

Report
v. 3.0

Customer
zkLink



Smart Contract Audit Circuits

21st April 2023

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1 Changelog

#	Date	Author	Description
0.1	30.01.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Initial Draft
0.2	30.01.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Minor revision
1.0	31.01.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Release
1.1	07.02.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Issues classification is added
1.2	07.02.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Syntax highlighted
2.0	07.02.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Release
2.1	21.04.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Original Repository is fixed
3.0	21.04.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Release

2 Introduction

All modifications to this document are prohibited. Violators will be prosecuted to the full extent of the U.S. law.

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting (Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich) at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations.

zkLink is a trading-focused multi-chain L2 network with unified liquidity secured by ZK-Rollups.

3 Project scope

We were asked to review:

- Original Repository
- Fix Repository

Files:

/	account.rs	allocated_structures.rs	circuit.rs
	element.rs	exit_circuit.rs	operation.rs
	serialization.rs	signature.rs	utils.rs
witness/			
	change_pubkey_offchain.rs	close_account.rs	deposit.rs
	forced_Exit.rs	full_exit.rs	noop.rs
	order_matching.rs	transfer.rs	transfer_to_new.rs
	utils.rs	withdraw.rs	
op_circuit/			
	change_pubkey_offchain.rs	deposit.rs	forced_exit.rs
	full_exit.rs	noop.rs	order_matching.rs
	transfer.rs	transfer_to_new.rs	withdraw.rs

4 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a selection of methods and tactics combined differently and tuned for each particular project, depending on the project structure and technologies used, as well as on client expectations from the audit.

- **General Code Assessment.** The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and for whether it follows best code practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this phase we also understand overall code structure.
- **Entity Usage Analysis.** Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places as well as their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase, we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- **Access Control Analysis.** For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and done properly. At this phase, we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.
- **Code Logic Analysis.** The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check if code actually does what it is supposed to do, if that algorithms are optimal and correct, and if proper data types are used. We also make sure that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.


We classify issues by the following severity levels:

- **Critical issue** directly affects the smart contract functionality and may cause a significant loss.
- **Major issue** is either a solid performance problem or a sign of misuse: a slight code modification or environment change may lead to loss of funds or data. Sometimes it is an abuse of unclear code behaviour which should be double checked.
- **Moderate issue** is not an immediate problem, but rather suboptimal performance in edge cases, an obviously bad code practice, or a situation where the code is correct only in certain business flows.
- **Minor issues** contain code style, best practices and other recommendations.



5 Our findings

We found 12 critical, 47 major, and a few less important issues. All identified Critical issues have been fixed.



Fixed 84 out of 170 issues

6 Critical Issues

CVF-1. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** exit_circuit.rs

Description This code effectively does nothing. Should probably enforce an equality of `is_required_source_token_and_target_token` to true.

Client Comment Modified to `Boolean::enforce_equal`.

```
68 Boolean::and(  
    cs.namespace(|| " require correct token"),  
    &is_required_source_token_and_target_token,  
    &Boolean::constant(true),  
)?;
```

CVF-2. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Description 'b' must be amount+fee for chunk0 and amount for chunk1, whereas here it can be any of them in both chunks. This may lead to fund loss.

Client Comment *The check for chunk0 and chunk1 respectively contains is_user_b_correct and is_global_asset_b_correct.*

```
89 let is_b_correct = {  
90     let is_user_b_correct = Boolean::from(Expression::equals(  
         cs.namespace(|| "is_user_b_correct"),  
         op_data.b.get_number(),  
         sum_amount_fee.clone(),  
     )?);  
     let is_global_asset_b_correct = Boolean::from(Expression::equals  
         ↪ (  
             cs.namespace(|| "is_global_asset_b_correct"),  
             op_data.b.get_number(),  
             Expression::from(op_data[WithdrawArgs::FullAmount].  
                 ↪ get_number()),  
         )?);  
     multi_or(  
         cs.namespace(|| "is_b_correct_in_chunk0"),  
         &[is_user_b_correct, is_global_asset_b_correct],  
     )?  
};
```

CVF-3. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Description This allows any fourth chunk to pass the function.

Client Comment *Added the chunk3_valid_flags.*

```
208 boolean_or(  
    cs.namespace(|| "is valid withdraw op"),  
210    &is_op_valid,  
    &is_correct_chunk_numbers[3]
```

CVF-4. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description This may overflow if the nonce has been just taken from the updated order, which is not checked for non-overflow.

Recommendation Consider checking all nonces for overflows.

Client Comment Added nonce overflow check.

529 Expression::from(pre_branch.order.nonce.get_number()) + Expression::
 → u64::<CS>(1),

CVF-5. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** deposit.rs

Description The "is_correct_chunk_numbers[3].clone()" allows the "deposit" function to successfully validate a chunk with index 3 even if its TX type is not deposit. So if some TX type (not necessary deposit) has at least four chunks, the fourth chunks will be considered valid regardless of its content.

Client Comment Added the chunk3_valid_flags.

134 &[is_chunk0_valid, is_chunk1_valid, is_chunk2_valid,
 → is_correct_chunk_numbers[3].clone()],

CVF-6. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description The witness is generated using `change_pubkey_offchain.account_id` as changer, whereas `op_data` carries `temp_account_id`. If these two variables differ, the proof will fail.

Client Comment *Removed `temp_account_id`, There's really no problem here, and it's redundant code, because in the state handler module, `temp_account_id` is also derived from the `account_id`.*

```
35     account_id: *change_pubkey_offchain.account_id,  
37     temp_account_id: *change_pubkey_offchain.tx.account_id,  
148 let account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(change_pubkey_offchain.account_id  
    ↪ as u64);  
150 let temp_account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(change_pubkey_offchain.  
    ↪ temp_account_id as u64);  
219 before: OperationBranch {  
220     account_id: Some(account_id_fe),  
271     frs_with_4_bytes: vec![  
273         Some(temp_account_id_fe),  
317     ChangePubkeyArgs::AccountId => &self.ces_with_4_bytes[1],
```

CVF-7. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Client Comment *Considering `E::Fr::CAPACITY=253`, I checked the upper limit of parameters `a` and `b`, both `a` and `b` are less than 2^{126} , so that the subsequent multiplication will not overflow. 2^{126} is about 8×10^{37} , and can accommodate any currency with a total of 10^{18} and a precision of 18. It's enough for most coins.*

```
343 let product = a.mul(
```



CVF-8. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Overflow is possible here. The quotient variable must be range checked first.

Client Comment Considering $E::Fr::CAPACITY=253$, I checked the upper limit of parameters a and b , both a and b are less than 2^{126} , so that the subsequent multiplication will not overflow. 2^{126} is about 8×10^{37} , and can accommodate any currency with a total of 10^{18} and a precision of 18. It's enough for most coins.

444 `let quotient_mul_b = quotient.mul(`

CVF-9. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This condition is not sound if the middle product overflows.

Recommendation Consider checking that both $a*magnify$ and $b*(q+1)$ do not overflow.

Client Comment Considering $E::Fr::CAPACITY=253$, I checked the upper limit of parameters a and b , both a and b are less than 2^{126} , so that the subsequent multiplication will not overflow. 2^{126} is about 8×10^{37} , and can accommodate any currency with a total of 10^{18} and a precision of 18. It's enough for most coins.

465 `// b*q < a*magnify < b*(q+1)`

CVF-10. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** utils.rs

Description All multiplications and additions in this function may overflow, and the range checks in the end of the function do not prevent it. For example, if $k=2^{128}-1$ but x and y being small, the $x*y$ may be between k^2 and $(k+1)^2$ as both overflow.

Recommendation Consider using big number arithmetic here.

Client Comment Considering $E::Fr::CAPACITY=253$, I checked the upper limit of parameters a and b , both a and b are less than 2^{126} , so that the subsequent multiplication will not overflow. 2^{126} is about $8*10^{37}$, and can accommodate any currency with a total of 10^{18} and a precision of 18. It's enough for most coins.

485 `pub fn sqrt_enforce<E: Engine, CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>()`

CVF-11. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Description The variable `is_correct_chunk_numbers[3]` is not checked against anything and thus is true for any 4-th chunk, which makes the entire function to return true.

Client Comment Added the `chunk3_valid_flags`.

145 `&[is_chunk0_valid, is_chunk1_valid, is_chunk2_valid,
 ↪ is_correct_chunk_numbers[3].clone()]`

CVF-12. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Description The “`is_correct_chunk_numbers[3]`” allows the “`forced_exit`” function to successfully validate a chunk with index 3 even if its TX type is not forced exit. So if some TX type (not necessary forced exit) has at least four chunks, the fourth chunks will be considered valid regardless of its content.

