

Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) Report

1. Project Overview

Application Name: Damn Vulnerable Node.js Express App


Base URL: <http://localhost:5000>

Testing Type: Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)

Testing Date: —

Tools Used:

- OWASP ZAP (Automated Scanning)
- Postman (Manual Testing & PoCs)
- Web Browser (Manual Verification)



2. Scope of Testing

The scope of this assessment includes all publicly accessible endpoints exposed by the application running on the local environment. The testing focused on identifying common web application vulnerabilities based on the OWASP Top 10.

Out of scope:

- Source code review (covered in Phase B – SAST)
 - Infrastructure and OS-level hardening
-

3. Methodology

The assessment was conducted using the following approach:

1. **Automated DAST** using OWASP ZAP to enumerate endpoints and identify potential vulnerabilities.
 2. **Manual Verification** using Postman and browser-based testing to validate findings and create Proof of Concepts (PoCs).
 3. **OWASP Top 10 Mapping** for each confirmed vulnerability.
-

4. Phase A – Automated Testing (OWASP ZAP)

4.1 Discovered Endpoints (Examples)

- /api-docs
- /v1/admin/promote/{id}
- /v1/search/{filter}/{query}
- /v1/beer-pic/
- /v1/test/
- /v1/redirect/
- /v1/status/{brand}
- /
- /v1/user/{id}

4.2 ZAP Findings Summary

OWASP ZAP reported multiple high-risk issues, including:

- Possible SQL Injection

- Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Path Traversal
- Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Broken Access Control
- **Screenshot:**

The screenshot displays two instances of the ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) application. The top instance shows the 'Alerts' tab open, listing several security vulnerabilities found during a scan of the local host (http://localhost:5000). These include issues such as 'CSP Failure to Define Directive with No Fallback', 'Content Security Policy (CSP) Header Not Set', and 'Missing Anti-clickjacking Header'. The bottom instance shows the 'Automated Scan' interface, where a scan is in progress against the same target URL. A progress bar indicates the scan is at 100%. Below the progress bar, a table provides a detailed log of the scan results, showing the status of each URL (Processed, Method, URI, and Flags).

5. Phase A – Manual Testing & Proof of Concepts (PoCs)

Note: Vulnerabilities are reordered for clarity based on OWASP Top 10 categories. Technical details remain unchanged.

● V1 – Vertical Privilege Escalation (Admin Promotion)

- **Endpoint:** PUT /v1/admin/promote/{user_id}
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/v1/admin/promote/1>
- **OWASP Category:** A01 – Broken Access Control

Description:

Any authenticated or unauthenticated user can promote themselves to admin.


Impact:

Full administrative privileges gained.

Expected Result:

User role changes to admin.

📸 Screenshot:



● V2 – Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/user/{ id}
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/v1/user/1>
- **OWASP Category:** A01 – Broken Access Control

Description:

User IDs can be modified to access other users' data without authorization.

Impact:

Unauthorized access to sensitive user information.

Expected Result:

Another user's data is returned.

📸 Screenshot:

The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. The main window displays a request to `http://localhost:5000/v1/user/1`. The 'Body' tab shows a JSON response with user data for user ID 1. The response body is as follows:

```
1  "id": 1,
2  "email": "admin@admin.com",
3  "profile_pic": null,
4  "password": "admin",
5  "role": "admin",
6  "address": "123 Main St, Springfield, USA",
7  "name": "Abdelrahman",
8  "createdAt": "2025-12-15T21:51:43.678Z",
9  "updatedAt": "2025-12-17T17:47:53.928Z",
10 "deletedAt": null,
11 "createdAt": "2025-12-15T21:51:43.678Z",
12 "updatedAt": "2025-12-17T17:47:53.928Z",
13 "deletedAt": null,
14 "beers": []
```

The left sidebar shows a history of requests, including several attempts to exploit the endpoint with different user IDs. The top navigation bar shows multiple tabs for various API endpoints and tools like Swagger and GraphQL.



V3 – Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/test/
- **Payload:** url=<http://127.0.0.1:5000/v1/admin/users>
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/v1/test/?url=http://127.0.0.1:5000/v1/admin/users>
- **OWASP Category:** A10 – Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Description:

Server performs internal requests based on user-controlled input.

Impact:

Access to internal admin endpoints.

Expected Result:

The server confirms connectivity to the internal admin endpoint by returning a **200 OK status**, proving it can scan internal ports

Screenshot:

The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. In the center, there is a request configuration window for a GET request to <http://localhost:5000/v1/test/?url=http://127.0.0.1:5000/v1/admin/users>. The 'Body' tab is selected, showing the JSON response: {"response":200}. The left sidebar shows a history of requests, including several DELETE requests to <http://localhost:5000/v1/user/1>. The bottom left corner of the interface has a note: 'Create collections in Postman' and 'Use collections to save your requests and share them with others.' with a 'Create a Collection' button.

V4– Path Traversal

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/beer-pic/
- **Payload:** ../../../../../../etc/passwd
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/v1/beer-pic/?picture=../../../../etc/passwd>
- **OWASP Category:** A05 – Security Misconfiguration

Description:

Improper file path validation allows directory traversal.

Impact:

Disclosure of sensitive server files.

Expected Result:

/etc/passwd content returned.

