# ABDK CONSULTING

SMART CONTRACT AND CIRCUIT AUDIT

# Mystiko

mystikonetwork


**Solidity and Zokrates** 

abdk.consulting

# **SMART CONTRACT AUDIT CONCLUSION**

by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich 1st August 2022

We've been asked to review 39 files in a Github repository. We found 1 critical, 12 major, and a few less important issues. All identified critical and major issues have been fixed.



# **Findings**

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ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-1	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-2	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-3	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-4	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-5	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-6	Major	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-7	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-8	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-9	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-10	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-11	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-12	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-13	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-14	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-15	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-16	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-17	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-18	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-19	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-20	Minor	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-21	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-22	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-23	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-24	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-25	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-26	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-27	Minor	Suboptimal	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-28	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-29	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-30	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-31	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-32	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-33	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-34	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-35	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-36	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-37	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-38	Moderate	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-39	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-40	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-41	Minor	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-42	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-43	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-44	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-45	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-46	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-47	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-48	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-49	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-50	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-51	Minor	Unclear behavior	Fixed
CVF-52	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-53	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-54	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-55	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-56	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-57	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-58	Moderate	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-59	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-60	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-61	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-62	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-63	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-64	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-65	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-66	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-67	Moderate	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-68	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-69	Moderate	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-70	Critical	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-71	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-72	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-73	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-74	Minor	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-75	Minor	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-76	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-77	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-78	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-79	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-80	Major	Overflow/Underflow	Fixed
CVF-81	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-82	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-83	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-84	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-85	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-86	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-87	Minor	Bad datatype	Info

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-88	Minor	Readability	Fixed
CVF-89	Major	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-90	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-91	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-92	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-93	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-94	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-95	Minor	Bad datatype	Info
CVF-96	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-97	Minor	Flaw	Fixed
CVF-98	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-99	Minor	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-100	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-101	Moderate	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-102	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-103	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-104	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-105	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-106	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-107	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-108	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-109	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-110	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-111	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-112	Minor	Bad naming	Fixed
CVF-113	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-114	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-115	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-116	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-117	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed

ID	Severity	Category	Status
CVF-118	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-119	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-120	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-121	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-122	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-123	Minor	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-124	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-125	Minor	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-126	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-127	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-128	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-129	Minor	Suboptimal	Info
CVF-130	Moderate	Procedural	Fixed
CVF-131	Major	Documentation	Fixed
CVF-132	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-133	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-134	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-135	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-136	Major	Suboptimal	Fixed
CVF-137	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-138	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-139	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-140	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-141	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-142	Minor	Bad datatype	Fixed
CVF-143	Minor	Procedural	Info
CVF-144	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-145	Minor	Bad naming	Info
CVF-146	Minor	Bad naming	Info



# Contents

1	Docu	ument properties	12
2			13
	2.1	About ABDK	14
	2.2	Disclaimer	14
	2.3	Methodology	15
3	Deta	iled Results	16
	3.1	CVF-1	16
	3.2	CVF-2	16
	3.3	CVF-3	16
	3.4	CVF-4	17
	3.5	CVF-5	17
	3.6	CVF-6	17
	3.7	CVF-7	18
	3.8	CVF-8	19
	3.9	CVF-9	19
	3.10	CVF-10	20
	3.11	CVF-11	20
	3.12	CVF-12	21
	3.13	CVF-13	21
	3.14	CVF-14	21
	3.15	CVF-15	22
	3.16	CVF-16	22
	3.17	CVF-17	22
	3.18	CVF-18	23
	3.19	CVF-19	24
	3.20	CVF-20	25
	3.21	CVF-21	25
	3.22	CVF-22	26
	3.23	CVF-23	27
	3.24	CVF-24	27
	3.25	CVF-25	27
	3.26	CVF-26	28
	3.27	CVF-27	28
	3.28	CVF-28	29
	3.29	CVF-29	29
	3.30	CVF-30	30
	3.31	CVF-31	30
	3.32	CVF-32	30
	3.33		31
			31
			31
			32
			32
	-		

	_
mystikonetwork Review	ABDK
3.38 CVF-38	 . 32
3.39 CVF-39	 . 33
3.40 CVF-40	 . 33
3.41 CVF-41	 . 33
3.42 CVF-42	 . 34
3.43 CVF-43	 . 34
3.44 CVF-44	 . 34
3.45 CVF-45	 . 35
3.46 CVF-46	 . 35
3.47 CVF-47	 . 35
3.48 CVF-48	 . 36
3.49 CVF-49	 . 36
3.50 CVF-50	 . 36
3.51 CVF-51	 . 37
3.52 CVF-52	 . 38
3.53 CVF-53	 . 38
3.54 CVF-54	 . 38
3.55 CVF-55	 . 39
3.56 CVF-56	 . 39
3.57 CVF-57	 . 39
3.58 CVF-58	 . 40
3.59 CVF-59	 . 40
3.60 CVF-60	 . 41
3.61 CVF-61	 . 41
3.62 CVF-62	 . 41
3.63 CVF-63	 . 42
3.64 CVF-64	 . 42
3.65 CVF-65	 . 42
3.66 CVF-66	 . 43
3.67 CVF-67	 . 43
3.68 CVF-68	 . 43
3.69 CVF-69	 . 44
3.70 CVF-70	 . 44
3.71 CVF-71	 . 45
3.72 CVF-72	 . 45
3.73 CVF-73	 . 46
3.74 CVF-74	 . 46
3.75 CVF-75	 . 46
3.76 CVF-76	
3.77 CVF-77	 . 47
3.78 CVF-78	 . 47

48

48

49

49

50

3.79 CVF-79

3.80 CVF-80

3.81 CVF-81

3.82 CVF-82

3.83 CVF-83

3.03 CVI -03	•	•	•	 	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	 •	•	•	•	•		 				•		_	, _
3.86 CVF-86				 																					 						5	52
3.87 CVF-87				 																					 						5	52
3.88 CVF-88				 																					 						5	52
3.89 CVF-89				 																					 						5	53
3.90 CVF-90				 																					 						5	53
3.91 CVF-91				 															 						 							53
3.92 CVF-92																																54
3.93 CVF-93				 																					 							54
3.94 CVF-94				 																					 						5	54
3.95 CVF-95				 															 						 							55
3.96 CVF-96				 																					 							55
3.97 CVF-97																																56
3.98 CVF-98																																56
3.99 CVF-99																																56
3.100CVF-100																																56
3.101CVF-101																																57
3.102CVF-102																																57
3.103CVF-103			-		•			•		•	-	•								-			•	-		•		·	·	•		57
3.104CVF-104																																58
3.105CVF-105																																58
3.106CVF-106																																58
3.107CVF-107																																59
3.108CVF-108																																59
3.109CVF-109																																59
3.110CVF-110																																50
3.111CVF-111																															-	50
3.112CVF-112																																50
3.113CVF-113																																51
3.114CVF-114																															-	51
3.115CVF-115																															-	51
3.116CVF-116		•	•	 •	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	 •	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•		52
3.117CVF-117		•	•	 •	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	 •	•	•	•				•	•	•	•	•	_	52
3.118CVF-118																																52
																															-	53
3.120CVF-120																																53
3.121CVF-121																															-	53
3.122CVF-122																															-	54
3.123CVF-123																																54
3.124CVF-124																															_	54
3.125CVF-125	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			-	_	-	_	-	_	, . 54
3.126CVF-126																															-	55
3.127CVF-127																																55
3.128CVF-128																																55
3.129CVF-129																																,5 56
J.129CVI-129	•	•	•	 •	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	 •	•	•	•	•		 •	•	•	•	•	٠	Ċ	,0

