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# PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS

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Peace and Conflict,  
Development  
and Civilization

JOHAN GALTUNG

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PEACEFUL MEANS**



International Peace Research Institute, Oslo  
Fuglehauggata 11, N-0260 Oslo, Norway  
Telephone: (47) 22 55 71 50  
Telefax: (47) 22 55 84 22  
Cable address: PEACERESearch OSLO  
E-mail: info@prio.no

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# Preface

This book is intended as an introduction to peace studies – but in the sense of opening the way for many directions of inquiry, not of being elementary or easy reading (the introductory chapter has that function). Those with some knowledge of the fields explored in any one of the four parts may find the whole text more useful.

Peace politics is soft politics; to a large extent dependent on very concrete decisions made by elites, but increasingly by people doing their own peace politics: at the micro level of the inner person and the family (where there is always much to do); at the meso level, that of society; and at the macro level of inter-societal, even inter-regional conflict. At all these levels, there is room for politics in the sense of peaceful steering toward peace.

But underlying political decisions are military and economic realities – in this book explored under the broader headings of ‘conflict’ and ‘development’. And underlying those, in turn, are the still deeper realities of our civilizations: in particular, the deep cultures, the cosmologies, so influential in conditioning our behavior in the other three fields.

The four parts of this book are outcomes of comprehensive research programs in major parts of peace studies:

- A Theory of Peace
- A Theory of Conflict
- A Theory of Development
- A Theory of Civilizations

This book, however, is the only effort to bring all the four fields together.

To make the four parts more independent of each other there is some repetition. On the other hand, everything is meant to hang together, hence the many references among the parts; and the conclusion.

A word of warning: it has not been my experience that mainstream security studies/international relations (IR), conflict studies, economics and culture theory can be used as they are for peace studies, in the sense that all that would be needed is simply to bring them together and then start an interdisciplinary dialogue. To the contrary: they have to be rethought from the beginning, and probably much more so than in the following pages (which, incidentally, have been long in coming anyhow; the task is problematic to say the least).

Thus, peace and violence will have to be seen in their totality, at all levels of organization of life (and not only human life). Inter-state violence is important, but inter-gender and inter-generation violence even more so. So is intra-personal violence, both intra-spirit (repression of emotions, for instance) and intra-body (say, cancer). Moreover, as the purpose of the whole exercise is to promote peace, not only peace studies, a non-positivistic epistemology is indispensable, with explicit values and therapies, rather than stopping once the diagnosis has been pronounced.

Conflict is much more than what meets the naked eye as ‘trouble’, direct violence. There is also the violence frozen into structures, and the culture that legitimizes violence. To transform a conflict between some parties, more than a new architecture for their relationship is needed. The parties have to be transformed so that the conflict is not reproduced forever. There are intra-party aspects to most inter-party conflicts.

In this book mainstream economics is mainly seen as cultural violence, concealing and mystifying what happens when people produce, distribute, and consume. Most causes and effects are made invisible as ‘externalities’, outside mainstream theory and practice. By making them explicit and internalizing them into theory and practice, less violent economic structures may emerge.

And the focus in culture theory is not on the visible and audible, on the artefacts, but on the deep culture sedimented in the collective subconscious, in the assumptions that define, for a given civilization, what is normal and natural. The focus on culture should not be confused with the ‘idealism’ a Hegel embraces and a Marx rejects. Rather, the point of departure is the poverty of instincts in the human organism, yet the need to act and the impossibility of deciding for each act as if it were for the first time. There must be some programming, some automaticity bypassing individual consciousness. For the single individual that program is known as the ‘personality’, sedimented in the individual subconscious. For the members of a civilization the collective program will be described here as the ‘cosmology’, the collectively shared and subconsciously held assumptions.

Being subconscious, these assumptions are just enacted, they are not discussed. And being collective, there is reinforcement in seeing all others doing just the same. The steering comes not through the pull being exercised by ideas, but through the push from the cosmology, the code, the collective program. That does not mean that ideologies, consciously held systems of belief, individual or collective, are not very important. But they are far from alone in steering human action.

Make the subconscious conscious and we may be liberated from much protracted structural and repetitive, direct violence. Perhaps this will also make us better see how the modern, Western economy functions, and how mainstream economics is a decoding of the deep assumptions of some type of Western civilization. And some of the same holds for mainstream conflict and security analysis: much of it is a decoding of collectively and subconsciously held assumptions not subjected to serious inquiry.

In short, when we do peace studies one of the first tasks is our liberation from forms of academic cultural violence that become more, not less, violent by having survived too long. And the next task is not to become a prisoner of those who present themselves as liberators – including the present author.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the many students at the universities of Alicante; Bern; Burg Schlaining (European Peace University); Cairo; City University of New York; Duke; Firenze; FLACSO Santiago/Mexico; Freie Universität Berlin; Gujarat Vidyapith; Hawai'i; ICU Tokyo; Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik; Oslo; Princeton; Queensland; Saarland; Sichuan; Tromsø; Witten/Herdecke and the Peace Studies Around the World; for countless active, critical and constructive dialogues. And to the Right Livelihood Award Foundation, for support at a crucial moment.

Deep thanks to Dieter Fischer, Susan Høivik, Hajo Schmidt, and Håkan Wiberg, and to my critic Peter Lawler (*A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research*). There are answers in my writings to what he says; but the issues are perennial.

The book is dedicated to my wife, Fumiko Nishimura, who has taught me more about peace and conflict than anybody else.

Johan Galtung  
Honolulu, Hawai'i  
March 1995

# INTRODUCTION:

## VISIONS OF PEACE

### FOR THE 21st CENTURY

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#### 1 Peace: the Diagnosis–Prognosis–Therapy Triangle

Peace studies are so similar to health studies that the triangle *diagnosis–prognosis–therapy* can be applied. There is the common idea of a system (of actors, of cells), of well-states and ill-states.<sup>1</sup> The word-pairs ‘health/disease’ from health studies and ‘peace/violence’ from peace studies can be seen as specifications of these more general labels.

Both states are actually in need of *diagnosis* (or analysis) – not only of violence and disease. Also peace and health have their conditions and their contexts; different from the conditions for violence and disease, but they may also be related to them. Thus, one condition for peace is probably an equitable relation; but there may also be violence in a non-exploitative system if something goes wrong within one single actor. Likewise, a condition for health is a stable equilibrium of key parameters of the human body. And yet one cell or a colony of cells may go wrong, for instance starting to grow out of all proportion.

The peace researcher must look for causes, conditions, and contexts in various spaces – Nature, Human, Social, World, Time, Culture. This transdisciplinary spectrum makes peace studies both challenging, difficult intellectually, and problematic in praxis. On the other hand, a narrow focus is doomed in advance.<sup>2</sup>

If, now, for some reason, the system falls out of its ‘well-state’ and shows symptoms of ill-states, the obvious question to be answered in an accurate *prognosis* is whether the system is capable of adequate *Self-restoration* to the well-state, or whether some *Other-intervention* is needed.

Intervention from the outside should not be identified with therapy. First, such interventionism may actually make the system worse in the end; second, Self may also be capable of providing adequate therapy. And third, Self-restoration does not necessarily mean conscious, deliberate intervention. The system may simply ‘take care of itself’. Our bodies have that miraculous capacity to restore equilibrium through hyper-complex mechanisms we can hardly understand, let alone influence. What we can do is to provide positive conditions for these restorative functions.<sup>3</sup>

Let us now turn to the third corner of the triangle, *therapy*, meaning deliberate efforts by Self or Other to move the system back again toward some well-state. Closely related to the distinction between negative and positive health and peace is one between curative and preventive therapy. All four stand for well-states with no (or very little) disease or violence. The systems are (almost) symptom-free. But in the negative case, that is about all that can be said about them. The equilibrium is so unstable that even a minor insult can tip the system into an ill-state. In the positive case the equilibrium is more stable, meaning there is more capacity of Self-restoration even if the system may not be entirely symptom-free. Curative therapy aims at the former, preventive at the latter. Both are needed for health, and for peace.

## 2 The Direct–Structural–Cultural Violence Triangle

Creating peace obviously has to do with reducing violence (cure) and avoiding violence (prevention). And violence means harming and/or hurting. We then assume the existence of something that can experience being harmed and being hurt, and follow the Buddhist tradition in identifying that something with life. Life is capable of suffering (*dukkha*) violence done to the body and to the mind, referred to as physical and mental violence respectively. But life is also capable of experiencing bliss (*sukha*), the pleasure that comes to the body and the mind. Some might reserve the term ‘positive peace’ for that experience.<sup>4</sup>

So far we have looked at violence from the perspective of the receiver. If there is a sender, an actor who intends these consequences of violence, then we may talk about *direct* violence; if not, about indirect or *structural* violence.<sup>5</sup> Misery is one form of suffering, hence there is violence somewhere. The position taken here is that *indirect violence* = *structural violence*. Indirect violence comes from the social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world. And inside human beings there is the indirect, non-intended, inner violence that comes out of the personality structure.

The two major forms of outer structural violence are well known from politics and economics: *repression* and *exploitation*. Both work on body and mind, but are not necessarily intended. For the victim, however, that offers scant comfort.

Behind all of this is *cultural* violence: all of it symbolic, in religion and ideology, in language and art, in science and law, in media and education. The function is simple enough: to legitimize direct and structural violence. In fact we are dealing with violence in culture, in politics and in economics, and then with direct violence. We need a concept broader than violence, and also broader than peace. *Power* is that concept. Cultural power moves actors by persuading them what is right and wrong; economic power by the carrot method of *quid pro quo*; military (or ‘force’ in general) power by the stick method of ‘or else’; and political power by producing decisions.

That gives us four types of power, or discourses: *cultural*, *economic*, *military*, and *political*. Well-known words, but not merely to be tossed around. They stand for four realms of power and four types of violence (structural violence has political and economic faces), and by implication for four types of peace. Before we turn to the question of what they look like concretely, some words about the relations between the four realms of power.

They all impact on each other; twelve arrows can be drawn. But, however true, that is the easy way out, because no stand is taken. Another truth should be added. There is also a general thrust in the power system: single acts of direct violence come out of structures of political decisions and economic transactions; and the latter cause each other. But underneath it all lurks culture; legitimizing some structures and acts, delegitimizing others.

The ‘realist’ assumption that only military power counts is the least realistic of all. However, the liberal faith in the right political structure and the Marxist faith in the right economic structure are not better. They all matter, particularly culture. But single-minded culturalism is also insufficient. My own position is an eclectic one, but with the causal flow more in the direction from culture via politics and economics to the military than vice versa. Thus, the major causal direction for violence is from cultural via structural to direct violence.

## 3 Roads to Peace: the Eightfold Path

Two types of therapies or remedies have been indicated above: curative and preventive, aiming at negative and positive peace respectively. And four types (with the two

subtypes) of violence have been identified. This gives us eight combinations, the ‘eight-fold path’ of the heading of this section. Each combination, for instance ‘cultural power, positive peace’, confronts us with a question: what can be done? The reader will find some answers in Table 1 and can add and subtract. The six headings around the Table are perhaps more important than the content inside: they are meant to inspire our search. Other classifications of peace policies are certainly also possible, for instance building on the Nature–Self–Society–World–Time–Culture scheme of spaces for locating conditions.

There is no place to start and certainly no place to end policies for peace. The best advice is to work on all eight cells at the same time. Better some moves ahead on all than a single thrust on one, hoping that the others will take care of themselves or can be easily handled afterwards. Experience with single-factor peace theories has generally been negative. Kant hoped for republics and democracy, liberals for free trade and democracy, Marxists for social production and guided democracy, mondialists for a strong UN. Peace did not follow in their wake.

Most proposals aim at the world as a system of countries with states inside them: the inter-country system usually called the inter-state system. With slight modifications they also apply to inter-gender, inter-generation, inter-class and inter-nation (ethnic) systems; all relevant today.

Table 1 *Peace Policies for the 21st Century*

	Negative peace	Positive peace
Political	<i>Democratize states</i> Human rights all over, but de-Westernization Initiative, referendum, direct democracy Decentralization	<i>Democratize the UN</i> One country, one vote No big-power veto Second UN Assembly Direct elections (1 seat/1 million) Confederations
Military	Defensive defense Delegitimize arms Non-military defense	Peace-keeping forces Non-military skills International peace brigades
Economic	<i>Self-reliance I</i> Internalize externalities Use own factors Also locally	<i>Self-reliance II</i> Share externalities Horizontal exchange South–South cooperation
Cultural	<i>Challenge</i> singularity universalism chosen people ideas violence, war <i>Dialogue</i> between hard and soft	<i>Global Civilization</i> a Center everywhere relaxed time holistic, global nature partnership equality, justice life enhancement

A great many comments are of course needed to Table 1. People working for world peace, whether in the state system or in the non-state system of organizations, will recognize something; few will recognize all the points made or necessarily agree. That debate is essential if the peace movement is to grow and become at least as influential as the anti-slavery and anti-colonialist movements were in their time. Being against war is a good

moral position, but the questions of *alternatives to war* and the conditions for *abolition of war* will not disappear. They have to be addressed.

And ideally, all of these points should be addressed at the same time to emphasize the synchronicity advocated. But that style of communication does not communicate well, so let us proceed line by line, well aware that no order of priority is intended.

#### **4 The Political Dimension**

Democracy is a great idea, but it has been badly understood in relation to inter-state affairs. If a democracy works well within a country it will, in principle, produce a relatively content population that, on the average and over time, gets much of its wishes satisfied, within the limits of the feasible. Again, in principle this should lead to a peace surplus inside the country, with democracy functioning as a nonviolent arbiter between parts of the population vying with each other for power and privilege. But there is no guarantee that this intra-state peace surplus will translate into peaceful activity in the inter-state system. The democracy has to be global, in the inter-state system, in the world system. But that system is today conservative-feudal, not liberal-democratic.

That opens for two approaches: making the inter-state system more democratic, and making the intra-state system even more peaceful, with democratic means. Both are laudable goals and approaches: there is no need to justify a more democratic country with the (at best unproven, at worst blatantly wrong) assumption that intra-peace translates automatically into inter-peace. If that were the case, the leading democracies in the world today would not also have been slaving, colonialist, and highly belligerent in general – except for the smaller democracies, which probably are peaceful more because they are small than because they are democratic. This also works the other way: a democratic inter-state system does not automatically guarantee that all component parts will become democracies overnight.

The most direct approach is to democratize the inter-state system. *One country one vote* is a formula that could be applied to the Bretton Woods institutions, reducing the money power of the richest countries in the world. This would probably also reduce the credit available. The question is whether the World Bank record makes that eventuality so deplorable. Obviously, the formula rules out Big Power veto – that has to go.

But democracy is more about *one person one vote*, and that points unambiguously to a world parliament, such as a Second UN Assembly, a *United Nations Peoples' Assembly* (UNPA), with member-states as constituencies entitled to one seat per one million citizens (states with less than one million getting one seat), but only if elected by popular and secret ballot, not selected by the state. This would be an articulation channel additional to UNGA, read as UN Government Assembly. The two assemblies could work out a timetable for transferring more power from UNGA to UNPA, making governments responsible to the people, rather than vice versa.

*Human rights* point in the same direction, although they also strengthen the state system by making states the guarantors of human rights, responsible to UN mechanisms. Today they bear an unmistakable male, adult, human species, Western imprint; all of that could be improved without losing the power of that fine tradition against direct and structural violence.

Bringing government closer to the people, through confederal forms of cooperation rather than federations and unitary states, through decentralization inside countries and initiatives and referenda, would also help. But these are not panaceas: people are not always peaceful. People, 'civil society', can also kill.

## 5 The Military Dimension

The argument made here is not to abolish the military but to give it new tasks. That institution has had very bad habits in the past, such as attacking other countries and nations, and other classes, usually at the behest of the ruling elites, killing and devastating through external and internal wars. But there have also been virtues: good organization, courage, willingness to sacrifice. The bad habits have to go; not necessarily the military, and certainly not the virtues.

Let us give the military new tasks, substituting defensive defense with defensive means (short-range conventional military, para-military and non-military defense) for aggressive, external warfare. Pure defense provokes nobody and causes no fear, yet makes it clear that attacks will be strongly resisted.

Peace-keeping forces can be used to prevent aggressiveness, even in places where there has been no open display of violence (but good reasons to assume that something may happen). One idea may be to station such forces preventively in the 30-odd small countries without military forces, to forestall the possibility of some Big Brother demanding to be a 'protector' in crisis.

But this is not enough. There has to be further development along nonviolent lines, delegitimizing arms, nonviolent skills, reducing the conventional and para-military components, at the same time building up non-military defense, turning to civilian peace-keeping and to international peace brigades in hot areas. We are at the threshold of such important endeavors; they must be developed much further. The military are hereby invited!

There is also a negative side to all of this. The long-term goal is the abolition of war as an institution, like the abolition of slavery and colonialism as institutions – an entirely realistic goal, but demanding, difficult – and absolutely necessary. Of course, there will still be violence around, some still organized collectively as wars. But it will not be institutionalized, and not internalized. Nor legitimate.

What upholds war? Many factors, three of them being patriarchy (rule by the male gender of the human species), the state system with its monopoly on violence, and the super-state or superpower system with the ultimate monopoly of the hegemons. Males more than females tend toward violence; and those who possess arms tend to think and act according to the old adage that to the person with a hammer the world looks like a nail. Incidentally, this is not necessarily so because such a person is violent, but because he has the use of military power as both profession and monopoly and simply wants to be relevant.

To fight patriarchy means fighting patriarchal cultures and structures and arriving at a more equitable power-sharing between the genders. The danger is that, in the process of the struggle, women may take on some of the male values they are fighting.

The struggle against the tendency of states to seek recourse to military power goes by way of alternatives that are more compelling. And the struggle against hegemonic tendencies in the world society of societies goes by way of democratization of that society, creating alliances of non-hegemonic countries within or across their 'spheres of interest', and through decision-making of the one country/one vote variety. We return to that later in Part I, Chapter 4.

## 6 The Economic Dimension

The problem here is not only economic practice, but also economic theory with its carefully nursed neglect of the side-effects of economic activity, the *externalities*. Some of

them are positive, like the *challenge* derived from taking on complex problems for which there are no immediate, routine solutions. And some of them are negative, like *ecological degradation*, not to mention *human degradation*. They are not reflected in economic theory, or at most as side- and after-thoughts. Economists focus on quantities and prices of products, goods, and services offered on the market without reflecting whether they might also be *bads* and *disservices*. Such variables are referred to as *internalities*, internal to the paradigm. One example is ‘terms of exchange’, the quantity of one product needed to get in exchange a constant quantity of another product, like how much oil for one tractor. Another approach would be to compare the working hours needed.

Exploitation means that one party gets much more out of a deal than the other – measured by the sum of internalities and externalities. The terms of exchange may be bad and getting worse: in addition one party gets all the challenge, leaving the routine work to the other, who also gets ecological and human degradation in the bargain. As this is a fairly adequate description of the trade between rich (not all in the North) and poor (not all in the South) countries in the world today, we are dealing with a key case of structural violence. This condition often leads to direct violence intended to change or to maintain the structure, and is solidly protected by the cultural violence provided by mainstream theory. A heavy triangle of violence.

One way out is to trade less, relying more on one’s own resources (factors). This means that the positive externalities stay at home; the negative externalities will be suffered by oneself rather than inflicting them upon others. The hope is that Self-interest may lead to better types of economic activity. If this is *Self-reliance I* then *Self-reliance II* extends this to include exchange with other countries, but then with sensitivity to externalities. The short formula is to share them. What this means in practice is to give each other positive externalities, and to cooperate in reducing the negative ones.<sup>6</sup>

At this point a Catch-22 problem arises. Considerateness, taking the effects of international economic transactions on others (at least) as seriously as the effects on oneself, would generally presuppose some kind of closeness, a feeling of kinship. This is what good family relations are supposed to be about. One formula may be ‘neighboring countries’, another ‘like-minded countries’, still another ‘countries at the same level of development’. *Self-reliance II* is supposed to develop such affinities – yet those affinities are at the same time the very condition for their coming into being.

All the same, the best approach is simply to get started. The Nordic countries, the ASEAN countries and the European Union countries did just that. This is probably also the best, perhaps even the only, way for developing/poor countries in the South to develop – lifting not only themselves but also each other up with shared bootstraps. In that perspective South–South cooperation as advocated by the Nyerere Commission is a policy not only for development, but also for peace, at least within the South.<sup>7</sup>

## 7 The Cultural Dimension

Why do people kill? Partly because they are brought up that way – not directly to kill, but to see killing as legitimate under some conditions. That brings us to culture, that great legitimizer of violence, but also of peace. Where do we find the key carriers of violence? The easy answer would be ‘religion and ideology’, since people are known to kill in the name of either. However, not all religions or ideologies are violent; some are even outspoken in their advocacy of nonviolence. Or, to use the formulation preferred here: religions and ideologies can come in *hard* and *soft* varieties, the harder varieties tending to focus on some abstract, transcending goal and the softer ones on empathy, even compassion. Examples of the former would be the triumph of a transcendent God, for

instance in the occidental version of a male deity 'in the heavens'; of some political utopia all over the world (capitalism, socialism, democracy, fascism); of some 'great' nation. Examples of softer or gentler goals would be an immanent God, as 'that-of-God' in everyone; satisfaction of concrete basic needs in concrete human beings; regard for all life.

Obviously, the greatest occidental religions and ideologies, Islam and Christianity, liberalism and Marxism (the latter will probably have some kind of comeback) have streaks of both, so we should speak of hard and soft 'aspects' rather than hard and soft religions and ideologies, or even of hard and soft varieties. In addition, all four are also *singularist*, claiming to be the single, valid carrier of truth, and *universalist*, claiming validity all over the world and for all future time.

Such faiths become particularly dangerous when they define a *chosen people* (gender, generation, race, class, nation) with the right and duty to spread and defend the faith. The occidental faiths (and not only those) have elements of this, the archetype being the Judaic idea of a Chosen People with a Promised Land.

All such notions should be challenged, replete as they are with violence and war. And violence itself should be challenged directly. In the pragmatic West that is perhaps best done by pointing out how *violence breeds violence*, probably one of the safer propositions of social science. And the best form of challenge is dialogue. Christianity comes in hard and soft varieties; the dialogue between the two varieties within a faith may be more meaningful to the believers than ecumenical dialogues across faiths. One approach need not exclude the other, however.

As usual, the best approach is probably a positive one. The four systems criticized above are carriers of a faith maximum, with answers to (almost) everything. To demand the same belief from everybody is like prescribing the same size shoes for all. And yet, a world civilization needs some faith minimum.

Table 1 gives some ideas that might be useful. A world where each place is a center and no place a periphery. A less dramatic time concept; ups and downs are normal, but they should be kept within bounds. The world can only be understood in a reasonably holistic and global manner. Partnership with nature, with humans and nature serving each other, providing for each other's basic needs. Equality and justice within and among societies. The enhancement of all life as the end, and as the means. Words, words, words – but important all the same.

## 8 Who Are the Carriers of Peace Strategies?

In principle, the answer is everyone. But in practice there are problems in having the state system as carrier. One reason has been mentioned above: the tendency to transform the system, or at least the image of it, so that the means at one's disposal become relevant or at least appear to be relevant, and we end up with sticks, meaning violence, rewards, and negotiating elites.

On the other hand, there are also severe problems in having the non-state system as a carrier of peace strategies. People, as mentioned, are not always peaceful; and even when they are, what they have at their disposal is mainly cultural power, not the carrots and sticks of economic and military power used by the state system. Non-state systems will also tend to see the world as a nail even if their hammer is considerably softer, persuasion by word and by example. This may help; but it also may not. There is a case for the double-track system, adding a potential peace-maker who tends to be overlooked: the transnational corporation.

In the face of two potential major errors, peace can be made only by elites, or only by

non-elites, the challenge is to commit neither error, trying to use both tracks. Maybe the end of the Cold War can serve as an example. Important steps were taken by the state system, particularly in connection with the Helsinki process. But even more important were the steps taken by the non-state system; the dissident movements in the East who made the illegitimacy of (post-) Stalinism crystal clear, and the peace movement in East and West doing the same to nuclearism. The two trends were united in the person and action of Gorbachev, with a happy ending in the fall 1989.<sup>8</sup> Might this success not be repeated?

## Notes

1. A person feels well, or a person feels ill; but systems of actors do not feel that way. Yet states of well-ness and ill-ness or 'eu-functioning' and 'dis-functioning' can be attributed to them. The word disease (dis-ease) from health studies can be seen as related to the latter. But who decides, according to what criteria? Do we lean towards 'subjectivism' (people themselves decide whether they are suffering or not), or toward 'objectivism' (others decide, according to their criteria, that they must be suffering)? My inclination is both/and and a dialogue, the only possible conclusion from a *yin/yang* perspective (there is suffering in bliss and bliss in suffering). People often gain in personal depth from dis-ease, society may learn its strength and weaknesses from a violent shock, like an invasion. But, does that mean we always have to pay such prices?

2. An example would be the narrow-minded focus during the Cold War on balance of terror and propaganda; and what started happening after the Cold War was officially over. Multi-causal or multi-conditioned problems demand multi-space/layer/level remedies. The formula current in health studies, 'psycho-somatic', is a recognition of this, although it could be amended to 'socio-psychosomatic' to be more satisfactory. And yet the official analyses of, for instance, the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia proceed along Cold War lines: only two parties, the parties are states, whoever is not registered as a bad guy is a good guy, etc.

Of course, that primitive way of thinking existed before the Cold War (see Part II, Chapter 1.4). But a good guess would be that the Yugoslavia conflict is seen by people whose mind-set was shaped by the Cold War as isomorphic with that conflict formation, with Serbia corresponding to Russia, the heartland of communism, Slovenia corresponding to the Baltic states, Catholic Croatia to Catholic Poland, and then some Muslims in the South.

3. For health restoration the typical example would be reasonable dietary and exercise habits, in other words 'lifestyle'. For peace restoration, an example would be to keep communication channels open.

4. One reason why that is not being done here is the effort to see peace more as a floor than a ceiling concept, something that very many can agree on. The more peace is specified, the richer the definition, the less consensus.

5. In other words, the structure is the medium through which the violence is transmitted, similar to the 'field' for gravity, electricity and magnetism in physics. Colonialism may serve as an example: there was an original input of mega-violence which was used to build the structure known as colonialism, still to a large extent operational after formal decolonization.

6. If A demands a product from B that challenges and stimulates B then B should, in return, demand an equally stimulating product from A, not simply a run-of-the-mill (literally speaking) product. And if one or both of these processes leads to ecological and/or human degradation, then A and B should cooperate in reducing these consequences wherever they appear.

7. See *The South Commission Report* (Geneva: South Center, 1990).

8. For an effort to analyze what happened, see my 'Eastern Europe Fall 1989 – What Happened, and Why?', pp. 75–97 in L. Kriesberg & D.R. Segal, *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, vol. 14 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992).

# PART I

## PEACE THEORY

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### 1

### Peace Studies: an Epistemological Basis

#### 1.1 A Point of Departure: Peace by Peaceful Means

To start with, two compatible definitions of peace:

- *Peace is the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds.*
- *Peace is nonviolent and creative conflict transformation.*

For both definitions the following holds:

- *Peace work is work to reduce violence by peaceful means.*
- *Peace studies is the study of the conditions of peace work.*

The first definition is violence-oriented; peace being its negation. To know about peace we have to know about violence.

The second definition is conflict-oriented; peace is the context for conflicts to unfold nonviolently and creatively. To know about peace we have to know about conflict and how conflicts can be transformed, both nonviolently and creatively. Obviously this latter definition is more dynamic than the former.

Both definitions focus on human beings in a social setting. This makes peace studies a social science, and more particularly an applied social science, with an explicit value-orientation.

Epistemologically, peace studies will share some assumptions with all scientific endeavors, some with other social sciences, and some with other applied sciences such as medical (health) studies, architecture, and engineering.

Thus, peace studies follows such general rules for scientific research as intersubjective communicability and acceptability. Premises (data, values, theories), conclusions, and links between them must be open to public scrutiny. Science and idiosyncracy do not go together. Nor do science and secrecy, as in security studies protected by the ‘confidential’ stamp. Science is public.

#### 1.2 A Tripartite Division of Peace Studies

A suitable point of departure is the distinction between three branches of peace studies.<sup>1</sup>

1 *Empirical peace studies*, based on *empiricism*: the systematic comparison of theories with empirical reality (data), revising the theories if they do not agree with the data – data being stronger than theory.

- 2 *Critical peace studies*, based on *criticism*: the systematic comparison of empirical reality (data) with values, trying, in words and/or in action, to change reality if it does not agree with the values – values being stronger than data.
- 3 *Constructive peace studies*, based on *constructivism*: the systematic comparison of theories with values, trying to adjust theories to values, producing visions of a new reality – values being stronger than theory.

Broadly speaking, these are peace studies in the past, present, and future tenses, or modes, respectively. In the logic of empiricism, data prevail over theory; in the logic of criticism, values prevail over data; and in the logic of constructivism, the (transitive) conclusion is drawn from this: values prevail over theories. Thus, in peace studies the values lumped together under the heading of ‘peace’ have the upper hand, directing the construction of the theories used to account for data. Yet the data also have the upper hand, since theories are used to account for them.

How can they both have ‘the upper hand’? Because peace studies, like any other applied science, is based on the conviction that the world is changeable, malleable, at least up to a certain point. How this adds up to an epistemology for applied science will be explored below.

*Empirical peace studies* will inform us about patterns and conditions for peace/violence in the past, since only the past can yield data. The canons of research are the same as for other social sciences: careful data collection, processing, and analysis, and inductive theory formation; or the other way round, deductively, comparing data and theories, adjusting the latter to the former to get consonance between data and theory.

Much can be learned from this, particularly about the past. But the (positivist) assumption that what held in the past also holds in the future is a dramatic assumption, presupposing that social phenomena have time homogeneity, with no major changes, continuous or discontinuous (ruptures) through time. Continuous changes can be predicted through extrapolation, particularly if they are monotonic, with never-waxing or never-waning trends. Discontinuous changes are more problematic. Could people in the Roman Empire have understood the ‘Middle Ages’, manorial or feudal phases; could medieval people understand the ‘Modern Period’; indeed, do we understand ‘Post-Modernity’? Futures transcending past experiences, available through empirical studies, are unknown and possibly unknowable. They are *sui generis*, of a new kind. History – societies or persons – does make ‘quantum leaps’, like physical nature. And so, according to evolution theory, does biological nature.

The conceptual and other tools needed to conceive of the future are not necessarily found in a research tool-chest adjusted to the present and the past, although a macro-historical overview may help. This is an argument for understanding the future through non-scientific means, dreams and myths, intuition, with artists and mystics the better scientists. More imaginative.

*Critical peace studies* would evaluate data or information about the present in general, and present policies in particular, in the light of peace/violence values. Such comparisons may conclude with consonance or dissonance (agreement or disagreement). In the latter case, the conclusion is not the empiricist ‘the theories/values were false’, but the criticist ‘reality is bad/wrong’, as in literary criticism or in (penal) jurisprudence. Dissonance is no reason to change values, but it is *the* reason to change reality so that future data may show consonance. Critical peace studies, like art criticism, should not necessarily lead to negative conclusions, even if the word ‘criticism’ is often thus interpreted. Applaudable policies can and should be applauded. Defendants are at times acquitted. But law rarely offers praise, and criticism rarely concludes ‘neither good, nor bad’.

*Constructive peace studies* takes theories about what might work and brings them together with values about what ought to work; this is what architects and engineers are doing, coming up with new habitats and constructions in general. If they had been empiricists only, they would have been content with empirical studies of caves and of the carrying capacity for human beings; if they had been critics only, they would have been content with declarations deplored the shortcomings of caves and humans. Constructivism transcends what empiricism reveals, and offers constructive proposals. Criticism is an indispensable bridge between the two. There has to be motivation, anchored in values.


*Empirical peace studies* is mainstream social science. When applied to international relations, for instance, the result is just that: the field of ‘international relations’.<sup>2</sup> Critical peace studies takes explicit stands. What makes it research is the explicitness not only of data but also of values, specifying what is good/right and bad/wrong, how and why. Very often this will have to be done with reference to the future: what looks like a plausible policy today may turn out to be disastrous; what looks unacceptable today may work in the longer run.

A prognosis is added, with all its uncertainties. And constructive peace studies adds to this a dimension of therapy or remedy, producing blueprints for the future – visions, images. The prognosticator gambles on a bad prognosis as a self-denying prophecy, a therapist on the self-fulfilling nature of a therapeutic vision as prophecy. Both transcend empiricism as a way of defining epistemological borders, defended by some and broken through by others. But that does not mean that every single piece of peace studies has to end up with explicit policy implications. Solid empirical peace studies is indispensable. But this is not the final product: only the beginning of a complex process, much more difficult than empirical studies alone.

### 1.3 Trilateral Science: the Data–Theories–Values Triangle

The three approaches build on each other because of the inner connections in the data–theories–values triangle (see Figure 1.1). Data divide the world into *observed* and *unobserved*; theories into *foreseen* (meaning ‘accounted for by the theory’, which may or may not imply an element of prediction) and *unforeseen*; and values divide the world into *desired* and *rejected*. The logic of empiricism is to adjust theories so that the observed

Figure 1.1 *The Data–Theories–Values Triangle*



becomes foreseen and the unforeseen unobserved. The logic of criticism is to adjust reality so that the future will produce data with the observed being the desired and the rejected being unobserved. And the logic of constructivism is to come up with new theories, adjusted to values so that the desired is foreseen and the rejected unforeseen. There is nothing new in this: medical people, architects, and engineers have been doing this for generations, centuries.

If the observed is foreseen and desired, and the unobserved is unforeseen and rejected, then we live in the best of all worlds. The second-best is a world where the desired is unobserved but foreseen through an evolutionary process with some automaticity, like ‘we are condemned to peace’ in the longer run. Both of which are unlikely.

The other six combinations have built-in dissonance, with the empiricist trying to resolve the foreseen/unobserved and unforeseen/observed dissonances, and the criticist calling attention to the observed/rejected and the unobserved/desired dissonances. The constructivist tries to create a new reality by adjusting the three to each other. The point of departure is the desired/unforeseen or rejected/foreseen dissonances; this calls for new theories to make the desirable foreseeable.

Sooner or later, however, the proof of the pudding is in the eating: the foreseen also has to be observed. It is one thing to foresee, ‘image’, UN Peacekeeping Forces (UNPKF), with hand-weapons essentially as symbols of authority, combining two desirables, no violence and peace-keeping. Another is whether it works, i.e. is observed in reality.

For this it is useful to recall the distinction between *empirical reality*, already there in past and/or present; *potential reality*, to come about in the future; and *irreality*, never possible. Applied science explores empirical reality for ideas about a potential, and presumably better, reality. The cognitive bridge is a theory open enough to foresee the unobserved, not a closed system accounting only for an already observed empirical reality. And the bridge is composed of the values defining steep gradients between the rejected and the desired, with the persistent question, ‘But could it not work in the future?’ This is a meaningless question in a world assumed to be unchanging or to run according to unchanging laws – which is how we have been taught to think about the physical world, but not about biological, social, and personal worlds.

The ultimate test can be found only in the logic of empiricism, where data have the final say. But since reality is not final but created all the time (a Buddhist/humanist rather than a Christian/physicist assumption<sup>3</sup>), there is always a new approach, a new reality, new data, in an everlasting process. The negation of that process – insisting that the desired potential can never be empirical, e.g., ‘because violence is inherent in human nature’, or that the desired potential has by definition already been realized ‘because we are revolutionary/had a revolution’ – that is known as dogmatism.

Although this spiral process can be started at any point in the triangle and work in any direction, one frequent point of departure is the observed/foreseen/rejected dissonance. Something empirical is well accounted for, ‘explained’, theoretically. But it is also ‘bad’, to put it in simple terms – like war. This is where *imagination* has to enter the process. To account for the empirical also calls for that commodity. But to account for the non-existing or not-yet-existing calls for even more, since there is no empirical reality to be inspired by or to latch onto.

What is often done is to locate some tiny empirical reality in the remote corners of society, history, and geography, and then explore the conditions for its existence (including the conditions for its non-existence if it vanished), attempting generalizations.<sup>4</sup> Another, more promising, approach is to explore a fully fledged empirical reality that is isomorphic, structurally similar, to the potential reality one hopes to bring about, like deriving hypotheses about peace from healthy life.

## 1.4 Science as Invariance-Seeking and -Breaking Activity

One formula for breaking through the wall which theories have built around empirical reality (and the better the fit the stronger the wall) is to introduce a third (in general an  $n+1$ st) variable or set of variables. The germane question to ask is: under what conditions does this empirical finding hold? Is it really invariant of variations in all other variables? For instance, is it really true that demand increases with decreasing prices? Could some goods be particularly attractive to people who have a lot of money and who use them as positional goods for their status, so that demand would increase with increasing price? Yes, the Giffen goods.<sup>5</sup>

In other words, a ‘finding’ linking a set of variables in a thin curve (a ‘law’) or in a cluster with a respectable correlation coefficient (a ‘tendency’), whether those variables can be dichotomized meaningfully into independent and dependent or not, is never truly invariant in the sense that it will hold no matter what. There is always the rest of the world, the context, which can be seen as a set of variables called ‘conditions’. They in turn can be divided into relevant or irrelevant, depending on whether their variation affects the finding. The point is not whether invariances are made of rubber or steel. The point is to specify the conditions under which they look as if they are made of steel, and then explore whether changing those conditions brings out more rubber-like qualities. Here we are trying to produce a reality closer to what we want, breaking into the desired/unobserved corner.

## 1.5 Values in Peace Studies

Whereas there is no reason to assume anything particular about data in peace studies (like data in social science in general, they should be validly and reliably collected, processed, and analyzed), values play a special if not unique role. Comparisons can be made with social work and criminology. Let us start with some theses.

### *Value-thesis No. 1*

*Without values, peace studies becomes social studies in general and world studies in particular.*

The value dimension opens for peace studies as a discipline *sui generis*. Without the value of ‘peace’, both critical and constructive peace studies become impossible; what is left is the game of adjusting theories to data – important, but only a part of peace studies. In another language to be developed later, prognosis and therapy would also be impossible, and with that the whole idea of a peace profession. Here we should note that prognosis is more than prediction: it is prediction on a value-dimension spanning the extremes of peace and violence. And therapy is, of course, deliberate intervention aimed at bending that prognostic trajectory upwards, toward the more peaceful regions.

The logic is constructivist logic, inspired by criticist logic and tested by empiricist logic. Borrowing from medical theory and practice merely adds a touch of legitimization, medical studies being more recognized than peace studies. Today. Yesterday medical studies were not recognized either. And tomorrow?

### *Value-thesis No. 2*

*The core value, peace, has to be well, but not too well, defined.*

If the value of peace is the guiding light for peace studies, for the empirical, critical, and constructive branches, then this term must be defined. Much work has to be done to

make the term ‘peace’ precise enough, with specifications, with indicators, so that a given ‘situation’ (the corresponding medical term is ‘case’) can be classified and understood in terms of its peacelessness and peacefulness. We have to know whereof we talk and think – and to be able to act.

A value as defined above is a standard that divides the possible states of affairs into desirable and rejectable, allowing for a third category of indifferent/undecided. To define is also to refine, to speak of varying degrees, and to introduce typologies, one- or many-dimensional – all of which will be done below. Hopefully without losing the guiding light.

#### *Value-thesis No. 3*

*Value-knowledge differs from value-holding.*

Science is public, inter-subjective – meaning at the very least that it can be communicated and received approximately as sent. Knowledge of the value(s) of peace, as understood in peace studies, is a condition for doing and understanding peace studies, and for assessing correctly a situation and a process. At this point an important distinction should be made. It is entirely possible to know a value without holding that value. It is possible to know peace without being a ‘peaceful person’, without believing in peace or without even wanting peace in the sense of having internalized the value.

The value is a knowable standard, known the moment it has been communicated and received: the test is whether the same states of affairs are classified as states of peacefulness and peacelessness, respectively. Knowledge is a cognitive process: the test is whether it has been correctly or incorrectly received. Internalization is part of an emotive process: the test is whether peacelessness, including one’s own, hurts or not. It is the difference between consciousness and conscience, with Paulo Freire’s conscientization comprising the two since they do not contradict each other.

#### *Value-thesis No. 4*

*A minimum of value-consensus is necessary; a maximum of value-consensus is undesirable.*

A minimum is needed to establish a discourse for thought, speech, and action; and not only among the practitioners in the field, but among everybody concerned. For communication to take place it matters less whether these values are held and not only known: what matters is that concrete situations are classified in roughly the same way. The problem is that the line between education and indoctrination in this field is a very fine one. The more refined and enriched the value of peace, the more situations are generally ruled out if we assume decreasing denotata with increasing connotata. In other words: the more criteria we build into the definition of peace, the less likely we are to encounter empirical situations where all the criteria have been satisfied. Thus it is better to think of peace in the plural, as peaces. But the plural is incorrect, in English and German for example, whereas ‘wars’ and ‘Kriege’ are unproblematic, opening for typologies of the latter but not the former.<sup>6</sup>

And so it seems even desirable that there should be divisions among peace researchers and others about the deeper meanings of peace. For example, most people would agree with the definition of (negative) peace as absence of direct violence, but not necessarily with an additional definition of (positive) peace as the presence of symbiosis and equity in human relations; nor with the thesis that positive peace is the same as absence of structural and cultural violence. These and others are matters of informed dissent, with schools forming around different definitions and theses. Disagreement among scholars

and professionals in a field may complicate matters and confuse insiders and outsiders alike, to the point of losing confidence in the field. But agreement among scholars and professionals in a field, especially total agreement, down to the slightest detail, in other words maximum consensus, is far worse. This can easily become massive dogmatism, scholastic and intolerant.

The comparison with medicine is tempting. There is nothing wrong with schools of medicine, in the plural; the problem is when only one school is available. Insiders and outsiders alike are entitled to a choice. The field can benefit from diversity only as long as it is interactive in general, and dialogical in particular, with a view to mutual enrichment and in some cases to a synthesis. A stable synthesis would be maximum consensus, however, so new divisions should be encouraged. Let one hundred schools blossom – but not sects. Sects are closed to others and claim a monopoly on the truth.

#### *Value-thesis No. 5*

*Objectivity is inter-subjectivity; the condition for inter-subjectivity is explicitness.*

One may ask: can a field so utterly permeated by values be objective? But that question is based on a very special understanding of science as revealing an 'objectively existing' reality, unveiling it (removing the *maya*, the veil). This in turn presupposes a near-zero level of observer-reality interaction. Now, this is an assumption that may still for some time be fruitful for the natural science study of other than sub-atomic phenomena (in the latter the Heisenbergian uncertainty principles give another meaning to objectivity). In studies of biological, social, human, generally live subjects, however, the assumption of zero or low-level interaction cannot fruitfully be held to be tenable unless an artificial distance is created between observer and observed, 'objectifying' (reifying) the Other, the observed.

All this need not imply that social science is doomed to be an entirely subjective process, even if two social scientists studying the same phenomenon will only rarely formulate the same conclusions in the same language. Social science, like all science, is public, available to scrutiny by others. For this to be possible everything has to be explicit. Above, applied science has been defined as a dialectic process adjusting the observable, the foreseen, and the desirable to each other. The general rule is that the foreseen has to yield to the observed and the observed to the desirable; the former by adjusting the theory to empirical reality, the latter by adjusting empirical reality to the values, as argued above.

Explicitness for all three is completely possible, defining the six sets and the three in-between zones. With explicitness communication is possible, and with communication inter-subjectivity, comparison, dialogue, informed debate. The moment those basic assumptions – be they about the observed, the foreseen or the desired – are implicit, subjectivity can be alleged. This can happen as an act of omission, of not making assumptions explicit because to the holder they seem so normal and natural as to be not worth mentioning, not even to oneself, or not even seen by the holder. Or, as an act of commission, when assumptions are deliberately swept under the carpet.

When basic assumptions are hidden, unaccounted leaps in the reasoning will occur. To tweeze out hidden assumptions is an important step on the way to objectivity in the sense described here. Another step would be to link the assumptions together in a coherent, compelling story, called a *paradigm*.

The conclusion from value-theses Nos 4 and 5 is already in value-thesis No. 3: as much work has to be put into the values as into the data and the theories. Conferences on peace studies can safely have 'Definitions of Peace' as a permanent item on their agendas.

In short, 'objectivity' in the sense of reflecting an underlying unchanging reality,

however dynamic, is rejected and is also on its way out in the natural sciences. Objectivity as an inter-subjective dialogue based on explicit premises is what is argued here: in other words, awareness of own assumptions.

### 1.6 Theory in Peace Studies

If the agenda item ‘Theories of Peace’ should be a permanent agenda item of peace research conferences, then the question is whether there is anything particular to theory-formation in connection with peace: and I would argue that there is no such thing. Good peace theory is good social science theory, even if the reverse is not necessarily the case. What is ‘good social science theory’ is not so obvious, however. Some of my views, based more on experience in the field rather than on a priori philosophical reasoning, can be expressed in the following theses or perspectives.

#### *Theory-thesis No. 1*

*Proceed from dichotomies to yin/yang; and from fourfold tables to the double dialectic.*

Take peace vs. violence. Of course these two words can be defined as each other’s negation and a logical discourse can be constructed. But Daoist epistemology yields better insight by pointing to the violence in peace (for instance, by being too passive) and the peace in violence (for instance, by being active). There is the presence of *yin* in *yang* and of *yang* in *yin*; of *yang* in the *yin* in the *yang* and *yin* in the *yang* in the *yin*, and so on, *ad inf.* Furthermore – a more Hindu/Buddhist/Jainist point: the both/and and the neither/nor possibilities should always be considered. The strict Aristotelian *tertium non datur* is a poor guide in constructing reality, except as a logical game. The man/woman distinction is useful, but limits our awareness of the broad spectrum of actual, not to mention potential, gender reality.

*Dichotomies should be handled with care.* That said, they can be very useful analytical tools even if they are neither exhaustive (neither/nor left out) nor exclusive (both/and left out, including in the more subtle *yin/yang* sense). The same applies to the fourfold table or double dichotomy, which permits us to see one dichotomy in the light of another (like seeing peace/violence in the light of woman/man).

The dichotomy as such is a dead thing: there is no process. The Manichean dichotomy, so frequent in occidental thought, does have life because one is good, the other evil and there is struggle between the two, with no outcome guaranteed in advance. There is a gradient. Ideally the good will prevail, but the evil forces may prove too strong; in either case, dichotomy ends up as monotony (very close to monotony, some kind of mental lobotomy). No doubt peace studies, like health studies, is based on a steep gradient between violence and peace, disease and health; yet it should be open to the *yin/yang* nature of these contradictions.

The *yin/yang* opposition or contradiction is endowed with much more life. *Yin* and *yang* are each other’s opposites, but in the sense of complementarity, of being in each other, not in the sense of one winning over the other. One balancing the other, not one prevailing over the other, gives a state of equilibrium. Yet that equilibrium is not stable. The aspect that was lagging will continue to catch up till it starts leading and the other is lagging, then catching up till that one starts leading, etc.

The result, then, is an undulating process with an unstable equilibrium between the two turning points. Unlike the linear Manichean process, this cyclical (or spiraling) *yin/yang* process has no final state, no ultimate triumph of good over evil (or vice versa). The perspective is richer, but it impedes action, letting *yin/yang* run its course. By contrast,

simplistic occidental thought facilitates action, intervening in the good/evil struggle, but at the risk of making major mistakes.

Journalists are always asking: 'Will there ultimately be peace in the world?' This question is subconsciously inspired by the Manichean dichotomy between violence (or more specifically, war) and peace: will one ultimately triumph over the other? Like, will there be health by the Year 2000? Of course not. There will be neither total peace nor total health by the Year 2000, or any other year. What may happen is a better balance between peace and violence, meaning more and better peace and less and 'better' (less evil) violence – a betterment of the human condition. The same goes for health: some diseases may be eliminated, others may arise, just as some violences (plural) may be eliminated and new ones may emerge. The task of peace studies is the same as that of health studies: not unrealistic total triumphs of good over evil, but better deals, with less suffering, from violence as from disease.

How do two such undulating *yin/yang* processes combine into a double dialectic, the Daoist version of an Aristotelian–Cartesian fourfold table? Take as example two very frequently used dichotomies for world studies: North/South and West/East; both interpreted here as dominant vs. dominated. To the layman this may sound as stable as geography, with its fixed, compass-inspired categories.

But the *yin/yang* metaphor immediately calls our attention to the impurities in such dichotomies: there is 'dominated' in the North, like non-whites, women, and East/Central Europe and the non-Russians under the former Soviet Union; and there is 'dominant' in the South, like white Argentinians/Brazilians, South Africans, Australians. There is 'dominated' in the West, again non-whites, women and national minorities; and 'dominant' in the East, like Russians, Han-Chinese, Japanese. Also inside these categories reversals can be found: the *yin* in the *yang* in the *yin* etc. The logic of Chinese boxes is a good guide, reflecting social reality much better than any strict Aristotelian dichotomy. But that should not lead us to a dogmatic jump from Aristotelian to Daoist thinking. Much better is to view them both as forms of thought, often starting with dead, Aristotelian dichotomies, always watching for Daoist life.

The crucial point is the dialectic process postulated by Daoist logic. The *yin/yang* postulates, built into this form of understanding as apodictic (synthetic a priori) knowledge, are understood here as a source of hypotheses, an intuition, always to be tested against upcoming empirical reality.

More precisely, the hypothesis calls for an equilibrium, a harmony between the dominant and the dominated – or between the dominant and the dominated aspects of their relationship. However, unless watched and protected, that equilibrium is not stable but could be reversed. Thus, the prediction would be a long-term world tendency for South to dominate North after some period of equilibrium, and for East to dominate West. History rides on waves, into the future. To each *actio* a *reactio*.

But in that case, the world Southeast, meaning particularly the Buddhist–Confucian countries (China and Japan, Korea and Viêt Nam) are riding on a double wave. We would expect the challenge to the doubly dominant to come from the doubly dominated – from a humiliated China, a defeated/nuclearized Japan, and from Korea and Viêt Nam, both divided by the North. And likewise we would expect a search for equilibrium, perhaps to be rejected by those used to being dominant, whereupon the tide will continue until it reverses at some point in the more distant future.

In short, with Daoist logic, life is blown into dichotomies. The argument is that all dichotomies and other classifications should be seen that way – without accepting this as a priori knowledge, only as a heuristic for hypotheses. More particularly, we should note the diagonals in a fourfold table because there are two, usually different, processes operating. Thus, the static Cold War way of talking about North–South conflict and

East-West conflict as two separate phenomena, forgetting the inner contradictions in all categories, their transient nature, forgetting the Northwest-Southeast conflict, and forgetting how one conflict or diagonal can impact on the other, would have been impossible under the more subtle Daoist logic. Northeast and Southwest also become interesting categories, including in their relation to each other. But here there would be two tidal waves in opposite directions, with Northeast waning as North and waxing as East (and Southwest waxing as South and waning as West); partly canceling each other.

