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| FINAL REPORT **Software Testing and Quality Assurance** |

by

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Section: A

**1. Introduction**

This report documents the security testing conducted on the orangehrm software with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities through various test cases. The goal of this testing is to identify different weaknesses of the software against various security attacks.

**2. Tools Overview**

Initially, the *OWASP ZAP* (Zed Attack Proxy) tool was selected to conducted the security testing. ZAP is a widely recognized open-source application that is used as a security scanner. It is a highly extensible tool that supports range of plugins and scripts. Primarily it includes features like:

* *Automated scanning*
* *Interception proxy*
* *Web crawler*
* *Fuzzer*
* *Token extractor*
* Query decoder
* *Script engines*, and many more.

However, it still lacks features to generate attacks like *MITM*, Address spoofing, *ARP poisoning*, etc. Thus for testing, another tool named *Ettercap* was selected which includes attacks such as:

* *ARP poisoning*
* NDP poisoning
* DHCP spoofing
* port stealing
* SSL intercepting, etc.

**3. Test Cases Overview**

A list of conducted security test cases are as listed below:

**TC01.** To check unauthorized update of users’ info (ZAP)

**TC02.** To view other users’ personal info  as non-admin user (ZAP)

**TC03.** To check add employee feature with malicious entries (Manual)

**TC04.** To insert with improper file name to do Path Traversal Attacks (Manual)

**TC05.** To upload vulnerable XSS payloads in the file attachment (ZAP)

**TC06.** To check SQL injection vulnerability in the login functionalities (ZAP)

**TC07.** To check for bruteforce attempts vulnerability in the login functionalities (ZAP)

**TC08.** To check the access control to the users for *candidates’* application (ZAP)

**TC09.** To perform the purge action to all users and vacancy posts (Ettercap)

**TC10.** To perform the purge action to all users and vacancy posts (ZAP)

**TC11.** To validate input sanitization in user registration forms (Manual)

**TC12.** To test for session expiration after logout (ZAP)

**TC13.** To verify that file uploads are restricted to allowed types only (Manual)

**TC14.** To verify that audit logs are not accessible to unauthorized users (Manual)

**TC15.** To test SQL injection in the *search* functionalities (ZAP)

**TC16.** To check for CSRF protection on sensitive form submissions (ZAP)

**TC17.** To validate that user roles cannot be overlooked through URL access (Manual)

**4. Details on Each Test Cases**

**TC01: To check unauthorized update of users’ info:**

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| **Goal** | In PIM module, under Employee Information tab, all of the info about an employee can be seen (and as admin: can be modified). Goal is to check that by intercepting ongoing request-response action, and then modifying the request (as a non-admin user) if anyone can update other user’s information. |
| Steps | * Start ZAP as a proxy. * Log in as a non-admin user. * Go to the PIM section in *orangehrm* and access the employee list. * Capture the request to access user information in ZAP. * Modify the request (header) to attempt an unauthorized update of another user's info. * Make a *POST* request * Resend the modified request. * Observe the response in ZAP |
| Expectation | Non-admin users should not be able to update any information of other users. |
| Observation | Non-admin users cannot update any information of other users. It is only possible by the user himself and the admin. |
| Risk | None |

**TC02.** To view other users’ personal info  as non-admin user

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| **Goal** | This is somewhat similar to TC01, but here instead of trying to modify information (which failed), it was checked if the (private) information such as joining dates, addresses, contact numbers, or user names can be seen as a non-admin user. |
| Steps | * Start ZAP as a proxy. * Log in as a non-admin user. * Go to the PIM section in *orangehrm* and access the employee list. * Capture the request to access user information in ZAP. * Modify the request and make a *GET* request * Resend the modified request. * Observe the response in ZAP |
| Expectation | Non-admin users should not be able to view any private information of other users. |
| Observation | Although the response returned 200 OK, The information was not visible while logged in as a non-admin user. |
| Risk | None |

**TC03.** To check add employee feature with malicious entries

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| **Goal** | Here, it was check whether the system supports malicious entries as First/Middle/Last name in the *Add Employee* option. This action (adding employee) can only be done by Admin, so the goal was to check if malicious entries (or inappropriate ones) can be put in the these fields. |
| Steps | * Login as Admin * Go to PIM * Select Add Employee option * Put malicious (or odd) code as name entries in the fields * Try to create employee * Check if system throws any warming. |
| Expectation | The application should have rejected the user creation attempt with inappropriate entries such as scripts, code, or any link. |
| Observation | It is observed that the system allows such entries in this module (though it was not allowed in the registration option). |
| Risk | Yes |

**TC04.** To insert with improper file name to do Path Traversal Attacks

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| **Goal** | Target for this test case is to make a Path Traversal Attack by modifying uploaded file’s name. If it is successful, then whenever a file is uploaded, it should redirect to another path (in this case to the profile menu, see 5th step) immediately. |
| Steps | * Start ZAP as a proxy. * Go to My Info → Personal Details * Click on profile icon * Upload a valid image (jpg/png) * Intercept the request in ZAP and modify the filename to “../../../empNumber/1” * Check if it is updated |
| Expectation | File name should not be changed as file path fashion, rather should have sanitation mechanism so that it prevents from renaming them to inappropriate names. |
| Observation | File Name is not changed. Put request was unmodified |
| Risk | None |

**TC05.** To upload vulnerable XSS payloads in the file attachment

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| **Goal** | Similar to TC04, this test was also designed for testing file upload criteria in the My Info module. Target for this test case is to upload a XSS script as executable file. |
| Steps | * Start ZAP as a proxy. * Go to My Info → Personal Details * Select Add Attachment option * Upload an XSS file * Check if it is uploaded |
| Expectation | Executable files should not be allowed to be uploaded |
| Observation | Executable files are not allowed. |
| Risk | None |