Client Comment Added the `chunk3_valid_flags`.

238 `&is_correct_chunk_numbers[3]`



7 Major Issues

CVF-13. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** exit_circuit.rs

Description Using SHA-256 for hashing public inputs is expensive.

Recommendation Consider using a zk friendly hash as in here <https://docs.google.com/drawings/d/1v5zGTuydDuT2cI52twJAS71h4kQRuk8dIZLCcZSiaY/edit?usp=sharing>

Client Comment After that, I'll think about it.

```
188     let mut hash_block =
        sha256::sha256(cs.namespace(|| "sha256 of pub data"), &
                      ↳ initial_hash_data)?;
```

```
333 let mut h = Sha256::new();
```

CVF-14. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description SHA-256 calls are expensive in circuits.

Recommendation Consider using an algebraic hash inside the circuit and SHA-256 in the contract as described here <https://docs.google.com/drawings/d/1v5zGTuyd-DuT2cI52twJAS71h4kQRuk8dIZLCcZSiaY/edit?usp=sharing>

Client Comment After that, I'll think about it.

```
354 let mut hash_block = sha256::sha256(cs.namespace(|| "hash with pub
                                          ↳ data and op offset commitment"), &pack_bits)?;
```



CVF-15. INFO

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description There is no check to ensure that tx_type is valid.

Recommendation Consider adding such a check or explaining why it is not necessary. Also, consider adding an explicit assert for this.

Client Comment *There is no need to check here, the real check is that tx_type is checked at the execution of each op.*

419 `tx_type.get_number()`,

CVF-16. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description This variable has the same name as an argument.

Recommendation Consider using a different name.

Client Comment *Changed the variable name of the function entry.*

458 `let next_chunk_number = Expression::conditionally_select(`



CVF-17. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description This function behaves differently for different operations and is away of the chunk structure of particular operations. Such approach is very error -prone.

Recommendation Consider moving all operation-specific logic into files named after particular operations, and keeping only operation-agnostic logic here.

Client Comment *Here's the logic for determining the circuits of different blocks based on contains_ops field, which is the binary bits of ops composition nunmber. The ops composition nunmber represents the minimum circuit execution selected based on the available ops composition nunmbers of the environment configuration and the transactions in the block.*

```
584     &[zk_link_ops[WithdrawOp::OP_CODE as usize].clone(),  
    ↪ is_correct_chunk_numbers[1].clone()],
```

```
590     zk_link_ops[OrderMatchingOp::OP_CODE as usize].clone(),  
     zk_link_ops[ForcedExitOp::OP_CODE as usize].clone(),
```



CVF-18. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description Underflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider using 'less equal than fixed' check instead

Client Comment *pre_branch.token is a CircuitElement that contains a maximum of 16 bits and cannot exceed max_token_id.*

```
701 let diff_token_numbers = max_token_id.clone() - pre_branch.token.  
    ↪ get_number();  
let _ = diff_token_numbers.into_bits_le_fixed(  
    cs.namespace(|| "pre account token number is smaller than  
        ↪ processable number"),  
    balance_tree_depth(),  
)?;  
  
708 let diff_token_numbers = max_token_id.clone() - post_branch.  
    ↪ as_ref().unwrap().token.get_number();  
let _ = diff_token_numbers.into_bits_le_fixed(  
    cs.namespace(|| "post account token number is smaller than  
        ↪ processable number"),  
    balance_tree_depth(),  
)?;
```

CVF-19. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description This function behaves differently for different operations and is away of the chunk structure of particular operations. Such approach is very error -prone.

Recommendation Consider moving all operation-specific logic into files named after particular operations, and keeping only operation-agnostic logic here.

Client Comment *This function is redundant. The check for this function has already been done at the corresponding op.*

```
937 fn assert_global_assert_account<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(
```



CVF-20. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** deposit.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider using 'a' and 'b' variables to prevent it.

Client Comment Although the value here is scaled up by 18 precision, there should not be a coin with a total of more than 2^{18} . Here is the code outside the circuit. If it overflows, there is a limit of 128bits in the corresponding place of the circuit, so the proof cannot be generated.

```
189 bal.value.add_assign(&amount_as_field_element);
```

CVF-21. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the withdraw TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct withdraw TX type.

Client Comment With `zk_link_ops` in `base_flags`, compare `global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type` with all `tx_type`.

```
22 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
    ↪()); //TX_TYPE_BIT_WIDTH=8
```

CVF-22. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Description This extends serialized_tx_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the withdraw TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct withdraw TX type.

Client Comment With `zk_link_ops` in `base_flags`, compare `global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type` with all `tx_type`.

```
56 serialized_withdraw_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.  
    ↪ get_bits_be());
```



CVF-23. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Pubdata does not contain MakerIsSell flag, which makes it difficult to restore the operations.

Client Comment Since pubdata contains MakerSellToken and TakerSellToken, MakerIsSell is not required. I've changed this part of the code a little bit to make it clearer.

22 `let mut pubdata_bits = Vec::with_capacity(OrderMatchingOp::CHUNKS * ↪ CHUNK_BIT_WIDTH);`

CVF-24. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the order matching TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct order matching TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

23 `pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be ↪ ()');`

CVF-25. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description This extends serialized_tx_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the order matching TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct order matching TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

115 `serialized_tx_bits_version.extend(global_variables.chunk_data. ↪ tx_type.get_bits_be());`



CVF-26. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Overflow is possible here

Client Comment *Overflow case, will not be selected. If it's selected, there's no way that overflow can happen here, because ActualBaseAmount is part of residue CircuitElement::conditionally_select_with_number_strict function will limit the result of selection does not exceed 128 - bit (with parameter y bits length is given priority to, The bits length of pre_branch.order.residue is 128), here if overflow happens, it must not comply with the 128bit constraint. Of course, in actual case, Here the ActualBaseAmount is itself part of pre_branch.order.residue, so naturally it won't overflow either. When another op executes this part of the code, although an overflow may occur, the overflow value will not be selected because the judgment criteria are not met.*

513 Expression::from(pre_branch.order.residue.get_number()) - op_data[
 → OrderMatchingArgs::ActualBaseAmount].get_number(),

CVF-27. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description MakerBuyAmount is not restricted to any number of bits so that operations with it are prone to overflows.

Recommendation Consider making it the same 20-byte size as TakerBuyAmount

Client Comment *There is no overflow. If the value passed in does overflow, then the MakerBuyAmount and TakerBuyAmount in the check_op_data_part_args function are different from the value actually computed in the circuit and the check will fail. The final conditional selection constraint guarantees that the MakerBuyAmount and TakerBuyAmount will not exceed 128bits.*

540 let actual_amount = AllocatedNum::conditionally_select(
 cs.namespace(|| "actual_amount"),
 op_data[OrderMatchingArgs::MakerBuyAmount].get_number(),

CVF-28. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Client Comment *There's not that much to overflow. Assuming an overflow occurs here, the 128bits constraint here will not be satisfied.*

564 Expression::from(pre_branch.balance.get_number()) + op_data.b.
 ↳ get_number(),

582 Expression::from(post_branch.balance.get_number()) + &
 ↳ exchange_fee,
 Expression::from(post_branch.balance.get_number()) + &
 ↳ actual_amount - &exchange_fee,

CVF-29. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Underflow is possible here

Client Comment *exchange_fee is calculated based on percentage actual_amount and Underflow is not possible. Assuming an underflow occurs here, the 128bits constraint here will not be satisfied.*

583 Expression::from(post_branch.balance.get_number()) + &actual_amount
 ↳ - &exchange_fee,

CVF-30. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** deposit.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the deposit TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct deposit TX type.

Client Comment With `zk_link_ops` in `base_flags`, compare `global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type` with all `tx_type`.

```
20 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
↪()); //TX_TYPE_BIT_WIDTH=8
```

CVF-31. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** deposit.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Client Comment I don't think this problem exists. We can't allow the total amount of a coin to exceed 2^{128} , and there will be no addition overflow. Assuming an overflow occurs here, the 128bits constraint here will not be satisfied.

```
116 let updated_balance = Expression::from(cur.balance.get_number())  
+ Expression::from(op_data[DepositArgs::FullAmount].get_number()  
↪);
```

CVF-32. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description There is no nonce overflow check here, while the circuit has such check. Thus, it is possible to generate a witness that cannot be proven.

Client Comment We will do this checking in the state handler module(which is used for rapid transaction execution).

```
182 acc.nonce.add_assign(&Fr::one());
```



CVF-33. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the change pubkey offchain TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct change pubkey offchain TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
21 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
    ↪()); //TX_TYPE_BIT_WIDTH=8
```

CVF-34. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description This extends serialized_tx_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the change pubkey offchain TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct change pubkey offchain TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
48 serialized_tx_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.  
    ↪ get_bits_be());
```

CVF-35. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description This operation may overflow.