Recent geopolitics would seem to confirm such perspectives, making a complete mockery of East/West and North/South dichotomies.

### *Theory-thesis No. 2*

*Identify processes, events and permanents; use that to locate ruptures.*

*Process*, meaning change, is normal and natural: everything moves, flows, *panta rhei*. But the speed may differ. Given a human life-span and our limited perceptual capabilities, the differences between the speed with which mountains crumble away and glaciers move and the speed of electromagnetic waves – these do matter. There is mountain time, glacier time, biological time, social time (history), human time (biography), electron time. If a phenomenon measured in human time ‘for all practical purposes’ is constant, then we may refer to it as a *permanent*. The variable is a constant as a function of time.

There is also another distinction to be made. Changes show up against chronological time as continuous or discontinuous. In a continuous change the smaller the time interval, the smaller the change; in a discontinuous change, however, the change does not decrease with decreasing time intervals: instead, it escapes, it is ‘jumpy’. This jump shows up as an *event*. The variable is a discontinuous function of time.

So we are dealing with events, processes (in the sense of a continuous function of time) and permanents. All three are relative to human and social time; in the *Annales/Braudel* tradition of recent French historiography called *événemmentielle*, *conjuncturelle*, and *la longue durée* respectively. This becomes more interesting when we combine these three modes of temporal phenomena with each other, which we have to do to reflect, and reflect on, a reality where the parts are all moving, but in different modes.

Table 1.1 *Modes of Change, Two Variables*

	Events	Processes	Permanents
Events	<i>Actio-reactio</i> Event dialogue	Accelerating Decelerating	Releasing unstable equilibria; events
Processes	Enhancing, Dampening	Synergistic +, 0,-	<i>Ruptures</i> , producing events
Permanents	Dampening events	Dampening, from linear to cyclical	Coexistence

How do events (quick), processes (slow), and permanents (very slow) impact on events, processes, and permanents in the same system? This depends on the degree and kind of coupling between the phenomena; but some hypotheses are offered in Table 1.1.

First, the main diagonal of *same mode* phenomena, starting with two *sets of events* produced in two parts or ‘corners’ of the system. As they mirror, topologically, human action in general and speech in particular, both of which are discontinuous phenomena,

one representation would be as action or speech dialogue; in either case as *actio-reactio*. The two may be unrelated, but seeing them as related brings out new facets.

The same applies to two *processes*: the synergy may be zero, but the hypothesis that they could reinforce each other or dampen each other (not to mention reinforce one and dampen the other) can still be entertained and checked against upcoming reality. For two *permanents*, however, it is difficult to imagine anything but coexistence. There is something constant here and something constant there and that is it: like geography and race, measured in human time.

With phenomena proceeding in *different modes* everything becomes more lively. Events may impact greatly on processes and permanents. Launched at the right moment, they may be pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical, accelerating or decelerating processes. And they may impact even more on permanents – like the proverbial Inuit giving an iceberg perched in unstable equilibrium a little push into the ocean.

Most interesting is the impact a process can have on a permanent. If something changes gradually (continuously), and something else does not change at all, and the two are coupled together, then something will happen, sooner or later. One of them has to yield.

A yielding permanent is known as a *rupture* (in French). The, also proverbial, snow accumulating on the branch of a cherry tree is an example. Normally the snow falls off, given the rounded, slippery surface of the branch. But if the snow is wet it will also be sticky and hang on to the branch; the branch sloping downward will provide more opportunities for the snow to slide off, but may also eventually crack if it is too rigid. Martial arts start here.

This also serves as an illustration of how a permanent works on a process: by denying its linearity. The linear accumulation (snow on the branch) reaches a maximum (the space provided), is thwarted and the snow is sent downwards for melting, evaporation and returning in a second effort, a third, a fourth. A linear phenomenon is made cyclical, meaning dampened; and this is important since a finite world cannot accommodate unlimited linearity. What it can manage is *rupture*, or cyclicity, or both.

The *rupture* principle alluded to above is also known from Hegelian dialectics as the principle of transition from quantity (accumulation) to quality (the jump, the event, the *rupture*). This can be a reason, for instance, for peace movements never to give up, since the rupture with some violent structures will come sooner or later. On the other hand, they are in for the long haul, *la longue durée*, like deep politics in general.

How do processes and permanents impact on events? Permanents dampen their effect. Introduce a curricular reform, or increase teachers' salaries in an educational system surrounded by a non-changing, highly anti-educational media system, and see what happens. Chances are that permanents will cancel out events; one interpretation of the mechanism underlying the cynical but realistic *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

But processes may work differently on events. They may enhance the event, coming up from behind so to speak; or they may dampen it, coming down from the front, like the way events work on processes. The phenomenon is well known to politicians as the principle of *ripe time* or *right timing*, letting the event ride on the right process. Or, with some luck, the process may be happening anyhow. Either way synergies may then be brought about deliberately.

### *Theory-thesis No. 3*

*Build theories on structures and pattern recognition/isomorphism rather than single variables.*

A focus on diachrony, phenomena through time, should not overshadow the equally significant focus on synchrony, on phenomena in time, at the same time. If the mathematical language for diachronic phenomena is a *time series*, depicted as (interlocking) trajectories,

the mathematical language for synchronic phenomena would be *geometrical*. The overarching concept is a structure,  $S$ , defined as a set of elements,  $E$ , with a set of relations,  $R$ , relating those elements;  $S = S(E, R)$ . The relations may be divided into synchronic and diachronic, providing for both perspectives.

Another word for structure is *pattern*. Systems with the same structure, patterned the same way, are isomorphic. The test is whether corresponding elements are related in the two systems by corresponding relations, like the terrain and the map. In real life, as opposed to the purity (and sterility) of mathematics, isomorphisms are never perfect; but approximate, like metaphors.

#### *Theory-thesis No. 4*

*Prefer poly- and pan-theistic to mono- and a-theistic theories.*

In any type of theory something, the *explicandum*, is explained by something else, the *explicans*. The relation is logical, by inference. How do we explain ‘Socrates is mortal’? Because (major premise) ‘All men are mortal’ and (minor premise) ‘Socrates is a man’: hence ‘Socrates is mortal’ (the syllogism *barbara*). How do we explain peace among Nordic countries? Because of ‘high level of equitable symbiosis’ and ‘high level of conflict-solving machinery’; both being peace mechanisms, and the Nordics have them.

The *explicans* has a certain explanatory force. At the core of the *explicans* we find axioms, tenets of belief not in need of, or beyond, further explanation. In general we are talking about logical chains here, with the *explicans* in one context being the *explicandum* in another. An axiom has no *explicans*, being its own explanation. Rather than self-explanatory, it is Self-explanatory.

But that gives to axioms godlike characteristics. They are self-contained, their own explanation like god being his/her own cause (*causa sua*). They are omniscient, in the sense of containing all knowledge, if only partially revealed. They are omnipotent and omnipresent, capable of explaining everything everywhere. They radiate meaning. Like a transcendent god on top of the human condition, axioms do so from the top of the axiomatic pyramid, the deductive system. Even the humblest little empirical finding has some meaning bestowed upon it from the axioms, thereby fitting into the grand scheme like any little human fits into the scheme of god.

Underlying any theory there is an act of faith, for a simple reason. Even if the *explicandum* follows logically from the *explicans*, thereby deriving a reason for its empirical existence, a certificate to inhabit the world so to speak, the opposite is not necessarily the case. From ‘P implies Q’ it does not follow ‘Q implies P’ (the converse) – only ‘not-Q implies not-P’ (the contra-positive). Fruitfulness and usefulness as *explicans* do not add up to proof; neither of axioms, nor of god(s).

There may always be alternative explanations, the reason why this book is called ‘peace studies’, not ‘peace study’. This would argue strongly in favor of a polytheistic rather than a monotheistic conceptualization of theory-formation in the field, with explanatory force/light coming from multiple sources and not only from one.

There may be several models: one god/theory for this and one for that, or even several gods/theories for the same phenomenon. Yes, that might be to overexplain – but so what? If the Nordic peace community can be explained both in terms of equitable symbiosis (if this is called ‘interdependence’ then at least add ‘horizontal’) and in terms of conflict processing machinery, then two factors are highlighted that may explain different but at least partly overlapping aspects of the system. Or give two different explanations for the same thing. It is only in monotheist minds that theories exclude each other.

What would then correspond to pantheism and to atheism? Pantheism is all-permeating: God not above, but immanent, within. Translation: the meaning is in the *explicandum*

itself; that which is to be explained is its own explanation – not derived from above, but derived from itself. The Buddhist wheel, interlinking insights, giving prominence to none of them, neglecting none, illustrates this: the meaning is in the field spun by the insights. The corresponding symbol for monotheistic explanation from the top would be the pyramid or triangle.

Atheism proclaims there is no god. Translation: there is no meaning. All insights are scattered, solitary findings, devoid of inner connections. There is no explanation, nothing to be explained. In social science this would correspond to ‘barefoot empiricism’: get your findings off the computer, list them, one by one, do not even classify them since that in itself sheds light.

Of these four positions, the two extremes should be rejected. The idea of one theory, *the theory*, is an open invitation to cultural violence – neglecting all other truths, trying to fit reality into one truth only, lumping together all the others as ‘non-Western’, ‘non-Christian’, ‘non-Marxist’, etc. It almost inevitably leads to a school, *the school*, and with the head of the school as prophet. Since this school or church is seen as representing the only true god, singular and universal, structural violence in such an organization is inevitable. Mono-prophetism is an almost inevitable companion of monotheism, although Judaism is an interesting example of how monotheism is compatible with poly-prophetism, each one seeing different facets of Truth. Hence the highly dialogical Talmud!

But the idea of no meaning, no truth, no light at all is also incompatible with peace studies. Detached empirical findings with no sense attributed to them may be fascinating; but probably because they come with no explanation attached, inviting the reader/viewer to come up with his/her own interpretation. The fascination is not in the absence of meaning but in the act of creating meaning, breathing life into dead data.

For peace studies the world is not neutral. It is loaded with meaning, and a gradient from violence to peace – or from death to life, to state it more dramatically even if most of the world is *ad iafora*, ‘nonaligned’.

This leaves us with the polytheist and the pantheist options, with theoretical pluralism and shared meaning. There is no reason to choose between the two; they complement each other rather well.

## 1.7 On the Intellectual Style of Peace Studies

In a sense, the intellectual style is supposed to summarize all the above, trying to incorporate it into a coherent framework. There is a relative emphasis on *paradigms* (foundations), *data* (descriptions, what is in the world), *theories* (explanation, why is it in the world), *commentary* (what do others say about it, also the Talmudic tradition); *criticism* (viewing present reality in the light of peace values); *constructivism* (making space for a viable and attainable future); *education* (bringing more people into peace studies and research); *action* (the translation of all of this into peace-relevant praxis).<sup>7</sup>

What has been called the *Saxonic* style puts the emphasis on data; both the *Teutonic* and *Gallic* styles put the emphasis on theory and on paradigms; the *Nippionic* style on commentary, a pastime also engaged in by the others (additionally, Judaic, Islamic, Indic and Sinic intellectual styles are being explored). All engage in education, probably because that is the price to pay for university employment. And all are trained to abstain from criticism, constructivism, and action, unless they happen to be in certified applied sciences. If not, they have to break their way into it, not a very easy task.

What follows from the above section for all these eight points? In general terms, expand the intellectual profile so as to cover all of them. Break through that artificial

value barrier – by doing data, theory, and education from 9 am to 5 pm and anything that smacks of value from 5 pm to 9 am. Be a fully fledged student/researcher.

Essentially this is a plea for eclecticism, for combining different styles creatively. This shows up particularly clearly in the construction of theories, which in turn is a function of the whole view of reality.

Two positions can be described as follows. The first, more occidental: reality is atomistic, with parts that are separable and can be studied one by one; propositions reflecting the observed can be formulated and chained together in deductive theories. The second, more oriental: reality is holistic, with parts that can be studied only as part of a whole; in that whole there will be tensions, *yin/yang* being one discourse to express contradictions.

Peace studies takes two explicitly holistic stands – one on the unit side, one on the variable side. Thus, there is no point in studying countries (or other world actors) as if these were unrelated by ties of conflict and cooperation to other countries (and other actors). Peace studies is not only inter-state and inter-nation; it is an approach to world studies in the sense of trying to take in the total world system. And there is no point in studying that system only in terms of military, or political, or economic, or cultural variables: everything must be taken into consideration. Not only interdisciplinary, but holistic: trying to understand the rich web of contradictions in that *holon*.

On the other hand: the atomistic-deductive combination is also very effective, maybe as first approximation (so is holistic-deductive and atomistic-dialectic). That is why we spell out all combinations within a discourse, exploring all of them for possible insights. It is deductive. And sensible.

And finally, some comments on relative emphasis. The paradigms of peace research are of utmost importance. Concretely, this means the never-ending exploration of the term ‘peace’, checking the discourses surrounding ‘peace’ for over- and under-emphasis, and particularly for subjugation of discourses. We must draw upon all meanings of ‘peace’ in all corners of history and geography, using fully the transnational nature of peace studies.

When it comes to data, it can be argued that the transdisciplinary nature of peace studies would make it possible to draw upon data collected in the disciplines feeding into peace studies. This is correct up to a certain point; beyond that there is the need for data to verify the triadic spirals (Figure 1.1 in section 1.3 above).

Theories-construction (plural) is an endless enterprise, and absolutely crucial to that spiral. Commentary, on the other hand, is less important. There is an argument for unmediated knowledge, for starting afresh, not knowing ‘the literature in the field’ except after one’s own efforts, so as not to be too much steered by it.

Criticism and constructivism are as fundamental to peace studies as empiricism: hence full attention to both, as in empiricism. That this serves to guide peace education goes without saying. But the critical point is action based on skills.

At this point the most appropriate role-models are not engineers and architects, but physicians – for reasons to be explored in some detail. For that purpose we need paradigms, including for action. One point of departure is diagnosis–prognosis–therapy, which we meet again in the next chapter.

Peace studies demands an epistemology that sees the world as flexible, and that produces equally flexible images of that world.

5

## Notes

1. See Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Ideology* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977), ch. 2.

2. Actually, the name of the field, ‘international relations’ ('IR' for short) is a misnomer. ‘Inter-state relations’ is what is usually meant, and even so ‘inter-country relations’ would be better, the

State being only one organization inside the country with no monopoly on 'foreign affairs' in the age of the TNCs for Capital, and the INGOs or IPOs (international people's organizations) for Civil Society. Human beings are certainly also organized in nations, and nations relate, like Serbs and Croats in ex-Yugoslavia. A possible name for that discipline might be 'inter-nation' relations, avoiding the word 'ethnic', as it is mainly used about the nations of other peoples (like 'tribe'). 'International relations' sounds like all countries have become nation-states when in fact only about 20 (of 200) may be said to fall in the category of being uni-national. Why not use the term 'world studies' to cover all of this, like 'social studies' and 'human studies'?

3. For an exploration of the difference between Christianity-inspired and Buddhism-inspired epistemology, see Johan Galtung, 'Back to the Origins: on Christian and Buddhist Epistemology', pp. 15–27 in *Methodology and Development* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), ch. 1.1.

4. Thus, Margaret Mead stirred the imagination of entire generations with her accounts of the social situation in, for most people, very remote Pacific islands: *Growing Up in New Guinea, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies, Coming of Age in Samoa*. All these came together in her *Male and Female: a Study of the Sexes in a Changing World* (New York: Dell, Sixth Laurel Printing, 1973). Mead will survive her critics very well because of her basic point: the incredible variation in the uses of the human body, and how gender, attitudes, and behavior come in other combinations in other societies.

5. Named after Sir Robert Giffen (1837–1910) – although he was studying poor people buying bread when the price of bread went up (they bought more since they could not afford luxury goods), and not rich people buying goods for their snob value.

6. Of course, there is no argument that speech determines thought unambiguously. Any researcher is used to working with (peace or anything else, of) Type A, Type B, etc. But in the general mind the singular form of peace may also lead to singularist thinking about peace, for instance the classical children's drawing with a field, blue sky, sunshine and animals and children playing, with or without the lion and the lamb.

7. See Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Development* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), ch. 1; and *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. VI (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), ch. 14.

## 2

# Peace Studies: Some Basic Paradigms

### 2.1 The Diagnosis–Prognosis–Therapy Triangle Again

This language is obviously drawn from medical science, an applied science that took some centuries to get from the Scylla of under-recognition to the Charybdis of over-recognition. Peace studies has much to learn from all three stages. The non-recognition took two basic forms easily captured in the analytical framework above: what is rejected – the disease – should actually be desired because there is a meaning behind it, God's plan, difficult to grasp but the suffering will ennable you; and sheer dogmatism, ordaining blood-letting for a very wide range of diseases, proclaiming that it works without checking, or accepting the very low levels of success as the only level attainable. There was also the failure to explore alternative, competitive approaches to new realities, with new data, seeing the spiraling triangular process using empiricism, criticism, and constructivism as everlasting.

And then we are already at the other end: a profession possibly as dogmatic as those it replaced, an easy victim of its own success, closed to new approaches, clinging to 'school medicine'. The story is enlightening and discouraging. And yet, why should any special approach or group be granted eternal life? Or even reincarnation? Why not rebirth in some other form, inspired by the same guide-light, improvement of the human condition? Discontinuous ruptures with the past because old paradigms do not accommodate new data and particularly new theories, that is the normal process of science like so much else.

For some time now, the coming profession of peace workers has been knocking softly at the door of the disciplines essentially serving the interests of the rulers of nation-states, international law and international relations, announcing *your time is up!* There are good arguments against international law and security studies, with their ritualistic faith in 'national interests' and 'balance of power' as panaceas for regulating force in the state system, in spite of the notorious blood-letting that seems to follow in the wake of power accumulation. *Caveat:* If peace studies closes itself somebody will come knocking at that door too . . .

To return to the diagnosis–prognosis–therapy triangle, where there is much to learn. It mirrors the data–theory–values triangle. The diagnosis is databased analysis – part of the data being known as 'symptoms', another as 'anamnesis', the health–illness career of a patient, with context information. The prognosis consists of theory-based predictions of the likely course of an illness, given the context variables. And therapy is value- and theory-based intervention, generalizing from other cases, guided by values of negative health (becoming symptom-free) and positive health (building up resistance).

The diagnostic task is to map the patient, or more correctly certain aspects of the patient, on a set of diseases described in pathology texts. There are subdivisions, like categorizing strokes according to the blood-vessel affected. With the development of medicine as a science, the system for classifying has become more refined, with more descriptions (connotata) and fewer illnesses (denotata) per class and sub(sub-sub)-class.

The goal is a system where patients classified as suffering from the same illness will also be classified as having the same prognosis, *ceteris paribus*, and needing the same therapy, again *ceteris paribus*. This means mutual adjustment of the three sets of diagnoses (D), prognoses (P), and therapies (T). Change in one set, such as the emergence of a new therapy, will call for adjustments in D and P specifying the conditions for applying or justifying the therapy. There is always the case of the new therapy in search of a diagnosis when the gains from the therapy – money-wise, prestige-wise – are considerable, backed up by a somber prognosis; a thesis well known from peace studies (a new weapons system in search of a strategy in search of a conflict with a bad prognosis). The D,P,T triangle has a highly dynamic dialectic.

A prognosis is a trajectory through future time (the part tracing past time is the anamnesis) that yields the best estimate of the patient's illness/wellness situation. A gray zone between illness and wellness gives us a zero region on the ordinate, with a lower border between acceptable and unacceptable levels of illness and a higher border between unacceptable and acceptable levels of wellness. On the abscissa  $t=0$  means Now. The more serious the case, the lower down in the unacceptable illness region the trajectory will start. A downward or stable trajectory calls for intervention with the aim of healing; and more quickly, the lower the point of departure and the steeper the slope of the trajectory. There is a bottom line, called death – extinction – just as for violence. But there are no limits to health – just as for peace.

The goal set for an intervention, by Self (the patient) or by Other (the healers) is to bend the trajectory upwards:

*best outcome*: into the 'acceptable wellness' region, not only curing, but exiting with a wellness – positive health – surplus;

*second best*: into the 'unacceptable wellness' region, delivering the patient symptom-free but exiting with no wellness surplus;

*third best*: into the 'acceptable illness' region, delivering the patient with a chronic, long-lasting, but acceptable illness;

*fourth best*: away from death, delivering the patient with an unacceptable illness but alive, meaning prolongation of life.

All four can be termed 'successes', to varying degrees; the standard fourth-case criterion being five years' death-avoidance.

Underlying this is another division into four trajectories.

*Self-healing*: the trajectory turns upward by itself, through the self-healing capacity of the human body, mind, spirit.

*Other-healing*: there is intervention from the outside; the patient's self-healing capacity is seen as insufficient.

*The autistic case*: the trajectory is insensitive to Self- or Other-intervention; stable or sloping downwards. And then:

*The lethal case*: the trajectory turns downward by itself, regardless of Self- and Other-healing, hitting that bottom line.

Ultimately, aging makes us all hit that line.

There are a number of weaknesses in this thinking: There is a classificatory system, D, for illnesses, but no classificatory system for wellnesses. Why health in the singular but disease also in the plural? Why is it that a person can suffer from several diseases, but not enjoy several healths? Why this asymmetry, just like for war and peace?

Like all correct classifications the fourfold division into illness-wellness,

acceptable-unacceptable aims at being exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The problem is that there can be illness in wellness (a sense of superiority? carelessness? insensitivity to the illness of both Self and Others?) and wellness in illness (the negations of the above, and the spiritual values derived from some suffering, probing outer and inner limits of the human condition).

And then comes the basic problem: the D,P,T triangle is resting on top of concrete, specific life, in all its enormous complexity and contexts. The point of departure is not a disease, but in human medicine a specific human being, in a specific context. By defining that person as a *patient* a certain role-behavior has been prescribed with the patient accepting Other-healing, taking the person out of the usual social system context and into a health system context – with low relevance given to the former and high to the latter.

This process of abstraction is then carried further by defining the patient – who is still a human being – as a *case*, complete with anamnesis, diagnosis, prognosis, and suggested therapy. Only through abstraction is generalization possible, meaning the mapping of that human being on an element in *D*, mapped on elements in *P* and *T*. Such abstraction/generalization is indispensable for the whole system to work. The question is how much is lost in that process of human/social relevance, and of illness-wellness relevance.

One problem is easily solved within this paradigm, however. There is no assumption of single-valued mapping, that a patient has only one disease, that a disease can have only one prognosis, that to a disease/prognosis combination there corresponds only one therapy. A patient can suffer from more than one disease, with important synergistic effects. Old people often do, having some chronic, some acute diseases. Aging expresses itself as accumulation of multiple diseases with none of them being *the* disease, the root of a causal tree branching into the other diseases. And even if only one disease is identified, multiple prognoses are still possible, meaning that there is uncertainty about the future. Of course, multiple therapies can also be prescribed, not only for multiple diseases but for the single disease, ‘to be on the safe side’. And added to this comes the distinction between positive and negative health.

Peace studies has much to learn from the paradigm. Here let us note just one point: conceiving of diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy in the plural, adjusting them to each other. Much thought, speech, and action in the field of violence/peace diagnoses violence, but then only as direct and physical, and mainly the acute case. The prognosis is that, unless treated, violence will be repeated. The therapy is either incapacitation of the body, with castration, lobotomy, chemotherapy (or even elimination in extreme cases); or punishment after an adjudication process, for individual and/or general prevention, often done in such a way that it also serves the purpose of incapacitation through exile or incarceration.

A very simplistic scheme indeed: one disease, one prognosis, two therapies. The folkloristic aphorisms for the two therapies are *attack is the best defense*, and *violence is the only language he understands* – with *si vis pacem, para bellum* for prevention.

Translation: ‘I don’t know any other language he speaks.’

What we need in peace studies is a much more refined classificatory scheme for all three. The catch-all formula of ‘violence’ has to be subjected to considerable refinement and specification. As to prognosis, all the trajectories noted earlier make sense once we have defined peace surplus and deficit. And we may find that the prognostic folklore, *violence breeds violence*, holds up better empirically than the therapeutic pieces, both violent, mentioned above. What we need would be nonviolent therapies.

But it is the set of therapies, the answers to ‘so what; what are you going to do about it?’ that is the ultimate test of whether peace studies has come of age. A rich set of active intervention routines with an adequate correspondence to the set of diagnoses is called for; and we are far away from that. Or, is it mainly a question of bringing dispersed knowledge together? And of using several nonviolent therapies?

Or a more strategic question, knowing what to do, why and how and in addition when and where, by whom and to or with whom, and, perhaps also against whom? What and why is the problem of peace research, using the D,P,T approach above as a paradigm underlying the epistemologies explored. How is the basic problem of peace action. But when and where, from whom and to whom will also have to be parts of the general theory of peace action, which is what we are talking about. For that, we need maps of the social reality in which violence and peace can unfold.

## 2.2 How Could Peace Researchers Do Peace Work (Therapy)?

Let us first ask: where would peace researchers act to promote peace? Of the many answers, some of them, using a very simple map of society, may serve as a first approximation. Later on more complete maps will be given.

Let us use a model with two classes and two countries; we refer to the classes as 'elite' and 'people', and the countries as A and B (adding more classes and countries changes nothing). Inserting peace researchers in A and B we get Figure 2.1.

There are many possibilities for peace researchers to act. But first we need to discard the non-possibility: peace researchers talking with each other only, at institute seminars, national or international academic associations, etc. We may now progress listing six possibilities.

Figure 2.1 *Channels of Influence*

	COUNTRY A	COUNTRY B
ELITES	Elites A	Elites B
RESEARCHERS	Peace Research A	Peace Research B
PEOPLE	People A	People B

1 *Peace Research-Elite, own country* This is the classical channel of influence, *dem Kurfürsten etwas in den Ohren zuflüstern*, whether the initiative is taken by the elites or by the researchers. Dialogue should be the goal, but elites tend to seek advice that can be accommodated within their own paradigms, not advice they might identify with the opposition or with opposed countries. They will generally see researchers as producers of premises, not of conclusions, and as servants, not as dialogue partners.

If we now can assume that elite conclusions will lie within 'peace by peaceful means' there is no problem, as long as the public nature of peace knowledge is kept in mind. If knowledge has to be kept secret, then it cannot be peace knowledge since the assumption must be that others should not partake of it. This marginalizes others – meaning that structural violence is operating. Behind that lurks the possibility, or at least suspicion, of direct and/or cultural violence at work, in the form of knowledge of means of violence or patterns of thinking etc. that cannot meet the public eye and ear. This suspicion is not irrational in a world where the political class, owners or administrators of states, see themselves as having monopoly both on the ultimate means of force and on the ultimate decisions in foreign affairs. These two find a ready combination in wars.

**2 Peace Research–People, own country** This is also known as peace education or popular education. In a foreign policy crisis like the Cold War or the Gulf crisis it might take the specific form of relating to peace movements, in three ways.

Model 2.1 would see the peace movement as essentially uneducated, possibly also uneducable, and do top-down, one-way education; lecturing at the movement.

Model 2.2 would see the peace movement as infallible, being popular, and engage in bottom-up premise-production for conclusions (e.g., disarmament) drawn by the peace movement.

Model 2.3 would reject 2.1 as non-democratic and 2.2 as capitulationist, giving up the academic freedom to search and then research. The alternative is dialogue with the people, always retaining complete academic freedom.

**3 Peace Research–People–Elites, own country** This is a two-step channel: the researchers communicating with the people, who then exercise pressure on the elites. This may easily be the most effective channel, at least if there is adequate access to media, if the country is not too big, and if there is a generally democratic ethos. The latter is not the same as a democratic election system, as the parties or persons standing for election may have stands on issue-bundles rather than on single issues, and peace issues may not enjoy the first priority on people's minds. A referendum might put the peace issue up front.

**4 Models 1, 2, and 3, other country** This would be the same, only operating in another country. As the peace *problématique* among countries is international it should be promoted at all points. There is no good reason for limiting action on a global problem to one's own country, which may have very intransigent elites or be relatively insignificant even if the elites should adopt peace policies. Dialogue with elites in other countries can be very sensible also because this does not involve a national position–opposition divide. Dialoguing with people in other countries might have the same function with regard to that divide in that other country. And the indirect channel to elites via their own people may sometimes work better than in one's own country, bringing in new perspectives. If there is a double opposition at work – with the people in B being against the elites in B who are against the elites in A – the latter may even appreciate the contact with the people in B: my enemy's enemy is my friend. Not that this is so peaceful, however.

**5 Model 4 internationally** This means peace researchers acting together in conjunction and partly through an internationalized peace movement, carrying out people's diplomacy, the civil society's diplomacy, to exercise pressure on elites wherever they are, and whether or not they have shared interests. This is pretty much what happened at the end of the Cold War, with the peace researchers as an intelligentsia for the peace movement, both groups loosely unified, exercising pressure on Stalinist and nuclearist elites that were not unified at all. The weakest collapsed first; the second might have followed if only the pressure could have been maintained.

**6 All models combined** Obviously, eclecticism is the best approach here. We live in a militarized world that is prone to use direct violence backed up by the structural and cultural violence of heavily institutionalized military–bureaucratic–corporate–intelligentsia complexes and strongly internalized militarist ideologies. To point out the counter-productive nature of violence and that there are alternatives makes sense in all channels, and they can only reinforce each other. Indeed, one insight gained from the end of the Cold War might be exactly that peace cannot be obtained through the action of elites alone (the Helsinki process, in many ways impressive, somehow ended in limbo), nor through the action of people's movements alone (both the dissident and the peace movements had

been going on for a long time), but through the action of both combined (the dissident movement–peace movement–Gorbachev triangle). Here we have a point to be made often: redundancy is preferable in this field to too much scarcity.

### **2.3 Peace Research Paradigm I: Six Spaces, Inter/Intra Systems**

*Systematics* is an indispensable exercise in any science, exemplified by such luminaries as Linnaeus for plants and Mendeleev-Meyer for the elements in the periodic table. The subject-matter of the discipline is subdivided, and that division should satisfy the old criteria for good classifications: being reasonably mutually exclusive, exhaustive and based on a *fundamentum divisionis* (for Linnaeus, the number of flower parts that produce and receive male sex cells; for Mendeleev, the atomic number). Good systematics should serve four purposes: be a map of the field defining it by listing the subdivisions that fall under the *optique* of that discipline; by serving as a guide for data-collection; for theory-formation; and for organizing research reports in an easily retrievable way. These four purposes should be served by the same scheme; the first three generating new research, the fourth organizing the old.

First some words about roads *not* to be taken.

Conceptualization in terms of geographical location – whether of the problem explored or of the author – runs contrary to the *globalism* of peace studies. And conceptualization according to discipline leads to systematics with psychological, economic–sociological–politological–anthropological, international relations–law approaches, which runs contrary to the *holism* of peace studies. The old disciplinary structure would carry over into a new discipline in search of its own perspectives, whether referred to as transdisciplinary or as a new discipline. Multidisciplinarity, with an inner dialogue across disciplinary borders, is only an early phase.

Another approach would be to ask researchers in the field how they themselves define what they are doing – for instance, as expressed in the list of commissions of the International Peace Research Association. The approach is democratic, and excellent for defining study commissions. But there would be no underlying conceptual scheme, no *fundamentum divisionis*, no overall, possibly holistic, view. On the other hand, a holistic view may also be artificial, even a strait-jacket for people in the fields having themselves defined, by intension or extension, their own specialty. Both of these are legitimate, both can be used for dialogues, and as mutual check-lists.

What I propose is an approach that takes as a point of departure the view of peace studies as an applied science similar to medical studies or health science, informed by an underlying D,P,T-paradigm (diagnosis, prognosis, therapy). Let us recall:

*Diagnosis* is the mapping of an empirical system on a set of states of suffering (*dukkha*, ill-ness, dis-ease; violence); and on a set of states of bliss, life-enhancement (*sukha*, well-ness, ease, health, peace), defined negatively as absence of suffering, or positively as enhancement of life. Or both.

*Prognosis* is a prediction about the trajectory of that system over time, usually from *dukkha* toward *sukha*, from illness to health, from violence to peace; distinguishing between self-healing, or automaticity, and intervention.

*Therapy* is that intervention, whether by Self, Other, or both, and closely related to diagnosis and prognosis. The therapies can be preventive, *ex ante* (*dukkha*) or *ex post*, as curative therapies. Or both – but not neither one, nor the other.

One way of measuring the maturity of an applied science would be through the level of differentiation, roughly speaking the cardinal measure, in the three sets of diagnoses, prognoses and therapies; a second the precision of the mapping of these three sets on each

other; a third the accuracy of the prognoses with or without intervention; a fourth the adequacy of the therapies. We are still far away from this in peace studies; and there remain important philosophical problems about feasibility and desirability to clarify.

But the present sad state of affairs (diagnosis: trouble; prognosis: things are getting worse; therapy: call the police/the Marines/UN intervention) is not worthy of *Homo sapiens*.

Thus, our point of departure is as follows:

- diagnosis: states of violence;
- prognosis: processes of violence; increase, same, decrease;
- therapy: processes of violence reduction (negative peace);  
processes of life enhancement (positive peace).

One place for peace studies to start would be by clarifying violence, or suffering, with the questions:

*What is the cause of violence? What are the effects of violence?*

We could also start in the peace end, asking:

*What is the cause of peace? What is the effect of peace?*

Either way we will need a typology broad enough for the answers. A minimum typology would make use of these six spaces: *Nature, Person, Social, World, Culture, Time*. Added to this comes the *intralinter* system distinction, like between *intra-personal dialectic* and *inter-personal relations*.

Combining spaces and systems, then, we arrive at 12 factors, as set out in Table 2.1. This will be spelt out in some detail in Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.1 *Systematization I of Peace and Conflict Studies*

Space	Intra	Inter	Violence	Negative peace	Positive peace
Nature					
Person					
Social					
World					
Culture					
Time					
	Inner dialectic	Outer relation	Life-reduction	Reducing reduction	Life-enhancement

Sub-typologies can now be suggested for the six spaces:

- Nature (N): humans, animals, plants, micro-organisms, viruses.  
 Person (P): needs for survival, well-being, freedom, identity  
               (categories that may also apply to sentient nature).  
 Social (S): nature, gender, generation, race, class, nation, country.  
 World (W): Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, Southeast;  
               territorial (state-system),  
               non-territorial (capital, civil society, people).

- Culture (C): Occident I, Occident II,  
Indic, Buddhic, Sinic, Nipponic.<sup>1</sup>  
Time (T): intra-time, *kairos*; and inter-time, *khronos*.

This scheme can then be simplified to distinguish between nature, actor, structure, culture, and time, violence or peace.

*Nature violence* would originate in nature, including in the human body, and be unintended (by any human subject).

*Actor or direct violence* is defined in person, social, and world spaces and is intended, by individuals acting singly or inside collectivities.

*Structural or indirect violence* is defined as built into the person, social and world spaces and is unintended.

*Cultural violence* serves to legitimize direct and structural violence, motivating actors to commit direct violence or to omit counteracting structural violence; can be intended or unintended.

*Time violence* means negative impacts on future life generations. Extreme case: life is no longer reproducible ('sustainable').

Direct violence can be divided into *verbal* and *physical*, and violence harming the *body*, *mind* or *spirit*. All combinations leave behind traumas that may carry violence over time.

Structural violence divides into *political*, *repressive* and *economic*, *exploitative*; supported by structural *penetration*, *segmentation*, *fragmentation* and *marginalization*. In addition, there is also the *horizontal structural violence* of being too tightly related, and of being too loosely or even unrelated. Structures can be too dominant (vertical), too tight (horizontal) too much (both/and), and too little (neither one, nor the other).

Cultural violence divides by content: *religion*, *law and ideology*, *language*, *art*, *empirical science*, *cosmology* (*deep culture*) and by carriers: *schools*, *universities*, *media*.

Intended violence can originate only in (human) persons, as individuals or inside collectivities, in social and world spaces; sometimes using natural, structural, and cultural violence. But the harmful effects of intended violence can be found everywhere – in humans, in sentient nature, in non-sentient nature, and in damaged structures and cultures, also as time violence. Violence also hurts and harms the non-sentient parts of the world, being broader than *dukkha*. There exist special terms for extreme cases:

- ecocide*: extreme violence against nature;
- suicide*: direct, terminal violence against Self;
- homicide*: direct, terminal violence against Other;
- genocide*: direct, terminal violence against an entire people;
- structurocide*: destruction of a structure; destructurelation;<sup>2</sup>
- culturocide*: destruction of a culture; deculturation;<sup>3</sup>
- omnicide*: all of the above.

*Negative peace* is the absence of violence of all kinds.

Absence of structural violence cannot be interpreted as no structure at all, meaning no outer, no inner relation. The inner human dialectic is forever; as people we can escape from others, but not from ourselves. And no outer relation is no solution; hence the search for horizontal structures, without and within.

Here is a typology for positive peace, also beyond *sukha*:

*Nature peace* is species cooperation, not struggle.

*Direct positive peace* would consist of verbal and physical kindness, good to the body, mind and spirit of Self and Other; addressed to all basic needs, survival, well-being, freedom and identity. Love is the epitome of this: a union of bodies, minds and spirits.

*Structural positive peace* would substitute freedom for repression and equity for exploitation, and then reinforce this with *dialogue* instead of penetration, *integration* instead of segmentation, *solidarity* instead of fragmentation, and *participation* instead of marginalization. Some large, vertical (alpha) structures may be necessary, but small, horizontal (beta) structures are more beautiful (avoiding too much structuration). This also holds for *inner peace*: the task is to bring about the harmony of body, mind, and spirit. Key: outer and inner dialogue with oneself.

*Cultural positive peace* would substitute legitimation of peace for the legitimation of violence; in religion, law, and ideology; in language; in art and science; in schools, universities, and the media; building a positive peace culture. In the inner space of the Self, this means to open for several human inclinations and capabilities, not repressing.

The sixth space, *time*, is the medium in which any system moves or undergoes process, increasing or decreasing violence or peace, or *dukkha* and *sukha*, beyond human agency, or moved by intervention, by Self and/or by Other. Time violence, or ‘temporal violence’, also makes sense as peace processes moving too slowly, or violence processes too quickly; or as processes that are badly coordinated. There are no limits to peace, just as there are no limits to violence. Omnipeace is as meaningful as omnicide. *Pax omnium cum omnibus*, not *bellum omnium contra omnes* should be the key slogan of our culture. It is not.

This discourse with six spaces and intra/inter systems (twelve combinations) is useful. A discourse is an intellectual framework within which alternative theories can be formulated; a theory is an interconnected set of hypotheses; an hypothesis excludes some combination and is falsified by its empirical appearance. But a discourse excludes that which cannot be formulated; it should accommodate thought, not subjugate, silence it.

These theorems are easily accommodated in this discourse:

- *Violence of any kind breeds violence of any kind.*
- *Peace of any kind breeds peace of any kind.*
- *Positive peace is the best protection against violence.*

More particularly, direct violence breeds itself through revenge and offensive deterrence; structural violence breeds itself through cloning and completion; cultural violence breeds itself through cloning and completion; direct violence can be used to build structural violence; structural violence leads to revolutionary and counter-revolutionary direct violence; and cultural violence legitimizes all of the above.

The scheme in Table 2.2 is actually very simple. DV and SV, DP and SP have six subdivisions (N,P,S,W,C,T); CV and CP have eleven each, altogether  $4 \times 6 + 2 \times 11 = 46$ . Then there are sub-subdivisions for N,P,S,W,C,T and for the cultural subdivisions. And so on.

One basic point is that peace studies presupposes violence studies. If violence is the problem and peace is the solution, remedy, then each side calls for research, education, and action.

To test the scheme, let us see how topics like militarism, ecology, democracy, and patriarchy would be accommodated.

*Militarism* would be located in the DV–SV–CV column with arms and deployment for

Table 2.2 *Systematization II of Peace and Conflict Studies: Some Examples of Fields of Education, Research, Action*

<b>Direct violence (DV)</b>	<b>Direct (positive) peace (DP)</b>
N: 'survival of the fittest'	N: 'mutual aid and cooperation'
P: violence to Self, suicide	P: intra-, inter-personal growth
S: violence across fault-lines	S: nonviolent liberation
W: war geography; genocide	W: peace movements; alternative defense
C: culturocide	C: cultural liberation
T: history and future of violence, war	T: history and future of peace
<b>Structural violence (SV)</b>	<b>Structural (positive) peace (SP)</b>
N: ecocide	N: non-homocentric eco-peace
P: psychopathologies	P: intra-, inter-personal peace
S: patriarchy, racism, class	S: development, parity, equity
W: imperialism, trade	W: peace regions; governance, UN
C: cultural imperialism	C: cultural coexistence
T: history and future of exploitation and repression	T: sustainability of the above
<b>Cultural violence (CV)</b>	<b>Cultural (positive) peace (CP)</b>
Religion: transcendent	Religion: immanent
Law: democracy, human rights	Law: democracy, human rights
Ideology: universalist, singularist	Ideology: particularist, pluralist
Language: sexist, racist	Language: humanist/non-speciesist
Art: patriotic, patriarchic	Art: humanist/non-speciesist
Science I: Western logic?	Science I: Daoist? Buddhist?
Science II: to destroy life	Science II: to enhance life
Cosmology: Occident I? Sinic?	Cosmology: Occident II? Indic?
Nipponic?	Buddhic?
School: militarization	School: peace education
University: militarization	University: peace study and research
Media: war-violence journalism	Media: peace journalism

military W intervention, supported by such structures in S as industrial complexes, legitimized by patriotic and patriarchic elements in C and by patriotism in schools, military training in universities. Militarism should be studied in space and time, geography and history, and relative to the dialectic with the DP-SP-CP column: *demilitarization*.

*Ecology* and eco-crisis in general is direct violence against nature, e.g., in war; the structural violence of industry and agro-industry; and the cultural patterns legitimizing this; again in relation to the corresponding peace categories.

*Democracy* (like *human rights*) is an institution, meaning a set of legal rules that as culture may or may not legitimize direct or structural peace or violence/war. This will have to be examined in all six spaces, and cannot be decided a priori.

*Patriarchy* is structural violence with men on top and women lower down, expressing itself in S and W as countless forms of violence against women, legitimized by certain cultural patterns; again to be understood relative to its peaceful negations.

Thus, a topic is spread over several points in the system, but a concrete study may be more limited. Systematics serves as a challenge to complete the study, bringing in more aspects.

How, then, do we classify the eighteen commissions set up by the International Peace Research Association, IPRA?

- *Communications.* A form of interaction in S and W; and a study of media as carriers of peace/war culture.
- *Conversion issues.* Demilitarization of hardware and software aspects of militarism, for civilian purposes.
- *Defense and Disarmament.* Security (low probability of war in W), reducing offensive and increasing defensive defense.
- *Ecological Security.* Resolution of conflicts in P, S, and W arising from eco-crisis in N, to prevent outbreak of violence.
- *Food Policy.* One of the most basic needs in P in its relation to the whole DV/DP, SV/SP and CV/CP scheme.
- *Human Marginalization in the Global Political Economy.* One basic aspect of structural violence in W, and its implications.
- *Human Rights and Development.* A particular institution (set of legal rules) and its relation to structural peace in M and S, potentially also in N and W, and in T (sustainability).
- *Internal Conflicts and Their Resolution.* Creative conflict transformation as the alternative to violence in S (not in W).
- *International Conflict Resolution.* Creative conflict transformation as the alternative to violence in W (not in S).
- *War Termination and Peace-Building in the Middle East.* All of the above and below (and more) in the Middle East.
- *Nonviolence.* Direct peace in all fields through peaceful means, in the context of (threats of) major violence.
- *Peace Education and University Peace Studies.* Education and study at all levels as a way of transforming the culture.
- *Peace Movements.* Movements in civil society in S and W for direct, structural, and cultural peace in S and W.
- *Refugees.* The plight of people forced by crisis in N, S, and W to leave their homes; violence victims in general.
- *Religion and Conflict.* A major aspect of culture in its role as legitimizer of direct or structural violence or peace.
- *Changes in Eastern Europe.* All of the above (and more) in Eastern Europe in the present process of transformation.
- *Women and Peace.* All of the above (and more) relative to one division in S; patriarchy and its deconstruction.
- *Peace and Japan.* All of the above (and more), for Japan.

These 18 commissions have their own definitions; the task of (re)defining is always a major aspect of research activity. Here the point is only that all the IPRA commissions can be accommodated in the discourse suggested here. Three of them are non-global by being area-specific (Middle East, Eastern Europe, Japan) which is quite reasonable. No commission is non-holistic by being discipline-specific. More commissions could be suggested (P, e.g. inner peace; T, e.g. macro-history; C, more aspects of culture). There is so much work to be done!

There are some serious omissions: *general peace theory* (protection and enhancement of the basic needs of nature and human beings), *general conflict theory* (what happens when goals of goal-seeking systems are incompatible) and *general development theory* (reproducible implementation of needs and goals). The same applies to *foundations* and *epistemology/methodology*, also to be added to the two schemes presented here. In order for peace studies to take on new problems (Gulf, Eastern Europe, Somalia, Rwanda, Chiapas), general expertise is indispensable. The end of the Cold War also meant the end for many a peace researcher.<sup>4</sup> An IPRA Peace Theory Commission is emerging.

## 2.4 Peace Studies from Peace Knowledge to Peace Skills

Peace is transition from left to right in Systematizations I and II of peace studies. Peace studies may contribute through research-based knowledge. But studies alone do not halt direct violence, dismantle violent structures, nor do they build direct, structural, and cultural peace. Skilled people do; and *skills = how-to knowledge + imagination + compassion + perseverance*.

To build direct and structural peace, action is needed; and the medium in which it all unfolds is *time*, both as *kairos* and as *khronos*. Engineers may know what is wrong with a bridge and what an adequate bridge looks like. But action, like a lot of welding, is needed to go from A to B; a task given to 'workers', whereas in medicine the surgeon with a scalpel may do all three. Both are professions. Engineering is high on knowledge and low on skills, hence the need for workers low on knowledge and high on skills. The medical profession is high on both, of course with nurses and patterns of internal division of labor.

There are compelling arguments for integrating knowledge and skills in the same person: two-way direct transfer between theory and practice, taking on personal responsibility – as opposed to demanding action from others – so as to achieve a more peaceful world. But there are also some arguments for division of labor.

Above all, there is no argument here against pure peace studies, peace research, peace science; unimpeded by the demand for immediate and workable implementations. Experience shows that there will always be serendipities like unintended practical payoffs when pure knowledge is pursued. Nor is that an argument against opening for peace skills in addition to peace knowledge.

How the present author would systematize a one-year course in peace knowledge and peace skills flows easily from the second systematization above:

Basics:	General Violence Theory Conflict Formations Epistemology	General Peace Theory Conflict Transformations Methodology
Special:	Direct Violence Structural Violence I: <i>Exploitation</i> Structural Violence II: <i>Repression</i> Cultural Violence	Direct Peace Structural Peace I: <i>Economic Justice</i> Structural Peace II: <i>Political Justice</i> Cultural Peace

Structural violence and peace are here divided into the violent or peaceful exercise of economic and political power, and six basic courses have been added, altogether fourteen courses. In a shorter version the *yin* and the *yang* sides, the problems and the remedies, may be combined into one course, and we get seven courses. Or only the first four courses – as an ultra-short introduction.

The classical training offered by diplomatic academies and the like defies globalism by focusing on area studies, defined in such a way that Center and Periphery are fragmented intellectually ('Latin America' without studying the USA; 'Eastern Europe' without studying the EU), which in turn makes the structures invisible. Holism is defied by conceiving of an 'expert' as a person firmly rooted in a traditional discipline. The general perspective on conflict and peace is legalistic, without questioning law as one more source of structural and cultural violence (but also potentially of structural and cultural peace); military power, intervention, is legitimized as a last recourse, with insufficient knowledge and attention to alternatives; economic power (sanctions and positive offers

as sticks and carrots) is conceived of within mainstream economics, itself a major legitimizer of economic structural violence; political power is seen in terms of an uncritical democratic theory; and cultural power is either not considered at all or increased by a pattern of 'we studying them' (area studies). In short, not only is this training of diplomats heavily ideologically biased with easily predictable conclusions, but also simply outdated.

There is ample room for modernization, and the present scheme is one possibility. The classical combination of area studies (including linguistic competence), legalism, 'realism' (focus on violence rather than nonviolence), focus only on inter-country conflict, and one or two mainstream disciplines – that is a recipe for inadequacy.

Badly needed in the world would be postgraduate training, in as many places as possible, for a *Master of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, similar to Master of Business Administration. There is no substitute for creative conflict resolution in the search for peace. Unresolved conflict may lead to frustration, which may lead to aggression, which may lead to violence. To strengthen peace and conflict resolution further, we might also add development; but that field is so vast that separate degrees might be better. In both degrees, due attention should be paid to the interface between peace and development; and to the significance of civilization (culture) as a context to be taken into account and as a major cause of both violence and peace.

In all courses both knowledge and skills would be developed. Knowledge can be developed vertically (lectures), horizontally (seminars and discussions) and horizontally among students, and among professors (colloquia). The latter two are often missing at US universities – at great cost to professors and students alike. But how about 'how-to', imagination, compassion and perseverance? Universities are weak on all four, particularly the last two.

In the end there is no substitute for field training and practice, in direct, structural, and cultural social reality. That will have to be a part of second-year training, and/or in having practice as a prerequisite for entering such courses. But reality can also be brought into the classroom through *witnesses*, or *audio-visual* media; it can be simulated as *paper and pencil exercises* with descriptions of problem situations, demanding remedy prescriptions with action directives and consequence analysis; and *gaming/simulation* – whether of the computer–computer, computer–human or human–human varieties (*role-playing*).

In addition to (not instead of) all the above, *theater*, much more holistic than role-playing, should be used, mirroring situations from real or imagined life, with the participants both writing and enacting the drama. A class divided into small groups writing and acting on the same theme, or being given 'six characters in search of an author' (to borrow from Pirandello) would yield ample basis for comparison and further development. A team discussing how to write about a conflict is itself in some kind of conflict, which adds to the depth of the experience. Ideally, the play should cover a whole cycle of related events; and of course be the subject of extensive discussion afterwards.

In conclusion, where in S and W would people with this kind of training be able to act for negative and positive peace?

The answer flows from another subdivision of S and W into *state* (government-bureaucracy) *capital* (corporation) and the *civil society* of people and people's informal and formal organizations of all kinds; the latter known in W as NGOs. One of the three – the state – has a monopoly on violence and easily becomes more prone to use violence ('to the man with a hammer the world looks like a nail') in a 'situation'; in much the same way TNCs would use capital, and people's organizations would use people's moral, nonviolent power, including civil disobedience.

Peace specialists could work in all six:

- in governments and intergovernmental organizations, and the UN, including the municipal level which has great peace potentials;

- in national and transnational corporations (TNCs);
- in national and international people's organizations (IPOs).

In the state-system, including the UN, the focus might be more on preventing the use of violence by pointing out alternatives; in the others, more on enacting those alternatives.