Screenshot:

The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. In the top navigation bar, there are tabs for Home, Workspaces, Explore, and a search bar labeled 'Search Postman'. On the right side of the header, there are buttons for Sign In, Create Account, and various request methods (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE). Below the header, the main workspace displays a history of requests and a current request configuration. The current request is a GET to `http://localhost:5000/v1/beer-pic/?picture=../../../../etc/passwd`. The 'Body' tab is selected, showing the raw response content which is the full text of the /etc/passwd file from the target system. The status bar at the bottom indicates a 200 OK status with a time of 13 ms and a size of 1.63 KB.

● V5 – Open Redirect

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/redirect/
- **Payload:** <https://evil.com>
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/v1/redirect/?url=https://evil.com>
- **OWASP Category:** A05 – Security Misconfiguration

Description:

Application redirects users to untrusted URLs.


Impact:

Phishing and malicious redirection attacks.

Expected Result:


Browser redirects to external domain.

Screenshot:



● V6 – Unhandled Exception → Application Crash

- Endpoint : POST / v1/user/login,token
- Payload : v1/user/login,token
- FULL URL : **http://localhost:5000/v1/user/token**
- OWASP Category : A09 – Security Logging & Monitoring Failures
- Denial of Service (DoS)
- Impact: An attacker can crash the entire backend application by sending a malformed authentication request, causing a denial of service condition.



V7 – SQL Injection

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/search/{ filter}/{ query}
- **Payload:** test' UNION SELECT 1, 'TEST_HTML', 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9-- -
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection


Full URL: <http://localhost:5000/v1/search/name/test' UNION SELECT 1, email || ':' || password, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 FROM Users -- -> **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection

Description: SQL query uses unsanitized input, allowing UNION-based injection to extract data from the Users table.

Impact: Critical disclosure of all user credentials (emails and passwords) leading to account takeover.

Expected Result: User emails and passwords appear in the response instead of search results.

Screenshot:



The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. In the top navigation bar, there are tabs for Home, Workspaces, Explore, and a search bar labeled "Search Postman". On the right side, there are buttons for Sign in and Create Account. Below the navigation, there's a history section titled "History" showing several recent requests. The main area displays a single request with the following details:

- Method:** GET
- URL:** http://localhost:5000/v1/search/name/test' UNION SELECT 1, email || ':' || password, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 FROM Users -- -
- Params:** None
- Authorization:** None
- Headers:** (10)
- Body:** None
- Cookies:** (1)
- Headers:** (7)
- Test Results:** Status: 200 OK, Time: 6 ms, Size: 996 B

The response body is displayed in a JSONpretty-printed format, showing multiple user records. The first few records are as follows:

```
    "id": 1,
    "name": "1@gmail.com : 25f9e794323b453885f5181ff1b624d0b",
    "picture": 3,
    "price": 4,
    "currency": 5,
    "stock": 6,
    "created_at": 7,
    "updated_at": 8,
    "deleted_at": 9

    "id": 2,
    "name": "2@gmail.com : 25f9e794323b453885f5181ff1b624d0b",
    "picture": 3,
    "price": 4,
    "currency": 5,
    "stock": 6,
    "created_at": 7,
    "updated_at": 8,
    "deleted_at": 9

    "id": 3,
    "name": "3@gmail.com : 25f9e794323b453885f5181ff1b624d0b",
    "picture": 3,
    "price": 4,
    "currency": 5,
    "stock": 6,
```

8 – Remote Code Execution (Command Injection)

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/status/{brand}
- **Payload:** google.com|whoami
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/v1/status/google.com|whoami>
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection

Description:

User input is passed directly to OS commands.

Impact:

Remote command execution on the server.

Expected Result:

Command output returned in response.

Screenshot:

The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. In the center, there is a request configuration window for a GET request to <http://localhost:5000/v1/status/google.com|whoami>. The 'Params' tab is selected, showing a single parameter 'Key' with the value 'abdelrahman'. Below the request window, the response pane displays the raw JSON output: { "name": "abdelrahman" }. The status bar at the bottom indicates a 200 OK status with a time of 1619 ms and a size of 239 B. On the left side of the screen, the 'History' sidebar lists numerous failed DELETE requests to <http://localhost:5000/v1/user/1>, each with a status of [CONFLICT].

● V9 – Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

- **Endpoint:** GET /
- **Payload:** {{7*7}}
- **Full URL:** http://localhost:5000/?message={{7*7}}
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection

Description:

User input is evaluated by the server-side template engine.


Impact:

Potential remote code execution and data leakage.

Expected Result:

Expression evaluated and returns 49.

Screenshot:



● V10 – Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- **Endpoint:** GET /
- **Payload:** <script>alert(1)</script>
- **Full URL:** http://localhost:5000/?message=<script>alert(1888888888)</script>
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection

Description:

User input is reflected in the response without sanitization.


Impact:

Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in victim's browser.

Expected Result:

JavaScript alert box appears.

Screenshot:



● V11 – Exposed API Documentation

- **Endpoint:** GET /api-docs
- **Full URL:** <http://localhost:5000/api-docs>
- **OWASP Category:** A05 – Security Misconfiguration -Information squelger

Description:

Swagger API documentation is publicly accessible without authentication.


Impact:

Attackers can enumerate all backend endpoints and plan targeted attacks.

Expected Result:

Swagger UI loads successfully.

Screenshot:



6. OWASP Top 10 Coverage Summary

Vulnerability	OWASP Category
V1	A01
V2	A01
V3	A10
V4	A05
V5	A05
V6	A09
V7	A03
V8	A03
V9	A03
V10	A03
V11	A03

□ Phase B – Static Analysis with Semgrep (SAST)

Goal

The goal of Phase B is to statically analyze the application source code using **Semgrep** in order to:

- Identify insecure coding patterns behind the vulnerabilities discovered during Phase A (DAST).
- Correlate runtime exploits with their root causes in the source code.
- Write custom Semgrep rules to detect selected vulnerable patterns.

