICS	98 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

VARI [80]

FLD: [7/27.21]

Q.25b Any other groups?

\*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP LISTED BELOW.

ONLY ONE ENTRY AT EACH PROMPT. \*\*

01 MEN	15 TEACHERS	29 JEWS
02 WOMEN	16 STUDENTS	30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS
03 BLACKS	17 TAXPAYERS	31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
04 WHITES	18 HOMEOWNERS	32 VETERANS
05 WHITE MEN	19 RETIRED/ELDERLY	33 VIETNAM VETERANS
06 WHITE WOMEN	20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC.	34 LIBERALS
07 BLACK MEN	21 THOSE ON WELFARE	35 CONSERVATIVES
08 BLACK WOMEN	22 THE UNEMPLOYED	36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.
09 DISABLED	23 THE EMPLOYED	37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS
10 BUSINESSMEN	24 WORKING WOMEN	38 SINGLE PARENTS
11 HOUSEWIVES	25 ASIAN AMERICANS	39 YUPPIES
12 UNION PEOPLE	26 MEXICAN AMERICANS	40 BABY BOOMERS
13 FARMERS	27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG	41 OTHER
14 IMMIGRANTS	28 CATHOLICS	98 NO MORE

FLD: [3/29.2]

Q.25b Any other groups?

\*\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP IF LISTED BELOW

OR ENTER IN '41' AND SPECIFY. \*\*

HIT RETURN AND THEN ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE

01 MEN 15 TEACHERS 29 JEWS  
02 WOMEN 16 STUDENTS 30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS

03 BLACKS 17 TAXPAYERS 31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE  
04 WHITES 18 HOMEOWNERS 32 VETERANS  
05 WHITE MEN 19 RETIRED/ELDERLY 33 VIETNAM VETERANS  
06 WHITE WOMEN 20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC. 34 LIBERALS  
07 BLACK MEN 21 THOSE ON WELFARE 35 CONSERVATIVES  
08 BLACK WOMEN 22 THE UNEMPLOYED 36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.  
09 DISABLED 23 THE EMPLOYED 37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS  
10 BUSINESSMEN 24 WORKING WOMEN 38 SINGLE PARENTS  
11 HOUSEWIVES 25 ASIAN AMERICANS 39 YUPPIES  
12 UNION PEOPLE 26 MEXICAN AMERICANS 40 BABY BOOMERS  
13 FARMERS 27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG 41 OTHER  
14 IMMIGRANTS 28 CATHOLICS 98 NO MORE  
VAR: [80]

FLDI [3/31.2]

Q.25b Any other groups?

\* ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE FOR GROUP LISTED BELOW,  
ONLY ONE ENTRY ALLOWED \*\*

01 MEN 15 TEACHERS 29 JEWS  
02 WOMEN 16 STUDENTS 30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS  
03 BLACKS 17 TAXPAYERS 31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE  
04 WHITES 18 HOMEOWNERS 32 VETERANS  
05 WHITE MEN 19 RETIRED/ELDERLY 33 VIETNAM VETERANS  
06 WHITE WOMEN 20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC. 34 LIBERALS  
07 BLACK MEN 21 THOSE ON WELFARE 35 CONSERVATIVES  
08 BLACK WOMEN 22 THE UNEMPLOYED 36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT.  
09 DISABLED 23 THE EMPLOYED 37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS  
10 BUSINESSMEN 24 WORKING WOMEN 38 SINGLE PARENTS  
11 HOUSEWIVES 25 ASIAN AMERICANS 39 YUPPIES  
12 UNION PEOPLE 26 MEXICAN AMERICANS 40 BABY BOOMERS  
13 FARMERS 27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG 41 OTHER  
14 IMMIGRANTS 28 CATHOLICS 98 NO MORE

FLDI [3/33.2]

Q ENTER IN OTHER(S) FROM ABOVE. YOU ONLY HAVE  
20 SPACES OF FREE SPACE.

VAR: [9/41.20]

1

(IF R IS OF NON-WESTERN EUROPEAN ETHNICITY OR  
ETHNICITY WAS REPORTED IN Q.21b)

Q.26a OK, as you mentioned previously,  
you are (FROM Q21b). Do you think that  
most Americans are prejudiced against  
(FROM Q.21b), only some Americans  
are prejudiced, or that most Americans  
are not prejudiced?

C37 1 1 MOST ARE

C37 2 2 SOME ARE

C37 3 3 MOST ARE NOT

C37 8 8 NO OPINION/REFUSED

✓  
1 IF SOME ARE IN Q.26a>

Q.26b When you say some are, is there any particular group of people who you think are especially prejudiced against (FROM Q.21b)s ?

[ACCEPT ONE GROUP ONLY FROM LIST BELOW, HIT RETURN TO GET PROMPT TO ENTER 2-DIGIT CODE]

01 MEN	13 TEACHERS	29 JEWS
02 WOMEN	16 STUDENTS	30 BORN AGAIN CHRISTIANS
03 BLACKS	17 TAXPAYERS	31 RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
04 WHITES	18 HOMEOWNERS	32 VETERANS
05 WHITE MEN	19 RETIRED/ELDERLY	33 VIETNAM VETERANS
06 WHITE WOMEN	20 THOSE ON SOC. SEC.	34 LIBERALS
07 BLACK MEN	21 THOSE ON WELFARE	35 CONSERVATIVES
08 BLACK WOMEN	22 THE UNEMPLOYED	36 NUCLEAR FREEZE MVMNT
09 DISABLED	23 THE EMPLOYED	37 ENVIRONMENTALISTS
10 BUSINESSMEN	24 WORKING WOMEN	38 SINGLE PARENTS
11 HOUSEWIVES	25 ASIAN AMERICANS	39 YUPPIES
12 UNION PEOPLE	26 MEXICAN AMERICANS	40 BABY BOOMERS
13 FARMERS	27 NON-ENGLISH SPKNG	41 OTHER
14 IMMIGRANTS	28 CATHOLICS	42 NO GROUP IN PARTICULAR
		98 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

VAR: [80]

FLD: [3/38.21]

Q PLEASE SPECIFY OTHER GROUP  
\*\* YOU HAVE 20 COLUMNS TO ENTER TEXT \*\*

VAR: [9/61.20]

(IF R IS OF NON-WESTERN EUROPEAN RACE OR  
ETHNICITY WAS REPORTED IN Q.21b)

Q.26c Have you, yourself, personally experienced  
discrimination because you are (FROM Q.21b) ?

looks like  
for

C48 1 1 YES

C48 2 2 NO

C48 3 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

(IF YES IN Q.26c)

Q.26d Thinking of the most serious discrimination you have experienced, was it in getting a job, or getting into a school, in getting a house or apartment, in a social situation, or in some other respect?

C49 1 1 GETTING A JOB

C49 2 2 GETTING INTO SCHOOL

C49 3 3 GETTING HOUSE OR APARTMENT

C49 4 4 SOCIAL SITUATION

C49 5 5 OTHER - SPECIFY

44 6 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

45  
46 BRIEFLY DESCRIBE (40 FREE TEXT SPACES) 'OTHER'  
47 DISCRIMINATION SITUATION.

48 VAR: [10/1.40]

49  
50 (IF R IS OF NON-WESTERN EUROPEAN RACE OR  
51 ETHNICITY WAS REPORTED IN Q.21b)  
52 Q.26e Do you think that over the next 10 years or so  
53 Americans will become more prejudiced  
54 against (FROM Q.21b)s , less prejudiced,  
55 or do you think that their attitudes probably  
56 won't change much?

57 C51 1 1 MORE PREJUDICED

58 C51 3 2 LESS PREJUDICED

59 C51 2 3 WON'T CHANGE MUCH

60 C51 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

61 Q.31 Suppose that on election day you could have  
62 voted on the following propositions. Please  
63 tell me in each case whether you would have  
64 favored the proposition or opposed it.

65 If you don't really have an opinion, please  
66 feel free to tell me so.

67 THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF TWELVE QUESTIONS WILL  
68 HAVE THE SAME SET OF AVAILABLE RESPONSES WHICH  
69 WILL APPEAR ON THE SCREEN THE FIRST FEW TIMES

70 ONLY. "1" MEANS FAVOR

71 "2" MEANS OPPOSE

72 "3" MEANS NO OPINION

73 "8" MEAN DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

74 \*\* HIT RETURN TO BEGIN THIS SERIES \*\*

75 VAR: [80]

76 a First, an increase in federal spending for  
77 military and defense purposes. Would you  
78 favor this, oppose it, or would  
79 you say you really don't have an opinion  
80 one way or the other?

81 C52 1 1 FAVOR

82 C52 2 2 OPPOSE

83 C52 7 3 NO OPINION

84 C52 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

b. How about Equal Rights Amendment? Do you favor,  
oppose, or don't really have an opinion?

- C 53 1 1 FAVOR  
C 53 2 2 OPPOSE  
C 53 7 3 NO OPINION  
C 53 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

c. Ok ... Reducing a family's federal income tax  
by \$100 for each child attending a private or  
parochial school.

- C 54 1 1 FAVOR  
C 54 2 2 OPPOSE  
C 54 7 3 NO OPINION  
C 54 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

d. A constitutional amendment to permit prayer  
in public schools.

- C 55 1 1 FAVOR  
C 55 2 2 OPPOSE  
C 55 7 3 NO OPINION  
C 55 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

e. An increase in government spending for social  
programs such as health, education and welfare.

- C 56 1 1 FAVOR  
C 56 2 2 OPPOSE  
C 56 7 3 NO OPINION  
C 56 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

f. A ban on federal financing of abortions.

- C 57 1 1 FAVOR  
C 57 2 2 OPPOSE  
C 57 7 3 NO OPINION  
C 57 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

g. A ban on possession of handguns except by the  
police and other authorized persons.

58 1 1 FAVOR

58 2 2 OPPOSE

58 7 3 NO OPINION

58 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

7 J. The death penalty for persons convicted of  
8 first degree murder.

9 10 10 C59 1 1 FAVOR

11 11 C59 2 2 OPPOSE

12 12 C59 7 3 NO OPINION

13 13 C59 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

14 19 1. An amnesty program so illegal immigrants who are  
15 presently working in the U.S. can remain here  
16 legally. Favor, Oppose, or No Opinion?

17 23 23 C60 1 1 FAVOR

18 24 24 C60 2 2 OPPOSE

19 25 25 C60 7 3 NO OPINION

20 26 26 C60 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

27 31 31 M. A law making it illegal for an employer to hire  
28 immigrants who have come to the U.S. without papers.

29 34 34 C61 1 1 FAVOR

30 35 35 C61 2 2 OPPOSE

31 36 36 C61 7 3 NO OPINION

32 37 37 C61 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

38 42 42 P. Bilingual education programs. In other words,  
39 teaching non-English speaking students in their  
40 own language as well as English.

41 46 46 C62 1 1 FAVOR

42 47 47 C62 2 2 OPPOSE

43 48 48 C62 7 3 NO OPINION

44 49 49 C62 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

50 54 54 S. Providing non-English speaking voters in an  
51 election with ballots printed in their own  
52 language.

53 55 55 C63 1 1 FAVOR

54 56 56 C63 2 2 OPPOSE

063 7 3 NO OPINION

063 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

072 There has been a great deal of controversy  
concerning the issue of abortion in recent years.  
I am going to read you three statements concerning  
abortion. Please tell me which one of them best  
agrees with your own views on the subject.

[NOTE: READ ALL 3 CHOICES BEFORE ACCEPTING ANSWER]

1. By law abortion should never be permitted.

2. The law should permit abortion only in the  
case of rape, incest or when the mother's  
life is in danger.

3. By law a woman should always be able to obtain  
an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

064 1 1 SHOULD NEVER BE PERMITTED

064 2 2 ONLY IN SELECTED CASES LIKE RAPE, INCEST

064 3 3 ALWAYS A PERSONAL CHOICE

064 4 4 RESPONDENT VOLUNTEERS OTHER OPINION - DO NOT READ

064 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

#### BRIEFLY INPUT OTHER OPINION

TEXT POINTER STORED IN [3/65]

038 Thanks for your cooperation so far -- we just  
need to ask a few more questions about yourself  
and then we'll be done. OK, we need to know  
what country you were born in.  
[DO NOT READ. ENTER IN 2-DIGIT CODE]

01 UNITED STATES

02 MEXICO

03 THE PHILLIPINES

04 CHINA

05 TAIWAN

06 HONG KONG

07 JAPAN

08 KOREA

09 VIETNAM

10 IRAN

11 ISRAEL

12 OTHER - WILL SPECIFY

98 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

ELD: 14/7/81

PLEASE SPECIFY OTHER COUNTRY OF BIRTH

TEXT POINTER STORED IN [4/9]

(IF NO IN Q.39)

Q. 40a Were both of your parents born in this country?

D10 2 2 NO

D10 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

(IF NO IN Q.39)

Q. 40a Which country was you father born in?

01 UNITED STATES

02 MEXICO

03 THE PHILLIPINES

05 TAIWAN

06 HONG KONG

07 JAPAN

08 KOREA

09 VIETNAM

10 IRAN

11 ISRAEL

12 OTHER - WILL SPECIFY

98 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

FLDI [4/11.2] ✓

D, 11, v1 2

Q PLEASE SPECIFY FATHER'S COUNTRY OF BIRTH

TEXT POINTER STORED IN [4/13]

(IF NO IN Q.39)

Q. 40b Which country was you mother born in?

01 UNITED STATES

02 MEXICO

03 THE PHILLIPINES

04 CHINA

05 TAIWAN

06 HONG KONG

07 JAPAN

08 KOREA

09 VIETNAM

10 IRAN

11 ISRAEL

12 OTHER - WILL SPECIFY

98 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

FLDI [4/14.2]

Q PLEASE SPECIFY MOTHER'S COUNTRY OF BIRTH

TEXT POINTER STORED IN [4/16]

IF R STATES COUNTRY OF BIRTH AS OTHER THAN U.S. >

Q41 Do you still keep in touch with friends or relatives back in (FROM Q38) ?

D17 1 1 YES

D17 2 2 NO

D17 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

IF R STATES COUNTRY OF BIRTH AS OTHER THAN U.S. >

Q42 Do you ever send money back to friends or relatives back in (FROM Q38) ?

D18 1 1 YES

D18 2 2 NO

D18 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

IF R STATES COUNTRY OF BIRTH AS OTHER THAN U.S. >

Q43a Have you ever considered going back to (FROM Q38) to live, or are you pretty sure you will always live in the United States?

D19 1 1 MIGHT GO BACK

D19 2 2 WILL STAY IN U.S.

D19 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

→ D19 9 9 QUESTION NOT ASKED .

1

2

3

4

5 IF R STATES COUNTRY OF BIRTH AS OTHER THAN U.S. >

Q43b What year did you first come to the United States?

ENTER 2 DIGITS INDICATING YEAR, I.E 1895 = 95 AND  
1924 = 24, \*\*NOTE: ENTER DK FOR DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

NUM: [4/20.2]

NUMBER MUST BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 99.00

VALID ALPHA CODES ARE: DK

IF R STATES COUNTRY OF BIRTH AS OTHER THAN U.S. >

Q43c Have you become a U.S. citizen, or not?

D22 1 1 CITIZEN

D22 2 2 NOT CITIZEN

D22 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

(IF R BORN IN U.S.)

Q44 What state were you born in?  
[ENTER 2 LETTER STATE CODE]

AL-ALABAMA	MD-MARYLAND	OR-OREGON
AZ-ARIZONA	MA-MASSACHUSETTS	PA-PENNSYLVANIA
AR-ARKANSAS	MI-MICHIGAN	RI-RHODE ISLAND
CA-CALIFORNIA	MN-MINNESOTA	SC-SOUTH CAROLINA
CO-COLORADO	MS-MISSISSIPPI	SD-SOUTH DAKOTA
CT-CONNECTICUT	MO-MISSOURI	TN-TENNESSEE
DE-DELAWARE	MT-MONTANA	TX-TEXAS
FL-FLORIDA	NC-NORTH CAROLINA	UT-UTAH
GE-GEORGIA	ND-NORTH DAKOTA	VT-VERMONT
ID-IDAHO	NE-NEBRASKA	VA-VIRGINIA
IL-ILLINOIS	NV-NEVADA	WA-WASHINGTON
IN-INDIANA	NH-NEW HAMPSHIRE	WV-WEST VIRGINIA
IA-IOWA	NJ-NEW JERSEY	WI-WISCONSIN
KS-KANSAS	NM-NEW MEXICO	WY-WYOMING
KY-KENTUCKY	NY-NEW YORK	DC-DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LA-LOUISIANA	OH-OHIO	AK-ALASKA
ME-MAINE	OK-OKLAHOMA	HI-HAWAII.

FLD: [4/23.2]

(IF CALIFORNIA IN Q.44)

Q45 When did your family first come to California?  
Was it your parents, your grandparents, or  
before that?

D25 1 1 PARENTS

D25 2 2 GRANDPARENTS

D25 3 3 BEFORE THAT

D25 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

1

(IF R BORN IN U.S. STATE OTHER THAN CALIFORNIA)

Q46 Do you still keep in touch with any friends  
or relatives back in (FROM Q44)?

D26 1 1 YES

D26 2 2 NO

D26 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q51 Is your primary speaking language a language other  
than English/Spanish?

D27 1 1 YES

D27 2 2 NO

D27 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

(IF YES IN Q.51)

Q52 What language is it?

ENTER IN ONLY 1 LANGUAGE - RESPONDENT'S PRIMARY

1 SPEAKING LANGUAGE.

2 01 SPANISH/ENGLISH

3 02 ITALIAN

4 03 GREEK

5 04 FRENCH

6 05 GERMAN

7 06 HEBREW

8 07 ARABIC

9 08 FARSI (IRANIAN)

10 09 ARMENIAN

11 10 HINDU

12 11 JAPANESE

13 12 CHINESE

14 13 KOREAN

15 14 VIETNAMESE

16 15 TAGALOG

17 16 THAI

18 17 OTHER

19 96 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

20 FLD: [4/28.2]

21

22 Q ENTER IN OTHER PRIMARY LANGUAGE.

23 YOU HAVE 20 FREE SPACES FOR TEXT.

24 VAR: [10/41.20]

25

26

27

28

29

30

31 <IF SOME LANGUAGE SPECIFIED IN Q.52>

32 Q At home, do you speak (FROM Q52) more than  
33 English, English more than (FROM Q52), or  
34 both languages about the same?

35 038 1 1 OTHER MORE

36 038 2 2 ENGLISH MORE

37 038 3 3 BOTH THE SAME

38 038 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

39

40

41

42

43 <IF SOME LANGUAGE SPECIFIED IN Q.52 AND

44 R HAD VOTED IN Q.1>

45 Q In the last election did you vote with a  
46 ballot printed in (FROM Q52)?

47 039 1 1 YES

48 039 2 2 NO

49 039 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

50

51

52

53

54

55 Q: We're just about done -- there are only a  
56 few more questions we would like to ask you  
57 about yourself.

58 First, what year were you born in?

1954 = 54. ENTER 'DK' FOR REFUSED.  
MINT: 54/41.21

NUMBER MUST BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 99.00  
VALID ALPHA CODES ARE: DK

Q18 Do you or your family own your place of residence or is it rented?

- D43 1 1 OWN
- D43 2 2 RENT/DO NOT OWN
- D43 3 3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

Q20 Next I'm going to read you some income categories. Please tell me when we get to the category which indicates the total income you expect all members of your family to earn in 1984. Is it ...  
(NOTE: READ LIST)

- 01 Less than \$10,000
- 02 between \$10,000 and \$15,000
- 03 between \$15,000 and \$20,000
- 04 between \$20,000 and \$25,000
- 05 between \$25,000 and \$30,000
- 06 between \$30,000 and \$40,000
- 07 between \$40,000 and \$60,000
- 08 over \$60,000

98 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED - DO NOT READ

FLD1 [4/44.2]

Q.3 In the election for President, did you vote for Walter Mondale, Ronald Reagan, or some other candidate?