A short list of future employers of peace specialists includes:

- in local government, for local conflict;
- in ministries of foreign affairs and defense for more creative world and foreign policy;
- in the UN and other intergovernmental organizations, where they would be ideally suited;
- in national and transnational corporations to make the economy more cooperative and focused on basic human needs;
- in national and international people's organizations such as churches and trade unions;
- in schools, universities, and the media.

## 2.5 Peace Research Paradigm II: Body–Mind–Structure–Culture

One problem with the systematics, and Paradigm I, given in section 2.3 above, is its complexity. The discourse is very rich, as can be seen from Table 2.3:

Table 2.3 *A Synopsis of Paradigm I: the 12-Factor Discourse*

Space	Intra (inner dialectic)	Inter (outer relations)
Nature	Intra-species Evolution	Inter-species Anti-biosis, symbiosis
Person	Inner conflict Inner peace	Inter-personal, e.g., marital relations
Social	Intra-social dialectic Social fault-lines	International relations conflict and cooperation
World	Intra-world dialectic World fault-lines	Inter-planetary relation (empirically empty)
Culture	Intra-cultural dialectic Birth–maturity–death	Inter-cultural dialogue Antithesis, synthesis
Time	<i>Kairos</i> : biological time, subjective time	<i>Khronos</i> : physical time, inter-subjective time

The intra-inter distinction is fundamental, bringing out two different but not mutually exclusive analytical perspectives: dialectic, inner tensions, contradictions, *yin/yang*; and a relational perspective between distinct units. Fault-lines in the social and world spaces play a major role in conflict analysis.

Three perspectives for hypotheses about violence and peace:

- 1 *Causality*: violence/peace originates in one place, for instance in the intra-personal (Freudian) or intra-social, class (Marxist) or intra-social, 'Volk' (Hitlerite); and is acted out elsewhere.

- 2 *Isomorphism*: each space can serve as a metaphor for the other, being sufficiently structurally similar to generate hypotheses.
- 3 *Causal isomorphism*: patterns are transferred between spaces by individual or collective, conscious or subconscious learning.

Referring to Table 2.3, we should note that the causal hypothesis is usually applied horizontally, with stress accumulating inside and then being ‘acted out’ in the same space: inner conflicts coming out in marital relations; class and national conflicts being acted out internationally; our highly contradictory world possibly uniting against other planets; non-creative cultures taking it out on other cultures; and a *kairos* (such as individual or collective trauma) being transmitted through *khronos* as lasting disposition.

The isomorphism hypothesis is usually applied vertically, in the intra column, or in the inter column. If we assume ten fault-lines in a social space of human beings (species/nature, gender, generation, race, class, nation, territory, and the three edges of the state–civil society–capital triangle), and nine fault-lines in a world space of countries (species/nature, seniority, race, class, civilization, region, and the three edges of the IGO–IPO–TNC triangle) – only nine because gender among human beings in social space does not have a clear homologue in world space – then we can find many parallels, trivial and non-trivial. If in addition we see a person from the somatic point of view as a giant cell world, even with some cells growing at the expense of others (cancer, known as exploitation in S and W), there is much to learn. The Freudian architecture of the mind – in terms of id, ego and super-ego – also has S and W parallels.

But most interesting is the causal use of isomorphisms through learning; for example the ‘Social Darwinism’ hypothesis from Nature space, which is projected into other spaces as a norm in the deep culture (cosmology) and becomes a cause in itself. Paradigm I is basic to peace studies. But let us simplify, and bring the discourse closer to the direct–structural–cultural violence/peace and military–economic–political–cultural power discourses. With (vertical) structural violence splitting into two types – economic (exploitation) and political (repression) – they are very similar. To come to grips with peace and violence, an irreducible, minimum discourse extracted from Paradigm I would have to include human nature (N) and culture (C). But how about P, S, and W – the person, social and world spaces? We certainly need the inner person relative to other persons, from P. But we could combine S and W under the broad heading ‘structure’. Time, T, is brought in via the indispensable DPT triangle; therapy being a diagnosis-based effort to turn a prognosis toward peace.

With these four factors – *body, mind, structure, culture* – we have not abandoned Paradigm I completely, only simplified it. Indeed, the discourse is now so simple that reductionism to one factor, or rather to one syndrome of factors, is dangerously close. A single-minded focus on (human) biology (‘biologism’), human psychology (‘psychologism’), structure (‘structuralism’) and culture (‘culturalism’) should be avoided. The interplay between these factors and violence/peace is to be pursued.

The linkage to the other two discourses could not be more simple: structural and cultural violence/peace are already there; in addition, the body/mind interface leads straight into direct violence/peace. A violent act involves both the body (as aggression) and the mind (as aggressiveness); a peaceful act also both the body (love) and the mind (compassion).

We can now be more specific, as set out in Table 2.4, where these general hypotheses about violence and peace can be read vertically. The problem is that no (post-)modern society world can be built solely with Column II elements.

Table 2.4 *Paradigm II: the 4-Factor Discourse, With Hypotheses*

	Violence-productive	Peace-productive
N:	Body	Male
P:	Mind	Non-empathic
S,W:	Structure	Vertical (alpha)
C:	Culture	Centrifugal
		Female
		Empathic
		Horizontal (beta)
		Centripetal

There are other dichotomies (or variables, in general) that can be used to tap the four syndromes; but for our present purpose let us specify the discourse in those particular directions.

The first pair is at the individual and the second at the collective level; body and structure are somatic/material (a structure is the sum total of patterned transactions), and mind and culture are spiritual/non-material. The primacy of culture hypothesis shows up in culture shaping the mind ('socialization') and the structure, the pattern of interaction (structuration). The body receives commands partly from the mind and partly from the social context, the structure.

And here the objection is obvious: the mind can influence the micro-culture in and around the person (some minds even the macro-culture); the culture may reflect what is already embedded in the structure (e.g., due to conquest). And it is well known that the body can defy commands from mind and structure, the internalized and institutionalized norms. In short, there are causal arrows in all twelve directions, now to be explored.

The next chapter (in the present Part I, on *peace*), on gender differences (N) will focus on *body* as a major factor, and the following two chapters, on democracy (S) and the state system (W), will focus on *political structure*. Part II, on *conflict*, will bring in *mind* and *empathy* (P); Part III, on *development*, deals with *economic structure*; and Part IV, on *civilization*, spells out implications of deep *culture* (cosmology) for peace.

## Notes

1. These macro-cultural categories will be defined in Part IV, Chapter 1.2.
2. Destructuration is destruction without implanting a new structure: there is no structure at all, only isolated humans.
3. Deculturation is destruction without implanting another culture: there is no culture at all, only egocentric cost-benefit calculations.
4. More particularly, the Cold War could be construed as having two parties and one basic issue: the nuclear arms race to some, human rights to others. Considerable expertise accumulated, and was projected onto the Gulf War and the wars in ex-Yugoslavia as if they were only a question of two parties and only a military issue (see Part II, Chapter 1.4).

# 3

## Woman : Man = Peace : Violence?

### 3.1 Patriarchy as Direct, Structural, and Cultural Violence

In this section we explore the relation between gender and direct violence, and more specifically between male sexuality and male aggressiveness. The reasoning will be partly biological, but not biologistic, meaning a discourse with independent variables chosen from one discipline only, *in casu* biology. To account for peace/violence as dependent variable we shall use the four-factor independent variable discourse based on *body*, *mind*, *structure*, *culture*. ‘Body’ will be discussed here as female–male; ‘mind’ as high–low empathy; ‘structure’ as horizontal–vertical (‘hierarchical’) and ‘culture’ as centripetal–centrifugal (‘expansionist’). Female-high empathy–horizontal–centripetal disposes for peace; male-low empathy–vertical–centrifugal for violence: that is our basic hypothesis.

Of course, things are not quite that simple – and studies of violence and peace are considerably more complex. But this discourse may suffice for our present purpose. As to a discourse for violence, we shall stick to the distinction between *direct* violence intended to insult the basic needs of others (including nature), *structural* violence with such insults built into social and world structures as exploitation and repression, and *cultural* violence, aspects of culture (such as religion and language) legitimizing direct and structural violence. Negative peace is the negation of all of this.

The quadrilateral combination of gender, structure, culture, and peace/violence brings us straight to patriarchy as a social formation. Failure to perceive the reality of patriarchy in human society can perhaps best be explained as an example of cultural violence at work. Feminist theory has made important contributions to peace theory by pointing out this.<sup>1</sup> As any concept is best understood in terms of its negation, we should hasten to add that the peaceful negation of patriarchy is not matriarchy, but parity, or gender equality – horizontal structures relating the genders in partnership.<sup>2</sup>

Patriarchy is then seen as an institutionalization of male dominance in vertical structures, with very high correlations between position and gender, legitimized by the culture (e.g., in religion and language), and often emerging as direct violence with males as subjects and females as objects. Patriarchy, like any other deeply violent social formation (such as criminal subcultures and military structures), combines direct, structural, and cultural violence in a vicious triangle. They reinforce each other in cycles starting from any corner. Direct violence, such as rape, intimidates and represses; structural violence institutionalizes; and cultural violence internalizes that relation, especially for the victims, the women, making the structure very durable.<sup>3</sup>

All this is done in countless ways, many of which have been explored in feminist studies, mostly by women.<sup>4</sup> This is a field which men should enter much more, especially exploring the male side of the equation.<sup>5</sup>

### 3.2 Direct Violence: an Essentially Male Phenomenon

To say that 95% of direct violence is committed by men is probably an understatement. This does not mean that women may not participate in criminal, even violent gangs, support warfare etc.: only that the directly violent acts are committed by men.

Correlations between gender and violence are not only very high, but also seem to be space- and time-invariant. No evidence of 'Amazons',<sup>6</sup> ferocious and belligerent women, has been unearthed; this is probably a male myth like 'women enjoy rape', a way of getting even with women on violence. But such correlations are too high to be visible: social scientists work usually with modest percentage differences. The evident has escaped serious attention for much too long.

There is massive male direct violence at all social levels; as criminal violence in the family and the society, and as political violence within and between societies. Recent Swedish statistics point to 1,400 cases of reported rape and 14,000 cases of violence inside families during one year in a population of about 8 million, the real figures of course being much higher.<sup>7</sup> For violent crimes ratios like 25:1 men to women are standard in criminology; for sexual assault like rape, higher. Political violence from above, state terrorism against citizens, is a monopoly of men – whether committed by judges and torturers during the Spanish Inquisition from the late 15th century,<sup>8</sup> but with decreasing violence; or as police violence and torture today (routine in about 60 countries, occasional in 30 more).

Political violence from below makes more use of women, attracting couples in love to become involved in terrorist activity.<sup>9</sup> And combat, killing as soldiers, is still a male prerogative, both in giving and executing orders. The positive male predisposition for violence is as clear as the negative female predisposition: close to 0% of all violence.<sup>10</sup> But why?

Men have obvious vested interests in directing research away from that question, since any findings reflect badly on man as male, not as species. It seems safer to study 'human aggression', hiding gender specificity by hiding 'man = male' behind 'human'.<sup>11</sup>

But women may also have reasons to shy away from this topic. Their problem is not rejection of facts, but finding acceptable explanations. With the four factors above, some explanations can be found in cultures with male culture high on aggressiveness and assertiveness, female culture high on compassion and submissiveness; in structures, with males given more incentive and opportunity to be violent; and in the mind, with males lower on empathy, neither having nursed nor prepared for nursing. Here we are dealing with differential socialization,<sup>12</sup> deeply rooted, but modifiable. The moment biology enters, violence looks unmodifiable. Biologism is used as cultural violence against women, legitimizing male dominance through muscular strength and alleged female instability and withdrawal during menstruation and procreation cycles. Using biologism against men could easily boomerang. In addition, what do you do about it? Given (understandable) taboos against tampering with *all* men?

This would be a special case of the more general human inclination not to accept a problem until the moment a solution is on the horizon – if not in practice, then on paper. A deep problem without a solution becomes unbearable: hence repress it, forget about it. That would seem to be the mechanism underlying the failure to take this overwhelming correlation seriously, and what is meant here by saying the correlation is simply 'too high'. The mechanism works both for men and for women, including researchers, but in different ways. Men accept biologism, not wanting change; women do not, wanting change, for instance in power relations.

### 3.3 Male Violence: the Sexuality–Violence Interface

Here the general thesis is that part of the explanation for the male predominance in violence is found in the interface between male sexuality and male aggressiveness. This is certainly known to military planners. It was hardly by accident that, during the Gulf War, US (male) bomber pilots on the USS *Kennedy* watched porn videos before leaving on their sorties to destroy military and civilian targets and kill soldiers and civilians (reported by Associated Press, but deleted by the censors as ‘too embarrassing’).<sup>13</sup> In war, the rape of enemy women is part of the conquest. Why this sexuality–violence linkage?

One theory would be sex as compensation for risk and sacrifice, and no doubt there is something to this. But the point to be explored here would be the interfaces between sexuality and the job of the soldier, which is to kill and destroy, not to be killed and destroyed.

Six hypotheses follow.

**1 Male sexual orgasm and violence share much of the same physiology** Imagine the physiological state of the male body measured over time – noting the high adrenalin level, rapid pulse, perspiration, panting, uncontrolled vocalization and high blood pressure, leading to reduced vision and hearing. Over a period of days, weeks, or at least months, the chances are that a typical adult human male will pass through some orgasms and some moments of anger. His physiological trajectories will run parallel, since they share much of the same physiology<sup>14</sup> – lustful in one, fearful in the other. The corresponding single-minded states of mind may not be that different either.

**2 As these are neurological neighbors, triggering one may trigger off the other** The physiological modes of orgasm and anger are mediated by impulses from the same centers of the sympathetic nervous system. This calls for a model with ‘energy’ (*élan vital?*) flowing from one to the other if some threshold is lowered. One example is torture, the torturers being male, the victims often female, and the torture of women usually directed against the genital and breast areas.<sup>15</sup> Rape would be another, whether conceived of as violent ways of obtaining sex, or sexual ways of committing violence.<sup>16</sup> The carry-over, both ways, comes easily once the threshold is lowered. Producers of porno films know this, and present neurological neighbors as visual neighbors. There is money to be made in linking sex and violence – blocked in public for socio-cultural reasons, predominantly for male viewers in front of private video screens, adding liquor to lower the threshold. On the other hand, there is also money to be made linking sex and love in socially legitimate movies etc., and this is by far preferred by women.<sup>17</sup>

Sexuality–violence is by no means the only link. Sado-masochism<sup>18</sup> is another way of combining sex and violence, inflicting pain and having pain inflicted, before, during and/or after orgasm. To dismiss it as perversion does not eliminate the neurological links to sex. Possibly more important is the linkage between torture and sex, where both torturer and victim experience some sexual arousal, even without any explicitly sexual element in the torture. Boys and men are likely to have erections while reading about torture, or at least feelings that are not negative, even pleasant. Soldiers in combat are reported to have erections, as are hangmen and their ‘clients’. All mainly male roles.

**3 As these are neurological neighbors, repressing one may trigger off the other** Given their common neurological basis, sexuality (S) and violence (V) might be like communicating vessels:  $S+V=K$  (constant) as opposed to the preceding thesis: S triggers V; V triggers S in an escalating spiral.

Wilhelm Reich<sup>19</sup> explored the repression of sexuality in Nazi Germany and the use of

males for extreme violence as SS, as guards in concentration camps, etc. This does not contradict the trigger hypothesis, just as 'Not having eaten the whole day, I was very hungry', does not contradict 'The more I ate, the hungrier I became'; this is simply the triggering mechanism at a higher level.

Sigmund Freud<sup>20</sup> linked socially unacceptable sexuality and violence to creativity (C) in an S+C = K formula, in which repressed energy emerged as creativity through processes of sublimation. One such insight need not stand in the way of the other. We should note that Reich and Freud were observing quite different social classes with S+V+C=K, with C blocked for the lower, and V for the higher, classes.

**4 The testosterone curve for men coincides with military age** If we assume a curve coming up through pre-puberty, tapering off after middle age, we arrive at an interval like 12–65, which is what was mobilized by Nazi Germany at the end of World War II. This may seem trivial since there is a third factor: muscular strength. But not all military tasks are muscular. Rather, it probably has to do with the definition of a real *man* as capable of socially legitimate erection–ejaculation sequences, as opposed to the very young and the very old male. The most useful male for violence is the sexually ripe male; and sexuality in males peaks at around 18–20, which also happens to be peak military age.<sup>21</sup>

**5 The estrogen curve for women is cyclical and more complex** Women in the pre-menstruation phase, until ovulation, seem to be more aggressive in the sense of being outer-directed, brilliant, radiating, socially active and creative – sociobiologically possibly a strategy to catch men for fertilization. Menstruation would signify that the strategy failed (for that month), leading to a certain inner-directed dullness; to be activated again with the next cycle.

Any military use of heightened readiness for violent activity among women would, consequently, have to be tuned to the menstrual cycle, capitalizing on pre-ovulation female aggressiveness. All the same, the high point of potential for violent aggression on the monthly cycle of an average woman is far below the corresponding point in the life-cycle of an average man. We should also note that with the advent of old age the predisposition for violence in the human male is considerably reduced, making the male more 'human', like a male child, or at least a male infant. The use of steroids in sports competition is built on the same linkage, but at younger age.<sup>22</sup>

**6 Monoamino oxidase (MAO) levels differ between the genders** A low level of these enzymes predisposes for aggression. The level is low in 90% of males but increases with age, and it is low in 10% of females. The MAOs are responsible for the metabolic breakdown of amines, particularly the biogenic amines held to be critical components in the pathogenesis of various psychotic disorders.<sup>23</sup> Low level of MAO means less ability to break down the biogenic amines, hence higher likelihood of certain psychotic disorders. Violence could be seen as pre-psychotic or psychotic, indicating serious disorder underneath.

### 3.4 Cultural and Structural Factors

There is no assumption that biology rules this ground alone: perhaps it can explain only 10–20%. Other factors do not necessarily counteract the male biological predisposition toward violence; they may, or may not, pull the same way.

Starting with *culture*, and more particularly *language*, we may note that a word very frequently used in English – used by men very much more than by women – is fuck.

Among some US males one may easily get the impression of a language reduced to one word only – as verb, noun, adverb, adjective, etc. That it can denote sex in one form or the other is clear. But the sentence ‘my car got fucked up yesterday’ is also correct English, even if not clearly descriptive of any sexual activity, nor is the more imaginative ‘I had my car defucked’, probably indicative of a successful visit to a garage. The point is obvious: neurological neighbors are covered by the same term, for both sexual and destructive activity. In this there is also an ambivalence toward sex – intense pursuit and intense rejection being neighbors in psychological space.

The phallic shape of missiles and bombs has been commented on *ad nauseam*. But how about new bombs, smart bombs? One of their major functions during the Gulf War was to penetrate heavily fortified targets by entering a hole (a ventilation shaft, a door), often at night, entering and exploding, sometimes even with two smart bombs entering the same hole. Gang-rape in other words. Safe bet on pilot comment afterwards: ‘We sure fucked them, didn’t we?’ Going from language to *religion*, another heavyweight in the general syndrome of cultural violence, we might ask: which of the three Christianities – Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant – would tend to be the most violent? One guess would be Protestantism as *Christianity without Mary*, a trinity with two males, Father and Son, the third being of doubtful, even dubious gender and Mary being reduced to birth mother. This is a defeminized Christianity, carrying the process from the Middle Eastern origins of Christianity<sup>24</sup> even further, coinciding with the advent of ‘witch’ processes.<sup>25</sup> Add to this the general difficulty Christianity has with sexuality, and we get linkages between sexuality and aggression that are not congenital but rooted in culture; dehumanization of women made easy by the absence of women from the Protestant pantheon.

Turning to *structure*, but still close to religion: besides religion, how do human beings solve the problem of finite life? For women, eternal life is guaranteed through their children, their offspring, particularly in matrilineal terms. For men the answer is less obvious. Patrilineal, patrilocal, even patriarchic systems are partial answers, and they start with giving children the (presumed) father’s family name. Beyond that there is competition – entering eternity through corrosion-proof fame, whether gained in arts or science, sports or entertainment, business or politics, or by military prowess. The latter has the advantage that lasting geopolitical changes often carry the names of battles and generals, at least for a while.

The most visible monuments around the world seem to be dedicated to the man of violence, on horseback. Hence one more reason for violence, fame obtained through structures of competition.<sup>26</sup> And each major city, at least in the West, seems to have some phallus-shaped monument (Nelson’s column, Place de la Concorde or the Eiffel Tower, the Washington Monument and so on). Then there is the fourth independent factor, the *mind*. Assuming nursing and nurturing to be one way of creating and expanding human empathy, women do have a near monopoly position in some very basic physiological ways. Nevertheless, males as infants also benefit from mothering, from warmth and safety and concern, from having first priority. But at an early stage differences in nursing set in. Boys are treated more roughly, assuming they can take it; or with more care, assuming they are more valuable.

A general process of creating physical and emotional distance between mother and child, male or female, starts with birth and ends with biological death. But it can safely be hypothesized that more distance is created to the male offspring, if for no other reason because the man will never be fully in the mother’s role. A girl’s life can be spun around the theme of high empathy, from infancy to motherhood to grandmotherhood. It is not necessary to assume that the boy is trained for more risk-taking, less consideration, even for violence, in order to postulate a lower level of empathy. All we have to assume is less training for motherhood. Both infants transit from the same warmth of the inside to

the warmth of the outside of mother's body. But the girl is invited to stay, the boy will have to leave. This must have some deep effects.<sup>27</sup> The girl has a re-entry ticket to that warmth: socio-culturally she is permitted to cry, to be cuddled and comforted. The boy is less in possession of that re-entry ticket, and will tend to spend less time skin-to-skin with the mother, more time roaming around.<sup>28</sup>

This skin-to-skin contact is probably psycho-somatically basic. Sexuality is a combination of genital and skin contact; the latter decreasing in significance with rear entry of the woman. If we hypothesize that genital contact is more important for men and skin contact for women, then it is easier to understand the frustration felt by women when they are insufficiently caressed before and after coitus, and by men if women are mainly interested in skin contact. Furthermore, the near-sexual nature of nursing a baby becomes more comprehensible as intense skin-to-skin contact.

Take the proverbial Saturday morning in many families: the mother close to the children with skin-to-skin contact and the father close to the car with skin-to-metal contact. How clearly this illustrates how men are deprived of rich experiences that are also based on the complex working of hormones.<sup>29</sup>

A sense of rejection, sacrifice, and envy in the young man can be compensated by notions of superiority as the chosen gender for production, not 'only' reproduction. Envy for the womb in all senses is probably much more deep-rooted than any penis envy.<sup>30</sup> Maybe rapists, torturers and soldiers are punishing women? Maybe what they are doing is not an expression of the cry of Jesus, 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matthew 27:46), but 'My Mother, my Mother, why have you forsaken me?' Deep psychological and biological mechanisms can reinforce each other. And that is the general message of this entire exploration: all four factors/syndromes operate synergistically – negatively for violence, and, let us hope, positively for peace.

### 3.5 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?

That question is entirely legitimate and to the heart of peace studies, not to be postponed by the safe 'we-have-to-do-more-research-first'. We shall never get final knowledge, least of all in a field as complicated as this. Whatever we do, we are merely testing hypotheses in order to develop new hypotheses.

But hypotheses, like concepts, can only be understood if they come complete, with their negations. Only by better understanding the conditions under which an hypothesis is false can we understand the conditions for the hypothesis being true. Since we have been riding on four factors we should, in principle, have a number of approaches at our disposal.

First, there is the possibility of some kind of medication for males, an anti-testosterone drug for instance. The problem is that if S(ex) and V(iolence) are real neighbors, then suppressing one may also suppress the other, and few males would be willing to have the potential for violence reduced at the expense of reducing their sexual potency. Males would demand of that drug anti-V specificity. Men have been more than willing to administer medication to the female half of humanity in the form of biochemically based contraceptives, for their own pleasure and convenience, but have been far less inclined to develop corresponding male contraception. Maybe the time has come for females to get even? With 38% of the parliamentarians in Sweden recently being women, the power configuration is approaching parity; with 83% it would be more similar to what males have always enjoyed.

But there are only 2% women on the boards of Swedish corporations; and the Swedish ministries of defense and foreign affairs are essentially boys' clubs, in spite of some ministers.<sup>31</sup>

Second, there is the possibility of increasing the empathy level of males through a socialization pattern similar to that for women. From the point of view of reducing violence, parity between genders should not be obtained by raising girls like boys, nor by raising both to some in-between positions, but rather by raising boys like girls and making fathers more similar to mothers in this extremely important psycho-physiological area. There should be considerable gains to be made in violence reduction, with the *caveat* that the topology of the physiological space would remain relatively similar, possibly with a higher threshold. Some of this must also apply to females, since female orgasm and anger are not that different, even if they are less single-peaked and violent.<sup>32</sup>

Third, there is the possibility of prolonging the mother-son relation by women undertaking the task of humanizing males, on a one-to-one, many-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-many basis. Polygyny might be embraced with enthusiasm by males, noting its institutionalization in Islam, with four as the classical maximum.<sup>33</sup> This might lead to new patterns in male-female relations, some of them more similar to the relations women have among themselves. This might break down the pattern of women having more close womanfriends than men have menfriends, men's closest friends also being women, but then, perhaps, their mistresses rather than their wives.<sup>34</sup> Drawback: the burden falls on women.

Fourth, rather than using the remaining two factors one at a time let us now look at the total configuration, drawing on the multi-factor discourse. Imagine a highly vertical structure in a highly expansionist chosen gender-race-nation type country, and put on top of it a low empathy male, adequately stimulated with pornography, maybe some alcohol/drugs and a combination of coffee and sweets (the ubiquitous 'Danish' pastry).<sup>35</sup> We get a high violence potential, noting that pornography and drugs/alcohol may be for lower classes and coffee/pastries for higher.

Then, put a woman low on empathy with other social classes and national groups on top of that structure, with the same culture, and we get a Margaret Thatcher, a Golda Meir or an Indira Gandhi. Gender as such is insufficient if it is isolated.

But then let us change the equation. Make the structure horizontal from early age on, as a stage for participation, solidarity, cooperation; and make the culture less exclusive, without steep Self-Other gradients, more inclusive, able to see Self in Other and Other in Self. Put into that a woman, and she would probably feel, literally speaking, at home. Put into that a male, and he might grow humanly to like it. His physiology would remain about the same. But thresholds, motivations, capabilities, and opportunities would be drastically changed, or at least so we might assume. Result: reducing direct violence, to the great benefit of all, using the reduction of structural and cultural violence as some of the ways to bring that about.<sup>36</sup> And the males would no longer be so tempted to use their physiology as an excuse. And that leads to a conclusion about epistemological adequacy: always do feminist and peace studies within multi-factor discourses. Stick to one of the four factors alone, and not only will discourse and theory suffer, but the practice may even become counter-productive. This comes easily to interdisciplinary new social sciences like women's studies and peace studies. Older sciences, take note: you have nothing to lose but your poor, mono-disciplinary discourses.

## Notes

1. See, for instance, Betty A. Reardon, *Sexism and the War System* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985); Birgit Brock-Utne, *Educating for Peace. A Feminist Perspective*. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985).

2. See Riane Eisler, *The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future* (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1987). There is a weak distributional interpretation of 'gender equality' as low or

zero correlation between gender and any social status variable, and a strong relational definition as equitable interaction relations between the genders, at home, at work, in society at large. Parity aims at the stronger interpretation, beyond the '50%' and equal opportunity positions.

3. A pattern of direct violence that has become firmly institutionalized, like vendetta, gang warfare or female infanticide, could be referred to as 'ritualized', or 'institutionalized' violence. That type of violence tends to be accepted socially as part of 'human nature' or social reality. To get rape out of this category requires consciousness-building, mobilization and confrontation: and this is exactly what is being done, particularly by US feminists, hammering at internalization and institutionalization to expose rape as direct violence, even as war between the genders. Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (New York: Ballantine, 1969) finds its place alongside Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*.

4. I have found Marilyn French, *Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985) particularly useful.

5. In Norway the work by Öystein Gullvåg Holter, building on Harriet Holter's work on gender roles, is very promising.

6. *The Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia*, vol. I locates the Amazons in Greek mythology, with the comment that 'the ascribed habitat of the Amazons necessarily became more remote as Greek geographical knowledge developed'. The myth obviously made an impact on Spanish cartography for South America in the 16th century, after Francisco de Orellana 'asserted that he had battled with fighting women'.

7. Figures on the Swedish situation from a speech by Margot Wallström, then cabinet minister for women's affairs, at Mannsmässan, Göteborg, 21 May 1991.

8. For the Inquisition, see Cecil Roth, *The Spanish Inquisition* (New York/London: W.W. Norton); and Robert Held, *Inquisition-Inquisicione: a Bilingual Guide to the exhibition of torture instruments from the Middle Ages to the Industrial Era presented in various European cities in 1983–92*, (Florence: no publisher or year indicated). All texts and pictures attribute the violent roles to men, with women frequently among the victims.

9. See Francesco Alberoni, *Innamoramento e amore* (Garzanti, 1979; American edition, *Falling in Love*, New York, Random House, 1983). The pattern of women in love committing acts of direct violence together with their lovers was found in the German RAF, the Italian Brigate Rosse and the Japanese *sekigun*. See also Robin Morgan, *The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism* (New York: Norton, 1989) about exactly this syndrome.

10. But the indirect contribution of women as *Mittäterinnen* should be emphasized. See, for instance, Tordis Batscheider, Susanne Lang & Ilse Petry, 'Kriegerische Männer – Friedliche Frauen?', *Friedensforschung Aktuell*, no. 24, Winter 1990. What is so shocking about the famous paintings by the 17th-century Florentine painter Artemisia Gentileschi is that she portrays the violent act itself with women killing men brutally, and dispassionately.

11. Thus, Konrad Lorenz seems to have been a conservative extremist as described by one of his former assistants, Norbert Bischof, *Gescheiter als alle die Affen* (Hamburg: Rasch und Rohring, 1990). Lorenz always talked about 'Mensch' when 'Mann' would have been appropriate. Or were the two identical for him?

12. As pointed out later in the text, access to mother love in the concrete sense of skin contact comes in addition to raising the children differentially into stereotypical gender roles. If boys receive less of that love than girls, then they may also as fathers be less able to give it to their own children, reproducing the pattern diachronically.

13. See *Village Voice*, 26 March 1991.

14. I am indebted to Professor Herman Tennessen, in a private communication, for this insight.

15. Robert Held, *Inquisition*, Part 5, 'On Women and Torture', makes this point very clearly by analyzing the torture instruments.

16. Or both: the discourses do not exclude each other.

17. But instead of seeing these differences as shaped by social role-playing as children and adults, the perspective here tends more toward seeing it as caused by early experiences in the mother-father-daughter-son quadrangle, with the women learning more to associate sex (= skin contact) with love (physical, mental, spiritual intimacy) and men more to associate sex (= genital contact) with exploration, penetration, perhaps also violence.

18. The Marquis de Sade (sadism) became particularly notorious not only through his flagrant maltreatment of a young prostitute, Rose Keller, but also through his legitimization of the sex-violence linkage through his writings, with such titles as *Les crimes de l'amour*. The Austrian novelist Leopold von Sacher-Masoch was also a man (masochism).

19. Reich was more class-conscious than Freud; this important dimension is missing in Freud, as if society were horizontal. See his *Massenpsychologie des Faschismus* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1971). The goals of the leaders are linked to the unconscious wishes of the masses.

20. The theory of sublimation can be understood as a general theory about the displacement of

instinctual energies to non-instinctual spheres of activity, seeking to explain the evolution of 'higher functions' from lower ones; *Penguin Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, article on sublimation.

21. As well as being peak age for a related phenomenon, competitive physical sports.

22. Sportswomen may try to become pregnant before major sports competitions, so as to make use of the hormone effect in early pregnancy, and then abort afterwards; this was reportedly practiced by some in the former DDR where abortion was easily obtainable.

23. See *Penguin Medical Dictionary*, article on monoamino oxidase.

24. For one analysis of the pre-eminence of goddesses in the Near and Middle East, see Toni Liversage, *Den Store Gudinde*, (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1990). The classic work on the subject is Robert Graves, *The White Goddess* (New York: Farrar, 1948). For the Holy Spirit, see Matthew 1 : 18.

25. See Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, *Die Vernichtung der weisen Frauen* (Hemsbach: Marz, 1985) on the population growth background for the 'witch processes' (they were often accused of practicing birth control).

26. There is something strange about the military profession as career opportunity. Where other professions offer a relatively steady opportunity to prove oneself, the military profession implies very many years of waiting for that sudden opportunity, a war. Of course war is then embraced with enthusiasm as the chance to enact the skills, as if an author were given access to paper only once or twice a lifetime. *Village Voice*, 26 March 1991, reports the enthusiasm among Desert Shield military in the Gulf area when Desert Storm was declared.

27. Carol Gilligan in her famous *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), points out how women tend to see ethical problems in terms of care and direct consequences for those concerned; men in terms of abstract principles. Another way of putting it might be as follows. Women see the alternative to direct violence in direct care and love. Men, afraid of their own violent inclinations (and those of other men) try to engage themselves in social hierarchies with strict control, giving those on the top monopoly on (commanding) violence; and/or in verbal hierarchies of commandments, commands and general norms, produced in theology and law. They build themselves into structural and cultural violence to escape from direct violence and its alternative, direct care.

28. Thus, the grown-up girl would be more inclined to link sex to love and the grown-up boy to link it to exploration, conquest, even violence. See Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).

29. See Anthony Walsh, 'The Biological Relationship Between Sex and Love', *Free Inquiry*, Summer 1991, pp. 20–24 about the role of endorphins in connection with genital and skin contact.

30. Freud-bashing in connection with the concept of penis envy has already a long tradition. It should be pointed out that what is suggested here is not womb-envy, but also womb/mother-longing and the double advantage of women: enjoying mother closeness longer, and being able to recreate it through their own motherhood.

31. For the inclusion of women in most government ministries and their general exclusion from the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, see Karin Lindgren, *Participation of Women in Decision-Making for Peace* (New York and Vienna: United Nations, 1989).

32. Adding this to the skin-to-skin contact and the endorphins would already tend to make female sexuality more holistic, as opposed to genital, single-peaked male sexuality. It should be pointed out that this tradition is also Occidental, a Chinese alternative for males being described in great detail in Jolan Chang, *The Tao of Love and Sex* (New York: Dutton, 1977).

33. But on the condition that all four are equally much loved by the man – a condition perhaps not so easily fulfilled.

34. Getting stuck in emotional marital problems they cannot solve and with no intimate male friends, the alternative becomes womanfriends.

35. See R. M. Warshawsky, A. B. Titkin, & J.C. Egle, *It All Adds Up* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983), ch. 9, for the synergism of coffee and sugar.

36. If the three types of violence reinforce each other in a vicious cycle, they may also undo each other in a virtuous cycle.

## Democracy : Dictatorship = Peace : War?

### 4.1 Are Democracies Belligerent or Peaceful?

The following is an effort to explore some aspects of the possible linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy at a crucial point: democracy domestically, belligerence abroad.<sup>1</sup>

According to their self-image, democracies are not belligerent, engaging in war; and not even bellicist, inclined to resort to war. They are peace-loving, stressing the peaceful pursuit of their goals, including peace. Only very reluctantly do they occasionally find themselves forced to use arms abroad. And yet the USA, for instance,<sup>2</sup> has used arms abroad more than 200 times (averaging about once per year) – each time supposedly against a strong isolationist and pacifist inclination. Credible? War activities have often been referred to by other names, such as ‘punitive expeditions’ (a British tradition for at least two centuries, participation in the Gulf War being only one in a long chain of events); or ‘action to protect our citizens and economic interests abroad’ (a US tradition). But why so belligerently, if not for a bellicist inclination? Could something be wrong with the distribution of citizens and investment abroad if ‘protection’ by belligerent means is so indispensable? Moreover, were peaceful means really tried?

A third argument for excusing the belligerence of democracies can quickly be ruled out: for election purposes, to re-elect a Reagan and a Thatcher, a Bush and a Major. This only shows that democracies are not immune to strategies also used by dictators, to be explored later; and successful elections in no way justify belligerence.

Exploring this brings us to a rather disturbing aspect of the track records of the democracies of Northern America and Western Europe (including Australia/New Zealand): with very few exceptions they all engaged for centuries in such major forms of international violence as slavery and colonialism; the latter book not yet being closed. Very much of this was done after milestones on the path toward democracy such as 1688, 1776, and 1789 had been passed. Citizens benefiting from democratic rights in these countries knew very well what happened. Spain and Portugal were not democracies when they started these practices; indeed, they were not to become so, in a firm sense, until in the 1970s. But that underscores the same point: what the democracies did (the USA, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands) was similar, bordering on the identical, differences being minor.

But – one may object – both slavery and colonialism were violent, but not belligerent. Wars are acts of governments. There was no government on the other side, often not even on the democratic side. At least initially, slavery and colonialism were acts of enterprising individuals and companies; governments entered later, often with softening effect. But, who defined wars that way? Did it make any difference to the indigenous people who were eliminated through genocidal practices? Moreover, those indigenous peoples who were kidnapped or occupied, suppressed and exploited were polities with some system of central governance, even if not Western-style states. And, why did democratically elected governments only soften, but not abolish these practices? Why did the suppressed and

exploited have to stand up themselves and fight, violently or nonviolently, against all that democratic belligerence? Why so little support for their political will?

After World War II the countries most frequently engaging in war have been the USA, the UK, France and Israel; all of them democracies.<sup>3</sup> Most countries in the ‘US-led coalition’ against Iraq in the Gulf War were democracies.<sup>4</sup> But they disregarded the negotiation opportunities of August 1990, and did not pursue less belligerent approaches such as the French effort to let sanctions work, nor the Soviet effort to spare retreating Iraqi soldiers. Democracy is indeed compatible with large-scale exercises of violence – bellicist, not only belligerent.

#### **4.2 Building a Theory Relating Democracy and Belligerence**

By *democracy* we mean a polity where rulers are accountable to the ruled through a feedback process of one person/one vote, keeping them in power if positive and removing them if negative. Today this is done through secret ballot in elections, the electorate being the adult population guaranteed the freedom of thinking, speaking, organizing, and acting in favor of their issues and persons. More direct ways of implementing this general formula are possible, such as initiative-referendum, by which token Switzerland is a better *demos kratein*.

By *belligerence* we mean engagement in war and war-like acts; ‘bellicism’ is then the general inclination to do so, the opposite of ‘pacifism’. An indicator of bellicism would be to what extent and how often the country is involved in wars and here we should disregard the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars, i.e. whether the country initiated a war by throwing the first stone, or merely responded. The life-cycles of conflicts and violence are highly complex so that it becomes arbitrary to make cutting points in time for defining one as aggressor and the other as victim, regardless of prior relation.

The task now is to explore the relationship between the two variables D for democracy and B for belligerence, theoretically rather than statistically, focusing on the reasons to expect a positive or a negative relation. For this we need a set of third variables, T, since nothing follows directly from the definitions of D and B. If D is the antecedent and B the consequent, then T can be an *underlying* factor, preceding both; a *concomitant* factor to D; or a factor *intervening* between D and B.

This gives us six types of theorems as building-blocks in a theory for the relation between democracy and belligerence:

*Positive form:*

*the more T, the more D and the more B* (T underlying, common)

*the more T and the more D, the more B* (T concomitant factor)

*the more D, the more T; the more T, the more B* (T intervening)

*Negative form:*

*the more T, the more D and the less B* (T underlying, common)

*the more T and the more D, the less B* (T concomitant factor)

*the more D, the more T; the more T, the less B* (T intervening)

The problem now is how to choose T from the many candidates. We shall start with two underlying and two concomitant variables, searching for factors that produce democracy and belligerence, and for factors that together with democracy tend to produce belligerence. After that we shall identify five variables that are produced by democracies and in turn produce belligerence. The first two sets are external to democratic theory if not to the concrete historicity of democracies; the third set is internal.

**Theorem 1**

*The more individualistic and competitive the culture, the more likely that the country is democratic; and the more likely that the country, given the capability, is belligerent.*

Historically, after the forerunners in Greece and Iceland, Western democracies started in the Northwestern corner of the world, meaning Western Europe and Northern America. This process cannot be detached from the culture of Protestantism defining Man's relation to God – individualizing the relation, making it more direct, defeminizing it through the peripheral role given to the only feminine Christian deity, Mary, seeing salvation as a highly scarce good linked more to correct faith and God's grace and less to good deeds and correct rituals, and success/failure as indicative of the same in the afterlife.

The individual was set free, but imbued with bad conscience and a constant need to prove him/herself. As a result, a great deal of creative and individualistic/competitive activity ensued to secure a niche in paradise; in the economic sphere as entrepreneurship and in the cultural sphere as science. The political power of the clergy and the aristocracy was reduced: through the individualizing head-counting of the vote, expanding electorates so as to outvote all entrenched elites; and by human rights declaring all human beings to be born equal. The military follow-up was nationalistic conscript armies. The payoff came with the total culture of *entrepreneurialism*, leading to economic growth when coupled to creativity in science and technology; *political liberation* of the pent-up energies of ever-increasing layers of the population; and with *modern warfare*.

Democracy protected the carriers of all this aggressive competitiveness from themselves – within, but not without. So they went to war, in the name of Christianity, civilization, and as 'peace-loving'<sup>5</sup> but perhaps more to secure and protect private property abroad. When the state took over, colonialism became the world-space homologue of private property, establishing the ownership of whole countries and everything that entailed. The two went hand in hand.

**Theorem 2**

*The more a country has a history of inflicting traumas upon others, and the more democratic the country, then the more belligerent that country.*

This goes beyond the truism that a country that is belligerent gets into the habit of being belligerent. The point is that inflicting traumas often creates, or at least reinforces, a culturally defined pre-existing situation between Self and Other, with extreme upgrading of Self and degrading of Other to the point of dehumanization, preparing Other for exploitation, repression and even extermination. Traumas will degrade the victim further, and confirm the theory.

But this is a trauma not only to Other but also to Self: *one day they may come and do to us what we did to them!* Here, in Theorem 2, the focus is on direct violence: the worse you treat or have treated the rest of the world, the more reason to fear reprisals. In Theorem 3 below the focus will be on world structural violence; in Theorem 4 on domestic structural violence. The thesis here is that direct violence breeds direct violence – not necessarily as revenge from the victims, but also to forestall that threat, real or imagined, of revenge.<sup>6</sup> Theorems 3 and 4 express the same for structural violence.

Take the USA as an example. Few countries have so much reason to fear an invasion, knowing precisely what invasion may entail: genocide, the extermination of peoples. Few countries have such good reason to fear kidnapping and being enslaved in any way, knowing well what slavery is about. US values of security and freedom are the negations of what they did to others; they are existential, historical, not merely theoretical, and can be used to mobilize the population for their own violent defense. Americans know their

own existential worries. And the best defense would be to stop ‘them’ before they get started.

### *Theorem 3*

*The higher the position in the world economic pyramid of countries, the more likely that the country is democratic and belligerent.*

To war they went, and it was war that landed them at the top of the world pyramid of countries. They are still there. Once at the top of the world they had two obvious problems: not to fall down again, and not to admit too many others. The latter led to a relatively peaked pyramid with few countries on the top and many in the middle and at the bottom. The former led to a number of mechanisms to retain cultural, economic, political and military control on the top. Generally, this has meant a ‘division of labor’ between senders and receivers of (religious and scientific) truth; between *le cult* and *le cru* in the economic sense of processed versus raw goods and services; between decision-makers and those affected by the decisions; between those possessing the ultimate means of violence and those preparing for the impact. Democracies have always gone for the best, for the top. (They still do, but using international economic relations, not colonialism, see Part III.)

In short, to be on top creates strong motivations for remaining there, and preferably without too much competition. For those on top the world order is not bad at all, it is certainly worth defending against ‘fundamentalists’ who want to change everything by flattening the pyramid; and against upstarts who want to pull themselves up and someone else down, absolutely or relatively. Castles upon the hill do not initiate violence: they merely respond, after freezing the structure.

*Homo occidentalis*, first as Catholics and then as Protestants, traveled all over the world making ‘discoveries’, using direct violence to build this gigantic world pyramid of structural violence with democracies still on top. More direct violence followed, in self-defense, as revolutionary efforts to change the order and as counter-revolutionary violence to preserve it. To see the non-initiating as non-belligerent is not only bad politics but also bad social science, as it neglects third variables. When somebody is sitting on somebody else, chances are that the latter will move first; to call that ‘aggression’ is somewhat far-fetched.

Do democracies stop short of war against themselves? Traditionally they have fought each other, as the most cursory glance at the history of democracies will confirm, particularly over colonial territories. But then (Berlin Conference 1884–85 to divide Africa) as now (OECD, the Trilateral, with the G7 as Executive Committee) they discovered that the precarious position at the top of the pyramid is better preserved jointly than singularly. A relatively closely knit alliance is one response. ‘The alliance to preserve power and privilege’ did not sound so good; an alliance of Christian, or peace-loving, or democratic countries sounds better, provided this definition could cover the ‘right’ countries and exclude any change-oriented ‘left’ countries. Like Rotary Club members who de facto run a city, or a country, solidarity pays off.

World War I pitted democratic countries against each other; but World War II was more between an upper class of democracies and a lower class of non-democracies. War rhetoric concealed the economic class factor, but not the politics. Much international violence, also in the form of war, is class war. Lower down in world society, as in domestic society, the genteel manners of democratic process are less easily found. Since the pyramid is peaked, there are few at the top to receive the violence from the many lower down; any country engaged in direct or structural colonialism tends to have more than one colony. Consequently, there will be more violent responses per top country than violent

initiatives per bottom country, which partly explains why democracies top the list of belligerence. This picture is not altered by a few small social democracies with neither colonies nor neo-colonies, neither initiating nor responding with violence: showcases of democracy, they are mostly too small.

#### *Theorem 4*

*The more isomorphism between domestic and world social structure, and the more democratic the country, the more belligerent the country.*

Take three aspects of the world system structure: race, nation, class. In racial terms the world is a white upper class, with yellow and brown (Japanese, Chinese, Indian) middle classes, a black lower class (Africa) and a red, almost exterminated, underclass (in the Americas).

In terms of culture, the world is divided into civilizations or nations, with Occident I on top, then the Nipponic, Sinic and Indic civilizations, and at the bottom the African, Pacific and Native American civilizations.

In economic terms, the world consists of a small affluent class of people who do not have to worry about money, a vast middle class of people who worry very much about money, and a somewhat smaller class of people living in poverty and misery who worry more about survival than money.

The three aspects are strongly correlated, and the whole structure is based for its preservation on the assumption that those in the middle will side with the top rather than the bottom. But that makes any country with a structure along these lines a very nervous country, fearing not only the instability inside, but also the spillover from instability in other countries, or in the world as a whole.

Three dangers loom: internal revolution, world revolution, and internal revolution anywhere else in the world. That the elites are concerned with the former is obvious. That they have a dim view of the world revolution is equally obvious, since it will hit themselves (Theorem 3 above). But how about the third case, which has to be fought abroad? What is the justification for self-defense against revolution in somebody else's country?

The answer is obvious: lower classes elsewhere winning over white monopoly/occidental superiority/economic privilege could provide legal precedent in norm-producing organs like the UN, as well as encourage local lower classes to do the same; moreover, those who have won elsewhere may export their revolution.

And so, the elite of any country, sitting on top of suppressed races, stateless nations and real misery, recognize their own situation in others and will try to stop revolution elsewhere lest it hit themselves. Victory abroad, to win at home. Are democracies more in this category of countries mirroring the world racial, cultural, and economic situation? No – but that was not the thesis either, since we are dealing with a contributing, not an intervening or underlying factor. Some democracies, like the USA and Israel, clearly fall in this category, with this structure. They are active in world anti-revolutionary alliances, and also very nervous about South Africa as a world microcosm.

Moreover, other democracies have begun to develop this social structure through immigration by the black and the brown, the non-Western and/or the very poor (the UK; Germany, France, Spain, and Italy; Belgium and the Netherlands). As usual, the threat to international peace is seen as coming from others, not from themselves. And multi-cultural federations like Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia have seen breakup as a concomitant of democratization, meaning that the tensions became more clearly articulated. To be both democratic and truly multi-cultural (not melting pot) is difficult, for domestic reasons as well. But even if they should manage to contain the tension the threat remains: instability in other countries or in the world as a whole may inspire

local groups. And if the democracy has managed to co-opt the underdogs they may even be persuaded to fight their own kind in other countries.

Again, take as an example the USA: a society that mirrors the world along the three dimensions of race, nation and class. The proportions are not right – by definition: if the proportions were the same as in the world, the country would probably have been a ‘democracy’ in the old South African sense – for *blankees*. In Israel the Jews are still in the majority, so they can practice one person/one vote. Yellow and brown countries can be tolerated if they are homogeneous and not anti-white; even black countries can be tolerated if they can be controlled (but the moment they become ‘uppity’, the risk of intervention increases). Stateless nations may get states of their own if they follow the same line.

The problem is multi-racial countries and countries with stateless nations similar to stateless nations in democracies. South Africa has been mentioned for the former; and the Kurds and the Palestinians could be mentioned for the latter. Statehood for the Kurds would probably encourage the Palestinians, and statehood for the Palestinians might encourage native Americans (with native Hawaiians as a special case). Consequently, such statehood would be strongly resisted by Israel and the USA. And this may also apply to class. Redistribution and welfare state practices in other countries will be resisted lest they set off similar demands, say, in the USA. Iraq may have been an example here, boasting acceptable material livelihood for, say, the bottom 20% in the country under Ba’ath ‘socialism’. But the same went for the former socialist countries and even the social democracies in Northwestern Europe/Canada. Hence, an aggressive export of ‘privatization’.

There is an additional motivation to the three already mentioned: if we, the democracies, are No. 1, then no Other can be permitted to outrank us. There are several ways of ensuring that: denying that rank dimension, improving Self’s democracy, or by destroying Other’s non-democracy, isolating it from world trade, using harassment. And, ultimately: military intervention.

### *Theorem 5*

*The more democratic the country, the more shared the decision-making; and the more shared the decision-making, the less belligerent the country.*

This is the best-known justification for the widespread thesis that democracies are less belligerent. The problem is that neither part holds – which, however, does not mean that the converse is true. In prewar situations a small, inner circle makes decisions in any political system simply for reasons of secrecy/security.

Even more problematic is the second part, which asserts that where decisions are shared among many types and levels of decision-makers, including a possible referendum on whether to go to war, countries are less likely to favor war. Behind that lurks the idea that ordinary people are naturally less belligerent than their leaders.

As the circle of decision-makers expands from one leader to the whole population, the decision increasingly depends on something shared by all, meaning the overwhelming majority since so much is at stake. This something cannot be structural like class interests since, by definition, these are not shared. They may even be contradictory, as when young working-class boys on both sides lay down their lives, while weapons manufacturers and dealers reap tremendous profits.