□ B1 – Running Semgrep with Existing Rules

Tool Used

- **Semgrep (CLI)**

Command Executed

```
semgrep --config "p/javascript" --config "p/nodejs" -error
abdelrahman@BODA:~/SSD_... ✘ + ⌂
```

Scan Summary

✓ Scan completed successfully.

- Findings: 16 (16 blocking)
- Rules run: 68
- Targets scanned: 23
- Parsed lines: ~100.0%
- Scan skipped:
 - Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 9934
- Scan was limited to files tracked by git
- For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag

Ran 68 rules on 23 files: 16 findings.

⚠ Missed out on 447 pro rules since you aren't logged in!

⚡ Supercharge Semgrep OSS when you create a free account at <https://sg.run/rules>.

```
abdelrahman@BODA:~/SSD_PROJECT/vuln-node.js-express.js-app$ semgrep --config "p/javascript" --config "p/nodejs" --json > semgrep-results.json
```

Scan Status

Scanning 92 files tracked by git with 74 Code rules:

Scanning 23 files with 68 js rules.

100% 0:00:00

Scan Summary

✓ Scan completed successfully.

- Findings: 16 (16 blocking)
- Rules run: 68
- Targets scanned: 23
- Parsed lines: ~100.0%
- Scan skipped:
 - Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 9934
- Scan was limited to files tracked by git
- For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag

Ran 68 rules on 23 files: 16 findings.

```
abdelrahman@BODA:~/SSD_PROJECT/vuln-node.js-express.js-app$ |
```

Vuln ID	Vulnerability Type	Endpoint / Feature	Code Location (File:Line)	Semgrep Finding (Rule ID)
V1	Privilege Escalation	PUT /v1/admin/promote/:id	src/routes/user.js (around line 20)	✗
V2	IDOR	GET /v1/user/:id	src/routes/user.js (around line 45)	✗
V3	SQL Injection	GET /v1/search	src/routes/order.js:67	✓
V4	Command Injection	GET /v1/status/:brand	src/routes/system.js (check for exec/spawn)	✗
V5	SSTI	GET /	src/router/routes/frontend.js:17	✓
V6	XSS	GET /	src/router/routes/system.js:18	✓
V7	SSRF	GET /v1/test	src/routes/system.js (check for request/http.get)	✗
V8	Path Traversal	GET /v1/beer-pic	src/router/routes/order.js:33	✓
V9	Open Redirect	GET /v1/redirect	src/router/routes/system.js:37	✓
V10	Exposed API Docs	GET /api-docs	src/server.js (Swagger setup)	✗

Scan Scope

- JavaScript / Node.js backend source code
- Only Git-tracked files

Semgrep Results

- **Total findings:** 16
- **Rules executed:** 68
- **Files scanned:** 23
- **Severity:** All findings are blocking (ERROR level)
-

Key Findings Related to Phase A (DAST)

Semgrep automatically detected several issues that directly match or strongly relate to vulnerabilities confirmed dynamically in Phase A, including:

- Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
- SQL Injection
- Path Traversal
- Open Redirect
- Insecure Object Deserialization (RCE)
- Insecure JWT implementation
- Weak session cookie configuration

These findings validate that the exploited vulnerabilities are rooted in insecure code patterns.

□ B2 – Mapping DAST Vulnerabilities → Semgrep → Code

Important:

For each vulnerability, the **exact file, line number, and vulnerable code snippet** are provided as required.

● V1 – Vertical Privilege Escalation

- **Endpoint:** PUT /v1/admin/promote/{id}
- **OWASP Category:** A01 – Broken Access Control
- **File:** src/router/routes/user.js
- **Lines:** 320–341
- **Semgrep Detection:** ✗ Not detected (logic flaw)

Vulnerable Code

```
app.put('/v1/admin/promote/:id', (req, res) =>{
  const userId = req.params.id;
  db.user.update({role:'admin'}, {
    where: { id : userId }
  }).then((user)=>{
    res.send(user)
  })
});
```

Why Vulnerable

No authentication or authorization check is performed. Any user can promote themselves to admin.

● V2 – Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/user/{id}
- **OWASP Category:** A01 – Broken Access Control
- **File:** src/router/routes/user.js
- **Lines:** 50–57
- **Semgrep Detection:** ✗ Not detected (authorization logic)

Vulnerable Code

```
app.get('/v1/user/:id'
', (req,res) =>{
  db.user.findOne({
    include: 'beers',
    where: { id : req.params.id }
  }).then(user => {
    res.json(user);
  });
});
```

Why Vulnerable

The endpoint trusts the user-supplied ID and does not verify ownership or role.

● V3 – SQL Injection

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/search/{filter}/{query}
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection
- **File:** src/router/routes/order.js
- **Lines:** 60–75
- **Semgrep Rule:** javascript.sequelize.security.audit.sequelize-injection-express
- **Status:** ✓ Detected

Vulnerable Code

```
const filter = req.params.filter
const query = req.params.query
const sql = "SELECT * FROM beers WHERE "+filter+" = '"+query+"'";

db.sequelize.query(sql, { type: 'RAW' })
```

Why Vulnerable

User input is concatenated directly into a SQL query without parameterization.