- D46 1 1 MONDALE
- D46 2 2 REAGAN
- D46 3 3 OTHER
- D46 8 8 DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER

Q OK, this is the last question. I'm going to read you three statements about voting in elections. Please tell me which of the three comes closest to your opinion.

1. So many people vote, it's not very important for me to vote in elections
2. It's only important for me to vote in those elections where the interests of people like me are affected

3. Whether or not the interests of people like me  
are affected, it's important for me to vote  
in elections.

- 3 D47 1 1 NOT IMPORTANT  
4 D47 2 2 IMPORTANT ONLY WHEN INTERESTS AFFECTED  
5 D47 3 3 IMPORTANT EVEN WHEN INTERESTS NOT AFFECTED  
6 D47 8 8 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED

7  
8  
9  
10  
11 Thank you very much  
12 for taking the time to talk to us. Have a real  
13 nice (day) (evening).

14  
15 ONCE THE INTERVIEW IS COMPLETED AND YOU HAVE  
16 HUNG UP THERE ARE STILL A FEW QUESTIONS TO  
17 BE ANSWERED BY THE INTERVIEWER.

18  
19 HIT RETURN TO ACCESS THOSE QUESTIONS.  
20

21 VAR: 1801  
22  
23  
24

25 RESPONDENT IS:

- 26 D50 1 1 MALE  
27 D50 2 2 FEMALE  
28  
29

30  
31  
32 RESPONDENT'S COOPERATION IS:  
33

- 34 D51 1 1 VERY GOOD  
35 D51 2 2 GOOD  
36 D51 3 3 FAIR  
37 D51 4 4 POOR  
38 D51 5 5 VERY POOR  
39

40  
41  
42  
43 RESPONDENT'S GENERAL LEVEL OF INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICS  
44 AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS SEEMED:  
45

- 46 D52 1 1 VERY HIGH  
47 D52 2 2 FAIRLY HIGH  
48 D52 3 3 AVERAGE  
49 D52 4 4 FAIRLY LOW  
50 D52 5 5 VERY LOW  
51

52  
53  
54  
55 HOW SINCERE DID THE RESPONDENT SEEM TO BE IN  
56 (HIS/HER) ANSWERS?  
57

- 58 D53 1 1 COMPLETELY SINCERE  
59 D53 2 2 USUALLY SINCERE

252 2 3 OFTEN SEEMED TO BE INSINCERE

3       \*\*\* A BIT OF PHONE SYSTEM INFO \*\*\*  
4  
5  
6       (PRESS RETURN TO CONTINUE)

7       VAR: [801]  
8  
9  
10  
11     ENTER IN 3-DIGIT AREA CODE  
12     NUM: [223]  
13  
14  
15  
16     ENTER IN 3-DIGIT PREFIX  
17     NUM: [323]  
18  
19  
20  
21     ENTER IN 4-DIGIT SUFFIX  
22     NUM: [3541]  
23  
24  
25  
26     ENTER IN 2-DIGIT NUMBER INDICATING MONTH OF INTERVIEW  
27  
28     11 NOVEMBER  
29     12 DECEMBER  
30     FLD: [9.21] p. 33  
31  
32     ENTER IN 2 DIGIT DATE OF INTERVIEW  
33     NUM: [1121]  
34     NUMBER MUST BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO      31.00  
35  
36  
37  
38     \*\*\*\*\*  
39     \*\*\*\*\* END OF PROGRAM \*\*\*\*\*  
40     \*\*\*\*\*  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57

611    SECONDS ELAPSED TIME

51      SECONDS CPU TIME USED

ETHCODE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0 =	0	270	16.4	16.4	16.4
1= A	1	60	3.6	3.6	20.0
2= H	2	648	39.4	39.4	59.4
3= J	3	77	4.7	4.7	64.1
4= K	4	37	2.2	2.2	66.3
5= N	5	554	33.7	33.7	100.0
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1646 MISSING CASES 0

BLKTRACT HIGH PERCENTAGE BLACK TRACT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
HIGH PERCENTAGE BLAC	1.00	1151	69.9	69.9	69.9
TOTAL		495	30.1	30.1	100.0
VALID CASES	1646	1646	100.0	100.0	

MISSING CASES 0

ETHSAMPLE SAMPLING FRAME

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
HISPANIC SURNAME	1.00	742	45.1	45.1	45.1
ASIAN SURNAME	2.00	174	10.6	10.6	55.7
KOREAN SUBSAMPLE	3.00	85	5.2	5.2	60.8
OTHER	4.00	645	39.2	39.2	100.0
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1646	MISSING CASES	0		

## VOTESTAT 'PARTICIPATE IN 1984 ELECTION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	1002	60.9	60.9	60.9
NO	2	643	39.1	39.1	100.0
DK/NA	0	1	.1	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1643	MISSING CASES	1		

## ZREGSTAT REGISTRATION STATUS IN 1984

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
REGISTERED	1. 00	1124	68.3	68.3	68.3
NOT REGISTERED	2. 00	518	31.5	31.5	100.0
DK/NA	.00	4	.2	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1642	MISSING CASES	4		

## ZPARTSTA PARTY REGISTRATION STATUS OF INDIVI

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
DEMOCRAT	1. 00	721	43.8	66.4	66.4
REPUBLICAN	2. 00	253	15.4	23.3	89.7
INDEPENDENT	3. 00	104	6.3	9.6	99.3
OTHER	4. 00	8	.5	.7	100.0
INAP	.00	522	31.7	MISSING	
DK/NA	8. 00	38	2.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1086	MISSING CASES	560		

SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VMS  
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MicroVAX-I VMS V4.3

CONTRIS 'CONTRIBUTE \$\$ TO POLITICAL UNIT IN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	276	16.8	16.9	16.9
NO	2	1358	82.5	83.1	100.0
DK/NA	0	12	.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1634 MISSING CASES 12

POLISHO 'EXHIBIT STICKER OR POSTER IN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	151	9.2	9.2	9.2
NO	2	1494	90.8	90.8	100.0
DK/NA	0	1	.1	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1645 MISSING CASES 1

POLIWORK 'POLI WORK ON CAMPAIGN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	72	4.4	4.4	4.4
NO	2	1571	95.4	95.6	100.0
DK/NA	0	3	.2	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1643 MISSING CASES 3

## POLIRALI 'ATTENDED POLITICAL RALLY 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	196	11.9	11.9	11.9
ND	2	1447	87.9	88.1	100.0
DK/NA	0	3	.2	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

VALID CASES 1643 MISSING CASES 3

PARTYID MICHIGAN PARTYID

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
STRONG DEMOCRAT	1.00	402	24.4	28.0	28.0
WEAK DEMOCRAT	2.00	344	20.9	24.0	51.9
LEANING DEMOCRAT	3.00	117	7.1	8.1	60.1
INDEPENDENT	4.00	117	7.1	8.1	68.2
LEANING REPUBLICAN	5.00	84	5.1	5.8	74.1
WEAK REPUBLICAN	6.00	162	9.8	11.3	85.4
STRONG REPUBLICAN	7.00	167	10.1	11.6	97.0
OTHER	8.00	43	2.6	3.0	100.0
DK/NA	0.00	210	12.8	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

VALID CASES 1436 MISSING CASES 210

TOEO 'CMCATE OPINION TO ELECTED OFFICIALS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FREQUENTLY	1	82	5.0	5.0	5.0
SELDOM	2	472	28.7	28.8	33.8
NEVER	3	1086	66.0	66.2	100.0
DK/NA	0	6	.4	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

VALID CASES 1640 MISSING CASES 6

## YPROB COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION PROBLEM

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
NATIONAL SECURITY	1. 00	2	.1	.3	.5
NUCLEAR WAR	2. 00	11	.7	2.5	2.9
GOVT SPENDING	3. 00	2	.1	.5	3.4
CENTRAL AMERICA	7. 00	2	.1	.5	3.8
WORLD HUNGER	9. 00	5	.3	1.1	5.0
INTL INCIDENT	11. 00	3	.2	.7	5.6
CRIME	12. 00	63	3.8	14.2	19.8
GANGS	13. 00	8	.5	1.8	21.6
DRUGS	14. 00	15	.9	3.4	25.0
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH	15. 00	34	2.1	7.7	32.7
RELIGIOUS RALLY	16. 00	1	.1	.2	32.9
PROPERTY CONDITIONS	17. 00	2	.1	.5	33.3
ABORTION	18. 00	5	.3	1.1	34.5
SCHOOL PROBS	20. 00	20	1.2	4.5	39.0
ROADS STREETS	21. 00	10	.6	2.3	41.2
HOUSING	22. 00	9	.5	2.0	43.2
RACIAL ETHNIC ISSUES	23. 00	13	.8	2.9	46.2
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION	25. 00	2	.1	.5	46.6
WOMENS RIGHTS	26. 00	2	.1	.5	47.1
UTILITY RATES	27. 00	1	.1	.2	47.3
TAXES	29. 00	3	.2	.7	48.0
SENIOR CITIZENS	35. 00	4	.2	.9	48.9
DUMPS ENVIRONMENT	37. 00	24	1.5	5.4	54.3
NUCLEAR REACTORS	38. 00	1	.1	.2	54.5
UNION RALLY	41. 00	3	.2	.7	55.2
PARKS	42. 00	4	.2	.9	56.1
RENT CONTROL	44. 00	5	.3	1.1	57.2
'REDEVELOPMENT	45. 00	14	.9	3.2	60.4
LIQUOR DRUNKENESS	46. 00	6	.4	1.4	61.7
LITTER	47. 00	16	1.0	3.6	65.3
FED BUDGET CUTS	48. 00	2	.1	.5	65.8
GUN CONTROL	49. 00	3	.2	.7	66.4
VOTING REGISTRATION	50. 00	17	1.0	3.8	70.3
TEENAGERS	51. 00	5	.3	1.1	71.4
HEALTH MED ISSUES	52. 00	2	.2	.9	72.3
EDUCATIONAL FUNDING	54. 00	6	.4	1.4	73.6
TRAFFIC CONTROL	55. 00	14	.9	3.2	76.8
AID TO DISABLED	58. 00	9	.5	2.0	78.8
POVERTY HOMELESS	59. 00	11	.7	2.9	81.3
GAY RIGHTS	60. 00	2	.1	.5	81.8
AGRICULTURE	61. 00	8	.5	1.8	83.6
POLICE PROBLEMS	62. 00	2	.1	.5	84.0
BUSING	64. 00	3	.2	.7	84.7
COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES	65. 00	7	.4	1.6	86.3
BATTERED WOMEN	66. 00	3	.2	1.7	86.9
YOUTH PROGRAMS	67. 00	5	.3	1.1	88.1
VIETNAM WAR	68. 00	2	.9	0.0	89.0

24-FEB-87  
18: 16: 43  
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ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB  
DEC MICROVAX-I VMS V4.3  
'CMCATE OPINION TO NEWSMEDIA'

## TONEWG 'CMCATE OPINION TO NEWMEDIA'

VALUE	LABEL	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	FREQUENTLY	2.3	2.3
2	SELDOM	18.3	18.4
3	NEVER	79.2	20.7
0	DK/NA	1	79.3
	MISSING		100.0

TO GROUP WORKED WITH GROUP AGAINST PROBLEM.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT
YES	1	456	27.7	27.8
NO	2	1185	72.0	72.2
DK/NA	0	5	.3	MISSING
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0

VALID CASES 1641 MISSING CASES 3

## YPROB COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION PROBLEM

CHILD ABUSE	70.00	2	1	1	1	5	89.4
THE ARTS	71.00	1	1	1	2	89.6	
XRATED VIDEOS	73.00	1	1	1	2	89.9	
HALT CONSTRUCTION	74.00	5	3	3	1.1	91.0	
DISCRIMINATION	75.00	4	2	2	9	91.9	
THE INS	77.00	1	1	1	2	92.1	
COMM. COLLEGES	78.00	1	1	1	2	92.3	
ZONING	79.00	4	2	2	9	93.2	
HALFWAY HOUSE	80.00	2	1	1	5	93.7	
ANIMAL SHELTER	81.00	1	1	1	2	93.9	
RED CROSS	82.00	1	1	1	2	94.1	
BIG BROTHER	84.00	1	1	1	2	94.4	
WORKING CONDITIONS	85.00	2	1	1	5	94.8	
MISC NGHBRHD ISSUE	86.00	11	7	2	5	97.3	
MISC	88.00	12	7	2	7	100.0	
TOTAL		1202	73.0	MISSING			
VALID CASES	444	MISSING CASES	1202				

## COMPROB TYPE OF COMM. ORG. PROBLEM

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CRIME	1.00	123	7.5	27.7	27.7
MORAL VALUES	2.00	14	.9	3.2	30.9
EDUCATION	3.00	35	2.1	7.9	38.7
TRANSIT, TRAFFIC	4.00	20	1.2	4.5	43.2
HOUSING/RENT CONTROL	5.00	25	1.5	5.6	48.9
ETHNIC, DOCUMENTA	6.00	24	1.5	5.4	54.3
POVERTY, WELFARE	7.00	29	1.8	6.5	60.8
POLLUTION, LITTER	8.00	40	2.4	9.0	69.8
POL. ORGANISATION	9.00	18	1.1	4.1	73.9
WORLD/NATIONAL ISSUES	10.00	47	2.9	10.6	84.5
MISCELLANEOUS	11.00	69	4.2	15.5	100.0
INAP	98.00	1140	72.3	MISSING	
DK/NA	98.00	12	.7	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	444	MISSING CASES	1202		

RELICION RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CATHOLIC	1. 00	717	43. 6	44. 9	44. 9
JEWISH	2. 00	20	1. 2	1. 3	46. 1
PROTESTANT	3. 00	607	36. 9	36. 0	84. 2
CHRISTIAN: GENERAL	4. 00	52	3. 2	3. 3	87. 4
BUDDHIST	5. 00	45	2. 7	2. 8	90. 2
OTHER	6. 00	58	3. 5	3. 6	93. 9
NUKE	7. 00	98	6. 0	6. 1	100. 0
DK/NA	. 00	49	3. 0	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100. 0	100. 0	

VALID CASES 1597 MISSING CASES 49

EVANPROT EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
EVANGELICAL	1. 00	292	17. 7	17. 7	17. 7
NOT EVANGELICAL	2. 00	315	19. 1	19. 1	36. 9
NOT PROTESTANT	3. 00	1039	63. 1	63. 1	100. 0
TOTAL		1646	100. 0	100. 0	

VALID CASES 1646 MISSING CASES 0

## PROTDNOM PROTESTANT DENOMINATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PRESBYTERIAN	1.00	52	3.2	8.6	8.6
LUTHERAN	2.00	26	1.6	4.3	12.9
CONGREGATIONAL	3.00	3	.2	.5	13.3
EPISCOPALIAN	4.00	14	.9	2.3	15.7
METHODIST	5.00	44	2.7	7.2	22.9
BAPTIST	6.00	197	12.0	32.5	55.4
SOUTHERN BAPTIST	7.00	5	.3	.8	56.2
CHURCH OF GOD	8.00	7	.4	1.2	57.3
PENTECOSTAL	9.00	33	2.0	5.4	62.8
AME	10.00	5	.3	.8	63.6
CHURCH OF CHRIST	11.00	13	.8	2.1	65.7
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST	12.00	10	.6	1.6	67.4
MORMON LDS	13.00	14	.9	2.3	69.7
UNITARIAN	14.00	3	.2	.5	70.2
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES	15.00	22	1.3	3.6	73.8
OTHER PROTESTANT	16.00	35	2.1	5.8	79.6
PROT. IN GENERAL	17.00	124	7.5	20.4	100.0
	.00	1039	63.1	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1646 MISSING CASES 1039

## EDU 'LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0-8 YEARS	1	129	7.8	7.9	7.9
SOME HIGH SCHOOL	2	163	10.0	10.1	17.9
HIGH SCHOOL GRAD	3	452	27.5	27.6	45.5
SOME COLLEGE	4	512	31.1	31.2	76.8
SOME TRAINING/TRADE	5	42	2.6	2.6	79.3
COMPLETED COLLEGE	6	239	14.5	14.6	93.9
GRADUATE WORK	7	100	6.1	6.1	100.0
DK/NA	0	7	.4	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1639 MISSING CASES 7

## MARSTAT 'MARRITAL STATUS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
SINGLE	1	583	35.4	35.5	35.5
MARRIED	2	778	47.3	47.4	82.9
DIVORCED	3	143	8.7	8.7	91.6
WIDOWED	4	114	6.9	6.9	98.5
LIVING TOGETHER	5	6	4	4	98.9
OTHER	6	18	1.1	1.1	100.0
DK/NA	0	4	.2	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1642 MISSING CASES 4

## YNGSTAT 'HAVE CHILDREN'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	962	58.4	58.5	58.5
NO	2	683	41.5	41.5	100.0
DK/NA	0	1	1	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1645 MISSING CASES 1

YNG# 'NUMBER OF CHILDREN'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1 CHILD	1	248	15.1	25.9	25.9
2 CHILDREN	2	321	19.5	33.5	59.5
3 CHILDREN	3	194	11.8	20.3	79.7
4 CHILDREN	4	99	6.0	10.3	90.1
5 CHILDREN	5	43	2.6	4.5	94.6
MORE THAN 5 CHILDREN	6	52	3.2	5.4	100.0
INAP	0	684	41.6	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	5	.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 957 MISSING CASES 689

YNG#EDU 'NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN SCHOOL'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
NO CHILDREN	0	449	27.3	48.6	48.6
1 CHILD	1	203	12.3	22.0	70.6
2 CHILDREN	2	176	10.7	19.0	89.6
3 CHILDREN	3	66	4.0	7.1	96.8
4 CHILDREN	4	21	1.3	2.3	99.0
5 CHILDREN	5	6	.4	.6	99.7
MORE THAN 5 CHILDREN	6	38	2.3	3	100.0
DK/NA	9	684	41.6	MISSING	
INAP					
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 924 MISSING CASES 722

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 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB  
 DEC MicroVAX-I VMS V4.3

## YNGCOL 'WILL CHILDREN GO TO COLLEGE'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WILL GO	1	370	22.5	82.4	82.4
SOME WILL/SOME WON'T	2	50	3.0	11.1	93.5
WON'T GO	3	29	1.8	6.3	100.0
INAP	0	1171	71.1	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	26	1.6	MISSING	
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	1646		100.0	100.0	
MISSING CASES	1197				

## ENR\$ 'HOST IMP SOURCE OF INCOME'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
RESPONDENT	1	1025	62.3	63.0	63.0
SOMEONE ELSE	2	601	36.5	37.0	100.0
DK/NA	0	20	1.2	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1626				
MISSING CASES	20				

ZERNLIN 'IMP INCOME-EARNER' S RELSHIP TO RESP:

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PARENTS	1	16	1.0	2.7	2.7	
DAD/ FATHER	2	162	9.8	27.4	30.1	
MOTHER	3	55	3.3	9.3	39.4	
HUSBAND	4	281	17.1	47.5	87.0	
WIFE	5	19	1.2	3.2	90.2	
BROTHER	6	10	.6	1.7	91.9	
SISTER	7	11	.7	1.9	93.7	
SPOUSE	8	2	.1	.3	94.1	
COUSIN	9	5	.3	.6	94.9	
UNCLE	10	2	.1	.3	95.3	
AUNT	11	00	3	.2	95.8	
GRANDFATHER	12	00	3	.2	96.3	
GRANDMOTHER	13	00	2	.1	96.6	
BOYFRIEND	14	00	2	.1	97.0	
EX-HUSBAND	15	00	1	.1	97.1	
PRIVATE	16	00	1	.1	97.3	
STEPFATHER	17	00	1	.1	97.5	
SON	18	00	5	.3	98.3	
DAUGHTER	19	00	3	.2	98.6	
SCHOOL	20	00	1	.1	99.0	
FRIEND	21	00	3	.2	99.5	
SON-IN-LAW	22	00	1	.1	99.7	
FIANCE	23	00	1	.1	99.8	
OTHER	26	00	1	.1	100.0	
INAP	98	00	1045	63.5	MISSING	
DK/NA			10	.6	MISSING	
VALID CASES	591	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
MISSING CASES	1055					