mystikonetwork Review	ABDK
3.130CVF-130	. 66
3.131CVF-131	. 66
3.132CVF-132	. 67
3.133CVF-133	. 67
3.134CVF-134	. 67
3.135CVF-135	. 68
3.136CVF-136	. 68
3.137CVF-137	. 68
3.138CVF-138	. 69
3.139CVF-139	. 69
3.140CVF-140	. 69
3.141CVF-141	. 70
3.142CVF-142	. 70
3.143CVF-143	. 70
3.144CVF-144	. 71



# 1 Document properties

# Version

Version	Date	Author	Description
0.1	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Initial Draft
0.2	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Minor revision
1.0	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release
1.1	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	CVF-131 was removed
2.0	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release
2.1	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Mystico > Mystiko
3.0	August 1, 2022	D. Khovratovich	Release

# Contact

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# 2 Introduction

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts and circuit structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations.

We have reviewed contracts and circuits at repository.

Solidity smart contracts:

- core/commitment/CommitmentPool.sol
- core/commitment/CommitmentPoolERC20.sol
- $\bullet \ \, \mathsf{core/commitment/CommitmentPoolMain.sol} \\$
- core/deposit/base/MystikoV2Loop.sol
- core/deposit/loop/MystikoV2LoopERC20.sol
- core/deposit/loop/MystikoV2LoopMain.sol
- core/rule/Sanctions.sol
- interface/ICommitmentPool.sol
- interface/IHasher3.sol
- interface/IMystikoLoop.sol
- interface/IVerifier.sol
- libs/asset/AssetPool.sol
- libs/asset/ERC20AssetPool.sol
- libs/asset/IERC20Metadata.sol
- libs/asset/MainAssetPool.sol
- libs/verifiers/Rollup1Verifier.sol
- libs/verifiers/Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

#### Zokrates circuits:

- Commitment.zok
- JoinSplit.zok
- KeccakBatch.zok
- MerkleTree.zok
- MerkleTreeBatchUpdater.zok



- MerkleTreeBuilder.zok
- MerkleTreeUpdater.zok
- Ownership.zok
- Rollup1.zok
- Rollup4.zok
- Rollup16.zok
- Rollup64.zok
- Rollup256.zok
- SerialNumber.zok
- Sha256Batch.zok
- SignatureHash.zok
- Transaction1x0.zok
- Transaction1x1.zok
- Transaction1x2.zok
- Transaction2x0.zok
- Transaction2x1.zok
- Transaction2x2.zok

The fixes were provided in the 151ff80 commit.

#### 2.1 About ABDK

ABDK Consulting, established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function. The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.

#### 2.2 Disclaimer

Note that the performed audit represents current best practices and smart contract standards which are relevant at the date of publication. After fixing the indicated issues the smart contracts should be re-audited.



# 2.3 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a collection of methods and tactics that combined differently and tuned for every particular project, depending on the project structure and and used technologies, as well as on what the client is expecting from the audit. In current audit we use:

- **General Code Assessment**. The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and for whether it follows code best practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this phase we also understand overall code structure.
- Entity Usage Analysis. Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places and that their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- Access Control Analysis. For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and is done properly. At this phase we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.
- Code Logic Analysis. The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check that code actually does what it is supposed to do, that algorithms are optimal and correct, and that proper data types are used. We also check that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.



# 3 Detailed Results

#### 3.1 CVF-1

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved to a separate file named "Transaction1x0Pairing.sol".

#### Listing 1:

3 library Transaction1x0Pairing {

#### 3.2 CVF-2

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** This library looks identical to the "Rollup1Pairing" library defined in "Rollup1Verifier.sol".

**Recommendation** Consider defining the library in a shared place.

#### Listing 2:

3 library Transaction1x0Pairing {

#### 3.3 CVF-3

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** In the yellow paper and ERC-1025 this value is known as "p" and "q" is used for another value: 2188(...)5617.

**Recommendation** Consider using the same notation as in the specification.

#### Listing 3:

33 uint256 q =

 $\rightarrow 218882428718392752222464057452572750886963111572978236626890$ 

37894645226208583;



# 3.4 CVF-4

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

#### Listing 4:

33 uint256 q =

 $\rightarrow 21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297823662689$ 

037894645226208583;

#### 3.5 CVF-5

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** Should be "p.X % q" to guarantee that returned values are field element.

#### Listing 5:

35 return G1Point(p.X, q - (p.Y % q));

#### 3.6 CVF-6

• **Severity** Major

- Status Fixed
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** The latter argument overflows for p.Y==0.

**Recommendation** Consider taking both outputs modulo q in order to ensure they are field elements

#### Listing 6:

35 return G1Point(p.X, q - (p.Y % q));



# 3.7 CVF-7

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** The success flag is checked twice.

Recommendation Consider removing one of the checks.

Client Comment Keep this redundant check for failing fast.

# Listing 7:

```
success := staticcall(sub(gas(), 2000), 6, input, 0xc0, r, 0
46
         \rightarrow x60)
      switch success
      case 0 {
        invalid()
50
      }
   require (success);
      success := staticcall(sub(gas(), 2000), 7, input, 0x80, r, 0
62
         \rightarrow x60)
      switch success
      case 0 {
        invalid()
   require(success);
68
      switch success
88
      case 0 {
90
        invalid()
93 require (success);
```



# 3.8 CVF-8

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** The "revert" opcode would be more efficient as it doesn't waste all the remaining gas.

# Listing 8:

- 49 invalid()
- 65 invalid()
- 90 invalid()

#### 3.9 CVF-9

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to pass a single array of structs with two fields, rather than two parallel arrays. This would also make the length check unnecessary. Also it would be possible to pass the content of such array to the precompile as is, without copying." **Client Comment** The interface is more clear when defining parameters separately.

# Listing 9:

```
71 function pairing (G1Point[] memory p1, G2Point[] memory p2)

→ internal view returns (bool) {
```



#### 3.10 CVF-10

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** The coordinates of the points are copied twice: once before calling the "pairing" function and another time inside "pairing".