Client Comment I don't think this problem exists. We can't allow the total amount of a coin to exceed 2^{128} , and there will be no addition overflow. Assuming an overflow occurs here, the 128bits constraint here will not be satisfied.

```
147 Expression::from(cur.balance.get_number()) + op_data[  
    ↪ ChangePubkeyArgs::FeeUnpacked].get_number(),
```



CVF-36. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This file contains both, circuit fragments and normal Rust utility functions.

Recommendation Consider separating these two classes of utilities into two files.

Client Comment *Then we'll consider splitting up.*

```
1 // Workspace deps
```

CVF-37. INFO

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** utils.rs

Description There is no check to ensure that the bits length is a factor of 8.

Recommendation Consider adding such a check.

Client Comment *The assert check has been added on line 10 and the function on line 138 has been removed because of another issue that redefined the function.*

```
10 bits.chunks(8)
```

```
138 for byte_chunk in byte_chunks {
```

CVF-38. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This packing method effectively drops MSB of r_y and does not take any bit of r_x. This makes the full signature not recoverable. Why is this done?

Client Comment *In theory, we only need to know the y coordinate, and the highest bit in 256bits of y coordinate is not necessary. We can use it to store a bit of x information, which is convenient to select when recovering the elliptic curve points. This is a means of compression for elliptic curve points. Since y is a scalar field element Fr that requires only 254bit representation, the last two 2bits of the 32 bytes are free and can be used to store the parity of the x coordinates. This compresses the x and y Fr into a single 32 bytes. This part of code is the original code of zksync, and I have not changed it. Based on previous experience, I guess the reason for such coding should be this.*

```
107 sig_r_packed_bits.extend(signature_r_y_be_bits[1...].iter());
```

CVF-39. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation This function calculates: $a - a*n/d \leq b \leq a + a*n/d$ it would be more reasonable to calculate: $a*x/y \leq b \leq a*y/x$

Client Comment *This function is no longer used and has been removed.*

```
284 pub fn constraint_two_number_error<E:Engine, CS: ConstraintSystem<E
    ↪ >>()
```

CVF-40. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This length does not seem to be sufficient as $|a-b|$ may be BIT_WIDTH long.

Client Comment *This function is no longer used and has been removed.*

```
309 CircuitElement::from_number_with_known_length(
310     cs.namespace(|| "chosen number as ce"),
     selected_number,
     FR_BIT_WIDTH - 2,
```



CVF-41. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This length does not seem to be sufficient as quotient may be BIT_WIDTH long.

```
406 CircuitElement::from_number_with_known_length(  
        cs.namespace(|| "three precision quotient"),  
        quotient,  
        FR_BIT_WIDTH - 2  
410 )
```

CVF-42. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Client Comment For a and b , the maximum ($\text{MAX_CALCULATION_BIT_WIDTH}=126$) limit is done. Therefore, multiplication must not overflow($126+126 < \text{Fr}::\text{capacity}=253$). 126bit is sufficient for most cryptocurrencies.

```
425 let magnify_a = a.mul(  
        cs.namespace(|| "magnify_a"),  
        &amplification_factor  
)?;
```

CVF-43. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This length does not seem to be sufficient as product may be BIT_WIDTH long.

Client Comment For a and b , the maximum ($\text{MAX_CALCULATION_BIT_WIDTH}=126$) limit is done. Therefore, multiplication must not overflow($126+126 < \text{Fr}::\text{capacity}=253$). 126bit is sufficient for most cryptocurrencies.

```
429 let magnify_a = CircuitElement::from_number_with_known_length(  
430     cs.namespace(|| "magnify_a with bits"),  
     magnify_a,  
     FR_BIT_WIDTH - 2  
)?;
```

```
452 let lower_bound = CircuitElement::from_number_with_known_length(  
    cs.namespace(|| "lower_bound"),  
    quotient_mul_b,  
    FR_BIT_WIDTH - 2  
)?;
```

```
459 let upper_bound = CircuitElement::from_number_with_known_length(  
460     cs.namespace(|| "upper_bound"),  
     upper_bound,  
     FR_BIT_WIDTH - 2,  
)?;
```

CVF-44. INFO

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This function fails for inputs that are not unpacked values.

Recommendation Consider documenting it.

Client Comment We check if the value is packable as soon as the transaction enters layer2. Non-packable transactions will be returned.

```
550 pub fn pack_amount_with_exponent_and_mantissa<E: Engine, CS:  
        ConstraintSystem<E>>(  
        ↢
```



CVF-45. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Description There is no nonce overflow check here, while the circuit has such check. Thus, it is possible to generate a witness that cannot be proven.

Client Comment *We will do this checking in the state handler module. The Nonce type in the transaction is u32, so it cannot exceed 32bits. Therefore, you only need to check that the Nonce is not equal to u32::MAX.*

277 acc.nonce.add_assign(&Fr::one());

CVF-46. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Description There is no nonce overflow check here, while the circuit has such check. Thus, it is possible to generate a witness that cannot be proven.

Client Comment *We will do this checking in the state handler module.*

289 acc.nonce.add_assign(&Fr::one());

CVF-47. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** transfer.rs

Description There is no nonce overflow check here, while the circuit has such check. Thus, it is possible to generate a witness that cannot be proven.

Client Comment *We will do this checking in the state handler module.*

237 acc.nonce.add_assign(&Fr::one());



CVF-48. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the transfer to new TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct transfer to new TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
22 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
    ↪ ()); //8
```

CVF-49. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Description This extends serialized_tx_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the transfer to new TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct transfer to new TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
57 serialized_tx_bits.extend(tx_code.get_bits_be());
```

CVF-50. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the full exit TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct full exit TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
19 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
    ↪ ()); //1
```



CVF-51. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the transfer TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct transfer TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
23 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
    ↪());
```

CVF-52. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer.rs

Description This extends serialized_tx_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the transfer TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct transfer TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
49 serialized_tx_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.  
    ↪ get_bits_be());
```



CVF-53. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** allocated_structures.rs

Description The vector lengths are inconsistent with those set in 'operation.rs'.

Recommendation Consider using named constants and define those in a common file.

Client Comment Added constant.

```
346 ces_with_bool: vec![ce_with_bool; 2],  
ces_with_1_byte: vec![ce_with_1_byte; 7],  
ces_with_2_bytes: vec![ce_with_2_bytes.clone(); 7],  
ces_with_4_bytes: vec![ce_with_4_bytes; 15],  
350 ces_with_8_bytes: vec![ce_with_8_bytes; 4],  
ces_with_15_bytes: vec![ce_with_15_bytes; 2],  
ces_with_16_bytes: vec![ce_with_16_bytes.clone(); 12],  
ces_with_20_bytes: vec![ce_with_20_bytes; 3],  
ces_with_max_bytes: vec![ce_with_max_bytes; 1],  
fee_packed_ces: vec![ce_with_2_bytes; 2],  
fee_unpacked_ces: vec![ce_with_16_bytes.clone(); 2],  
amount_packed_ces: vec![ce_with_5_bytes; 5],  
amount_unpacked_ces: vec![ce_with_16_bytes; 5],
```

CVF-54. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** utils.rs

Description There is no check that the number of operations matches the number of pubdata chunks.

Recommendation Consider adding such a check.

Client Comment Since *NoOp* might be populated later, I considered adding a check on the number of *OperationUnits* and the length of pubdata in the *calculate_pubdata_commitment* function.

```
74 ops: Vec<OperationUnit<Engine>>,  
pubdata: Vec<bool>,
```



CVF-55. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Description This extends pubdata_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the forced exit TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct forced exit TX type.

Client Comment With `zk_link_ops` in `base_flags`, compare `global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type` with all `tx_type`.

```
24 pubdata_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.get_bits_be  
    ↪());
```

CVF-56. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Description There are no authorization checks for the initiator account. Does this mean that anybody may initiate a forced exit?

Client Comment Can only `ForcedExit` inactive accounts. The initiator can be anyone, considering that some smart contracts charge money to the second layer, but the smart contract has no private key, because it cannot be used as a `ChangePubKey`, the funds at the second layer cannot be referred to the first layer, so `forcedExit` is required. Refer to <https://preview-docs.zk.link/docs/developer/terminology/#forcedexit>.

```
26 pubdata_bits.extend(op_data[ForcedExitArgs::InitiatorAccountId].  
    ↪ get_bits_be());  
pubdata_bits.extend(op_data[ForcedExitArgs::InitiatorSubAccountId].  
    ↪ get_bits_be());
```

CVF-57. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Description This extends serialized_tx_bits with the current TX type, which could be different from the forced exit TX type.

Recommendation Consider extending with the correct forced exit TX type.

Client Comment With zk_link_ops in base_flags, compare global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type with all tx_type.