A better candidate is national culture. And the most bellicist cultures in the world seem to be occidental Judeo-Christian-Islamic inspired cultures, with their chosenness, singularity (the only truth) and universalism (for the whole world – Judaism being the exception here). But the Judeo-Christian aspect is also the civilization that inspires

democracies through competitive individualism, as argued above. Hence we land on a common cultural factor linking democracy and bellicism, rather than the pacifism of Buddhist civilization which is less individualistic, and hence less democratizing in the Western sense.

#### *Theorem 6*

*The more democratic the country, the more human rights are implemented; and the more human rights are implemented, the more human duties can be extracted.*

For international wars to be fought the leadership, usually older and relatively cunning men, will have to make younger men fight and possibly die in those wars. There are three ways of doing this: *normatively*, by making the young men fight because of inner conviction; *contractually*, by paying them or otherwise remunerating them for doing so; and *coercively*, by forcing them to fight, possibly even shooting them if they do not.

These three ways of obtaining compliance do not exclude each other. Obviously, the safest is to rely on all three: giving the soldier good reasons to fight (love for Self and/or hatred of Other in the shape of nationalism or other fundamentalisms, pride and love for own military and contempt and hatred for the other side); by paying mercenaries handsomely, particularly when they are victorious; and through heavy punishment for deserters. Political systems tend to use all three.

As democracies by definition implement, progressively, human rights there is more *quid*, to be converted into the *quo* of human duties. There are three duties, by the logic of the state above: to be generally positively inclined toward *l'état providence*, particularly the democratic state as an extension of Self; to pay taxes; and to be willing to give up one's life if called upon to do so. Hence, war. *Quid pro quo* logic demands 'not only what the country can do for me, but what I can do for the country'. Non-democracies can also exact gratitude through welfare state practices (Bismarck and Hitler). The point is that, in democracies the mechanisms are institutionalized and do not exist simply because of the whim of the leaders. And this is, in the end, probably a more successful formula.

#### *Theorem 7*

*The more democratic the country, the more inner competition for power; and the more inner competition for power, the more temptation to gain support through outer aggression.*

This is a formulation of the famous 'aggression without so as to obtain cohesion within' thesis. On the surface it would seem to run against the preceding theorem. Let us examine it more carefully.

No doubt there have been autocratic leaders who have used this mechanism. However, according to the reasoning in the preceding theorem, they can do so only at considerable risk since they do not have sufficient peace surplus at their disposal. There is a difference between repression in dictatorships and democracies: dictatorships may repress people higher up, democracies may repress people lower down, to put it simply. In a dictatorship there are competitive elites, often evicted by the group in power; in a democracy elite groups have agreed on 'orderly' rotation of the power among themselves, e.g., through party system and elections. Underneath there may be enormous repression and exploitation, as argued above, along the lines of race, nation, and class. But democracies are two-thirds societies whereas dictatorships are one-third societies – or some other fractions above and below 50%. Dictatorships in fact go to war hoping to get support above 50% levels through popular/populist policies.

The point about the theorem, then, is that democracies may do exactly the same, 'for

domestic reasons' as the adage goes, deflecting attention from troublesome issues, with a view to the next election. The more organic and alive the democracy, the more competition for power. Democracies are based on divisiveness. If there is little or no competition (and low election turn-out may be an indicator), then something is not working well. Elections have to be fought, and won. Wars may win elections. Hence, wars are fought.

### *Theorem 8*

*The more democratic the country, the more inner peace surplus available for outer activity, belligerent or not.*

In general the assumption is that citizens in democracies are more satisfied than citizens in non-democracies. After all, they (or at least the majority) are supposed to get what they want through democratic processes, with adjustments as their wants change. As more debate is permitted in democracies than in non-democracies, the superficial observer may draw the conclusion of dissatisfaction in the former and satisfaction in the latter. But people in democracies have at their disposal a process to redress grievances. For that reason we should expect them by and large to be more conservative than their counterparts in non-democracies, with less basic social change on their political agenda. The potential for violence is non-zero but low; in dictatorships it is high, given the amount of coercion needed for compliance with authoritarian repression, and for revolt.

To whom does this inner peace surplus belong, and how is it used? Theorem 8 does not state that it is used for belligerent purposes abroad, only that it exists, whereas non-democracies have a peace deficit and have to spend their coercive energy inside the country. If we postulate the existence of a certain amount of coercive energy in all 'modern' states, then the conclusion would be that the energy surplus generated by the inner peace surplus of democracies can be used for outer purposes, whereas dictatorships will be more inward-looking, busily trying to suppress inner revolts. Democracies can send armies abroad for belligerent purposes, not worrying about what happens in the meantime; dictatorships less so. Their forces are needed at home; by contrast the democratic military may even have to invent something military to do, for want of jobs at home.

### *Theorem 9*

*The more democratic the country, the more self-righteous the leaders/people; and the more self-righteous the leaders/people, the more belligerent the country.*

This point differs from the point made that self-righteous peoples, seeing themselves as chosen by transcendental deities, often live in democracies. The point here is that people living in democracies tend to become self-righteous simply for that reason. If we assume that the leading political system is the system of the world's leading countries, then to live in a democracy is prestigious. To live in a non-democracy carries a stigma; it is something to be ashamed of, like being an international pariah caste, in for marginalization with political and economic boycotts, even sanctions. As a consequence people try to escape, so as to share the presumed safety and prestige of the democracies.

For the democratic side, there is no problem in responding positively to the call to straighten out the dictatorships, with political and economic sanctions, if necessary with military means. A war of that kind is seen more as a duty than as a right; something to be engaged in not for selfish reasons but to save other countries from dangerous, expansionist dictators. Or to come to the rescue of the people suffering under those dictators. And those suffering people will generally have more of the ear of the world being higher up in society, like the victims of socialist non-democracies. To repress or even kill upwards brings forth international solidarity; to repress and kill downwards passes unnoticed. So

the democracies go to war against the evil dictatorships, projecting onto them their own repression and expansionism in the way of the truly self-righteous.

#### **4.3 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?**

Let us see what we have. Nine factors have been explored as possible links between democracy as a way of doing domestic politics, and belligerence as a way of doing foreign policy.

- 1 *Individualistic, competitive, aggressive culture.*
- 2 *A history of inflicting traumas upon others.*
- 3 *High position in the world pyramid.*
- 4 *Isomorphism between domestic and world structure.*
- 5 *Shared decision-making.*
- 6 *Implementing human rights.*
- 7 *Inner power struggle.*
- 8 *Inner peace surplus.*
- 9 *Self-righteousness being a democracy.*

Changing these factors is not easy.

The first factor refers to the whole cultural foundation for most of the countries today known as democracies (Japan would differ by being collectivist, competitive, and aggressive). Far from being a culture of tolerance – except for tolerating others in the same culture, meaning essentially Self – this is a culture of intolerance, producing steep Self–Other gradients that can serve as conduits for violence.

The second factor refers to the most basic, agonizing dilemma of so many of the world's democracies: having come into being by highly non-democratic and violent means, they now fear that their historical wake will one day catch up with them: that 'one day they will do to us what we did to them'.

The next two factors reflect the present distribution of power and privilege in domestic and world society. Although occasionally the subject of critical reflection this distribution is not easily changed, as recent history informs us. It easily mobilizes violence – pre-emptive, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary.

The next four – shared decision-making and human rights implementation, inner power struggle and inner peace surplus – belong to the very essence of what democracies are most proud of. No one will want to change them, even though all four can also become mechanisms converted into belligerence.

From that democratic essence, however, there also flows the self-righteousness of democracies, the feeling of belonging to a 'Commonwealth of Democracies' with the right, and the duty, to belligerence.

It is worth noting that the nine factors mentioned have an inner historical/logical coherence. From the first flows the second, and from the second flows the third and the fourth. That gives us the base, the concrete historical-cultural context, all rhetoric notwithstanding, the point of departure for understanding democratic geopolitics.

The next four factors constitute another causal flow, starting with sharing of decision-making and implementation of human rights, accepting power struggle and institutionalizing it, turning it into a peace surplus. Democracies have good reasons for pride, but not for self-righteousness, which then serves to reinforce the first factor. We get a positive feedback, which becomes particularly dangerous since all of this can be converted into belligerence, particularly given the concrete, critical, historical context of challenge along race, nation, class lines in the world of today.

*Conclusion:* more democracies, more belligerence, given the last five factors. The inner (OECD) and innermost (G7) core will probably even break the rule of not attacking democracies, should their power and privilege become challenged by less powerful and/or more recent democracies. And this may happen, as when Chile elected Communism (1973)<sup>7</sup> and Algeria Islam (1992).<sup>8</sup>

## Notes

1. In no way should the skeptical tenor of this section be interpreted as an argument against democracy. It does not follow from 'democracies are not necessarily peaceful' that 'non-democracies are necessarily peaceful'. The conclusion might be that pacifist/belligerent depends on other variables, such as deep culture (expansionism, Manicheism, singularism/universalism), that cut across the democracy/non-democracy divide. And democratic rule is one of the greatest innovations of humankind.

For an excellent presentation of a much less skeptical position, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Russett focuses on the weak interpretation of the democratic peace thesis: 'Democracies almost never fight each other'. I do not even believe in that one. I am afraid that if they do not, it is because they have more to gain by sticking together in defense of privileges in the world system than by fighting each other; moreover they may be threatened from below (World War II, wars of decolonization, the Cold War) and that makes for cohesiveness. (Methodologically Russett has a tendency to focus on pairs of countries, leaving out the context.)

Moreover, I do not agree that Germany differed that much from England and France in the years up to World War I. At any rate, the basic point, if the thesis is that the people might have a moderating influence on hot-tempered leaders, is whether there is democracy in the shaping and making of foreign policy, and that sector seems always to be clouded in secrecy in times of crisis; when democracy would be most needed.

Russett does not seriously discuss global democracy, a position that to me seems much more promising. But that presupposes institutions at present not existing, such as a directly elected United Nations People's Assembly, to which the United Nations General Assembly one day might be responsible, etc. This is developed in a paper for the Commission on Global Governance, published by them.

At one point I would agree with Russett: democracies will be more concerned with public opinion. But if they are belligerent for some other reason, that will probably not make them abstain from warfare but make them go in for low-intensity versions, less visible to the unguided public, including media, eye. In fact, a much more plausible hypothesis is probably that democratization changes the nature of warfare to escape public criticism, hiding their wars better.

2. Of course, the USA is in general not a good example of a democracy. Rather, it is a plutocracy and a mediocracy (as well as a mediocracy). Those standing for election are nominated by the rich and/or powerful (or are themselves); and money, mainly spent for idiotic television ads, determines largely who wins. Even so, Reagan could not invade Nicaragua because of strong popular opposition. The USA did instigate and support the brutal overthrow of democratically elected Allende, but not overtly, rather through a covert operation by the CIA, the diametrical opposite of democracy. Democracy is open, with public debate, nothing hidden, whereas the CIA operates in the dark, keeping the public uninformed or deliberately misinformed. In addition, with participation in major presidential elections down to around 50% (and in mid-term elections far below that) serious questions of democratic legitimacy of the leadership can be raised. Thus, Reagan had the support of 27% of the electorate in his first administration and 31% in the second; the difference was referred to as a landslide.

3. The research on local wars by István Kende makes this very clear; see his 'Twenty-five Years of Local Wars', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1971, pp. 5–22, and 'Wars of Ten Years (1967–1976)', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 15, no. 3, 1978, pp. 227–241.

4. The most important members were the USA, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, Egypt; and then Syria, Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Arab Peninsula (the Gulf States), except Yemen. Altogether 38 countries participated directly in the coalition forces; 4 were supportive (Soviet Union, Germany, Israel, Japan); 2 were neutral (Iran and Lebanon); 7 were supportive of the aggressor (Iraq): Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen. By any definition of democracy there is a clear correlation between supporting the coalition and being a democracy. The outcome was a liberated Kuwait and 310,000 Iraqis killed (IPPNW).

From that some people will draw the conclusion that democracies are peace-loving, and willing

to sacrifice to preserve or recover peace. The conclusion made here, however, would focus more on the readiness to engage in war rather than 'peace by peaceful means', to preserve the status quo rather than peace. There is room for both interpretations. See Jeffrey Ian Ross, 'Research Note: Hypotheses About Political Terrorism During the Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 6 no. 2, 1994, pp. 224–234, for another perspective.

5. These three phases have been well identified by Bert Röling; see B.V.A. Röling & Antonio Cassese, *The Tokyo Trial and Beyond* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 4, 'A "Miserable International Law"?' , pp. 133 ff.

6. An example might be the way the Hutus, in Rwanda 1994, incited the slaughter of Tutsis over the radio by predictions of Tutsi revenge if they were not all killed.

7. This is where the famous quotation from Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State of a democracy, the USA, enters: 'I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people', *The Nation*, 28 March 1994 (in an article about the CIA. The sentence added to its fame by being censored by the CIA in the first edition of Victor Marchetti & John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1974).

8. When the first parliamentary elections were held on 26 December 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won 188 seats and the National Liberation Front (FLN) won 15 – after 30 years in power. The second round was slated for 16 January 1992 but was cancelled, with no strong protests from the world's leading democracies.

# The State System: Dissociative, Associative, Confederal, Federal, Unitary – or a Lost Case?

## 5.1 Ten Fault-lines in the Human Condition

We human beings are parts of nature, of the ‘earth’ from which we have come and to which we return. How can this human-nature *holon* live in harmony, without direct and structural violence? As small bands of human gatherers (not hunters who exercise direct violence against fellow life) in a sufficiently generous nature context?<sup>1</sup> Our present reality is far from that. Rather, analytically, we will need to think in terms of at least ten fault-lines criss-crossing that human/nature *holon*:

*humans/non-humans; gender (male/female); generation (old/young); race (white/colored); class (high/low); nation (high/low); countries (center/periphery); and the three edges in the state–civil society–capital triangle, in social and world space.*

The terms *speciesism, sexism (patriarchy), ageism (gerontocracy), racism, classism, nationalism, territorialism, statism, anarchism, capitalism, and super-statism (imperialism)*, with some clarifications,<sup>2</sup> carry immediate connotations of direct, structural, and cultural violence. The order mirrors the evolution of the human condition: first non-humans (abiota and biota, divided into micro-organisms, plants, and animals); then humans of two genders, reproducing in generations; possibly emerging as different races in different places; then class differentiation as nomads who become pastoral nomads who then become pastoral and sedentary, attached to territory with borders; then the state as territorial locus of power within a territory over non-state, and as super-states over states.

The modern territorial system consists of countries with states, inside which live people of the same nation, nation-states – or at least on the top. Fault-lines everywhere, contradictions, *yin/yang*. To privilege analytically territorialism at the expense of the other nine fault-lines carries in its wake not only surprises when the social tectonics of the other fault-lines can no longer be neglected,<sup>3</sup> but is also intellectually simply too primitive. The world cannot be understood as a set of countries only. When we nevertheless start focusing on territorialism and peace here, the reason is mainly pedagogical: the peace/war vocabulary has to be pried loose from territorial discourses with some care.

The Daoist epistemology underlying peace studies imbues us with a sense of process, of dynamism. Stability is possible, with *yin* and *yang* locking into each other in harmony; the dynamism is then carried by other contradictions. Failure to achieve harmony shows up in the waxing of one and the waning of the other till there is a rupture, a turning point, whereupon the order is reversed and a new search for harmony is started. Concretely, rupture may mean war, revolution, coup d’etat; and harmony may mean a new social contract.

If we define harmony as absence of direct and structural violence, then how can the state system of today, the modern territorial system, become a peace system – or at least

a less violent system? Later on in this section some answers will be indicated, perhaps necessary rather than sufficient conditions, bringing in more contradictions and harmonies to overcome the analytical limitations of territorialism.

## 5.2 Dissociative and Associative Peace Systems

Traditionally there are two answers: keep countries apart spatially, through distance (oceans, deserts), or impediments (rivers, mountains), or threats (defensive or offensive deterrence); or keep them together, spatially by overcoming distance and impediments through transportation and communication, and socially through cooperation. We refer to 'apart' and 'together' as the *dissociative* and *associative* approaches. The two are well known from the Cold War as the hawk and dove approaches in East-West relations, respectively.

A first reflection would be that dissociative approaches become increasingly irrelevant as distance and impediments are overcome by transportation/communication. But threats may be used to compensate for this, which is one reason for spiraling arms races. And social dissociation works attitudinally through prejudice, and behaviorally through discrimination, as solid class formations keeping 'dangerous lower classes' in multinational countries and empires at bay. Spatial dissociation is horizontal, compatible with parallel evolution; social dissociation is vertical, caste- or class-based. It is vertical structural violence, like states suppressing citizens or super-states suppressing other states, or both.

Spatial dissociation carries with it a certain probability of direct violence if distance, impediments, or threats fail. And social dissociation is based on a structural violence that may lead to pre-emptive, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary violence. These are good reasons why dissociation is insufficient in the search for peace in the state system.

We could conceive of dissociation as an answer *in vacuo*. Not knowing what a harmonious relation with states mainly exchanging positive acts looks like, and not wanting negative exchanges – meaning disharmony, meaning violence – let us as a minimum settle for a non-relation. A couple who find themselves unable to achieve harmony, or a positive balance, may do better with a non-relation (separation, divorce), taking into account how complex and multi-dimensional two persons' search for the harmony of body, mind, and spirit is in practice. A prolonged negative relation loaded with the violence of the mind (e.g., angry inner dialogues), verbal violence or even physical violence, in addition to the standard structural and cultural violence of patriarchal society, may become too destructive.

But dissociative peace is at most an answer to the problem of negative peace, a violence-free system. By positive peace we mean a cooperative system beyond 'passive peaceful coexistence', one that can bring forth positively synergistic fruits of the harmony. In a set of states this leads to a continuum from total separation, dissociation, to total association, union. For a human couple, total union – of body, mind, and spirit – is found in peak experiences of bliss related to sexual union, with all kinds of states of partial fulfillment in between. Needless to say, in the associative/harmonious/symbiotic there will also be elements of the negative, dissociative/disharmonious/anti-biotic. We are talking about the balance. And total union may not be sustainable, being too intense, too tight, to be more than a peak experience. As will be seen later, this probably also holds for state systems.<sup>4</sup>

## 5.3 Five Models of Association: From Zero to Unity

Five points will be explored on the association continuum: *dissociative*, *associative*, *confederal*, *federal*, and *unitary state systems* (the last three being advanced forms of association).

*Dissociative state systems: anarchy/hierarchy* Each state is looking out for itself, with no built-in associative links. This does not mean a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, except under special social and cultural conditions. Mutual isolation to the point of irrelevance is not only conceivable – it was also empirically the dominant condition throughout most of human history. But today we are so many, so densely settled, and with such a dense network of transportation and communication that there is no way of looking out for oneself without bumping into others. On the other hand, war is not the foregone conclusion so frequently found in the discipline of international relations. However, given the asymmetries of power resources, *anarchy* may carry in its wake elements of *hierarchy*, meaning structural violence (which is not what Hobbes or latter-day Hobbesians have in mind), exploiting, repressing, and controlling others.

*Associative state systems: treaties–conventions–regimes–organizations* The state system is a social system with states as actors, interacting with each other. For this to be a system, some stability has to be built into it. Treaties and conventions serve to equip the system with a set of mutually binding normative expectations. Any social system has such expectations, which serve to make the world more foreseeable: ‘everybody does it that way’, ‘we’ve always done it this way’, ‘now we are going to do it in a new way’.

By locking Self and Other, Ego and Alter into each other through a normative system the world becomes, in principle, more stable – but not necessarily less violent, as the *vendetta* is also a normative system. However, for the norms to predict and not only prescribe behavior they have to be internalized in the cultural system ('I abide by the norm because that is the right thing to do') and/or (preferably *and*) institutionalized in the social structure ('I abide by the norm, hoping for remuneration, or fearing punishment if I do not'). Treaties and conventions are bilateral and multilateral efforts to build harmony on normative, remunerative, and punitive power (enforcement). Universal conventions include (practically) all states, approximated by the UN system in general, and the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in particular.

Under what conditions would treaties/conventions be peace-building? ‘Mutual benefit’ is the first condition often found in the discourse, the negation being ‘unequal treaties’, a way of freezing a condition of hierarchy (structural violence), with the hierarchy between winner and loser in a war as a special case. The Versailles Treaty, for instance, is wrongly called a ‘peace’ treaty: ‘armistice’, ‘war termination’ or ‘structural violence’ might be more appropriate terms.

*Symbiosis* will be used here in roughly the same sense as ‘mutual benefit’, meaning that both or all parties get something positive out of it. Presumably this is the reason why they enter the treaty/convention, not only negotiating but ratifying, using the internal process at their disposal.

However, we shall add a second condition: *equity*. It is not sufficient for harmony that both get ‘something’ out of it, meaning that neither ends up worse off. The deal has to be equitable, non-exploitative: each party getting approximately equally much. Only then would we hypothesize a peace-building effect, and even so only as an hypothesis.

The treaty/convention world can be universalistic, for the whole world; or particularistic, for only a part of the world, a region; with a pair seeking bilateral understanding as the minimum case. But it retains the specificity of the treaty/convention, defining a specified set of complementary expectations. To return to the analogy of the human couple: we are now in the realm of colleagues or neighbors; rather specific.

We can now build on this in two directions: making the relation more solid; and/or making it more diffuse, covering more themes. A *regime* is a way of institutionalizing a system of treaties or conventions by incorporating rewards and punishments. And an *organization* regulates a broad range of themes or issues. The *UN system* can be seen as

an effort to be universal with a maximum number of member-states; highly diffuse, built around a high number of themes or issues; and at the same time solidly institutionalized. The question is not only whether this combination is feasible (whether these three can be combined), but whether it is desirable. Thus, if enforcement becomes a major way of obtaining normative compliance, by using direct violence, then we are certainly not creating peace.<sup>5</sup> We began all this by stating that peace studies is about *peace by peaceful means* – not by violence.

Under what conditions would organizations or regimes be peace-building? What would we add to symbiosis and equity?

Third, *diversity* of the parties. If the relation is to be diffuse, involving co-operation along many dimensions/themes/issues, then they have to have different assets and resources, different inputs, otherwise mutual benefits would be limited. In nature, diversity is the assumption underlying symbiosis, and the two together add up to ecological resilience.

Fourth, *homology*. They have to find each other, locking in with each other, so to speak. Since we are now evidently moving from colleagues/neighbors to friendship relations in the couple metaphor, there have to be shared interests at the same time as there has to be diversity. For states to cooperate, each part of State A must find its 'opposite number' in State B; and this is easily done because states today are built according to the same basic model (tripartite division of power, with the executive part divided roughly the same way into ministries, etc.)

Fifth, *creative conflict resolution*. There is bound to be conflict, not only among the parties (disputes) but also within, among the goals/issues (dilemmas), not to mention the combination of the two. Real-world conflicts are never only between two parties over one issue: they are much more complex. On the other hand, that also offers more opportunities for creative conflict resolution because of the possibility of bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral etc. trading; with two, three, any number of issues. Hence, two sub-conditions:

- The *domain*, number of parties  $m$ , has to be higher than 2.
- The *scope*, number of issues  $n$ , has to be higher than 1.

Sixth, *positive compliance mechanisms*, meaning no or minimal use of punishment, enforcement. Norms have to be followed, by and large; otherwise association does not work. Best would be compliance coming out of inner conviction, in other words internalization. At the personal level this means having a good or bad conscience. But countries, meaning territories with states in the center and a uni- or multi-national population, may be too self-righteous to develop a collective bad conscience except under extreme circumstances (Germany after World War II?). However, they can, and in fact often do, feel collectively good about themselves – unfortunately often for reasons not shared by others. Then there is the possibility of reward (positive institutionalized compliance), making cooperation pay, instead of focusing on punishment for non-compliance. This means positive sanctions, as when trade really is for mutual benefit.

Seventh, *transcendence*. There has to be a concretization of the notion that association is more than the sum (more correct expression: set) of member-states. This may take the ad hoc form of a periodic conference, or the institutionalized form of a secretariat, with a staff attending to the interests of the association as such. The task of the conference or secretariat is defined in the preceding six points.

Together, then, these seven points define a mature associative system, based on symbiosis and diversity. Obviously, we are then spanning quite a range, from a treaty

regulating fishing rights in a border river to the whole UN system, and sub-typologies have already been indicated. Much peace and harmony in general can be created within this paradigm.

*Confederal state systems* What is new at this stage? How does a confederal system, a confederation, differ from an organization of states with successful implementation of the seven principles announced above? This is a crucial question and a key reason why this step is more important than the difference between a treaty and a convention/organization just discussed. Let us approach it, again using the couple metaphor.

We have seen our couple move from mutual irrelevance (dissociation) via colleague/neighborhood to friendship, living as good room-mates (association), by increasing the level of commitment to the relation. But at the confederal stage they are no longer 'just friends'. They become known as a couple. There also exists a much higher level of permanence, although they may still decide to split. They work out their own relation as internalized in themselves rather than as institutionalized, in the total state system. 'Co-habitation' would today be an appropriate model at the couple level: 'we are the ones who decide, not society'.

Behind that decision there are deeper sentiments than a colleague/neighbor rationality based on compatible interests. Call it love. The relation is also very diffuse, comprising many themes. And even more important: the scope is totally open; *there is no limit to cooperation*. There is no codification which by defining themes of mutual cooperation defines all other themes as essentially irrelevant, as normatively void. In a confederation any theme is open for cooperation; moreover, *the parties expect each other to be the first choice as cooperation partner*.

But for that to happen there has to be some kind of growing together, or internalization. In a couple both have to internalize the concerns of the Other as if they were their own. The binding cement goes beyond calculated, utilitarian (egocentric) rationality and into the field of deep emotions, mobilizing deeper layers of the *psyche*, more of the mind, the spirit.

For something similar to happen in a state system it is not sufficient that governmental representatives should feel deeply committed to the inter-state organization they are creating. Something more has to be mobilized. And this is where the non-state system enters: the citizens in all the countries concerned and their associations, the national and inter-national *civil society*. Positive ties should be found not only among governments but among non-governments, NGOs, filling the total system with all kinds of mainly positive interaction in all directions, very dense, and very live; weaving it together across borders. This can be formulated as a condition, as follows.

Eighth, *entropy*, meaning a distribution of the total interaction mass on all relations, not only inside countries between state and non-state, or between governments. Like couples relating to each other not only with the deep sympathy of the mind also found in friendship, but with the union of their bodies and the joining of their spirits. The European Community before the Maastricht Treaty, the Nordic Community before three of its countries joined the European Union, and the ASEAN may serve as examples of confederations. A loose circle is drawn between 'we' and 'they', with some coming and some leaving. To the extent that this happens, a new actor has been born, a super-actor.

*Federal state systems* In a federation, that super-actor is supposed to be forever, like a couple being married 'until death do us part'. The relation is institutionalized in the total system, not only internalized in the parties. If confederal systems are like two-egged twins, then federal systems are not only one-egged but indeed Siamese twins, sharing

essential organs to the point of being inseparable; a separation would damage at least one of them beyond repair. The general formula is that states grow together exactly at the points needed to become a super-actor in the total system:

- politically:* common foreign policy (decisions);
- economically:* common finance policy (currency, central bank);
- militarily:* common security policy (army);
- culturally:* common cultural identities (values, faiths).

Thus, the federation gets a center by growing together, making joint foreign policy decisions, having a common currency (and a central bank), having a joint army, and by building a super-nation by stressing common culture ('American' for the USA; 'New Soviet Man' for the Soviet Union; 'European' for the European Union; 'Southern Slavs' for Yugoslavia). There is an assumption of considerable cooperation among the peripheries in addition to this sharing of the center.

Federation is a deep relation. Separation is now branded 'sedition', to be counteracted with norms to the effect that the federation is 'everlasting'. Just as with a human couple it may work, and then again it may not, depending on whether the federation is built across fault-lines, with unidentifiable (or at least unidentified) harmony points impeding political earthquakes. If they are found.

*Unitary state systems* At this point the states grow together, voluntarily or not, into one state; not only at the center but in the periphery as well, with unified economies, unitary schooling systems, and so on. No major decisions are taken in the periphery, only decisions about how to implement what has been decided at the center. An approximation here could be couples in complete harmony, even to the point of becoming look-alikes. If the size is sufficient we may conclude that a super-state has been born. Many of today's states were yesterday's super-states; scales can change over time.

The problem is to what extent these five alternatives to violent state systems (dissociative, elementary associative with four subtypes, and advanced associative, confederal, federal, and unitary) are peace systems. The problem obviously has an inside and an outside: is the system good at containing violence and transforming conflicts within, and how does the system relate to the rest of the world? Many of today's states were yesterday's state systems (Germany), and may return to that state of affairs (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia); many of today's states may become parts of tomorrow's super-states (the fifteen members of European Union, combining confederal, federal, and unitary aspects).

There is no reason to believe that super-states are any more peaceful than states. As long as the context of that super-state has not changed, super-state formation merely transforms the problem of violence, even war, to a higher level where scale is concerned, if it is a cohesive actor, meaning a federal or unitary system. The closer the association is to unity (unitary), the more threat to the outside, *ceteris paribus*.

We can summarize the key hypotheses in this connection:

	<i>Peace-building capacity inside</i>	<i>Peace-threatening capacity to the outside</i>
1 <i>Dissociative</i>	low	low
2 <i>Associative</i>	low to medium	low to medium
3 <i>Confederal</i>	medium	medium
4 <i>Federal</i>	high	high
5 <i>Unitary</i>	very high	very high

The dilemma is obvious: the organization of the territorial system that is most peace-building on the inside may also be the organization most peace-threatening to the outside. Germany obtained peace among German territorial units,<sup>6</sup> but at what price to the rest of Europe? So did the United States,<sup>7</sup> the federal unity confirmed by the Civil War; so did the Soviet Union, after the civil war of 1918–22.

The logic is simple. Building a solid state organization in the center of the super-system (meaning the federal and unitary levels, in the other stages the state as a shared organization is only found in embryonic form) regulates the relations among the components, often with creative conflict resolution and positive compliance mechanisms. But that very same state organization also gives outer coherence to the new system. A potential threat to peace has been born, as some states have been included and others excluded. The same mechanisms that are peace-productive at level L may become peace-counterproductive at level L+1. The conclusion is problematic: exclude nobody, make the whole world federal or unitary. Feasible? Desirable?

#### 5.4 Territorial Peace Systems and Race–Class–Nation

There are serious problems with a world government, federal or unitary. This becomes apparent the moment we complicate the analysis above by bringing in other fault-lines. If the territory is host to a society, then there has to be nature for production, two genders for reproduction, and several generations. There is no choice. Societies handle these three fault-lines more or less well. But for the next three – race, class, nation – there is a choice: uni- or multi- racial, class, and national, societies.<sup>8</sup>

We get eight combinations, all of them meaningful.

	<i>Race</i>	<i>Class</i>	<i>Nation</i>	<i>Comment:</i>
1	uni	uni	uni	Gender/generation contradiction?
2	uni	uni	multi	National territorial separation?
3	uni	multi	uni	Class society with much mobility
4	uni	multi	multi	Nations will tend to be stratified
5	multi	uni	uni	Racial territorial separation?
6	multi	uni	multi	The peace utopia
7	multi	multi	uni	Races will tend to be stratified
8	multi	multi	multi	Race and nation both stratified

The comments are based on the general assumption that the human ability to live very close to the very different is very limited: an assumption that itself is subject to limitations.<sup>9</sup> But let us imagine some validity. In that case dissociation will take place, socially in terms of stratification (Nos 4, 7, and 8), and spatially in terms of separation (Nos 2 and 5 above). Multi-class systems serve as receptacles for stratification; borders drawn on the map serve to accommodate new countries.

If the society is uni-class (meaning relatively little difference in quality and quantity of life) the territorial solution will be used; if it is multi-class (with heavy differences) then stratification will be used. In the former Republic of South Africa the two came together in *apartheid*, stratified and separated within one country. Then,

No. 1 *uni-uni-uni*. The inhabitants are, or feel like, one race and one nation, living in what is essentially a single-class society. In principle this means that three of the fault-lines have been superseded (the Germans have the good expression '*aufgehoben*'). But the Daoist thesis – let us put it in the form ‘contradiction or death’<sup>10</sup> – would then yield the

hypothesis that the dynamism of the society will be carried by the first three on the list of fault-lines, or by state/non-state.

No. 3 *uni-multi-uni*. This would be a homogeneous society with soft class borders: soft because they are not made visible by race and/or audible by nation (assuming language differences and cultural rituals to be audible). Mobility should in principle be easier than in societies where class has a race and/or nation foundation, making class more similar to caste. This is the Western prototype, the nation-state class society.

No. 6 *multi-uni-multi*. This would be the much-praised multi-racial and multi-national but uni-class society. It differs from No. 1 above in race and nation being subjectively and objectively present, yet with people managing to live together within one country and one class. The absence of empirical cases around the world should not be taken lightly, nor should it serve to stop the quest for this triple harmony.<sup>11</sup>

If the conclusion is that multi-racial/national societies tend to be vertically segregated and/or horizontally separated, then the next question is *how much?* One hypothesis would be that multi-racial/national societies will have particularly steep class gradients; another hypothesis would be that horizontally separated federations, with the parts hanging together in a strong center, would be insufficient.

In other words, *multi-national* (and *multi-racial*) *federations* (with nations and races separated in states, or republics, or whatever they are called) *are not viable*. They are too tight. Europe has seen the breakdown of three of them within two years, 1991–93 (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia).<sup>12</sup> Nor is the answer that they should have been unitary states instead. If they had, then class would, most probably, have been even more correlated with nation. Considerable force was needed to keep them together as federations; even more would have been needed for the unitary state (*non-*)solution.

And that actually answers the problem of the viability of a world government, on top of a world federation or world unitary state. All the race, class, and nation fault-lines would be on the inside. Today they are already correlated; in that kind of system, they might become even more highly correlated. Power will tend to be directed downwards in that system, with the result being countless cases of the center intervening in the peripheries to keep the race-class-nation combination at bay.<sup>13</sup> Direct violence will follow the structural violence, from the center above, but also from below, from the periphery. The net outcome is very far from peace.

But that also applies to the opposite scenario: total separation, the dissociative model. This is *horizontal structural violence* at work, a territorial structure keeping people apart. The whole 20th-century machinery of borders,<sup>14</sup> border control, visas, passports, stamps, and similar irritants, is structural violence that impedes unrestrained contact with anybody, any Other, including the very different Other. The problem is that having Other too close is also violence to some Selves – who should not necessarily be branded as racists, bigots, anti-Semites, etc., for that reason. More promising would be the idea of limited capacity for Self–Other differences; and the search for new approaches.

Violence if different peoples are kept apart, and violence if they are brought together? Yes, indeed. And there is no contradiction here – partly because anything social is already contradictory, partly because we may be talking about violence to different persons. The best general answer available to us today is probably the confederal formula. Multi-national confederations do not impose closeness, yet they make togetherness easy for those who want it by making borders porous, not only visa- but also passport-free, etc. Moreover, as pointed out above: a confederation can easily be renegotiated, and escape is possible. Neither too loose, nor too tight, but somewhere in the middle.

So, what is bad about a confederation? The difficulty lies in keeping it stable, protecting it against the Scylla of the federation and the Charybdis of elementary

association. Confederation is not a very stable form; we need to develop mechanisms to make a confederation a stable equilibrium.

The present author would tend to prescribe confederal solutions for many problems in the territorial system, because of the implicit egalitarianism and absence of a strong center to punish the recalcitrant and launch conflicts with outside actors. Good arguments can be made for:

- Bosnia-Herzegovina as a tripartite confederation.
- Yugoslavia III, after unitary Yugoslavia I (1918–1941) and federal Yugoslavia II (1945–1991), as a confederation.
- Southeast Europe (the ‘Balkans’) as a confederation.
- The European Union as a confederation, not implementing the federal aspects.<sup>15</sup>
- A Pan-European confederation from the Atlantic to the Pacific, based on the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the ECE (the UN Economic Commission for Europe).
- The world as a confederation, strengthening the horizontal ties in the United Nations, but keeping the superstructure weak, as global governance rather than world government.

In the world of yesterday, three regions could be said to be multi-national confederations and peace systems: the Nordic countries, the European Community, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This meant  $5+12+6 = 23$  nations of the soon 190 member-states of the United Nations, making internal war among their member-states not ‘unthinkable’, but highly unlikely. All nine criteria mentioned above were reasonably well satisfied. Such an achievement should not be belittled. Nor should the solid infrastructure in non-state terms, people’s organizations connecting the member-states from below, be under-estimated either, counteracting the eighth fault-line, possibly also internationally (with the EU, even the UN, as super-states).

### **5.5 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?**

Above we have touched on some relevant peace-building and peace-threatening dimensions. Let us bring in one more: the morphological inclination in culture. Clearly the unitary and federal solutions are uni-centric, the confederal solution is poly-centric, the associative solution is based on some general social ‘glue’ keeping parts together, and the dissociative solution has no glue at all. If we refer to this ‘something’ that keeps countries together in a state system as God, then this translates into monotheistic, polytheistic, pantheistic, and atheistic structures, respectively. And the general thesis is obvious: ‘Tell me your religion and I’ll tell you the peace order you believe in.’ Monotheists will tend to go in for world government (of the unitary or federal varieties); polytheists will celebrate multi-centered confederations; pantheists will, like Gandhi, look for the ‘oceanic circles’ keeping it all together; and atheists will be non-believers, ‘realists’, keeping the states, the parts, apart.

At the individual level, predictions are not that simple. They tend to work better at the level of world cultures. And so, we would expect a predilection for world government and dissociation in the monotheistic, and also secular, Occident; likewise, a predilection for looser levels of association in the polytheist, pantheist, and eclectic Orient. The debate is not necessarily a peace-rational debate along Kantian or Weberian lines; rather it is an expression of civilizational positions already taken, and for that reason difficult to countenance. Thus, we end up with the thesis of *the primacy of culture*.

## Notes

1. For an exploration of the significance of 'primitivity' for the character of warfare, see Tom Broch and Johan Galtung, 'Belligerence Among the Primitives', pp. 25–37 in *Peace, War and Defense, Essays in Peace Research*, vol. II (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1976).

2. Thus, sexism could conceivably involve more than two genders as gays/lesbians would be quick to point out, and matriarchy (not only matrilineal and/or matrilocal formations) might be conceivable; ageism today takes the form of the middle-aged against the young and the old (killing the very young with abortion/infanticide and the very old through euthanasia); racial groups are only defined through pigment and physiognomy, but race is objectively as insignificant as it is subjectively important because of its high visibility; national groups are defined by means of cultural characteristics, particularly religion, language, and shared myths; the definition of class varies enormously through space and time; so does the significance of territorial divisions (borders); the state is an organization with monopoly on ultimate power inside a territory and a super-state an organization with monopoly over ultimate power inside a state-system.

3. The role of nationalism after the end of the Cold War, a 40-year exercise in super-statism, is today (1996) already classic.

4. The same holds for the negative end of the spectrum of inter-state exchanges: a total exchange of negative acts in all directions among all members of the state system, the total negative peak experience, will also be short-lasting – not only because of the destruction wrought, but also because of the energy expenditure needed.

5. Thus, the effort to use the term 'peace-creating' for enforcement should be rejected. Force is force and tends to generate counter-force. Somalia 1993 may be the first example of a people using counter-force to resist 'peace-creation'.

6. The German Confederation, *Deutsche Bund*, had as successors two unitary states, *Das Zweite Reich* (Bismarck, 1871–1918) and *Das Dritte Reich* (Hitler, 1933–45), and then a federation, *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, from 1949. An educated guess: the next time round, Germany will again become a confederation.

7. Originally based on the *Articles of Confederation*, 1781–89 as a preparation for a more federal constitution. Switzerland also started as a confederation of cantons but became a federation by the criteria used here from 1874 (the national license plates with *CH, Confederatio Helvetica*, are inaccurate – they should read *FH*). For an excellent analysis of the Swiss structure and process, in many ways a world model, see Wolf Linder, *Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994).

8. Instead of 'multi-national' the term 'multi-ethnic' is often found, the problem with the latter being that 'ethnic' usually is applied to Other, not to Self – as in 'Let's go out and taste some ethnic cooking tonight'. Likewise, 'ethnic' clothes-styles are periodically declared in fashion ('the ethnic look').

9. Thus, one important limitation would be that this applies particularly to *Homo occidentalis*, with a Manichean paradigm, a dichotomy with strong black and white, bad and good gradients firmly imprinted on their minds. Different = bad is only too easily available as a concrete reading of that imprint.

10. Rather different from one occidental version, *patria o muerte*, fatherland or death, the slogan made famous by Castro. Patria is more contradiction-free; for that reason already dead?

11. To state the obvious: the United States is not a case in point, given the extermination of the native Americans and the way in which incoming races and nations are stratified in a solid class system with caste aspects, and then become 'americanized'. Bosnia-Herzegovina was multinational, but then the construction seems to have had Titoist dictatorship as a condition for the cohesiveness (or the Ottomans, the Habsburg occupation/annexation, the Croatian dictatorship under Pavelić).

12. And, before that the (almost complete) breakdown of the British Empire and the French colonial system to more confederal-type systems, the *Commonwealth of Nations*, and the *Communauté Française*, can also be seen as reactions against the heavy vertical structural violence associated with federations.

13. The UN action in Somalia that started in late 1992 as a humanitarian action and gradually became a question of who possesses ultimate power may serve as an example. History will probably classify what happened less as humanitarian and more as the first War of Independence by people against the closest the world has come to a world government, the post Cold War United Nations.

14. Medieval systems needed little control of border transitions for individuals. Cohesiveness could be obtained with other means: inter-marriage among royal families, and the powerful influence of an over-arching non-territorial institution, the Catholic Church (*pax ecclesiae*).

15. Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J, particularly 1–4 and 4–1. Title II, Article 3 in the Maastricht Treaty defined 20 activities of the European Union, making the unitary aspects very clear. Educated guess: the life expectancy of this multinational federation is very limited.

# PART II

## CONFLICT THEORY

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### 1

## Conflict Formations

### 1.1 Conflict as Creator and Conflict as Destroyer

A theory of conflict is as indispensable for development studies as it is for peace studies. To develop is to create. The same is true of peace, but peace also has that emphasis on violence-reduction and non-violent conflict transformation. Deep inside every conflict lies a contradiction, something standing in the way of something else. A problem, in other words. And what could serve better as a *force motrice* for any actor, individual or collective, than a problem demanding to be solved?

But somewhere a danger is also lurking, particularly if the problem is highly solution-resistant. ‘Something standing in the way of something else.’ I want something badly, but so does somebody else. I want something badly, but I also want something else. These classical situations will be referred to as the *elementary conflict formations* or *conflict atoms*:

**Dispute:** *Two persons, or actors, pursuing the same scarce goal.*

**Dilemma:** *One person, or actor, pursuing two incompatible goals.*

The dispute easily leads to efforts to harm or hurt that actor whose pursuit is standing in the way, in other words to Other-destruction. And the dilemma may lead to efforts to deny something in oneself, in other words to Self-destruction. There may also be Self-destruction in the dispute (denying one’s own pursuit of that evasive goal, e.g. leadership of a group) and Other-destruction in the dilemma (taking ‘it’, the frustration, out on somebody else). Most of us experience both, every day. Conflict generates energy. The problem is how to channel that energy constructively.

This is reminiscent of the classical Chinese double-character definition of ‘crisis’, a concept in the neighborhood of ‘conflict’, as ‘danger’ + ‘opportunity’. ‘Danger’ is close to ‘violence’, and ‘opportunity’ reasonably close to ‘challenge’, the root of creation. Here we see old Chinese wisdom, very different from single-minded fear in connection with conflicts, trying to do away with them by solution/resolution/dissolution; even to conceal them by sweeping them ‘under the carpet’, meaning away from personal and social awareness or consciousness.

A basic thesis underlying the approach to conflict taken here will be that *there is no viable alternative to creative conflict transformation*. The question then becomes how to do it.

### 1.2 The Manifest–Latent Dialectic and the Conflict Triangle

The statement ‘this is a conflict’ should always be taken as an hypothesis – not as something obvious, even trivial, about which consensus is easily obtained. True, when certain

types of destructive behavior, *B*, are observed at the manifest, overt level, and more particularly as violent physical or verbal acts, or as hostile body language, then the conclusion is often drawn: here there is a conflict unfolding.

But: we have just made the point that conflict, being problematic, could also lead to constructive behaviors, such as deep, meditative postures, also known as 'inner dialogues', and 'outer dialogues', with others, about the problems. Destructive behavior tears down, it hurts and harms; constructive behavior builds something. Both can be present at the same time and place, in the same person; they are not incompatible.

Thus, there is no simple relation between conflict and conflict behavior as long as the doubleness of conflict is taken into account. As an example, observe formerly hostile antagonists when they, together and/or with a conflict facilitator, begin moving creatively toward some basic conflict transformation: hectic hilarity, visible excitement, deep happiness, even love. And yet the conflict is still there. No doubt, many people experience their finest hour precisely when a conflict is unfolding. On the other hand, if tension becomes a necessary and not only sufficient condition for their happiness, we may be dealing with a neurotic personality. If the person creates conflicts to obtain that happiness, we may be moving into the psychotic. And if in addition the person uses those conflicts to dictate the solutions, then the term 'psychopath' may indeed be apt.

Evidently there is something underneath in all cases, and in other cases where conflict behavior is observed. Let us refer to what is hidden as assumptions (cognitions), and as attitudes (emotions), wrapped together by the letter *A*. And then there is the content of the conflict, *des Pudels Kern*, as Goethe said, which we assume to be a contradiction, *C*. The contradiction has to involve something wanted. Let us call it a goal, and its attainment a goal-state. We get:

**Contradiction: incompatible goal-states in a goal-seeking system.**

**Conflict: attitudes/assumptions + behavior + contradiction/content.**

In other words, *conflict = A + B + C*. The conflict is a triadic construct. Focus on only one of the three, and the significance of that one will probably also be lost.


The only systems we shall accept as goal-seeking are live systems, capable of experiencing the realization of a goal as happiness (*sukha*) and the deprivation as suffering (*dukkha*). In other words, we shall never assume that a gender, a generation, a race, a class, a nation, any territorial unit (a municipality, a district, a country, a region or the whole world), a state, or a super-state, has 'goals'. These are all abstractions. The happiness derived from goal-fulfillment, and the suffering derived from goal-deprivation, both presuppose a subject, however primitive, capable of experiencing a *sukha-dukkha* gradient. Somalia has no goals, nor does the USA; but certain elites in either of them (and not only they) may have goals, even very clearly formulated ones. Likewise, minerals, water, air are not abstractions, but we generally do not assume that they experience the gradient mentioned. We include all kinds of life, but exclude non-life from *conflict*.

So conflict is about life, pointing straight to contradictions as life-creative and life-destructive. A theory of conflict will have to be located at this level phenomenologically. How close to the essence of life can be discussed, but this aspect should be ever-present in the discourses now to be developed about conflict. If conflict is essential in life, then life may also be essential for conflict. A conflict does not experience happiness-suffering. But a conflict may have life-like properties, such as a life-cycle – to be explored in Chapter 2 here. And there is a manifest and a latent side to conflict, the manifest side being identified with behavior, and the latent aspect with attitude and contradiction.

At the manifest, empirical, observed level, conflict participants can only experience,

observe behavior, called B. Both A and C are at the latent, theoretical, inferred level. The three together add up to the conflict triangle in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 *The Conflict Triangle*



This triangle can be used to trace and identify flows in all six directions, starting anywhere. Thus, a contradiction may be experienced as a *frustration*, where a goal is being blocked by something, leading to aggressiveness as an attitude and to aggression as behavior<sup>1</sup> according to a famous and fruitful hypothesis,<sup>2</sup> useful as long as it is not taken as an iron-clad law. Aggressive behavior may be incompatible with the other party's concept of happiness (unless we are talking of a sado-masochist combination), leading to a new contradiction on top of the old one, possibly stimulating more aggressiveness and aggression in all parties concerned. Violence breeds violence, the triangle becomes the projection of a spiral that may run its course the same way as a fire: stopping when the house is burnt down. The parties may burn out in the A corner from emotional exhaustion or in the B corner from physical incapacitation. However, A and B may also be restrained, and/or the contradiction, C, may be superseded. Unlimited escalation to the bitter end is no absolute law. There are still humans around in our conflict-ridden world.

A basic problem is that such processes may also start in A or B. One party may have accumulated negative attitudes (aggressiveness) or negative behavioral inclination (a capacity, predisposition for aggression); and when 'something comes along' that looks like a problem, either A or B, or both, may be activated and hitched on to the new problem. If A takes the form of aggressiveness, both as hostile emotions and as negative cognitions of Other ('*Feindbild*') we may talk about negative conflict energy being hitched on to a contradiction, possibly the result of accumulated experiences in the past, for instance from approaching conflicts too negatively. But, in the spirit of what has been pointed out above, the conflict energy can also be positive – a generally loving, compassionate, accepting attitude and positive cognitions of Others ('*Freundbilder*') and of Self. Accumulated conflict experiences may lead to positive personality transformations; they can also lead to transformations in very negative directions, producing bitter personalities, filled with *ressentiment*.

We assume much of this to be subconscious, hidden to the persons or actors. In a dispute the two actors may observe each other's behavior, perhaps also their own. Through inner dialogues they may increase their own awareness of A and C, and check their own findings through outer dialogues with each other, becoming each other's guides in understanding themselves. In a dilemma the person/actor is more lonely. The inner and outer dialogues coincide, both becoming like playing a game of chess with oneself. Training helps; but an integrated, not a split personality is the goal of that inner dialogue exercise.

We can now talk about A-, B-, and C-oriented approaches to conflict, and also of A, B, and C realities: a total of eight possibilities:

- A=0, B=0, C=0** *total non-conflict, the state of death*
- A, B=0, C=0** *attitudes/assumptions prepared*
- A=0, B, C=0** *behavioral patterns prepared*
- A, B, C=0** *attitudes/assumptions/behavior prepared*
- A=0, B=0, C** *contradiction is there and nothing else*
- A, B=0, C** *the subconscious level fully prepared*
- A=0, B, C** *ritualistic conflict behavior*
- A, B, C** *a fully articulated conflict*

Each case has a story to tell, as indicated in keyword form. Reading vertically from the top, we may speculate about conflicts in search of *articulation*, or completion, starting in any corner, adding the others, which evidently can be done in six different ways. But we may also read upwards, and speculate about *disarticulation* of conflicts, with attitudes dying out, behavioral patterns receding into oblivion and contradictions dissolving. Sometimes by themselves, but very often conscious intervention is needed, by Self(Selves) or Other(s).

A (complete) conflict is a syndrome, a triadic concept. Great care should be exercised: the statement ‘this is a conflict’ may become a self-fulfilling or self-denying prophecy. People are told they have a conflict, so they start behaving, feeling, and acting accordingly, seeing contradictions where there are none. Or they may disarticulate, for instance fearing the consequences of accepting the conflict diagnosis. As a result, they may never face their own conflicts.