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring to avoid double copying.

```
Listing 10:
```

```
105 p1[0] = a1;
    p1[1] = b1;
    p2[0] = a2;
    p2[1] = b2;
    return pairing(p1, p2);
122 p1[0] = a1;
    p1[1] = b1;
    p1[2] = c1;
    p2[0] = a2;
    p2[1] = b2;
    p2[2] = c2;
    return pairing(p1, p2);
143 p1[0] = a1;
    p1[1] = b1;
    p1[2] = c1;
    p1[3] = d1;
    p2[0] = a2;
    p2[1] = b2;
    p2[2] = c2;
150 p2[3] = d2;
    return pairing(p1, p2);
```

#### 3.11 CVF-11

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** This contract looks very similar to the "Rollup1Verifier" contract.

**Recommendation** Consider extracting a shared abstract base contract to avoid code duplication.

#### Listing 11:

155 contract Transaction1x0Verifier {



#### 3.12 CVF-12

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

Recommendation The return type should be "bool".

## Listing 12:

236 function verify (uint256 [] memory input, Proof memory proof)

→ internal view returns (uint256) {

#### 3.13 CVF-13

- Severity Minor
- Status Info
- Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

Client Comment Local variables spend less gas.

# Listing 13:

237 uint256 snark\_scalar\_field =

 $\rightarrow 218882428718392752222464057452572750885483644004160343436982$ 

04186575808495617;

#### 3.14 CVF-14

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Readability

• **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

Recommendation Should be "else return" for readability.

#### Listing 14:

261 return 0;



## 3.15 CVF-15

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Description** 'Proof' and 'input' are not checked to be curve points. It may be possible that invalid inputs result in a successful check as the curve operations do not check the inputs either.

#### Listing 15:

```
264 function verifyTx(Proof memory proof, uint256[] memory input)

→ public view returns (bool r) {
```

#### 3.16 CVF-16

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction1x0Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** "This could be simplified as: return verify(input, proof) == 0;"

#### Listing 16:

```
266 if (verify(input, proof) == 0) {
    return true;
} else {
    return false;
270 }
```

#### 3.17 CVF-17

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** Declaring top-level structures in a file named after a contract makes it harder to navigate through the code.

**Recommendation** Consider either moving the structured into the contract or moving the structures to a separate file named "types.sol" or something like this.

#### Listing 17:

- 11 struct CommitmentLeaf  $\{$
- 16 struct WrappedVerifier {



# 3.18 CVF-18

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The same constant is defined in the "MystickoV2Loop" contract. **Recommendation** Consider defining once and a shared place.

# Listing 18:

22 uint 256 constant FIELD SIZE =

 $\,\hookrightarrow\,\,21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698$ 

 $\hookrightarrow$ 

204186575808495617;



#### 3.19 CVF-19

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

bool rollupWhitelistDisabled;

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** There is not access level specifies for these variables, so internal access will be used by default.

**Recommendation** Consider explicitly specifying an access level.

```
Listing 19:
```

```
22 uint256 constant FIELD SIZE =
      \hookrightarrow 218882428718392752222464057452572750885483644004160343436982
   04186575808495617;
24 mapping(uint32 => mapping(uint32 => WrappedVerifier))

→ transactVerifiers;

   mapping(uint32 => WrappedVerifier) rollupVerifiers;
27 mapping(uint256 => bool) historicCommitments;
   mapping(uint256 => bool) spentSerialNumbers;
30 mapping(uint256 => CommitmentLeaf) commitmentQueue;
   uint256 commitmentQueueSize = 0:
   uint256 commitmentIncludedCount = 0;
34 uint256 immutable treeCapacity;
   mapping(uint32 => uint256) rootHistory;
   uint256 currentRoot:
   uint32 currentRootIndex = 0;
   uint32 immutable rootHistoryLength;
40 address operator;
   uint256 minRollupFee;
   mapping(address => bool) rollupWhitelist;
   mapping(address => bool) enqueueWhitelist;
45 bool verifierUpdateDisabled;
```



# 3.20 CVF-20

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The semantics of the keys for this mapping is unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

# Listing 20:

- 35 mapping(uint32 => uint256) rootHistory;

#### 3.21 CVF-21

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** Using root=>bool mapping would make history search much cheaper.

#### Listing 21:

35 mapping(uint32 => uint256) rootHistory;



#### 3.22 CVF-22

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** String error messages are suboptimal. **Recommendation** Consider using named errors instead.

```
Listing 22:
```

require(msg.sender = operator, "only operator.");49 require(rollupWhitelistDisabled || rollupWhitelist[msg.sender], 54 → "only whitelisted roller."); require (enqueueWhitelist [msg.sender], "only whitelisted sender 59  $\hookrightarrow$  . "); 73 require ( rootHistoryLength > 0, " rootHistoryLength should be  $\hookrightarrow$  greater than 0"); 87 require ( request.rollupFee >= minRollupFee, "rollup fee too few  $\hookrightarrow$  "): require (commitmentIncludedCount + commitmentQueueSize <  $\hookrightarrow$  treeCapacity, "tree is full"); require (! historicCommitments [ request.commitment], "the → commitment has been submitted "); require (!isKnownRoot( request.newRoot), "newRoot is duplicated") 101 "invalid rollupSize" 106 require (commitmentIncludedCount % request.rollupSize == 0, " 108 → invalid rollupSize at current state"); require (commitment Queue [index]. commitment != 0, "index out of 117 → bound"); require ( request.leafHash = expectedLeafHash, "invalid leafHash 126 133 require(verified, "invalid proof");

(150, 159, 163, 167, 176, 183, 221, 228, 237, 243, 267)



## 3.23 CVF-23

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns.

#### Listing 23:

- 63 event CommitmentQueued(
- 69 event CommitmentIncluded (uint 256 indexed commitment);
- 70 event CommitmentSpent(uint256 indexed rootHash, uint256 indexed → serialNumber);

#### 3.24 CVF-24

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal
- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** Shift would be more efficient.

#### Listing 24:

76 treeCapacity = 2\*\*uint256( treeHeight);

#### 3.25 CVF-25

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The maximum "\_treeHeight" value that could be used here is 255, while the "\_treeHeight" argument has type "uint32".

**Recommendation** Consider changing the type to "uint8".

#### Listing 25:

76 treeCapacity = 2\*\*uint256( treeHeight);



# 3.26 CVF-26

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** This function always returns true. **Recommendation** Consider returning nothing.

# Listing 26:

85 returns (bool)

#### 3.27 CVF-27

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "rollupVerifiers[\_request.rollupSize]" is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

# Listing 27:

rollup Verifiers [\_request.rollup Size].enabled,



#### 3.28 CVF-28

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The value "commitmentIncludedCount" is read from the storage several times. **Recommendation** Consider reading once and caching in a local variable.