```
53    serialized_tx_bits.extend(global_variables.chunk_data.tx_type.  
    ↪ get_bits_be());
```

CVF-58. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Description There is no nonce overflow check here, while the circuit has such check. Thus, it is possible to generate a witness that cannot be proven.

Client Comment We will do this checking in the state handler module.

```
248 acc.nonce.add_assign(&Fr::one());
```

CVF-59. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** element.rs

Description There is no check to ensure that the length doesn't exceed the field capacity.

Recommendation Consider adding such a check.

Client Comment Added check.

```
11 pub fn unsafe_empty_of_some_length(zero_num: AllocatedNum<E>, length  
    ↪ : usize) -> Self {
```



8 Moderate Issues

CVF-60. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation Consider calling this function in each operation-specific call in order to distinguish between the two cases: when we have to check the prev.branch becomes post.branch, and when we do not

381 `fn contains_double_account_modules(&self) -> bool {`

CVF-61. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description Underflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider working with addition instead.

Client Comment I'm assuming underflow, and it doesn't pass the equal check. There is no token id as large as in the underflow case.

630 `let real_l1_token = Expression::from(op_data[CommonArgs::L1Token].
 → get_number()) - Expression::u64::<CS>(USDX_TOKEN_ID_RANGE as
 → u64);`



CVF-62. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** deposit.rs

Description These variables are not range-checked against the expected bitlengths.

Recommendation Consider asserting.

Client Comment *I don't think there are any overflow issues here, the data is handled by the state handler, and the type conversions are small to large.*

```
161 let account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(deposit.account_id as u64);
let global_account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(*GLOBAL_ASSET_ACCOUNT_ID as
    ↪ u64);
let chain_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(deposit.chain_id as u64);
let l1_source_token_fe = Fr::from_u64(deposit.l1_source_token as u64
    ↪ );
let l2_target_token_fe = Fr::from_u64(deposit.l2_target_token as u64
    ↪ );
let l1_source_token_after_mapping = Fr::from_u64(deposit.
    ↪ l1_source_token_after_mapping as u64);
let amount_as_field_element = Fr::from_big_uint(deposit.amount.into
    ↪ ());
```

CVF-63. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow

- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Overflow here may cause false positive.

Client Comment *There's not that much to overflow.*

```
670 Expression::from(op_data[OrderMatchingArgs::ExpectQuoteAmount].
    ↪ get_number()) +
    op_data[OrderMatchingArgs::ExpectBaseAmount].get_number(),
```



CVF-64. INFO

- **Category** Documentation

- **Source** deposit.rs

Description The same assignment was done for witness in chunk2 but not verified here.

Recommendation Consider explaining the inconsistency in the comment.

Client Comment *This is explained in the document <https://preview-docs.zk.link/docs/developer/terminology/#global-assets-account>, I will be right here to add a comment.*

```
97 chunk1_valid_flags.push(CircuitElement::equals(
    cs.namespace(|| "DepositArgs::ChainId == cur.sub_account_id in
        ↪ chunk1"),
    &op_data[DepositArgs::ChainId],
    &cur.sub_account_id,
)?);
```

CVF-65. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow

- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description These variables are not range-checked against the expected bitlengths.

Recommendation Consider asserting.

Client Comment *These checks are done in the state handler.*

```
148 let account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(change_pubkey_offcahin.account_id
    ↪ as u64);
let sub_account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(change_pubkey_offcahin.
    ↪ sub_account_id as u64);
150 let temp_account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(change_pubkey_offcahin.
    ↪ temp_account_id as u64);
let validator_account_id_fe = Fr::from_u64(*FEE_ACCOUNT_ID as u64);

153 let fee_token_fe = Fr::from_u64(change_pubkey_offcahin.fee_token as
    ↪ u64);
```

CVF-66. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This bit is always false when FR is 255 bits or shorter.

Client Comment *This is not always false, this bit is equivalent to the parity of the number.*

```
106 sig_r_packed_bits.push(signature_r_x_be_bits[FR_BIT_WIDTH_PADDED -  
    ↪ 1]);
```

CVF-67. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Conversion to a floating point number may loose precision, thus the unpacked number m, may differ from the original one.

Recommendation Consider replacing this strict check with a range check.

Client Comment *We check if the value is packable as soon as the transaction enters layer2. Non-packable transactions will be returned.*

```
584 let is_correct_a = CircuitElement::equals(  
    cs.namespace(|| "a != a_unpacked"),  
    a,  
    &a_unpacked,  
)?;
```

CVF-68. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** signature.rs

Recommendation Consider making this assumption explicit in the function documentation.

Client Comment *Adopted.*

```
370 // only order of R is checked. Public key and generator can be  
    ↪ guaranteed to be in proper group!
```



CVF-69. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer.rs

Description The same data is added twice.

Client Comment *This function has been deprecated.*

```
157 append_be_fixed_width(  
    &mut sig_bits,  
    &self.before.witness.account_witness.pub_key_hash.unwrap(),  
    NEW_PUBKEY_HASH_WIDTH,  
);  
160 append_be_fixed_width(  
    &mut sig_bits,  
    &self.before.witness.account_witness.pub_key_hash.unwrap(),  
    NEW_PUBKEY_HASH_WIDTH,  
);
```



CVF-70. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Description The signed data format for a transfer to new transaction differs from the signed data format for a transfer transaction. This means that the sender needs to choose between these two transaction types, rather than the operator. If two users sign two transfer to new transactions to the same new address, only one of these transaction could be successfully executed.

Recommendation Consider using the same signed data format for both transactions.

Client Comment *Although the transaction construction codes of Transfer and TransferToNew look different, in fact, every field and length are identical and one-to-one corresponding. In the actual construction, tx_type of TransferToNew will also be used as tx_code of Tranfer. This ensures that the Transfer transaction format is unique; This is because TransferToNew involves creating a new account and pubdata involves linking to NewAddress.*

```
57 serialized_tx_bits.extend(tx_code.get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(cur.account_id.get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(op_data[TransferToNewArgs::
    ↪ FromSubAccountId].get_bits_be());
60 serialized_tx_bits.extend(op_data[TransferToNewArgs::NewAddress] .
    ↪ get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(op_data[TransferToNewArgs::ToSubAccountId
    ↪ ].get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(cur.token.get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(op_data[TransferToNewArgs::AmountPacked] .
    ↪ get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(op_data[TransferToNewArgs::FeePacked] .
    ↪ get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(cur.account.nonce.get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(op_data[TransferToNewArgs::Timestamp] .
    ↪ get_bits_be());
```



CVF-71. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Description The full exit transaction doesn't update nonce, but still performs a nonce overflow check. This makes it impossible to withdraw funds from an account with maxed nonce.

Client Comment Removed.

```
56 chunk0_valid_flags.push(no_nonce_overflow(
    cs.namespace(|| "no nonce overflow"),
    cur.account.nonce.get_number(),
)?);
```

CVF-72. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Recommendation This check could have been done in the 'a>b' check for which the target balance should be 'a' and amount should be 'b'.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
82 let is_balance_lt_surplus = CircuitElement::less_than_fixed(
    cs.namespace(|| "is balance less than surplus" ),
    &user_balance,
    &op_data[FullExitArgs::TargetChainSurplus],
)?;
```

CVF-73. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Description These variables are not range-checked against the expected bitlengths.

Recommendation Consider asserting.

Client Comment *There are no overflow issues, and data out of bounds is checked by the state handler module and type serialization.*

```
204 let account_address_initiator_fe = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.  
    ↪ initiator_account_id as u64);  
let account_address_target_fe = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.  
    ↪ target_account_id as u64);  
let l2_source_token_fe = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.l2_source_token as  
    ↪ u64);  
let l1_target_token_fe = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.l1_target_token as  
    ↪ u64);  
let l1_target_token_after_mapping = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.  
    ↪ l1_target_token_after_mapping as u64);  
let fee_token_fe = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.fee_token as u64);  
210 let amount_as_field_element = Fr::from_big_uint(forced_exit.amount.  
    ↪ into());  
let target_sub_account_id = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.  
    ↪ target_sub_account_id as u64);  
let initiator_sub_account_id = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.  
    ↪ initiator_sub_account_id as u64);  
let chain_id = Fr::from_u64(forced_exit.chain_id as u64);
```

CVF-74. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** element.rs

Recommendation Should be "CAPACITY" instead of "NUM_BITS".

Client Comment *This should be NUM_BITS, and we should allow all possible values of SCALAR field to be accepted.*

```
82 assert!(witness_bits.len() <= E::Fr::NUM_BITS as usize);
```



CVF-75. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Description This should be done only when "is_success" is true.