EMPSTAT 'RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WORKING	1	707	43.0	69.1	69.1
UNEMPLOYED/LAID OFF	2	92	5.6	9.0	78.1
HOUSEWIFE	3	16	1.0	1.6	79.7
STUDENT	4	14	.9	1.4	81.0
RETired	5	173	10.5	16.9	97.9
OTHER	6	21	1.3	2.1	100.0
INAP	0	621	37.7	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	2	.1	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1023 MISSING CASES 623

OCCU 'RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PROF/TECHNICAL	1	202	12.3	28.6	28.6
MANAGERIAL	2	81	4.9	11.5	40.0
SALES	3	44	2.7	6.2	46.3
CLERICAL	4	73	4.4	10.3	56.6
CRAFTSMEN	5	78	4.7	11.0	67.6
OPERATIVES	6	57	3.5	8.1	75.7
SERVICE WORKER	7	64	3.9	9.1	84.7
LABORER	8	100	6.1	14.1	98.9
OTHER	9	8	.5	1.1	100.0
INAP	0	939	57.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 707 MISSING CASES 939

## UNEMP 'RESPONDENT UNEMPLOYED IN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	82	5.0	11.6	11.6
NO	2	622	37.9	88.4	100.0
INAP	0	939	57.0	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	3	.2	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	764	MISSING CASES	942		

## UMEM 'RESPONDENT' S UNION MEMBERSHIP'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
UNION	1	197	12.0	19.3	19.3
TEACHERS' ASSO	2	35	2.1	3.4	22.7
NO	3	788	47.9	77.3	100.0
INAP	0	621	37.7	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	5	.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1020	MISSING CASES	626		

REMPSTAT 'RELATIVE'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WORKING	1	483	29.3	81.0	81.0
UNEMPLOYED/LAID OFF	2	36	2.2	6.0	87.1
HOUSEWIFE	3	3	.2	.5	87.6
STUDENT	4	3	.2	.5	88.1
RETIRER	5	62	3.8	10.4	98.5
OTHER	6	9	.5	1.5	100.0
INAP	0	1045	63.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	5	.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 596 MISSING CASES 1050

ROCCU 'RELATIVE'S OCCUPATION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PROF/TECHNICAL	1	98	6.0	20.3	20.3
MANAGERIAL	2	69	4.2	14.3	34.6
SALES	3	29	1.8	6.0	40.6
CLERICAL	4	32	1.9	6.6	47.2
CRAFTSMEN	5	64	3.9	13.3	60.5
OPERATIVES	6	41	2.5	8.5	68.9
SERVICE WORKER	7	39	2.4	8.1	77.0
LABORER	8	70	5.5	18.6	95.7
OTHER	9	21	1.3	4.3	100.0
INAP	0	1163	70.7	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 483 MISSING CASES 1163

## RUNEMP 'RELATIVE UNEMPLOYED IN 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	44	2.7	9.2	9.2
NO	2	432	26.2	90.8	100.0
INAP	0	1163	70.7	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	7	.4	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 476 MISSING CASES 1170

## RUNEM 'RELATIVE' S UNION MEMBERSHIP

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
UNION	1	160	10.9	31.5	31.5
TEACHERS' ASSO	2	12	.7	2.1	33.6
NO	3	380	23.1	66.4	100.0
INAP	0	1043	63.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	29	1.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 572 MISSING CASES 1074

## HEMPSTAT HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYMENT STATUS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WORKING	1.00	1190	72.3	73.3	73.3
UNEMPLOYED/LAID OFF	2.00	128	7.8	7.9	81.4
HOUSEWIFE	3.00	19	1.2	1.2	82.6
STUDENT	4.00	17	1.0	1.1	83.6
RETIRRED	5.00	235	14.3	14.5	98.1
OTHER	6.00	30	1.8	1.9	100.0
DK/NA	0.00	27	1.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1619 MISSING CASES 27

HOCCU HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OCCUPATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PROF/TECHNICAL	1. 00	300	18.2	25.2	25.2
MANAGERIAL	2. 00	150	9.1	12.6	37.8
SALES	3. 00	73	4.4	6.1	43.9
CLERICAL	4. 00	105	6.4	8.8	52.8
CRAFTSMEN	5. 00	142	8.6	11.9	64.7
OPERATIVES	6. 00	98	6.0	8.2	72.9
SERVICE WORKER	7. 00	103	6.3	8.7	81.6
LABOURER	8. 00	150	11.5	16.0	97.6
OTHER	9. 00	29	1.8	2.4	100.0
NOT IN LABOUR FORCE	. 00	456	27.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1190 MISSING CASES 456

HUNEMP HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD UNEMPLOYED IN 84

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1. 00	126	7.7	10.7	10.7
NO	2. 00	1054	64.0	89.3	100.0
NOT IN LABOUR FORCE	. 00	466	28.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1180 MISSING CASES 466

HUDEM HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S UNION MEMBERSHIP

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
UNION	1	377	22.9	23.7	23.7
TEACHERS ASSO	2	47	2.9	3.0	26.6
ND	3	1168	71.0	73.4	100.0
DK/NA	0	54	3.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1592	MISSING CASES	54		

RACE 'RACIAL GROUP -- RGROUP1'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WHITE	1	433	26.3	26.4	26.4
BLACK	2	330	20.0	20.1	46.6
ASIAN	3	277	16.8	16.9	63.5
PACIFIC ISLANDER	4	27	1.6	1.6	65.1
AMERICAN INDIAN	5	25	1.5	1.5	66.6
OTHER	6	547	33.2	33.4	100.0
DK/NA	7	4	MISSING		
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1592	MISSING CASES	54		

## NATLITY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
BLACK	1. 00	331	20. 1	21. 2	21. 2
MEXICAN	2. 00	34	2. 1	2. 2	23. 4
FILIPINO	3. 00	304	30. 6	32. 3	55. 7
CHINESE	4. 00	50	3. 0	3. 2	58. 9
JAPANESE	5. 00	63	3. 9	4. 2	63. 0
KOREAN	6. 00	66	4. 0	4. 2	67. 3
VIETNAMESE	7. 00	89	5. 4	5. 7	73. 0
INDIAN	8. 00	13	. 8	. 8	73. 8
ISRAELI	9. 00	6	. 4	. 4	74. 2
ARMENIAN	10. 00	1	. 1	. 1	74. 4
PALESTINIAN	11. 00	3	. 2	. 2	74. 6
ENGLISH	12. 00	1	. 1	. 1	74. 4
SWISS	13. 00	3	. 2	. 2	74. 6
POLISH	14. 00	50	3. 0	3. 2	77. 8
SPANISH	15. 00	46	2. 8	2. 9	80. 8
SCOTTISH	16. 00	16	1. 0	1. 0	81. 8
GERMAN	17. 00	48	2. 9	3. 1	84. 9
FRENCH	18. 00	12	. 7	. 8	85. 7
DUTCH	19. 00	20	. 3	. 2	85. 8
ITALIAN	20. 00	3	. 2	. 2	85. 8
PORTUGUESE	21. 00	6	. 4	. 4	86. 2
SPANISH	22. 00	23	. 9	. 5	86. 8
RUSSIAN	23. 00	6	. 4	. 4	87. 2
RUMANIAN	24. 00	25	1. 5	1. 6	88. 8
HUNGARIAN	25. 00	15	1. 9	1. 0	89. 8
NORWEGIAN	26. 00	27	1. 6	1. 7	91. 5
AUSTRIAN	27. 00	7	. 4	. 4	91. 9
GREEK	28. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 0
FINNISH	29. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 0
YUGOSLAVIAN	30. 00	3	. 2	. 2	92. 2
BALTIC	31. 00	3	. 2	. 2	92. 4
MEDITERRANEAN	32. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 4
SLOVAK	33. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 5
SCANDINAVIAN	34. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 5
EUROPEAN	35. 00	4	. 2	. 3	92. 8
EASTERN EUROPEAN	36. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 8
CANADIAN	37. 00	1	. 1	. 1	92. 9
AUSTRALIAN	38. 00	1	. 1	. 1	93. 3
SALVADORAN	39. 00	2	. 1	. 1	93. 5
NICARAGUAN	40. 00	2	. 1	. 1	93. 5
GUATEMALAN	41. 00	2	. 1	. 1	93. 5
PUERTO RICAN	42. 00	2	. 1	. 1	93. 6
CUBAN	43. 00	2	. 1	. 1	94. 3
COSTA RICAN	44. 00	3	. 2	. 2	94. 5
JAMAICAN	45. 00	3	. 2	. 2	94. 7



ETHNICID ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WHITE	1.00	317	19.3	19.3	19.3
BLACK	2.00	335	20.4	20.4	39.6
HISPANIC	3.00	574	34.9	34.9	74.5
ASIAN-AMERICAN	4.00	308	18.7	18.7	93.2
OTHER/W ASIAN/AM IND	5.00	41	2.5	2.5	95.7
NOT ASCERTAINED	6.00	71	4.3	4.3	100.0
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1646 MISSING CASES 0

ASAM ASIAN-AMERICAN GROUPS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FILIPINO	1.00	50	3.0	16.5	16.5
CHINESE	2.00	65	3.9	21.5	38.0
JAPANESE	3.00	66	4.0	21.6	59.7
KOREAN	4.00	69	5.4	29.4	89.1
VietNAMESE	5.00	13	.8	4.3	93.4
OTHER ASIAN-AMERICAN	6.00	20	1.2	6.6	100.0
INAP		1343	81.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 303 MISSING CASES 1343

## HISPID HISPANIC GROUP ID

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1.00	MEXICAN	1.00	513	31.2	31.2	31.2
2.00	NON-MEXICAN	2.00	44	2.7	2.7	33.8
3.00	UNSPECIFIED HISPANIC	3.00	16	1.0	1.0	34.8
4.00	NON-HISPANIC	4.00	1073	65.2	65.2	100.0
	TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
	VALID CASES		1646			
	MISSING CASES		0			

ZUEP 'BIGGEST PROBLEM OF USA'

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	THREAT/NUCLEAR WAR	1.00	190	11.5	13.2	13.2
2	ARMS RACE	2.00	2	.1	.1	.1
3	SOVIET/COMM THREAT	3.00	6	.4	.4	1.3
4	RELS W/ SOVIET UNION	4.00	8	.5	.6	1.8
5	TOO MUCH DEF EXPENDI	5.00	4	.2	.3	2.1
6	TOO LITTLE DEF EXPEND	6.00	3	.2	.2	2.3
7	WAR: C. AMERICA	7.00	3	.2	.2	2.5
8	WAR: MIDDLE EAST	8.00	1	.1	.1	2.6
9	WORLD HUNGER	9.00	31	1.9	2.2	4.8
10	FGN AFFAIRS: GEN	11.00	12	.7	.8	5.6
11	CRIME	12.00	129	7.8	9.0	14.4
12	YOUTH GANGS	13.00	14	.9	1.0	15.3
13	DRUGS, ALCOHOLISM	14.00	69	4.2	4.8	19.1
14	SELFISHNESS	15.00	11	.7	.8	19.9
15	LACK: RELI/MORALITY	16.00	16	1.0	1.1	21.0
16	TOO MUCH WELFARE	17.00	9	.5	.6	21.6
17	ABORTION	18.00	1	.1	.1	22.7
18	INTERF/RELI IN PA	19.00	6	.4	.4	23.1
19	EDUCATION	20.00	29	1.8	2.0	25.9
20	MASS TRANSIT	21.00	2	.1	.1	26.0
21	HOUSING HOMELESSNESS	22.00	12	.7	.8	26.8
22	RACE/ETH DISCRIMINA	23.00	32	1.9	2.2	29.0
23	RACE RELATIONS	24.00	8	.5	.6	29.6
24	ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION	25.00	15	.9	1.0	30.5
25	HIGH COST OF LIVING	27.00	65	3.9	4.5	34.4
26	INFLATION	28.00	53	3.2	3.7	38.1
27	HIGH TAXES	29.00	35	2.1	2.4	38.9
28	HIGH INTEREST RATES	30.00	1	.1	.1	39.0
29	UNEMPLOYMENT	31.00	326	19.8	22.7	61.7
30	LARGE GOVT DEFICIT	32.00	32	1.9	2.2	63.9
31	TRADE, BAL/PAYMENTS	33.00	1	.1	.1	64.0
32	PROTECTIONISM	34.00	2	.1	.1	64.1
33	SSEC/MEDICARE	35.00	25	1.5	1.7	65.8
34	ECO: GEN	36.00	158	9.6	11.0	76.8
35	ENVIRONMENT/POLLU	37.00	14	.9	1.0	77.7
36	NUCLEAR POWR PLANTS	38.00	4	.2	.3	78.9
37	UTILITY BANKRUPTCIS	39.00	2	.1	.1	79.0
38	LABOR PROBLEMS	41.00	4	.2	.3	79.2
39	REAGAN GOVT POLICY	42.00	25	1.5	1.7	79.9
40	POVERTY INEQUALITY	43.00	27	1.6	1.9	81.5
41	LOSS OF ETH. HERITAG	44.00	5	.3	.3	81.8
42	POLITICAL APATHY	45.00	5	.3	.3	82.1
43	FAMILY RELATED	46.00	10	.6	.7	82.7
44	LIBERALISM	47.00	5	.3	.3	83.0
45	MEDICAL COSTS	48.00	6	.4	.4	83.4
46	OTHER	49.00	17	1.0	1.2	84.6
47	DK/NA	50.00	0	0	0	100.0
48	MISSING	51.00	128	12.8	12.8	100.0

24-FEB-87 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VMS  
18:16:47 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MICROVAX-I VMS V4.3

ZVSP  
`BIGGEST PROBLEM OF USA'

VALID CASES 1435 MISSING CASES 211

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IFRACEP SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GROUPING

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	717	43.6	46.3	46.3
NO	2	831	50.5	53.7	100.0
DK/NA	0	98	6.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

## ZRACEP 'BIGGEST PROBLEM OF RGROUP1'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
THREAT/NUCLEAR WAR	1. 00	13	.8	2.0	2.0
SOVIET/COMM THREAT	3. 00	4	.2	.6	2.6
TOO LITTLE DEF EXPEND	6. 00	1	.1	.2	2.8
MAR: C AMERICA	7. 00	6	.4	.9	3.7
MAR: MIDDLE EAST	8. 00	5	.3	.8	4.5
WORLD HUNGER	9. 00	2	.1	.3	4.8
FGN AFFAIRS: GEN	11. 00	4	.2	.6	5.4
CRIME	12. 00	17	1.0	2.6	8.0
YOUTH GANGS	13. 00	12	.7	1.8	9.8
DRUGS, ALCOHOLISM	14. 00	14	.9	2.2	12.0
SELFISHNESS	15. 00	5	.3	.8	12.7
LACK: RELI/MORALITY	16. 00	3	.2	.5	13.2
TOO MUCH WELFARE	17. 00	1	.1	.2	13.4
EDUCATION	20. 00	71	4.3	10.9	24.3
HOUSING HOMELESSNESS	22. 00	5	.3	.8	25.0
RACE/ETH DISCRIMINA	23. 00	130	7.9	20.0	45.0
RACE RELATIONS	24. 00	28	1.7	4.3	49.3
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION	25. 00	22	1.3	3.4	52.7
DISCRIMINA VS WOMEN	26. 00	2	.1	.3	53.0
HIGH COST OF LIVING	27. 00	11	.7	1.7	54.7
INFLATION	28. 00	3	.2	.5	55.1
HIGH TAXES	29. 00	4	.2	.6	55.8
UNEMPLOYMENT	31. 00	177	10.8	27.2	82.9
LARGE GOVT DEFICIT	32. 00	1	.1	.2	83.1
PROTECTIONISM	34. 00	2	.1	.3	83.4
SSEC/MEDICARE	35. 00	2	.1	.3	83.7
ECO: GEN	36. 00	33	2.0	5.1	88.8
ENVIRONMENT/POLLU	37. 00	2	.1	.3	89.1
BIG BUSI/CORPS	40. 00	2	.1	.3	89.4
POVERTY INEQUALITY	43. 00	5	.3	.8	90.2
LOSS OF ETH. HERITAGE	44. 00	25	1.5	3.8	94.0
POLITICAL APATHY	45. 00	11	.7	1.7	95.7
FAMILY RELATED	46. 00	6	.4	.9	96.6
PROBS IN PHILLIPINES	50. 00	3	.2	.5	97.1
PROBS IN IRELAND	51. 00	2	.1	.3	97.4
WWII REPARATIONS	52. 00	3	.2	.5	97.8
OTHER	97. 00	14	.9	2.2	100.0
INAP	98. 00	928	56.4	MISSING	
DK/NA	98. 00	67	4.1	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	651	MISSING CASES	995		

PSOLGOV 'GOVT REQD TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF RGRP1'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
NO GOVT ACTION REQD	1	112	6.8	18.2	18.2
GOVT ACTION REQD	2	504	30.6	81.8	100.0
INAP	0	929	56.4	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	101	6.1	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

VALID CASES 616 MISSING CASES 1030

PODVLEV 'GOVT LEVEL TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF RGRP1'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FED GOVT	1	87	5.3	17.4	17.4
STATE GOVT	2	34	2.1	6.8	24.2
LOCAL GOVT	3	16	1.0	3.2	27.5
ALL LEVELS OF GOVT	4	361	21.9	72.3	99.8
STATE & LOCAL GOVT	6	1	.1	.2	100.0
INAP	0	1142	69.4	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	5	.3	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

VALID CASES 499 MISSING CASES 1147

24-FEB-87 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VMS  
18:16:48 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MicroVAX-I VMS V4.3

ZPSOLGRP ' IF OTHER GRP TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF RGRPI '

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1.00	PRIVATE BUSINESS	1.00	13	.8	12.5	12.5
2.00	GROUP WORK TOGETHER	2.00	57	3.5	54.8	67.3
3.00	INDIVIDUALS	3.00	29	1.8	27.9	95.2
4.00	SOMETHING ELSE	4.00	5	.3	4.6	100.0
.00	INAP	.00	1534	93.2	MISSING	
8.00	DK/NA	8.00	6	.5	MISSING	

VALID CASES	104	MISSING CASES	1542
IFORP2	'ANY OTHER GROUP OF ID OR RGROUP2'		

VALID PERCENT	PERCENT	FREQUENCY	VALUE	VALUE LABEL
16.9	16.2	267	1	YES
83.2	80.4	1324	2	NO
MISSING	3.3	55	0	DK/NA
100.0	100.0	1646	TOTAL	

VALID CASES 1591 MISSING CASES 555

MISSING CASES 55

ZORP2 'OTHER GROUP OF ID OR RGROUPL'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WOMEN	2	2.00	16	1.0	6.5
BLACKS	3	3.00	21	1.3	8.6
WHITES	4	4.00	4	2	1.6
DISABLED	9	9.00	2	1	.8
BUSINESSMEN	10	10.00	2	1	.8
UNION MEMBERS	12	12.00	5	3	2.0
FARMERS	13	13.00	2	1	.8
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14	14.00	3	2	1.2
TEACHERS	15	15.00	5	3	2.0
STUDENTS	16	16.00	7	4	2.9
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	17	19.00	8	5	3.3
UNEMPLOYED	22	22.00	4	2	1.6
EMPLOYED	23	23.00	5	3	2.0
WORKING WOMEN	24	24.00	2	1	.8
ASIAN AMERICANS	25	25.00	5	3	2.0
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26	26.00	42	2.6	17.1
NON-ENG SPEAKERS	27	27.00	1	1	.4
JEWS	28	28.00	9	5	3.7
CATHOLICS	29	29.00	7	4	2.9
BORN-Again CHRISTNS	30	30.00	9	5	3.7
RELI PEOPLE	31	31.00	33	2.0	13.5
VETS	32	32.00	2	1	.8
ALCOHOLICS	33	33.00	3	2	1.2
HOMOSEXUALS	34	34.00	4	2	1.6
ENVIRONMENTALISTS	37	37.00	2	1	.8
SINGLE PARENTS	38	38.00	2	1	.8
YUPPIES	39	39.00	1	1	.4
BABY-BOOM GENERA	40	40.00	1	1	.4
OTHER OCCUPA GRPS	41	41.00	7	4	2.9
NO PARTICULAR GRP	42	42.00	2	1	.8
AMERICAN INDIANS	43	43.00	3	2	1.2
LOWER CLASS	46	46.00	8	5	3.3
OTHER	97	97.00	18	11	7.3
INAP	98	98.00	22	13	MISSING
DK/NA					
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	245	MISSING CASES	1401		