#### Listing 28:

#### 3.29 CVF-29

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "commitmentIncludedCount + \_request.rollupSize" is calculated on every loop iteration.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 29:

114 index < commitmentIncludedCount + request.rollupSize;



#### 3.30 CVF-30

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "commitmentIncludedCount + \_request.rollupSize" is calculated twice.

**Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 30:

- index < commitmentIncludedCount + \_request.rollupSize;
- 135 commitmentIncludedCount = commitmentIncludedCount + \_request.

  → rollupSize;

#### 3.31 CVF-31

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "commitmentQueue[index]" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 31:

117 require (commitmentQueue [index]. commitment! = 0, "index out of → bound");

uint256 commitment = commitmentQueue[index].commitment;

120 totalRollupFee = totalRollupFee + commitmentQueue[index].

→ rollupFee;
delete commitmentQueue[index];

#### 3.32 CVF-32

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "commintemtQueue[index].commitment" is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 32:



## 3.33 CVF-33

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** This line could be simplified using the "+=" operator.

## Listing 33:

120 totalRollupFee = totalRollupFee + commitmentQueue[index].

→ rollupFee;

#### 3.34 CVF-34

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** This line could be simplified using the "-=" operator.

#### Listing 34:

 $122 \quad commitmentQueueSize = commitmentQueueSize - 1;$ 

#### 3.35 CVF-35

- **Severity** Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The "commitmentQueueSize" variable is updated on every loop iteration. **Recommendation** Consider updating once after the loop.

#### Listing 35:

122 commitmentQueueSize = commitmentQueueSize - 1;



## 3.36 CVF-36

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** This check makes the " request.leafHash" field redundant.

**Recommendation** Consider removing this field.

Client Comment Keep this redundant check for failing fast.

#### Listing 36:

126 require (\_request.leafHash  $\Longrightarrow$  expectedLeafHash, "invalid leafHash  $\hookrightarrow$  ");

#### 3.37 CVF-37

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** It is not checked that "\_request.newRoot" is a field element.

# Listing 37:

129 inputs[1] = request.newRoot;

#### 3.38 CVF-38

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** Reentrancy is possible here.

**Recommendation** Consider calling external contracts after updating the state.

#### Listing 38:

134 processRollupFeeTransfer(totalRollupFee);



# 3.39 CVF-39

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** This line could be simplified using the "+=" operator.

#### Listing 39:

135 commitmentIncludedCount = commitmentIncludedCount + \_request.

→ rollupSize;

#### 3.40 CVF-40

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The message value is not used in this function. It is unclear, why is ti payable.

#### Listing 40:

143 payable

#### 3.41 CVF-41

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** Overflow is possible here.

**Recommendation** Consider using safe conversion.

#### Listing 41:

```
uint32 numInputs = uint32(_request.serialNumbers.length);
uint32 numOutputs = uint32( request.outCommitments.length);
```



#### 3.42 CVF-42

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** This check makes the " request.sigPk" field redundant.

Recommendation Consider removing this field.

**Client Comment** Keep this redundant check for failing fast.

#### Listing 42:

require (\_request.sigPk == bytes32(uint256(uint160(recoveredSigPk → ))), "invalid signature");

#### 3.43 CVF-43

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** It is not ensured that the input values assigned here are field elements.

#### Listing 43:

```
inputs[0] = _request.rootHash;

inputs[i + 1] = _request.serialNumbers[i];
inputs[i + 1 + numInputs] = _request.sigHashes[i];

inputs[2 * numInputs + 2] = uint256(_request.publicAmount);
inputs[2 * numInputs + 3] = uint256(_request.relayerFeeAmount);

inputs[2 * numInputs + 4 + i] = _request.outCommitments[i];
inputs[2 * numInputs + numOutputs + 4 + i] = _request.

outRollupFees[i];
```

#### 3.44 CVF-44

- **Severity** Minor
- Section willion
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "\_request.serialNumbers[i]" is calculated twice. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once and reusing.

#### Listing 44:



#### 3.45 CVF-45

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "1 + numInputs" is calculated on every loop iteration. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once before the loop.

#### Listing 45:

169 inputs  $[i + 1 + numInputs] = \_request.sigHashes[i];$ 

#### 3.46 CVF-46

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The expression "2 \* numInputs" is calculated several times. **Recommendation** Consider calculating once before the loop.

#### Listing 46:

#### 3.47 CVF-47

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** The conversions are redundant, as the corresponding fields are already "uint256".

#### Listing 47:

```
inputs[2 * numInputs + 2] = uint256(_request.publicAmount);
inputs[2 * numInputs + 3] = uint256(_request.relayerFeeAmount);
```



#### 3.48 CVF-48

- **Severity** Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** These parameters should undergo range checks.

#### Listing 48:

```
172 inputs [2 * numInputs + 2] = uint256 (_request.publicAmount);
inputs [2 * numInputs + 3] = uint256 (_request.relayerFeeAmount);

179 inputs [2 * numInputs + numOutputs + 4 + i] = _request.

→ outRollupFees[i];
```

#### 3.49 CVF-49

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** Consider making serial number dependent on the leaf index. This would allow using duplicate commitments.

#### Listing 49:

#### 3.50 CVF-50

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The names are confusing, as these functions set a particular flag value rather than toggle a flag.

Recommendation Consider renaming.

#### Listing 50:



## 3.51 CVF-51

- Severity Minor
- Category Unclear behavior
- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** These functions should emit some events.

## Listing 51:

208 function toggleRollupWhitelist(bool state) external → onlyOperator {  $212 \quad function \quad toggle Verifier Update (\ bool \quad \_state) \quad external \quad only Operator$ 216 function enableTransactVerifier( 227 function disableTransactVerifier(uint32 numInputs, uint32 → numOutputs) external onlyOperator { 236 function enableRollupVerifier(uint32 rollupSize, address → rollup Verifier) external only Operator { 242 function disableRollupVerifier(uint32 rollupSize) external → onlyOperator { 250 function addRollupWhitelist(address roller) external → onlyOperator { 254 function removeRollupWhitelist(address roller) external → onlyOperator { 258 function addEnqueueWhitelist(address actor) external → onlyOperator { 262 function removeEnqueueWhitelist(address actor) external → onlyOperator { 266 function setMinRollupFee (uint256 minRollupFee) external → onlyOperator { 271 function changeOperator(address newOperator) external → onlyOperator { 275 function toggleSanctionCheck(bool check) external onlyOperator  $\hookrightarrow$  { 279 function updateSanctionContractAddress (address sanction) → external onlyOperator {



## 3.52 CVF-52

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this argument should be "IVerifier".

# Listing 52:

219 address transactVerifier

## 3.53 CVF-53

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** These checks don't save gas. **Recommendation** Consider removing them.

## Listing 53:

- 231 if (transactVerifiers[\_numInputs][\_numOutputs].enabled) {
  245 if (rollupVerifiers[\_rollupSize].enabled) {
  - 3.54 CVF-54
    - **Severity** Minor
    - Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the " rolling Verifier" argument should be "IVerifier".