Client Comment When *is_success* is false, *exit_amount* is None, and eventually *unwrap_or_default* is called, *exit_amount*=0, so I got rid of *is_success*.

221 | bal| bal.value.sub_assign(&full_exit.exit_amount),

9 Minor Issues

CVF-76. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** exit_circuit.rs

Description The way how a zero element is obtained is different from circuit.rs.

Recommendation Consider using the same approach in both circuits.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
26 let zero = AllocatedNum::zero(cs.namespace(|| "zero"))?;
```

CVF-77. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** exit_circuit.rs

Description Multiplication after division could lead to precision degradation.

Recommendation Consider multiplying before division.

Client Comment The 18 precision used here is high enough.

```
157 let withdraw_ratio = div_enforce(
```

```
163 let amount = multiply_enforce(
```

CVF-78. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** exit_circuit.rs

Description This constant is field specific.

Recommendation Consider naming it and putting into a common file.

Client Comment Added constant BN256_MASK.

```
339 hash_result[0] &= 0x1f; // temporary solution, this nullifies top  
    ↪ bits to be encoded into field element correctly
```



CVF-79. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation These numbers should be named constants.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
144 data[DepositOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
    data[TransferToNewOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
    data[WithdrawOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
    data[TransferOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
    data[FullExitOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
    data[ChangePubKeyOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
150 data[ForcedExitOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 2];
    data[OrderMatchingOp::OP_CODE as usize] = vec![zero.clone(); 3];
```

CVF-80. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description This doesn't guarantee that all the holders are actually allocated. Removing any of the lines 143..151 would break this check.

Client Comment This is just a basic op quantity check.

```
155 assert_eq!(pubdata_holder.len(),
    ↪ ALL_DIFFERENT_TRANSACTIONS_TYPE_NUMBER);
```

CVF-81. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation '7' should be a named constant.

Client Comment It's weird to use a constant for 7 here, but our goal is to only set the first byte to 1.

```
211 block_onchain_op_offset_bits.extend(vec![Boolean::constant(false);
    ↪ 7]);
```



CVF-82. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description Using 8 bits for a flag looks redundant.

Recommendation Consider using 1 bit per flag.

Client Comment *It's easier to use bytes in the contract.*

```
211 block_onchain_op_offset_bits.extend(vec![Boolean::constant(false);  
    ↪ 7]);
```

CVF-83. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description The variable name "pre_state_root" is very similar to the name of another variable: "prev_state_root".

Recommendation Consider using more distinct names.

Client Comment *Modified.*

```
261 let (pre_state_root, _, _) = check_account_data(
```

CVF-84. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation The name is confusing, as its value is actually the current chunk.

Client Comment *This is indeed the number used to describe the next chunk.*

```
408 next_chunk_number: &AllocatedNum<E>,
```



CVF-85. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation These functions can be precomputed for all operations

Client Comment *This function is defined by generics and cannot be precomputed.*

```
417 let max_chunks_powers = generate_powers(
    cs.namespace(|| "generate powers of max chunks"),
    tx_type.get_number(),
    ALL_DIFFERENT_TRANSACTIONS_TYPE_NUMBER,
)?;
420
let max_chunks_last_coeffs = generate_maxchunk_polynomial::<E>();
```

CVF-86. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation Consider refactoring the code so that the equality of (a,b) is not needed across op_data .

Client Comment *Not sure what the problem is here.*

```
582 let withdraw_second = multi_and(
    cs.namespace(|| "withdraw_second"),
    &[zk_link_ops[WithdrawOp::OP_CODE as usize].clone(),
      ↪ is_correct_chunk_numbers[1].clone()],
)?;
587 let skip_check_a_and_b = multi_or(
    cs.namespace(|| "skip_check_a_and_b"),
    &[
590     zk_link_ops[OrderMatchingOp::OP_CODE as usize].clone(),
     zk_link_ops[ForcedExitOp::OP_CODE as usize].clone(),
     withdraw_second,
    ],
);
```



CVF-87. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Description Here a constant is converted to a circuit element at run time.

Recommendation Consider doing at compile time.

Client Comment Adopted.

653 `let usdx_tokene_id_upper_bound = CircuitElement::
 ↪ from_fe_with_known_length()`

CVF-88. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant.

Client Comment Adopted.

656 8

CVF-89. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation The signature verification logic should be moved moved into a separate function.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
736 let public_generator = self
      .jubjub_params
      .generator(FixedGenerators::SpendingKeyGenerator);  
  
740 let generator = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
      cs.namespace(|| "allocate public generator"),
      Some(public_generator.clone()),
      self.jubjub_params,
)?;
let (public_generator_x, public_generator_y) = public_generator.
    ↪ into_xy();
generator.get_x().assert_number(
    cs.namespace(|| "assert generator x is constant"),
    &public_generator_x,
)?;
generator.get_y().assert_number(
    cs.namespace(|| "assert generator y is constant"),
    &public_generator_y,
)?;
let signer_key = unpack_point_if_possible(
    cs.namespace(|| "unpack pubkey"),
    &op.signer_pub_key_packed,
    self.rescue_params,
    self.jubjub_params,
)?;
760 let signature_data = verify_circuit_signature(
    cs.namespace(|| "verify circuit signature"),
    &op_data,
    &signer_key,
    &op.signature_data,
    self.rescue_params,
    self.jubjub_params,
    generator,
)?;
(Some(signer_key), Some(signature_data))
```



CVF-90. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant

Client Comment *This type is determined by generics and constant cannot be created.*

947 `&AllocatedNum::one::<CS>()`

CVF-91. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This can be replaced by a simple check of three variables being all equal to 0.

Client Comment *Adopted.*

1044 `let is_account_empty = {`

CVF-92. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This comment should be resolved or removed.

Client Comment *Removed.*

1083 `// TODO: Add AllocatedNum to leaf.`



CVF-93. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This function could be simplified. Just construct a series of polynomials P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n such that $P_i(i) = 1$, and $P_i(j) = 0$ for $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, i-1, i+1, \dots, n\}$. Then calculate the result as: $P_1(c)c_1 + P_2(c)c_2 + \dots + P_n(c)c_n$. Here c is the chunk number to select, and c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n are pubdata chunks.

Client Comment *The Recommendation approach does not save much constraint because: 1. The calculation of each polynomial requires a linear combination constraint 2. Calculate x^1, x^2, \dots, x^3 powers also require n constant constraints 3. $P_1(c)c_1 + P_2(c)c_2 + \dots + P_n(c)c_n$ requires n multiplicative constraints plus a linear combination. So it doesn't feel like it's reducing constraints.*

1173 `pub fn select_pubdata_chunk<E: JubjubEngine, CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(<--> >>()`

CVF-94. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This function could be simplified as: $\text{multi_or}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = (x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_n) \neq 0$

Client Comment *Rewritten, moved to utils.rs line 119.*

1207 `pub fn multi_or<E: JubjubEngine, CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(<--> >>()`

CVF-95. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This low-level utility function should be moved to some other file.

Client Comment *Moved to utils.rs line 119.*

1207 `pub fn multi_or<E: JubjubEngine, CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(<--> >>()`



CVF-96. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation These values could be precalculated.

Client Comment *This function is defined by generics and cannot be precomputed.*

```
1232 let empty_node_hashes = calculate_empty_account_tree_hashes::<E>(  
    ↳ params, tree_depth);
```

CVF-97. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** circuit.rs

Recommendation This function can be precomputed.

Client Comment *This function is defined by generics and cannot be precomputed.*

```
1258 fn generate_maxchunk_polynomial<E: JubjubEngine>() -> Vec<E::Fr> {
```

CVF-98. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** deposit.rs

Description Data loss is possible when converting types here.

Recommendation Consider using checked conversion.

Client Comment *There is no data loss here because both data are converted from a small type to a large type.*

```
33 l2_target_token: *deposit.tx.l2_target_token as u32,
```



CVF-99. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** deposit.rs

Description Here a variable name carries the data bitlength, which is a compile-time constant. If the constant changes then the variable name should change.

Recommendation Consider putting the expected bitlength into an immutable variable of the struct so that it can be matched with the provided bitlength.