ZCRP2P 'BIGGEST PROBLEM OF RGROUP2'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
THREAT/NUCLEAR WAR	1.00	2	.1	.9	.9
ARMS RACE	2.00	1	.1	.4	1.3
MAR: MIDDLE EAST	8.00	1	.1	.4	1.7
WORLD HUNGER	9.00	10	.6	4.3	6.0
FGN AFFAIRS: GEN	11.00	1	.1	.4	6.4
CRIME	12.00	6	.4	2.6	9.0
YOUTH GANGS	13.00	1	.1	.4	9.4
DRUGS, ALCOHOLISM	14.00	4	.2	1.7	11.1
SELFISHNESS	15.00	2	.1	.9	12.0
LACK: RELI/MORALITY	16.00	19	1.2	8.1	20.1
TOO MUCH WELFARE	17.00	1	.1	.4	20.5
ABORTION	18.00	3	.2	1.3	21.8
INTERF/RELI IN PA	19.00	3	.2	1.3	23.1
EDUCATION	20.00	20	1.2	8.5	31.6
HOUSING/HOMELESSNESS	22.00	3	.2	1.3	32.9
RACE/ETH DISCRIMINA	23.00	23	1.4	9.8	42.7
RACE RELATIONS	24.00	6	.4	2.6	45.3
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION	25.00	9	.5	3.8	49.1
DISCRIMINA VS WOMEN	26.00	8	.5	3.4	52.6
HIGH COST OF LIVING	27.00	16	1.0	6.8	59.4
INFLATION	28.00	1	.1	.4	59.8
HIGH TAXES	29.00	2	.1	.9	60.7
HIGH INTEREST RATES	30.00	2	.1	.9	61.5
UNEMPLOYMENT	31.00	31	1.9	13.2	74.8
LARGE GOVT DEFICIT	32.00	2	.1	.9	75.6
PROTECTIONISM	34.00	2	.1	.9	76.5
SSEC/HECICARE	35.00	5	.3	2.1	78.6
ECG GEN	36.00	7	.4	3.0	81.6
ENVIRONMENT/POLLU	37.00	3	.2	1.3	82.9
LABOR PROBLEMS	41.00	3	.2	1.3	84.2
REAGAN GOVT POLICY	42.00	3	.2	1.3	85.5
POVERTY INEQUALITY	43.00	10	.6	4.3	89.7
LOSS OF ETH. HERITAC	44.00	3	.2	1.3	91.0
FAMILY RELATED	46.00	5	.3	2.1	93.2
PAY EQUALITY	54.00	6	.4	2.6	95.7
AIDS PROBS OF GAYS	55.00	2	.1	.9	96.6
OTHER	97.00	8	.5	3.4	100.0
INAP	98.00	1379	83.8	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA	98.00	33	2.0	MISSING	MISSING
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	100.0
VALID CASES	234	MISSING CASES	1412		

## P2SOL.GOV 'GOVT READ TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF RORP2'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
NO GOVT ACTION REQD	1	58	3.5	25.4	25.4
GOVT ACTION REQD	2	170	10.3	74.6	100.0
INAP	0	1379	83.8	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA	8	39	2.4		
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 228 MISSING CASES 1418

## P2GOVLEV 'GOVT LEVEL TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF RORP2'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FED GOVT	1	27	1.6	16.0	16.0
STATE GOVT	2	11	.7	6.5	22.5
LOCAL GOVT	3	6	.4	3.6	26.0
ALL LEVELS OF GOVT	4	124	7.5	73.4	99.4
FED & STATE GOVT	5	1	.1	.6	100.0
INAP	0	1476	89.7	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA	8	1	.1		
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 169 MISSING CASES 1477

ZP2SQLCR 'IF OTHR GRP TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF RGRP2'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PRIVATE BUSINESS	1. 00	3	.2	5.8	5.8
GRUP WORK TOGETHER	2. 00	34	2.1	65.4	71.2
INDIVIDUALS	3. 00	12	.7	23.1	94.2
SOMETHING ELSE	4. 00	3	.2	5.8	100.0
INAP	.00	1568	96.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8. 00	6	.4	MISSING	
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	52	MISSING CASES	1594		
				100.0	100.0

IFLOLUC 'GROUPS WITH FEWER OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	905	55.0	58.7	58.7
MAYBE/DEPENDS	2	45	2.7	2.9	61.6
NO	3	592	36.0	38.4	100.0
DK/NA	0	104	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1542	MISSING CASES	104		
				100.0	100.0

## ZL0LUC1 'GROUP WITH FEWER OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MEN	1. 00	3	.2	.4	.4
WOMEN	2. 00	42	2.6	5.5	5.9
BLACKS	3. 00	295	17.9	39.0	44.9
WHITES	4. 00	12	.7	1.6	46.5
WHITE MEN	5. 00	2	.1	.3	46.8
WHITE WOMEN	6. 00	2	.1	.3	47.0
BLACK MEN	7. 00	3	.2	.4	47.4
DISABLED	9. 00	7	.4	.9	48.3
BUSINESMEN	10. 00	1	.1	.1	48.5
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14. 00	24	1.5	3.2	51.7
STUDENTS	16. 00	17	1.0	2.2	53.9
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	19. 00	15	.9	2.0	55.9
SOCSEC RECIPIENTS	20. 00	5	.3	.7	56.5
WELFARE RECIPIENTS	21. 00	7	.4	.9	57.5
UNEMPLOYED	22. 00	15	.9	2.0	59.4
EMPLOYED	23. 00	3	.2	.4	59.8
WORKING WOMEN	24. 00	2	.1	.3	60.1
ASIAN AMERICANS	25. 00	20	1.2	2.6	62.7
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26. 00	121	7.4	16.0	78.7
NON-ENG SPEAKERS	27. 00	14	.9	1.8	80.6
CATHOLICS	28. 00	1	.1	.1	80.7
JEWS	29. 00	1	.1	.1	80.8
VETS	32. 00	1	.1	.1	81.0
VIETNAM VETS	33. 00	1	.1	.1	81.1
SINGLE PARENTS	38. 00	2	.1	.3	81.4
YOUNG PEOPLE	40. 00	4	.2	.5	81.9
NO PARTICULAR GRP	42. 00	6	.4	.8	82.7
MINORITIES	44. 00	46	2.8	6.1	88.8
AMERICAN INDIANS	45. 00	36	2.2	4.8	93.5
LOWER CLASS	46. 00	36	2.2	4.8	98.3
UPPER/MIDDLE CLASS	47. 00	4	.2	.5	98.8
OTHER	97. 00	9	.5	1.2	100.0
INAP	98. 00	693	42.2	MISSING	
DK/NA		194	11.8	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	757				
MISSING CASES	889				

ZL0LUC2 OTHER GROUP WITH FEWER OPPORTUNITIES

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WOMEN	2. 00	18	1.1	5.0	5.0
BLACKS	3. 00	77	4.7	21.2	26.2
WHITES	4. 00	3	.2	.8	27.0
WHITE WOMEN	5. 00	1	.1	.3	27.3
DISABLED	6. 00	6	.4	1.7	28.9
FARMERS	13. 00	1	.1	.3	29.2
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14. 00	11	.7	3.0	32.2
STUDENTS	16. 00	2	.1	.6	32.8
TAXPAYERS	17. 00	1	.1	.3	33.1
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	19. 00	9	.5	2.5	35.5
SOCSEC RECIPIENTS	20. 00	2	.1	.6	36.1
WELFARE RECEIPIENTS	21. 00	1	.1	.3	36.4
UNEMPLOYED	22. 00	10	.6	2.8	39.1
EMPLOYED	23. 00	1	.1	.3	39.4
ASIAN AMERICANS	25. 00	32	1.9	8.8	48.2
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26. 00	148	9.0	40.8	89.0
NON-ENG SPEAKERS	27. 00	6	.4	1.7	90.6
JEWS	29. 00	2	.1	.6	91.2
RELI PEOPLE	31. 00	1	.1	.3	91.5
ENVIRONMENTALISTS	37. 00	1	.1	.3	91.7
SINGLE PARENTS	38. 00	1	.1	.3	92.0
YOUNG PEOPLE	40. 00	1	.1	.3	92.3
MINORITIES	44. 00	9	.5	2.5	94.8
AMERICAN INDIANS	45. 00	12	.7	3.3	98.1
LOWER CLASS	46. 00	7	.4	1.9	100.0
INAP	.00	879	53.4	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA	98. 00	404	24.5	-----	-----
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 363

MISSING CASES 1283

24-FEB-87 SPES-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VME  
 18:16:50 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MITSOVAX-I VMS V4.3

## ZL01VU3 'OTHER GROUP WITH FEWER OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WOMEN	2. 00	10	.6	9.0	9.0
BLACKS	3. 00	14	.9	12.6	21.6
WHITES	4. 00	4	.2	3.6	25.2
BLACK MEN	7. 00	1	.1	.9	26.1
BLACK WOMEN	8. 00	1	.1	.9	27.0
DISABLED	9. 00	3	.2	2.7	29.7
UNION MEMBERS	12. 00	1	.1	.9	30.6
FARMERS	13. 00	1	.1	.9	31.5
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14. 00	3	.2	2.7	34.2
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	19. 00	5	.3	4.5	38.7
ASIAN AMERICANS	25. 00	18	1.1	16.2	55.0
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26. 00	31	1.9	27.9	82.9
IND-ENG SPEAKERS	27. 00	1	.1	.9	83.8
RELI PEOPLE	31. 00	1	.1	.9	84.7
VETS	32. 00	1	.1	.9	85.6
NO PARTICULAR GRP	42. 00	1	.1	.9	86.5
MINORITIES	44. 00	3	.2	2.7	89.2
AMERICAN INDIANS	45. 00	9	.5	6.1	97.3
LOWER CLASS	46. 00	2	.1	1.8	99.1
OTHER	97. 00	1	.1	.9	100.0
INAP	98. 00	1279	77.7	MISSING	
DK/NA	99. 00	256	15.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	111	MISSING CASES	1535		

ZL0LUC4 'OTHER GROUP WITH FEWER OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WOMEN	2	2.00	6	15.0	15.0
BLACKS	3	3.00	2	5.0	20.0
WHITES	4	4.00	1	2.5	22.5
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14	14.00	1	2.5	25.0
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	15	15.00	1	2.5	27.5
ASIAN AMERICANS	25	25.00	8	20.0	47.5
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26	26.00	5	12.5	60.0
NON-ENG SPEAKERS	27	27.00	1	2.5	62.5
CATHOLICS	28	28.00	1	2.5	65.0
JEWS	29	29.00	2	5.0	70.0
RELI. PEOPLE	31	31.00	1	2.5	72.5
YOUNG PEOPLE	40	40.00	2	5.0	77.5
AMERICAN INDIANS	45	45.00	9	22.5	100.0
INAP	06		1526	92.7	
DK/NA	98	98.00	80	4.9	MISSING
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 40 MISSING CASES 1606

IFHILUC 'GROUPS WITH MORE OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	746	45.3	49.5	49.5
MAYBE/DEFENDS	2	33	2.0	2.2	51.7
NO	3	727	44.2	48.3	100.0
DK/NA	0	140	8.5	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1506 MISSING CASES 140

ZHLUG1 'GROUP WITH MORE OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MEN	1. 00	16	1. 0	2. 7	2. 7
WOMEN	2. 00	6	. 4	1. 0	3. 7
BLACKS	3. 00	35	2. 1	5. 9	9. 5
WHITE	4. 00	201	12. 2	33. 7	43. 2
WHITE MEN	5. 00	21	1. 3	3. 5	46. 7
WHITE WOMEN	6. 00	1	. 1	. 2	46. 9
BUSINESSMEN	10. 00	19	1. 2	3. 2	50. 1
UNION MEMBERS	12. 00	1	. 1	. 2	50. 3
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14. 00	26	1. 6	4. 4	54. 6
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	19. 00	2	. 1	. 3	54. 9
WELFARE RECIPIENTS	21. 00	9	. 5	1. 5	56. 4
UNEMPLOYED	22. 00	1	. 1	. 2	56. 6
EMPLOYED	23. 00	27	1. 6	4. 5	61. 1
ASIAN AMERICANS	25. 00	57	3. 5	9. 5	70. 7
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26. 00	22	1. 3	3. 7	74. 4
NON-ENG SPEAKERS	27. 00	2	. 1	. 3	74. 7
CATHOLICS	28. 00	1	. 1	. 2	74. 9
JEWS	29. 00	5	. 3	. 8	75. 7
VETS	32. 00	1	. 1	. 2	75. 9
Vietnam VETS	33. 00	2	. 1	. 3	76. 2
LIBERALS	34. 00	1	. 1	. 2	76. 4
CONSERVATIVES	35. 00	4	. 2	. 7	77. 1
YUPPIES	39. 00	10	. 6	1. 7	78. 7
IRANIANS, ARABS	43. 00	4	. 2	. 7	79. 4
MINORITIES	44. 00	6	. 4	1. 0	80. 4
LOWER CLASS	46. 00	3	. 2	. 5	80. 9
UPPER/MIDDLE CLASS	47. 00	100	6. 1	16. 8	97. 7
POLI/GOFFI PEOPLE	48. 00	9	. 5	1. 5	99. 2
OTHER	97. 00	5	. 3	. 6	100. 0
INAP	98. 00	867	52. 7	MISSING	
DK/NA		182	11. 1	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100. 0	100. 0	
VALID CASES	597	MISSING CASES	1049		

## ZHILUC2 'OTHER GROUP WITH MORE OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MEN	1. 00	2	.1	1.8	1.8
WOMEN	2. 00	2	.1	1.8	3.6
BLACKS	3. 00	13	.8	11.7	15.3
WHITES	4. 00	13	.8	11.7	27.0
WHITE MEN	5. 00	2	.1	1.8	28.8
BUSINESSMEN	10. 00	4	.2	3.6	32.4
UNION MEMBERS	12. 00	1	.1	.9	33.3
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14. 00	11	.7	9.9	43.2
STUDENTS	16. 00	1	.1	.9	44.1
TAXPAYERS	17. 00	2	.1	1.8	45.9
HOMEOWNERS	18. 00	1	.1	.9	46.8
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	19. 00	1	.1	.9	47.7
UNEMPLOYED	22. 00	1	.1	.9	48.6
EMPLOYED	23. 00	2	.1	1.8	50.5
ASIAN AMERICANS	25. 00	16	1.0	14.4	64.9
MEXI-AM'S/HISPANICS	26. 00	16	1.0	14.4	79.3
JEWS	29. 00	7	.4	6.3	85.6
RELI PEOPLE	31. 00	2	.1	1.8	87.4
VETS	32. 00	1	.1	.9	88.3
VIETNAM VETS	33. 00	1	.1	.9	89.2
ENVIRONMENTALISTS	37. 00	1	.1	.9	90.1
IRANIANS, ARABE	43. 00	1	.1	.9	91.0
AMERICAN INDIANS	45. 00	1	.1	.9	91.9
UPPER/MIDDLE CLASS	47. 00	7	.4	6.3	98.2
OTHER	97. 00	2	.1	1.8	100.0
INAP	98. 00	1041	63.2	MISSING	
DK/NA		494	30.0	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	111	MISSING CASES	1535		

## ZHILUC3 'GROUPS WITH MORE OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
BLACKS	3	3	.2	17.6	17.6
WHITES	4	2	.1	11.8	29.4
BUSINESSMEN	10	1	.1	5.9	35.3
IMMIGRANTS	14	3	.2	17.6	52.9
TEACHERS	15	1	.1	5.9	58.8
ASIAN AMERICANS	25	1	.1	5.9	64.7
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26	1	.1	5.9	70.6
JEWS	29	2	.1	11.8	82.4
YUPPIES	39	1	.1	5.9	88.2
MINORITIES	45	1	.1	5.9	94.1
PUERTO RICANS	57	1	.1	5.9	100.0
INAP	0	1534	93.2	MISSING	
DK/NA	98	95	5.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	17	MISSING CASES	1629		

## ZHILUC4 'GROUPS WITH MORE OPPORTUNITIES'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WOMEN	2	1	.1	11.1	11.1
IMMIGRANTS	14	1	.1	11.1	22.2
TAXPAYERS	17	1	.1	11.1	33.3
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26	1	.1	11.1	44.4
OTHER*	41	5	.3	55.6	100.0
INAP	0	1624	98.7	MISSING	
DK/NA	98	13	.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	9	MISSING CASES	1637		

PREJ 'AMERICANS PREJUDICED TO RGROUP1'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MOST ARE	1	117	7.1	10.7	10.7
SOME ARE	2	613	37.2	55.9	66.6
MOST ARE NOT	3	366	22.2	33.4	100.0
INAP	0	410	24.9	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	140	8.5	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1096 MISSING CASES 550

ZPREJGRP 'PARTICULAR GROUP PREJUDICED TO RGROUP1'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MEN	1. 00	2	.1	.4	.4
WOMEN	2. 00	2	.1	.4	.7
BLACKS	3. 00	11	.7	2.0	2.7
WHITES	4. 00	125	7.6	22.8	25.5
WHITE MEN	5. 00	3	.2	.5	26.1
BUSINESSMEN	10. 00	7	.4	1.3	27.4
UNION MEMBERS	12. 00	1	.1	.2	27.6
FARMERS	13. 00	3	.2	.5	28.1
IMMIGRANTS, REFUGEES	14. 00	3	.2	.5	28.6
HOMEOWNERS	16. 00	1	.1	.2	28.8
RETD PEOPLE: ELDERLY	19. 00	5	.3	.9	29.7
UNEMPLOYED	22. 00	1	.1	.2	29.9
EMPLOYED	23. 00	3	.2	.5	30.5
ASIAN AMERICANS	25. 00	3	.2	.5	31.0
MEXI-AMS/HISPANICS	26. 00	3	.2	.5	31.6
JEWS	29. 00	4	.2	.7	32.3
BORN AGAIN CHRISTNS	30. 00	2	.1	.4	32.7
VETS	32. 00	1	.1	.2	32.8
YUPPIES	39. 00	2	.1	.4	33.2
NO PARTICULAR GRP	42. 00	322	19.6	58.8	92.0
LOWER CLASS	46. 00	11	.7	2.0	94.0
UPPER/MIDDLE CLASS	47. 00	12	.7	2.2	96.2
KKK	49. 00	12	.7	2.2	98.4
SOUTHERNERS	50. 00	4	.2	.7	99.1
OTHER	97. 00	5	.3	.9	100.0
INAP	98. 00	1033	62.8	MISSING	
DK/NA		65	3.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	348	MISSING CASES	1098		

## SELFPREJ 'PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	517	31.4	45.6	45.6
NO	2	617	37.5	54.4	100.0
INAP	0	410	24.9	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	102	6.2	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1134 MISSING CASES 512