## Listing 54:

236 function enableRollupVerifier(uint32 \_rollupSize, address  $\rightarrow$  \_rollupVerifier) external onlyOperator {



## 3.55 CVF-55

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** It should be ensured that "\_rollupSize" is a power of 2. A cheap way to do this is to require \_rollupSize & \_rollupSize - 1 == 0.

## Listing 55:

236 function enableRollupVerifier(uint32 \_rollupSize, address

→ rollupVerifier) external onlyOperator {

## 3.56 CVF-56

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** The argument type should be "SanctionsList".

## Listing 56:

279 function updateSanctionContractAddress (address \_sanction)

→ external onlyOperator {

#### 3.57 CVF-57

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** These functions wouldn't be necessary if the corresponding mappings would be declared as public.

## Listing 57:

- 283 function is Historic Commitment (uint 256 \_commitment) public view

  → returns (bool) {
- 287 function is Spent Serial Number (uint 256 \_serial Number) public view  $\hookrightarrow$  returns (bool) {



## 3.58 CVF-58

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** This functions returns true for a zero root in case the root history has unfilled slots.

**Recommendation** Consider explicitly returning false for a zero root.

**Client Comment** New root is guranteed not to be zero root.

## Listing 58:

291 function is Known Root (uint 256 root) public view returns (bool) {

## 3.59 CVF-59

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to split this loop into two ordinary "for" loops: one from the current index to zero, and another from the history length to the current index.

## Listing 59:

```
293 do {
    if (root == rootHistory[i]) {
        return true;
    }
    if (i == 0) {
        i = rootHistoryLength;
    }
300    i ---;
    } while (i != currentRootIndex);
```



## 3.60 CVF-60

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** These functions wouldn't be necessary if the corresponding variables would be declared as public.

## Listing 60:

## 3.61 CVF-61

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** This line could be simplified using the "+=" operator.

## Listing 61:

336 commitmentQueueSize = commitmentQueueSize + 1;

#### 3.62 CVF-62

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

Category Suboptimal

• Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** This function could be optimized by using a binary decision tree rather than a linear one: if  $(_nth < 16)$  { if  $(_nth < 8)$  { if  $(_nth < 4)$  { if  $(_nth < 2)$  { if  $(_nth < 2)$  { if  $(_nth < 2)$  } else { ... etc ...

**Client Comment** Only called by the constructor function.

## Listing 62:

340 function zeros(uint32 nth) internal pure returns (uint256) {



# 3.63 CVF-63

- Severity Minor
- Category Readability

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

Recommendation Should be "else return" for readability.

## Listing 63:

408 return 0;

## 3.64 CVF-64

- **Severity** Minor
  - Category Suboptimal

- **Status** Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The function silently returns zero on unsupported input. **Recommendation** Consider reverting in such a case.

#### Listing 64:

408 return 0;

# 3.65 CVF-65

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** This function uses linear approach to count bits in a number. Bisection approach would be more efficient: function \_pathIndices(uint256 \_fullPath, uint32 \_rollupSize) public pure returns (uint256) { if (\_rollupSize >= 0x10000) { \_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 16; \_fullPath  $\gg$ = 16; } if (\_rollupSize >= 0x100) { \_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 8; \_fullPath  $\gg$ = 8; } if (\_rollupSize >= 0x10) { \_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 4; } if (\_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 0x4) { \_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 2; \_fullPath  $\gg$ = 2; } if (\_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 0x2) { /\* \_rollupSize  $\gg$ = 1; \*/ \_fullPath  $\gg$ = 1; } return \_fullPath; }"

## Listing 65:



## 3.66 CVF-66

- Severity Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** A new bytes array is allocated on each iteration and the contents of the previous array is copies into it, thus memory usage and gas consumption is  $O(n^2)$ .

**Recommendation** Consider appending to a single array. This would require using assembly.

## Listing 66:

423 requestBytes = abi.encodePacked(requestBytes, \_request.

→ outEncryptedNotes[i]);

## 3.67 CVF-67

• **Severity** Moderate

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source CommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The boundaries between individual encrypted notes are not preserved when hashing.

**Recommendation** Consider preserving them somehow.

#### Listing 67:

#### 3.68 CVF-68

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

Source AssetPool.sol

**Description** String are inefficient.

**Recommendation** Consider returning a enum constant instead.

## Listing 68:

16 function assetType() public view virtual returns (string memory)  $\hookrightarrow$  ;



## 3.69 CVF-69

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source JoinSplit.zok

**Description** The order of arguments in these functions is different which is error prone. **Recommendation** Consider using the same order.

## Listing 69:

```
47 def checkOwnerships<N>(\
    field[N] secretKeys, \
    field[N] publicKeys, \
```

#### 3.70 CVF-70

• **Severity** Critical

- Status Fixed
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Source JoinSplit.zok

**Description** Overflow is possible here.

**Recommendation** Consider checking that "inAmount[i]", "outAmount[i]", "rollupFeeAmount[i]", "publicAmount", and "relayerFeeAmount" are in a certain safe range, or preventing overflow is some other way. Note that the assert (x>0) only verifies that the value is non-zero.

## Listing 70:

inTotal = inTotal + inAmount[i]

ssert(outAmount[i] > 0)
outTotal = outTotal + outAmount[i] + rollupFeeAmounts[i]

84 outTotal = outTotal + publicAmount + relayerFeeAmount

44



## 3.71 CVF-71

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source JoinSplit.zok

**Recommendation** This should be asserted to be a curve point.

**Client Comment** This two numbers are copied from https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2494 which is supposed to be on curve.

## Listing 71:

112 ownershipParams.Gu =

 $\hookrightarrow$  529961924064155128163486558351829703028287447219077289408652

 $\hookrightarrow$ 

1144482721001553

ownershipParams.Gv =

 $\rightarrow$  169501507984606577179586255678218345503016631616247077872228

\_

15936182638968203

#### 3.72 CVF-72

• **Severity** Minor

Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• Source ICommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to have a single array of structs with two fields, rather than two parallel arrays. This would also make the length check unnecessary. **Client Comment** The interface is more clear when defining parameters separately.

## Listing 72:

24 uint256 [] serialNumbers; uint256 [] sigHashes;



# 3.73 CVF-73

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source ICommitmentPool.sol

**Recommendation** If would be more efficient to have a single array of struct with three fields, rather than three parallel arrays. This would also make the length checks unnecessary. **Client Comment** The interface is more clear when defining parameters separately.

## Listing 73:

- 29 uint256[] outCommitments;
- 30 uint256[] outRollupFees;
- 33 bytes[] outEncryptedNotes;

#### 3.74 CVF-74

- Severity Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Fixed
- Source ICommitmentPool.sol

**Description** The semantics of the returned value is unclear. **Recommendation** Consider documenting.

## Listing 74:

36 function enqueue (CommitmentRequest memory \_request, address → executor) external returns (bool);

## 3.75 CVF-75

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Fixed
- **Source** SerialNumber.zok

**Recommendation** Consider commenting it is a nullifier key to explain the two-step format.

## Listing 75:

4 field nk = poseidon([secretKey])



## 3.76 CVF-76

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This library should be moved to a separate file named "Rollup1Pairing.sol".