```
47 &self.args.frs_with_1_byte[0].unwrap(),
```

```
62 &self.args.frs_with_2_bytes[1].unwrap(),
```

```
67 &self.args.frs_with_2_bytes[0].unwrap(),
```

```
72 &self.args.frs_with_16_bytes[0].unwrap(),
```

```
78 &self.args.frs_with_20_bytes[0].unwrap(),
```

CVF-100. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** deposit.rs

Recommendation This constant should be named.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
90 let mut commitment = vec![false; DepositOp::CHUNKS * 8];
```

CVF-101. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming

- **Source** deposit.rs

Recommendation Constant 0 should be named.

```
195 get_audits(tree, *GLOBAL_ASSET_ACCOUNT_ID, deposit.chain_id, deposit
    ↵ .l1_source_token_after_mapping, 0);
```

```
204 (deposit.chain_id, deposit.l1_source_token_after_mapping, 0),
```



CVF-102. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** deposit.rs

Recommendation Consider removing this data.

Client Comment Removed.

```
272 frs_with_8_bytes: vec![ // need or not
    Some(Fr::zero()), Some(Fr::from_u64(u32::MAX as u64))
].into(),
```

CVF-103. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Description Outputting not an actual nonce seems odd.

Recommendation Consider always outputting the signed nonce

Client Comment Considering.

```
37 pubdata_bits.extend(nonce.get_bits_be()); // NONCE_BIT = 32
```

CVF-104. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Recommendation This comment looks incorrect

```
66 serialized_withdraw_bits.extend(op_data[WithdrawArgs::IsFastWithdraw
    ↵ ].clone().into_padded_be_bits(8)); //ETH_ADDRESS=160
```



CVF-105. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant.

Client Comment Added constant ORDERS_BIT_WIDTH.

```
106 orders_bits.resize(1424, Boolean::constant(false));
```

CVF-106. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Recommendation nonece → nonce

```
183 let select_order_nonece = CircuitElement::conditionally_select(
```

CVF-107. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Recommendation The variable name is misleading as it covers chunks zero and one, rather than just zero.

```
261 let is_sub_account_correct_in_chunk_0 = multi_and(
```

CVF-108. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** order_matching.rs

Recommendation These two flags could be merged into one that is calculated for the chunks 0, 1, and 2.

Client Comment *The feeling here is that chunk2 cannot be merged into chunk 1 or 2, and the situation is different.*

```
261 let is_sub_account_correct_in_chunk_0 = multi_and(
```

```
265 let is_sub_account_correct_in_chunk_2 = multi_and(
```

CVF-109. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior

- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Should it be 'chunk0, 3'?

```
307 cs.namespace(|| "select post token in chunk0-2"),
```

CVF-110. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior

- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description This variable is always true as two flags may never be equal due to 'matching_trading_relationship' flag enforcement.

Client Comment Fixed `MakerIsSell` to `MakerSlotId`. Fixed `TakerIsSell` to `TakerSlotId`.

```
337 let is_different_slot = CircuitElement::equals(
    cs.namespace(|| "is different slot"),
    &op_data[OrderMatchingArgs::MakerIsSell],
    &op_data[OrderMatchingArgs::TakerIsSell],
)? .not();
```



CVF-111. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description This is always equal to is_self_swap (see above)

```
342 let is_self_swap_and_different_slot = Boolean::and(
```

CVF-112. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description This is always true (see above)

```
347 boolean_or(
    cs.namespace(|| "if is_self_swap {is_different_slot}"),
    &is_self_swap_and_different_slot,
    &is_self_swap.not()
)?
```

CVF-113. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description There is no need to check this in every chunk.

Recommendation Consider checking only in one chunk.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
395 base_flags.push(is_price_ok.clone());
```



CVF-114. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** deposit.rs

Recommendation Constant DepositOp::CHUNKS should be used here.

Client Comment Considering.

134 `&[is_chunk0_valid, is_chunk1_valid, is_chunk2_valid,
 ↳ is_correct_chunk_numbers[3].clone()],`

CVF-115. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description The role of this field is unclear.

Recommendation Consider documenting.

Client Comment Removed.

7 `pub temp_account_id: u32,`

CVF-116. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description Data loss is possible when converting types here.

Recommendation Consider using checked conversion.

Client Comment There is no data loss here because both data are converted from a small type to a large type.

40 `fee_token: *change_pubkey_offchain.tx.fee_token as u32,`

42 `nonce: Fr::from_u64(*change_pubkey_offchain.tx.nonce as u64),`



CVF-117. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Recommendation The indices should be named constants, or there should be a diagram in the code explaining why these elements are selected.

```
54     &self.args.frs_with_1_byte[0].unwrap(),  
59     &self.args.frs_with_4_bytes[1].unwrap(),  
64     &self.args.frs_with_1_byte[1].unwrap(),  
69     &self.args.frs_with_20_bytes[0].unwrap(),  
74     &self.args.frs_with_20_bytes[1].unwrap(),  
79     &self.args.frs_with_4_bytes[2].unwrap(),  
89     &self.args.fees_packed[0].unwrap(),  
102    let mut commitment = vec![false; ChangePubKeyOp::CHUNKS * 8];  
           commitment[7] = true;
```

CVF-118. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Description Here a variable name carries the data bitlength, which is a compile-time constant. If the constant changes then the variable name should change.

Recommendation Consider putting the expected bitlength into an immutable variable of the struct so that it can be matched with the provided bitlength

```
54 &self.args.frs_with_1_byte[0].unwrap(),  
CHAIN_ID_BIT_WIDTH
```

```
59 &self.args.frs_with_4_bytes[1].unwrap(),  
60 ACCOUNT_ID_BIT_WIDTH,
```

```
64 &self.args.frs_with_1_byte[1].unwrap(),  
SUB_ACCOUNT_ID_BIT_WIDTH,
```

```
69 &self.args.frs_with_20_bytes[0].unwrap(),  
70 NEW_PUBKEY_HASH_WIDTH,
```

```
74 &self.args.frs_with_20_bytes[1].unwrap(),  
ETH_ADDRESS_BIT_WIDTH,
```

```
79 &self.args.frs_with_4_bytes[2].unwrap(),  
80 NONCE_BIT_WIDTH,
```

CVF-119. INFO

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Recommendation Should be 'change_pubkey_offchain'.

Client Comment *Here it feels unnecessary, ChangePubkeyOffChainData is ChangePubkeyOffChainOp to ChangePubkeyOffChainDataWitness an intermediate product.*

```
143 change_pubkey_offchain: ChangePubkeyOffChainData,
```



CVF-120. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** change_pubkey_offchain.rs

Recommendation This flag is redundant. Just do: cur.balance = conditionally_select (balance - fee, conditionally_select (balance + fee, cur.balance, is_chunk1), is_chunk_0);

Client Comment Adopted.

```
151 let is_valid_first_or_second = boolean_or(
```

CVF-121. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation This issue should be removed or resolved

Client Comment Removed.

```
68 // TODO: handle the case where it is not valid (ZKS-101)
// if !is_valid_signature {
70 //     return None;
// }
```

CVF-122. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Reversing twice is suboptimal.

Recommendation Consider refactoring

Client Comment Optimized.

```
90 signature_r_x_be_bits.reverse();
96 signature_r_x_be_bits.reverse();
98 signature_r_y_be_bits.reverse();
104 signature_r_y_be_bits.reverse();
```



CVF-123. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This code largely duplicates that of 'sign_sha256' function.

Recommendation Consider refactoring.

Client Comment Removed.

124 `pub fn sign_sha<E>()`

CVF-124. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation This function could be simplified as: $\text{multi_and } (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = (x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_n == n)$

Client Comment Rewritten.

168 `pub fn multi_and<E: Engine, CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>()`

CVF-125. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider adding an explicit overflow check.

Client Comment If this overflows, the unwrap will panic.

258 `E::Fr::from_str(&product.to_string()).unwrap()`



CVF-126. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider adding an explicit overflow check.

Client Comment *If this overflows, the unwrap will panic.*

272 `E::Fr::from_str("ient.to_string()).unwrap()`

CVF-127. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** utils.rs

Description 'b' plays no role in the computation. Is it ok?

Client Comment *b is going to be involved, but b and a are both amplified values.*

317 `let product = a.get_number().mul(`

CVF-128. INFO

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation Consider documenting that the caller must ensure that precision is not too high

Client Comment *So far, we have layer2 with an accuracy of 18.*

417 `precision:u64`



CVF-129. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Description Data loss is possible when converting types here.

Recommendation Consider using checked conversion.

Client Comment *Token is u16, there is no loss when converted to u32.*

```
36 token: *transfer_to_new.tx.token as u32,
```

CVF-130. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Recommendation This constant must be named.

Client Comment *Removed this function.*

```
182 &Fr::from_u64(5u64), //Corresponding tx_type
```

CVF-131. INFO

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Recommendation Subtracting the sum would be more readable.

Client Comment *The values here are all values that have been processed by the state handler. If you subtract a negative number, the state handler will return an insufficient balance error.*

```
280 bal.value.sub_assign(&amount_as_field_element);  
bal.value.sub_assign(&fee_as_field_element);
```



CVF-132. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** transfer_to_new.rs

Recommendation Should be u32

Client Comment *This is just because from_u64 requires a u64 parameter.*

```
401 Some(Fr::from_u64(transfer_to_new.ts as u64)),
```

CVF-133. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** signature.rs

Description This bit is packed_key[248]. Why is called r_x_bit?

Client Comment *This bit is packed_key[256].*

```
41 let r_x_bit =
    AllocatedBit::alloc(cs.namespace(|| "r_x_bit"),
        ↳ packed_key_bits_correct_order[0])?;
```

CVF-134. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** signature.rs

Description This drops elements 248 and 249 of the original array. Is this okay?

Client Comment *The elements 248 and 249 of the original array are not dropped E::Fr::NUM_BITS=253(bn256).*

```
46 let r_y = CircuitElement::from_witness_be_bits(
    cs.namespace(|| "signature_r_y from bits"),
    &packed_key_bits_correct_order[start_of_y..],
)?:
```



CVF-135. FIXED

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** signature.rs

Recommendation Consider renaming.

Client Comment Modified.

```
290 let hash_input = multipack::pack_into_witness(
```

CVF-136. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** signature.rs

Recommendation Truncating two output elements to halves does not make sense. It suffices to just take one element and use its bits.

Client Comment In the essence we perform modular reduction, so to ensure uniformity we only take half of the bits, so non-uniformity is around $1 / (\text{char} / (\text{E::Fs::CAPACITY} / 2))$ that is around $1/2^{126}$.

```
313 let s0 = sponge.squeeze_out_single(
    cs.namespace(|| "squeeze first word form sponge"),
    &rescue_params,
)?;

let s1 = sponge.squeeze_out_single(
    cs.namespace(|| "squeeze second word form sponge"),
    &rescue_params,
)?;

let s0_bits =
    s0.into_bits_le_strict(cs.namespace(|| "make bits of first word
        ↪ for FS challenge"))?;
let s1_bits =
    s1.into_bits_le_strict(cs.namespace(|| "make bits of second word
        ↪ for FS challenge"))?;

let take_bits = (<E as JubjubEngine>::Fs::CAPACITY / 2) as usize;

330 let mut bits = Vec::with_capacity(<E as JubjubEngine>::Fs::CAPACITY
    ↪ as usize);
bits.extend_from_slice(&s0_bits[0..take_bits]);
bits.extend_from_slice(&s1_bits[0..take_bits]);
assert!(bits.len() == E::Fs::CAPACITY as usize);
```



CVF-137. INFO

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** withdraw.rs

Recommendation Subtracting the sum would be more readable.

Client Comment *The values here are all values that have been processed by the state handler. If you subtract a negative number, the state handler will return an insufficient balance error.*

```
292 bal.value.sub_assign(&amount_as_field_element);  
bal.value.sub_assign(&fee_as_field_element);
```

CVF-138. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** transfer.rs

Description Seems this function is not used anywhere

Client Comment *Removed this function.*

```
140 pub fn get_sig_bits(&self) -> Vec<bool> {
```

CVF-139. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** transfer.rs

Recommendation This should be a named constant

Client Comment *Removed this function.*

```
144 &Fr::from_u64(5u64), //Corresponding tx_type
```

CVF-140. INFO

- **Category** Readability
- **Source** transfer.rs

Recommendation Subtracting the sum would be more readable.

Client Comment *The values here are all values that have been processed by the state handler. If you subtract a negative number, the state handler will return an insufficient balance error.*

```
240 bal.value.sub_assign(&amount_as_field_element);  
bal.value.sub_assign(&fee_as_field_element);
```

CVF-141. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Recommendation Consider using designated types for that.

Client Comment *Considering.*

```
5 pub account: u32,  
pub sub_account_id: u8,  
pub slot_id: u32,  
pub nonce: u32,  
pub amount: u128,  
10 pub price: u128,  
pub is_sell: u8,  
pub fee_ratio1: u8,  
pub fee_ratio2: u8,
```

```
36 pub sub_account_id: u8,  
pub tokens: (u32, u32),  
pub fee: u128,  
pub fee_token: u32,  
40 pub submitter: u32,
```

```
43 pub is_refresh_order: (u8, u8),
```



CVF-142. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description Data loss is possible when converting types here.

Recommendation Consider using checked conversion.

Client Comment *There is no data loss here because both data are converted from a small type to a large type.*

```
68 submitter: *order_matching.submitter as u32,  
73     *order_matching.tx.maker.base_token_id as u32,  
         *order_matching.tx.taker.quote_token_id as u32,  
77 fee_token: *order_matching.tx.fee_token as u32,
```

CVF-143. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Recommendation These code blocks could be significantly simplified by calculating $\min(\text{residue1}, \text{residue2})$.

Client Comment Adopted and optimized.

```
282 if residue1 < residue2 {  
    let actual_exchanged = residue1  
        .checked_mul(&maker.price.into())?  
        .checked_div(&precision_magnified)?;  
    (Fr::from_big_uint(residue1), Fr::from_big_uint(actual_exchanged  
        ↪ ))  
} else {  
    let actual_exchanged = residue2  
        .checked_mul(&maker.price.into())?  
        .checked_div(&precision_magnified)?;  
    (Fr::from_big_uint(residue2), Fr::from_big_uint(actual_exchanged  
        ↪ ))  
}  
  
294 if residue1 < residue2 {  
    let actual_exchanged = residue1  
        .checked_mul(&maker.price.into())?  
        .checked_div(&precision_magnified)?;  
    (Fr::from_big_uint(actual_exchanged), Fr::from_big_uint(residue1  
        ↪ ))  
} else {  
    let actual_exchanged = residue2  
        .checked_mul(&maker.price.into())?  
        .checked_div(&precision_magnified)?;  
    (Fr::from_big_uint(actual_exchanged), Fr::from_big_uint(residue2  
        ↪ ))  
}
```



CVF-144. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description These parameters are not used.

Recommendation Consider removing them.

Client Comment *It is used on line 655.*

```
314 let maker_fee_ratio2_fe = Fr::from_u64(matching.maker.fee_ratio2 as
    ↪ u64);
let taker_fee_ratio1_fe = Fr::from_u64(matching.taker.fee_ratio1 as
    ↪ u64);
```

CVF-145. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** order_matching.rs

Description We did not review this function

Client Comment *crypto/src/circuit/account.rs line 136*

```
390 ord.update()
```

```
426 ord.update()
```

CVF-146. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Recommendation The "not" call is redundant here. Just interchange the values to be selected.

Client Comment *The recommended changes require modifying the function entry or creating a new zero variable with 128bits, which increases the circuit overhead.*

```
78 Expression::constant::<CS>(E::Fr::zero()),
&cur.balance,
80 &is_address_correct.not(),
```



CVF-147. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** operation.rs

Recommendation The vector lengths should be named constants.

Client Comment Adopted, added constant.

```
139 pub frs_with_bool: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 2>,
140 pub frs_with_1_byte: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 7>,
    pub frs_with_2_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 3>,
    pub frs_with_4_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 5>,
    pub frs_with_8_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 4>,
    pub frs_with_15_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 2>,
    pub frs_with_16_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 5>,
    pub frs_with_20_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 2>,
    pub frs_with_max_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 1>,
150 pub fees_packed: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 1>,
    pub amounts_packed: ArgumentsWithSameLength<E, 2>,
```

CVF-148. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** allocated_structures.rs

Recommendation Consider asserting that the constants are not too big to make an overflow.

Client Comment The constant in the circuit means that once it is set, it cannot be changed unless the verification key is upgraded in the contract.

```
146 sub_account_id.get_number().mul(
147 )?.add(
148 sub_account_id.get_number().mul(
149 )?.add(
```



CVF-149. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** allocated_structures.rs

Description This function is superseded with the "convert_amounts" function.

Recommendation Consider removing this function or refactoring the code to avoid duplication.

Client Comment Removed.

391 `fn get_amounts<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>()`

CVF-150. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** utils.rs

Description The semantics of this argument is unclear.

Recommendation Consider documenting.

Client Comment Adopted.

76 `offset_commitment: Vec<bool>,`

CVF-151. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation These extensions could be done once after the loop. Just calculate the correct numbers of elements to be appended.

Client Comment Adopted.

94 `self.pubdata.extend(vec![false; CHUNK_BIT_WIDTH]);
self.offset_commitment.extend(vec![false; 8])`

CVF-152. INFO

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** utils.rs

Description Overflow may be possible here.

Recommendation Consider asserting that no information is lost after truncation

Client Comment *I don't think there are any overflow issues here, the data is handled by the state handler, and the type conversions are small to large.*

```
121     Some(Fr::from_u64(*self.fee_account_id as u64)),  
     Some(Fr::from_u64(*self.block_number as u64)),  
  
151     block_number: Some(Fr::from_u64(*self.block_number as u64)),  
     block_timestamp: Some(Fr::from_u64(self.timestamp)),  
     validator_address: Some(Fr::from_u64(*self.fee_account_id as  
     ↪ u64)),  
  
413 let slot_id = calculate_actual_slot(sub_account_id.into(), slot_id.  
     ↪ into()).0 as u32;  
  
464 let mut balance = validator_leaf.subtree.remove(*actual_token as u32  
     ↪ ).unwrap_or_default();  
  
466 validator_leaf.subtree.insert(*actual_token as u32, balance);
```

CVF-153. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation This code should probably be removed

Client Comment Adopted.