## ZSITPREJ 'SITUATION OF DISCRIMINATION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
GETTING A JOB	1.00	176	10.7	35.8	35.8
GETTING INTO SCHOOL	2.00	41	2.5	8.3	44.1
GETTIN HOUSE-APARTH	3.00	42	2.6	8.5	52.6
SOCIAL SITUATION	4.00	190	11.5	38.6	91.3
ALL THE ABOVE 1-4	5.00	5	.3	1.0	92.3
ON THE JOB	6.00	6	.4	1.2	93.5
REL. TO POLICE LAW	7.00	6	.4	1.2	94.7
DURING WAR: IN CAMPS	8.00	4	.2	.8	95.5
IN SCHOOL/COLLEGE	9.00	6	.4	1.2	96.7
COMMERCIAL DEALINGS	10.00	12	.7	2.4	99.2
OTHER	97.00	4	.2	.8	100.0
INAP	00	1129	68.6	MISSING	
DK/NA	98.00	25	1.5	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 492 MISSING CASES 1154

## FUTPREJ 'FUTURE AMOUNT OF PREJUDICE'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MORE PRE-JUDICED	1	95	5.8	9.2	9.2
WON'T CHANGE MUCH	2	498	30.3	48.2	57.4
LESS PRE-JUDICED	3	441	26.8	42.6	100.0
INAP	0	410	24.9	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	202	12.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1034 MISSING CASES 612

## ARMS\* 'INCREASED MILITARY SPENDING'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	443	27.0	28.3	28.3
OPPOSE	2	785	47.7	49.9	78.2
NO OPINION	7	343	20.8	21.8	100.0
DK/NA	0	73	4.4	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1573 MISSING CASES 73

## ERA 'EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	1150	69.9	73.2	73.2
OPPOSE	2	187	11.4	11.9	85.1
NO OPINION	7	234	14.2	14.9	100.0
DK/NA	0	75	4.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1571 MISSING CASES 75

## EDJTAX 'TAX CREDIT FOR PAROCHIAL-PVT SCHOOL'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	639	38.8	41.1	41.1
OPPOSE	2	582	35.4	37.4	78.5
NO OPINION	7	335	20.4	21.5	100.0
DK/NA	0	90	5.5	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1556 MISSING CASES 90

## PRAYR 'PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOL'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	815	49.5	52.1	52.1
OPPOSE	2	465	28.3	29.7	81.8
NO OPINION	7	285	17.3	18.2	100.0
DK/NA	0	81	4.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1565 MISSING CASES 81

## WELFARE 'INCREASED SPENDING ON WELFARE'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	1099	66.8	70.1	70.1
OPPOSE	2	292	17.7	18.6	88.8
NO OPINION	7	176	10.7	11.2	100.0
DK/NA	0	79	4.8	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1567 MISSING CASES 79

24-FEB-87 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VMS  
18:16:52 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MicroVAX-I VMG V4.3

**ABORT\*** 'BAN FED SPENDING ON ABORTIONS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	510	31.0	32.8	32.8
OPPOSE	2	708	43.0	45.5	78.3
NO OPINION	7	337	20.5	21.7	100.0
DK/NA	0	91	5.5	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

VALID CASES 1555 MISSING CASES 91

**NOGUN** 'BAN HANDGUNS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID ID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	722	43.9	46.2	46.2
OPPOSE	2	627	38.1	40.1	86.4
NO OPINION	7	213	12.9	13.6	100.0
DK/NA	0	84	5.1	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

VALID CASES 1562 MISSING CASES 84

**DEATHP** 'DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	965	58.6	61.9	61.9
OPPOSE	2	311	18.9	19.9	81.8
NO OPINION	7	264	17.3	18.2	100.0
DK/NA	0	86	5.2	MISSING	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

VALID CASES 1560 MISSING CASES 86

24-FEB-87 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VMS  
 18: 16: 52 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB  
 DEC MicroVAX-I VMS V4.3

AMNESTY 'AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	754	45.8	48.7	48.7
OPPOSE	2	473	28.7	30.6	79.3
NO OPINION	7	321	19.5	20.7	100.0
DK/NA	0	98	6.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1548 MISSING CASES 98

EMPSANC 'USE OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	765	46.5	49.5	49.5
OPPOSE	2	529	32.1	34.2	83.8
NO OPINION	7	251	15.2	16.2	100.0
DK/NA	0	101	6.1	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1545 MISSING CASES 101

BILINGE 'BILINGUAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	900	54.7	57.7	57.7
OPPOSE	2	509	30.9	32.6	90.3
NO OPINION	7	151	9.2	9.7	100.0
DK/NA	0	86	5.2	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1560 MISSING CASES 86

BILINGB 'BILINGUAL BALLOTS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
FAVOR	1	719	43.7	46.5	46.5
OPPOSE	2	683	41.5	44.1	90.6
NO OPINION	7	145	8.8	9.4	100.0
DK/NA	0	99	6.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1547 MISSING CASES 99

ZABORT 'VIEWS ON ABORTION'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
SHD NEVER BE PERMTD ONLY IF RAPE/INCEST	1.00	130	7.9	8.6	8.6
ALWAYS ONE'S CHOICE	2.00	635	38.6	41.8	50.4
OTHER OPINION	3.00	751	45.6	49.5	99.9
DK/NA	4.00	2	1	1	100.0
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1518 MISSING CASES 128

## ZBORN 'RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY OF BIRTH'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
U.S.	1.00	1111	67.5	72.3	72.3
MEXICO	2.00	181	11.0	11.8	84.1
PILIPPINES	3.00	31	1.9	2.0	86.1
CHINA	4.00	19	1.2	1.2	87.3
TAIWAN	5.00	5	.3	.3	87.6
HONG KONG	6.00	11	.7	.7	88.4
JAPAN	7.00	10	.6	.7	89.0
KOREA	8.00	75	4.6	4.9	93.9
Vietnam	9.00	13	.8	.8	94.7
ISRAEL	11.00	1	.1	.1	94.8
AFRICA	12.00	2	.1	.1	94.9
EUROPE	13.00	16	1.0	1.0	96.0
LATIN/C AMERICA	14.00	32	1.9	2.1	98.0
ASIA	15.00	10	.6	.7	98.7
WEST ASIA	16.00	1	.1	.1	98.8
EL SALVADOR	17.00	19	1.2	1.2	100.0
DK/NA	0.00	109	6.6	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1537 MISSING CASES 109

## IFUPAMA 'IF PARENTS BORN IN US'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	811	49.3	73.3	73.3
NO	2	295	17.9	26.7	100.0
INAP	0	535	32.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	6	5	.3	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1106 MISSING CASES 540

## ZIPBORN 'COUNTRY OF FATHER'S BIRTH'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
U.S.	1.00	41	2.5	14.1	14.1
MEXICO	2.00	119	7.2	40.9	55.0
PILIPPINES	3.00	8	.5	2.7	57.7
CHINA	4.00	18	1.1	6.2	63.9
JAPAN	7.00	25	1.5	8.6	72.5
KOREA	8.00	2	.1	.7	73.2
AFRICA	12.00	2	.1	.7	73.9
EUROPE/WHITE SETTLER	13.00	35	3.3	18.9	92.8
LATIN/C AMERICA	14.00	14	.9	4.8	97.6
ASIA	15.00	3	.2	1.0	98.6
WEST ASIA	16.00	4	.2	1.4	100.0
INAP	98.00	1351	82.1	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA		4	.2		
TOTAL		1646	100.0		100.0

VALID CASES 291 MISSING CASES 1355

## ZMABORN 'COUNTRY OF MOTHER'S BIRTH'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
U.S.	1.00	73	4.4	25.3	25.3
MEXICO	2.00	106	6.4	36.7	61.9
PILIPPINES	3.00	8	.5	2.8	64.7
CHINA	4.00	10	.6	3.5	68.2
HONG KONG	6.00	3	.2	1.0	69.2
JAPAN	7.00	26	1.6	9.0	78.2
KOREA	8.00	2	.1	.7	78.9
EUROPE/WHITE SETTLER	13.00	41	2.5	14.2	93.1
LATIN/C AMERICA	14.00	16	1.0	5.5	98.6
ASIA	15.00	1	.1	.3	99.0
WEST ASIA	16.00	3	.2	1.0	100.0
INAP	98.00	1351	82.1	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA		6	.4		
TOTAL		1646	100.0		100.0

VALID CASES 289 MISSING CASES 1357

24-FEB-87 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VME  
18: 16: 53 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MicroVAX-I VMS V4.3

LINK 'SOCIAL LINKS WITH COUNTRY OF ORIGIN'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	350	21.3	78.0	78.0
NO	2	99	6.0	22.0	100.0
INAP	0	111	67.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	86	5.2	MISSING	
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	449	MISSING CASES	1197		

LINKS 'MONEY SENT HOME TO CTRY OF ORIGIN'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	170	10.3	38.1	38.1
NO	2	276	16.8	61.9	100.0
INAP	0	111	67.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	89	5.4	MISSING	
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	446	MISSING CASES	1200		

SETL 'INTENTION TO SETTLE IN US'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MIGHT GO BACK	1	42	2.6	12.3	12.3
WILL STAY IN U.S.	2	299	18.2	87.7	100.0
INAP	0	111	67.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	194	11.8	MISSING	
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	341	MISSING CASES	1305		

## VENTRY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
	.00	15	.9	3.3	3.3
	6.00	1	.1	.2	3.5
	7.00	1	.1	.2	3.7
	8.00	3	.2	.7	4.4
	11.00	2	.1	.4	4.8
	12.00	1	.1	.2	5.0
	13.00	2	.1	.4	5.4
	15.00	4	.2	.9	6.3
	16.00	2	.1	.4	6.8
	20.00	3	.2	.7	7.4
	21.00	3	.2	.7	8.1
	22.00	2	.1	.4	8.5
	24.00	1	.1	.2	8.7
	27.00	1	.1	.2	8.9
	28.00	1	.1	.2	9.2
	34.00	1	.1	.2	9.4
	37.00	1	.1	.2	9.6
	40.00	1	.1	.2	9.8
	45.00	2	.1	.4	10.2
	48.00	1	.1	.2	10.5
	49.00	4	.2	.9	11.3
	51.00	2	.1	.4	11.8
	52.00	3	.2	.7	12.4
	53.00	4	.2	.9	13.3
	54.00	3	.2	.7	13.9
	55.00	5	.2	.0	15.9
	56.00	3	.2	.7	16.6
	57.00	4	.2	.9	17.4
	58.00	5	.3	.1	18.5
	59.00	3	.2	.1	19.6
	60.00	10	.6	.2	21.8
	61.00	2	.1	.4	22.2
	62.00	5	.3	.1	23.3
	63.00	7	.4	.5	24.8
	64.00	11	.7	.2	27.2
	65.00	10	.6	.2	29.4
	66.00	10	.6	.2	31.6
	67.00	15	.9	.3	34.9
	68.00	21	1.3	.6	39.4
	69.00	16	1.0	.5	42.9
	70.00	22	1.3	.6	47.7
	71.00	15	1.9	.3	51.0
	72.00	20	1.2	.4	55.3
	73.00	19	1.2	.4	59.5
	74.00	23	1.4	.6	64.5
	75.00	29	1.8	.6	70.8
	76.00	19	1.2	.4	74.9

## VENTRY

77.00	16	1.0	3.5	78.4
78.00	23	1.4	5.0	83.4
79.00	22	1.3	4.8	88.2
80.00	17	1.0	3.7	91.9
81.00	18	1.1	3.9	95.9
82.00	7	.4	1.5	97.4
83.00	5	.3	1.1	98.5
84.00	7	.4	1.5	100.0
106.00	1167	72.1	MISSING	
TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 459 MISSING CASES 1187

IFCTZN 'IF US CITIZEN YET'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CITIZEN	1	189	11.5	42.0	42.0
NOT CITIZEN	2	261	15.9	38.0	100.0
INAP	0	111	67.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	85	5.2	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 450 MISSING CASES 1196

USTATE 'STATE IN US WHERE RESPONDENT WAS BORN'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
AK	2	1	1.4	1.4	1.4
AL	16	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.6
AR	18	1.1	1.6	1.6	3.2
AZ	26	1.6	2.3	2.3	5.6
CA	568	34.5	51.1	51.1	56.7
CO	9	.5	.8	.8	57.5
CT	4	.2	.4	.4	57.9
DC	2	.1	.2	.2	58.1
DE	1	.1	.1	.1	58.1
FL	4	.2	.4	.4	58.5
GE	5	.3	.5	.5	59.0
HI	17	1.0	1.5	1.5	60.5
IA	10	.6	.9	.9	61.4
ID	4	.2	.4	.4	61.7
IL	23	1.4	2.1	2.1	63.8
IN	8	.5	.7	.7	64.5
KS	10	.6	.9	.9	65.4
KY	4	.2	.4	.4	65.8
LA	56	3.4	5.0	5.0	70.8
MA	10	.6	.9	.9	71.7
MD	2	.1	.2	.2	71.9
ME	2	.1	.2	.2	72.1
MI	13	.8	1.2	1.2	73.3
MN	7	.4	.6	.6	73.9
MO	9	.5	.8	.8	74.7
MS	21	1.3	1.9	1.9	76.6
MT	2	.1	.2	.2	76.8
NC	5	.3	.5	.5	77.2
ND	4	.2	.4	.4	77.6
NE	6	.4	.5	.5	78.1
NH	1	.1	.1	.1	78.2
NJ	8	.5	.7	.7	78.9
NM	13	.8	1.2	1.2	80.1
NY	20	1.2	1.8	1.8	81.9
OH	22	1.3	2.0	2.0	83.9
OK	18	1.1	1.6	1.6	85.5
OR	2	.1	.2	.2	85.7
PA	10	.6	.9	.9	86.6
RI	1	.1	.1	.1	86.7
SC	2	.1	.2	.2	86.9
SD	4	.2	.4	.4	87.2
TN	11	.7	1.0	1.0	88.2
TX	99	6.0	8.9	8.9	97.1
UT	5	.3	.5	.5	97.6
VA	3	.1	.5	.5	98.0
VT	1	.1	.1	.1	98.1
WA	6	.9	1.0	1.0	99.0
	10				

Wyoming

24-FEB-87 SPSS-X RELEASE 2.2 FOR VAX/VMS  
18:16:54 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LAB DEC MicroVAX-I VMS V4.3

USTATE 'STATE IN US WHERE RESPONDENT WAS BORN'

	WI	8	.5	.7	99.7
	WV	3	.2	3	100.0
	ZZ	535	32.5	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1111 MISSING CASES 535

UCAL 'GENERATION ENTERING CALIFORNIA'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PARENTS	1	250	15.2	45.5	45.5
GRANDPARENTS	2	218	13.2	39.7	85.2
BEST BEFORE THAT	3	81	4.9	14.8	100.0
INAP	0	1078	65.5	MISSING	MISSING
DK/NA	8	19	1.2		
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 549 MISSING CASES 1097

ULINK 'SOCIAL LINKS WITH STATE: ORIGIN IN US'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	412	25.0	76.3	76.3
NO	2	128	7.8	23.7	100.0
INAP	0	568	34.5	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	538	32.7	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 540 MISSING CASES 1106

ZLANG 'PRIMARY NON-ENGLISH LANGUAGE'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
SPANISH	1. 00	328	19. 9	67. 4	67. 4
ITALIAN	2. 00	1	.1	.2	67. 6
GREEK	3. 00	1	.1	.2	67. 8
FRENCH	4. 00	2	.1	.4	68. 2
GERMAN	5. 00	4	.2	.8	69. 0
ARABIC	7. 00	2	.1	.4	69. 4
HINDI	10. 00	1	.1	.2	69. 6
JAPANESE	11. 00	8	.5	1. 6	71. 3
CHINESE	12. 00	36	2. 2	7. 4	78. 6
KOREAN	13. 00	62	3. 8	12. 7	91. 4
VietNAMESE	14. 00	9	.5	1. 8	93. 2
TAGALOG	15. 00	17	1. 0	3. 5	96. 7
THAI	16. 00	1	.1	.2	96. 9
OTHER	97. 00	15	.9	3. 1	100. 0
INAP	.00	1155	70. 2	MISSING	
DK/NA		4	.2	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100. 0	100. 0	

VALID CASES

487

MISSING CASES

1159

VOTLANG 'USED BALLOT OF OTHER LANGUAGE IN 1984'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	11	.7	6. 6	6. 6
NO	2	156	9. 5	93. 4	100. 0
INAP	0	1477	89. 7	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	2	.1	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100. 0	100. 0	

VALID CASES

167

MISSING CASES

1479

## YRBBORN

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
	.00	2	.1	.1	.1
1.00	1	1	.1	.1	.3
2.00	2	4	.2	.3	.5
3.00	3	3	.2	.2	.7
4.00	4	7	.4	.4	1.2
5.00	5	7	.4	.4	1.6
6.00	6	5	.3	.3	1.9
7.00	7	4	.2	.3	2.2
8.00	8	37	.2	.2	4.6
9.00	9	12	.7	.8	5.3
10.00	10	9	.5	.6	5.9
11.00	11	6	.4	.4	6.3
12.00	12	10	.6	.6	6.9
13.00	13	8	.5	.5	7.5
14.00	14	15	.9	1.0	8.4
15.00	15	14	.9	.9	9.3
16.00	16	16	1.0	1.0	10.3
17.00	17	20	1.2	1.3	11.6
18.00	18	7	.4	.4	12.1
19.00	19	10	.6	.6	12.7
20.00	20	16	1.2	1.3	14.0
21.00	21	11	.7	.7	14.7
22.00	22	16	1.0	1.0	15.7
23.00	23	22	1.3	1.4	17.2
24.00	24	16	1.0	1.0	18.2
25.00	25	14	.9	.9	19.1
26.00	26	22	1.3	1.4	20.5
27.00	27	23	1.4	1.5	22.0
28.00	28	20	1.2	1.3	23.3
29.00	29	11	.7	.7	24.0
30.00	30	13	.8	.8	24.8
31.00	31	14	.9	.9	25.7
32.00	32	15	.9	1.0	26.7
33.00	33	15	.9	1.0	27.6
34.00	34	7	.4	.4	28.1
35.00	35	17	1.0	1.1	29.2
36.00	36	17	1.0	1.1	30.3
37.00	37	12	.7	.8	31.0
38.00	38	10	.6	.6	31.7
39.00	39	24	1.5	1.5	33.2
40.00	40	20	1.2	1.3	34.5
41.00	41	18	1.1	1.2	35.7
42.00	42	18	1.1	1.2	36.8
43.00	43	19	1.2	1.2	38.0
44.00	44	18	1.1	1.2	39.2
45.00	45	15	1.6	40.8	
46.00	46	28	1.7	1.8	

INCOME 'INCOME LEVEL'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
LESS THAN \$10,000	1	237	14.4	17.5	17.5
\$10,000-\$15,000	2	217	13.2	16.0	33.5
\$15,000-\$20,000	3	198	12.0	14.6	48.0
\$20,000-\$25,000	4	176	10.7	13.0	61.0
\$25,000-\$30,000	5	157	9.5	11.6	72.6
\$30,000-\$40,000	6	143	8.7	10.5	83.1
\$40,000-\$60,000	7	135	8.2	9.9	93.1
OVER \$60,000	8	94	5.7	6.9	100.0
DK/NA	0	289	17.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1357 MISSING CASES 289

PVOTE 'PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE 84'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MONDALE	1	529	32.1	60.0	60.0
REAGAN	2	328	19.9	37.2	97.3
OTHER	3	24	1.5	2.7	100.0
INAP	0	644	39.1	MISSING	
DK/NA	8	121	7.4	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 881 MISSING CASES 765