## Listing 76:

3 library Rollup1Pairing {

## 3.77 CVF-77

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** This library looks identical to the "Transaction1x0Pairing " library defined in "Transaction1x0Veridier.sol".

**Recommendation** Consider defining the library in a shared place.

## Listing 77:

3 library Rollup1Pairing {

#### 3.78 CVF-78

- **Severity** Minor
  - •
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** In the yellow paper and ERC-1025 this value is known as "p" and "q" is used for another value: 2188(...)5617.

Recommendation Consider using the same notation as in the specification.

## Listing 78:

32 uint 256 q =

 $\,\hookrightarrow\,\,21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297823662689$ 

037894645226208583;



# 3.79 CVF-79

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This value should be a named constant.

## Listing 79:

32 uint256 q =

→ 218882428718392752222464057452572750886963111572978236626890

37894645226208583;

## 3.80 CVF-80

- **Severity** Major
- Category Overflow/Underflow
- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** The latter argument overflows for p.Y==0.

**Recommendation** Consider taking both outputs modulo q in order to ensure they are field elements

## Listing 80:

34 return G1Point(p.X, q - (p.Y % q));



## 3.81 CVF-81

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** The success flag is checked twice.

**Recommendation** Consider removing one of the checks.

Client Comment Keep this redundant check for failing fast.

# Listing 81:

```
46
      switch success
      case 0 {
        invalid()
   require (success);
51
      switch success
62
      case 0 {
        invalid()
      }
   require (success);
87
      switch success
      case 0 {
        invalid()
90
   require (success);
```

## 3.82 CVF-82

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** The "revert" opcode would be more efficient as it doesn't waste all the remaining gas.

## Listing 82:

- 48 invalid()
- 64 invalid()
- 89 invalid()



# 3.83 CVF-83

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** It would be more efficient to pass a single array of structs with two fields, rather than two parallel arrays. This would also make the length check unnecessary. Also it would be possible to pass the content of such array to the precompile as is, without copying. **Client Comment** The interface is more clear when defining parameters separately.

## Listing 83:

70 function pairing (G1Point[] memory p1, G2Point[] memory p2)

→ internal view returns (bool) {



## 3.84 CVF-84

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** The coordinates of the points are copied twice: once before calling the "pairing" function and another time inside "pairing".

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring to avoid double copying.

```
Listing 84:
```

```
104 p1[0] = a1;
    p1[1] = b1;
    p2[0] = a2;
    p2[1] = b2;
    return pairing(p1, p2);
121 p1[0] = a1;
    p1[1] = b1;
    p1[2] = c1;
    p2[0] = a2;
    p2[1] = b2;
    p2[2] = c2;
    return pairing(p1, p2);
142 p1[0] = a1;
    p1[1] = b1;
    p1[2] = c1;
    p1[3] = d1;
    p2[0] = a2;
    p2[1] = b2;
    p2[2] = c2;
    p2[3] = d2;
150 return pairing (p1, p2);
```

## 3.85 CVF-85

- Severity Minor
- - -
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** This contract looks very similar to the "Transaction1x0Verifier" contract. **Recommendation** Consider extracting a shared abstract base contract to avoid code duplication.

## Listing 85:

154 contract Rollup1Verifier {

# 3.86 CVF-86

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

Recommendation The return type should be "bool".

## Listing 86:

227 function verify (uint256 [] memory input, Proof memory proof)

→ internal view returns (uint256) {

#### 3.87 CVF-87

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

Recommendation This value should be a named constant.

Client Comment Local variables spend less gas.

## Listing 87:

228 uint256 snark\_scalar\_field =

→ 218882428718392752222464057452572750885483644004160343436982

04186575808495617;

#### 3.88 CVF-88

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Readability

• **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

Recommendation Should be "else return" for readability.

## Listing 88:

249 return 0;



# 3.89 CVF-89

- Severity Major
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Description** 'Proof' and 'input' are not checked to be curve points. It may be possible that invalid inputs result in a successful check as the curve operations do not check the inputs either.

## Listing 89:

252 function verifyTx(Proof memory proof, uint256[] memory input)

→ public view returns (bool r) {

#### 3.90 CVF-90

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup1Verifier.sol

**Recommendation** This could be simplified as: return verify(input, proof) == 0;

## Listing 90:

```
254 if (verify(input, proof) == 0) {
    return true;
} else {
    return false;
}
```

## 3.91 CVF-91

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** The same constant is defined in the "CommitmentPool" contract. **Recommendation** Consider defining once and a shared place.

## Listing 91:

- 12 uint256 constant FIELD SIZE =
  - $\,\hookrightarrow\,\,21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698$

 $\hookrightarrow$ 

204186575808495617;



## 3.92 CVF-92

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** There is no access level specified for these variables, so internal access will be used by default.

Recommendation Consider explicitly specifying an access level.

## Listing 92:

- 12 uint256 constant FIELD SIZE =
  - $\ \hookrightarrow \ 21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698$

 $\hookrightarrow$ 

204186575808495617;

- 14 | Hasher3 | hasher3;
- 16 address associatedCommitmentPool; uint256 minAmount;
- 19 address operator;
- 21 bool depositsDisabled;

#### 3.93 CVF-93

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Info
- Source MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this variable should be "ICommitmentPool".

## Listing 93:

16 address associatedCommitmentPool;

## 3.94 CVF-94

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• **Category** Bad datatype

• **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Recommendation** The argument type should be "IHasher3".

# Listing 94:

28 constructor(address hasher3) {



## 3.95 CVF-95

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Info
- **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Recommendation** The argument type should be "ICommitmentPool".

## Listing 95:

33 function setAssociatedCommitmentPool(address

→ commitmentPoolAddress) external onlyOperator {

## 3.96 CVF-96

• Severity Minor

• **Status** Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** These functions should emit some events.

## Listing 96:



## 3.97 CVF-97

- Severity Minor
- Category Flaw

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** It is not checked than this value is a field element.

**Recommendation** Consider adding such check.

## Listing 97:

uint128 randomS

#### 3.98 CVF-98

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Recommendation** The conversion to "uint256" is redundant, as "uint128" is automatically converted to "uint256".

#### Listing 98:

return hasher3.poseidon([ hashK, amount, uint256( randomS)]);

#### 3.99 **CVF-99**

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Documentation
- Status Fixed
- Source MystikoV2Loop.sol

Recommendation Should be 'too small'.

## Listing 99:

53 require( request.amount >= minAmount, "amount too few");

#### **CVF-100** 3.100

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

Source MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** This check makes the " request.commitment" field redundant.

