MLIS2021: Discussion about the Encrypted DNS hosted in Internal CPE

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- Encrypted DNS Service
 - Service Type
 - Service Provider
 - Server Address
 - Resolver Discovery
 - Resolver Validation
 - Special Scenario
- Encrypted DNS Service for Internal CPE
 - Encrypted DNS Service Provider for Internal CPE
 - Our Proposal
- Conclusion
 - Conclusion
 - Resources

Service Type

- DNS-over-TLS (DoT)
- DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)
- DNSCurve

Service Provider

- Public DNS
- ISP DNS
- Internal CPE DNS




Fig: Service Provider

Server Address

- Authentication Domain Name(ADN)
- Public IP Address
- Private IP Address



Fig: Server Address

Resolver Discovery

- Discovery of Network Designated Resolvers(DNR)
 - DHCP
 - Router Advertisement(RA)
- Discovery of Designated Resolvers(DDR)
 - domain: SVCB record
 - resolver: SVCB record from dns://resolver.arpa
- Adaptive DNS Resolver Discovery
 - SVCB record
 - provisioning domain (PvD) file

Resolver Validation

- DNSSEC-signed SVCB record
- PvD file: well-known HTTPS URI based on a zone apex
- TLS certificate: confirm of domain name ownership
 - · certificate with trusted certificate chain
 - self-signed certificate

Special Scenario

- IoT secure bootstrap
 - use PAKE scheme to authenticate the EST server, and fetch the certificate
- BYOD
 - VPN tunnel

Encrypted DNS Service Provider for Internal CPE: Public DNS

- Server Address: ADN/Public IP Address
- Service Type: DoT/DoH
- Resolver Discovery: DHCP/RA/SVCB resolver.arpa
- Resolver Validation: DNSSEC/TLS certificate



Fig: Public DNS

Encrypted DNS Service Provider for Internal CPE: ISP DNS

- Server Address: ADN/Public IP Address/Private IP Address
- Service Type: DoT/DoH
- Resolver Discovery: DHCP/RA/SVCB resolver.arpa
- Resolver Validation: DNSSEC/TLS certificate



Fig: ISP DNS

the Encrypted DNS hosted in Internal CPE

- Server Address: Private IP Address
- Service Type: DoT/DoH
- Resolver Discovery: DHCP/RA/SVCB resolver.arpa
- Resolver Validation: TLS certificate



Fig: CPE DNS

Resource Constrained IoT Device

- Limited CPU/Memory/Battery
- Defense against Mirai DDoS attack
- DNS packet at local network without DNSSEC validation
- MDNS/DNSSD at local network probably without authentication

the Encrypted DNS hosted in Internal CPE: Lightweight

Make IoT device use the Encrypted DNS hosted in Internal CPE will be helpful to make access control on DNS query, and design filter policy against Mirai DDoS attack.

Terminal	Internal_CPE
Resolver Discovery	
Join Local Network, request DNS Information	
alt [DNR]	
DHCP/RA	
<u> </u>	
[PAKE]	
use PAKE scheme to authenticatethe encrypted DNS server, setup secure com	munication
[DOR]	
SVCB record from dns://resolver.arpa	
Resolver Validation	
Resolver Validation alt [DNSCurve]	
alt [DNSCurve] raw public key	
alt IDNSCurve) Trust On First Use (TORU)	→
alt [DNSCurve] raw public key	→
att DRSCure	→
alt [DASCurve] raw public key Trust On First Use (TORU) [Optional] CryptographicallyGenerated Addresses (CGA)	—
att DRSCure	→
alt [DRSCure] raw public key Trust On First Use (TORU) [Optional] CryptographicallyGenerated Addresses (CGA) [DoT/Def] self-signed certificate	

Conclusion

It is important to enhance security and privacy on local network communication.

We should design an local network DNS ecosystem, which is secure and affordable for resource constrained device.

Resources

- Discovery of Designated Resolvers https://github.com/ietf-wg-add/draft-ietf-add-ddr
- Discovery of Network provided Resolvers https://github.com/ietf-wg-add/draft-ietf-add-dnr
- DNS-over-HTTPS and DNS-over-TLS Server Deployment Considerations for Enterprise Networks https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-add-enterprise/
- Adaptive DNS Resolver Discovery https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pauly-add-resolver-discovery-01
- DNSCurve https://dnscurve.org/
- Cryptographically Generated Address https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically Generated Address