### 1.3 Actor Conflicts and Structure Conflicts

To understand better the manifest/latent dialectic, which is also in part a consciousness/subconsciousness dialectic, consider the following questions: could we have a conflict only at the manifest level? Or, only at the latent level? The answers given here will be *no* to the former and *yes* to the latter, for the following reasons.

Of course we can observe a person/actor or two at total ease or total dis-ease, or both, with themselves, at the B level. We may talk about ‘tension’ if the dis-ease takes the upper hand, and about ‘dis-tension’ in the opposite case, noting that the two do not exclude each other. However, neither tension nor distension (or its positive aspect, attraction) presupposes a conflict anywhere. People may behave the way they tend to behave – like devils or angels, both or neither – depending on personalities, which certainly may be shaped by conflicts in the past. Place two persons filled with *resentiment* next to each other, and verbal and/or physical animosity starts flowing. But for a conflict diagnosis to be justified there has to be an identifiable contradiction between the two that can be used to formulate reasonable hypotheses about the total formation and its dynamic under various circumstances, its transformation.

Imagine then that we have identified a content/contradiction, maybe also assumptions/attitudes, and that the party or parties are unaware of what is taking place within and between them. What would be the prognosis following that diagnosis? That sooner or later there will be behavioral manifestations.

A crucial distinction can now be made between direct and indirect conflict, or actor conflict and structural conflict, depending on the extent to which the conflict has become not only articulated, but manifest – meaning overt, explicit, observed, *conscious*. Let us

start with the dilemma (one party, two goals) and then move on to the dispute (two parties, one goal, 'bone of contention', *Streitapfel*).

*Actor conflict:* A and C both conscious.

*Structural conflict:* A and C both subconscious.

Of course, B, the behavior, is always manifest, observed and not only inferred: otherwise it is not behavior. As mentioned above, it can be fully autistic, not related to any adequately composed A,B,C triangle. The party simply behaves, something is moving, including the special case of standstill. Interest focuses on A and C, starting with A: the inner person, the attitudes and assumptions. The personality.

The subdivision of the personality into cognitions, volitions, and emotions is useful. Of course the intellectual maps, the wants, drives etc. and feelings are strongly related to each other. In an actor conflict, the actor is a subject, conscious of what *is* (cognition), what s/he *wants* (volition) and for that reason *ought to be*, and how s/he *feels* (emotion), e.g., about the relation between *is* and *ought*. If what *ought to be* also *is*, then s/he may report 'I feel just fine, thank you'; if not 'I feel terrible' might be the verbal formulation of the tormented internal state of affairs. We would generally assume that emotions are better guides to real goals than cognitions.

However, under A we have also included 'assumptions'; these we can now interpret as pre-cognitions, pre-volitions and pre-emotions in the deeper layers of the personality, between the conscious and the unconscious, not easily available for recall. Professional help may be needed. One approach, as Freud told us, is to use dreams, debris from the filing process of cognitions/volitions/emotions in personality files prepared in the pre-emotions/pre-volitions/pre-cognition, to understand how these deeper layers are organized.

Then, the C corner, the contradiction between goal-states. To lift C up in the daylight, making it manifest, means consciousness about where the incompatibility is located: what goal-states stand in the way of each other. The actor then has a map to the contradiction included in his or her cognitions. We are now dealing with a conscious person, aware not only of his/her own images, wants, and feelings, but also of what stands in the way. A *subject*, in other words, ready to preside over a sentence with predicate and object; ready to act, with a purpose, not merely behaving.

What can we call this process of lifting A and C up from the subconscious, partly even from the unconscious? Following Paulo Freire<sup>1</sup> we refer to it as *conscientization* and to the opposite process as *deconscientization*. The process is basic, for how can a conflict be consciously transformed unless the parties to a conflict are conscious subjects, true actors? Otherwise, the conflict will transform the actors as objects, parties to the conflict, not the other way round. The party is only a passenger taken for a ride, not a driver presiding over the process.

Yet conscientization is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition, as will become clear in Chapter 3 below about conflict transformation. In addition, the actor will be transformed anyhow, but with consciousness added more able to steer that transformation, including of her/himself. At this point we may mention a very simple reason why conscientization is only a necessary condition: the image of the conflict may be false or inadequate. There is such a thing as false consciousness, as Marx told us. We, party to the conflict or not, construct an image of the conflict, complete with A, B, and C of ourselves and the other party. Whether this is done by the participants or by the observer, that image will always remain an hypothesis, to be tested again and again and to be revised. False consciousness means a disconfirmed hypothesis, an unrealistic image, and that can and does happen to all of us.

If conscientization is such a good thing, why do we conceptually open for its negation, deconscientization? Because not only does that happen – conflicts are forgotten, even repressed – but this may also be necessary, even desirable. We cannot be conscious all the time of all the conflicts to which we are parties, one way or the other. We should be willing and also able to ‘retrieve’ them after having saved them, to use an adequate computer metaphor that today is a part of world culture. We cannot have them equally present at all times and all the time. Some selectiveness is a condition for human and social survival. But store them: ‘save’, do not ‘delete’.

Next, a key question and very far from the realms of the metaphysical: Who does all this, who is the subject of the conscientization process? Who lifts cognitions/volitions/emotions up in the consciousness? Not the subconscious/unconscious itself, if we assume that the mind cannot possibly be both subject and object at the same time of this process. Or, is that more of a conceptual/linguistical than a psychological problem? The answer preferred by the present author is to use a third category as a constituent of *homo sapiens* in addition to body and mind (personality, the seat of pre-cognitions, volitions and emotions): the *spirit*. We can conceive of the spirit as the seat of reflection, on or over what goes on in body and mind, in *soma* and *psyche*.<sup>4</sup> That reflective capacity starts working on A, B, and C, and the result is, in principle, a conflict image that is fully articulated, including in the consciousness of the actors.

Would this process differ depending on whether we are dealing with a dispute or a dilemma? Not much. The dilemma is made conscious in one party through inner dialogue. In the dispute we are dealing with more than one party where the conscientization takes place. They develop images, more or less realistic, of the conflict they are involved in. Should we demand that the images coincide? No, but comparing images through outer dialogue is obviously an important aspect of a conflict transformation process, only noting that coincidence does not necessarily mean that the shared image is realistic. The shared image may be unrealistic the same way because of shared pre-cognitions.<sup>5</sup> The test lies in what happens later.

Let us now turn to what is here called structural or indirect conflict with neither A nor C present in the consciousness, but embedded in the subconscious. Prying it loose from that subconsciousness may be painful, even almost impossible. There is a contradiction, but no awareness of it. There is not even awareness of a goal, in other words no volition, and consequently no open feelings, because there is no awareness of any is/ought coincidence or not. There is not even false consciousness, since there is no consciousness at all. What do we have then, with what right do we talk about a conflict at all?

For the case of the dilemma of a person, the answer is obvious: this is precisely what the whole psychoanalytical tradition is about. The contradiction, e.g. between id and super-ego, lies in the deeper recesses of the personality, or in the *structure of the (inner) person system*, a formulation with its homologue in the next paragraph. But the contradiction between these pre-volitions is not accessible to the spirit of the holder of the contradiction. That does not imply that s/he cannot feel ‘terrible’, and behave strangely; but there is no consciousness of the conflict triangle, or if there is any, it is far from realistic. On the surface, often observable to Others more than to Self, patterns of behavior show up that are classified as ‘symptoms’, meaning indicative of A and C very deep down. But conscientization would seem to be beyond the capacity of the person. Intervention may be called for, in the form of professional help. How professional that help is is another question, to be discussed to some extent in Chapter 4.

Let us then turn to the dispute. The parties are on a collision course, there is a contradiction. But they are aware neither of the contradiction, nor the goal-states that define it. Emotions may be unrelated to contradictions in their spirit, which may not even be working on the problem. The contradiction lies in the system tying them together; or to use the

homologous formulation: in *the structure of the social system*. Take the two genders in a patriarchy: obviously there is a contradiction, and it was there before Henrik Ibsen wrote *A Doll's House* and increased the collective awareness by a quantum jump. In the same vein the contradiction in *the structure of the world system* between the USA and Cuba did not start with Fidel Castro making 'trouble' (a highly B-oriented category), nor was the inter-nation conflict between certain Native American and Anglo-Saxon tribes in North America something that started with 'Indian troubles'. They were manifestations.

But in these latter cases were we not dealing with consciously held goals? To some extent, yes: but there was hardly any awareness of the entire scope of what was at stake. We need a concept for subconsciously held goals, goals that are objectively there even if the subject is not aware of them. We shall refer to them as *interests*, and to consciously held goals as *values*. They can both be material or non-material. There is no assumption that those subconscious interests are material and the values are 'ideological' and hence non-material. Both can be both; it is conscientization that makes the difference.<sup>6</sup>

We could now say that in an intra-personal conflict the person has an interest in giving id its due, and an interest in giving super-ego its due. The level of consciousness is very low or zero. But through conscientization, these interests may become values: the person as an actor, as a subject, may now value both of them consciously, decide there is an incompatibility, and opt for one or the other. A consistent preference for id will define a person who is highly sensual, a consistent preference for super-ego will define a person who is highly ethereal. Other word-pairs are somatic/spiritual, materialist/idealistic, epicurean/platonic, or Sorokin's 'sensate/ideational'. Then Sorokin goes on to define the integrated combination of the two, referring to it as 'idealistic' and the non-integrated combination as eclectic/amalgam/congerie. Freud refers to the integrated synthesis as the emergence of a strong ego, embedded in the personality as a patterned cognition/volition/emotion syndrome, capable of producing and reproducing behavior that gives both their due in a reasonable balance. A non-integrated mix of id and super-ego with a very weak ego is also conceivable, however; but all of this belongs to transformation theory. What we have done here is only to test the conceptual apparatus.

Actor-conflicts are conscious, structural conflicts are not; they can both be of the dilemma or dispute types. And, as indicated above: there are some other in-between types or truncated conflicts that are not fully articulated at the conscious level, or not at all. But this distinction will do.

#### 1.4 Complexity: Elementary and Complex Conflicts

We are now in a position to bring together much of what has been said above in an overriding scheme based on two simple variables:  $m$ , the number of actors in a conflict, and  $n$ , the number of themes or issues or simply goals that enter in their (intra-action) dilemmas and (inter-action) disputes.

Consider the scheme set out in Figure 1.2. The figure is simple: a conflict with  $m$  actors and  $n$  goals is found in position  $(m,n)$ . To handle an  $(m,n)$  conflict intellectually one has to keep in mind at least the  $m$  actors and the  $n$  goals, meaning  $m + n$  items in the formation.

We could now define the *complexity*,  $c$ , of a conflict as  $m + n$ , but we shall prefer the formula  $c = m + n - 2$  (or  $c = m \times n - 1$ ):

- $c < 0$ : structural conflict, neither actors nor goals (0,0)
- $c = 0$ : one actor, one unrealized goal: frustration (1,1)
- $c = 1$ : elementary conflicts: dilemmas (1,2) or disputes (2,1)
- $c > 1$ : complex conflicts ( $m,n$ )

Figure 1.2 *The Number of Actors (m), and the number of goals (n)*

$n=n$	X	(1,n)	(2,n)	(3,n)		(m,n)
$n=3$	X	(1,3)	(2,3)	(3,3)		(m,3)
$n=2$	X	(1,2)	(2,2)	(3,2)		(m,2)
$n=1$	X	(1,1)	(2,1)	(3,1)		(m,1)
$n=0$	(0,0)	X	X	X		X
	$m=0$	$m=1$	$m=2$	$m=3$		$m=m$

X: combinations that are omitted as empty or uninteresting.

With complexity as a key conflict dimension, we introduce a one-dimensional perspective with considerable explanatory and praxeological power. Structural conflict, frustration, and elementary and complex actor conflicts, whether of the dilemma or dispute types or both, are very different phenomena. But this perspective invites us to handle them together, and in a dynamically highly relevant manner.

The transformation from structural to actor conflict (and vice versa) has been explored above under the heading of conscientization/deconscientization. New here is the notion that this transformation passes through the case of frustration where one actor has one goal but the goal-state is blocked. There is a barrier. This is a zero conflict, but similar enough to be an important part of general conflict theory, among other reasons because of the frustration-aggression (or destruction) hypothesis, and the equally important frustration-creation hypothesis.

An actor, unconscious of what is happening to him/her in the structure of the person, social, or world system, may have a frustration image as a passing stage before an image of a fully fledged conflict emerges – like working-class frustration at never realizing middle-class goals, or the frustration of women at not being in control of their own life situation. Later on the actor may see clearly that something very concrete stands in the way – class society, patriarchy – with very concrete actors on the other side. The frustration phase becomes like a crust of ice on a frosty day as the consciousness passes from the cold waters underneath into the clear air above.

Once there, the consciousness (meaning the human spirit) is faced with an equally crucial problem: simplification versus complexification. Here are three basic conflict hypotheses:

*Thesis 1:* Real-life conflicts are usually very complex; elementary conflicts, (1,2) or (2,1), are for textbooks.

*Thesis 2:* The more complex the conflict, the more openings for nonviolent, creative transformation of the conflict.

*Thesis 3:* In the heat of conflict tension, one of the first victims is conflict complexity.

Complexity is then reduced through the process of polarization, leading to the nakedness of elementary conflicts, the cruel choice between this or that, we or they. Obviously Thesis 2 is the good news and Thesis 3 the bad news.

The more complex the conflict image, the more openings for transformation – as will

be explored later. This should argue in favor of *complexification*, splitting up actors and goals into sub-actors and sub-goals and bringing in other actors and goals, transforming here and there, hoping for some roll-up effect.

The problem, the Scylla, is that the complexity may become too great for the human mind to handle. If we go by the magic number 7 as the maximum of elements most humans can handle creatively, the upper limit would be 3 or 4 actors and 3 or 4 goals, in other words  $c = 4, 5$  or  $6$ . Thus, *simplification* may also be called for, with the danger – the Charybdis – that simplification becomes polarization, down to elementary conflicts. The crucial problem is how to steer a course between Scylla and Charybdis, i.e. around  $c = 5$ .

### 1.5 Typology: Conflict Spaces

Conflict presupposes goal-seeking systems, goal-seeking systems presuppose life; and life can be found many places. The typology that will be developed here is based on the six spaces found throughout the pages of this book, Nature, Person, Society, World, Culture, and Time,<sup>7</sup> combined with the dilemma–dispute distinction that will be referred to as intra/inter. This gives us the typology shown in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3 *A Typology of Conflict Spaces*

<i>Space</i>	<i>Intra: dilemma</i>	<i>Inter: dispute</i>
Nature		
Person		
Society		
World		<b>no cases</b>
Culture		
Time		

For Person, Society, and World, dilemmas and disputes have already been introduced, only noting that the inter-World dispute at present is an empirically empty category. The inter-Society category is certainly empirically very rich; this particular combination is dealt with under the heading of ‘international relations’ (‘world studies’ would have been better), with inter-country and inter-nation relations as special cases.

But for Nature, Culture, and Time something more has to be said. An example of inter-Nature would be inter-species conflict, overemphasized by Darwin in the ‘survival of the fittest’ metaphor, tempered by Kropotkin’s ‘mutual aid’.

The intra-species combination might direct our attention to deeper contradictions, e.g. in the genetic codes of a species. The same applies to intra-Culture. However, for the conflict paradigm, or even conflict concept to apply, we shall assume the sides of the cultural dilemma (e.g., freedom versus equality in Western political culture) to have human representatives, as we would assume for inter-cultural disputes. Here the reader might try placing a copy of the Bible and of the Qur'an next to each other on a table, watching for tensions to emerge, inside one or the other, or between the two of them. Do the same with a Christian and Islamic theologian (at rather than on the table) and the results will be considerably more dynamic. Live carriers of goals are indispensable for conflict to emerge.

How about Time? One important interpretation would be as synchronic and diachronic conflict, e.g., intra- and inter-generational conflict, the latter being highly meaningful in connection with environmental deterioration. One generation lives not only at the expense of nature, but also at the expense of posterity: *après nous le déluge*.<sup>8</sup>

Figure 1.3 can be used to illustrate many processes in conflict and in conflict images. The ultimate outcome of an intra-personal dilemma can be withdrawal, possibly generalizing to apathy or schizophrenia, resulting in Self-destruction to the point of suicide. Similarly, the ultimate outcome of an inter-personal dispute can be withdrawal, or perennial tension, resulting in Other-destruction to the point of homicide. The processes do not exclude each other; they may coincide. And then both conflicts may be used in a creative and life-enhancing way.

The intra-Societal dilemma is then seen as a collectively shared intra-personal dilemma, such as the French bourgeois dilemma between French-socialist-Jewish and German-Nazi-anti-Semitic. One possibility is apathy, like the French reaction to the German invasion of May 1940. After some time, however, the contradiction within will become a contradiction without, here between *résistance* and *collaborateurs*.

And correspondingly for the intra-World dilemmas found all over the planet at present: as growth versus distribution or growth versus environment, sometimes leading to apathy, but mostly to sharp polarization during the Cold War between a capitalist bloc emphasizing growth (often without any distribution) and a socialist bloc emphasizing distribution (often without any growth). The growth camp won, probably also winning over the environment camp despite, or because of, verbal compromises like 'sustainable development'.

Many efforts have been made to trace *causal processes* in Figure 1.3 (or some similar figure); particularly the intellectually heroic Freudian effort to root such processes in intra-personal contradictions (between id and super-ego) and the Marxian attempt to root them in intra-social contradictions (between capital and labor, or, more subtly, between means and modes of production). Not denying causal flows, reductionist efforts to root them in the same type are doomed to fail. What can be argued, however, is a high level of *isomorphism* between different types of conflict processes. Using one as the prototype, a causal chain may be traced through the human observer, imposing the same metaphor process on all of them.

## 1.6 Conflict Formations and Conflict Transformations

Much has been said above about actors and goals, about their numbers and how they relate to each other in the structure of the person, social and world systems (and, we may add, in nature, in culture, and over time). The time has now come to emphasize that goals are certainly not necessarily incompatible and actors are not necessarily in dilemmas or disputes or more or less complex combinations of them.

Let us refer to any goal-seeking system simply as a *formation*. It is not merely a set or listing of actors and goals; there is a structure (e.g., an interaction structure) in the systems referred to above. There is interdependence. A formation can then be *harmonious* or *symbiotic* (meaning co-life-enhancing) to the extent that attaining one goal-state is correlated with attaining another. A harmonious marriage has this characteristic, the *sukha* of one going together with the *sukha* of the other. But if the *sukha* of one goes together with the *dukkha* (suffering) of the other, we are obviously dealing with a *disharmonious* or *anti-biotic* formation, life-enhancing for one at the expense of being life-destructive for the other. The formation has become a conflict formation.

The obvious has to be stated again and again: any real-life formation has both

harmonious and disharmonious aspects. We will find conflict and cooperation, Darwin and Kropotkin, side by side. *In a conflict formation, the disharmonious aspect of the formation is dominant.* But in no way should that make us blind to the cooperative, harmonious aspects that may very well be the basis on which conflict transformation can build.

## Notes

1. See Piero Giorgi, 'The Origin of Violence by Cultural Evolution in Humans', forthcoming.
2. The classical text is John Dollard, *Frustration and Aggression* (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1980) (original 1944). Also see Aubrey J. Yates, *Frustration and Conflict* (New York: Wiley, 1962).
3. In his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, not worrying too much about whether the felicitous term introduced by Freire is used exactly the same way here. We could also have used a word based on 'consciousness', such as 'consciousness-formation' (in German: *Bewusstmachung*). This term, however, is not easily negated in English (in German *Unbewusstmachung* would be possible). However, Freire's use of conscience rather than consciousness points to volition and emotion, not only to cognition.
4. A convenient assumption for us humans would be that the spirit is the *differentia specifica* that distinguishes us from plants and animals. Maybe. Never having been a dolphin myself, I would prefer an agnostic position.
5. The whole theory of cosmology, the deep culture of a civilization, is designed to deal with shared pre-cognitions, in the collective subconscious (Part IV of this book).
6. Thus, one thing is what actors say they want (this is the level where political science tends to stop); another, what they believe they want (this is where historians may come in and point out that this may differ from what they said); yet another, what they subconsciously want, they want it but do not know that themselves (this is where psycho-analysts and functionalist sociologists/anthropologists enter); again, yet another, what they will eventually want, with more information, better analysis, higher levels of consciousness (here Marxists, realist school IR people and others are willing to offer advice). My own position would be in favor of all; there is something to be gleaned analytically and practically from all perspectives. A peace research would not, indeed should not, be totally free from the moralism of the last perspective.
7. Person is sometimes called Self, sometimes Human, but here we shall use 'person' as intra-personal versus inter-personal conflicts is frequently found. And Society-World can be made much more refined, starting with Micro-Meso-Macro, specifying to Family/Household-Local-District-Country-Region-World.
8. According to *The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 492) wrongly attributed to Louis XV (ruling 1714–1774). But whoever said it at the time, *after me, the flood* was not a bad prediction. The French Revolution struck 15 years after his death as one of those big intra-time (*kairos*) contradictions that had enormous inter-time (*khronos*) implications.

# 2

## Conflict Life-Cycles

### 2.1 Deep Culture, Time Cosmology, and Social Cosmology

We have a conflict formation, we are looking for a conflict transformation: in between lies conflict dynamics, the life-cycle of a conflict. The term itself directs attention to such figures of thought as birth/genesis, maturation/dynamics, death/(re-, dis-)solution. But, as will be shown below, these terms may also be highly misleading, or at least culturally biased.

The deep culture or cosmology of a civilization<sup>1</sup> obviously conditions not only the perception of conflict life-cycles, but also the actual behavior in conflict, with a major bearing on conflict transformation. The level of knowledge of this factor, by participants or outsiders, will also affect the outcome. That level is not necessarily higher among insiders than outsiders to the civilization, since cosmology by definition is rooted in the collective subconscious, not in the individual consciousness. For any student of human conflict, this type of knowledge is essential.<sup>2</sup>

In the following, two civilizations, referred to as the hard Occident and the Buddhic civilizations, will be explored for their image of conflict life-cycles. Christianity (with Judaism and Islam), and Buddhism, are actually mega-civilizations defining Occident and Orient respectively. Ideas about how these basic religions view conflict should be a useful guide.<sup>3</sup>

Using the conceptualization of *time* as point of departure some insights come readily. If Christian time is bounded, with a beginning, a *genesis*, and an end with *apocalypse-catharsis*, then we would also expect the view of a conflict life-cycle to be encased within finite time. A conflict would be seen as having a clear beginning, birth or *genesis*, and a clear ending, after a *crisis*, as *apocalypse* or *catharsis*. The cosmology will impose itself, demanding corresponding behavior and attitudes.

By contrast, Buddhist time is infinite. For all practical purposes there is no beginning and no end, although there is the transcendence of *nirvana*, a transformation to other unknown and unknowable types of existence. Conflict would be seen as interminable, no beginning and no end, flowing from eternity to eternity like an infinite river, possibly with a delta somewhere infinitely far out where the energies accumulated in that river pour into the ocean and take on other forms. The conflict is transformed, preferably to a higher (meaning less violent) level, but not extinguished.<sup>4</sup> Time cosmology will be imposed on the conceptualization of conflict, demanding this image of the process, expecting actors and commentators to feel, behave, talk, and write accordingly, imposing neither beginning nor end.

Then, add to time cosmology an element of social cosmology: individual vs. collective/social. Using the knot–net metaphor,<sup>5</sup> which is more *real*, the knots or the net? The Christian soul being individual, social reality will have to be conceived of as individual knots and not as social nets. For Mahayana Buddhism individual connectedness is what is reality; separable and eternal, individual souls, an illusion. Nets are real, knots not.

Again, this will affect the way conflict is viewed. Whereas Christianity would individualize conflicts, even to the point of seeing conflict as originating in one individual who through the conflict may affect the lives of Others, Buddhism would see conflict as arising within a collectivity of significant Others. That collectivity does not necessarily have to be synchronic. The net is what matters, sideways and diachronically backwards and forwards, relating to sentient life in present, past, and future. Reality is unbounded in social space as well as in time.

Christianity will not deny individual connectedness in the sense that the acts of one person can affect the life of Others. But the ethical unit of account is the individual endowed with the capacity to *will* – hence not merely behaving, but acting. An individual is an actor. For Buddhism the ethical unit of account is collective, denying neither individual existence nor capacity to *will*. But responsibility does not lie with individuals alone.

To return to the river metaphor: the Buddhist conflict river flows from eternity to eternity, now quick, now slow, with eddies curling back on themselves, sometimes in cycles, sometimes in giant waterfalls, sometimes uphill, sometimes not, with tributaries and forking paths. Like the *samsara*, the birth-rebirth cycle. What could be a corresponding Christian water metaphor? A geyser, arising out of troubled waters underneath, rising to a climax, possibly released as evaporation, dwindling, disappearing, or spreading, moving others to a cataclysm?

‘Individualized conflict in finite time’ vs. ‘collectivized conflict in infinite time’ are very different points of departure for conflict theory and conflict praxis. The first image lends itself epistemologically to Occidental atomism, nomothetic (generalizing) conflictology, with deductive theory-formation, possibly based on a typology of actors. The second image lends itself to the dialectics of Oriental holism with ideographic conflictology, there being one connected humankind, or life-kind.

## 2.2 Christian and Buddhist Time and Conflict Cosmology

With this general conceptualization we can now turn to more concrete images of conflict transformation. Both civilizations have strong views on disharmony, with precepts. Both of them see harmony as coming to the person who follows the precepts, be they the Ten Commandments of Judeo-Christianity or the Noble Eightfold Path in Buddhism.<sup>6</sup> Conflicts or disharmony come to the one who strays away from the Law, the Law of *God* in Christianity and the Law of *karma* in Buddhism. God is omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent, caused by nothing but Himself; holding individuals accountable. Likewise, the *karma* is an omnipresent dialectic between an ethical determinism making human beings accountable to themselves (‘whatever you say and whatever you do, sooner or later comes back to you’), and the possibility of improving one’s *karma* through acts of volition, the individual will.

The Law comes to human beings by being received, not only in the sense of being heard and understood, but in the sense of being internalized as binding. What Moses and Jesus Christ did for Judeo-Christianity, the Buddha did for Buddhism; the Law being above all of them, applying also to them. What they both did was to spell out the Law, as articles of faith and commandments, 3 and 10 of them in Christianity (5 in the pillars of Islam), 4 and 8 in Buddhism. With these the moral base or benchmark has been laid. Infraction leads to disharmony. Thereby conflicts arise; possibly with others, for sure with the Law, and thus with themselves. In Christianity in addition with God, with the Christ; in Buddhism in the sense of creating bad *karma*, both the individual *karma* and the *karma* shared with others.

Any infraction will be detected. The moral value of an act is registered by an omniscient God; its merit/demerit deposited in the omnipresent *karma*. God adjudicates, as salvation or damnation. The *karma* improves or deteriorates. What then?

From this point on, similarities between the two traditions in this double reading break down, and two different flow-charts will have to be established, one Christian, one Buddhist. There are similarities, but also conspicuous dissimilarities. Thus, there is similarity between the Christian wish to improve one's standing with God if a sin has been committed, and the Buddhist wish to improve the *karma* after demeritorious acts. There is similarity in the view that the individual alone may be incapable and needs help from God (Christianity) or from Others (Buddhism). This in itself is already a dissimilarity in approaches, with profound bearing on how conflict life-cycles are conceptualized.

The Christian process is a complex chain of sin, submission to God, confession of the sin committed, repentance, penitence, atonement, and possible forgiveness (by God). The final decision rests with God, and Him alone; His will is the Law, He alone decides by an act of grace over salvation and damnation.

*Basic to this approach is its pervasive verticality.* The sin committed is against God's Law and His Son: 'Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of my brethren, ye have done it unto me' (Matthew 25:40, also see Matthew 25:45). One's relation to God has to be repaired, whereas the victim is secondary. The moral content of an act lies in its relation to God, because His is the Law. With that relation restored, the sin is canceled and the person starts with a clean slate. Born again.

Christianity distinguishes between *peccatum* and *peccator*, the sin and the sinner, condemning the former, with a way out for the latter. This assures finiteness in time and individualization in space. The conflict process starts with an act of sin by a fallible human actor, and ends with an act of grace by the infallible God. The focus is all the time on the sinner, the one who infringed the Law – the rest is a context. The stage is then set for a possible repetition of the sequence, or no more sin, or for the final, the mortal sin, the point of no return.

The Buddhist process introduces a very different sequence. If there is no God, no heaven, no hell, no eternal salvation or damnation, no eternal and separable individual soul – then any demerit is not relative to God nor to oneself, but to the net of significant Others. Only in that community can the demerit be canceled. One way would be through action dialogue, undoing the evil, restoring relationships through merits. Another would start with a verbal dialogue, identifying why and how that bad collective *karma* developed and how it can be improved toward ever higher levels; then going ahead and doing so.

*Basic to this paradigm is its pervasive horizontality.* The demerit of an act lies in what it does to other forms of sentient life. The act cannot be undone, but that relation can be changed. The significant Others do not have to be alive as identifiable individuals today; the relation of demerit may also be to life already dead or not yet (re)born. In other words, there is no way of individualizing the relation. The relation, bad or good, is in the collectivity, and there it will remain, from eternity and to eternity.

A non-finite time perspective is guaranteed through responsibility not only for acts committed in the past, but for all acts of merit and demerit affecting that *karma*, regardless of when and where. Only by assuming full responsibility for the merits and demerits of that collectivity can the illusion of individual separateness and permanence be eliminated.

*Karma* is a very holistic concept transcending individual life-spans in time and space. At the same time it is also very dialectic, the demerit introducing a contradiction in *karma* to be superseded through dialogues with words and action; through meritorious acts, deeds. If this is the general way of viewing the human condition, then it makes little sense to separate conflicts from each other, sticking individual name-tags on them and

bracketing them in time and space. To label one part of this *holon* guilty and the other non-guilty makes no more sense than to label the right hand guilty and the left hand non-guilty in a crime of two-handed strangulation. As merit and demerit is shared, its distribution on individuals becomes a metaphysical question. Any merit is (partly) due to inspiration from my brothers and sisters (significant Others) anyhow; so is any demerit, because they should have prevented me from straying.

What is not metaphysical is the willingness to do something about it, each part of the *holon* making contributions to navigate the collective Self, with parts dying and reborn, through the complex topology of that Buddhist River of Life. Christianity offers eternal life, in salvation or damnation, but in practice is concerned with finite life between biological birth and death. Buddhism offers no *resurrectio carnis*,<sup>7</sup> this biological life stops with the death of the body. In practice, however, it conceives of life as an eternal flow of energy from eternity to eternity, lived with less suffering and more bliss to Self and Other the better the interconnectedness sideways, backwards, and forwards. For the Christian there is no appeal because there is no second life; the split second here on earth determines eternity. For the Buddhist eternity itself is the time perspective for improving the *karma*, life being an interconnected chain of opportunities to do so. Nothing is final, there are always opportunities to improve the *karma*.

Comparing the two views which have been presented here in somewhat overdrawn fashion, one cannot help feeling that whereas Christianity makes guilt too dichotomous, Buddhism draws no line, preferring the joint search for causes of bad *karma*. Where Christianity is too asymmetric, Buddhism is too symmetric. And whereas Christianity is cruel in its insistence that this highly finite life determines eternal afterlife, Buddhism is too gentle in giving us unlimited time to improve our *karma*. Along both dimensions in-between positions could be designed, and an eclectic compromise might be preferable.

But we are not free to design our civilizations; they are given. The fact is that these two perspectives on conflict life-cycles exist: one as an infinite number of finite conflict life-cycles between being born in a state of original sin and redemption through a divine act of grace, and the other as a finite number of infinite life-cycles, starting nowhere and anywhere, with ups and downs, ultimately ending in the ever-flowing ocean of eternity.

### **2.3 Secular Versions of Christian and Buddhist Perspectives**

So much for Christian and Buddhist perspectives, both religious in the sense of relinking with *that out there*, with God or with *karma*. One of them demands that we bend to the will of God, the other that we bend *karma* to our desire for *satori*, enlightenment. But how many, and who, believe in the reality of the Law of God and the Law of *karma* today? There are processes of secularization in the Christian and Buddhist civilizations, and the processes sap both perspectives of much of their content. Nevertheless, in line with general cosmology theory, we would expect the form of these perspectives, such as finite-atomistic versus infinite-holistic, to survive content variation.<sup>8</sup>

The Occidental secular perspective is known as the Western legal tradition, meaning that which the Roman, German, and English legal traditions have in common. Transcendental references are found, but they are ritualistic. Basically, the ultimate sources of Law are in the successors to God as the Prime Mover, meaning the constituent legal act by King or Assembly, self-constituted as their own causes and sources for domestic law; and the United Nations for international law. Recipients are successor Kings–Assemblies–General Assemblies; producers of lesser laws, defining more or less explicitly the prescribed, the permitted, and the proscribed. An act detected and registered as proscribed is a transgression: the actor is then adjudicated in accordance with the

laws of due process. The verdict remains equally dichotomous: guilty or not guilty. Then comes a sentence, today in terms of money (fines) or time (prison), which may be adjusted to make the guilty-not guilty dichotomy less sharp. Heavy punishment may be alleviated through an act of grace. Afterwards the slate is clean again, in theory, at least after a period of probation.

In short, we find similarity in all essentials. The verticality is still there. The sin, now called a 'crime', is seen as committed upwards, against King-State-People. The victim recedes into oblivion. Penitence, now called 'punishment', is only external, inflicted from the outside, and on the outside of the evil-doer – the purse or the body. For a time, the complex spiritual process induced by Christian teachings was kept alive inside prisons; now it is for all practical purposes defunct. Pay, do time, quits. Only recently has there been a trend to sentence law-breakers to work for the community, and to compensate the victim.

We would expect something similar in the secularized versions of Buddhism, only with less emphasis on the written law and the 'whodunit' than in the West, and with more emphasis on some type of reconciliation. But rather than the search for causes by going into oneself, meditating on the wrong done, and then a patient dialogue with the offended Other, this process is perhaps also increasingly left to a third party – in Japan often to the proverbial police in the police 'box'. The task of verbalization, and the search for diagnosis, prognosis and therapy, is left to others who then become conflict processors. Lay or professional, there is less self-reliance and as a consequence less maturation in the conflict parties themselves, nor improvement of the *karma* that is theirs, only a smoothening of the relations between them. The goal is outer (B), not inner (A) change. The meta-physical, spiritual underpinning of Buddhist conflict processes is wanng.

The basic conceptual structure may still remain at the deeper level, as less of a tendency to see conflict as starting with one act and ending with another, and less of a tendency to see conflict as rooted in one actor and not in a relationship. But the conflict conceptualization is becoming verticalized, and not only in Japan with its long feudal tradition opposed to the ideal 'temple and the tank' autonomous village of classical Buddhism. As a consequence we would expect law, lawyers, and litigation to be on the increase in the Buddhist part of the world as the Buddhist perspective becomes secularized.

Is there a middle way position between the spirituality of the past, often very obscurantist, and contemporary conflict transformation processes, often steered by cynical outsiders who demand no inner, personal effort at all, only, possibly, a consultation fee? In the West there is the gentler Christianity of a softer Occident II;<sup>9</sup> in the Orient a possible revival of Buddhist patterns of conflict processing. Buddhist spirituality may also prove more acceptable to Westerners whose God has died, than a Christianity with a God very much alive to Easterners.

## 2.4 Some Implications at the International Level

To explore international-level implications of how conflicts are conceptualized let us compare the Viêt Nam War (the Second Indochina War) and the Gulf War, both with the USA as a major party. There was a major difference between the two wars. In the Viêt Nam War the USA became decreasingly convinced that 'North Viêt Nam' was guilty of some crime, and more inclined to doubt its own righteousness. This was not only because the USA finally lost the war, whatever be the reason (more military talent on the Viêt Name side headed by a military genius of the century; the US use of conscripts, including college students, some of them conscious and mobilized against the war; the US media coming closer to reporting accurately, not 'patriotically'). By contrast, in the Gulf

War the USA/Bush were convinced of their own righteousness and the guilt of Iraq/Saddam. As the possibly most Christian country in the world, the USA would be expected to conceive of both wars as beginning with ‘sins’: transgressions on the other side. Whether this is really believed at the top level of decision-making matters less, as long as the conflict discourse takes place within that mind-set. ‘Throwing the first stone’ is often done in Christian countries despite the warning against doing so when not innocent, and in a glass-house. You may hit yourself, a Buddhist (and Jesus) would quickly point out.

As a background to the comparison, let us take a brief glance at two recent cases made to fit the Western script, USA–Japan and USA–Germany in World War II. There were transgressions defining the *beginning*: Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941, and the attack on Poland 1 September 1939. There were acts defining the *end*: the capitulation signed in Rheims, effective 8 May 1945, and in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. With evil acts so well defined, identifying the authors of those evil acts was an easy matter.

Verticality was imposed on the situation not only through capitulation and surrender of arms as obvious acts of submission, but through tribunals (the Nuremberg and the Far Eastern tribunals being the most famous) extracting something close to confessions, individualizing the conflict with the concept of ‘war criminals’ who committed ‘crimes against humanity’. The structure of occupier–occupied served to institutionalize the verticality. Reparations were only one form of punishment; another being marginalization from the world by denying UN membership.

The crimes of the Axis Powers being unspeakable, proofs of basic change afterwards were called for. The opportunity came with the Berlin blockade of 1948/49 and the Korean War of 1950/53, eagerly seized upon by the two occupied countries to prove that they had indeed embraced the cause of the occupiers, particularly of the USA – not difficult, as their anti-Communist credentials were impeccable. The Allies, particularly the USA, used this occasion to exercise the divine privilege of grace, bestowing peace on them (but no formal peace treaty with Germany), restoring them to international normalcy (1951 for Japan, 1954 for Germany, 1955 for Austria).<sup>10</sup> General acceptance of the process no doubt derived from following the Western script so well, with the Japanese quickly learning what to do.

The Viêt Nam War witnessed none of this. The USA did not win, so there could be no sequence initiated by Vietnamese acts of submission. However, the Viêt Namese did not win either, so they could not extract submissiveness, even capitulation from the USA, to be followed by Washington tribunals for premeditated crimes against humanity committed by such US war-makers as Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, Richard Nixon, and Henry Kissinger.

There is still general uncertainty as to how to interpret the post-Viêt Nam War situation. Given the two scripts and the role of Buddhism in the East Asian *san fa* (three teachings, in Viêt Nam with Confucianism and nationalism), what to expect?

We would expect the Viêt Namese to be less concerned with confessions of guilt *as long as the other side does not insist on being non-guilty*, and very much concerned with entering a dialogue to explore what went wrong and how relations could be improved. No doubt a dialogue of that kind would be conducted in secular terms by the Viêt Namese, as by the other three Mahayana Buddhist countries (China, Korea, Japan); the Buddhist aspect being in the deep structure, not on the surface. There may be reference to inscrutable ‘oriental wisdom’ – ‘inscrutable’ only to those who fail to scrutinize. All of this would be done with no expression of rancor if the rule above is adhered to, with smiles (although it should be remembered that the semantics, syntax, and pragmatics of smiles in the Orient are non-Western). The basic ingredients remain the same: much *inner dialogue* (also known as meditation) within, much *outer dialogue* between.

How does this look to the US side? First, they might see pleas for dialogues with the USA as signs of economic despair, but refuse to engage in them lest these be used 'for propaganda purposes', fearing harsh words. The absence of 'you are guilty' finger-pointing at the USA will, in a dichotomous zero-sum discourse, be seen as a sign that the ViêtName have turned around, no longer seeing the USA as guilty and themselves as non-guilty. The thousands of refugees will be seen as confirming the shortcomings in socialist Viêt Nam. From this it does not follow that the USA was right, but nor were the ViêtName. And the subtle smiles may be taken as signs of forgiveness for possible US wrongs. Each party interprets the same phenomenon within its own framework, remaining as far apart as ever.

The Gulf War was less ambiguous, at least so far. There was at least a clear *beginning* in the act of aggression committed when Iraq occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The ideal *end* would have been not only withdrawal from Kuwait and capitulation by some Iraqi military forces, but capitulation of the Ba'ath regime with a Baghdad tribunal for Saddam Hussein, and some others, for 'crimes against humanity', followed by the Germany-Japan routine. A sense of completion of the Christian conflict life-cycle *Gestalt* would have ensued. The book could be closed. The temptation must have been enormous.

Let us then introduce a Buddhist perspective on the Gulf conflict. In that perspective, 2 August 1990 and 17 January 1991 are still there, so are the twelve Security Council resolutions in general and 678 ('with all necessary means') in particular. But the conflict formation now extends sideways, backwards, and forwards, relating to other actors and parties, to past history and future consequences: a much more complex view than the simplicity of international law applied (correctly) to the Iraqi transgression. That backward perspective has also been used by Germany (Versailles as act of aggression) and Japan (Western economic sanctions as acts of aggression), but in an exculpatory, not holistic manner, picking what served their own guilt-budget.

The closest Western approximation to Buddhist conflict transformation would be a multilateral conference with all issues on the table and all parties seated around the table, and time to articulate and process the conflicts in the system, preceded by meditation, and without pre-conditions. Holistic and dialectic, *mature*: but very rarely practiced during conflict.

## Notes

1. By this is meant the collectively shared, but usually only at the subconscious level, assumptions in a culture about what is natural and normal; how things simply *are*.

2. Thus, when two persons in conflict meet to negotiate we are (at least) dealing with four levels: the *persona*; the masks they show each other; the consciously held but not necessarily revealed strategies; the individual subconscious of both parties; and the collective subconscious which may or may not be similar depending on whether they come from the same culture or not. A conflict theory based only on levels 1 and 2 is rather naive.

3. For an introduction to Buddhist texts, see Edward Conze, *Buddhist Scriptures* (London: Penguin, 1959). For an elementary introduction, see Johan Galting, *Buddhism: a Quest for Unity and Peace* (Colombo: Sarvodaya Publishing Services, 1993).

4. An example: in multinational states, conflicts between national groups do not disappear with a transformation to federation. But some separation and autonomy *may* facilitate less violent approaches, with the center of the federation as ultimate decision-maker. However, that decision-making will often be quite vertical, meaning that it could also be an exercise in structural violence. Consequently, confederation, with a very weak center, might be a transformation away from structural conflict, meaning to a higher level. Needless to say, this is a delicate balance.

5. See Raimundo Panikkar, 'La notion des droits de l'homme, est-elle un concept occidental?', *Diogenes*, no. 120, 1982, pp. 87-115.

6. Right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. For a beautiful discussion of Buddhist ethics and practice, see

Robert Aitken, *The Practice of Perfection* (New York and San Francisco: Pantheon, 1995), particularly pp. 28–32. The Buddhist precepts, in the *pancha shila* and the *pancha dhamma* – like the Judeo-Christian-Islamic commandments – would also define stealing, adultery, lying and using intoxicating substances as violence. In the approach of the present book they certainly fall under the definition of violence as anything that harms and hurts, particularly when basic needs are insulted (the use of intoxicating substances hurting/harming the Self to start with). In all cases we would be talking about direct violence, as acts of omission (failure to tell the truth) and/or acts of commission (lying).

7. Resurrection of the flesh, not only the soul (the tomb of Christ was empty).

8. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose* and the famous philosophy in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's *Il Gattopardo* (Milan: Feltrinelli Editore): we change so that everything remains the same ('Perché tutto resti com'è', p. 29; *una di quelle battaglie combattute affinché tutto rimanga come è*, p. 31).

Maybe it is not by chance that both come from Latin countries? Wise, and somewhat cynical? Would a German, an American, or a Scandinavian not rather assume that when something changes then it is to have *impact*, consequences? The more it changes, the more it changes? We change in order for the rest not to remain constant? Sounds a little trivial, not quite sophisticated.

Cosmology theory (Part IV) is precisely about things that remain constant when the surface changes. And one observation by the present author: people in Latin countries grasp this cosmology theory immediately, people in Germanic countries tend not to understand, and if they do, to reject. Both see a contradiction in an author with that type of Latin insight, and yet so action-oriented (from my point of view this is not at all a contradiction, but an effort to be realistic when dealing with deep-rooted assumptions and behavior).

9. See Part IV, Chapter 2.1 for the definition. An illustration may serve the medieval period of European history.

10. The motive behind the Soviet acceptance of Austria returning to normalcy was the hope that unification with neutrality could serve as a model for Germany. If West Germany had been one-third or one-fourth the size of East Germany, and not the other way round, maybe that would have been a US and not a Soviet motive?

# 3

## Conflict Transformations

### 3.1 The Formation/Transformation/Deformation Dialectic

In a conflict there is, somewhere, a contradiction. And in a contradiction there is, somewhere, dynamism. The Daoist idea of *yin/yang*, one waxing, one waning, in search of a harmony point is, as is said about causality, not a law but the form of a law.<sup>1</sup> At the very least it can help us see conflict as something ever-changing, ever dynamic. One may be absorbed in harmony; the other opens up. We have an intellectual handle on the conflict when we can describe the *conflict formation*, i.e. answer the question: which are the *m*, actors/parties, which are the *n*, goals, which are the incompatibilities, the contradictions? But the conflict formation is slippery: as we describe it, transformations are taking place somewhere, before our (inner or outer) eyes.

In what direction? As pointed out in the preceding chapter: Occidental thought (also see Part IV, Chapter 2) will have us believe in an *Endzustand*, some final state where the conflict is either solved or given up as hopeless, ‘protracted’, forever ongoing. A *conflict solution* can be defined as a new formation that is (1) *acceptable to all actors*, (2) *sustainable by the actors*. Thus, the most naive view one can possibly have of a conflict is to believe that a conflict is solved once the elites from the parties of the conflict formation have accepted the solution, as indicated by their signatures on some document outlining the new formation. Not without reason this outcome of ‘diplomacy’ is often referred to as a ‘scrap of paper’. Why?

First, the signatories may be dishonest. Second, even if they are honest, where are the other actors, the people all over? Third, even if they also accept, where are the sustaining forces, producing the less conflictuous formation, not just reproducing the old? A less contradictory formation (C) is good, but it has to be supported by the right attitudes and assumptions (A); otherwise the prognosis will be that the wrong behavior (B) will resume and hitch on to whatever residual or new conflict material (read: contradictions) may be around. A bad rebirth.

Unfortunately, this type of naiveté is rather widespread, particularly among diplomats, probably because of the feudal nature of their institution and its function in an inter-state system with clearly feudal characteristics. But the opposite – that only ‘people’ can solve conflicts by providing acceptability and sustainability – is also naive. Both/and, or double-track diplomacy (elite-track and people-track, with track interaction) would be a much better formula.

Another point made above is that sustainability has to be endogenous, being rooted inside the formation. If outside parties (sometimes called mediators) use carrots and sticks, paying the parties for accepting and punishing them if they do not, then there is no real acceptability or sustainability, unless one assumes that the ‘mediators’ are parts of the conflict formation, not outside, and certainly not ‘above’. But in that case their goals should be clearly stated and added to the conflict, which may then become a *conflict deformation*.

In the life-cycles of conflicts there are no doubt phases that may be referred to as 'solutions', coming reasonably close to satisfying the two criteria above. *But basically conflict transformation is a never-ending process.* Old or new contradictions open up. Negative or, hopefully, positive conflict energy of the A or B varieties is continually injected into the formation. A solution in the sense of a steady-state, durable formation is at best a temporary goal. A far more significant goal is *transformative capacity*, the ability to handle the transformations in an acceptable and sustainable way. *The Way is the Goal*, Gandhi said. 'The process is the goal' might be our formulation; and the moment one thinks a steady-state solution has been found it is lost. Those who think they can resolve all contradictions, thereby producing a contradiction-free, surprise-free, society, are in for the greatest surprises. Like seeds under asphalt or radioactivity under Chernobyl concrete, repressed contradictions will begin sprouting. Unless the formation is dead.

At the risk of repeating this point too often: conflicts do not arise by parthenogenesis, out of nothing, *ex nihilo*; nor do they evaporate or dry out, whether by themselves or by intervention; nor can they be annihilated through conflict euthanasia. Even if the three groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina manage to kill each other, the conflict, like the *holocaust*, will live on as a memory transforming Yugoslavia, Europe, the whole world to the worse: a colossal *karma* deterioration. Our responsibilities transcend the formations here and now. We are in all conflicts. And they in us.

### 3.2 Conflict Transformations: a First Overview

Transformations take place in time, and time is *khronos* and *kairos*, in the steady flow of physical time and in the eddies of that flow where time curls up in and on itself and stands still in an everlasting *now*, from which it jumps to a new *kairos*.

In Chapter 1 above five processes with potential *kairos* character were defined and described:

- (*dis*)articulation: a complete vs. a truncated conflict triangle;
- (*de*)conscientization: making A and C more or less conscious;
- complexification/simplification: seeing more/less actors/goals;
- (*de*)polarization: seeing conflicts as (2,1)/(1,2) or not;
- (*de*-)escalation: increasing/decreasing violence at the B level.

There is a relatively simple relation between these processes: articulation and conscientization go together, so do polarization and escalation, whereas complexification and simplification processes have a complex relation to both.

With A and C consciousness, the conflict triangle is by definition completed. Consciousness of inner and outer contradictions, and of own attitudes to them, will almost inevitably have behavioral consequences, including the zero consequence of willed non-behavior. The conflict may simply be too overwhelming, like national conflicts in Eastern Europe in the socialist period. There is consciousness of contradiction and own attitudes but no behavioral manifestations. The conflict is taboo. Another example of zero behavior being behavior would be the thunderous silence about class conflict in the USA.

Polarization means reducing a conflict formation to the most simplistic level, assigning all *m* parties to one or the other of *two* camps, wrapping all *n* conflict themes together in *one* super-theme. All positive, cooperative relations are within the camps and all negative relations between them (but there may be neutral relations both within and between, as long as there is nothing negative within, or positive between). The Cold War was the classic example, with the inevitable consequence that conflicts within camps were

underplayed, conflicts between camps overplayed and the content of the conflict was vulgarized to anti-totalitarianism as seen by the West, and anti-imperialism as seen by the East. Of course such formulas catch something. But the result is a conflict formation put into a straitjacket, another type of *conflict deformation* in other words. Once that conflict deformation is resolved, or rather dissolved, meaning that the straitjacket is no longer there, the underplayed or repressed contradictions will surface. This is yet another example of how conflicts are reborn positively or negatively in many places and do not die, nor are given eternal life, nor do they reincarnate.

Does polarization necessarily lead to escalation, meaning more violence at the B level? Potentially yes; but not always.