Recommendation Consider removing the field.

**Client Comment** Keep this redundant check for failing fast.

## Listing 100:

55 require(\_request.commitment == calculatedCommitment, "commitment → hash incorrect");



## 3.101 CVF-101

- **Severity** Moderate
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** Here an external contract is called before updating the state. This could be used for reentrancy attacks.

**Recommendation** Consider calling the external contract after updating the state.

## Listing 101:

67 \_processDepositTransfer(associatedCommitmentPool, \_amount + → rollupFee, 0);

## 3.102 CVF-102

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Fixed
- Source MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Description** Despite the names, these functions don't toggle flags but rather set them to certain values.

**Recommendation** Consider renaming.

#### Listing 102:

- 80 function toggleDeposits(bool \_state) external onlyOperator {
- 88 function toggleSanctionCheck(bool \_check) external onlyOperator  $\hookrightarrow$  {

#### 3.103 CVF-103

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source MystikoV2Loop.sol

**Recommendation** These functions wouldn't be necessary if the corresponding variables would be declared as "public".

## Listing 103:

- 100 function getMinAmount() public view returns (uint256) {
- 104 function is Deposits Disabled () public view returns (bool) {



## 3.104 CVF-104

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source MystikoV2LoopMain.sol

Recommendation The argument type should be "Ihasher3".

## Listing 104:

7 constructor(address hasher3) MystikoV2Loop( hasher3) {}

## 3.105 CVF-105

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MystikoV2LoopMain.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

## Listing 105:

7 constructor(address \_hasher3) MystikoV2Loop(\_hasher3) {}

## 3.106 CVF-106

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source MystikoV2LoopERC20.sol

**Recommendation** The type of the arguments should be "IHasher3" and "IERC20" respectively.

## Listing 106:

```
7 constructor(address _hasher3, address _token) MystikoV2Loop( \hookrightarrow _hasher3) ERC20AssetPool(_token) {}
```



# 3.107 CVF-107

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MystikoV2LoopERC20.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

# Listing 107:

7 constructor(address \_hasher3, address \_token) MystikoV2Loop( → hasher3) ERC20AssetPool( token) {}

## 3.108 CVF-108

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source CommitmentPoolMain.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

## Listing 108:

9 {}

11 receive() external payable {}

#### 3.109 CVF-109

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPoolERC20.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this argument should be "IERC20".

# Listing 109:

10 address \_token



## 3.110 CVF-110

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- **Source** CommitmentPoolERC20.sol

**Recommendation** It is a good practice to put a comment into an empty block to explain why the block is empty.

## Listing 110:

11 ) CommitmentPool( \_treeHeight , \_rootHistoryLength ) ERC20AssetPool  $\hookrightarrow$  (\_token) {}

## 3.111 CVF-111

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source Sanctions.sol

**Recommendation** This interface should be moved to a separate file named "Sanction-sList.sol".

# Listing 111:

3 interface SanctionsList {

#### 3.112 CVF-112

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad naming

• Source Sanctions.sol

**Description** Unlike other interfaces in this project, the name of this interface doesn't have the "I" prefix.

**Recommendation** Consider adding the prefix for consistency.

## Listing 112:

3 interface SanctionsList {



## 3.113 CVF-113

- Severity Minor
  - Severity Willion
- Category Bad naming

• **Source** Sanctions.sol

• Status Info

**Description** Despite the name, this interface doesn't look like a list, but rather like a set or even oracle.

**Recommendation** Consider renaming.

**Client Comment** The interface name is defined by Chainalysis oracle.

## Listing 113:

3 interface SanctionsList {

#### 3.114 CVF-114

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** Sanctions.sol

**Description** Hardcoding mainnet addresses is a bad practice, as it makes it harder to test contracts.

**Recommendation** Consider passing the sanctions contract address as a constructor argument and storing in an immutable variable.

**Client Comment** Hardcoding for sanction contract address, because it is same address for all chain, and we also support sanction contract address change.

## Listing 114:

- 8 address sanctionsContract = 0
  - → x40C57923924B5c5c5455c48D93317139ADDaC8fb:

#### 3.115 CVF-115

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source Sanctions.sol

**Description** There are no access levels specified for these variables, not internal access will be used by default.

Recommendation Consider explicitly specifying an access level.

## Listing 115:

- 8 address sanctionsContract = 0
  - → x40C57923924B5c5c5455c48D93317139ADDaC8fb;

bool sanctionCheckDisabled = false;



# 3.116 CVF-116

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source Sanctions.sol

**Recommendation** The type of this variable should be "SanctionsList".

# Listing 116:

- 8 address sanctionsContract = 0
  - → x40C57923924B5c5c5455c48D93317139ADDaC8fb;

#### 3.117 CVF-117

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• **Source** Sanctions.sol

**Recommendation** These functions wouldn't be necessary if the corresponding variables would be declared as public.

## Listing 117:

- 11 function is Sanction Check Disabled () public view returns (bool) {
- 15 function getSanctionsContract() public view returns (address) {

#### 3.118 CVF-118

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source Sanctions.sol

Recommendation The return type should be "SanctionsList".

## Listing 118:

15 function getSanctionsContract() public view returns (address) {



## 3.119 CVF-119

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source Sanctions.sol

**Recommendation** This function could be simplified as: return !sanctionsListDisabled && SanctionsList (sanctionsContract).isSanctioned( addr);

## Listing 119:

19 function is Sanctioned (address addr) internal returns (bool) {

#### 3.120 CVF-120

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- Source MainAssetPool.sol

**Description** String error messages are suboptimal.

**Recommendation** Consider using named errors instead.

## Listing 120:

- 11 require (msg.value == amount + bridgeFee , "insufficient token");
- 13 require(success, "amount transfer failed");
- 18 require(success, "executor fee transfer failed");
- 23 require(success, "rollup fee transfer failed");
- 27 require (msg. value = 0, "no mainnet token allowed");
- 29 require(success, "withdraw failed");

#### 3.121 CVF-121

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source MainAssetPool.sol

**Description** There is no complimentary check in "ERC20AssetPool".

**Recommendation** Consider removing this check or moving it somewhere else.

## Listing 121:

27 require (msg. value == 0, "no mainnet token allowed");



## 3.122 CVF-122

- Severity Minor
- **Category** Procedural

- Status Fixed
- Source IERC20Metadata.sol

Recommendation Consider moving this interface to the "interface" directory.

## Listing 122:

5 interface IERC20Metadata is IERC20 {

#### 3.123 CVF-123

- Severity Minor
- Category Procedural

- **Status** Fixed
- Source ERC20AssetPool.sol

Description No access level specified for this variable.

Recommendation Consider explicitly specifying an access level.

## Listing 123:

9 IERC20Metadata asset;

#### 3.124 CVF-124

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

Source ERC20AssetPool.sol

Recommendation The argument type should be "IERC20".