## YR BORN

47.00	45	2.7	2.9	45.5
48.00	36	2.2	2.3	47.8
49.00	36	2.2	2.3	50.1
50.00	44	2.7	2.8	53.0
51.00	31	1.9	2.0	54.9
52.00	43	2.6	2.8	57.7
53.00	36	2.2	2.3	60.0
54.00	48	2.9	3.1	63.1
55.00	39	2.4	2.5	65.6
56.00	46	2.8	3.0	68.6
57.00	48	2.9	3.1	71.7
58.00	38	2.3	2.4	74.1
59.00	45	2.7	2.9	77.0
60.00	47	2.9	3.0	80.0
61.00	57	3.5	3.7	83.7
62.00	39	2.4	2.5	86.2
63.00	36	2.2	2.3	88.5
64.00	53	3.2	3.4	91.9
65.00	49	3.0	3.1	95.1
66.00	70	4.3	4.5	99.6
88.00	1	.1	.1	99.6
95.00	1	.1	.1	99.7
97.00	1	.1	.1	99.7
98.00	3	.2	.2	99.9
99.00	1	.1	.1	100.0
TOTAL	1646	100.0	MISSING	100.0

## VALID CASES

1556

## MISSING CASES

90

## HOMEDN 'HOME OWNER OR RENTER'

VALID CASES	MISSING CASES	PERCENT	CUM PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1536	110				
OWN					
RENT/DD NOT OWN	1	912	55.4	59.4	59.4
DK/NA	2	624	37.9	40.6	100.0
TOTAL	1646	100.0		100.0	

## INCOME 'INCOME LEVEL'

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	LESS THAN \$10,000	1	237	14.4	17.5	17.5
2	\$10,000-\$15,000	2	217	13.2	16.0	33.5
3	\$15,000-\$20,000	3	198	12.0	14.6	48.0
4	\$20,000-\$25,000	4	176	10.7	13.0	61.0
5	\$25,000-\$30,000	5	157	9.5	11.6	72.6
6	\$30,000-\$40,000	6	143	8.7	10.5	83.1
7	\$40,000-\$60,000	7	135	8.2	9.9	93.1
8	OVER \$60,000	8	94	5.7	6.9	100.0
0	DK/NA	0	289	17.6	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0		

VALID CASES 1357 MISSING CASES 289

## PVOTE 'PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE 84'

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	MONDALE	1	529	32.1	60.0	60.0
2	REAGAN	2	328	19.9	37.2	97.3
3	OTHER	3	24	1.5	2.7	100.0
0	INAP	0	64	39.1	MISSING	
8	DK/NA	8	121	7.4	MISSING	
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0		

VALID CASES 881 MISSING CASES 765

## VOTEUSE 'IMPORTANCE OF VOTING'

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	NOT IMPORTANT	1	73	4.4	5.1	5.1
2	IMP IF INTEREST AFF	2	137	8.3	9.5	14.5
3	IMPORTANT	3	1235	75.0	85.5	100.0
0	DK/NA	201	12.2	MISSING		
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0		

VALID CASES 1445 MISSING CASES 201

## SEX 'SEX OF RESPONDENT'

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	MALE	1	802	48.7	48.7	48.7
2	FEMALE	2	844	51.3	51.3	100.0
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0		

VALID CASES 1445 MISSING CASES 0

## COOP 'CO-OPERATION OF RESPONDENT'

VALUE	LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
1	VERY GOOD	1	1101	66.9	66.9	66.9
2	GOOD	2	325	19.7	19.7	86.6
3	FAIR	3	147	8.9	8.9	95.6
4	POOR	4	46	2.8	2.8	98.4
5	VERY POOR	5	27	1.6	1.6	100.0
	TOTAL	1646	100.0	100.0		

VALID CASES 1445 MISSING CASES 0

## INFO 'INFORMATION LEVEL OF RESPONDENT'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	430	26.1	26.1	26.1
FAIRLY HIGH	2	408	24.8	24.8	50.9
AVERAGE	3	361	24.1	24.1	85.0
FAIRLY LOW	4	165	10.0	10.0	95.0
VERY LOW	5	62	5.0	5.0	100.0
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	1646	100.0		100.0	
MISSING CASES	0				

## TRU 'SINCERITY OF RESPONDENT'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
COMPLETELY SINCERE	1	1231	74.8	74.8	74.8
USUALLY SINCERE	2	347	21.1	21.1	95.9
PERHAPS INSINCERE	3	68	4.1	4.1	100.0
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	1646	100.0		100.0	
MISSING CASES	0				

## IMGEN IMMIGRANT GENERATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
NON-US BORN	1.00	418	25.4	27.4	27.4
NON-US BORN PARENTS	2.00	295	17.9	19.4	46.8
US-BORN PARENTS	3.00	811	49.3	53.2	100.0
DK/NA	0.00	122	7.4	MISSING	MISSING 0 = ?
TOTAL					
VALID CASES	1524	100.0		100.0	
MISSING CASES	122				

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## NONENG NON-ENG PRIMARY LANG OR SPAN INTERVIEW

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	500	30.4	32.1	32.1
NO	2	1059	64.3	67.9	100.0
DK/NA	0	87	5.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1559	MISSING CASES	87		

## SPLANG 'SPANISH LANGUAGE INTERVIEWS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
ENG LANG INTERVIEWS	1	1607	97.6	97.6	97.6
SPAN LANG INTERVIEWS	2	39	2.4	2.4	100.0
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 1646 MISSING CASES 0

## IFLANG 'PRIMARY LANG: NON-ENGLISH OR SPANISH'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	491	29.8	31.5	31.5
NO	2	1066	64.8	68.5	100.0
DK/NA	0	89	5.4	MISSING	
TOTAL		1646	100.0	100.0	
VALID CASES	1557	MISSING CASES	89		

# Racial and Ethnic Politics in California

Byran O. Jackson and  
Michael B. Preston, Editors

## Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition Prospects of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans

Ethnicity and race have historically served as a basis for coalition formation in American politics. The Democratic New Deal coalition can be understood in part as an alliance of European immigrants and their children with northern blacks (Anderson 1979; Petrocik 1981). Over the last few decades, changing immigration patterns and birthrates have led to a substantial increase in the number of Latinos and Asian Americans. The shift has arguably been most notable in California, where the proportion of non-Hispanic whites in the population dropped from 87 percent in 1960 to 67 percent in 1980 and 58 percent in 1990 and is expected to fall below 50 percent by the year 2010. Will these "new" groups join each other in a political coalition? Will they join blacks in a larger "minority" coalition? These questions are of substantial importance to political analysis (see Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1991). Clearly a number of political commentators and actors anticipate that these groups will come together as a political force. Recall, for example, Jesse Jackson's talk of a Rainbow Coalition in the 1984 campaign. In light of the size of these populations in California, the future evolution of politics in the state will depend to a large extent upon the fate of these potential alliances.

At its most practical, the question about coalitions translates into the question of whether citizens from any or all of these groups will support a candidate from another group. Will the combined numbers of voters from minority groups translate into the election of minority officials? A descriptive notion of representation underlies this concern. Although descriptive representation captures only a portion of the concept (Pitkin 1967), voter behavior suggests that people do care about being represented by people "like them." Studies of policy outcomes suggest minority

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representation has real consequences for minority communities (Browning, Marshall, Tabb 1984). However, simply being other than non-Hispanic white may not be sufficient to make a candidate an adequately descriptive representative for persons who are also not non-Hispanic white but of different backgrounds. It depends upon how individuals categorize their world. Beyond descriptive representation, however, voters select officials to look out for their interests. Thus, cross-group support may derive from shared interests. Clearly, a coalition of minorities must rest on some common ground.

Shared interests in bald material terms may not be a sufficient basis for unity among these groups, as blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans in California face different circumstances. Variations in objective economic standing, place of residence, educational attainment, and cultural traditions suggest possibilities for divisiveness rather than cooperation. As reported in Shastri (1986), in 1980 blacks in California were more likely than either of these other groups to have incomes below the poverty line, be unemployed, and use welfare and social services programs heavily. Latinos were only slightly more affluent than blacks and also used welfare programs heavily. However, they were much less likely to use social programs such as foster care and elderly services. Asian Americans had the highest income and lowest poverty and unemployment rates of these three groups, and a substantially higher proportion of their families than in any other group contained two or more workers. They made the least use of welfare and social service programs. The differences may lead individuals from each group to respond to others as competitors or just fail to see them as potential allies. On the other hand, since all three groups shared a lower standard of living than non-Hispanic whites, they may join together in demands for greater affluence. Even if potential partners do not share similar objective circumstances, they may have compatible interests.

Shared perceptions and experiences of discrimination provide an alternative, although related, possible common ground for a coalition. To the extent that people believe that the "majority" society is prejudiced against them based upon their race or ethnicity and that the opportunity structure of American society contains inequities, they may consequently believe that others who are "minorities" are politically like them. Perceived prejudice provides a particularly potent basis for a coalition, as the relevant political information—discriminatory experience—is acquired incidentally during the course of daily life. Much of the discussion of coalitions of minorities seems implicitly to assume that the belief that the dominant society treats minorities unfairly would provide the driving force behind joint action. Under this view, it makes sense to consider Asian Americans as possible coalition members, despite their objectively better economic circumstances, to the extent that discrimination limits their opportunities. Other relatively affluent groups that have experienced discrimination have

previously entered similar coalitions. Daniels and Kitano (1970) suggest that discrimination in the U.S. reflects a two-category system of stratification, where "white" is presumed superior to "non-white." Thus persons of color, having suffered similar prejudice, may fight back collectively. However, perceptions of discrimination and lack of opportunity need not necessarily lead to cooperation. Instead of sympathy towards others, someone who suffers from prejudice may instead feel competition, especially if they feel that they are particularly disadvantaged. Thus, discriminatory experiences might produce antagonisms instead of coalitions.

One factor that may affect a person's experience of prejudice is being native born versus being an immigrant. The experiences of white ethnic immigrants in the last century attest to the virulence of nativist sentiments at times in the United States. Substantial proportions of Latinos and Asian Americans are immigrants; many more are the children of immigrants. Beyond the issue of discrimination, and even in tolerant periods, immigrants confront different problems than the native born. Learning a new language, dealing with new customs, and negotiating the intricacies of the immigration and naturalization process itself present a set of experiences that may generate common interests that bring immigrants together. For example, language use is directly relevant to certain issues, such as bilingual services. Paradoxically, the newest immigrants may be most insulated from perceived discrimination, for example if they live within ethnic enclaves.

Up to this point, ethnic and racial groups have been discussed as though all possible members identified with them equally. However, individuals vary substantially both in their ethnic or racial identity and in the extent to which they believe that such an identity is linked to specific interests. Ethnically specific interests can provide a basis for alliance or for competition with others. Moreover, the perception of such interests may itself serve as an indicator of the salience and the potential political relevance of the ethnicity. The belief that one has both group-specific problems and a strong ethnic identity may enhance the ability to perceive prejudice. Conversely, the experience of prejudice reinforces a sense of ethnic identity. Keefe and Padilla (1987, 192) conclude that in their study of Chicanos, "perceived discrimination is a major contributory force in the maintenance of ethnic loyalty across our four generations of respondents." There is evidence that ethnic identity and perceived group problems are related to increased political activity. Whether they inhibit coalition formation—by leading to a focus on the problems of one's own group—or enhance it—by spotlighting the relevance of ethnicity as an organizing principle—remains unclear.

Ethnic identity and perceived inequity come together in the concept of group consciousness. Gurin and her collaborators argue that a crucial prerequisite for group identity to produce political consequences is the linking of ethnic identity with a political consciousness of the external structures producing the group's circumstances (Gurin and Epps 1975;

Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989). Group identification denotes a subjective sense of similarity to others. Group consciousness denotes political beliefs that arise from the identity, including, although not limited to, the sense that the group's condition is illegitimately inferior to that of others in society. The experience of prejudice should increase a sense of group consciousness. It reinforces a sense of ethnic identity. More crucially, this experience provides a tutorial in the lesson that one's group is treated unfairly. However, perceived prejudice is not identical with the perception of structural inequality. That further step, which is an important element of group consciousness, may be encouraged by the experience of prejudice, but need not necessarily follow. Whether group consciousness leads to a coalition may well depend upon whether structural inequality is seen as limited to one's own group or as a general condition affecting other groups as well. In the latter case, cooperation may well appear useful.

### THE APPROACH

This paper examines perceived prejudice among California blacks, Mexican Americans, and Asian Americans and considers the possibilities for building a coalition upon this perception. It will also examine other aspects of possible shared experiences, as discussed above, as they may contribute to perceptions of prejudice and affect the likelihood of alliance.

Thus, data will first be presented on the degree to which these groups contain immigrants and to which their members identify problems specific to their ethnicity. Next, the distribution of perceived prejudice, as personally experienced, as perceived towards one's own group, and as projected into the future will be examined. An attempt will be made to locate those factors that correlate with higher or lower perceptions of bias.

As noted in the discussion of group consciousness, a perception of discrimination can exist without individuals believing that their group holds an illegitimately depressed structural position, that is, that it receives fewer opportunities than it deserves. Moreover, a belief that others also receive fewer opportunities may be key to the formation of a coalition. Thus, data on this set of beliefs, and the factors associated with them, are examined.

While eventually any coalition will have to deal with concrete political issues, any particular set of issues may prove irrelevant. Issues change over time, and their salience and interpretation change even more rapidly. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider whether these groups do share some issue preferences and whether perceptions of structural inequity and prejudice enhance or diminish similarities.

The data on which these analyses are based are drawn from a statewide telephone survey of Californians undertaken in late 1984. The study yielded completed interviews with 574 Latinos, 308 Asian Americans, 335 blacks,

and 317 non-Hispanic whites of voting age, including noncitizens. The Latino sample includes 61 individuals of national origin other than Mexican. They are excluded from the analyses that follow, leaving 513 Mexican-American respondents.<sup>1</sup> In order to sample each of these four populations, rather than the state population, we overweighted certain census tracts, to locate blacks, and applied surname dictionaries to telephone listings, to locate Latinos and Asian Americans. Residential dispersion coupled with relatively low numbers in the population makes other techniques of locating respondents in these last two groups prohibitively expensive. As with most similar surveys, the resulting sample is somewhat more educated than the population as a whole but otherwise matches census data fairly well. Further details on the sampling design can be found in Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet (1989, Appendix A). For ease of exposition, non-Hispanic whites are referred to in the text that follows as "Anglos," Asian Americans are referred to as "Asians," and Mexican Americans are referred to as "Mexicans."

Since this paper focuses on the prospects for a coalition among blacks, Mexicans, and Asians, many of the analyses will be restricted to them. However, for some analyses it will be useful to look at the Anglos for comparison.

### IMMIGRATION AND GROUP PROBLEMS

As discussed in the introduction, substantial numbers of Asians and Mexicans in California share the experience of recent immigration. This may contribute to experiences of prejudice, and likely leads to some shared concerns. Table 1 shows that 40 percent of the Mexicans and 63 percent of the Asians were born abroad. Less than 10 percent of Anglos or of blacks were foreign born. In fact, 96 percent of blacks are third generation or more—their parents were born in the U.S. About a quarter of all three of the other groups are second generation citizens—persons whose parents were born abroad but who themselves were born in the U.S. Lower citizenship rates and a greater propensity to use a language other than English go along with the high proportion of recent immigrants among the Mexicans and

<sup>1</sup>Restricting the analysis to Mexican Americans avoids problems of interpretation that arise from the variety of countries and circumstances that characterize the other Latino respondents, at no real cost in statistical power as the number of Mexican Americans is very large. Although the Asian Americans come from a variety of countries, and thus lumping them into a single group is not optimal, there are too few from any single country to permit independent analyses. In other studies done with these data, however, it appears that this strategy has not produced serious distortions (see Uhlaner, Cain, Kiewiet 1989; Cain, Kiewiet, Uhlaner 1991).

**Table 1: Immigration and Language Characteristics of Racial/Ethnic Groups**

	Anglo	Black	Mexican	Asian
Respondent Born Abroad	9%	3%	40%	63%
Not citizen <sup>a</sup>	52 (15) <sup>b</sup>	44 (4)	71 (138)	47 (84)
Citizen <sup>a</sup>	48 (14)	56 (5)	29 (56)	53 (94)
Parents Born Abroad	22	2	29	22
Parents Born in U.S.	69	96	31	15
N	314	315	498	285
Not citizen	5%	1%	28%	30%
Citizen	95	99	72	70
N	314	317	493	283
Primary language English	92%	98%	46%	53%
English	8	2	54	47
N	317	335	513	308

<sup>a</sup>As percentage of those born abroad.<sup>b</sup>Actual number of cases in category.

Asians. Over one-fourth of the persons in these groups are not citizens, and only about one-half use English as their primary language.

Persons who believe that they have problems specific to their racial or ethnic group may have a stronger sense of ethnic identity, but in any event clearly identify ethnic interests. The following questions were used to locate respondents who perceive such interests and to assess which interests were most salient:

Do you think there are problems today of special concern to [ . . . ] Americans? [respondent's race/ethnicity obtained in a previous question was inserted automatically.]

[Anglo respondents were asked,

Do you think there are problems today of special concern to people of your racial or national background?] Thinking of those problems which are of special importance? [respondent's race/ethnicity inserted automatically.]

[Anglo respondents were asked,

Thinking of those problems which are of special concern to people of your racial or national background, what would you say is the most important?]

As indicated by the figures in Table 2, blacks were considerably more likely than either Anglos or members of other minority groups to name a particular problem of special concern to them as members of a racial/ethnic/national group. Sixty-five percent of the blacks in the survey said there was a problem of special concern, while only 24 percent of the white respondents did so. It is also clear that unemployment stood out in blacks' minds as especially troublesome for the black community. Over three out of 10 blacks cited this problem, compared with 10 percent of the Mexicans and only a handful of Anglos and Asians. Mexican respondents were notable for their relatively high propensity to refer to education. Blacks were more likely than respondents from other groups to refer to race relations, but not by a large margin. Asians stand out in their concern with loss of ethnic heritage, or such ethnically-specific problems as the Philippines or World War II reparations. The primary message of this table, however, is that blacks see themselves as more adversely affected by unemployment and other problems than do other Americans, including other minorities.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF PREJUDICE

Is the concern with ethnic/racial problems paralleled in perceptions of discrimination?<sup>2</sup> The most immediate impact of prejudice comes through personal experiences of discrimination. These perceptions were elicited by the following questions:

Have you, yourself, personally experienced discrimination because you are [ . . . ]? (The respondent's race/ethnicity was inserted automatically at this point by the computer).

(If "yes" to the previous question) Thinking of the most serious discrimination you have experienced . . . was it in getting a job, or getting into school, in getting a house or apartment, in a social situation, or in some other respect?

<sup>2</sup>Many survey researchers believe that blacks and members of other minority groups are frequently reluctant to discuss matters of race and ethnicity with white interviewers and that whites are reticent about expressing racist views that are no longer socially acceptable. Although many of the interviewers were Asian American or Latino (bilingual interviewers conducted interviews in Spanish), matching the race/ethnicity of respondents with the race/ethnicity of interviewers was not feasible. Thus, prejudice may be underreported in these results.

**Table 2: Problems of Special Concern to One's Racial/Ethnic Group**

Problem Reported	Race/Ethnicity of Respondent		
	Anglo	Black	Mexican
Asian			
None	76%	35%	54%
Unemployment	1	31	10
Education	0	3	9
Crime, Gangs, Drugs	1	4	3
Race Relations/Discrimination	7	12	10
Loss of Ethnic Heritage/ Ethnic Issues	1	0	0
			7

Anglo respondents were not asked these questions about personal experiences of prejudice. Table 3 reports the responses to these questions by the respondents' race/ethnicity.

As these figures indicate, the degree and nature of personally experienced discrimination reported in the survey varied dramatically across groups. Not only were blacks more likely to report personally experienced discrimination (62 percent), the discrimination they cited was largely economic in nature—over half reported that the discrimination involved a job. Although Asians perceived Americans in general as less prejudiced than did Mexicans, they were more likely to report having personally experienced discrimination (46 percent to 36 percent). In contrast with blacks, over half of the Asians who reported being personally discriminated against referred to social situations—possibly snubs, misguided attempts at ethnic humor, or insults—but not something that was obviously economically injurious. Only a quarter reported discrimination involving a job. Mexicans fell between these extremes, with a third reporting job discrimination and 40 percent reporting prejudice in a social situation. Mexicans were more likely than those in either of the other groups to report serious discriminatory experiences involving education or housing, although even for them these reports involved substantially fewer respondents than the job and social situation categories.