At the individual level, polarization means cognitive simplification, eliminating ambiguities, clearing the ground for black–white, foe–friend cognitions, with corresponding emotions and volitions, willing harm to Other and bliss to Self – simply because through polarization Self and Other are well constructed. At the collective level, polarization means organizational simplification, defining the camps, defining the cause. So, with people's minds cognitively, emotionally, and volitionally prepared and their bodies collectively organized, there is certainly 'stripping for action'.<sup>2</sup> The theory of arms races as *actio-reactio*, not as *Eigendynamik*,<sup>3</sup> within each camp for its own endogenous reasons, usually takes as its point of departure a bipolar conflict formation. If both parties do this, meaning that there is a race, then a dialectic between mutual provocation and mutual deterrence will start operating, probably in a *yin/yang* relation, and this in turn means that there may be very dangerous phases where provocation gets the upper hand and less dangerous phases where deterrence gets the upper hand. Trivial – but many seem to forget that for violence to ensue it is enough that only one party is more provoked than deterred, whereas for 'balance of power' to have the much quoted *si vis pacem, para bellum* effect both parties (not only Other) have to be deterred.

Equally trivial, but also worth mentioning: there may be other values at stake than the contested goal and violence-avoidance. Of course a Saddam Hussein may have wanted to get Kuwait, and in addition to get away with it. But even if he should lose Kuwait, and certainly not get away with it but lose quite a lot in addition, he might stand to gain in honor, display of courage, and self-respect. Much indoctrination is needed to be unable to imagine a culture where the latter three easily outweigh the former two, meaning that even the overwhelming power of the 'US-led coalition' did not suffice to deter.

These trivialities undermine balance-of-power ideology, particularly if in addition such factors as masochism and miscalculation, both of Self and Other, are taken into account.<sup>4</sup> But much more important is the assumption that there is no alternative to violence (with 'win', 'lose', or 'stalemate' as the three possible outcomes) or no violence, meaning being effectively deterred. There is, of course, the vast *tertium* of nonviolence, to be explored in more detail in Part II, Chapter 5 below.

The British thought the Indian *swaraj* (self-rule) movement was effectively deterred through standard colonial state terrorism of an occupied people; Gandhian *satyagraha* opened a different action (including verbal action) discourse. Israeli Zionism had the same assumptions about the Palestinian independence movement, and was mentally equally unprepared for the *intifada*. In both cases the focus had been on 'able-bodied young males with arms', leaving out the power of women (the Indian case), children (the Palestinian case), and the power of nonviolence in both cases. In short, the assumption that violent action and non-action exhaust the action universe is simply wrong, as wrong as the assumption that political violence has to take the form of a spatially contiguous 'front' operating with continuity in time (standard warfare) and not the form of point activity, now here, now there (terrorism).

However, polarization is probably a necessary condition for escalation, even if not

sufficient. And escalation is probably a sufficient condition for polarization, even if not necessary.

Complexification/simplification is obviously a question of how a conflict is perceived, here discussed in terms of numbers of actors,  $m$ , numbers of themes,  $n$ , and particularly in terms of complexity, here defined as  $c = m \times n - 1$ ;  $m > 0$  and  $n > 0$  for actors and values;  $m = 0$  when there are only parties around and  $n = 0$  when there are only interests around.

We could also have used the simple formula  $c = m + n$ , the number of items the parties have to keep in mind as a very minimum to be able to map the conflict formation on their mental screens. But the parties have to be related to the themes to give content to the conflict, the contradictions in other words, meaning that the cognitive map is an  $(m,n)$  matrix with  $m \times n$  entries (like '1' if theme no.  $j$  is relevant for party no.  $i$ , '0' if it is not). Consequently, the product is a better indicator of the mental work needed.

We have then subtracted 1 to arrive at the distinction between complex conflicts ( $c > 1$ ), elementary conflicts ( $c = 1$ ), frustrations ( $c = 0$ ; an unreal conflict) and structural conflict ( $c < 0$ ; either no actors, no values, or both).

The problem can now be explored, as was first done in Part II, Chapter 1 above: there is a Scylla as well as a Charybdis to be avoided.

The Scylla is too high complexity. We may debate where the upper limit for  $c$  is located, meaning for effective cognitive processing by a human mind (or a human mind that is to interpret a computer print-out and also check the program). Psychological theory tends to see 7 as an upper limit; meaning  $m$  or  $n$  being, say, 3 or 4, at least not much more, using the additive formula.

The Charybdis is reductionism down to  $c = 1$ , meaning too low complexity. This is polarization, and the accompanying dangers have been indicated above. If too high complexity is intellectually too exhausting, then too low complexity is intellectually too lazy. However, if escalation is a sufficient condition for polarization, then the more tense the conflict, the more will the actors tend to steer straight into Charybdis, thereby adding to the tension, and depriving themselves of possible avenues for successful conflict transformation.

The word for steering away from the Charybdis of reductionism is complexification, the word for steering away from the Scylla of too high complexity is simplification. In other words, make the too complex more simple, but be aware of the dangers of polarization. There will always be more conflict material around, always some more actors and more themes; so complexification does not have to be artificial at all.

Two examples from recent world politics.

In 1974 an important session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, took place in Caracas.<sup>5</sup> About 5,000 delegates from about 150 countries were dealing with a catalogue of about 150 issues. Of course, no one could handle a cognitive complexity of that magnitude, 300 (or 298) by the additive formula, 22,500 (or 22,499) by the multiplicative formula. Computerization will not help; somebody still has to decipher the print-outs; moreover, each single issue for each single country has unique importance.

Some simplification was indispensable. The cognitive solution was grouping – of actors (countries) and themes (issues) – in three groups: countries that were land-locked, coastal countries, and islands (no coast, some coast, only coast); and issues of territorial limits and rights, ocean floor and below, and military issues. With three commissions and three country groups with similar interests, the complexity was simplified to 6(4) additive or 9(8) multiplicative.

The second example is one of fruitful complexification: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 1972 (preparatory phase), and 1973. The Cold War had been simplified through reductionism down to the polarized (2,1) formula: East (Soviet

Union/WTO), West (US/NATO) over freedom/fascism, depending on who was speaking. To loosen up this type of propaganda speech was a major task, and would probably have been impossible in the coldest years, before Stalin died, and around the attacks on Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Two methods:

First, the introduction of the Neutral-Nonaligned countries (NN) as a third group. Of course, they were NN to varying degrees. Finland had a pact with the Soviet Union from 1948, Yugoslavia was through the Balkan Pact of 1953 with Greece and Turkey closely related to the West from which it was supported, also militarily,<sup>6</sup> Sweden was integrated with the West logically, Switzerland spied on anybody suspected of having the slightest sympathy for the East,<sup>7</sup> etc. All the same, as a caucus they had some independent positions or non-positions, so there were three parties.

Second, the vast gamut of issues was divided into three ‘baskets’: military-political issues (among them the borders), economic issues (among them joint ventures) and other issues (among them human rights). As a result the complexity was the same as in the first example, this time brought about through complexification. And the outcome no doubt had a thawing impact on the Cold War: borders were confirmed, joint ventures came into being, a human rights process started, slowly, in the Eastern bloc. The contradictions were blunted, so were A and B on all sides.

### 3.3 Conflict Transformation for Structural Conflicts, $c < 0$

In a structural conflict there is, by definition, structural violence. The basic contradiction/content of the conflict lies in the verticality of the structure, the repression (of freedom) in the political case and the exploitation (of well-being) in the economic case. But this repressive/exploitative structure is then protected by other structural (meaning operating regardless of intent) arrangements. More precisely:

*preventing consciousness-formation, conscientization:*

penetration, conditioning of the mind from above,

segmentation, those below getting limited vision of reality;

*preventing mobilization, organization of those below:*

fragmentation, splitting those below away from each other,

marginalization, setting those below apart from the rest.

Conscientization and mobilization are precisely the processes needed to transform the interests in a structural conflict into consciously held values and to transform a non-organized, non-crystallized party (to a structural conflict) into an actor (in a conflict). Consequently, all four have to be overcome in order to be able to approach, creatively, the basic issues of repression and exploitation. How then to do this?

Let us first note, in passing, that benevolent action from above, blunting repression and exploitation, may be necessary but not sufficient. A more benevolent structure with the four characteristics intact is still violent. Given those four new forms of repression, exploitation may reappear, for instance as run by a vast welfare state bureaucracy rather than by a greedy upper class. Better, but still very vertical, as critics say.

Here are four steps for overcoming structural violence.

*Confrontation*, selecting an issue that encapsulates the general conflict, like the ‘pinch of salt’ for Gandhi in the famous Salt March (to Dandi in Gujarat, 5 April 1930), stating the issue clearly, and stating the desired outcome.

*Struggle*, to overcome repression and/or exploitation. The question is how that struggle is carried out. The peace research answer is obvious: by means of nonviolence,

according to the general formula of 'peace by peaceful means'. The genius of a Gandhi consisted exactly in presenting an alternative to the stark choice between submissiveness (to repression and exploitation) or a violent struggle to overcome them. Such a struggle would at best incur terrible losses on either side, lead to demands for revenge, sow long-lasting hatred, introducing new contradictions by the use of violence; at worst, in addition to all of this, might be lost. The *Herr* also has resource power, carrots and sticks for reward and punishment, in addition to the structural power built into his position up there, at the top.

Moreover, and this is a basic point: to 'win' in the sense of turning the tables, changing the roles of *Herr* and *Knecht*, is not necessary, nor desirable. The result is simply a new structural conflict after the trauma of the violence has been repressed. As Camus says, he sides with the *Knecht* as long as he is *Knecht*, after that he sides with the new *Knecht*. The peace researcher can say the same: a conflict can only be solved if all parties are convinced that they cannot force the other(s) to submit. Nonviolence, like the *intifada* of the Palestinians, made this popular will clear to the British and the Israelis.<sup>8</sup>

*Decoupling*, cutting the structural tie to the repressor and/or exploiter. This is Gandhi's famous non-cooperation; but then it should be noticed that he always insisted on keeping the tie to the person on the other side as opposed to the incumbent of a structural position (in order to establish or continue a dialogue). The purpose is less to hit and hurt the *Herr* by depriving him (it is usually a he) of his structural power, the submissiveness and concrete material goods that flow upwards through the structure. Instead, the basic purpose is to build autonomy and the capacity for self-reliance and autonomy in those below. In doing so they become less repressible and exploitable, making it even more evident that those on top cannot prevail. Empowerment, in short.

*Recoupling*. Decoupling cannot be the goal in the longer run. In the longer run the goal is a horizontal structure, with human rights instead of repression, equity instead of exploitation, autonomy instead of penetration, integration instead of segmentation, solidarity instead of fragmentation, participation instead of marginalization. Words, word-pairs. They can only become reality by being enacted. Decoupling serves to build these positive structures from below, recoupling to build new, more encompassing, less violent structures.

This has still not been accomplished between the former colonial powers and their colonies. Repression from above has been reduced. But economic exploitation may have grown, under what Kwame Nkrumah referred to as 'neo-colonialism'. And the other four characteristics are still present. The therapy for pathological structures is a long-haul problem, not a single shot, quick fix. And decoupling is only a step.

Interestingly, most human beings on earth have been through this process and are experts on transforming structural conflicts, without knowing that they are: during puberty, socially and/or biologically defined. A family is not always repressive and/or exploitative. But it certainly conditions the child for the entire duration of his/her life, a giant exercise in brainwashing, with massive penetration that builds national group identity. How many parents actively seek to expose their children to other languages and cultures than their own, giving them a broader competence, including for choice or eclectic combination? Moreover, how many parents give their children an integrated view of the family situation, as opposed to certain selected, segmented glimpses? Moreover, the mechanisms of bonding children to their parents very often pit siblings against each other in a struggle for attention, love, and material goods. And parents often carry out their deliberations in parental caucus rather than in plenary sessions.

The puberty revolt can be individual, collective with other siblings, or collective with other adolescents. At the very least, there is exchange of information. Individual consciousness is built through confrontation, banging of doors being an audible and defiant

facial expressions a visible indicator known to many. The new consciousness often mirrors parental consciousness, by being its negation. Horizontal links are built to others in the same situation (adolescent groups, 'gangs'), a sub-culture emerges with entry of the younger and exit of the older. More integrative views of reality emerge, social platforms are conquered without parental guidance. A new generation is born.

### 3.4 Conflict Transformation for Frustrations, c=0

As mentioned, frustrations are conceptually located at the edges of conflicts. The basic characteristic is there: a goal, and something is blocking that goal, 'standing in the way'; but not efforts to realize other goals held by Self (dilemma), or by Others (disputes). How is that situation transformed?

Of course it depends on the goal and the block. But there are three general formulas that also apply to the general theory of conflict transformation..

*Transcendence*: the block is overcome, the goal is realized, possibly somewhat transformed. One reason may be that the block is not so massive as originally thought of, another that the actor had hidden resources, a third that the goal could be redefined. Thus, if a person is standing at the North Pole and the goal is to move 20 cm without moving South, frustration ensues till the possibility of jumping emerges. A vertical body move has then been made – but the decisive move was mental, broadening the paradigm mapping the frustration.<sup>9</sup>

*Compromise*: ambitions are lowered, then the goal is reduced, to the point that it may be attained. If the goal is a top position in society, power, wealth or fame (or all of these) most people will probably at some point in their life have to make some compromise, often referred to as 'becoming realistic'.

*Withdrawal*: the goal is simply given up, for instance as not worth the mobilization ('sour grapes'), and relegated to the deeper, subconscious recesses of the mind (from which it may re-emerge, with a vengeance); or it may be successfully eliminated.

Together these three are recipes for the art of living when combined, and for lifestyles when life is built around a single one. The creative uses transcendence, the adjusted uses the compromise, and the shy/coward/humiliated/lonely, the withdrawal. Playing only one card could be counterproductive, however.

### 3.5 Conflict Transformation for Elementary Actor Conflicts, c=1


Assuming that structural conflicts have been transformed to the point that interests have become values and parties have become actors, and assuming that the actor is of the opinion (rightly or wrongly) that what blocks the realization of that goal (value = consciously held goal) is a goal held by Self or Other, we are in the realm of elementary actor conflicts. As already noted, such elementary actor conflicts are more for textbook (like here) than real-life exercises. Real conflicts are giant conflict molecules, combining dilemmas and disputes at often incredible levels of complexity. But if we assume that their transformation passes through some process of simplification, then elementary conflicts become more realistic as approximations. And complex conflict molecules can to some extent be seen as composed of elementary conflict atoms, making insight in their transformation necessary.

Figure 3.1 gives the basic diagram for elementary conflicts.

The unit mapped here is a conflict formation with two actors, A1 and A2, and two goals G1 and G2 (A1, A2; G1, G2). If A1=A2=A the formation is a dilemma (in A; if in addition G1=G2, we have a frustration). If not we are dealing with a dispute; if in

addition  $G1=G2=G$ , the dispute is over the same, contested goal ('my brother and I agree on one thing: we both want Milano'). The diagram can be used to map the trajectory, i.e. the history of the conflict formation. The general hypothesis is that the five points indicated are good candidates as temporary equilibrium points in the sense that acceptability and sustainability may be obtained, but with the warning that no resolution can be forever, hence 'transformation'. There will usually be *conflict residues* in the A, B, or C corners of the conflict triangle and these residues will then hitch on to conflict formations in the neighborhood, including molecules of which the atoms are parts.

Figure 3.1 *Basic Diagram for Elementary Conflict Transformation*



At this point another warning should be issued against a terminology often found in US conflict jargon: referring to points (1), (3), (4), and (5) as win, win; lose, lose; win, lose; or lose, win. First of all, these terms are mechanistic and in no way suggestive of the underlying processes. Second, and more importantly: they do suggest something else, that conflict is a game, as in the conflict discourse known as 'game theory' (originally developed from the theory and praxis of submarine warfare). The terminology alienates; it does not evoke images of life-and-death concerns, nor of the depth of involvement. Rather, parlor-game cleverness is elevated as metaphor for existential concerns, as when news is converted by mass media into entertainment (and, not by chance, in the very same country).<sup>10</sup>

- 1 *Transcendence* is the outcome that carries the proud title 'creative conflict transformation'. Something new, *sui generis*, usually unexpected, has emerged from the process, meaning that the positive aspect of a conflict has been made use of, the challenge to transcend (hence the term) the underlying contradiction. Both goals are realized, possibly somewhat transformed. There is bliss. Key word: *creativity*.
- 2 *Compromise* means that less than full goal-attainment has been accepted, for both goals. Key word: *moderation*.
- 3 *Withdrawal* means goals have been given up, for ever or for some time; more time horizon. Key words: *apathy, perseverance*.

These three outcomes are symmetric, usually brought about by some cooperative steering of the goal-attainment process, through inner dialogues (for dilemmas) and/or outer ones (for disputes). Located on the main diagonal of the basic diagram, all three are indicative of harmony rather than disharmony (as they are symmetric, which one is (4) or (5) does not matter). The other two are indicative of disharmony, with two interpretations.

First, these are the corners where the one prevails and the other submits, e.g., by eliminating the actor's capability or motivation to pursue the goal further. *Fighting it out* is often the only alternative to compromise in the conflict transformation repertory of many people. Key word: *violence* (not peaceful).

Second, both acceptability and sustainability in these corners are possible, but then against some *compensation*. Counter-intuitive to some, other conflicts can be used, by *broadening*, bringing in more actors, and by *deepening*, bringing in more issues, or both. Key words: *increased complexity*.

Let us now turn to four illustrations of what transcendence, compromise, withdrawal, and compensation may mean in practice; two disputes and two dilemmas, two pedagogical and two realistic.

1 *First dispute illustration: Two children, one orange*<sup>11</sup> Obviously, they may decide by sheer force, and this outcome may be acceptable and sustainable if force is seen as a decision-mechanism in the culture. But most children would easily manage to arrive at a compromise solution, by peeling the orange and dividing the slices in two batches, or by slicing the orange and squeezing the two halves. In either case they may dispose of the residues, using the standard 'you divide, I choose' formula.

The transcendence becomes a little more advanced: using the seeds to plant orange trees, reaping the harvest (in due time) together. There is also the possibility of using the peel for cakes, for joint consumption or sale, splitting the profit.

All these outcomes call for action. Withdrawal would mean leaving the orange to itself, as an orange *an sich*, not *für mich*. This is compatible with another way of consuming the orange: with the eyes rather than with the mouth, enjoying its esthetic qualities, jointly or in parallel (this outcome is more frequently mentioned when the example is used in the Orient).

• And then there is broadening: bringing in a third child, A3, with whom both have a conflict. A1 gives the orange to A2 on the assumption that A2 submits to A3 and A3 to A1, possibly making all happy. In the process of deepening, A1 and A2 would bring in another bone of contention between the two of them. One of them submits on that one, getting the orange as compensation, or vice versa: gets the orange first and then submits.

2 *Second dispute illustration: Israel/Palestine*<sup>12</sup> A1 and A2 are Israel and Palestine, G is the contested area east of the Mediterranean of which the Israelis claim legitimate ownership by virtue of Chosen People, Promised Land theology; and the Palestinians by virtue of being there before the Israelis came.

Clearly, a Two-State solution (e.g., as proposed by the Palestine National Council in its resolution of 15 November 1988) is a compromise, bringing up the obvious point that a compromise is not necessarily 50–50, but may be 70–30, 90–10, but not 100–0. And withdrawal would be both parties giving up their claims, ceding the territory to third parties (historically, the Roman Empire, the Seljuk Turks, the Ottomans, the League of Nations/the British, the United Nations/the British are examples).

What would be the concrete interpretation of transcendence? Obviously not two cases of self-rule, but the case of 'together-rule'.<sup>13</sup> There are several possibilities between the Compromise and the Transcendence points in Figure 3.1 above:<sup>14</sup> if the compromise is a

dissociative, ‘anarchic’ system, then a first beginning would be associative cooperation built around treaties between Israel and Palestine (the assumption being that there is an independent Palestinian state, otherwise we are still in the wrong corners of Figure 3.1), then a confederation, then a federation, and finally a unitary state; the latter being the ultimate transcendence. In the view of this author that is unrealistic for the time being (however, ‘never say never!’). But a confederation Israel–Palestine as equal partners in political, economic, military and cultural cooperation is a goal very much worth working for, with or without Jordan as a third partner.

**3 First dilemma illustration: The couple planning vacation** The couple has four weeks’ vacation; the husband prefers the mountains, the wife the beach; they live in Denmark or the Alps. The two non-solution points are obvious: both do what the one wants, the other suffers, in silence or not. How to convert those points into solutions through broadening (‘You have the problem that the children want to be on their own during vacation, I that their vacation costs too much: I yield to you, you leave them to their own devices, they reduce their ambitions’) and deepening (‘I’ll go to that other place provided you stop harping about the furniture’). Another interpretation of deepening could be every second year the beach or the mountains, not the same as having two weeks in the mountains, and two weeks on the beach.

One point of transcendence might be a place like Taormina, Sicily – both beach and mountains. The example illustrates one use of specific, empirical knowledge: what exists is possible. A person versed in geography from extensive reading and/or travel would be a better conflict-resource person than one who is not: indeed a key to the qualifications of conflict workers in general.

But transcendence could also come by asking both what they really want, and if the husband feels he needs climbing and the wife feels she needs tanning, a modern summer hotel or camp site might serve both. Redefining the goals a little may help!

Withdrawal is obvious: ‘If we’re going to quarrel like this every year I’d rather not take any vacation!’ Or, escaping from the dilemma by cutting the linkage underlying the incompatibility, take the vacations separately, fission-disintegration?<sup>15</sup> Or, by implication: fusion-integration, eliminating individual tastes.<sup>16</sup>

**4 Second dilemma illustration: The id–super-ego struggle** G1 and G2 are in this case in the person system. *Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach!, in meiner Brust*, as Goethe says; one pulls in this direction, one in that; one is ethereal, one is sensual. Maybe there are even more than two! To use Sorokin’s terms again: in the ideational mentality, super-ego dominates the inner person completely; in the sensate personality id is in command, meaning that the personality is suppressive of the other mentality. If we stay within Freud’s scheme it is difficult to broaden and deepen.

Freud’s solution, his criterion of maturity, is of course transcendence, by which he seems to understand the emergence of an ego capable of a synthesis, of biology and religion in one formulation, adding individuality.<sup>17</sup> Both get their due, at a bland level in compromise, and at a fully-fledged level in the transcendence; somewhat like social democracy relative to the Japanese model when it comes to Market-Plan integration.

But the move can also be in the opposite direction: both id and super-ego contracting, neither yielding to the other. Suicide? Death? Or, a serious mental disorder?

Separation as a way out of the couple’s dilemma in the preceding example brings to mind images of schizophrenia: the manic-depressive trying to practice fission, oscillating between the two off-diagonal corners of the conflict diagram, neither attaining the maturity of integration, nor the quietude of death (or so we assume).<sup>18</sup> Maybe mental disorders are desperate ways of getting out of this existential dilemma, finding no equilibria in

compromise or transcendence, seeking the extremes till extreme withdrawal becomes the equilibrium state?

Two conclusions should emerge from these illustrations. First, the conflict analysis paradigm developed here can accommodate very different cases, from the intra-personal to conflict formations in very different social systems. This is not strange. We are dealing with goal-seeking systems, whether values or interests, and such 'systems' can be found wherever there is life, however complex the organization. The balance between harmony and disharmony may tilt in favor of the latter. And the similarities are not only imposed by the paradigm but are also 'out there'. At least, so it seems.

Second, however: transcendence, compromise, withdrawal, broadening, deepening, fission, fusion are not in themselves solutions, only the forms of solution hypotheses; and 'solutions' are not final resolutions or dissolutions, only more or less stable equilibria in the life-cycle of a conflict. In any one of these stages there may be A and B residues searching for a new C (contradiction, content) to hitch on to; there may be new C material building up, piecing together fragments of the old content or contradictions (as when a new border solves some historical problems, but not security or economic problems of access to raw materials and markets, nor of social togetherness).

Nevertheless, these five points are useful as guidelines for moves in conflict space (which generally will have  $m$  actors,  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_m$  and  $n$  goals,  $G_1, G_2, \dots, G_n$ ; in other words  $m+n$  dimensions). They constitute transformations of the conflict formation, avoiding violence and attracting challenge. For the latter, transcendence is usually the best answer. But a nonviolent road to transcendence is not always easily found.

### 3.6 Conflict Transformation for Complex Actor Conflicts, $c>1$

Clearly, the simplest answer to the problem of handling a complex actor conflict is exactly that: simplification, but then with the accompanying problem that reductionism in the sense of polarization lurks just around the corner, with the danger of escalation in its wake. Yet polarization is so tempting, down to two blocs in the social system of persons, groups, societies, regions etc. (with all positive links within and all negative links between), two blocs inside the person-system of values, inclinations, images (again with all positive links within and all negative links between), and with the images in the person-system of friend and enemy mapping the surrounding social system.

As mentioned, reductionism exaggerates the conflict between, while underestimating the conflicts within. The concrete implication is that whatever transformation toward transcendence, compromise, etc. is obtained for that type of formation, the chances are that suppressed conflicts will blossom once the steam has left the polarized conflict. National conflicts, and not only in Eastern Europe, erupted after the Cold War conflict formation had disappeared, among other reasons because it had been grotesquely exaggerated (for instance, so far, 1996, no proof has emerged that the Soviet Union ever seriously planned an unprovoked attack on Western Europe). There is the Chinese boxes argument: let us start treating a complex conflict as if it were an elementary conflict, through reductionism, transform that one, open the boxes, assume that two new conflicts surface, solve them, and then go on with  $2^N$  jobs at step N-1. For a linear, dichotomous mind this is the natural/normal approach.

The position taken here, however, is that complex conflict formations are *sui generis*, of their own kind, and should be treated as such. The seven approaches developed above, based on the three approaches from  $c=0$ , the two additional from  $c=1$ , and then fission and fusion, are equally meaningful for complex conflicts, only often more difficult (or so

we assume) to attain. Dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina among Serbs, Croats, and Slavic Muslims is not that different from dividing Krajina between Croats and Serbs or Kosovo/a between Serbs and Albanian Muslims.

These are simplistic transformations anyhow, with low levels of both acceptability and sustainability, for all the reasons mentioned above. Transcendence, in the form of new types of confederations, or a Confederation of Southeast Europe, will work better at higher levels of complexity with more possibilities of broadening and deepening. The basic point would be training to enable thinking in terms of three, four actors with two, three goals each, and not regressing to lower levels.<sup>19</sup>

But there are also approaches that combine bilateralization with multilateralization. Thus, the conflict molecule may be seen as constituted by conflict atoms, but not only two, any number; like Israel, in principle in bilateral conflicts with all Arab states, particularly the four/five bordering on Israel (and Iraq). This set of conflict atoms may then be divided into two subsets: the center (or core) and periphery (or margin) of the conflict. From this division three approaches emerge:

- diachronic approach: start in the center with ‘basic links’;
- diachronic approach: start in the periphery with ‘easy links’;
- synchronic approach: start with all links at the same time.

The two diachronic approaches suffer from the general shortcoming of linearity. The assumptions underlying them are similar: undo the basic contradiction and the rest will start unraveling; or get the easy agenda items settled and the rest will be smooth sailing because of the improved ‘atmosphere’. The first idea conjures up images of Marxist thought: the basic contradiction being in the social infrastructure, between labor and capital (or between means and modes of production). The second idea brings to mind liberal thinking: the world is a conflict cafeteria, you pick your conflicts and mix them together to create agendas, starting with the lighter dishes, even *hors d'oeuvres*, to create ‘atmosphere’ before the real *oeuvre*.

Translated to Israel the latter approach is sometimes known as ‘peace by pieces’, the process is known as a ‘peace process’. However, there could be little doubt that the people most affected by the creation of Israel as a Jewish state were the people living there, particularly the Palestinians. Bringing this contradiction up front would be the first approach above. It remains to be seen whether that brings the total formation closer to a more stable equilibrium than the second approach.

The third, more synchronic approach is what is preferred here. Some progress on all contradictions is better than a giant step taken in only one direction, leading to major conflict deformation. The process image is more Oriental, more Buddhist, assuming that circular, synchronic relations reflect better the reality of life at any level of organization.<sup>20</sup> There is also the advantage of avoiding the uncertainties that surround the division into center and periphery, and of knowing where to start.

### 3.7 Conflict Transformation: a Second Overview

Conflict transformation takes place in *time*, in physical *kronos* and organic *kairos*, as time flows evenly without any turbulences, and inside those turbulences. The latter are more dramatic, bringing to mind negotiators working through the night against deadlines, emerging in the early hours with their glasses raised, praising themselves. But the former should not be underestimated, among other reasons because so much else happens as *kronos* flows. There is a limit to how many conflicts anybody may have in mind,

participate in, not to mention try to solve. Conflict fatigue may set it and force a conflict into oblivion.

The second axis for general thinking about conflict transformation is *complexity*: some kind of uni-dimensionality imposed on phenomena that are different, yet similar. *Dukkha* unfolds in very different settings. Time is needed, sometimes a great deal of it, both as *khronos* and in the *kairos* form of inner and outer dialogues, for moves toward *sukha*.

Transformations do not just happen. They are willed; only when willed are they real. They have to be subjectively forced, the subject is the *force motrice*. This in turn means that the processes of articulation and conscientization are absolutely essential, aiming at the A, B, and C corners, breaking out of the darkness of structural conflict and, if needed, through the ice cap of the frustration image of reality.

The problem is that this image may become too complex to be manageable. And the antidote? Some simplification, avoiding polarization, and then guiding the formation, gently, towards higher levels of transformation, possibly through intervention.

## Notes

1. 'The *yang* having reached its climax retreats in favor of the *yin*; the *yin* having reached its climax retreats in favor of the *yang*' (Wang Ch'ung). This is a statement about the part(s) in a contradiction; the assumption being that they do not find the (elusive) point of harmony. It should be noted that Daoism also suffers, in this formulation, from the Western tendency to see contradictions as something involving two parties; of course more general formulas can be imagined.

2. This felicitous term comes from James S. Coleman.

3. These excellent terms with corresponding perspectives were introduced into peace studies by Dieter Senghaas.

4. For an exploration of some of the many conditions that have to be satisfied for the balance-of-power doctrine to have some plausibility, see Johan Galtung, 'Balance of Power and the Problem of Perception', pp. 38–53 in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. II (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1976).

5. For this author's analysis, as an observer in the Norwegian delegation, see 'Human Needs, National Interest and World Politics', pp. 361–380 in *Peace Problems: Some Case Studies. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. V (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980), ch. 13.

6. See, for instance, Michael W. Weithmann, 'Zwischen Orient und Okzident: Die Geschichte der Konfliktregion Jugoslawien', p. 56 in Rudolf H. Dittel, *Ex-Jugoslawien: Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme* (Königsbrunn: Mundi Reales, 1993).

7. For instance on the author of these lines, one more victim of *les fichocrates* in that country.

8. The *intifada* ('shaking off') is in the West mainly associated with throwing stones, which, even if the intention might not always be to hit, is clearly violent, at least as body language. So are the words accompanying the throwing. But the *intifada* is so much more: general strike, closed shops, a general attitude-behavioral syndrome expressing very well the *volonté générale* of the Palestinian people. See Johan Galtung, 'Intifadah: The Palestinian Struggle for Liberation', pp. 61–72 in *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989).

9. This is known as extra-paradigmatic thinking, or, by Edward De Bono, as 'lateral thinking', in his *Lateral Thinking* (London: Ward Lock Educational, 1970, and New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

10. On the other hand, if we rise above the terminology or introduce another discourse (as has been done here), game theory is also a good way of ordering one's thoughts about a conflict process. Any discourse can be misused. Game theory can also be used for cooperation problems, as in the enormous literature on the Prisoner's Dilemma. As a means of solving conflicts it may have been overadvertised, however. See Richard B. Braithwaite, *Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher*. An inaugural lecture delivered in Cambridge on 2 December 1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955).

11. Interest in this example comes from a stay in La Habana, Cuba, as Visiting Professor in 1972. Experiments were conducted testing the hypothesis that children raised in private families would arrive at asymmetric outcomes and those raised in socialist, public kindergartens at cooperative outcomes.

12. For more details see the first version of this in Johan Galtung, 'The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict', pp. 77–116 in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. V (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980), (originally published in 1971 in the *Journal of Peace Research*); and the second version in Johan Galtung,

'The "Middle East" Conflict', pp. 37–57 in *Solving Conflicts* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989).

13. Notice how clumsy this word sounds, whereas 'self-rule' is unproblematic. Language will need much time to adjust to peace and conflict studies, like 'peaces' in the plural, for instance (not only wars and conflicts).

14. See Part I, Chapter 5 for more details.

15. Of course, if this becomes a habit it may lead to separation in a deeper sense, and to divorce, the final disintegration of the couple. The assumption, then, would be that in post-modern society having/taking vacation together is a substitute for working together (as nomads, on the farm) in earlier formations.

16. Even if the expression of this dilemma may sound like a dispute, even a quarrel, it should be noted that this is a (1,2) not a (2,1) conflict, the contradiction being within the couple as one actor. Obviously, when the choice of vacation for one member of the couple is independent of the other member's choice that type of incompatibility disappears. And the same would happen if they should arrive at a total alignment of values and interests, complete fusion/integration in other words.

17. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (New York: Norton, 1960).

18. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (Boston and London: Shambhala, 1992) expresses one of the basic assumptions of Tibetan Buddhism, that dying and death are only stages on the way.

19. Thus, merely to learn that Krajina and Bosnian Serbs may have goals that do not necessarily coincide with the goals of Serbia-Beograd (whereas they may be compatible with each other) took the international community (whatever that is) at least two years of violent conflict time.

20. For an introduction to C. G. Jung's thinking in this connection, see Ira Progoff, *Jung, Synchronicity, and Human Destiny* (New York: Delta, 1973).

# 4

## Conflict Interventions

### 4.1 Conflict Intervention as Communication: Eleven Approaches

Let us start by assuming a conflict formation involving  $m$  actors and  $n$  goals, the tension level is high. The conflict is consuming more and more of the resources thrown into it (perhaps even more than the value of the goals); it is even consuming the actors themselves. The problem is no longer who wins most, but who loses least. Conflict reality is already bad: the prognosis is worse. The actors are unable to stop the process and reverse it. The material and non-material suffering the actors inflict on things, themselves, and others is intolerable, also to outsiders. The case for outside intervention, solicited or unsolicited, is strong. Yugoslavia 1991–1999 comes to mind. The Why is clear. But exactly What is to be done? Who does it? How? When? Where? For whose benefit, at whose expense?

Quick, superficial answers as a first guide to intervention:

*Why?* To stop further suffering and material and non-material destruction; if possible to arrive at a solution, meaning a formation that is reasonably acceptable and sustainable.

*What:* Three answers are fairly useful:

- *Peace-keeping:* control the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves (B-oriented).
- *Peace-making:* embed the actors in a new formation; in addition, transform attitudes and assumptions (A-oriented).
- *Peace-building:* overcome the contradiction at the root of the conflict formation (C-oriented).

*Who:* In principle anybody – by State ((inter-)governmental), Civil Society ((inter-)non-governmental), Capital ((transnational-)corporations); or by individuals of any kind.

*How:* By entering into a communication process with the actors in the conflict formation; *expanding that formation*.

*When:* ‘Anywhen’ (at any time) the negative and positive purposes of conflict intervention can be served.

*Where:* Anywhere, not necessarily around a table, and not necessarily with everybody together at the same time.

*For whose benefit:* for the benefit of the participants in the conflict formation and for others in similar formations.

*At whose cost:* those who benefit from further destruction.

To understand how conflict intervention works we need a typology, and one that derives from a *fundamentum divisionis*, not merely listing words floating around in this field (mediation, arbitration, conciliation, etc.). As usual we shall include ‘the zero case’, the non-intervention, of which there may also be several types. The parties coming in

from the outside, intervening in the conflict, will *not* be referred to as ‘Third’ parties, a highly unfortunate terminology as it ties the mind to a conflict of only two parties. Much better is simply *outside parties*, coming from the outside yet joining the conflict.

A first question would be what their goals are. To get the challenge? To gain experience? A Nobel Peace Prize, or some other prize? To show who is the ultimate conflict manager? To make use of the conflict to market conflict resources, ‘sticks’ (military means) for general intimidation, or ‘carrots’ (humanitarian aid, technical assistance) to generate a demand in the wake of the supply? All of this in order to reinforce a hegemonic system, the position of the hegemon and the system of hegemony in general, on behalf of other hegemons?

Or, just to serve? Just to do, neither seen, nor heard? Discreet, in ways to be described below? There is much to be said for that, lest the goals of the outside parties distort the conflict formation, resulting in a conflict deformation derailing the process. An example would be the UN operation in Somalia 1992–1997 where, through strange processes, the goal suddenly became to preserve, not even enhance, UN prestige by imposing the UN image of the conflict despite its absurdity.

But ‘neither seen, nor heard’ will not do either if the basic method is communication. And that is the dimension that will be used to establish a typology for conflict intervention.

#### *A. No communication with outside parties*

*Type 0: Dissociation: disintegration, fission.* The conflict parties do not communicate but separate, dissolving their formation. There is no communication, neither among them nor with outside parties (although the latter may have recommended this pattern). If the medium is the message, then the non-medium may also carry a message: for the time being they may not be ready for any conflict transformation process beyond the non-formation.

*Type 1: Association: communication inside the formation.* The parties are able to communicate with each other; communication is reasonably symmetric, even taking the form of a dialogue.

#### *B. Asymmetric communication to outside parties*

*Type 2: Outside parties provide the venue.* This is a very minimal form of intervention, but not to be scoffed at. Neutral meeting ground is provided (Geneva!), with amenities, perhaps even with expenses paid. The rest is, in principle, Type 1.

*Type 3: Outside parties provide an empathetic ear.* Now they are present, but their role is minimal. The parties may be unable to keep a dialogue going, even unable to be alone with each other in the same room. Outsiders provide the social and communicative glue. The parties have difficulties emptying the room because the outsiders are there, and they cannot stop talking because outsiders fill the empty time between their statements, if only with an encouraging ‘uhum?’, not to mention the classical ‘would you care to elaborate that point?’<sup>1</sup>

#### *C. Symmetric, dialogical communication with outside parties<sup>2</sup>*

*Type 4: Outside parties enter dialogue on conflict diagnosis.*

*Type 5: Like type 4, but adding conflict prognosis.*

*Type 6: Like type 5, but adding conflict therapy.*

#### *D. Asymmetric, imposed communication from outside parties*

*Type 7: Mediation.* At this point outside parties listen to the D,P,T as seen by all participants and then communicate what they see as the solution, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.<sup>3</sup>

*Type 8: Arbitration.* Like Type 7, but with prior commitment by the parties to accept, ‘take-it’, the proposed solution.

*Type 9: Rule of Law.* Like Type 8, but with higher level of predictability (and rigidity!), written rules, precedents, etc.

*Type 10: Rule of Man.* This is the conflict dictator who imposes a solution, backing it up with carrots and/or sticks:

- the soft conflict dictator: if you do as I say, you will be rewarded (in cash, technical assistance, MFN status, etc.);
- the hard conflict dictator: if you don't do as I say, you will be punished ‘with all necessary means’ in the military sense.

We have deliberately used the term ‘type’, not ‘step’, as there is no assumption of any ‘progress’ from lower to higher numbers, nor of any time order in the sense of starting at any point and then adding others. A process can start at any point. Type 6, for instance, does not presuppose Type 5 (although some arguments will be made for that particular order). The difference is that the agenda of Type 6 is richer. Start anywhere, stay there, jump to others, combine, leave the process, at any point, in principle. However, there are weighty arguments for and against certain types, with the additional rider that ‘it depends on the circumstances’.

## 4.2 Four Correlates of the Conflict Intervention Approaches

As we proceed from Type 0 to Type 10 we are accompanied by a number of important variables, all highly relevant for the outcome; all relating one way or the other to the communicative relationship.

I. *Increasing appropriation of the challenge derived from solving the conflict by outside parties* Obviously, in Types 0–2 the inside parties monopolize that challenge; in Types 3–6 the challenge is shared, with an increasing proportion going to the increasingly active outside parties; in Types 7–10 the outside parties monopolize that challenge.

Once again: if a conflict is ‘good’ because the contradiction can serve as a *force motrice* for creative change in the person, social, and world systems, then that positive aspect is increasingly ‘stolen’ on the way from 0 to 10.

In Types 0–2 the parties have *conflict autonomy*; in 3–6 outside parties enter as *conflict facilitators*; and in 7–10 as *conflict managers*, or as *conflict thieves*, in plain language.

They take the conflict away from the parties: from Type 7 ‘you have an interesting conflict going on there, let me solve it for you’ to Type 10 ‘I am sick and tired of this nonsense, I'll tell you what you have to do’.

II. *Increasing verticalization of the mode of conflict transformation increases the power distance inside the system* In Types 7–10 the mediator, arbitrator, judge, and dictator will all tend to be high up – and increasingly so, in terms of authority and/or in terms of resources they can use to tip the balance of the outcome. There are elements of this in Types 3–6 if we assume that the outside parties will use resources like knowledge, skill, and experience that will show up as

- cognitive resources (imagination to transfer insights from work on similar, and different, conflict formations);
- emotional resources (empathy, sympathy, compassion); and

- volitional resources (perseverance, ability to steer, even drive the transformation process).

The sum total of all of this yields authority. Participation as outsider is likely to increase the resources. For a society to have people with conflict knowledge and skills is in itself a resource; the problem is the uneven distribution of that resource. There is also the conflict dictator who may get requests to supply more means of destruction (stick) and means of construction (carrot). The result is increased power distance, and more so the higher the type number.

*III. With increasing type number, inner acceptance may decrease and external sustainability increase* With less participation and more dictates from above, it stands to reason that acceptance may decrease, even undergo steep downward jumps. The inner process – including the agony of working one's way to a solution, adding bit by bit, clearing the fog away from acceptable transformations – is not there. On the other hand, outside parties may provide outside resources sustaining the final construction, throwing their authority behind it, implicitly or explicitly using moral power to the point that it seems immoral not to comply with the plan, and/or submit to the remunerative and punitive power.

This yields two extreme types that can be found at the lower and higher type numbers: a transformation so high on acceptance that little or no external support is needed to make it sustainable, and a transformation not internalized in the parties, but sustained from the outside. Put in simple terms: in Types 0–2 the parties owe the compliance morally to themselves; in Types 3–6 they owe it morally to the facilitators in addition to themselves; in Types 7–10 they owe it to the outside parties morally, or they are in for reward/punishment.

*IV. With increasing type number, the possibility of attaining the goal-state of being right increases* One thing is the feeling within a party of being right and having a right to this or that; something else is a shared feeling by the parties in a conflict formation of how that precious good is distributed; and a third 'you are right' bestowed upon you vertically, even with a signed certificate, from above.

When the mediator, arbitrator, judge, or dictator comes out more in favor of one than the other(s) in the conflict formation the meta-goal of being right (see – I told you so!) may even overshadow the pleasure of having attained the original goal.<sup>4</sup> This is probably a major reason why people take cases to courts: not merely to be entitled to this or that, but to get moral righteousness.

The general conclusion, then, is to support lower number types: the challenges are where they should be; the processes will empower people all over society, not only a conflict managerial elite; acceptance will be high and so will inner sustainability; and the focus is on the conflict itself, not on some abstract right which may come close to righteousness. However, the parties may not be able to do this: they may have neither the capability nor the motivation; they may even prefer the thrill of the conflict in general and escalating tension in particular, regardless of how they destroy for themselves and others.

So, lower number types are beautiful, but some higher number types may be necessary. The parties may even have to be forced to undergo a transformation that resembles a solution. But, given the many arguments against the highest number types, steered by a general *in medias res* inclination, this would make us focus on Types 3–6. Before we do that, as a contrast and to explore fundamental aspects of conflict transformation, let us have a closer look at Types 0–2.

#### 4.3 Types 0–2: Autonomous Conflict Transformation

When are parties ready for autonomous conflict transformation? What are the preconditions?

First, deep down in themselves they will have some prognosis of how the process is going to end. There will be some more or less explicit ideas of what the outcome looks like; maybe unclear even to themselves, and still more difficult to communicate to other parties, lest they make use of it in the struggle.

There is the ‘win-lose’ dimension, short term, long term; depending on how they manage the B level. Obviously, short-term ‘win’ and long-term ‘lose’ makes for willingness to enter into dialogue; the opposite profile does not.

But then there is another dimension: diverging versus converging prognoses in the set of actors in the conflict formation. Two actors may disagree on very much, but still know deep inside themselves who will ‘win’. Or that neither will. In either case there are good reasons to short-circuit the conflict process and simply say: ‘Since this is more or less how it is going to end let’s bypass a phase which can only be destructive to all of us and get straight to the more creative phase of finding an acceptable and sustainable outcome.’ A mature thought, not so likely to emerge as long as they differ as to who will ‘win’, whether because they think it is Self (‘keep going, and we’ll end up with a much better deal!’) or Other (‘keep going so we can at least go down with honor!’).

Convergence in prognosis may be more easily identified by outsiders, and then communicated to the parties. But the actors may also, intuitively, identify convergence; perhaps because they suffer from conflict fatigue, or the intensity has peaked anyhow.

Second, the key word is *dialogue*.<sup>5</sup> That relation is profoundly horizontal, with communication among all actors.<sup>6</sup> In Chapter 2 above about conflict life-cycles the argument has been made that the apology/forgiveness paradigm has very limited applicability: it could be entirely verbal with no soul-searching on either side, presumptuous,<sup>7</sup> and above all: after apology and possible forgiveness there may be no further search for a solution.

The double Buddhist formula seems better. First *inner dialogue*, in person space, also known as meditation, to clarify one’s own attitudes and assumptions; and then *outer dialogue*, in social space, also known as dialogue, *tout court*. In this there is no denial that the Christian approach may also have some validity.

Meditation, then, is seen as indispensable. Space and time should be provided. Meditation is concentration, and it is serious. Body position, breathing, etc. may help; so may a mantra. Basic is the clarification of one’s own inner motives and general conflict philosophy, an often painful self-examination, being one’s own potentially most knowledgeable judge. Entering the conflict dialogue with only one thing in mind, a clever strategy to ‘win’, will hardly contribute to any solution, not even to this ‘winning’.

For the outer dialogue there already exists a good model: the seminar. There may be an initial presentation, or two, or more, but most of the time is made available for mutual brainstorming. The search is on. A room with a round table, all actors around the table and all themes/issues/goals on the table + TIME – that is in principle all that is needed. The basic point is to retain the searching spirit, trying to keep in mind that much more may be obtained for all if nobody tries to ‘win’ by turning the dialogue into a debate, trying to corner others.<sup>8</sup>

Human beings are visual, not only auditory, so diagrams may convey patterns better, just as the verbal presentation may be better for sequential reasoning. There should be paper all over, plenty of felt pens and easy access. The joint search is on, for creative ways out of a destructive conflict.

#### 4.4 Types 3–6: Dialogical Conflict Transformation

We now switch to Types 3–6. Enters the conflict facilitator, someone presumably knowledgeable about this type of situation; preferably experienced in person, social, and world systems, not only one of them. We shall refer to that person as she, which does not necessarily exclude men. But there may be reasons for assuming that women are better for this role: more compassionate and holistic, less aggressive in their verbal and body language.

She might have had some preliminary talks to explore basic facts about the D,P,T triangle as seen by the parties to the conflict, among other reasons to find out whether she herself is suited for that particular case. She would have paid special attention to the level of convergence in the prognoses, not for that reason excluding conflict facilitation if the level is low.

In other words, she is already acquainted with the conflict; perhaps she should use the parties as the first guide into the conflict, not some general or even special literature. Reading may come later. The point about meditation mentioned above is as relevant to her as to the parties: to clarify the mind, to understand one's own pre-cognitive, -emotional and -volitional assumptions that may cloud the sensitivity to the merits and demerits of the case. Metaphor: purify the instruments for a very difficult job, like any good chef, or surgeon, or any other kind of artisan would do. Very difficult, but hardly impossible.

The basic question on the road to an acceptable and sustainable outcome (not to be confused with conciliation, which is more at the A level) is how to use dialogue to clarify the D,P,T triangle. But first, let us take the typology as set out in Table 4.1:

Table 4.1 *The D,P,T Triangle and the Dimension of Time*

	Analysis	Praxis
Past	<i>Diagnosis</i>	Reliving, factually Reliving, counterfactually
Present	Description	Prescription
Future	<i>Prognosis</i>	<i>Therapy</i>

In general, what we find among conflict participants is a focus on the past, and on analysis. There are good reasons for this. The focus will tend to be B-oriented, 'he did this, and then I did that', usually very rich in detail, maybe one-sided but not for that reason false, only incomplete. The outsider well-equipped to listen, empathetically, to the analyses, and then add them together, may be close to an adequate picture – permitting, even forcing, the images to complete each other.

But we are not engaged in a social science project with a time dimension, collecting data for a project on oral history. Transformation may be a question of life or death, the extremes of creation and destruction. The whole group, the original conflict formation with outsiders, the facilitators, have somehow to end up in the opposite corner, future- and praxis-oriented rather than past and diagnosis-oriented. Not in the sense that a linear or curvilinear one-way trajectory must be traced in Table 4.1 from the upper left to the lower right corner. Jumps, sideways, backwards, whatever, can and should be made, and simultaneous work on all six combinations. But the general thrust will be as described, and this means that there are two hurdles to overcome: too much focus on the past, and on the analysis.

To overcome both at the same time may be too ambitious, although such jumps ('now, how can this be avoided or solved in the future') followed by a return to analysis of the past, may be recommended. A safer method is probably one step at a time, from past to future, and from analysis to praxis.

*The move from past to future* This move is indispensable, since the past evokes all the memories of what went wrong, of direct and structural violence of all types. The actors are likely to be experts here. The past offers an empirical basis for guilt-distribution, mutually among the actors and from above, as they may be hoping that the facilitators will issue 'you were/are right'-certificates, not only leaning toward one party's diagnosis rather than the other's, but also legitimizing past behavior, pushing the guilt away from them and onto somebody else.

The past can be mined for data, and the data can be used, are indeed indispensable, for moral processes and judicial procedures. But these are very special approaches to therapy, shifting attention from the conflict among the participants to the relation of one or some of them to higher authorities: God, or at least the priest; Justice, or at least the judge.

Between the past and the future lies an icy crust: the present, a narrow band in time, cutting out history and future. The attitude may be referred to as a *presentism*<sup>9</sup> that impedes diagnosis, substituting for it some kind of (journalistic) snapshot description of what is going on right now, blind to roots in the past. What come out are prescriptions, not therapy sensitive to positive and negative side-effects in the future. And the future is like the past: it lasts for a long time.

On the other hand, *pastism* and *futurism* are not much better. Digging for roots in the past will increase understanding, which is indispensable. But this may lead to the fallacy of *tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner*, morally, and to the search for solutions in the past, or extrapolating from the past. Evidently something basic was wrong with that past, so the past can never be a sufficient basis for designing a better future (if it were sufficient, and since we have been in the past for a long time, we would probably have entered that better future already). And a single-minded focus on the present is conducive to the opposite fallacy, a moral judgement not tempered by any understanding. Scylla and Charybdis again.

A single-minded focus on the future may, however, lead to something that for lack of a better word can be referred to as the 'cafeteria fallacy': that the future is open, and we can pick and choose any solution/dish we want. The future may not be totally closed – there may be a positive window, even for a prisoner of the past. But any live system has memory, not only persons, but also social systems (artifacts, such as monuments) and world systems (borders, national days). The past will always be with us, particularly the unprocessed past; inside us, around us, everywhere. How to overcome the time barrier?