● V4 – Path Traversal

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/beer-pic/?picture=
- **OWASP Category:** A01 – Broken Access Control
- **File:** src/router/routes/order.js
- **Lines:** ~25–40
- **Semgrep Rule:** express-path-join-resolve-traversal
- **Status:** Detected

Vulnerable Code

```
var filename = req.query.picture;
var filePath = `../../../../../uploads/${filename}`;

fs.readFile(path.join(__dirname, filePath), function(err,data) {
    res.send(data)
})
```

Why Vulnerable

User input is directly used in filesystem paths, allowing directory traversal.

● V5 – Open Redirect

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/redirect/?url=
- **OWASP Category:** A05 – Security Misconfiguration
- **File:** src/router/routes/system.js
- **Lines:** ~30–40
- **Semgrep Rule:** express-open-redirect
- **Status:** Detected

Vulnerable Code

```
var url = req.query.url
if(url) {
    res.redirect(url);
}
```

● V6 – Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

- **Endpoint:** GET /?message=
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection
- **File:** src/router/routes/frontend.js
- **Lines:** ~15–20
- **Semgrep Rule:** express-insecure-template-usage
- **Status:** Detected

Vulnerable Code

```
const message = req.query.message || "Please log in"
rendered = nunjucks.renderString(message);
res.render('user.html', {message : rendered});
```

● V7 – Remote Code Execution (Command Injection)

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/status/{brand}
- **OWASP Category:** A03 – Injection
- **File:** src/router/routes/system.js
- **Lines:** ~13–20
- **Semgrep Detection:** Indirect
- **Status:** Confirmed via DAST

Vulnerable Code

```
const test = execSync(
  "curl https://letmegooglethat.com/?q="+ req.params.brand
)
res.send(test)
```

● V8 – Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

- **Endpoint:** GET /v1/test/?url=
- **OWASP Category:** A10 – Server-Side Request Forgery
- **File:** src/router/routes/system.js
- **Lines:** ~70–90
- **Semgrep Detection:** Logic-based

Vulnerable Code

```
var url = req.query.url
requests.get(url)
  .then(Ares => res.json({response:Ares.status}))
```

● V9 – Insecure JWT Implementation (SAST-only)

- **OWASP Category:** A02 – Cryptographic Failures
- **Files:**
 - src/router/routes/user.js
 - src/middleware/authjwt.js line:13
- **Semgrep Rule:** hardcoded-jwt-secret
- **Status:** Detected

Vulnerable Code

```
jwt.verify(token, "SuperSecret")
jwt.decode(token)
```

Why Vulnerable

- Hardcoded secret
 - Use of `jwt.decode()` without signature verification
-

□ B3 – Custom Semgrep Rules

To detect vulnerabilities not reliably flagged by default rules, custom Semgrep rules were created.

Custom Rule Coverage

- SQL Injection via string concatenation
- Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
- Command Injection
- Insecure JWT decoding
- IDOR patterns (missing authorization)

Folder Structure

```
semgrep-rules/
├── sql-injection.yaml
├── ssti.yaml
├── command-injection.yaml
├── insecure-jwt.yaml
└── idor.yaml
```

Execution Command

```
semgrep --config semgrep-rules/my-custom-rules.yaml .
```

```
abdelrahman@BODA: ~/SSD_... + v
Scan Summary
  ✓ Scan completed successfully.
  • Findings: 15 (15 blocking)
  • Rules run: 4
  • Targets scanned: 23
  • Parsed lines: ~100.0%
  • Scan skipped:
    • Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 9934
  • Scan was limited to files tracked by git
  • For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag
Ran 4 rules on 23 files: 15 findings.
abdelrahman@BODA:~/SSD_PROJECT/vuln-node.js-express.js-app$ semgrep --config semgrep-rules/my-custom-rules.yaml .

OOO
Semgrep CLI

Scanning 93 files (only git-tracked) with 4 Code rules:
CODE RULES
Scanning 23 files with 4 js rules.

SUPPLY_CHAIN RULES
No rules to run.

PROGRESS
100% 0:00:00

15 Code Findings

src/middleware/verifySignup.js
  ↳ semgrep-rules.custom-sql-injection
    Potential SQL Injection via String concatenation
      38; message: "Failed! Role does not exist = " + req.body.roles[i]
```

Evidence

- Custom rules successfully matched vulnerable code **before fixes**
- After remediation, rules no longer matched the fixed code (or matched fewer locations), confirming effectiveness
- *The difference in findings count is due to running different rule sets (default registry rules vs custom rules only).*
-



Phase B Completion Summary

- Existing Semgrep rules identified **multiple root causes** for Phase A vulnerabilities
- All major DAST findings were mapped to source code locations
- Custom Semgrep rules were written to cover logic-based vulnerabilities
- Static and dynamic analysis results are now fully correlated

□ Phase C – Fix & Harden

Goal

The goal of Phase C is to **remediate the vulnerabilities identified in Phase A (DAST)**, verify that the exploits no longer work through **re-testing**, and confirm via **Semgrep (SAST)** that the insecure code patterns have been eliminated.

□ C1 – Implement Fixes

All fixes were applied as **small, focused changes**, each addressing a specific vulnerability. Where applicable, fixes follow OWASP recommended secure coding practices.

