## ISAIC2020: Privacy Enhancement for Vehicle's Long Term Credential in V2X using Direct Anonymous Attestation

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## Connected Car

https://www.qorvo.com/design-hub/blog/ v2x-in-the-connected-car-of-the-future



Fig: Connectivity

## V2X Communication

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331676083 Software-Defined Heterogeneous Vehicular Networking The Architectural\_Design\_and\_Open\_Challenges/




Fig: V2X Communication

## Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Avoid tracking.

GDPR: Prevent attackers or insiders from collecting Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

https://cyberscout.com/nl/blog/

recipe-for-a-safer-identity-is-as-easy-as-pii



## Privacy in V2X Communication

- Confidential
- Anonymous
- Pseudonymous
- Conditional Traceable, Protect PII

## **Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) Scheme**

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225162761\_On\_a\_Possible\_Privacy\_Flaw\_in\_Direct\_Anonymous\_Attestation\_DAA




Fig: DAA

## Privacy-Enhanced Capabilities for VANETs using Direct Anonymous Attestation

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321422009\_ Privacy-Enhanced\_Capabilities\_for\_VANETs\_using\_Direct\_ Anonymous\_Attestation




Fig: V2X PKI

Fig: V2X DAA

#### Related Work V2X DAA


JOIN: TC	=	Host	=	ISSUER
$sk_{ek_{tc}}, pk_{ek_{tc}}$		$pk_{ek_{tc}}, pk_{tc}$		$pk_{ek_{tc}}, sk_I$
$sk_{tc}, pk_{tc}$		$pk_I$		
			$pk_{ek_{tc}}, pk_{tc}$ $\rightarrow$	fresh $n_I$
			C	$C = \texttt{aenc}(n_I \parallel pk_{tc}, pk_{ck_{tc}})$
$n_I \parallel p k_{tc}$	$n_I \parallel pk_{tc}$		$n_I \parallel pk_{tc}$	$cre =  exttt{blindSign}(\ pk_{tc},\ sk_I\ )$
				fresh key
				e = senc(cre, key)
	d		d, e	$d = aenc(\ key \parallel pk_{tc},\ pk_{ek_{tc}}\ )$
$key \parallel pk_{tc}$	$\xrightarrow{key}$	store( cre )		

CREATE: TC	=		Host
$sk_{tc}$			cre
			fresh T
fresh $sk_{ps}/pk_{ps}$		"create"    $\widehat{cre}$	$\widehat{cre} := \operatorname{blind}(cre,r)$
fresh $r^\prime$			
$ps_{sig} :=  exttt{DAASign}(pk_{ps}, r', sk_{tc}) = (\sigma_1 \parallel \sigma_2 \parallel \widehat{cre})$			
$\sigma_1 := sign(pk_{ps}, sk_{tc})$			
$\sigma_2 := \text{blindSign}(\text{"certified"} \parallel pk_{ps}, r', sk_{tc})$			
$ps_{Cert_{1c}} := (pk_{ps} \parallel ps_{sig})$			
$store(sk_{ps})$	$\xrightarrow{ps_{Cert_{tc}}}$		$\mathit{store}(ps_{Cert_{tc}})$

SIGN / VERIFY: TC	=	Host	$\rightleftharpoons$	Verifier
$sk_{ps}$		$ps_{Cert_{te}}$		$pk_I$
	$m_{plain}$	$m_{plain} := \{ `70 mph" \mid   data \mid \}$		
$m_{sign} := \mathrm{sign}(m_{plain}, sk_{ps})$	$m_{sign}$	$msg := \{ \mid m_{plain} \parallel m_{sign} \parallel ps_{Cert_{te}} \mid \}$	msg	$\longrightarrow$ DAAVerify $(ps_{sig}, pk_I)$
				$store(pk_{ps})$

## **Securing V2X Communications for the Future**

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335089342\_ Securing\_V2X\_Communications\_for\_the\_Future\_Can\_PKI\_Systems\_ offer\_the\_answer






Fig: V2X PKI

Fig: V2X DAA

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## **Problem**

Traditional VID Certificate is a long-term credential, it is traceable by Pseudonymous CA.

Therefore, it is hard to scale if we want to enhance the privacy protection from Pseudonymous CA insiders.


Above DAA schemes make the enrollment authority write long-term pseudonymous certificate into vehicle, remove short-term pseudonymous certificate.

It is simpler than traditional V2X solution. However, the trust is mostly shift to vehicle.

# Privacy Enhancement for Vehicle's Long Term Credential in V2X using Direct Anonymous Attestation

Enrollment authority writes long-term pseudonymous credential into vehicle.

Reserve the Pseudonymous Authority to issue short-term pseudonymous credential for vehicle.



## **Issue Short-Term Pseudonymous Certificate**

Vehicle's long-term pseudonymous credential is used to authenticate the request for short-term pseudonymous credential.

The verifier is Pseudonymous Authority.




Fig: Issue Short-Term Pseudonymous Certificate

### **Conclusion**

Privacy enhancement is critical for person in V2X scenario.

We should build up the future V2X ecosystem with the principles of 'privacy by design' and 'privacy by default'.