The proposal is to stick to analysis and simply invite the participants to make prognoses on the basis of their diagnoses. The analytical frame of mind, guided by data and challengeable extrapolations from the past, can be kept. The point is to enter *futurelandia*, together. Once there, so much more can be done, always in an open dialogue with the facilitators participating like the rest, with knowledge and opinions, not holding back. Not too much diagnosis – that may come later.

Of course there will be resistance. The past is safe – not only because participants think they know it, but also because they have built so much of their conflict image around the past. And yet they want to escape from the prison of the past. An invitation to dwell in the future, guided by prognoses, may reinforce that desire to transcend. If all parties agree that the conflict will take care of itself the facilitators can call it a day. If they do not, the next question, 'how can we change the course of events so as to produce a better future' will come very easily. A turn to the future next door, in Table 4.1.

*The move from analysis to praxis* In principle this should be easier: after all conflict actors (not merely parties) are acting much of the time. But the present is a barrier, a minefield of strong emotions, and the future is threatening because somewhere there in *futurelandia* the outcome is located, and there may be so much less in it than they hoped for. That leaves us with the fourth possibility not included in the D,P,T triangle as usually conceived of: returning to the past – but emotionally, experientially, not analytically, in the sense of reliving it.

This can be done two ways, factually and counterfactually.

Imagine a case of sexual harassment, or the Soviet-US crisis in Cuba in the fall of 1962. Get the actors together, not only to analyze *what happened*, but to enact it. This does not work for conflicts at high B levels, but then the most violent parts may be omitted or indicated only. Why should anyone relive a trauma? To demystify the past, to show that these were ordinary, frail, and vulnerable human beings with all their strengths and weaknesses, nothing mysterious that had fallen down from the sky.

The basic point is the counterfactual way of reliving. Play the drama up to the crisis point, indicate what happened, and then ask the key question: *what could have been done?* Usually there is some point of no return where the freedom of choice of one or more of the actors is dramatically reduced, because of passion, or interest, or both.<sup>10</sup> Further away from the crisis the cone of choice expands. There were choices on the road, if not in the A, C corners, then certainly in the B corner. Behavior could have been different.

What is the point of this exercise? To show that what happened was not a law of nature; events could have followed a different course. Foresight would have been one condition, and above all empathy, even compassion, with others in the formation, to assess better the consequences of one's own action. To foster a sense of responsibility, for oneself, and for others. If in that type of session the actors are willing to accept advice about the past from other actors, weighing the pros and cons without claiming that they had no choice, much has been gained.

The factual approach demands good recall; the counterfactual approach calls for imagination. The former may be clouded by distortions and projections, the latter, much in demand, may be in very short supply. So the task of a facilitator becomes to help, to serve as the famous midwife for memory and imagination, the latter also defined as alternative memory. She has to ask and suggest, and then suggest and ask again. The purpose of the factual approach is to overcome the past by reliving it, the purpose of the counterfactual approach to invent the future by changing the history of the past. Both are needed.

After such exercises, breaking the barriers between past and future, and between analysis and praxis at least for the past, any entry into the therapy corner of the Table should be less scary. And at that point the brainstorming dialogue approach is probably the best general formula. The facilitators will, of course, have in the back of their minds the general formulas for conflict transformation from Chapter 3 above, or some similar formulas, and at some point they may suggest one or more of those.<sup>11</sup>

But the best would generally be together to arrive at possible solutions, whether they are of the transcendence, compromise, withdrawal, compensatory, fission-fusion or any other type. For higher complexity, simplification may be needed; for lower complexity, complexification, always with concreteness.

What kind of personality and behavior should one expect from a facilitator? Generally speaking: the best role-models known to all are probably those of the physician and the priest. The basic trait is acceptance that someone is in trouble, in need of assistance. There may be some scolding related to wrong choices, but after that comes general acceptance, and competence. For conflict intervention this means knowledge both of general conflict

theory, similar cases, and of the specifics of the particular case. The ‘your conflict reminds me of’ approach should be used with care, lest conflict participants feel a loss of identity, being reduced to a general formula. The conflict facilitator has to exude competence also through revealed knowledge, giving the participants a sense of having in their midst a good guide to the complex landscape of Table 4.1. In short: knowledge (particularly of nonviolence), imagination (creativity), compassion (empathy), and perseverance.

#### 4.5 Types 7–10: Imposed Conflict Transformation

This is a different game. The participants have entered a Faustian pact with the Devil – submission on their side, in return for a solution from Other. Even with the conflict dictator there is a pact, of total submission against total dictation. There is always the possibility of refusing to accept, to receive, to hear what the dictator has to say – even if the price could be enormous. Submission means compliance.

The four roles on the top of the mediation–arbitration–rule of law–rule of person paradigms would all have much to learn from Types 3–6. The mediator may still come out with his proposal on a take-it-or-leave it basis. Chances are that if the conflict participants have all been through the process described in section 4.4 above, the proposal stands a better chance of being acceptable and sustainable. The same applies to the arbitrator. Participants have to take it; but in that case they may even accept, and the result may be sustainable. However, if the actors are representatives of collective actors, even so-called leaders, all that has been obtained is acceptance at the top, with a few signatures. Let one thousand sessions blossom, repeat the process in many places, with maximum participation. Do not fall into the ‘like leader, like people’ trap, with scraps of paper the only result.

Can the judge enter into dialogue with the defendants? Of course he can, for instance by asking what punishment (criminal case) or decision (civil case) they think would be appropriate. That dialogue might have enormous conflict-solving potential; and the judge could still come up with his own, well-reasoned, verdict. Both sides in this vertical set-up might learn.

Can the conflict dictator be moved to play such games? Only if his will is resisted through tactics like non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Only if the whole conflict formation makes a united stand – like Serbs, Croats, and Muslims uniting to fight a UN/NATO intervention force out to impose a Security Council resolution – will the conflict dictator sooner or later have to resort to lower number types of intervention. Or withdraw.

There are good reasons for all of them to consider bringing dialogical conflict transformation into the picture. To steal challenges may not worry them very much, nor, for that matter, the issue of increased power distance through imposed conflict transformation. But the lack of internal acceptance and internal sustainability may worry them, because it gives their approaches a bad name. A meta-conflict over conflict intervention!

A basic problem is the low likelihood that participants in the conflict will be honest and constructive when exposed to imposed conflict transformation. There is a person to impress because he has power over them. The obvious strategy would be to hold back information, and to be frightened rather than constructive, waiting for the verdict instead of participating in constructing it. Maybe we are dealing here with the remnants of old social orders that took wisdom at the top for granted, or at least a mandate from higher forces. Mediators/arbitrators are not that different from random conflict-solving devices,<sup>12</sup> so there must be a lot of faith in both the wisdom and the mandate. But general horizontalization of conflict transformation would be a major revolutionary change. Lawyers may be unpopular: but anti-judge revolts are still for the future.

#### 4.6 Conflict Interventions and the Conflict Triangle

Back to the conflict triangle: if there is a successful conflict intervention process, carried by the participants, or by outsiders, or by both in a symmetric communicative relationship – what does it do to the corners of the triangle?

First, there is the peace-keeping aspect of lowering B, the level of destructiveness. However, to demand ceasefire or generally good behavior before a communication process can start may be to put the cart before the horse. Communication channels should be kept open for possible conflict transformation.

Second, there is the peace-making aspect in the A corner, changing attitudes and assumptions, but also highly concrete measures to make the new formation sustainable. Attitudes have to become more positive, and assumptions more conducive of peaceful coexistence within that new formation. An emotional outlet is probably a precondition; the praxis of reliving the past enters here. But all parties also have to be reasonably convinced that a deeper change in assumptions has taken place, making less likely any reproduction of the same conflict behavior, when given a chance. A mutually guided reprogramming would be the ideal. (For an exploration see Part IV, Chapter 5.)

Third, the peace-building aspect of trying to overcome C, the contradiction. General formulas have been given in Chapter 3; conflict interventions are deliberate ways of trying to implement them. Throughout that effort conscientization, raising the general level of consciousness, will and must take place. The goal is an acceptable formula, defining a new formation; new structures, new institutions.

This is the most difficult and hence most neglected part; this is where things may go wrong.

#### Notes

1. One model would be Rogers' non-directive counseling; see, for instance, W. U. Snyder, with the collaboration of Carl R. Rogers (and others), *Case-book of Non-directive Counseling* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1947).

2. Types 4, 5, and 6 have not been spelled out. As they form the centerpiece of the typology, they will be dealt with at some length in section 4.4.

3. This is the more technical, hard, use of the term 'mediation'. But there is also a more popular, softer use of the term covering all approaches by outside parties, more like 'conflict worker' or 'facilitator'. I prefer the more technical use since there is a need for a term for that activity. Håkan Wiberg uses 'low key' versus 'high key' mediation for this distinction.

4. One type of conflict resolution might actually be to give the meta-goal to one and the goal to the other: 'A, you are actually right; however, I am going to award the piece of land to B because he needs it more and I am sure you, knowing you are right, will generously accept this decision.'

5. For a definition and exploration of dialogue, its relation to debate (like brainstorming for mutual enrichment versus a verbal game in order to win), and why Socrates cannot be said to have engaged in dialogues (the outcome was pre-programmed), see Johan Galtung, 'Dialogues as Development', *Methodology and Development* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), ch. 2, pp. 68–92.

6. The word *dia* does not refer to the number 2, but means 'through' (can also mean 'apart, separate'), in other words through the word, *logos*. The concept opens for any number of participants. As an approach it favors those gifted with words. This is a good reason why particular attention should be paid to non-verbal communication, including body language, and not only negatively, to avoid expressions of hostility, but positively, to exude an atmosphere of positive transformation.

7. 'Who are you to think you can apologize yourself out of this?', and on the other side, 'Who are you to think you are entitled to hand out forgiveness?'. And yet there is also something beautiful to this paradigm, opening for a new beginning, provided that new beginning is used to move forward.

8. The general formula for winning a debate, particularly in the Occident, is to catch the other in a contradiction between two or more data-, theory- or value-sentences. In a dialogue the focus is on helping each other out of contradictions, or on using the contradictions fruitfully.

9. I am indebted to Professor Svetozar Stojanovic for this felicitous formulation of an attitude

found among many outsiders to the situation in ex-Yugoslavia, who neglect the shadows of the past completely, not to mention the shadows in the future.

10. Rapists, or sexually aroused males in general, will tend to claim this. Rightly, or wrongly?

11. Among the many texts in this field the reader may find Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), and E. Victoria Shook, *Ho'oponopono* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985) useful. I have serious reservations about Fisher's book, and they all relate to the subtitle, 'Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In'. A non-yielding attitude cannot be a good basis. On the other hand, the basic point is, of course, to seek a transcendence whereby no party to the conflict has to give in. Burton's book contains 56 very useful rules, particularly about third parties, sponsors, panels. And Shook's book serves as an introduction to how the Hawai'ian culture tries to handle conflict.

12. See Johan Galtung, 'Institutionalized Conflict Resolution', *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. III (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1978), ch. 14.

# Nonviolent Conflict Transformation

## 5.1 Conflict Theory, Conflict Transformation – and Gandhi<sup>1</sup>

Conflict theory might take as its point of departure on the one hand an incompatibility, and on the other the actors and their conflict formation. Sometimes it is possible to resolve an incompatibility without really touching the actors and their relations, even without really touching the conflict formation. Compromise does exactly this. The actors are still there, with their structure basically untouched. But the conflict is settled because both parties can now relax their conception of what is acceptable to them so that their modified goals become compatible. The opposite approach is in a sense an even better example: the borderline for the compatible is pushed outward, more and more, until it begins to touch what is acceptable. The incompatibility itself is transcended. In the classical employer–employee dispute over wages, the first approach would mean a new formula for dividing an existing cake; the second would refer to making the cake bigger, possibly retaining the old formula as to how to divide it. These two approaches do not exclude each other. In addition to that there is withdrawal, and other approaches as well. For instance, one can keep the actors unchanged, yet change the conflict formation in a crucial manner by deepening the scope of their interaction so as to increase the number of conflicts between them. Let us have a second glance to introduce Gandhi.

So far the actor-system has been left untouched. It too can also be expanded; with more actors than the original two that often define a conflict, there are more possibilities.

Broadening of a conflict takes it out of the bilateral or even bipolar frame where the conflict so often gets stuck. If A has a conflict with B, B a conflict with C and C a conflict with A, then they may all pool their conflicts together and decide that they cancel each other out.

The actor-system can also be changed by contracting rather than expanding. From two actors it can only be contracted down to one. This is what happens under integration, which means not only a fusion of the two actors into one, but also harmonization of their goals – their interests and values.

There is yet another important way of changing the actor-system: through disintegration, fission, decoupling. This is possible only if the parties are already coupled together. Decoupling becomes meaningless in a conflict between an invader and a population. But between exploiter and exploited it is highly meaningful. And it may also be meaningful in horizontal relations: two business partners may decide to break up, a marriage may break down. If there can be fusion with harmony of goals, then there can also be fission when there is disharmony of goals.

This yields six approaches to conflict resolution: resolving the incompatibility (transcendence), compromise, deepening, broadening, integration, and disintegration through decoupling. In addition to this comes another family of approaches that does not presuppose resolution of the incompatibility, but tries to freeze the conflict, negate it, protract it, through all kinds of devices, including structural and direct violence.

Thus, the parties may turn more inward; turning to each other in a more positive way; or even in a more negative manner, letting one conflict recede into the background by introducing a new one on top of the old one (if I burn down your house today, chances are that you will forget that I snatched your purse yesterday); or turning to other actors. And finally: structural and direct violence are also ways of 'resolving' a conflict, for if the other party is dominated he may be unaware of his own interests and unable to pursue them for that reason. And if he is 'incapacitated' (killed, secluded, banished) he will no longer pursue his goal and get in the way of the first actor.

Now, where does Gandhi, the leading theoretician and practitioner of nonviolence, stand on conflict transformation? He rejects most of these approaches. Gandhi can be said to be a puritan in his choice of approaches to conflict resolution – a vegetarian here as in the choice of food, so to speak, and largely for the same reasons.

Thus, he would obviously reject the last two, the application of direct and structural violence, since that would be against the whole idea of nonviolence. Nonviolence is an admonition to struggle against both kinds of violence, and an equally strong admonition not to use them in the struggle.

He would also reject the four protracted devices, because they run counter to his injunction to solve conflict. They are escapes from conflict, the way out for those unwilling to face the conflict squarely. As such these approaches do not belong to a *satyagraha*, Gandhi's way to struggle. There is no way to peace, peace is the way; to be taken, now.

A *satyagrahi* tries to fight injustice, not to sweep it under the carpet. This should not be confused with the use of the time element in a *satyagraha*. The struggle may be drawn out to permit the time necessary for changes in both parties, but it may not be permitted to drop into oblivion, to decrease in salience.

Of the first six approaches which all somehow involve real transformation of the conflict, Gandhi would definitely reject deepening and its twin companion, broadening. The incompatibilities would still be there. Such approaches only establish markets for trading with contradictions. This may be permissible for less fundamental conflicts. But when it is used as a device to continue basic injustice, as when continued exploitation is exchanged for a minor land reform, or independence for splitting India into two parts, then no real progress is made. Use in minor ways may be permissible, but not when basic values are at stake. And Gandhi chose, throughout his mature life, to fight basic conflicts.

That leaves Gandhi with four out of twelve approaches – a considerable reduction. All four are basic to Gandhi's approach, and have been elaborated further by him.

To start from the bottom of the list: *disintegration*, decoupling, fission. The whole theory of non-cooperation enters here. To Gandhi this is more than simply breaking relations, as when diplomatic and trade relations are suspended, or a marriage ends in divorce. To Gandhi this only means decoupling in one structure relating the two, the social structure. The deeper structure of unity-of-man is still there, and it is the duty of the *satyagrahi* to engage in even more interaction at this level, person-to-person.

Then: *integration* (fusion). This is the goal, made explicit in the *Rama Raj*, the Kingdom of God, union. Where Gandhi differs from other thinkers in this respect is in his insistence that there are no borderlines such as gender, generation, race, class, and nation that integration will respect. Integration is universal, transcending all of them. It is not an integration against somebody, an alliance/community for the containment of direct violence, or an exercise of structural violence. It is integration of humankind. Second, Gandhi is optimistic when it comes to its approximation, if not complete realization, here in this world. All of us can find a place on the oceanic circles of cooperation, with equal rights and duties.

Then: *compromise*. Gandhi often spoke in favor of compromise even when it looked as if the struggle could be won in the sense that all grievances would be redressed, all claims

could be met. The point was not to win, but to proceed in the struggle so as to lay the best basis possible for post-conflict life. A general inclination in favor of compromise, however, does not imply any willingness to compromise over fundamentals.

Finally: incompatibility resolution, or *transcendence*. Very often this is a question of imagination. Typically this was an approach Gandhi used when working in a direct conflict between others, but also when working as the first party in a structural conflict. The conflict is transcended; what looks incompatible becomes compatible in a new structure. The horizontal caste system, trusteeship, Britons staying on in India but not as colonizers, a (British) Commonwealth of equal and sovereign nations – these are examples.

Now, why does Gandhi have this puritan approach to conflict resolution? Basically because resolving the conflict is only one element of the desired outcome of a conflict. At least equally desirable is the impact the conflict is to have on both parties to the conflict. A conflict resolved, but leaving the parties unchanged, even worse, is no success. The criterion of conflict *transformation* is threefold: a new social structure as conflict resolution in the conventional sense, and a higher level of self-purification in all actors, both in the *satyagraha*-group and in the adversaries. Not only C-oriented, but A- and B-oriented!

The latter means, as interpreted here: a higher level of self-reliance in all parties, and this is where the destruction of a structure of exploitation liberates the exploiter. He was dependent on his exploitative practices – through the struggle he will also learn to become self-reliant. The same applies to the other two components: struggle is instrumental to the growth of fearlessness in either party, as it is instrumental, when properly conducted, to the strengthening of ties of unity. Only in the light of a broader set of criteria of success can Gandhi's attitude to conflict resolution be properly understood.

Gandhi eliminates two-thirds of the standard approaches to conflict, but then goes much more deeply into the remaining four. In modern strategic terms Gandhi seems to be an adherent of the doctrine of graded and delayed response. The other party should be given time to reflect and come to see the total situation differently, just as one's own group also needs time to have a corresponding chance to learn and transcend, to improve A and B, together with the antagonist. For a summary, see Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 *Twelve Approaches to Conflict Resolution and Gandhi's Four*

Actor system	Conflict system	Incompatibility eliminated	Incompatibility preserved
Preserved	Preserved	1. <i>Transcendence</i> 2. <i>Compromise</i>	7. Add positive intra-action 8. Add positive inter-action
Preserved	More	3. Deepening	9. Add negative inter-action
More	Preserved	4. Broadening	10. Inter-action other actors
Only one		5. <i>Integration</i> <i>Recoupling</i> <i>Fusion</i>	11. Domination (structural violence)
Splitting		6. <i>Disintegration</i> <i>Decoupling</i> <i>Fission</i>	12. Incapacitation (direct violence)

Time is needed to find solutions for the incompatibilities which are proven to exist despite all possible efforts to reach agreement. Conflict resolution in the Gandhian sense does not come about primarily through confrontation of views, dialogue, bargaining, and compromise, but through experimentation with new forms of social life. A low conflict tempo will permit more of this, and prevent human and social energy from dissipating into destructive actions. Nonviolence takes time: from 2 to 1.

However, very important differences – so important as to accumulate into a complete gap – lie between modern strategic reasoning and Gandhi's reasoning on this particular point. 'Graded response' means escalation, increasing the threat to the antagonist. One tries first with a mild threat, then with an enactment of that threat, then with increasingly higher levels until the 'losses become unacceptable'. The antagonist 'softens'.

Bypassing the problem of why this practice so often does not work but seems to be counter-productive, we should point out that Gandhi's escalation can be seen as one of increasing autonomy and self-reliance for oneself and the antagonist, not as increasing the level of inflicted injury.

In other words, when the *satyagraha*-group feels that oneness cannot be restored but has to be created, then the time has come to gain autonomy by cutting the ties of dependency. To the antagonist, this may look like an increasing threat. To the *satyagraha*-group it is more than a declaration of independence: it is independence, also for the antagonist, with a standing invitation to recouple after decoupling, when both are ready.

Both will have the opportunity to develop further, if for some time separately rather than in cooperation. In a sense this contradicts Gandhi's idea that no relationship is worse than a violent relationship. However, the goal is to come together again, possibly in some other way, as soon as possible, as between spouses who have found it necessary to live apart for a period. Decoupling is never a lasting solution. Integration, union, fusion is the goal: from 6 to 5.

Summary: from compromise in non-essentials toward transcendence in essentials; and from decoupling to recoupling and integration. For this, time is needed. But over time many things change. It is difficult to remain consistent. And yet, is consistency so important? Gandhi consistently demanded nonviolence of himself, as the way, and as the long-term goal. To Gandhi nonviolence (*ahimsa*) = love (*satya*) = Truth = God. Others were invited to join. The rest can be negotiated.

## 5.2 Comparing Nonviolence and Violence

Why do we not find much more nonviolent struggle in the world – directed against direct violence, and against structural violence in the two standard forms of repression and exploitation? The answer is probably not found in moral values alone: many people would agree that Gandhi is morally superior to a Lenin, or to a Mao Zedong equating power with what comes out of a gun. The answer will also have to be in the pragmatics of nonviolence.

To assert 'nonviolence does not work' is uninformed, given the amazing successes in the second half of this century.<sup>2</sup>

1 Gandhi's *swaraj* campaign for Indian independence from 1920.<sup>3</sup>

2 The liberation of arrested Jews in Berlin, February 1943.

3 Martin Luther King Jr's campaign in the US South from 1956.

4 The anti-Viêt Nam War movement, inside and outside Viêt Nam.

5 The Buenos Aires Plaza de Mayo mothers against the military.

6 The 'People's Power' movement in the Philippines, 1986.

- 7 The Children's Power movement in South Africa, from 1986.
- 8 The *intifada* movement in Occupied Palestine, from 1987.
- 9 The democracy movement in Beijing, spring 1989.
- 10 The Solidarność/DDR movements which ended the Cold War.

Of course, no case is ever totally clear and pure. But in these cases major direct violence was averted, and major structural violence was averted or reduced. Other factors were also at work; but if instead of using nonviolence, the threatened, exploited and/or repressed had engaged in major violence, not only would that have invited major counter-violence, but the oppressive conditions would probably have remained unchanged. This we cannot know, since we cannot run history over again. But it certainly seems highly plausible.<sup>4</sup>

To write the history of this violent century, and to explore its politics without also exploring its nonviolence, is to malign the century even further. Such negligence reveals ideological bias and intellectual incompetence, for reasons to be explored.

Here is a list of ten basic mechanisms behind nonviolence:

- 1 The threat of direct violence or the fact of structural violence is intolerable to major groups in the country.
- 2 A constructive alternative has been formulated and communicated to Other in speech and writing, demonstrations, etc.
- 3 There is a clear and present danger that violence of some kind will be used if active nonviolence is practiced, in other words, a real risk to Self is involved.
- 4 The commitment to nonviolence is clear<sup>5</sup>, applying not only to acts, but also to speech, and, if possible, to thought.
- 5 There are Self-to-Other acts of friendliness, love.
- 6 Nonviolent action then serves to communicate, to Other and outsiders, that Self will never surrender to oppression, is willing to face the consequences, and wants a positive relation.
- 7 Dissociation (non-cooperation and civil disobedience) from Other the oppressor and association with Other the person may then change the mind – and even the heart – of Other.
- 8 If the oppressor uses violence to counter nonviolence, then demoralization of Other facing the consequences of his violence on nonviolent resisters may serve to change his mind.
- 9 If Other uses long-distance violence, including economic boycott, to avoid facing the consequences, then outside parties must be mobilized to make the consequences clear to him.
- 10 If the socio-psychological distance Self–Other is based on Other dehumanizing Self, then nonviolence may have to include outsiders in a Great Chain of Nonviolence.<sup>6</sup> Some of the intermediaries will share many social characteristics with the oppressed, others will be socially closer to the oppressors.<sup>7</sup>

Uppermost in the mind should be the three basic concerns of nonviolent action: that action is to be directed against the bad relation between Self and Other, not against Other as such; that action should build love rather than hatred, and peaceful rather than violent behavior,<sup>8</sup> and that Other is at all times invited to share this enriching experience – including assurances to Other that there is space for him in future society. The point is to behave in such a way that the conflict becomes transformed upwards. The parties should emerge from the conflict not only with better social relations, but also as better persons than they were before, better equipped to take on new conflicts nonviolently. Those

inclined to violence yesterday or today may thus become the mediators of tomorrow.

Of course this does not always work. Self may have the first six points under control, but then Other may fail to respond as hoped for in the next four points. One possibility in that case is to try again; another is capitulation, which should never be viewed as permanent. To accept violence is itself violence.

Gandhians would emphasize the role of greater purification of Self for conflict transformation to take place. This theory has the advantage of placing the burden on oneSelf and on something one can do (e.g., through meditation), and the additional advantage of being non-falsifiable ('There has been no change of heart in Other? You need more Self-purification!').

This factor should certainly not be excluded, as nonviolence so obviously does work spiritually, from spirit to spirit. But that need not exclude political work on, and with, outside parties. In mechanisms (9) and (10) above they are crucial.

At any rate, let nobody claim that no conflict exists – no matter how internalized the hatred, how institutionalized the violent behavior, and how intractable the contradiction, the incompatibility, the issue – that cannot be transformed through nonviolence. We are not saying nonviolence always works. There is no panacea hypothesis. But many oppressed groups might have come much further toward autonomy had they used non-violence.<sup>9</sup>

The hypothesis that violence never works can be argued, however:

First, there are the number of people killed and bereaved; the number of people traumatized in body, mind and spirit, and those affected by that; the physical damage to human habitat and nature. Most of this harm is irreversible. And these are only the visible effects of violence, ignoring basic side-effects – like mainstream economists excluding externalities of economic action. Only by ignoring this vital point can the prophets of violence reach a positive conclusion as to the use of violence.

Second, if violence leads to change in Self–Other relations, then this is obtained by incapacitating Other. But an enforced outcome is not sustainable because it is not accepted; and it is unacceptable because a defeated Other is no longer Other.<sup>10</sup>

Third, there has been no positive transformation in Self, but even a negative transformation since a victory may trigger an addiction to violence, and lead to more violence next time.

Fourth, there has been no positive transformation of Other, but possibly a negative transformation since that defeat may also trigger an addiction to violence and lead to revenge, one barrier having been removed through having been the object of violence, so that there is no danger of incurring a moral deficit.

Back to the point of departure. Given the increasing bankruptcy of violence and war as institutions, with modern technology which certainly does not ennoble victor or victim but degrades them both; and given the significant achievements with nonviolent means: why don't we see much more of them? For answers we probably have to go to deep culture: there may be hidden obstacles that have to be understood, and then confronted – nonviolently, of course. But there may also be hidden factors that favor rather than impede nonviolent action. They should also be identified and understood – and perhaps be enhanced.

### 5.3 Deep Culture Factors Impeding or Facilitating Nonviolence

Let us explore some factors lurking in seven spaces that shape the human condition; and more particularly in how we conceive of these spaces and how that, in turn, shapes our condition (to be used much more in Part IV).

*Nature* The word ‘natural’ is obviously related to nature, taking nature as a norm. But nature is not an unambiguous model for what is natural and normal: there is conflict and cooperation, antibiosis and symbiosis, Darwin and Kropotkin. Occidental culture would seem to emphasize the first term of these pairs, at the considerable risk of losing sight of the second – and of reality.

However, the basic point is not how much violence and how much care there is in non-human nature, but in human nature. A biased reading of nature makes violence look ‘natural/normal’. The counter-position would draw more on Kropotkin, and on humans being spiritual rather than beastly under the surface. Of course we are both; the question is what we choose to emphasize.<sup>11</sup>

*Human* The Freudian image sees the inner person as a battlefield where, out of the struggle between id and super-ego, the ego emerges. This was a breakthrough relative to earlier images of the inner person as a tabula rasa to be imprinted with dogma, imparted by Church and/or Education. But there are also flaws in Freud’s image. Presumably violence is located as an urge in the id, and norms from the super-ego impede the release of all the violence. The human being is seen as a vessel seething with more or less tamed desires, the question being how tight is the lid.

To this there is an alternative and more realistic (not ‘realist’) discourse: to explore the pragmatics, not only the morality, of violence/nonviolence. This leads to the same discovery as for mainstream economics: major negative side-effects of violence have been left out and major positive side-effects of nonviolence have not even been thought of. This should not surprise anybody. Nonviolence is seen as part of a moral super-ego,<sup>12</sup> not as a serious proposition for practical politics, and ego is seen as ‘blowing in the wind’ between the two giant forces, rather than as a conscious Spirit steering the energies of id and super-ego in new and better directions. Maybe id is *less* violent than super-ego.

*Society* Occidental society – whether Judaic, Christian, or Muslim – is individualistic and vertical, with strong males on top. Events will register more easily when identified with male, non-lower-class, leaders like M. K. Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. A major event emanating from black, lower-class women (Rosa Parks) would not easily register with persons with the opposite rank configuration. And, as women are prominent in nonviolence, this factor alone accounts for much of the invisibility.

The Occident is excessively individualistic and verticality-conscious. At the root is the perception of society as a set of individuals fighting their way up. But a society is also a structure, a web tying people together through zillions of interactions. That invisible structure distributes life chances very unevenly. People react, and some of these ‘reacts’ may take the form of nonviolence, as in our list of campaigns. The struggle is from the bottom up, fought by underdogs, working-class, non-white, women and made invisible not only because of the actors’ low status and absence of identifiable leaders, but also because the struggle is threatening. A war does not necessarily upset a social order; it may only bring in some foreigners on top, as part of an occupation. A major campaign, like a general strike from the bottom of society, violent or nonviolent, indicates major dissatisfaction down there. Is the revolution lurking around the next corner?

With the emphasis on actor-orientation, at the expense of structure-orientation, such acts may not even be registered as political, but, for instance, as ‘fundamentalist’, driven by moral norms rather than by political thought. As a result people may wake up one day and discover that they live in a different society – for instance as shaped by the feminist revolution currently under way. They may then try to single out a leader and interview that person to understand what happened in terms of some of his/her characteristics. A good example is the East German revolt in 1989, which shook DDR society but also

Western German society, since the ideas of the nonviolent revolutionaries were equally applicable to capitalist society.

*World* As seen by the Occident, and by all those who have taken on the view of the Occident as theirs, the world has a Center in the Occident, a Periphery accepting the Occident, even submitting to it, and then an Evil sphere, neither submitting nor accepting. To the extent that nonviolence is directed against the direct or indirect power of the Center of this construction – cases (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) above – nonviolence may well be preferable to a situation where the same people do the same kind of thing with violence – but it remains subversive. Any moral, even pragmatic superiority, may cancel out against the defiance and refusal to submit; and the better it works the more dangerous it would be if other groups should pick up such ideas.

Case (2) is different; Nazism was also the enemy of the center in the Center. But the successful nonviolence in Berlin's Rosenstrasse sheds some doubt on the military approach used by the coordinated centers in the Center, the Allies, to crush the Axis, and particularly on the approach, or lack thereof, to save the Jews from the Holocaust. Would it have been better to denounce Nazism and help organize resistance inside Germany, particularly the Gandhian type already well known to the West in the 1930s? Or, was the extremely costly – in all regards – war on Nazism justified by the assumption that there was no alternative, also to assuage the consciences of those Germans who were not Nazis? Is that still the sad moral/pragmatic state of affairs? And is that why the case is so unknown?

Case (9) is different; the Chinese Communist Party was also an enemy of the center in the Center. The campaign was reported, with the expected distortions, without the word 'nonviolence'.<sup>13</sup>

Case (10) is different, for several of the reasons already mentioned. If this was the way of ending post-Stalinist autocracy, from within, then what was the relevance of the Cold War machinery with its alliances, calculated threats, nuclear deterrence and more? Would it have been better to denounce Stalinism, and then encourage internal nonviolence? The same question as for Nazism above. No doubt there was a conjunction of factors behind the inner erosion, one of them being the heavy toll of the arms race on the economy. Nevertheless, a major role was played by the combination of mass migration (also aided by the West), courageous demonstrations,<sup>14</sup> and the formulation of alternatives in the universal discourse of human rights.<sup>15</sup>

Even more important than this: what happens if nonviolence, in need of no money, 'only' courage, knowledge, compassion, perseverance, is turned against the center in the Center, instead of against its enemies? For Solidarność in Poland this was less of a problem, as the people involved were more mainstream trade union workers and Catholic intellectuals, and less counter-trend green ('ecologists') and nonviolent ('pacifist'). But in Germany?

Nonviolence is surrounded by ambiguities that sooner or later will have to be sorted out. Moreover, these ambiguities are also found in the movement itself, and in the shock effect of having succeeded. Used to being a small minority nobody paid attention to, to some extent taking rejection as a confirmation of their purity, suddenly they found themselves holding the reins of power, yet not struggling for any position as driver. Because they did not believe in the power they had exercised? Or, was the nonviolence expressive rather than instrumental?<sup>16</sup>

*Time* In social cosmology the struggle against evil is often associated not only with a hero/leader, but also with a certain time cosmology. Against the darkness of the oppression, resistance begins to mount, more and more, culminating in the final confrontation,

crisis. There are only two possibilities – make it or break it, victory or defeat. The world over, traditional tales/epics of violent resistance that end with a decisive battle and the hero emerging as the national leader (alternatively as the martyr, having been defeated)<sup>17</sup> faithfully follow this linear, male meta-narrative. And in the end there is somebody who concedes defeat, thereby emitting a stop sign.<sup>18</sup>

The argument here would be that effective nonviolence follows a more cyclical, more female time cosmology. The struggle against structural violence and the propensity to use direct violence never ends, it is a part of our human condition. Structural violence is easily reproduced in the social system, in turn generating direct violence to oppose or protect it; and that violence is also easily generated in the person-systems of the inhabitants of the social system. Like love, nonviolence has to be renewed, refreshed;<sup>19</sup> a ‘victory’ should not be taken for granted, it is not a single-shot affair. There is no such thing as a final victory or defeat, hence no stop sign. *La lotta continua*, the struggle (nonviolent) goes on.

This makes nonviolence almost hopelessly unsuited for reporting by the mass media. There is not necessarily any leader and the goal is structural change rather than to inflict defeat on any person. There is no beginning, and certainly no end. Reports will have to focus on the drama in the middle.

*Transperson* Violence is mainly carried out by the body, as physical violence, although the will to fight – ‘morale’ – plays a major role. Nonviolence is mainly carried out with the spirit, although physical stamina and concrete physical action also play major roles. Violence is based on the assumption that what harms me will also harm you, and I am going to make use of that. In nonviolence we can also find that assumption – only that the harm (like boycotting goods and services, or turning one’s back to rulers by migrating) is less irreversible.

In nonviolence there is the assumption that what enhances me will also enhance you. Nonviolence is a form of soft power, and a form of communication, with a sender and a receiver. In practice the communication may have to pass through a chain of nonviolence. The communication is predicated on the assumption of a deep communalism among human beings; that Other is touched by the suffering of Self and wants to remove himself as a cause of that suffering, for instance. Nonviolence seen only as a bag of tricks, doing little more than making life unpleasant for the oppressors, is a very shallow form of non-violence, indeed.<sup>20</sup>

We can postulate a universal human communalism, and then a more particular communalism within the same cultural idiom. This is clearly reflected in Europe: Protestant nonviolence is more verbal, serious, and individual, like Luther’s *hier steh’ ich, ich kann nicht anders*. Catholic nonviolence is more festive, more expressive, collective, like Catholic processions through cities, towns, and villages. Turning the idiom the other way round may easily prove counter-productive. The transpersonal medium is different; what touches one may not touch the other.

The transpersonal – sometimes we call it God – speaks to us in different ways. Of basic significance is whether nonviolence is part of that idiom. In South Asian Buddhism and Jainism, nonviolence is very direct and obligatory. Much the same can be said about Hinduism, but the *varna* system of castes is a form of structural violence which unavoidably sheds some doubts on the sincerity of the *ahimsa* message.

In the three Abrahamic religions of the Occident we find the awesome ambiguity of a God embracing and loving all of humankind, yet highly jealous of any other gods and punishing those who defy Him. Jesus Christ has the same inclination. The rich tradition of violence in the Occident will pick up the exclusive, punishing God; the nonviolent trickle (including Quakerism and Baha’i, among others) will build on the tradition of an inclusive, loving God, including the ultimate violence inflicted on the Christ in the

Passion story. The ambiguity is not resolved by *die zwei Regimenten*, violence here on earth and nonviolence thereafter. It is here, on earth, that we have to find more nonviolent ways of transforming conflicts.

The eclectic religious systems of the Far East use – in addition to Buddhism – Daoism, Confucianism, and Shintoism as building blocks. While the South Asian religions emphasize *ahimsa*, and the Occidental religions are steeped in ambiguity, the violence/nonviolence *problematique* is less explicit in the Far East, except for the Buddhist component. And yet Sun Tzu is very different from Clausewitz, just as Daoism is very different from the world-encompassing mega-structures built from the West. On the other hand, nonviolent workers' strikes are also Western.

*Episteme* A special aspect of culture is epistemology: what constitutes valid knowledge? This differs from one civilization to the other. Consider, for example, the idea of 'law', both in the sense of descriptive regularity and of normative prescription. The Western approach to the former is influenced by the natural sciences and laboratory experiments, by regularities that obtain under pure, even artificial conditions. Controlling all relevant conditions, one then establishes a bivariate relation between X and Y, the prototype of a law; X being the cause/condition, and Y the effect/consequence.

Society in general, and the complexity of nonviolence in particular, does not lend itself to such simple epistemes. Here, as in all the cases mentioned in the beginning, we are dealing with very complex syndromes as X and Y; in addition X and Y are parts of each other. *Yin/yang* cyclicity would be a better episteme to grasp this than Cartesian linearity, but as such understanding is underdeveloped in the Occident the complexity looks overwhelming, and a clear relation between nonviolence and an end to abject repression and/or exploitation becomes elusive. Some satisfaction that nonviolence did play a role, necessary if not sufficient, will do: there is no demand for a laboratory (X,Y) proof.

The metaphor of nonviolence as a force may also be less felicitous as it conjures up (X,Y)-type Newtonian physics. A force moves bodies with acceleration proportionate to the force, and inversely proportionate to the mass, inertia (actually not a bad term for oppression), impacting on other bodies, imparting force to them. But nonviolence is more holistic, dialectic, circular.

Just as a culture has an intellectual style, it also has a legal style.<sup>21</sup> Most promising for nonviolence would seem the Anglo-Saxon, UK–USA, common-law tradition which sees a law, or more particularly a legal formulation, not as sacrosanct but as an hypothesis that is subject to testing. If very many people violate the law, the conclusion is not automatically that they are morally wrong. It could also be that the law is wrong, inadequate, out of date, and needs to be changed.

This is an implicit invitation to nonviolence in the form of civil disobedience. Of course, there is nonviolence as massive non-cooperation, withdrawing the consent by the ruled that is the long-term condition for the ruler to rule. But this is pointed civil disobedience, directed at specific laws or regulations, done in two quite different ways: either as a massive, collective *satyagraha* or as an individual *satyagrahi* by people expressing the collective anguish in their person.

In both cases there is an implicit condition: that the nonviolence is not an expression of a general failure to obey laws. Moreover, there must be a willingness to suffer the consequences – punishment – to indicate that this is serious, and to set in motion processes that may change the law-maker's mind.

In other legal traditions (Roman, German, Japanese) laws or legal formulations may be forever, but they can be interpreted, and there can be an undercurrent of legal practice different from legal theory. The advantage of the common-law tradition is the clear

indication that the grievances have been redressed once a legal formulation has been changed. This means victory, and a stop sign for the campaign, perhaps moving on to other issues.

#### 5.4 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?

The theory above predicts the success and visibility of Gandhi: a high status, charismatic leader, in a culture with *ahimsa* as an element, and trained in the common-law tradition. Pitted against Gandhi was the object of his struggle, admired by the West: British imperialism. He had to pay one minor price: no Nobel Peace Prize.<sup>22</sup> This theory also predicts Martin Luther King, Jr's success for the same reason; by then, however, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee was up to its task.

From this exercise we may derive two basic conclusions. First, we need a theory of the consequences of violence in general and war in particular, much beyond the victory/defeat, number of killed and wounded ('casualties'), and material damage. The current expression, a war-torn society, becomes much deeper and more indicative when we add war-torn persons and worlds. Second, nonviolence has to become a part of the common discourse, and more particularly of a less violent political science<sup>23</sup>, in addition to being an increasingly important part of peace studies. Both theory and practice can be improved, as with any other human endeavor. More important than more empirical studies of nonviolent campaigns are critical studies of where they may have gone wrong, and constructive studies of how nonviolence could have been more effective in the past and become more effective in the future. And in that kind of study all the deep culture factors can be turned in a positive direction by lifting them up in the daylight, and by making people in general (and journalists in particular) more aware of their significance for nonviolence in our tormented century.

#### Notes

1. This section is based on my *The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today* (Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidyapith, 1992). The reader is referred to that book for more details; particularly to ch. 3.4, 'How Nonviolence Works: Some Hypotheses', pp. 130–135.

2. See, for instance, my *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Institute for Peace, 1989), particularly ch. 2, 'Principles of Nonviolent Action: the Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis', pp. 13–34; and 'Eastern Europe Fall 1989 – What Happened, And Why? A Theory Sketch', pp. 75–97 in *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992).

3. This also includes the independence of Pakistan, even if partition was very much against what Gandhi himself wanted.

4. Some short comments on some complexities of the ten cases:


- 1 Britain was also weakened by World War II and the contradiction between fighting autocracy, yet hanging on to colonialism. Gandhi's action sharpened that contradiction.
- 2 Many Jews returned to work after having been released and were re-arrested, in such a way that nonviolent action was much more difficult, and were killed. Others were able to hide. Nonviolence is not a single-shot action.
- 3 Official segregation has ended in the USA, while unofficial segregation remains; again an argument why nonviolence is a process, not a single-shot event.
- 4 Basically the Viêt Namese won a violent war, but the nonviolence probably weakened the resolve on the US side.
- 5 Essentially leader-less, so the peace prize was given to an outstanding man instead (Alfonso de Esquivel).
- 6 Probably more middle class than a movement of, for and by the really oppressed in the Philippines; so it should have been continued.
- 7 To this South African case could be added the moral impact of economic sanctions, divestment, and the positive example of Zimbabwe.

- 8 The action repertory of the *intifada* movement included throwing stones, but one argument might be that by regional standards this is almost nonviolent.
- 9 Major violence was used by Chinese government forces, but probably against the workers' trade union movement rather than against the student democracy movement.
- 10 The fact that violence was used in Romania does not make the actions in Poland and the DDR less nonviolent. In Hungary the transformation was a conventional, slow political change, and transformations in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria – not to mention the Soviet Union – can probably best be seen as domino effects from the DDR and Poland. In the DDR mass migration was a major nonviolent tactic. The nonviolent counter-coup in August 1991 in Moscow belongs here, but with some doubts: not because the Yeltsin counter-coup was not nonviolent, but because the coup itself may not have been credibly violent, but possibly staged (e.g. as a way of getting rid of Gorbachev, who by that time had dismantled the Soviet Empire, but not given in to Western economic demands). The coup was amateurish and half-hearted.

5. The deeper that commitment is rooted in basic values, secular or religious, the more likely that nonviolent activists will not be provoked into violence, or switch to violence simply because 'non-violence did not work', treating nonviolence as one tactic among many; and the more likely – and that is perhaps even more important – that Other will believe that there is a commitment beyond tactic, in other words that the group will not capitulate.

6. Johan Galtung, 'The Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis', pp. 13–34 in *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine*.

7. Imagine a society with three rank dimensions (for instance, gender, race, class), with well-defined underdogs (U) and topdogs (T). The oppressors have the profile TTT, and the oppressed UUU. Imagine further that communication is impossible across three rank gaps, weak across two gaps, but quite strong if they differ in only one social characteristic. Given these hypotheses, we can easily trace six chains through these social groups:



In practice there will be all kinds of additional factors to consider, like marital bonds (in the Berlin case, the intermediaries were the German wives married to the German Jews), or ideology (in the Indian case, Gandhi's friends in Britain were by and large more to the left, but they were white and middle- or upper-class).

8. The classical example – symbolically graphic enough to be picked up by the media – is the planting of flowers in the muzzles of the guns of the police/soldiers (and not, for instance, like the French students in May 1968 throwing stones and yelling their hatred).

9. An example may be the Kurds. Their goals are legitimate – not only respect for their human rights and autonomy within the countries where the border-drawing of more powerful forces (such as the Persian and Ottoman empires) has landed them, but also a *Kurdistan*. But their use of violence, particularly by the Turkish Kurds, makes it easy for their oppressors to mobilize people against them, and engages them in vicious cycles of revenge rather than in building a peaceful Kurdistan from the bottom up.

10. Thus, 'unconditional surrender' will only lead to acceptable outcomes if the defeated party interprets their defeat not only as due to military inferiority, but also as a sign of moral inferiority, as an act of God, for instance. In a secular age/civilization such interpretations are unlikely.

11. A good example of a positive reading of human nature is the UNESCO-sponsored Sevilla statement of a number of social and natural scientists, declaring that violence is not an innate part of human nature. Of course, military analysts tend toward a negative reading.

12. The Swedish expression for conscientious objectors reflects this very well, *samvetsömma*, meaning those with a particularly tender conscience.

13. For what this author believes to be a more correct version, based on a study in Beijing shortly

after, see 'What Happened in Beijing on 3-4 June 1989: What Happens Now?', pp. 240-244 in J. Galtung and R. Vincent, *Global Glasnost* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992).

14. The key event was the demonstration that proceeded from the Nikolai Church in Leipzig on 9 October 1989, to a large extent women, candles in hand, after the traditional Monday prayer. 'The largest demonstration to date has taken place in Leipzig with 75,000 participants despite threats by the party to "suppress any and all demonstration, if necessary with all due force". The police, it turned out, had received orders to shoot. Everything remains peaceful on this Monday evening', Dirk Philipsen, *We Were the People, Voices From East Germany's Revolutionary Autumn of 1989* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 394-395. The size of these nonviolent demonstrations, held at considerable risk, were 2 October 20,000; 9 October 75,000; 16 October 150,000 and 23 October 300,000. Of course there were bigger demonstrations in the West, but what matters is something like the product of the size, the prominence of the demonstrators, and the risk factor.

15. According to a study by the historian Walter Süss, reported in *Der Spiegel* no. 49/1994, pp. 69-73, nonviolence worked exactly the way it is supposed to work: by demoralizing the oppressors, and by rank-and-file Stasis turning against their superiors. Something akin to this happened to Moscow's relations to the DDR already, 7-8 November, before the fall of the Wall; see *Der Spiegel* no. 44/1994, pp. 43-46.

16. The instrumental mode means nonviolence as a way of obtaining the three goals mentioned: improvement of Self, of Other, and of the relation between the two. The expressive mode would focus on the expression of despair, frustration, perhaps at Self-improvement, but much less on the other two.

17. Milos, King of Serbs, after the Kosovo battle 28 June 1389, is one clear example that links directly into the current crisis of Yugoslavia.

18. Other examples of the same general pattern would be elections and sport competitions; in both cases accepting the arithmetics of the struggle as decisive.

19. Repressive regimes would actually say the same: to terrorize the population once is not enough to keep them submissive, they may still start getting ideas. Terror has to be replenished, the vessel is a leaky one: like love, marriage, nonviolence.

20. This is the major controversy within the nonviolence community, between the pragmatics of nonviolence (represented by Gene Sharp, with his classic *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston, MA: Porter & Sargent, 1973) and the spirituality of nonviolence, represented by the Gandhian tradition of meeting of hearts, not only minds, of 'stirring sluggish consciences'. My own position is (as usual) eclectic, both/and.

21. For an exploration, see Johan Galtung, 'Is the Legal Tradition Culture-Blind?', pp. 40-49 in *Human Rights in Another Key* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994).

22. I had an interview in 1954 with the late Professor Jacob Worm-Müller, who had been a consultant to the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. In addition to being skeptical of anyone highly skeptical of the British Empire, he also faulted Gandhi for not being consistently nonviolent in his admonition to prefer violence to cowardice, and for soldiers to do their job (but preferably not to enlist as soldiers at all).

23. Glenn D. Paige advocates a nonviolent political science, in his *To Nonviolent Political Science, From Seasons of Violence* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i, Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1993).

## PART III

# DEVELOPMENT THEORY

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### 1

## Fifteen Theses on Development Theory and Practice

A hotly contested field, this theoretical discipline called ‘development studies’, and policy area called ‘development practice’!<sup>1</sup> The theoretical field is mined with intellectual bombs; the practical area, with anti-state terrorism and the torture instruments of state torture. Why? Because we are dealing with how to create strong and rich countries, how to create strong and rich elites, and how to create strong human beings, people – if not rich, at least with their basic needs met.

How simple it would be if these three goals were not only compatible but could be met with the same policy measures: if a modern airport, massive tax reduction for the elites, free health and education for the people were pulling in the same direction. In practice the elites, including the middle classes,<sup>2</sup> may be seeking their own enrichment; the people may find the elites standing in their way when they improve their livelihood; and the airport may be used by either to bomb the other.<sup>3</sup>

These are very real problems in today’s world. But the overlap between development studies and peace studies is much deeper than the example indicates. Defined narrowly, peace studies has a negative focus: reducing direct violence = reducing the suffering, when basic needs are insulted. Development studies reaches beyond that, not only meeting the needs but also developing the needs further. At that point, peace studies enters again, focusing on the reduction of structural and cultural violence.<sup>4</sup> The relevance for development studies is the theme of the following 15 critical theses, to be explored in greater depth in Chapters 2 and 3, and constructively in Chapters 4 and 5. As I will attempt to show, *there are alternatives!*

### *Thesis No. 1: First definition of development*

*Development is the unfolding of a culture; realizing the code or cosmology of that culture.*

In the world, there are many cultures, even civilizations or macro-cultures, spanning vast regions in space and time. Thus, a consequence of choosing this definition would be that there are many developments. In turn, if one civilization imposes its definition of development on another, then we are clearly dealing with a major case of cultural violence, of grafting another cultural code onto another people’s culture, thereby legitimizing what may have been illegitimate and vice versa. At best this may leave an entire people confused, at worst expose them to culturocide, the killing of their own culture, leading to gross alienation and possibly to physical individual and collective suicide.<sup>5</sup> One reason: the belief that economics is ‘culture-free’,<sup>6</sup> and hence neutral.