● V6 – SQL Injection

Endpoint: GET /v1/search/{filter}/{query}

OWASP Category: A03 – Injection

File: src/router/routes/order.js

X Vulnerable Code (Before Fix)

```
const sql = "SELECT * FROM beers WHERE " + filter + " = '" + query + "'";
db.sequelize.query(sql, { type: 'RAW' })
  .then(beers => res.status(200).send(beers));
```

Problem

User input is directly concatenated into the SQL query, allowing UNION-based SQL injection.

✓ Fixed Code (After Fix)

```
const allowedFilters = ['id', 'name', 'price'];

if (!allowedFilters.includes(req.params.filter)) {
  return res.status(400).send("Invalid filter");
}

db.sequelize.query(
  `SELECT * FROM beers WHERE ${req.params.filter} = ?`,
  {
    replacements: [req.params.query],
    type: db.sequelize.QueryTypes.SELECT
  }
)
```

```
) .then(beers => res.json(beers));
```

✓ Why It's Safe Now

- SQL query is parameterized
- Column name is restricted via allowlist
- Injection payloads are treated as data, not code

The screenshot shows the Postman interface with a successful response. The URL in the header is `http://localhost:5000/v1/search/name/test' UNION SELECT 1, email || ':' || password, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 FROM Users -- -`. The status bar indicates `200 OK`, `Time: 13 ms`, and `Size: 235 B`. The response body is empty, showing only the number 1.

● V8 – Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

Endpoint: GET /?message=

OWASP Category: A03 – Injection

File: src/router/routes/frontend.js

✗ Vulnerable Code

```
rendered = nunjucks.renderString(message);  
res.render('user.html', { message: rendered });
```

✗ Problem

User input is rendered as a template, allowing execution of template expressions (SSTI).


✓ Fixed Code

```
const escape = require('lodash.escape');  
const safeMessage = escape(req.query.message || "Please log in");
```

```
res.render('user.html', { message: safeMessage });
```

✓ Why It's Safe Now

- User input is escaped
- No template rendering on user-controlled strings



● V9 – Insecure JWT Implementation

OWASP Category: A02 – Cryptographic Failures
File:

- src/router/routes/user.js
- middleware/authjwt.js

Vulnerable Code

```
jwt.decode(token);  
jwt.verify(token, "SuperSecret");
```

Problems

- Hard-coded secret
- jwt.decode() does not verify signature
- Missing algorithm restrictions

Fixed Code

```
require('dotenv').config();  
  
jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {  
  algorithms: ['HS256'],  
  expiresIn: '24h'  
});
```

Why It's Safe Now

- Secret moved to environment variables
- Token signature is verified
- Algorithm explicitly defined

● V5 – Open Redirect

Endpoint: GET /v1/redirect/?url=
OWASP Category: A05 – Security Misconfiguration
File: src/router/routes/system.js

Vulnerable Code

```
res.redirect(url);
```

Fixed Code

```
const allowedDomains = ['example.com'];
```


```

try {
  const parsed = new URL(url);
  if (!allowedDomains.includes(parsed.hostname)) {
    return res.status(403).send("Forbidden redirect");
  }
  res.redirect(url);
} catch {
  res.status(400).send("Invalid URL");
}

```

✓ Why It's Safe Now

- Redirects limited to trusted domains
- Invalid URLs are rejected



•

● V4 – Path Traversal

Endpoint: GET /v1/beer-pic/?picture=

OWASP Category: A05 – Security Misconfiguration

File: src/router/routes/order.js

✗ Vulnerable Code

```
const filePath = `../../../../uploads/${req.query.picture}`;
fs.readFile(path.join(__dirname, filePath), ...);
```

✓ Fixed Code

```
const filename = path.basename(req.query.picture);
```

```

const safePath = path.join(__dirname, '../../../../../uploads/', filename);

fs.readFile(safePath, (err, data) => {
  if (err) return res.send("File not found");
  res.send(data);
});

```

✓ Why It's Safe Now

- Directory traversal sequences are removed
- Only filenames are accepted

The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. In the center, there is a request card for a GET request to `http://localhost:5000/v1/beer-pic/?picture=../../../../etc/passwd`. The 'Params' tab is selected, showing a single parameter `picture` with the value `../../../../etc/passwd`. Below the request card, the 'Body' tab shows the response body: `File not found`. At the bottom of the interface, there is a message: `Not connected to a Postman account`.

● V3 – Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Endpoint: GET /v1/test/?url=

OWASP Category: A10 – SSRF

File: src/router/routes/system.js

✗ Vulnerable Code

```
axios.get(req.query.url);
```

✓ Fixed Code

```

const target = new URL(req.query.url);
const blockedHosts = ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '169.254'];

if (blockedHosts.some(h => target.hostname.includes(h))) {
  return res.status(403).json({ error: "SSRF blocked" });
}

```

}

```
const response = await axios.get(target.href, { timeout: 3000 });
res.json({ status: response.status });
```

✓ Why It's Safe Now

- Internal IPs are blocked
- URL is validated before request

The screenshot shows the Postman application interface. In the center, there is a request configuration window for a GET request to `http://localhost:5000/v1/test?url=http://127.0.0.1:5000/v1/admin/users`. The 'Params' tab is selected, showing a single parameter `url` with the value `http://127.0.0.1:5000/v1/admin/users`. Below the request window, the 'Body' tab of the response panel is visible, displaying a JSON object with one item: `{ "error": "SSRF blocked" }`. The status bar at the bottom indicates a 403 Forbidden status with a time of 51 ms.

□ C2 – Re-run DAST on Fixed Application

The same attack payloads used in **Phase A** were re-executed using **Postman** and **OWASP ZAP**.