**TC06.** To check SQL injection vulnerability in the login functionalities

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| **Goal** | Goal for this TC was to verify if the application is secure against SQL injection attacks during login. |
| Steps | * Start ZAP proxy browser (top right) * Go to the login page * Try a login with any username/password (as we need the request header) * Intercept request, and get the parameter name * Modify the request in *Repeater* * Put different SQL injection queries * Tested ones: *admin’ --; admin' OR '1'=';, SELECT \* FROM user WHERE name = 'Admin' OR 1=1;* * Keep the other entries empty in the request Repeater |
| Expectation | SQL injections should not be allowed |
| Observation | SQL injections are not allowed in the login module. |
| Risk | None |

**TC07.** To check for bruteforce attempts vulnerability in the login functionalities

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| **Goal** | In this test case, vulnerability against bruteforce attack was evaluated. It was also done on login module. The plan was that: first a know username has to be present, then using that name, multiple attempts on password will be carried out. Although it is obvious that it will be nearly impossible to hit a correct pswd (as pswd is 8=< chars long with upper/lower case, and special character constrains), so what actually was check is the response from the site after sending multiple attempts from the same username. |
| Steps | * Start ZAP proxy browser (top right) * Go to the login page * Put valid username in the username field (but keep password black) * Get a login request in ZAP * Open Intruder → Positions → Payloads * Add 8-digit passwords in the Payloads tab (or import in a txt file) * Select attack type as Sniper (to avoid ram issue) |
| Expectation | Multiple attempts from same username should provide different response (like “try again”, or “account locked”, or “contact admin”, or something of that sorts. |
| Observation | No response from the site was noted even after multiple (10 actually) attempts. The site seemed to allow these attempts without flagging any warning. |
| Risk | Yes |

**TC08.** To check the access control to the users for *candidates’* application

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| **Goal** | For this test case, it was check whether access control in in the *Recruitment* module can be altered. The Recruitment module contains Candidates and Vacancies options where hiring manager (could be any user) makes post mentioning the job title, description, etc as vacancy posts. On the other hand, the candidates makes application to those posts. When done, the hiring manager can short-list/reject the applicant. Now target for this test case is to see if it is possible to non-hiring managers (i.e., normal user/candidates) can alter this application system (e.g. reject it, or short-list it) themselves. |
| Steps | * Login as hiring manager * Make vacancy post * Login as normal user (i.e., as a candidate) * Apply for the post * Log out * Get the url of hiring manager (’s Recruitment module) * Try to short-list/reject the applications |
| Expectation | Applications should be short-listed/rejected only by the respective hiring managers |
| Observation | Only the hiring manager and the admin can short-list/reject the applicants. |
| Risk | None (however the admin should not be allowed to short-list/reject the applicants); Besides no log file was generated so it cannot be said if it is the admin or the hiring manager who short-list/reject the applicants |

**TC09.** To perform the purge action to all users and vacancy posts

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| **Goal** | In the Maintenance module, there is a 2nd login form available for the admin access. In this module, the admin can see all the purged user’s details, as well as purge users and vacancy posts. So, for this test case, it was tested whether a non-admin can do it using MITM attack. Ettercap was used to carry out this attack using its ARP poisoning module. In the console, it should show the input text fields’ (username, and password) entries. So the target is to get the entries and try to login as admin to the Maintenance module and try to purge all the information of users/vacancy posts. |
| Steps | * Login as admin (must) * Start Ettercap as root user * Scan for the hosts * Select router’s IP (gateway) as target 1 * Select admin’s IP as target 2 * Select ARP poisoning option (top-right) |
|  | * Start MITM * Look for input fields in the Ettercap’s console |
| Expectation | The credential information should not be visible in the Ettercap’s console |
| Observation | No info was noted |
| Risk | None |

**TC10.** To perform the purge action to all users and vacancy posts

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| **Goal** | The goal for this TC is similar to TC09. However, in this TC, instead of Ettercap, ZAP was used. |
| Steps | * Login as admin (must) * Start ZAP’s Spider * Scan for all the available ports (and respective requests) * Find “auth” request * Look for responses in the field. * Get the token, uname, and pswd * Make PUT request and add them in it. |
| Expectation | The credential information should not be visible in the response; even if it should, then it it should have been encrypted. |
| Observation | All username, token, and password were found in plain text (w/o any encryption or compression. |
| Risk | Yes |

**TC11.** To validate input sanitization in user registration forms

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| **Goal** | The goal for this TC is to ensure whether the user registration forms correctly sanitize inputs to prevent injection attacks and ensure that only valid data is accepted in the registry form. |
| Steps | * Go to installation step of orangehrm (as the site doesn’t offer new account creation in the login page) * Locate fields like username, password, email, and full name * Test a list of various malicious entries for checking sanitization * Tested ones (in each field (as entries):  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | Category | Attempts | Result | | SQL | '; DROP TABLE users; -- | X | | XSS | <script>alert('SQA Test)</script> | X | | HTML | <a href="uiu.ac.bd">link test</a> | X | | Characters | !@#$%^&\*() | X | |
| Expectation | Malicious entries should not be allowed as executing (or reading) them will cause security issue. |
| Observation | Malicious entries in the registration are not allowed. In fact, the system required a username of minimum 5 chars, and password of 8<= chars with strict conditions. |
| Risk | None |