Perceptions of group interests and experiences of discrimination are not necessarily independent. For example, Mexicans were more likely than others to cite education in both contexts. Individuals who have experienced discrimination may differ from those who have not in their perceptions of the existence and nature of group interests. Conversely, those who have a keen sense of group interests may be more ready to perceive prejudice.

**Table 3: Personally Experienced Discrimination Reported by Blacks, Mexican Americans, and Asian Americans**

	Race/Ethnicity of Respondent		
	Black	Mexican	Asian
<b>Respondent Personally Experienced Prejudice As Percentage of Those Who Said Yes, Most Serious Discrimination Personally Experienced:</b>			
Social Situation	26	40	55
Job	52	32	23
Education	7	13	7
Housing	7	12	6

When respondents' characterizations of the most important problem facing their group are tabulated by whether or not they report a personal experience of discrimination, it becomes clear that individuals who report personal experience of prejudice were much more likely than those who did not to report a problem that they viewed to be of special concern to their group. The salience of race relations and discrimination is higher—by a factor of two—among those who have had such experiences themselves than for others in each ethnic/racial group. Within each minority group, one other issue area stands out by receiving substantially more mentions from those who report experiences of prejudice. Blacks with such experiences are half again as likely as other blacks to name unemployment as a problem. Three times as many Mexicans who report prejudice name education as a major problem area. Asians who say they have experienced prejudice are much more likely than other Asians to spotlight crime as a problem.

As discussed above, the experience of prejudice may also differ for the native born as distinct from immigrants. Asian and Mexican respondents' personal experiences of prejudice did vary as a function of how long their families had been in the United States. (Virtually all of the blacks were third generation; Anglos were not asked about personal experiences of prejudice.) The pattern, however, was an uneven one. Reports of personally experienced discrimination increased from the immigrant to the second generation (those who were born in the United States, but whose parents were not) and then declined for third and later generations (those whose parents were born in the United States), for both groups. The first part of the pattern is consistent with data reported by Portes and Bach

(1985) that Cuban and Mexican immigrants to the U.S. perceive more discrimination after three years in the country than when they first arrive. The situations in which prejudice is perceived vary from generation to generation. For both the Mexicans and Asians, the incidence of job-related prejudice decreases with generation in the country, although the dramatic drop occurs between the immigrant and second-generation respondents. On the other hand, for respondents from both groups, discrimination in social situations increases from the immigrant to the second generation. Third-generation Asians report still more social prejudice. Whatever the generation, Mexicans are almost equally likely to point to education as a problem area, while for Asians mention of this as an area where discrimination occurs drops after the immigrant generation. On the other hand, problems with housing are greater for second-generation Asians than for immigrants or those in the third generation, while for third-generation Mexicans housing problems diminish. Overall, Asian experiences of prejudice were likely to be in the social sphere, and increasingly so with time in the country; fully three-quarters of those third-generation Asians who experienced discrimination did so in a social situation. On the other hand, for the immigrant generation in both groups, jobs and education frequently presented the occasion for bias.

In addition to direct reports of personal experience, people form general views of the extent to which others think of them in discriminatory fashion. Thus, another aspect of perceived prejudice can be tapped by asking respondents what they believe to be the attitude of other Americans toward someone of their race or ethnicity. Such perceptions were tapped with the following question:

As you mentioned previously, you are [...] [respondent's race/ethnicity] inserted automatically by the computer. Do you think most Americans are prejudiced against [...] only some Americans are prejudiced, or that most Americans are not prejudiced?

Table 4 reports the answers by the respondent's race/ethnicity.

Compared with Mexicans and Asians, blacks perceive Americans in general to be considerably more prejudiced. Asians perceive less prejudice than Mexicans. Asians, in fact, were twice as likely as blacks (42 percent compared with 21 percent) to report a belief that most Americans were not prejudiced against them.

However, differences between the groups were substantially less when respondents were asked about their expectations for future racial and ethnic relations. Respondents were asked:

Do you think that over the next 10 years or so Americans will become more prejudiced against [...] [respondent's race/ethnicity] inserted automatically by the computer], less

**Table 4: Degree of Prejudice and Future Amount of Prejudice Directed Toward One's Racial/Ethnic Group**

		Race/Ethnicity of Respondent		
		Black	Mexican	Asian
American's Degree of Prejudice:				
Most Are Prejudiced	17%			
Some Are Prejudiced	63	54		
Most Are Not Prejudiced	21	36		
America's Degree of Prejudice in 10 Years:				
More	8	9		
Won't Change Much	48	46	48	
Less	44	45	41	

prejudiced, or do you think that their attitudes probably won't change much?

The responses, by ethnicity, are reported in the bottom half of Table 4. Despite the fact that, as shown by the previous tables, blacks perceive more prejudice in contemporary American life than do members of the other two groups, there is little difference across groups in their perceptions of the future. Members of all groups display optimism, with very few respondents anticipating more prejudice in the future, and close to one-half in each group expecting to see less.

To assess which factors are associated with perceived prejudice for each group, the three measures discussed here—self experience, prejudice towards the group, expected future prejudice—were combined in a simple additive scale of overall prejudice. This scale was then regressed on a number of variables capturing the respondents' citizenship and immigration status and on a variable reflecting whether or not they identified a group-specific problem. A number of other variables were controlled for: the respondents' age, party identification, education, and a measure of issue attentiveness (the number of items in the issue battery to which the respondent gave a yes or no—rather than don't know—response). The last two items relate to the ability and willingness to process political information. Age may reflect accumulated wisdom or simply different life experience, and party may shape

a person's views. Table 5 reports the models estimated for each racial/ethnic group after variables with no effect were dropped.<sup>3</sup>

The first column reports the estimation for blacks. Perceptions of prejudice were lower among the handful of blacks who were foreign born or second generation. They were higher among younger blacks, among those who identified a problem affecting blacks, among those who are Democrats, and among those with more views on issues. Note that particularly with party identification and naming a group problem, causality may well run in either direction, or both. Persons may believe their group has a problem because they have been exposed to prejudice. The only claim being made for this estimation is that these factors are related to the perception of prejudice.

A rather different model holds for Mexicans and Asians. As among blacks, persons who identify a group specific problem are also more likely to perceive prejudice. However, in both of these groups, age, party identification, and issue attentiveness have no effect. Perceived prejudice is associated with generation and education, although in somewhat different fashions. Perceived prejudice is positively associated with education among Asians—the best educated perceive the most. Second generation Asians perceive more than either the foreign born or those in the third generation—there is a curvilinear relationship with time in the country. Among Mexicans, foreign-born noncitizens are the least likely to perceive prejudice. Naturalized citizens and those born in this country, whether or not of U.S. born parents, are all more likely, and by indistinguishable amounts, to perceive more. Education has a nonmonotonic relationship to these perceptions. Those who had at most a few years of high school, or who finished high school but had only a few years of college, are less likely to perceive prejudice than those who completed high school or who completed college. Altogether, despite the differences, these patterns for Mexicans and Asians suggest the "glass ceiling": perceptions of prejudice increase as persons should expect to be doing better. For all three groups, perceived prejudice is clearly associated with the awareness of a problem linked to ethnicity or race.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF STRUCTURAL INEQUITY

As noted previously, the perception of prejudice is not identical with the perception of inequitable life chances. These structural perceptions are especially important in providing a basis for cooperation or competition.

**Table 5: Factors Influencing Overall Amount of Prejudice; Regression of Combined Scale, Separately by Racial/Ethnic Group**

	Blacks	Mericans	Asians
Names group problem	.36 <sup>a</sup> (3.53) <sup>b</sup>	.36 (4.61)	.46 (3.93)
Age	-.010 (-3.76)		
Party (Dem. positive)	.21 (2.38)		
Has issue opinions	.05 (1.74)		
Foreign-born citizen	.33 (2.43)		
Second generation	.25 (2.39)		.53 (3.87)
Third generation	.59 (2.50)	.27 (2.62)	.05 (0.33)
Education (in years)			.05 (1.88)
High school graduate		.27 (3.27)	
College graduate		.24 (1.69)	
Constant	1.10 (3.69)	.98 (11.2)	.44 (1.17)
R <sup>2</sup>	.13	.09	.12
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	.11	.08	.10
N	315	492	284

<sup>a</sup>Unstandardized regression coefficient

<sup>b</sup>t-statistic

<sup>3</sup>The coefficients and significance of the remaining variables is virtually identical whether or not the insignificant ones are included, but it is far easier to read the tables in the simplified versions reported here.

Respondents' views of the opportunity structure in the United States were assessed directly, using the following parallel batteries of questions:

Do you think there are any groups of people in the United States today who get *fewer* opportunities than they deserve? . . . Any other groups?

Do you think there are any groups of people in the United States today who get *more* opportunities than they deserve? . . . Any other groups?

To mitigate any reluctance by respondents to express perceptions of prejudice, the interviewers solicited up to four responses to each question. Table 6 displays the responses to these items. Note that the entries in each cell of the tables are not mutually exclusive. The same respondent, for example, could state that blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans are disadvantaged, and all three responses would be registered.

Several things are readily apparent from these figures. First, it is clear that blacks are far more likely than Mexicans to perceive that people of their race/ethnicity are disadvantaged; 42 percent of black respondents stated that blacks received fewer opportunities than deserved, while only 24 percent of the Mexicans said that Latinos were deprived of deserved opportunity. Although they were given up to four chances to say so, only 9 percent of the Asians in our sample reported that being Asian limited their opportunities. Reports that whites lacked opportunities were virtually nonexistent and for that reason are not reported.

Reports that whites were unfairly advantaged, however, were fairly widespread. Consistent with the pattern of perceived disadvantage, blacks were more likely than members of other racial/ethnic groups to report the belief that whites received more opportunities than they deserved; one out of four blacks said so, compared with 15 percent each of the Asians and Mexicans and only 6 percent of the Anglos. Besides whites, no other group was perceived to be unfairly advantaged by more than a small number of respondents, regardless of their race/ethnicity. There is a glimmer of black and Mexican resentment of Asians, in that 8 percent of the blacks and 7 percent of the Mexicans reported that Asian Americans were unfairly advantaged. This is tempered, however, by the fact that 4 percent of the blacks and Mexicans believed that Asian Americans were unfairly disadvantaged. There is also an interesting asymmetry across the board, in that respondents, whatever their race/ethnicity, were considerably more likely to perceive a particular group or groups as unfairly disadvantaged than to assert that some group received more opportunities than they deserved. The prospects for a coalition across racial and ethnic lines seem enhanced by this apparent greater sympathy for the underdog than resentment against the privileged.

Although there were substantial differences in the perceived situation of members of different racial/ethnic groups, there was substantial agreement

**Table 6: Perceptions That Racial/Ethnic Groups Receive Fewer or More Opportunities Than They Deserve**

	Race/Ethnicity of Respondent			
	Anglo	Black	Mexican	Asian
<i>Fewer Opportunities Than Deserved Received By:</i>				
Blacks	20%	42%	20%	19%
Latinos	13	21	24	14
Asians	4	4	4	9
<i>More Opportunities Than Deserved Received By:</i>				
Whites	6%	25%	15%	15%
Blacks	5	0	3	4
Latinos	4	2	2	2
Asians	1	8	7	2

by respondents from different groups as to the structure of opportunities in American society. As indicated earlier, when asked which groups in the country today received fewer opportunities than they deserved, blacks referred to blacks more frequently than to any other group. But so did Anglos and Asians; 20 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of respondents in these categories reported that blacks did not receive the opportunities they deserved. For Asians this figure was far higher than the number who mentioned Asian Americans. Blacks, similarly, were almost as likely to report that Latinos were disadvantaged (21 percent said so) as were Mexicans (24 percent). Finally, only a handful of respondents, regardless of whether they were Anglo or not, reported that any minority group received more opportunities than warranted, or stated that whites received too few opportunities. Education had little effect upon the perceptions of Mexicans or Asians. Blacks who had attended college were, however, much more likely than other blacks to see whites as advantaged, although only slightly more likely to see blacks and Latinos as disadvantaged. Education has a large impact upon Anglo perceptions; the better-educated are substantially more likely to believe that blacks and Latinos receive fewer opportunities than they deserve and that whites receive more. Overall, then, the perceptions of other groups' structural position appear consistent with the formation of alliances.

Perhaps the most crucial question to answer in order to assess alliance possibilities is what perceptions are held by persons who believe their own group to be disadvantaged. Do they see their group as somehow singled out,

**Table 7: Perceptions That Fewer Opportunities are Received By Members of Other Groups**

		Percentage of Respondents Who See Specified Other Group as Disadvantaged		N
	Respondents Who See No Problem Specific to Own Group	Respondents Who See Problem Specific to Own Group		
<b>Black Respondents</b>				
Blacks not disadvantaged	Latinos Disadv. 2%	Asians Disadv. 2%	Latinos Disadv. 5%	196
Blacks disadvantaged	Latinos Disadv. 39%	Asians Disadv. 3%	Latinos Disadv. 47%	139
N	119	216		
<b>Mexican Respondents</b>				
Mexicans not disadvantaged	Blacks Disadv. 10%	Asians Disadv. 2%	Blacks Disadv. 7%	392
Mexicans disadvantaged	Blacks Disadv. 45%	Asians Disadv. 11%	Blacks Disadv. 65%	121
N	227	236		
<b>Asian Respondents</b>				
Asians not disadvantaged	Blacks Disadv. 14%	Latinos Disadv. 11%	Blacks Disadv. 12%	283
Asians disadvantaged	Blacks Disadv. 83%	Latinos Disadv. 58%	Blacks Disadv. 69%	25
N	195	113		

so that other minority groups would be at best irrelevant and at worst hostile to joint action? Or do they see structural disadvantage as something that extends beyond their own race or ethnicity? Similarly, do persons who perceive their group as having ethnically or racially specific problems become more willing to see others as disadvantaged, or does the awareness of their own problems make them more focused upon the conditions of their own group? Table 7 presents some data bearing on these points. It divides respondents in each ethnic/racial group by whether they named a group-specific problem and by whether they identified their own group as receiving fewer opportunities. Within each cell are reported the percentages of respondents with the cell characteristics who said that fewer opportunities are received by members of the other groups.

Clearly, persons who see their own group as structurally disadvantaged are also more inclined to see other groups as disadvantaged as well. This is especially true for perceptions of black and Latino opportunities by persons from other groups, including Asians. It appears to hold for perceptions of Asians, but very few people from any group see Asians as disadvantaged. Thus, a view of structural disadvantage tends to extend across groups. Perception of a group-specific problem has differing effects in different groups. Blacks who identify a problem are more likely to see others as disadvantaged. Mexicans who identify a problem and believe that Latinos face fewer opportunities are more likely to see blacks as disadvantaged. Otherwise, perception of a group problem has little effect, or a slightly negative one, on beliefs about other groups' chances. For Asians, perception of a group problem also has little, or possibly negative, effect, with one clear exception. Those Asians who believe they themselves are disadvantaged are more likely to see blacks as sharing that situation if they do *not* identify a group-specific problem. Thus, perception of one's own opportunities as diminished is associated with coalition-furthering perceptions of other groups. Perception of a group-specific problem may further black-Mexican coalition building but have asymmetric effects on coalitions with Asians.

As with the perceptions of prejudice, it is possible to assess the impact of various factors upon the perception that the respondent's own group or other groups suffer from structural inequity. A series of probit models were estimated for persons from each racial/ethnic group.<sup>4</sup> The dependent variables were dichotomous measures of whether or not some particular group was perceived as having fewer opportunities. The independent variables include those discussed before in the estimations of prejudice, plus perceived prejudice, two measures of income (home ownership and un-

<sup>4</sup>Use of ordinary linear regression would lead to incorrect estimation of the standard errors, since the dependent variable is truncated. STATA was used for estimating the probit models.

**Table 8: Factors Related to Perceptions by Blacks That They and Other Groups Have Fewer Opportunities**

	Blacks Fewer	Latinos Fewer	Asians Fewer	Asians Fewer
Combined prejudice	.27 <sup>a</sup> (3.02) <sup>b</sup>	.27 (.006)		
Names group problem	.56 (3.30)	.36 (1.97)		
Age		-.008 (-1.79)	.009 (-1.92)	-.017 (-2.29)
Has issue opinions	.08 (1.86)	.100 (2.10)		
Third generation		1.00 (2.22)		
Party (Dem. positive)		.30 (2.05)		
Head of household unemployed		.48 (2.36)		
Says blacks have fewer opportunities			1.61 (8.24)	.44 (1.73)
Constant	-2.77 (-4.96)	-1.73 (-4.38)	-1.32 (-4.99)	-.99 (-3.20)
LL at Convergence	-193	-158	-127	-58
Prob > Chi 2	.0000	.0000	.0000	.015
N	315	335	335	335

<sup>a</sup>Coefficient in probit estimation  
<sup>b</sup>t-statistic

employment of the head of household),<sup>5</sup> two additional immigration-related variables (other-than-English as primary language and foreign born). Table 8 reports the results of these estimations for black respondents, Table 9 for Mexicans, and Table 10 for Asians.

For all three groups, the propensity to see one's own group as lacking in opportunities is higher among group members who have experienced prejudice. The key component of prejudice among Mexicans and Asians for this perception is the belief that Americans are prejudiced against their group. Among Asians and Mexicans, those who do not primarily use English are also more likely to see disadvantage. For blacks, age has no effect upon perception of opportunity. Otherwise, all of the factors that were associated with heightened perceived prejudice are associated with perceived structural inequality—identifying a group problem, being a Democrat, having opinions on issues, and being of third or later generation. In addition, those blacks living in households with an unemployed head also perceive reduced opportunities. Mexicans, too, are more likely to report diminished opportunities if they cite a group problem, are issue attentive, or have less wealth (as indicated by being renters instead of homeowners). In addition, second-generation Mexicans are somewhat more likely than the foreign born, and clearly more likely than the third generation, to name reduced opportunities.

When it comes to perceptions of other groups, the single most powerful factor in predicting respondents' views are their opinions about their own group's opportunities. Thus, estimations were made of the perceptions of other groups both including and excluding the respondent's own-group belief. Blacks who believe blacks have fewer opportunities are more likely to see Asians and Latinos each as also having fewer opportunities. Controlling for self-perception, older blacks are more sympathetic to the other groups. Excluding self-perception, the only factor related to black perceptions of Asians' chances is age; older blacks are more likely to see Asians as disadvantaged. Again, excluding self-perception, older blacks are also more sympathetic than younger blacks to Latinos. In addition, blacks are more likely to see Latinos as disadvantaged if they themselves experience prejudice, identify a group problem, or are issue attentive.

With own group's opportunities out of the estimation, the factors associated with Mexican perception of black opportunities are very similar to those associated with own group opportunities. Mexicans who experience prejudice towards their group, who identify a group problem, and who are issue attentive are more likely to see blacks as structurally disadvantaged. Language use and homeownership are irrelevant, however. The second prejudice, identify a group problem, or are issue attentive.