Vulnerability	Old Result	New Result	Status
SQL Injection	Data leaked	400 Invalid input	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SSTI	Code execution	Rendered as text	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JWT Abuse	Token accepted	401 Unauthorized	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Open Redirect	Redirected	403 Forbidden	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Path Traversal	/etc/passwd	File not found	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SSRF	Internal access	SSRF blocked	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

📸 Screenshots

□ C3 – Re-run Semgrep (Built-in + Custom Rules)

Command Used

```
semgrep --config "p/javascript" --config "p/nodejs" --error  
semgrep --config semgrep-rules/ .
```

Results Comparison

Rule	Before	After
insecure-sql-concat	Matched order.js	✗ No longer matches
express-insecure-template	Matched frontend.js	✗ Clean
hardcoded-jwt-secret	Found "SuperSecret"	✗ Removed
express-path-traversal	Matched beer-pic	✗ Clean
open-redirect	Matched system.js	✗ Clean

Example Evidence

Rule `insecure-sql-concat` previously matched `src/router/routes/order.js:67`; after parameterization, the rule no longer produces findings.

◆ Built-in Rules Re-run

Command used:

```
semgrep --config "p/javascript" --config "p/nodejs" --error
```

Results comparison:

Rule	Before	After
express-insecure-template-usage (SSTI)	Detected in frontend.js	✗ Not detected
express-open-redirect	Detected in system.js	✗ Not detected
direct-response-write (XSS)	Detected	✗ Not detected
sequelize-injection	Detected	⚠ Reduced (conservative warning)

Note:

Remaining findings mainly relate to session cookie configuration and conservative static

warnings, not exploitable vulnerabilities confirmed in Phase A.

```
abdelrahman@BODA: ~/SSD_  +  ~
 145| res.redirect("/beer?user="+ current_user_id+"&id="+beer_id+"&message="+love_beer_message)
>>> semgrep-rules.insecure-jwt-decode
      JWT decoded without verification (Security Risk)

 182| current_user_id = jwt.decode(req.headers.authorization.split(' ')[1]).id
>>> semgrep-rules.custom-sql-injection
      Potential SQL Injection via string concatenation

 203| res.redirect("/beer?user="+ current_user_id+"&id="+beer_id+"&message="+love_beer_message)
  ...
421| res.status(401).json({error:'OTP was not correct, got: ' + GeneratedToken})

[Scan Summary]
✓ Scan completed successfully.
• Findings: 11 (11 blocking)
• Rules run: 4
• Targets scanned: 23
• Parsed lines: ~100.0%
• Scan skipped:
  • Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 9934
  • Scan was limited to files tracked by git
  • For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag
Ran 4 rules on 23 files: 11 findings.
abdelrahman@BODA:~/SSD_PROJECT1/vuln-node.js-express.js-app$ semgrep --config semgrep-rules/my-custom-rules.yaml .
```

◆ Custom Rules Re-run

Command used:

```
semgrep --config semgrep-rules/my-custom-rules.yaml .
```

Results comparison:

Custom Rule	Before	After
sti-nunjucks	Matched frontend.js	✗ Clean
command-injection	Matched system.js	✗ Clean
custom-sql-injection (search endpoint)	Matched order.js	✗ Clean
insecure-jwt-decode	Matched user.js	⚠ Remaining (known issue)

```
96| res.redirect('/profile?id=' + user[0].id);
src/router/routes/order.js
  » semgrep-rules.custom-sql-injection
    Potential SQL Injection via string concatenation
    71| res.status(500).send("error, query failed: " + err);

src/router/routes/user.js
  » semgrep-rules.custom-sql-injection
    Potential SQL Injection via string concatenation
    31| res.json({error:"error fetching users"+e})
    145| res.redirect("/beer?user="+ current_user_id+"&id="+beer_id+"&message="+love_beer_message)

  » semgrep-rules.insecure-jwt-decode
    JWT decoded without verification (Security Risk)
    182| current_user_id = jwt.decode(req.headers.authorization.split(' ')[1]).id

  » semgrep-rules.custom-sql-injection
    Potential SQL Injection via string concatenation
    203| res.redirect("/beer?user="+ current_user_id+"&id="+beer_id+"&message="+love_beer_message)
    421| res.status(401).json({error:'OTP was not correct, got:' + GeneratedToken})

Scan Summary
✓ Scan completed successfully.
• Findings: 10 (10 blocking)
• Rules run: 4
• Targets scanned: 23
• Parsed lines: ~100.0%
• Scan skipped:
  • Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 9934
  • Scan was limited to files tracked by git
  • For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag
Ran 4 rules on 23 files: 10 findings.
abdelrahman@BODA:~/SSD_PROJECT1/vuln-node.js-express.js-app$ |
```

□ Conclusion

- Both built-in and custom Semgrep rules confirm that critical insecure patterns were removed.
- Static analysis results are consistent with the successful fixes verified dynamically in Phase C (DAST).
- Remaining findings are either low-risk or outside the scope of the fixed vulnerabilities.

GITHUB LINK:<https://github.com/abdelrahman-elyan/ssd-vuln-nodejs-dast-sast>


BONUS

Phase D – Traffic Capture & Splunk Analysis (Bonus)

> During the dynamic testing phase, all attack traffic was captured using Wireshark on a Windows host.


The captured PCAP was ingested into Splunk Enterprise and indexed under vulnapp_index.

SPL queries were then used to rediscover the same vulnerabilities found during DAS



The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise homepage. At the top, it says "Hello, Administrator". Below that, there's a sidebar with "Apps" and a search bar. The main area has sections for "Bookmarks", "Shared with my organization", "Shared by me", and "Splunk recommended". Each section contains cards for "Add data", "Search your data", "Visualize your data", "Manage alerts", "Add team members", and "Manage permissions".

The screenshot shows the "Add Data" configuration page. It's on the "Set Source Type" step. The progress bar shows "Select Source" (green), "Set Source Type" (green), "Input Settings" (white), "Review" (white), and "Done" (white). The "Source" dropdown is set to "vulnapp_traffic.pcapng". The "Event Breaks" section shows an "Event-breaking policy" with options "Auto", "Every line", and "Regex". The "Timestamp" section shows an "Extraction" with options "Auto", "Curr...", "Adv...", and "Con...". The "Configuration" section shows a file path "etc/cldatetime.xml". The "Advanced" section is collapsed. On the right, there's a "View Event Summary" button and a table of event details. The first event is timestamped 12/19/25 10:56:42.000 PM.



The screenshot shows the 'Search & Reporting' interface in Splunk Enterprise. The search bar contains the query 'Index=vulnapp_Index'. The results section shows 6,422 events from December 18, 2025, to December 19, 2025. The 'Events' tab is selected. The table view lists events with columns for Time and Event. The first few events are:

Time	Event
12/19/25 11:00:39.000 PM	support@splunk.com# host = BODA source = vulnapp_traffic.pcapng sourcetype = vulnapp_traffic
12/19/25 11:00:39.000 PM	Splunk1 0 U SplunkCommonCA1!0 *x86\lx86\xF7 host = BODA source = vulnapp_traffic.pcapng sourcetype = vulnapp_traffic
12/19/25 11:00:39.000 PM	U host = BODA source = vulnapp_traffic.pcapng sourcetype = vulnapp_traffic
12/19/25 11:00:39.000 PM	San Francisco1 0 host = BODA source = vulnapp_traffic.pcapng sourcetype = vulnapp_traffic
12/19/25 11:00:39.000 PM	\x000 1 0 U US1 0 U CA1 0 U host = BODA source = vulnapp_traffic.pcapng sourcetype = vulnapp_traffic
12/19/25 11:00:39.000 PM	*x86\lx86\xF7 host = BODA source = vulnapp_traffic.pcapng sourcetype = vulnapp_traffic

□ D4 — Searches لكل Vulnerability (مهم جداً)

⚠️ كل Vulnerability = Screenshot لوحدة

● V1 — SQL Injection

index=vulnapp index ("SELECT" OR "UNION" OR "OR 1=1" OR "'--")

The screenshot shows a Splunk search interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** index=vulnapp index ("SELECT" OR "UNION" OR "OR 1=1" OR "'--")
- Results:** 8 events (before 12/9/25 11:25:52.000 PM)
- Event List:** The table lists 8 events, each showing a timestamp (e.g., 12/9/25 11:13:31.000 PM), a raw event string, and metadata fields like host, source, and sourcetype.
- Metadata Fields:** A sidebar on the left lists selected and interesting fields such as host, source, sourcetype, and various date-related fields.

ⓧ V2 — XSS

index=vulnapp_index ("<script>" OR "alert(" OR "onerror=")

The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise search interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** Index=vulnapp_index (<script> OR "alert(" OR "onerror=")
- Results:** 1 event (before 12/19/25 11:26:25.000 PM) | No Event Sampling
- Event View:** A single event is displayed in a table:

Time	Event
12/19/25 11:13:15.000 PM	"description": "{{range.constructor(`return global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('tail /etc/passwd')`)} }\n[16] host:5000/message:<script>alert@()
- Event Actions:** A detailed table of event actions:

Type	Field	Value	Actions
Selected	host	BODA	
	source	vulnapp_traffic_pcaps	
	sourcetype	vulnapp_index	
Event	message	<script>	
Time	_time	2025-12-19T23:13:15.000+02:00	
Default	index	vulnapp_index	
	linecount	1	
	punct	"^[-_~!@#%^&*(){} \\/?]{1}[.][^[-_~!@#%^&*(){} \\/?]}]"?	

● V3 — Broken Authentication

index=vulnapp_index "/login" (401 OR 200)

The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise search interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links like 'New tab', 'Final P...', 'REPORT...', 'Google...', 'Se...', 'Search', 'Page n...', 'Google...', 'Person...', 'abdelr...', 'Google...', 'love p...', 'Downl...', 'REPOR...', 'REPOR...', 'Login...', 'Login...', 'New tab...', and a '+' icon. Below the navigation bar, the title 'splunk-enterprise' and 'Apps' are visible. The main search bar contains the query 'index=vulnapp_index "/login" (401 OR 200)'. To the right of the search bar are buttons for 'Save As', 'Create Table View', and 'Close'. Below the search bar, it says '0 events (before 12/19/25 11:27:16.000 PM)' and 'No Event Sampling'. On the far right, there are icons for 'Job', 'Smart Mode', and a magnifying glass. The main content area is titled 'New Search' and displays the message 'No results found.' There are also tabs for 'Events (0)', 'Patterns', 'Statistics', and 'Visualization'. In the bottom right corner of the main window, there are two small circular icons: one with a gear and another with a magnifying glass.

V4 — IDOR

index=vulnapp_index "/users/" OR "/api/users/"

The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise search interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** Index=vulnapp_index "/users/" OR "/api/users/"
- Results:** 1 event (before 12/19/25 11:27:48.000 PM) - No Event Sampling
- Event View:** The event details show a timestamp of 12/19/25 11:13:15.000 PM and the URL */v1/admin/users/*.
- Event Actions Table:**

Type	Field	Value	Actions
Selected	host	BODA	
	source	vulnapp_traffic.pcap	
	sourcetype	vulnapp_index	
Time	_time	2025-12-19T23:13:15.000+02:00	
Default	index	vulnapp_index	
	linecount	1	
	punct	"/\/*~_	
	splunk_server	BODA	
- Left Panel:** Shows selected fields (host, source, sourcetype) and interesting fields (date_hour, date_mday, date_minute, date_month, date_second, date_wday, date_year, date_zone, index, linecount, punct).

V6 — Sensitive Data Exposure


index=vulnapp_index ("password" OR "token" OR "secret")

The screenshot shows a Splunk Enterprise search interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** index=vulnapp_index ("password" OR "token" OR "secret")
- Results Summary:** 651 events (before 12/9/25 11:28:31.000 PM) | No Event Sampling
- Time Range:** All time
- Event List:** The results list shows four events from December 9, 2025, at 11:20:48.000 PM. Each event includes fields like Time, Event, host, source, and sourcetype.
 - Event 1: Cookie: sessionID=s%3A1766177386616.RX6b%2FTPbEGby3bxrXj1jY1wgVdeEqZLRSXIJVbWx2Fio; splunkweb_csrf_token_8000=13379733599478371057; session_id_8000=b65ea6e3c37ea6af1d841b650478906f1f89adde; token_key=13379733599478371057; experience_id=72e54f77-541e-83a4-3d94-33ec73628ed; splunkd_8000=ynVksZogElvz*%Kw1vlcGRlqZafBa3ohhe5v98Vu1Axg1k7LBu62sInkR16t5yhZbsf1890kwyCB_sueG1lnrz2Wm#bVhsy7uXLXqvGGBSo*h10tZS2e3fUVY72fgsRgAv7xUcgn73.
 - Event 2: Cookie: sessionID=s%3A1766177386616.RX6b%2FTPbEGby3bxrXj1jY1wgVdeEqZLRSXIJVbWx2Fio; splunkweb_csrf_token_8000=13379733599478371057; session_id_8000=b65ea6e3c37ea6af1d841b650478906f1f89adde; token_key=13379733599478371057; experience_id=72e54f77-541e-83a4-3d94-33ec73628ed; splunkd_8000=e7DDWZVfa1B1QWY4kzlSoen2IBLJtfp'kwAzXvsaAXTGS_ddAHJv_huPrcrgfMLrdSp1yt1*297x125xzqJ0yo23VpRJ0pgkbXSeTM_aqnGItq6Wj6RSNA1tcCxsAhxTNKN8Uke7Sk.
 - Event 3: Set-Cookie: splunkweb_csrf_token_8000=13379733599478371057; Path=/; Max-Age=157680000; Expires=Wed, 18 Dec 2030 21:13:46 GMT
 - Event 4: Cookie: sessionID=s%3A1766177386616.RX6b%2FTPbEGby3bxrXj1jY1wgVdeEqZLRSXIJVbWx2Fio; splunkweb_csrf_token_8000=13379733599478371057; session_id_8000=b65ea6e3c37ea6af1d841b650478906f1f89adde; token_key=13379733599478371057; experience_id=72e54f77-541e-83a4-3d94-33ec73628ed; splunkd_8000=e7DDWZVfa1B1QWY4kzlSoen2IBLJtfp'kwAzXvsaAXTGS_ddAHJv_huPrcrgfMLrdSp1yt1*297x125xzqJ0yo23VpRJ0pgkbXSeTM_aqnGItq6Wj6RSNA1tcCxsAhxTNKN8Uke7Sk.

V7 — Unvalidated Redirect

```
index=vulnapp_index "redirect=" ("http://" OR "https://")
```



The screenshot shows the Splunk Enterprise search interface. The search bar contains the query: `index=vulnapp_index "redirect=" ("http://" OR "https://")`. Below the search bar, it says `0 events (before 12/19/25 11:29:06.000 PM)` and `No Event Sampling`. The results section displays the message `No results found.`. The interface includes a navigation bar with links like Search, Analytics, Datasets, Reports, Alerts, Dashboards, and a top menu with items such as New tab, Final P, REPORT, Google, Se, X, Search, Page n, Google, Person, abdelr, Google, love p, Down, REPORT, REPORT, Login, Login, New tab, and Chat.

V8 — Verb Tampering / Admin

index=vulnapp_index (PUT OR DELETE) "/admin"

The screenshot shows a Splunk search interface with the following details:

- Search Bar:** Index=vulnapp_index "/admin"
- Results Summary:** 22 events (before 12/19/25 11:29:41.000 PM)
- Event List:** The list displays 22 events from Nov 1, 2023, to Jan 1, 2026. Each event entry includes:
 - Time: e.g., 12/19/25 11:13:15.000 PM
 - Event URL: e.g., "/v1/admin/promote/{user_id}": {
 - Host: BODA
 - Source: vulnapp_traffic.pcap
 - Type: sourcetype = vulnapp_index
- Selected Fields:** host, source, sourcetype
- Interesting Fields:** date_hour, date_mday, date_minute, date_month, date_second, date_vday, date_year, date_zone
- Counters:** index, linecount, record