```
159 pub fn generate_dummy_sig_data(
160     bits: &[bool],
161     rescue_hasher: &RescueHasher<Bn256>,
162     rescue_params: &Bn256RescueParams,
163     jubjub_params: &AltJubjubBn256,
164 ) -> (SignatureData, Fr, Fr, Fr, Fr, Fr) {
165     let rng = &mut XorShiftRng::from_seed([0x3dbe_6258, 0x8d31_3d76,
166         ↪ 0x3237_db17, 0xe5bc_0654]);
167     let p_g = FixedGenerators::SpendingKeyGenerator;
168     let private_key = PrivateKey::<Bn256>(rng.gen());
169     let sender_pk = PublicKey::from_private(&private_key, p_g, &
170         ↪ jubjub_params);
171     let (sender_x, sender_y) = sender_pk.0.into_xy();
172     let mut sig_bits_to_hash = bits.to_vec();
173     assert!(sig_bits_to_hash.len() <= MAX_CIRCUIT_MSG_HASH_BITS);

174     sig_bits_to_hash.resize(MAX_CIRCUIT_MSG_HASH_BITS, false);
175     let (first_sig_part_bits, remaining) = sig_bits_to_hash.split_at
176         ↪ (Fr::CAPACITY as usize);
177     let remaining = remaining.to_vec();
178     let (second_sig_part_bits, third_sig_part_bits) = remaining.
179         ↪ split_at(Fr::CAPACITY as usize);
180     let first_sig_part: Fr = le_bit_vector_into_field_element(&
181         ↪ first_sig_part_bits);
182     let second_sig_part: Fr = le_bit_vector_into_field_element(&
183         ↪ second_sig_part_bits);
184     let third_sig_part: Fr = le_bit_vector_into_field_element(&
185         ↪ third_sig_part_bits);
186     let sig_msg = rescue_hasher.hash_bits(sig_bits_to_hash.clone());
187     let mut sig_bits: Vec<bool> = BitIterator::new(sig_msg.into_repr
188         ↪ ()).collect();
189     sig_bits.reverse();
190     sig_bits.resize(256, false);
```



CVF-154. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation These two lines could be replaced with a single "resize_grow_only" call.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
198 assert!(sig_bits_to_hash.len() <= MAX_CIRCUIT_MSG_HASH_BITS);  
200 sig_bits_to_hash.resize(MAX_CIRCUIT_MSG_HASH_BITS, false);
```

CVF-155. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Description This code assumes the field size fits 256 bits, which may not be the case in the future.

Recommendation Consider asserting it explicitly in the code.

Client Comment Fixed, and added constant.

```
225 public_data_initial_bits.extend(vec![false; 256 - block_number_bits.  
    ↪ len()]);
231 public_data_initial_bits.extend(vec![false; 256 - validator_id_bits.  
    ↪ len()]);
242 let mut packed_old_root_bits = vec![false; 256 - old_root_bits.len()  
    ↪ ];
249 let mut packed_new_root_bits = vec![false; 256 - new_root_bits.len()  
    ↪ ];
256 let mut timestamp_bits = vec![false; 256 - timestamp_unpadded_bits.  
    ↪ len()];
532     let signer_pub_key_packed = vec![Some(false); 256];
```



CVF-156. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation Designated types from tx::* should be used here.

Client Comment Considering.

```
312 account_id: u32,  
      sub_account_id: u8,  
      token: u32,  
      slot_id: u32,
```

```
347 token: u32,
```

```
381 account_address: u32,  
      slot_number: u32,
```

```
395 account_id: u32,  
      (sub_account_id, token_id, slot_id): (u8, u32, u32),
```

```
453 validator_address: u32,  
      token: u32,  
      fee: u128,
```

CVF-157. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation 32 should be a named constant

Client Comment I think adding a comment is fine, since most regular signature rs are 32 bytes long.

```
499 let (r_bytes, s_bytes) = sig_bytes.split_at(32);
```



CVF-158. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** utils.rs

Recommendation Consider moving this code to tests.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
643 // Provides a vector of copies of this `SigDataInput` object, all
    // → with one field
    // set to incorrect value.
    // Used for circuit tests.
pub fn corrupted_variations(&self) -> Vec<Self> {
```

CVF-159. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Recommendation op_data elements can be used here as they are checked against pre_branch in the code.

Client Comment It is possible for each OperationUint to be executed on a different account, so it is appropriate to use pre_branch here.

```
55 serialized_tx_bits.extend(pre_branch.account_id.get_bits_be());
serialized_tx_bits.extend(pre_branch.sub_account_id.get_bits_be());
```

CVF-160. INFO

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** forced_exit.rs

Recommendation Consider explaining in the doc why 'a' is computed correctly for this chunk.

Client Comment Since we checked that op_data.a should be greater than or equal to op_data.b before executing all op, to ensure that the user balance would be greater than the amount deducted in the subsequent execution of multiple op, so we need to do an additional constraint check that the user balance is consistent with op_data.a.

```
120 chunk1_valid_flags.push(is_a_correct);
```



CVF-161. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** serialization.rs

Recommendation All lengths must be global named constants.

Client Comment Adopted, added constant.

```
115 pub frs_with_bool: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 2>,  
117 pub frs_with_1_byte: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 7>,  
119 pub frs_with_2_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 3>,  
121 pub frs_with_4_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 5>,  
123 pub frs_with_8_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 4>,  
125 pub frs_with_15_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 2>,  
127 pub frs_with_16_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 5>,  
129 pub frs_with_20_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 2>,  
131 pub frs_with_max_bytes: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 1>,  
134 pub fees_packed: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 1>,  
136 pub amounts_packed: ArgumentsWithSameLength<Engine, 2>,
```

CVF-162. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** element.rs

Recommendation Consider implementing this function on top of the "into_padded_le_bits" function.

Client Comment Adopted.

```
28 pub fn into_padded_be_bits(self, to_length: usize) -> Vec<Boolean> {
```



CVF-163. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** element.rs

Description Due to this commented line data loss is possible.

Recommendation Consider either uncommenting this or adding the word "unsafe" to the name of the function to distinguish it from a very similar function "into_padded_le_bits".

Client Comment Adopted.

30 `// assert!(to_length >= bits.len());`

CVF-164. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** element.rs

Description This check seems redundant, as self.length was already checked.

Recommendation Consider removing this check.

Client Comment Adopted.

41 `assert!(n >= padded_bits.len());`

CVF-165. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** element.rs

Description This comment is unclear.

Recommendation Consider elaborating more.

Client Comment *The comment and the following two lines of code have been removed because bits vector is originally E::Fr::NUM_BITS long.*

124 `// this is safe due to "constants"`



CVF-166. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** element.rs

Description This comment seems to be incorrect.

Client Comment Modified to "chosen number as ce".

207 `cs.namespace(|| "chosen nonce"),`

CVF-167. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** element.rs

Description Converting numbers via string looks weird.

Recommendation Consider implementing a more elegant approach.

Client Comment Initialized the calculation with the `BigUint` type.

311 `let two = E::Fr::from_str("2").unwrap();
let power = E::Fr::from_str(&length.to_string()).unwrap();`

CVF-168. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** element.rs

Recommendation The function could be simplified by removing this line.

Client Comment Initialized the calculation with the `BigUint` type.

339 `base.sub_assign(&E::Fr::one());`



CVF-169. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Recommendation Consider using dedicated data types for these fields.

Client Comment Considering.

```
4 pub l2_source_token: u32,  
pub l1_target_token: u32,  
pub l1_target_token_after_mapping: u32,  
pub account_id: u32,  
pub to_chain_id: u8,  
pub sub_account_id: u8,
```

CVF-170. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** full_exit.rs

Recommendation The '7' constant must be named.

Client Comment It's weird to use a constant for 7 here, but our goal is to only set the first byte to 1.

```
96 commitment[7] = true;
```



ABDK Consulting

About us

Established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function.

The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.

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