## Listing 124:

11 constructor(address assetAddress) {

#### 3.125 CVF-125

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Suboptimal

• Source ERC20AssetPool.sol

**Description** String error messages are suboptimal.

**Recommendation** Consider using named errors instead.

## Listing 125:

20 require(msg.value == bridgeFee, "bridge fee mismatch");



## 3.126 CVF-126

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- Source ERC20AssetPool.sol

Recommendation This value should be a named constant.

## Listing 126:

37 return "erc20";

#### 3.127 CVF-127

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- **Source** Commitment.zok

**Description** Calling two width-4 Poseidons is suboptimal.

Recommendation Consider calling a single width-6 Poseidon which takes 5 inputs.

**Client Comment** This is an expected behaviour, because we need to use hashK to verify the commitment in the smart contract.

## Listing 127:

8 field hashK = poseidon([pubKey, randomP, randomR])
return poseidon([hashK, amount, randomS])

## 3.128 CVF-128

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Rollup1.zok

**Recommendation** The value "20" should be a named constant.

## Listing 128:

- 8 private field[20] pathElements, \
- 10 assert (MerkleTreeBatchUpdater::<20, 20, 1>(\



## 3.129 CVF-129

- Severity Minor
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Info
- Source Sha256Batch.zok

**Description** This function is overcomplicated by handling both even and odd cases of N in the same code without if statements.

**Recommendation** Consider refactoring to handle either both cases in the same function with an if-statement or just using two functions.

Client Comment This function is not used any more.

## Listing 129:

5 def main<N>(field[N] items) -> field:

## 3.130 CVF-130

• **Severity** Moderate

Status Fixed

• Category Procedural

• Source KeccakBatch.zok

**Description** This library may have padding issues.

**Recommendation** Consider checking its code against Keccak test vectors.

**Client Comment** The padding issue has been fixed in Zokrates 0.7.14, we have upgraded our Zokrates to 0.7.14.

#### Listing 130:

1 import "hashes/keccak/256 bit.zok" as keccak

#### 3.131 CVF-131

• **Severity** Major

- Status Fixed
- Category Documentation
- Source

Merkle Tree Batch Updater.zok

**Recommendation** It should be commented how these numbers are obtained to guarantee they are not malicious

## Listing 131:

 $6\quad 450606924168002311076418960365866471059232703941254714774574507842$ 

 $\hookrightarrow$ 

4755206435,



## 3.132 CVF-132

- Severity Minor
- Status Fixed
- Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Transaction1x2.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant.

## Listing 132:

- 19 private field [1][20] inPathElements,  $\setminus$
- 20 private bool[1][20] inPathIndices, \
- 26 assert(JoinSplit::<20, 1, 2>(\

## 3.133 CVF-133

• **Severity** Minor

Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• Source Rollup4.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant and the value 18 should be derived from that constant.

## Listing 133:

- 8 private field[18] pathElements, \
- 10 assert (MerkleTreeBatchUpdater::<20, 18, 4>(\

#### 3.134 CVF-134

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Rollup64.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant and the value 14 should be derived from that constant.

## Listing 134:

- 8 private field[14] pathElements, \
- 10 assert (MerkleTreeBatchUpdater::<20, 14, 64>(\



# 3.135 CVF-135

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Transaction2x0.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant.

## Listing 135:

- 19 private field[2][20] inPathElements, \
  20 private bool[2][20] inPathIndices, \
- 26 assert (Join Split:: <20, 2, 0>(\

## 3.136 CVF-136

- **Severity** Major
- Category Suboptimal

- Status Fixed
- **Source** MerkleTreeBuilder.zok

**Description** This allocates a two-dimensional array of (H + 1) \* N elements, while only 2 \* N - 1 elements are actually used.

**Recommendation** Consider allocating a linear array of 2 \* N - 1 elements.

## Listing 136:

5 field 
$$[H + 1][N]$$
 layers =  $[[0; N]; H + 1]$ 

#### 3.137 CVF-137

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Transaction1x1.zok

Recommendation The value 20 should be a named constant.

## Listing 137:

- 19 private field [1][20] in Path Elements ,  $\$
- 20 private bool[1][20] inPathIndices, \
- 26 assert(JoinSplit::<20, 1, 1>(\



# 3.138 CVF-138

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Transaction1x0.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant.

## Listing 138:

- 19 private field [1][20] in Path Elements ,  $\$  20 private bool [1][20] in Path Indices ,  $\$
- 26 assert (JoinSplit::<20, 1, 0>(

## 3.139 CVF-139

• **Severity** Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Transaction2x2.zok

Recommendation The value 20 should be a named constant.

## Listing 139:

- 19 private field[2][20] inPathElements, \
  20 private bool[2][20] inPathIndices, \
- 26 assert(JoinSplit::<20, 2, 2>(\

## 3.140 CVF-140

• Severity Minor

• Status Fixed

• Category Bad datatype

• **Source** Transaction2x1.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant.

## Listing 140:

- 19 private field [2][20] in Path Elements,  $\setminus$
- 20 private bool[2][20] inPathIndices, \
- 26 assert ( Join Split :: < 20, 2, 1>(\



# 3.141 CVF-141

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- Status Fixed
- **Source** Rollup256.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant and the value 12 should be derived from that constant.

# Listing 141:

- 8 private field[12] pathElements, \
- 10 assert (MerkleTreeBatchUpdater::<20, 12, 256>(\

## 3.142 CVF-142

- **Severity** Minor
- Category Bad datatype

- **Status** Fixed
- Source Rollup16.zok

**Recommendation** The value 20 should be a named constant and the value 16 should be derived from that constant.

## Listing 142:

- 8 private field[16] pathElements, \
- 10 assert (MerkleTreeBatchUpdater::<20, 16, 16>(\

## 3.143 CVF-143

• Severity Minor

• Status Info

• Category Procedural

• Source IVerifier.sol

**Description** These structs are not used in the interface.

**Recommendation** Consider moving them to where they are used.

**Client Comment** Used in verifyTx.

# Listing 143:

- 4 struct G1Point {
- 9 struct G2Point {



## 3.144 CVF-144

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- **Source** IVerifier.sol

**Description** Names of structure fields usually start with a lower case letter. **Recommendation** Consider renaming.

## Listing 144:

 5 uint256 X; uint256 Y;
 10 uint256 [2] X; uint256 [2] Y;

## 3.145 CVF-145

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source IVerifier.sol

**Description** The proof structure is specific to a particular ZK schema. **Recommendation** Consider naming the structure after said schema.

## Listing 145:

14 struct Proof {

## 3.146 CVF-146

- Severity Minor
- Category Bad naming

- Status Info
- Source IHasher3.sol

**Description** While the interface name is quite generic, the function name is specific to the "poseidon" hash.

**Recommendation** Consider renaming to "hash3" or just "hash".

# Listing 146: