

World Wide Health Smart Contract: Review

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This document describes the issues, which were found in World Wide Health smart contract during the code review performed by ABDK Consulting.

1. Introduction

We were asked to review a contract **ZMINE**.

2. World Wide Health

In this section we describe issues related to the smart contract defined in the World Wide Health.sol.

2.1 Critical Issues

The contract under investigation has two critical issues, which make it vulnerable to a wide group of attackers.

- 1. Line 362 and 368, 402, 428: method setAirDropDestination and holdersList (in three last lines) gives a permission to anyone to make the holdersList array gigantic. As a result, method holdersList and, more importantly, airdrop will not work if holdersList is too big (Line 437, 455, 458 and 472).
- 2. In line 629: function transferFor is public. It means that the function can be called by anyone, and he can then steal all presale tokens. Probably onlyOwner is missing here.

2.2 EIP-20 Compliance Issues

This section lists issues of token smart contract related to EIP-20 requirements.

- 1. Line <u>158</u>, <u>169</u>: parameter names are different from those that are defined in EIP-20. This maight cause some compatibility problems.
- 2. Line 391, 418: condition value > 0 directly violates EIP-20.
- 3. Line 498: instead of uint there should be uint8 (according to EIP-20).

2.3 Documentation and Readability Issues

This section lists documentation issues, which were found in the token smart contract, and the cases where the code is correct, but too involved and/or complicated to verify or analyze.

- 1. Line 326: it is mentioned in the comment that index if holder in holdersList. But if index is guaranteed to be not equal to zero, holders mapping is not unnecessary.
- 2. Line <u>329</u>: comment is confusing. Who should set to zero and what exactly should he set?
- 3. Line <u>331</u>: the variable name and comment look completely unrelated to each other.
- 4. Line <u>333</u>: the variable name _address is confusing. Probably there should be sender/author/etc.
- 5. Line <u>420-423</u>: code mentioned here is already implemented in StandardToken, so it would be better to call StandardToken.transferFrom in this case.
- 6. Line $\underline{568}$, $\underline{586}$, $\underline{630}$, $\underline{640}$, $\underline{658}$: probably instead of > there should be >=.
- 7. Line <u>569</u>, <u>590</u>: the bracket pair is redundant here.
- 8. Line 77: event AuthorizationSet should be renamed to AuthorizationChanged to improve the readability.
- 9. Line 351: instead of holders[_address] == false —
 !holders[address] would be more readable.
- 10. Line <u>543</u>: a regular date representation of number 1515376800 in a comment would improve the readability.
- 11. Line 612, 613: need human-readable comment with date.

2.4 Arithmetic Overflow Issues

This section lists issues of the token smart contract related to the arithmetic overflows.

- 1. Line <u>13</u>, <u>31</u>: the correctness of this check relies on how an overflow works in Solidity, but this behavior is not documented, so it may change in the future. We recommend to redevelop the function so the overflow does not ever happen.
- 2. Line 394: the comment is incorrect. Usually, SafeMath is used as the second line of defense. Related on that fact, the business logic of the smart contact is designed in such a way that over(under)flow is never possible, so SafeMath just checks that over(under) flow never happens. That's why SafeMath uses assert, not require. Making SafeMath to be a part of the business logic itself leaves the contract with only a single line of defense.
- 3. Line <u>512</u>: in the subtraction underflow is possible.
- 4. Line <u>562</u>: here might be a possible overflow that allows to actually decrease hard cap.
- 5. Line <u>563</u>: overflow is possible.

2.5 Unclear Behavior

This section lists issues of the token smart contract, where the contract behavior is unclear: the business logic might be violated here, but the documentation and functional requirements are not sufficiently documented to make a clear decision.

- 1. Line <u>187</u>, <u>227</u>, <u>390</u>, <u>417</u>: the condition _to != address(0) is not necessary. Addresses like 0x0 can be used to emulate token burn.
- 2. Line <u>342</u>: function setTreasureBox is available for everyone. The consequences of this avialability are not clear.
- Line 376: method setAirDropDestinationAndApprove does not push
 _destination into holders list, unlike setAirDropDestination. Perhaps, it
 should be replaced.
- 4. Line 448, 532: perhaps address should be indexed.
- 5. Line <u>572</u>, <u>644</u>: 1 ether seems to represent 10^18 rather than the unit of currency. This representation lowers the readability and is error-prone. Also, div here may cause rounding errors which might accumulate over time.
- 6. Line 631: perhaps, require (_amount >= minTx && _amount <= maxTx)
 restriction is not needed.</pre>
- 7. Line 702: using transferFrom assumes that the owner has approved the FounderThreader contract with tokens. Is this an adequate behavior?

2.6 Suboptimal Code

This section lists suboptimal code patterns, which were found in the smart contract.

- 1. Line 11: putting the rest of the method into false clause will the fact that the rest of the method is conditionally executed more obvious.
- 2. Line 63: if newOwner is zero, then the method if (newOwner != address(0)) executes successfully, but this executions silently does nothing in particular. In such case it would be better to revert, so the caller knows that owner hasn't been changed.
- 3. Line <u>77</u>, <u>115</u>: it would be more efficient and more convenient to have two separate events: first one to be logged when the address becomes authorized, and the second one for the case when the address becomes unauthorized.
- 4. Line <u>84</u>: AuthorizationSet event is not logged here, which makes it harder to track all authorized addresses for a contract.
- 5. Line <u>100</u>:it is a common practice to do nothing in case when the new set value is the same as the current one being used. Situation does not look bad enough to revert.
- 6. Line 115: probably, addressWhiteListed parameter should be indexed.
- 7. Line 122: whiteListSet event is not logged here, which makes it harder to track all whitelisted addresses.
- 8. Line <u>133</u>: isWhiteListed method would not be necessary if whiteListed mapping is declared as public.
- 9. Line <u>142</u>: it is a common practice to do nothing in case when new set value is the same as current one being used. Situatuion does not look bad enough to revert.

- 10. Line <u>217</u>: a default access modifier internal for storage variables, so this declaration does nothing effective. Also, other internal storage variables in the same contract do not have it.
- 11. Line 311 and 575, 634, 647:a return value is not checked in token.transfer and transferFrom.Probably it would be better to check and revert in case transfer fails.
- 12. Line <u>334</u>: it would be more efficient and more convenient to have two separate events: one being logged when the address is made to be and is an exchanger, and another one when the address becomes not an exchanger (<code>isExchanger</code>).
- 13. Line <u>338-339</u>: the construction here can be reduced to holderList [holderList.length++] = owner;.
- 14. Line <u>347</u>: it as a common practice to do nothing in case when the new value is the same as current value bieng used. Situation is does not look bad enough to revert.
- 15. Line <u>352</u>: if operation is being performed at multiple places. Probably, you should consider moving it into a separate method.
- 16. Line <u>354-356</u>: the construction here can be reduced to:

```
holderIndex [_address] = holderList.length;
holderList [holderList.length++] = address;
```

- 17. Line <u>377,378</u>: probably, it would be better to just call approve and setAirDropDestination respectively to reduce the code duplication.
- 18. Line <u>395-397</u>: the code listed here is already implemented in StandardToken. It would be better to just call StandardToken.transfer here.
- 19. Line <u>436</u>: the usage of <code>getHolders</code> is incorrect. Usually arrays are not returned as a whole, so two separate methods are implemented instead: one to get an array length and another one: to get i-th element of an array. This is what Solidity would generate if <code>holdersList</code> is declared as public.
- 20. Line 450: gas consumption of airDrop linearly depends on the number of token holders. It is easy to increase the number of token holder for making this function not to fit into block gas limit. A different approach should be chosen.
- 21. Line 461: 1000 ether in condition is confusing. TokenHolding is not in Wei.
- 22. Line <u>477-480</u>: code here is already implemented in StandardToken, would be better to just call StandardToken.transfer here.
- 23. Line 500: 1000000000 ether is confusing. Total Supply is not in Wei.
- 24. Line <u>520</u>: there is no need to revert require (rate != rate) here.
- 25. Line 532, 603: any of these parameters (1)uint _value, (2)uint _tokens and (3)uint _rate may be calculated from any two of them, so one of them is probably redundant.
- 26. Line 552, 621,685: parameter token is already listed as ZMINE type.
- 27. Line <u>553</u>, <u>622</u>: parameter _rateContract is already listed as RateContract type.
- 28. Line <u>554</u>, <u>555</u> <u>623</u>: parameters _whitelistPRE, _whitelistICO and whilelist is already of type WhiteList.
- 29. Line <u>574</u>, <u>646</u>: SafeMath is used here as part of a business logic, and not as the second line of defense.
- 30. Line <u>648</u>: transfer is more appropriate to use here. Also, it is inefficient to transfer every tranche to the owner separately from each other. Accumulating ether on

- contract's balance and allowing the owner to withdraw accumulated ether all at once would be a better way.
- 31. Line 600: contract PreSale has much in common with ICOSale contract. Probably, it would be better to extract the common parts into an abstract base contract, and then inherit both, ICOSale and PreSale from it.

2.7 Major Flaws

This section lists major flaws, which were found in the token smart contract.

- Line 279: assignment allowed [msg.sender] [_spender] = 0 allows
 _spender to front run the transaction and spend allowance in such a way that
 msg.sender will not notice this.
- 2. Line 337: value for holderIndex [owner] is not set anywhere.
- 3. Line 461: variable treasureBox[holder] is available for the public modification.
- 4. Line <u>593</u> and <u>665</u>: the functions does not fit into 2300 gas. This violates Solidity guidelines.

2.8 Moderate Issues

This section lists moderate issues which were found in the token smart contract.

- 1. Line 644: div may lead to rounding errors that may accumulate over time.
- Line 704: sum of three values sent could be less than _value due to rounding errors.

2.9 Other Issues

This section lists stylistic and other minor issues which were found in the token smart contract.

- 1. Line 304: function claim() should be public.
- 2. Line 333: probably, perameter _address should be indexed.
- 3. Line 440, 444, 524: isExchanger and airDropDestination and get should be declared as public. So the functions isExchanger, etAirdropDestination and getRate will not be needed.
- 4. Line 496, 497, 498: public should be constant as well.
- 5. Line 543, 544: startDate, stopDate should be constant as well.
- 6. Line <u>546,547</u>: minTx, maxTx should be constant as well.
- 7. Line 532, 533: parameter address should be indexed.
- 8. Line 612, 613, 614: startDate, stopDate and maxTx should be constant.
- 9. Line 615, 680: minTx should be constant.
- 10. Line 673: recipient parameter should probably be indexed.

3. Our Recommendations

Based on our findings, we recommend the following:

1. Fix the most important flaws described in section 2.1.

- 2. Make the token EIP-20 compliant.
- 3. Fix arithmetic overflow issues.
- 4. Check the issues marked as "unclear behavior" against functional requirements.
- 5. Refactor the code to remove suboptimal parts.
- 6. Fix the documentation issues.
- 7. Fix the documentation, readability and other (minor) issues.