<sup>5</sup> Although the survey included an item asking respondents about their income, the large amount of missing data, due to refusals, makes it inadvisable to use that variable.

generation was most likely to see own-group disadvantage; all citizens, whether native born or naturalized, are more likely than the noncitizens to see blacks as disadvantaged. With own-group perception included, and strongly positively related to perception of black disadvantage, only generation in the country has additional impact. The longer the respondent's

**Table 9:** Factors Related to Perceptions By Mexicans That They and Other Groups Have Fewer Opportunities

	Latinos Fewer	Blacks Fewer	Blacks Fewer	Asians Fewer	Asians Fewer
Prejudice towards group	.39 <sup>a</sup> (2.81) <sup>b</sup>	.24 (1.71)		-.42 (-1.85)	
Names group problem	.24 (1.84)	.22 (1.67)			
Has issue opinions	.06 (1.70)	.06 (2.17)			
Foreign-born citizen	.35 (1.58)	.50 (2.02)	.43 (1.54)	.72 (1.92)	.75 (1.87)
Second generation	.63 (3.47)	.77 (4.00)	.64 (2.97)	.75 (2.38)	.73 (2.14)
Third generation	.18 (.88)	.61 (3.21)	.81 (3.78)	.34 (.99)	.40 (1.10)
English not primary language	.33 (2.19)				
Homeowner	-.25 (-1.89)	.19 (-1.42)			
Says Latinos have fewer opportunities			1.56 (10.06)		.81 (3.62)
Constant	-1.77 (-6.01)	-1.95 (-6.83)	-1.89 (-10.03)	-2.18 (-7.89)	-2.27 (-7.14)
LL at Convergence	.250 .000	.233 .0001	.185 .0000	-.86 .043	-.78 .492
Prob > Chi 2					.0004
N	492				492

<sup>a</sup>Coefficient in probit estimation  
b<sub>i</sub>, arbitrary

Table 10: Factors Related to Perceptions by Asians That They and Other Groups Have Lesser Opportunities

	Asians	Blacks	Blacks	Latinos	Latinos	Latinos	Latinos	Latinos	Latinos
Prejudice towards group	.60 <sup>a</sup>	.29	(2.62) <sup>b</sup>	(1.67)					
English not primary language	.37								
Foreign born	.44	.57							
Says Asians have fewer opportunities	1.83	(-2.48)	(-3.04)	(-1.69)	(-2.17)	(-4.1)			
Says Blacks have fewer opportunities	1.54	(6.22)							
Constant	1.96	-.77	-.76	-.88	-.102	-.1.65 (8.21)	(-8.51)	(-4.83)	(-5.58)
LL at convergence	-.82	-.136	-.115	-.116	-.101	.79	308	285	285
Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0055	.015	.0000	.09	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

### **b**-Coefficient in probit estimation

### **t-statistic**

family has been in the U.S., the more the respondent sees blacks as having fewer opportunities. Conversely, Mexicans are more likely to see Asians as disadvantaged if they are immigrants or second generation rather than third generation, as long as they are citizens. Immigrants who do not have the security of citizenship are no more, and probably less, sympathetic than third-generation Mexicans. These generational effects, which are suggestive of a coalition of secure immigrants, hold even with the introduction of Mexicans' views of their own position. Once that is controlled for, however, those Mexicans who believe that Americans discriminate against their group are less likely to say that Asians suffer structural disadvantages.

Americans who believe Americans are prejudiced against their group are more likely to see blacks as structurally disadvantaged. Asians who are foreign born are less likely to see either blacks or Latinos as suffering from fewer opportunities. The story is the same with introduction of Asians' views of their own chances; those who believe themselves disadvantaged also see blacks and Latinos as disadvantaged, but the foreign born are less likely to report disadvantage for the other groups. Interestingly, the best predictor of Asian beliefs about Latinos' opportunities is Asian beliefs about black opportunities.

Thus, on the whole, older persons and those whose families have been in the U.S. longer are more willing to say that minorities face fewer opportunities. Economic and related "objective" factors seem to have very little influence upon this process. Prospects for a coalition of minorities are furthered by the fact that those who are aware of problems specific to their racial or ethnic group, and those who believe that their own group is structurally disadvantaged, are more inclined to view other minorities as also disadvantaged. Any coalition may be more supportive of blacks and Latinos than of Asians. Persons who believe that Americans are prejudiced towards their own group are more likely not only to see their group as having fewer opportunities but also to see blacks and Latinos as structurally disadvantaged. However, blacks who perceive prejudice are no more likely than other blacks to see Asians as disadvantaged, and Mexicans who believe there is prejudice towards their group are less inclined to believe that Asians have fewer opportunities. Nonetheless, on net, the evidence seems more consistent with an atmosphere conducive to coalition building than one rife with conflict.

#### ISSUE POSITIONS

The question remains as to whether there are specific issues that these groups might coalesce around. Answers to the issue questions posed in this study may be suggestive, but the caution raised in the introduction needs to be repeated with emphasis. Issues change over time. The public's perception of issues changes over time, and various political leaders have

large stakes in influencing the change. Moreover, a single or a few highly salient issues can suffice to cement a coalition, even if there is great internal disagreement over a wide range of other issues. However, with these caveats in mind, the distribution of responses to the specific issues included in this instrument may be suggestive.

The issue items included several related to immigration and language issues salient in 1984 (amnesty for illegal immigrants, employer sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants, bilingual education, bilingual ballots), one each on classic guns and "butler" (increased funding for welfare, increased spending for defense), and a number of "social" issues (support for the ERA, tax support for parochial schools, prayer in schools, banning federal funding for abortions, gun control, supporting the death penalty, restrict abortions or permit choice). Table 11 reports the percentage of respondents in each racial/ethnic group, including Anglos, in favor of each issue, after excluding those respondents who had no opinion. Anglos are included for comparison. Because four of the issues are aimed at immigration, Mexican and Asian respondents are divided into the foreign born and the native born. The percentage of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents are also included for each group.

Compared with the other ethnic/racial groups, blacks tend to be Democrats who favor spending on welfare and oppose further spending on defense. Along with foreign-born Mexicans, they oppose the death penalty. Foreign-born Asians want to spend more on defense. Foreign-born Mexicans favor amnesty and oppose employer sanctions. Anglos and native-born Asians oppose bilingual education, bilingual ballots, and prayer in school and are prochoice. Native-born Asians also oppose banning federal funding of abortions, and foreign born Asians are the group most favorably inclined towards gun control.

Persons who perceive structural disadvantage for minorities may well have different views on the issues. Thus, similar percentages were derived for respondents from each group who say blacks face fewer opportunities and for those who say Latinos face fewer opportunities. The results are more or less as one might expect. Anglos who see either blacks or Latinos as disadvantaged take more "liberal" views on the issues, and are more likely to be Democrats, than other Anglos. Blacks who perceive structural inequities have very similar issue views to those who do not. They are, however, even more likely to be Democrats and far less likely to decline to state partisanship. Those who see Latinos as disadvantaged are more supportive of bilingual ballots and less supportive of banning abortion funding. Blacks who see disadvantage for either group are less supportive of gun control.

Native-born Mexicans are more supportive of amnesty, bilingual education, bilingual ballots, and gun control if they see Latinos as disadvantaged. The views of foreign-born Mexicans change little, except that they are more likely to be Democrats if they report either group gets fewer oppor-

tunities than deserved. Foreign-born Asians who perceive black and Latino disadvantage have more liberal views than other foreign-born Asians across many of these issues, and are more likely to be Democrats. The views of U.S.-born Asians shift little; those who see blacks as disadvantaged are more in favor of employer sanctions, while those who perceive Latino disadvantage are more opposed. Surprisingly, native-born Asians who see either black or Latino structural disadvantage are more likely to be Republican.

To assess the prospects for coalition formation, the real question is how the position on the issues of each member of each of the minority groups compares with those of the others. Therefore, for each issue, probit estimations (not shown here) were run to assess whether there were significant differences of position between blacks, Asians, and Mexicans. The dependent variables were the percentages of respondents in favor on each issue, after excluding those with no opinion. Blacks were taken as the reference group. Thus, significant coefficients indicated that the corresponding group has substantially different views on the issue than do blacks. Separate dummy variables allowed comparison of blacks with noncitizen Mexicans, noncitizen Asians, naturalized Mexicans, naturalized Asians, U.S.-born Mexicans, and U.S.-born Asians.

A mixed pattern of opinion emerges. All Mexicans and Asians are more in favor of defense, and less supportive of "butter" (welfare spending), than are blacks. On a number of the social issues, there are no or few significant differences among the groups (tax credits for private schools, prochoice, banning abortion funding—though U.S.-born Asians are opposed to the last one). Foreign-born Asians are more supportive of gun control than anyone else. Everyone except noncitizen Mexicans are more supportive of the death penalty than blacks; everyone except foreign-born Mexicans are less in favor of prayer in school. Blacks, noncitizens, and naturalized Mexicans support the ERA more than the other Mexicans and Asians. Although the defense and welfare issues suggest differences in liberalism, the positions on the social issues do not line up according to any simple scale.

Immigration issues are mixed in a way that represents different group situations. Mexicans favor amnesty far more than either blacks or Asians. Noncitizens are opposed to employer sanctions more than anyone else while U.S.-born Asians favor them; the others, including blacks, are in between. Bilingual education is supported by Mexican noncitizens and opposed by Asian citizens; blacks and other Mexicans and Asians are in between again. Bilingual ballots are favored by noncitizens and opposed by Asian citizens; blacks and Mexican citizens hold equivalent views. Thus, opinions on these issues are mixed, partly reflecting differences in immigration status, but with substantial black support for the positions of many Mexicans and Asians. The differences in position reported above correspond to how results of a referendum on each issue, were it conducted at the time of the survey, would split by ethnicity. However, a number of the significant differences

	Anglo	Black	Born Mexican	Foreign- born Mexican	U.S.- born Mexican	Foreign- born Asian	Born Asian	Foreign- born Asian
Increase Defense \$	36	26	38	36	38	36	35	35
Increase Welfare \$	67	93	79	75	75	75	71	71
Amnesty	70	62	66	55	55	55	51	57
Bilingual Education	46	71	73	79	71	49	61	52
Employer Sanctions	30	56	63	55	55	56	78	78
Bilingual Ballots	46	54	55	55	55	54	55	55
Support ERA	30	93	96	93	93	93	78	78
Private School Tax	55	55	53	50	50	55	55	55
Credit	42	47	74	62	62	76	45	47
Payer in Schools	51	50	40	40	40	42	51	51
Ban Abortion	42	47	78	55	55	42	61	83
Funding	47	61	61	47	47	44	61	61
Gun Control	51	50	40	40	40	42	51	51
Death Penality	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Pro-choice	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Democrat	42	47	78	55	55	44	42	42
Independent	37	37	18	8	8	18	37	37
Replicable	7	7	10	10	10	10	42	42

Table II: Issue Preference by Ethnicity/Race; Number in Favor as Percentage of Those Who Have An Opinion

in overall group opinion across race and ethnicity may reflect other factors, such as education or age, which happen to be correlated with race and ethnicity. Moreover, variations in the experience of prejudice or in judgments of the opportunity structure may be partially responsible for differences in issue positions. One would like to compare people in each ethnic/racial group to those in others who share similar characteristics. Thus, a second series of probit models estimated issue positions on not only the dummies reflecting ethnicity and citizenship/immigration but also on control variables for these other factors. The control variables include language, party identification, and a number of demographic variables (religion, sex, homeownership, education, age). In addition, as the effects of perceived prejudice and perception of groups as having fewer opportunities are of particular interest, the measures tapping these variables were included. The results of these estimations, purged of insignificant variables as before, are reported in Table 12.

Some of the differences between the racial/ethnic groups diminish, reflecting the impact of these other variables. After introduction of the controls, defense spending is now favored more than by blacks only by foreign-born Asians. Those who see Latinos as having fewer opportunities want to spend more on defense. Those who have experienced more prejudice or who see blacks as having fewer opportunities want to spend less. Even with the controls, Mexicans and Asians still want to spend less on welfare than blacks, but the difference is now insignificant for the noncitizens.

The patterns of support across the groups for the ERA, tax credits for private schools, abortion funding, and gun control change little, although both the tax credits and gun control are opposed more by blacks who think blacks have fewer opportunities than by other blacks. Introduction of controls for age and being an Evangelical Protestant leaves only one significant difference among the groups with regard to school prayer; noncitizen Mexicans favor it more than non-Evangelical blacks or anyone else. After allowing for the fact that Catholics, men, and homeowners support the death penalty, Asian citizens still favor the death penalty more than blacks and the views of Mexican citizens are indistinguishable from those of blacks. Mexican noncitizens and non-Latinos who believe Latinos are disadvantaged are more opposed to the death penalty than blacks. The controls for religion, education, and age leave Asian noncitizens opposed to choice and naturalized Mexicans in favor.

The pattern of support for amnesty does not change at all with the introduction of other variables; in fact, none has any significant effect. The impact of ethnicity on the other immigration items, however, does shift. The borderline significant greater opposition of Mexican citizens to employer sanctions goes away; persons who do not speak English as a primary language are substantially more opposed to the sanctions than others.

Mexican citizens are opposed to bilingual education, as are people who have experienced prejudice, while noncitizens are now no more supportive than blacks. Mexicans who think Latinos have fewer opportunities favor bilingual education and bilingual ballots. Non-English speakers also favor bilingual ballots. With these controls, noncitizens are no more in favor of bilingual ballots than blacks or other Mexicans.

Thus, some of the differences in issue preferences across groups reflect differences in language status, in perception of opportunities, in prejudice, and in demographics (especially religion for the social issues). As to future coalitions, the data are sufficiently mixed that they can support either a "half-empty" or "half-full" interpretation. Perhaps the most systematic difference is that none of the other minorities, in any generation, are as supportive of welfare and other social program spending as are blacks. On the "gun" side, the preferences of all the groups are very similar, with the notable exception of the more hawkish stance of foreign-born Asians. On the immigration related issues, ethnicity and generation matter. Asian and blacks hold similar positions on amnesty, while Mexicans are very much more in favor of it. Blacks support the position of Mexicans on bilingual ballots, while Asian citizens are opposed to them. Blacks, Mexican citizens, and Asian citizens are all more in favor of employer sanctions than are noncitizens. And blacks support noncitizen preferences for bilingual education, while Mexican and Asian citizens are less in favor of the idea. On the social issues, there were fairly small differences across the groups. Asians are more in favor of the death penalty, and U.S.-born Asians tend to take a more secular view on the religion-related items, while Mexicans and foreign-born Asian citizens are less supportive of the ERA than blacks.

## CONCLUSION

In both their perceptions of opportunity structures and in their personal experiences, blacks are more likely than either Mexicans or Asians to believe that their race/ethnicity has hindered them, especially with respect to their pursuit of material well-being. They also appear somewhat more likely than these others to believe that other minority groups have been hindered as well. Minority group status is far more salient to blacks than to either Asians or Mexicans. Blacks are far more likely than members of the other minority groups to feel that as a group they do not get the opportunities they deserve, that whites get more opportunities than they deserve, that they have personally experienced discrimination, and that many Americans are prejudiced against them. For the most part, they seem to be sympathetic to the lot of other minority groups.

Although Mexicans and Asians are not substantially more likely than Anglos to perceive that blacks are unfairly disadvantaged, those who see themselves as disadvantaged extend the perception of structural inequality

	Increase \$	Increase \$	Welfare \$	Amnesty	Bilingual	Educational	Sanctions	Employer	Bilingual	Arms \$
Noncitizen Mexican	-.17 <sup>b</sup>	-.29	1.18	-.33	-.19	-.08	.05	-.42	-.15	.41
Noncitizen Asian	-.92 <sup>b</sup>	(-1.48)	(6.68)	(-1.18)	(-1.08)	(-1.08)	(-1.08)	(-1.18)	(-2.03)	(-1.30)
Noncitizen										
Foreign-born Mexican	.07	.51	.64	.06	.47	.24	.19	.05	.53	.07
Foreign-born										
Asian										
Citizen Mexican	(31)	(2.06)	(2.03)	(1.18)	(-2.12)	(-2.12)	(-1.75)	(-1.75)	(-1.05)	(2.70)
U.S.-born										
Mexican										
U.S.-born Asian	.04	.64	.04	.05	.72	.71	.19	.28	.32	(2.70)
Mexican Asian										
U.S.-born Asian	.05	.63	.03	.30	.64	.64	.19	.45	.31	(2.42)
U.S.-born Asian										
Black x Latino	.34	.37	.37	.18	(1.86)	(1.86)	(4.05)	(4.05)	(3.34)	(2.91)
Latino have fewer opp.										
NonMex x Latino	-.12	-.12	-.24	(-2.35)	(-2.29)	(-2.29)	(-2.00)	(-2.00)	(-2.24)	(-2.22)
Protestant Evangel.										
Catholic language										
English not experience										
Homeowner	.16	.16	.16	(1.67)	(1.67)	(1.67)	(-2.70)	(-2.70)	(-2.1)	(-2.19)
Education (years)	-.06	-.06	-.05	(-2.76)	(-2.76)	(-2.76)	(-3.23)	(-3.23)	(-2.02)	(-2.31)
Age	-.04	-.04	-.04	(-5.76)	(-5.76)	(-5.76)	(-5.77)	(-5.77)	(-0.02)	(-0.16)
Party (Dem.)	-.23	.30	(4.74)	1.53	(1.11)	(1.11)	2.54	1.45	1.45	(4.66)
Constant	.55	(3.79)	(3.79)	.09	(1.03)	(1.03)	2.54	1.45	1.45	(4.66)
LL at Convergence	-496	-394	-394	-.516	.965	.965	837	885	974	962
Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup>	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
N										

<sup>a</sup>Estimation excludes Anglos, so ethnic coefficients give effects relative to Blacks.  
<sup>b</sup>Probabilistic coefficients.

Table 12: Issue Preferences of Minorities by Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Immigration, Controlling for Political and Demographic Factors

	Tax Credit Support	Credit for Private Fryer	Ben School	Schools	Abortion	Funding	Control	Penalty	Pro-choice
Noncitizen Mexican	-.17 <sup>b</sup>	.13	.53	.15	-.13	.37	.02		
Noncitizen Asian	-.04	(1.06)	(.59)	(1.04)	(2.20)	(1.06)	(-2.24)		
Foreign-born Mexican	-.51	.20	.30	.25	.10	.27	.33		
Foreign-born Asian	(-1.75)	(.84)	(1.33)	(1.12)	(-.46)	(1.06)	(1.56)		
U.S.-born Mexican	-.61	.19	.05	.09	(.09)	(.71)	(3.74)	(-1.10)	
U.S.-born Asian	(-2.33)	(-1.23)	(-.09)	(.09)	(.71)	(.10)	(1.47)	(.04)	
U.S.-born Asian	(-1.19)	(.36)	(.36)	(.62)	(.62)	.04	.22	.00	
U.S.-born Asian	-.32	.29	.30	.43	.43	.12	.89	.02	
U.S.-born Asian	(-1.54)	(-1.62)	(-1.70)	(-2.34)	(-2.34)	(.66)	(4.60)	(.15)	
Blacks have fewer opp.									
Blacks x Blacks									
Mex x Latino									
NonMex x Latino									
Prejudice experience									
English not Bilingual									
Catholic									
Evang.	.40	.20	.20	.20	.20	.20	.20		
Male Protestant									
Homeowner									
Educational (years)	-.05	(-1.84)	.04	(2.16)	.05	(2.30)	.18	(1.81)	
Age									
Party (Dem.)	.18	(2.59)	1.92	(5.27)	.19	(-2.54)	-1.17	(-1.17)	
Constant									
LL at Convergence									
N									

Table 12: Issue Preferences of Minorities by Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Immigration, Controlling for Political and Demographic Factors (continued)

<sup>a</sup>Estimation excludes Anglos, so ethnic coefficients give effects relative to Blacks.  
<sup>b</sup>Prob > Chi 2  
<sup>c</sup>statistic  
<sup>d</sup>Probit coefficient

to blacks as well. The experience of prejudice tends to increase the perception of structural inequity, but this extends to other groups as well. There is little evidence here for interethnic competition.

Positions on specific issues vary, with a mixed pattern of agreement and disagreement across groups. On some issues ethnicity matters; on others, immigration generation and citizenship make the difference; on still others, none of these play much of a role. Overall, the conditions seem to point to the feasibility, but hardly the inevitability, of coalition building among these groups. As coalitions develop, they are likely to arise first among sub-groups—such as recent immigrants—rather than across grand categories. A coalition could build upon the willingness to see shared conditions of disadvantage. However, translation into broad support for specific issues will require skillful leadership.

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