The word ‘unfolding’ is reflected very clearly in the German *Entwicklung* (or the Norwegian *utvikling*), and also in ‘develop’ when seen as the antonym to ‘envelop’. The flower metaphor can be used for what it is worth. The unfolding is pre-programmed in the seeds, as a genetic code in the flower, as a cultural code or cosmology<sup>7</sup> in the civilization. There is a program to be realized; neither the flower, nor the civilization, has real freedom of choice. Once the program has been realized, the flower is fulfilled, starts wilting and may die out unless the seeds can be sown. So may civilizations; unless they manage to sow their seeds, add to their code, or adopt an open-ended code. How that can be done will be discussed in the following theses.

*Thesis No. 2: Second definition of development*

*Development is the progressive satisfaction of the needs of human and non-human nature, starting with those most in need.*

Human beings have needs; if these needs are not satisfied or met, they are no longer human beings, meaning for the more material/somatic needs they are no longer beings (with life), and for the more non-material/spiritual needs they are no longer human. We can identify the somatic needs with the physiological functions of the human body, including the human skin:<sup>8</sup> These are set out in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 *Human Needs and other Satisfiers*

Basic Human Needs	Satisfiers
Integrity of the human body	Trauma protection
Input of (clean) air, water, and nutrition	Air, water, food
Input of (pleasant)stimuli, visual, auditory, olfactory	Pleasant environment
Output of waste products, excretion	Latrines etc.
Temperature, humidity, wind control	Clothes, shelter
Sleep, rest	Quiet
Movement	Space
Sex	Privacy
Reproduction	All of the above

Needs-deprivation is suffering, and the more so the more intensive (total deficit for one need) and extensive (several needs) the deprivation. People who administer punishment to human beings know this. Prison is deprival of the last three, a concentration camp or harsh prison adds the preceding five, and torture attacks the human body to inflict maximum, often non-lethal and non-traceable, trauma. Misery has elements of all three types. At the minimum, development is misery-abolition, like peace is war-abolition.<sup>9</sup>

All of nature has needs. The first five above apply to plants, the next four also to animals. The need for reproduction is seen as an ontogenetic (individual), not as a phylogenetic need of the species for offspring; the species being an abstraction incapable of feeling need-deficits. Thus, the needs concept extends to all forms of *sentient life*: in Buddhist thought defined as anything capable of experiencing suffering, *dukkha*, and *sukha*, life enhancement.<sup>10</sup>

An important cutting point in needs-deprivation can now be defined. At all levels of deprivation there is an element of *suffering*, as mentioned. The extreme form of suffering is death, individual *extinction*: whether from traumas inflicted on the body (direct violence), or lack of inputs (structural violence). But before extinction of the individual,

there enters another key concept in development theory and practice: *exploitation*, defined here as the use of life beyond its capacity for reproduction. What this means for human beings is relatively clear. Reproduction – that is every morning, after sleep/rest, excretion and food, to be born again, fresh and fit, ready to start a new day. Not to be reproduced means every morning to be less than the morning before, in a downward succession ending with death sooner or later. When this happens for all individuals, then that species is endangered, threatened with extinction. Another word for ‘reproducibility’ is ‘sustainability’ – but it is less evocative as it conceals the mechanism, reproduction by own forces, as opposed to being propped up by external assistance, etc. ‘Renewability’ is better as a term, and also brings in non-live nature.<sup>11</sup>

If development is the progressive satisfaction of needs of human and non-human nature, then the problem of environmental degradation becomes a problem of priority. Three positions are relatively clear: a *homo-centric development*, whereby human needs are given priority to the exclusion of nature’s needs (or more precisely, non-human nature), a *nature-centered development*, whereby nature’s needs are given priority to the exclusion of human needs; and *homonature-balance* development, whereby some compromise is struck. Underlying this well-known debate is a simple fact, very unpleasant for human beings to contemplate: whereas nature can do very well without human beings, human beings can manage only a minute or two without air, a week or so without water, a month at most without food. Knowing this, homo-centric development today often takes the ‘enlightened’ form of environmental protection, lamenting that nature sets ‘limits to growth’ and talking about how nature can be ‘sustained’. Nature is then conceived of ‘*für mich*’, not ‘*an sich*’, in terms of its own needs for its own sake. And underlying this again is an attitude to nature very similar to that of certain elites to people: they exist for our sake, as means to our reproduction.<sup>12</sup>

The somatic needs come under two headings: *survival*, as opposed to extinction, and a minimum of *well-being*. Human beings also have spiritual needs. We can summarize them under the headings of *identity*, something with which to identify in nature, personal, social, world, time and culture spaces, giving meaning to life; and *freedom*, defined partly as mobility in world space, social space and inner, personal space; with the possibility of making choices. Do animals and plants have this? Who knows?

### *Thesis No. 3: Third definition of development*

*Development is economic growth, but at nobody's expense.*

This definition brings us closer to development as commonly conceived of, but with the important and troublesome condition given in the but-clause. The costs are well known. They would appear in Nature space as depletion (extinction of live and non-live nature) and (toxic) pollution; in Human space as human needs-deficits, to the point of threatening reproduction; in Social space (human interaction systems), as deficits in diversity and symbiosis; in World space (societal interaction systems), as deficits in diversity and symbiosis; in Time (future) as deficits in reproducibility (renewability, sustainability), and in Culture space as intellectual *inadequatio*.<sup>13</sup> The problem is whether economic growth without such costs is possible, even conceivable. If economic growth is defined as positive increments in a gross national product per capita, where the gross national product above all reflects the economic activities known as ‘industry’ and ‘trade’, ‘industry’ tends to produce anorganic and/or synthetic organic waste that is bio non-degradable, and trade tends to move cause and effect continents and decades away from each other, then there is an incompatibility. And so far we have only been looking at nature. But if we now interpret ‘economic growth’ as ‘economic activity’, meaning cycles connecting *nature* (material and energy resources, and waste deposit), *production* (processing of nature)

and *consumption* (any end-use of products, closing the cycle, with waste back to nature), then economic activity does not a priori entail costs. The task is to discover how this can be done.

Obviously the three definitions given above of development – *culture-centered*, *needs-centered*, and *growth-centered* – are contradictory. What is development to one may not be so to the other(s). A culture may have neither needs, nor growth on its hidden agenda, or one but not the other. Question: which cultures, civilizations, if any, are true development cultures?

#### *Thesis No. 4: First grammatical thesis*

*The noun 'development' can only be understood in the plural as developments, not in the singular.*

This follows from the first definition: several cultures, several developments. The thesis is fundamental and provides a background for a number of negative phenomena in our world. Thus, if the development of one culture is imposed upon another culture, it will sooner or later be experienced as a straitjacket – even if it is liberating, providing some degrees of freedom, in some new directions. For elites who already have internalized that foreign, even alien culture, there will be no problem, except with their ‘backward masses’. But the people will react, partly by passive, subconscious sabotage or at least inefficiency, when they have to work within a socio-cultural matrix not experienced as theirs; and partly as active resistance, including with violence, by the dominant culture referred to as ‘terrorism’. Another term used by the dominant culture today is ‘fundamentalism’, referring to people who believe enough in their own culture to stand up for it, and not give in to a dominant culture from the outside. Such beliefs also inspire passive and active resistance.<sup>14</sup>

#### *Thesis No. 5: Second grammatical thesis*

*The verb 'develop' can only be understood as an intransitive or reflexive or reciprocal verb, not as a transitive verb.*

Development is essentially Self-development. An Other cannot be the cause of development in Self, without harming the autonomy of Self. Autonomy is a development goal according to all definitions. I develop, I develop myself, we develop each other.

Try to raise your own children by never giving them the experience of self-causation. Perhaps the formula may work for the first ten years or so. But after that the parents will have on their hands a richly deserved puberty revolt. What then happens can also be formulated grammatically: to become oneSelf, one's (own) Self, is to be the S in a standard Indo-European SPO-sentence, subject-predicate-object; not the perennial O.

Try to raise a child with almost no challenges. The child masters nothing on his/her own, only carries out some household chores according to pre-set rules, like taking out the garbage, making beds, some cleaning. Do this for 70 years, adding a little pocket money as the former child goes through what could have been a life-cycle. The result would be tragic. Do this with countries, and you have exactly what today's development assistance is all about – an effort to develop somebody else.

Development assistance becomes a covenant whereby the receiver gets some pocket money for basic services, and the sender gets the inner growth deriving from all the challenges. But development means taking on the challenges, you yourself, not giving them away or have them taken away from you, by somebody else. ‘Development assistance’ is a *contradiccio in adjecto*.

*Thesis No. 6*

*Western civilization understands itself as the universal civilization, and universalizes its history as development history for others, meaning that*

- A. *Development = Western development = Modernization, and*
- B. *Development = Growth = Economic growth = GNP growth.*

These two propositions point to two basic aspects of Western theories of progress or general amelioration, already built into the word ‘development’: *differentiation*, and *growth*. According to the former, progress consists above all in increasing division of labor, meaning increasing specialization; and according to the latter, growth consists in increasing production of goods and services. The former is seen by some as a necessary and sufficient condition for the latter.<sup>15</sup>

But the Occidental mind, the site of the world’s two universalizing and (consequently) missionary religions (Christianity and Islam), which in addition are singularizing (the only truth) and mono-prophetic (Jesus and Mohammed),<sup>16</sup> does not rest content with a formula which may or may not apply to themselves. Any formula has to be universally valid, which leads to the general thesis above. The modernization formula, then, brings in its wake Western, Aristotelian-Cartesian logic, the logic of the state with cabinet, ministries, centralization etc., and the logic of capital with economic growth as its consequence.

And at this point, trivialization of the potential inherent in the term ‘development’ is brought to a convenient and highly operational *reductio ad absurdum* point, where a great many projects can be undertaken in the name of development.<sup>17</sup> All three definitions, and the semantic theses, are then disregarded.

*Thesis No. 7*

*The major conditions for economic growth are hard work, saving/investment, greed, and inconsiderateness.*

The road to economic growth passes through processing (industry) and marketing (internal and external trade). For success to ensue, three variables have to be watched: Q/P (highest possible quality at lowest possible price); C/N (highest amount of culture imprinted on the lowest amount of ‘raw’ nature; in other words, the highest possible degree of processing) and F/R (a good balance between finance economy and real economy).

For all three, hard work is necessary, especially in a competitive economy. But saving/investment, not using all income for material and non-material consumption, is also necessary: otherwise any competitive edge made cannot be maintained. Paying much attention to costs in terms of exploitation (reproduction deficits) of nature, of the internal proletariat in social space and the external proletariat in world space, and even of Self,<sup>18</sup> will only deflect energy away from the major pursuit. Besides, that is *their* problem. The key theme, the overriding motivation behind the activity is simple: *greed*.

There has to be some ‘postponement of gratification’ present in the culture: ‘work hard, enjoy later’. From this follows the pattern of vacations and retirement, presumably ‘hard work/no joy’ most of the year/life, and ‘no work/much joy’ for some of the year/life. But any enjoyment obviously takes time away from hard work and full attention given to saving/investment, making the amount of time for leisure activity a possible indicator of becoming ‘soft’, and as a consequence of incipient decline – whether applied to the Roman Empire 2000 years ago or to Japan today.

*Thesis No. 8*

*The major carriers of inconsiderateness are Males, Protestants, and Economists, particularly when combined.*

To explore this fully would bring us deep into theology, biology/culture/structure, and mainstream economics as a science. Only some points will be touched upon here.

First, *males*. With 95–98% of the direct violence in the world committed by males there is already a solid tradition of inconsiderateness, ‘toughness’. Males try to control their own violence by substituting structural and cultural violence for direct violence. They build themselves into hierarchies to control the exercise of direct violence, limiting it to violence by high against low, and from ingroup against the outgroup; protecting the internal high up. The army is the archetype; the exploitation of internal and external proletariats a continuation of war with other means. Preferred are deductive systems like Christian and Islamic doctrines of just war, and international law, rather than spontaneous acts of human compassion.<sup>19</sup>

Second, *Protestants*. Much has been said about their reasons for working hard and for saving, or postponement of gratification in general, in the Weberian (Max Weber himself was a Protestant) tradition.<sup>20</sup> Why should they also be less considerate? Two factors seem particularly important.

One of the basic features of the Lutheran theoscape was the construction of Paradise as a scarce good. Access should not be seen as guaranteed by any formula controlled by human beings themselves. To the contrary, with God being His own cause, humans have little or no leverage. This means uncertainty, but also standing in line, in front of those Pearly Gates. Given the super-individualization of the Protestant soul, standing in line would mean competition, to get into Paradise.

And then the second feature: Protestantism as de-Mary-ized Christianity; a truncation of the usual Christian quaternity with God-the-Father, Mary-the-Mother, the Holy Spirit and Christ-the-Son, excising Mary. With Mary disappear compassion and mercy, more profound than the divine grace bestowed upon humans by God, generally virtues held to be feminine. What remains is a trinity with two males and one of dubious gender, and no Holy Mother to put in a word of compassion for a sinner.

Result: agony, accompanied by the hope that success in this life may be a premonition of success in the afterlife.

Third, *economists*. Mainstream economics, like any science, is an effort to make certain aspects of reality transparent and amenable to processing by the human mind in general, and the faculties for abstraction and generalization in particular, but always with the cost of making other aspects of reality opaque. Peculiar to economics is that the aspects made invisible are within the very field of economics themselves: direct ‘side-effects’, positive and negative consequences, but not accounted for by economic activity. In other words, the ‘externalities’, so named because they are not in the focus of intellectual scrutiny but are kept in the shadows or beyond, in the sub- or unconscious of mainstream economics.

These are the holes or undeveloped areas at the margin of the economist mind. Six holes can be readily identified using the typology of spaces indicated in Thesis No. 3:

- *Nature space*, seen not in its own right but as a resource and possible dumping place for pollutants.
- *Human space*, seen mainly as production factors at various levels and as consumption potential.
- *Social space*, seen mainly as a locus for production-distribution-consumption cycles, and as a market place.
- *World space*, seen mainly as an international social space.

- *Time*, only shorter time-horizons forward and backward.
- *Culture*, made to serve economics as constructed by economists rather than vice versa, e.g., by relativizing all values and making them comparable through monetization so as to permit inter-personal and inter-value cost–benefit analyses.

And, then, on top of all this comes *the seventh hole*:

- *Episteme*, the missing capacity to develop awareness of the holes in one's own reasoning, to see the other six holes.

Imagine now a world where economic growth in the modern sense of that word, well operationalized in GNP/capita, gets started in the part of Europe dominated by Protestantism, and in a period with strongly articulated patriarchy. An enormous amount of violence accompanies the phenomenon, such as slavery and the triangular trade, and colonialism/imperialism for the external proletariat, with repression of the working class, the internal proletariat, when they try to improve their conditions.

What is missing is the good conscience from the firm conviction of being on the right and righteous path, even if there is some suffering on the way, particularly by the wayside. Mainstream economics produced and reproduces that justification, as a coherent, brilliant exemplar of cultural violence.

#### *Thesis No. 9*

*There are two major economic growth regions in the world: the Judeo-Christian (JC) Northwest and the Buddhist-Confucian (BC) Southeast.*

If the conditions are hard work, saving/investment, greed and inconsiderateness, then there is little doubt that the world Northwest qualifies, with the Protestant part at its center. Things are somewhat softer in the Judaic and Muslim parts, with their focus on social justice, and in Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, with the female goddess still in place.

But the world Southeast, meaning Japan–China–Korea–Viêt Nam, also qualifies. Hard work and a certain frugality are deeply embedded in the Confucian ethic, considerateness and solidarity in the Buddhist ethic, particularly in the Mahayana Buddhist ethic with its strong emphasis on the greater, trans-personal context. However, this greater context does not encompass the whole world. It is only the Occidental projects, particularly Christianity and Islam, that claim to be universally valid. The world Southeast might focus exploitation on the rest of the world, the world outside their own, treating their own part better. The net result may be the same: economic growth, and not development in the sense of Thesis No. 3, at nobody's expense. But in the combination of Mahayana Buddhism and Confucianism lies at least a potential for more equality in the BC-region.

The major country in the JC-region is Germany with the European Union, and Eastern Europe/ex-Soviet Union as *Hinterland*; and in the BC-region Japan with East/Southeast Asia as *Hinterland*. Question: is Germany–Japan an axis for peace or war? And how will this duo behave towards the United States?

#### *Thesis No. 10*

*The rest of the world is for the time being condemned to periphery status in the world economic growth system.*

Escape from this predicament is not impossible. But it certainly takes hard work, much saving and investment, greed, and possibly also some ‘countervailing inconsiderateness’, even if this is done completely nonviolently. Gandhi organized boycott of British goods,

particularly textiles, in order to pave the way for economic self-reliance, and even collected money so as not to hurt British merchants. But there was no escape from the fact that they were hurt in having their expansionism checked.

In today's world the two Cold War superpowers are remarkably similar. Greed and inconsiderateness are no problem, both sides have impeccable credentials in that field. But hard work and saving are problematic for both. It is hard to tell the future, however; both Americans and Russians have hidden strengths that may emerge when tested under conditions of real hardship.

While this profile applies to other areas of the world Periphery as well, there are also regions with the opposite profile: hard work, saving as a hedge against harder times, little greed, and with considerations to Nature, Self and Other. Most indigenous peoples are like that, which is the very reason why they have survived for so long. As well as being the reason why they are slowly being eliminated.

Exacerbating the situation: the general homogenization of world elites around the theme of economic growth, at which they may be more or less successful. If they do not satisfy all four conditions, they will tend to become the helpers of the Center, supplying them with raw nature, raw labor, and raw markets.

#### *Thesis No. 11*

*Development assistance is the legitimate offspring of a Western imperialist father and a Christian missionary mother, and the child carries the code of both.*

Basically, development assistance is a way of ensuring the worldwide reproduction, even survival, of Western culture and structure, by planting the socio-cultural seeds with that particular genetic code everywhere, making use of local poverty or misery for legitimization. When development assistance fails to produce reduction of misery, but leads instead to its reproduction, this is seen as one more reason to continue the development assistance exercise. The 'father' seizes the opportunity to expand, this time economically and culturally rather than merely politically and militarily, and the 'mother' feels good at dispensing so much charity in all directions.

When amelioration fails to show up and further deterioration does, then the recipients are often blamed for poor results. They are simply too 'traditional', their culture is not right, and in addition they are lazy and/or corrupt. All these may be correct observations – assuming it makes sense to judge people of one culture with its development goals by the criteria of another. Westerners have usually no problem with that, producing any number of 'scientific' reports on the development situation in any non-Western part of the world; failing to understand that Western science, atomistic and deductive, is also an ethno-science. But development assistance brings resources to the recipient, setting off competition, even fights, for a slice of the pie; making the winners corrupt and the losers lazy victims of the degradation of their own culture.

#### *Thesis No. 12*

*Development assistance constitutes a highly competitive international market where donor and recipient nations do their bidding, offering and accepting projects under various slogans (pre-investment, infrastructure, transaction costs, community development, participation, import substitution, export substitution, basic needs, for the poorest countries, for the poorest people, for the poorest people in the poorest countries, for women, for the poorest women in the countryside, for the environment, for sustainable development) to increase their share of what is offered and accepted.*

Level of participation in the exercise may matter more than whether the sloganized goal

is achieved. A process of bureaucratization sets in whereby projects are judged in terms of quantity of means rather than quality of ends. This opens for high-level cooperation between the negotiating elites from donor and recipient countries: the donor can increase his share if the recipient accepts, and vice versa.

So there they are, the development agencies, one for each hilltop and valley, sometimes cooperating and 'coordinating', sometimes competing, overbidding each other, making deals with local elites to make the projects 'succeed'. The local elites are very aware of their power in this regard, and of the importance for the agencies of having something to show. Suddenly one of them will sense, often through UN bodies, a new slogan that may open the way for new projects and new money. But then competing agencies will sense the danger and immediately adopt the same slogan, even the same 'decade', to be run by the same people who the year before had the opposite slogan. The exercise is slogan-invariant.

#### *Thesis No. 13*

*Development assistance could take the form of removing the major structural impediment, center-periphery structures, and placing challenging demands with the periphery.*

The poor results from decades of development assistance can in part be traced to the basic lack of understanding of the second grammatical thesis, Thesis No. 5 above. Development assistance is an effort to develop someone else, when the major effort so obviously has to come from the inside. The underlying mechanism is a part of externality theory: who picks up the challenge in connection with a development project? Obviously those who have the power to define the problem and use it as raw material to be processed into solutions – directives for action. By the definition of technical assistance it is those people who will be the foreign experts, not the local ones whose expertise would challenge the whole concept of technical assistance.

But even if 'develop' as a verb is not used as a transitive verb, it may be reflexive. The donor countries, mainly from the Center of the world economic system, can develop themselves and thereby contribute to development in others, through growth with less costs. If one road to material wealth passes through high C/N, then the LDCs will have to engage in processing and not remain content with the semi- or unprocessed products, albeit at high levels of Q/P, assigned to them by the devastating doctrine of 'comparative advantages'. If the MDCs do not change that impediment, the LDCs will do so themselves, as indicated by the *South Commission* (chaired by Julius Nyerere): by means of South–South cooperation. Helpful MDCs would then follow up by placing challenging orders with the LDCs.

#### *Thesis No. 14*

*A necessary condition for development assistance is reciprocity: I help you, you help me; for instance by asking LDCs to become donors of development advice to MDCs.*

The second alternative to the transitive verb, after the reflexive, is the reciprocal. The usual question in this connection is how LDCs can help, being by definition so poor. The answer, poorly understood in the MDCs, lies in non-material help; what the MDCs dispense so willingly – solicited and unsolicited expert advice. The LDCs have long been objects to be studied and evaluated. When this is also done the other way round, a dialogue can emerge between equals over common problems – over children, the aged and the sick, and alienation in general.

Are the MDCs willing to take it? Imagine what this can mean in practice. An Indian delegation arrives in Manhattan to study US patterns of procreation and family planning, firmly convinced that if 5% of the world population consumes disproportionate amounts

of world energy resources and is responsible for disproportionate amounts of world pollution, then what is needed is drastic population reduction. Corresponding reports have been made for the LDCs, by the MDCs. How about the LDCs making them for the MDCs, even for WDC (Washington, DC)?

Another example. Norway sees itself as highly developed and used to take pride in having a true welfare state. One aspect of the welfare state has been welfare for the aged, including old-age homes. From the viewpoint of other cultures taking the old away from their progeny is heinous. An LDC delegation arrives in Norway proposing various alternative measures. Are the Norwegians willing to take any advice? Or the Americans?

#### *Thesis No. 15*

*The best providers of development assistance are probably voluntary people's organizations engaging in people–people rather than expert–expert dialogues, providing assistance closer to basic needs, and being ready to accept reciprocity. Particularly helpful are probably women's voluntary organizations.*

One reason is very simple: people's organizations (by governments dubbed 'non-governmental', as if people exist only as negations of governments; like calling governments 'non-people') may promote own interests in a development assistance setting. But these interests are likely to be innocuous, even positive for the receiver. When governments 'give' aid, national interests as seen by the governments will generally be involved, and these are far from innocuous: trade promotion for national products, political reciprocity in the form of support, even votes in intergovernmental organizations, military rights to bases, joint defense arrangements, etc. All of this will color, even transform, any development content like meeting basic needs for humans and nature alike; even the economic growth aspect.

Added to this comes the difference between governmental experts and the expertise harbored by a voluntary organization. The former are experts on something high up in their own country, and as a consequence the production of this something in an LDC will usually be for export. *The road from expert to export is very short.* By contrast, voluntary organizations can transmit human-level experiences from MDCs to LDCs and back again, even in direct cooperation with LDC volunteers. And they can more easily be faithful to the primacy of basic needs and solidarity with humanity and nature. And to reciprocity.

#### Notes

1. For an excellent introduction to many of these issues and the underlying thinking, see Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: a Guide to Knowledge as Power* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: ZED Books, 1992).

2. Defined here as non-manual white-collar workers, and as self-employed with very few employees. They may come from the working classes of manual workers, in the primary, secondary or tertiary sectors, but aspire to the upper classes of the rich who do not have to work for a living and take on the social values of their class of aspiration rather than origin. Experience from Latin America indicates that when the working classes try to improve their situation, then the middle classes side with the upper classes and with other power elites (political, military, cultural); also in calling on foreign assistance. The same seems to apply to middle-class countries, non-OECD/non-Third World, such as the ex-Socialist countries at the world level.

3. All three policy measures are ways of handling the surplus created by a society. Surplus is generated all over, by the people and by the elites, and may come in from the outside (or leak out to the outside). The problem is who decides how to spend it. When workers are paid a pittance for a full day's work, surplus comes to the top by not making it available at the bottom. When the elites get a massive tax reduction they decide themselves how to spend it (usually not for popular education and health, except for some charity). When money is spent on airports rather than on international highways (Africa being a good example) only elites will benefit.

4. For these concepts, see Part IV, Chapter 1.

5. The history of the largest genocide in world history, the conquest of the Western Hemisphere, cannot be written without this as an additional explanatory factor. See David Stannard, *American Holocaust* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

6. For an exploration of this, see J. Galtung, K. Käufer, & C.O. Scharmer, 'Culture: Mainstream Economics and Occidental Cosmology', in *Economics in a New Key*, forthcoming, ch. 2.6.

7. For an early presentation of this concept, see J. Galtung, T. Heiestad, & E. Rudeng, 'On the Last 2,500 Years in Western History: And Some Remarks on the Coming 500', pp. 318–361 in Peter Burke, ed., *New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume*, vol. 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

8. For a more detailed discussion, see Johan Galtung, 'The Basic Needs Approach', in K. Lederer et al., eds, *Human Needs: a Contribution to the Current Debate* (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschläger, Gunn & Hain, 1980).

9. This is not the same as poverty. Poverty is having little; misery hurts.

10. For one exploration of Buddhism, see Johan Galtung, *Buddhism: a Quest for Unity and Peace* (Colombo: Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha, 1993).

11. Or what we define as non-live. The Mother Gaia hypothesis changes this by seeing the whole planet in a teleological perspective, with renewal as one way of maintaining an equilibrium.

12. To turn this around, at least by asking such questions, is one aspect of deep ecology, founded as an approach and a movement by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss. Nature-centered development might have as point of departure that human beings, the way they behave today, do so much more harm than good that priority should be given to nature and not to human beings, reducing their numbers dramatically. The third approach would lead to hard decisions when human and non-human life compete. For more on deep ecology, see George Sessions, ed., *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century* (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1995).

13. Thus, a basic thesis of the present exploration of 'development' is that mainstream economics is simply inadequate as a tool for development theory and practice.

14. Those who call others true believers, fundamentalists etc. might reflect on their own attachment to the major secular religion in the world today, variously called materialist individualism, individualist materialism, consumerism, or simply the bourgeois way of life. If one criterion of fundamentalism is willingness to kill, then they might qualify, for instance if we assume that one motivation behind the Gulf War was fear of losing control over Middle East oil, 'the jugular vein' (George Bush).

15. This was a basic position taken by highly influential Western macro-historians like Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. See Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, *Macro-history and Macro-historians*, forthcoming.

16. Judaism, the origin of the other two, is singularist but neither universalist nor mono-prophetic.

17. The point is simply this: to obtain economic growth is not necessarily easy, but the difficulties are minor relative to trying to square the circle of having economic growth at nobody's expense. To go for economic growth, not worrying much about the bill and who, if anybody, is going to pick it up, is to choose the path of least resistance.

18. The terms internal proletariat (for the inner working class) and external proletariat (for the outer world, the barbarians, today the Third World) are taken from Toynbee. Exploitation is defined here as overuse of life, and 'life' is then divided into four parts: the Self doing the exploitation, the inner working class, the outer world, Third World, and nature.

19. This is, of course, inspired by Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice*. But let me give a personally experienced example. In 1974 I was an observer in the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Caracas, Venezuela. There were about 150 states and about 150 issues, meaning that the total agenda had a very high level of complexity. Merely to come to grips intellectually with the issues, leaving alone finding solutions, went far above the capacity of most participants or even delegations. So there were many sessions devoted essentially to the reduction of complexity. One day I was invited to a session of secretaries. They had been typing the documents; composed by men, typed by women. One basic problem was the minerals on and below the ocean floor. The men discussed how to 'exploit' them, the secretaries wanted to discuss who should benefit from them. And their answers went in the direction of women and the children suffering in the Third World, in Latin America, in Africa, in South Asia. Compassion. But the men, meaning almost all the delegates, had other perspectives. Their first problem was how one could fit these possible ocean floor resources, such as the famous nodules, seamlessly into the edifice of international law. For that much research would be needed, in other words new institutes, possibly new PhD degrees, at least more people trained in adequate intellectual constructions. In addition there was the problem of how national interests, meaning those of their own rather than other nations, and not human beings in any direct sense, could be served. In other words, verbal and social

hierarchies of law and interest, as mentioned above. Not compassion for the needy.

20. Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, like *Das Kapital* by Karl Marx, is certainly still very much worth reading, whether the interpretation is in terms of the brilliance of the authors, or their relevance, because the world has not changed that much.

# 2

## Six Economic Schools

### 2.1 Defining Schools

Regardless of skepticism where mainstream economics is concerned, there is no denial that the *economy*, the organization of nature–production–consumption cycles, plays a major role in any society. On the other hand, the same can also be said about the *polity*, the organization of power; about *culture*, because culture plays a major role defining what to produce and consume, and how; and the *military*, the organization of coercive power.

The basic thesis of this chapter is that economies around the world are organized with a certain logic, according to economic schools. To explore those schools we need discourses, angles under which the schools can be viewed and their basic characteristics better understood. Here we shall make use of the economic cycle, and the underlying culture.

The *economic cycle* will be seen as inputs, throughputs, outputs, and distribution. We are talking about production of goods and services (bads and disservices). In order to produce, inputs are needed, *factors of production*. A set of five will be used: nature, labor, capital, technology, and management. The production function is  $Pr = Pr(Na, La, Ca, Te, Ma)$ , where  $Pr$  is the output of products. To arrive at products, *relations of production*, or organization, are needed. The word ‘throughput’ is clumsy, but relates inputs to outputs. The *products* then go to *distribution*. They can be used as inputs to new production, for storage, or end consumption, meaning that nothing remains but waste handed back to *nature*. The point of departure and point of arrival, the alpha and omega of the economic cycle, a stock to be replenished through recycling processes, not depleted.

The *culture* is like the soil, providing nutrients for some economic plants/weeds rather than others. We are concerned with some particular choices made in and by culture:<sup>1</sup>

<i>individualism</i>	vs.	<i>collectivism</i>
<i>verticality</i>	vs.	<i>horizontality</i>
<i>monetization</i>	vs.	<i>specificity</i>
<i>processing</i>	vs.	‘ <i>naturality</i> ’
<i>expansion</i>	vs.	<i>stability</i>

‘Individualism’ privileges and highlights the individual; under ‘collectivism’<sup>2</sup> the collectivity, groups, clans, tribes, nations, is privileged and the individual recedes into the background. The net is highlighted, not the knots.

‘Verticality’ is a predisposition for hierarchy, for a clear ordering in high and low; ‘horizontality’ is a predisposition for having things, of whatever kind, at the same level.

‘Monetization’ is putting monetary value on something, anything, everything; thereby generalizing and abstracting. The opposite of monetization is specificity, keeping the singular and concrete character of something, anything, everything.

‘Processing’ is to do something to the ‘natural’, imprinting the natural with form, or

culture. This concept would include pedagogy or education in general, imprinting the human brain with information. The opposite would be the state of nature, here referred to as 'naturality'. The French terms *le cru* and *le cuit* cover the same dimension, from pure nature to pure culture.

'Expansion' is a predisposition for augmenting everything. The opposite is 'stability'; contraction being unthinkable.

At the end we shall add *nature*. Its negation is nothingness.

Let us now use this to say something about the economic system that can be used as a point of reference for discussing all of them: Smithian economics, named after Adam Smith. As with any economy the concern is with how to turn inputs into outputs and then distribute them. The hypothesis would be that the cultural profile of Smithian economics is *individualism–verticality–monetization–processing–expansion*. The term 'capitalism' captures only monetization, so 'Smithism' is preferred.<sup>3</sup> Smith's intellectual agenda was clearly inspired by an effort to be positivist/scientific in the tradition of Galileo and Newton, Macchiavelli, Vico, Hobbes, peeling off layers of sentimentality and moralism, coming down to 'the natural'.<sup>4</sup>

An inquiry into the *nature* of man, seen basically as steered by self-interest, but tempered by moral sentiments.<sup>5</sup>

An inquiry into the *natural* economic system where everybody acts according to self-interest.

*An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*,<sup>6</sup> based on practicing the natural economic system.

*The Invisible Hand*: 'By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it' (this follows from the three).

Given this, the cultural/structural components of Smith's intellectual construction follow. Thus, there has to be:

- A1: *Individualism*, as only individuals can act in their own self-interest. The firm and the country are then seen as macro-individuals, which predisposes for a single person at the top of both. The country is a set of individuals, the world a set of countries. The perspective is actor-, not structure-oriented.<sup>7</sup>
- A2: *Private property* presupposes a division of the world into two sets: free actors and private property, with a one-one ownership relation between free actors and private properties.
- A3: *Freedom* in the limited economic sense becomes the right to have private property, and to use private property to make more private property. The basic role of the state follows from this: police for protection of the property of individuals and firms; military for protection (and expansion) of the property of societies; adjudication for disputes among actors.
- A4: *Market* for free actors to articulate buyer demand and seller supply; for willing buyers and sellers, including producers and consumers, to meet and make deals.
- B1: *Division of labor* at individual and societal levels, with different tasks for different individuals and societies.
- B2: *Differential rewards*, to reward skill and risk-taking.
- B3: *Competition*, for better market deals as buyers or sellers, be they individuals (households), firms or countries.
- C: *Monetization*, of everything in a production function, factors as well as products: prices for products, rent for land (nature); wages for labor; interest for liquid capital; returns for fixed capital; sales value for patents and overall ownership.

- D: *Processing* (manufacturing), imprinting culture and information on raw nature and raw human beings.
- E: *Expansion* (growth) of which there are several types:

- in quality, at least as increasing variety, choice of products;
- in quantity, increasing volumes of products;
- in domain, with economic cycles spanning larger territories;
- in scope, with increasing differentiation of inputs and outputs.


The components are listed as 'syndromes', A, B, C, D, E.

The A-syndrome of individualism assumes the individual to be the fundamental actor, not only endowed with self-interests, but capable of acting accordingly. Two other actors, the firm and the country (society, state) are seen in an anthropomorphic perspective. The image is weak-on structural relations except for the market relations of deals between buyers and sellers. A condition for market behavior is property; in the ideal world according to this image, all individuals own something, and all somethings are owned. Collective ownership does not exist, *res communis* = *res nullius* (what belongs to everybody belongs to nobody: Roman Law). The right to own and to use property to make more is basic, and is here referred to as freedom.

In the B-syndrome of verticality the point of departure is division of labor which makes rank of the position ('job') the successor of rank by status ('birth'). Differential reward is one major mechanism behind the ranking or verticality, justified by differential risk-taking. Competitive market behavior, then, opens for the possibility of mobility – upward, and downward.

In the C-, D-, E-syndromes money, processing, and expansion enter, closely related to each other. The result is monetized economic cycles with high levels of processing of inputs (a chip manufacturer, a university), to be repeated, and to be expanded. Ideally, supply meets demand, the prices paid meet the wages to be paid. The goal is to make the cycle at least self-sustaining.

Figure 2.1 *Monetized Economic Cycles*



## 2.2 The Blue School: Market and Capital

Smithism is the basis for the Mother of Schools, the Blue School.<sup>8</sup> There were predecessors (mercantilists, physiocrats, medieval economics, the Roman Empire, pre-historic, non-Western). But for the past 200 years this school, still dominant, served as an anchoring point for theory and practice (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 *The Blue School: Market and Capital*

	Factors of production	Relations of production	Products	Distribution
Individualism	Private ownership of: Nature Labor Capital Technology Management	Private ownership (or control)	Products for individual or household consumption	Market mechanisms Supply for demand Buyer meets seller: deal
Verticality	Owner decides use of factors and surplus Factor mobility Center/Periphery exploitation Future generations exploitation	Owner decides use of people, work conditions Challenge-monopoly Terms of exchange exploitation Competition Division of labor	Owner decides what products and how much Products stratified in quality and price Maximize quality over price (Q/P)	Consumer manipulation in marketing One-way communication Challenge-monopoly Terms of trade exploitation Competition
Monetization	All factors monetized	Productivity output:input	All products monetized	Rational decision-making
Processing	Maximize culture over nature (C/N)	Process problems to higher levels	Always more complicated products	Always more complicated markets
Expansion	Factors from further away Factor equilibration No stop sign	Expanding organizations Increasing differentiation No stop sign	Increasing volume Increasing variety No stop sign	World market products and factors Market share No stop sign
Nature	General depletion	Human depletion, pollution	Industrial pollution	Household pollution

In this scheme the logic of the Blue (Smithian, capitalist) system rests on 24 feet (with several toes for most). Horizontal readings are better for a total understanding of the system; vertical readings better for more limited economic understanding. The 'individualism' expresses itself as ownership because of the underlying assumption of *dominio* from Roman law. Both factors and relations of production can be owned, controlled.<sup>9</sup> That ownership applies to all factors. Slavery – the ownership of human labor and marketing (at a factor market) of slaves – is entirely within the logic of the Blue school. Abolition is an anomaly, and was, indeed, very strongly resisted. Anti-slavery campaigns can also be explained in terms of Blue logic by looking further down the column of factors for another key variable: factor (including labor) mobility. With a labor rather than slave market there is the additional advantage that workers themselves often

pay the costs of moving from one production site to the other. And African labor could also be used *in situ* – meaning on plantations in Africa with less mobile factor markets.

‘Individualism’ also appears in the products designed for individual consumption, seen, for instance, in the ratio between cars and buses produced. And then there is the market, the highly competitive, non-lethal, economic battlefield where individuals and macro-individuals (firms, countries) can display their mettle. Sellers struggle for the best sale and buyers for the best buy, in competitive relations. Sellers meet buyers, negotiate, and when they have become ‘willing’ sellers and ‘willing’ buyers they clinch the deal – in this logic like an act of love, events of beauty illuminating the universe.

‘Verticality’ is above all the enactment of the prerogatives of the owner under private ownership (or control). Owners can have control of factors (including the capital they generate themselves, the surplus); of the working conditions inside the organization; of the quality and quantity of the products, including stratifying them for a stratified society; and of the marketing, deciding or at least influencing consumer tastes through a very interesting feature of the Blue school: one-way advertising in the media (including posters and labels) with little or no chance of contradicting or questioning.<sup>10</sup>

One consequence of this arrangement is that owners (in the broad sense), and particularly first or early generation owners, the *entrepreneurs*, assume the role as problem-solvers to the extent that they obtain a *de facto* challenge monopoly.

Problems enter the system; the solution is clouded in uncertainty. A decision removes that uncertainty, decreasing the entropy. But that act requires an input of energy, taken from the problem-solver. In return, he gets an inner spinoff, training in problem-solving, ‘experience’.

Another aspect of the verticality is exploitation or inequity. Four types are mentioned: unequal exchange between a center where the factors are processed and a periphery where they are fetched; unequal exchange between those who define and solve problems (challenges) and those who work according to SOPs (‘standard operating procedures’);<sup>11</sup> unequal exchange in trade, which may coincide with the first type, and unequal exchange between generations depriving the latter of factors. Center and Periphery emerge as two aspects of the Blue system.<sup>12</sup>

‘Monetization’ is more than prices on factors and products. The implication that everything priced is up for sale,<sup>13</sup> on the market, makes everything comparable – so that everything can be traded for everything, including ‘traded off’ for everything. If rationality is defined as acting according to self-interest, maximizing net gains across a range of market activity and over time, then monetization makes that possible. At the same time the variable, price, is quantitative, facilitating construction of mathematical edifices that mirror the logic of the school.<sup>14</sup>

‘Processing’, imprinting Culture, C, on Nature, N, and increasing C/N, has implications all over. The organization, the firm, has to mirror higher processing by having increasing numbers of increasingly processed people inside, meaning R&D specialists. Products have to become increasingly sophisticated. Moreover, the market has to reflect the trend with increasingly complex transactions of increasingly complex products, meaning increasing transaction costs,<sup>15</sup> meaning squeezing out the lesser and more peripheral actors (individuals, firms, countries).<sup>16</sup>

‘Expansion’ shows up in all four fields: increasing variety and volume of products and transactions, economic cycles spanning ever-larger territories (soon to become extra-terrestrial), and with ever-expanding and increasingly differentiated economic organizations. One mechanism is factor mobility and then factor equilibration upwards to arrive at a balanced mix of inputs; no excesses, no deficits.<sup>17</sup> Expansion, with no built-in stop sign.

Finally, ‘Nature’, including humans when exposed to boring, degrading, dirty, dangerous work. The great loser, depleted and polluted in an economic process that has become a goal in itself.

About the Blue school and system libraries have been written. The ability to market an incredible volume of an equally incredible variety of products all over is clear, and a rather major achievement. But there are also well-known problems, as indicated in the simple logic of Table 2.1.

The system works as long as it works, meaning that products supplied to the market generate enough demand to pay for the factors, thereby keeping the cycle growing, or at least going. Whether because factor prices are too high or product prices too low, there is a limit to how much deficit an individual, a firm or a country can accumulate, unless they can draw on sufficient subventions from the outside to weather a crisis. In the Blue system, that type of assistance is based on credit-worthiness in the finance economy. In the Red system, the real economy has the whole state to fall back upon, and in the Yellow system in Japan, individuals or firms may draw on the resources of interconnecting webs of state and capital. There are similar life-prolonging institutions in the world for countries accumulating deficits.

Overproduction is a special and deeper case affecting all, or many, firms producing in a branch of the economy – or, more seriously, all or many firms regardless of branch in a country. There is excess production capacity, or underconsumption, meaning effective demand, including for storage. Excess products are then returned to nature directly through destruction instead of via consumers. Excess production capacity has to be eliminated. Not only the firm but the branch has been outcompeted; not only the branch but the whole country. What follows is massive contraction, even deterioration, of the economic system.

### 2.3 The Red School: State and Power

This crisis of the Blue system is the point of departure for the Red School.<sup>18</sup> Whereas the Blue system is based on Smithism, the Red system is not based on Marxism, which is essentially a brilliant analysis and critique of the Blue school. The attraction of Smithism lies with its constructive genius, absent in Marxism. The Red, socialist school developed by improvisation, challenging Blue assumptions on crucial points (Table 2.2).

The Red system can be defined as a *weak negation* of the Blue. Both are based on *alpha* structures,<sup>19</sup> vast, peaked hierarchies, run by big corporations, many of them transnational for Blue, and vast bureaucracies, a few of them international, for Red. In both, very few people make decisions affecting very many. But in Blue there is feedback: people have choices in the market, and the choices reveal preferences. To survive in Blue, popular preferences either have to be manipulated or followed; in either case they have to be taken into account. In the best-known Red system, the failed socialist system in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, state power was so absolute that the leaders were not forced to take popular preferences into account. They could offer a supply on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. However, our thinking about Red should not be tied to the history of Russia/Soviet Union/Eastern Europe from 1917, 1922 or 1945–48 till the end of 1989. The category is much broader.<sup>20</sup>

Since so much in Red is similar to Blue let us focus on the major negations.

1 *State ownership*, at least in the sense of control, of the whole cycle – meaning nature (resources), labor (controlled through employment and residence permits), capital (except for capital for household consumption), technology and management; in addition to that the concrete facilities for production (except for the collectively owned, but state supervised) and the distribution mechanisms (communication, transportation). This massive ownership does not mean that all was owned by the same agency: the multiplication of ministries under Soviet socialism was an effort to parallel the branches of a Blue economy.

Table 2.2 *The Red School: State and Power*

	Factors of production	Relations of production	Products	Distribution
Individualism	Public, state ownership of factors	Public, state ownership Full employment	Products for collective consumption	Planned economy Supply for needs, only then demand
Verticality	State decision-making over factor use, and surplus	State decision-making over people, work conditions	State decision-making over products and how much	Planned products to meet assumed needs
	Factor mobility	Challenge-monopoly	Products uniform in quality and price	One way communication
	Center/Periphery exploitation	Terms of exchange exploitation	Fulfilling plan	No marketing
	Future generations exploitation	Power struggle	Try	No competition
Monetization	Factors not monetized; not for sale	Productivity of labor not essential	Products priced to meet needs	Plan rationality
	Try C/N increases	Try higher level problems	Try higher level products	Try higher level plans
Expansion	Continue production <i>No stop sign</i>	Expanding organizations <i>No stop sign</i>	Increasing volume <i>No stop sign</i>	National market focus <i>No stop sign</i>
Nature	General depletion	Human depletion/pollution	Industrial pollution	Household pollution

2 *Planned economy*, planning production, distribution, and consumption, there being no official alternative for consumers. Like the God of religion, this secular God was *omnipresent* (the party); *omniscient* ('scientific socialism'), *omnipotent* (the powers of the state, *l'état gendarme*, in ex-Soviet Union the KGB and the Army), and *benevolent* (*l'état providence* covers the idea perfectly). Certainly one-way communication of propaganda.

3 *First priority: production for basic needs*. There should be a *floor* level in basic-needs fulfillment, with some efforts to establish a *ceiling* (number of houses, for instance). The Red production profile should be higher on food, clothing and housing, facilities for health and education; and offer more products for collective consumption (the car:bus ratio again; or private house:apartment construction). Like profit for the Blue economy, *plan fulfillment* easily becomes an end in itself.

4 *Full employment* as an end in itself. Although high labor productivity is a desirable goal of the Red economy,<sup>21</sup> it is not a basis for dismissing workers since full employment, meaning that everybody has a job even if work performance is perfunctory, is an even higher goal.<sup>22</sup> Many workers interpret the Red system as being soft on workers, demanding little work.

5 *Limited monetization*. The state controls the production in the Red system. Factors

are not for sale. Workers cannot sell their labor power to whomever they want, nor can land be sold. A manager has a fixed salary. Basic needs products are inexpensive, although scarcity may make for long waiting lines. Low level monetization limits the finance economy, making it a biased and diminished monetary image of the real economy.<sup>23</sup>

All these five are efforts to negate the Blue system. But the sharp division of labor between those in command and those commanded is even more pronounced, inviting power struggle. The Blue system can decentralize initiative and control. Businesses can grow many places, they may be squeezed out or remain small, but some experience is gained. Up to some point originality and innovation are rewarded. In the Red system the country's economy is one company, too big for complete information, too connected for real change. And rulers on top are unlikely to take risks.<sup>24</sup>

The Red rulers have even more of a challenge monopoly than in the Blue system. And the workers cannot use trade unions to improve their terms of exchange (between work and working conditions, including wages) if the trade unions are run by the same state that dictates working conditions. Any new economic activity anywhere in a system of that kind is not a new center but at most a sub-center, receiving its directives from above.

With no competition it is difficult to mobilize sufficient motivation to increase Q/P or C/N. Q/P may be very high because of subsidized prices. But with no or little consumer choice and producer competition, the best way of getting new ideas is to look at (or spy at) other economies – in fact, an admission that the system is incapable of generating its own dynamism.

For the Red system the sentence it 'works as long as it works' does not apply. The system is doomed from the very beginning, for reasons to be made more clear in the next chapter. As indicated in the bottom lines of Table 2.2: the system self-destructs by expanding at a low level of consumer satisfaction, with no stop signs, depleting and polluting all over.<sup>25</sup>

## 2.4 The Green School: Civil Society and Dialogue

If the Red school is a weak negation of the Blue, the Green school is a strong negation. Based on local economic cycles and Civil Society,<sup>26</sup> the system has neither national markets nor national plans, and not transnational or international versions either. The basic idea is local self-reliance, even self-sufficiency, meaning local consumption of what is produced and local production of what is consumed. The logic is in Table 2.3. Clearly, the Green system is based on *beta* structures: small, more horizontal, keeping people together, not segmented in small tasks, or fragmented in different roles. Instead, there is job integration, job rotation, and job reconstruction.<sup>27</sup> Concretely, this means small economic organizations – say, no more than 30 persons – so that everybody can be relevant to everybody, and hierarchies do not arise. This also opens the possibility of expanding households, from the four-person nuclear family of today to the extended family, or to the 'commune' with which many in the West have had recent experiences. In the latter a-, hetero-, homo- and bi-sexual relations might well coexist.

Commune-ism should not be confused with communism. The basic goal of the Green economy is not material economic growth, whether achieved by Blue or Red methods, but *nature development* (enhancing nature, not only keeping nature sustainable), *human development*, which means not only somatic health but also mental and spiritual development; *social development*, which would point to societies compatible with nature and human development; and *world development*, which means a world setting where diverse societies can interact symbiotically and enhance each other.<sup>28</sup> This is a tall order, but typical of Green thinking, with Gandhi's *sarvodaya* villages and 'oceanic circles' as models.<sup>29</sup>

Table 2.3 *The Green School: Civil Society and Dialogue*

	Factors of production	Relations of production	Products	Distribution
Collectivism	Collective ownership of factors	Private or cooperative ownership	Individual, collective products	Local market Local plan Exchange
Horizontality	Collective decision-making over factors and surplus Limited factor mobility Everywhere is a center Synchronic diachronic solidarity	Collective decision-making over people, work conditions Challenge-sharing Equity main norm Job rotation Job reconstruction	Collective decision-making over products and how much Products diverse in quality and price Maximize Q/P	First priority for needs Second for demand Third for exchange Dialogue about all aspects Self-reliance
Specificity	Factors not monetized; not for sale	Productivity not a major concern	Basic needs guaranteed; market for the rest	Human and nature needs rationality
Processing	Increase C/N if useful	Appropriate technology	Spiritual development	Spiritual development
Stability	Production for needs, not for greed <i>Stop sign</i>	Organization human scale <i>Stop sign</i>	Production for replacement <i>Stop sign</i>	Local plan and market focus <i>Stop sign</i>
Nature	Mainly renewable factors	Human development	Only recyclable waste	—

Production for profit or plan fulfillment are not goals in themselves. The typical production unit would be a self-managed cooperative with dialogue and co-decision of everyone involved, including customers. Although production is basically for use, not exchange, relations to trade partners would be cooperative. And harmonious relations with nature would be a *sine qua non*.

The most fundamental aspect of the Green School can now be mentioned and explored: there are four stop signs – these were missing both in the Blue and Red schools;<sup>30</sup> at the same time, these indicate promises and limitations, or at least problems, of the Green school.

1 *Production for needs, not for greed.* Of course, there is a zone between basic needs satisfaction and greed; the question is where greed starts. The last twenty years have not clarified this issue except as general admonitions, probably in vain, for the rich and super-rich to change their lifestyle.

2 *Organizations of human scale.* The idea is to change all organizations, not only the economic ones, so that people feel comfortable and at home in them. This implies a

maximum size, and possibly also a minimum size as people work also to meet other people, getting out of the narrowness of the family and small villages. This does not mean reduction of production volume, as smaller organizations may also be much more productive.

3 *Production for replacement*. This is a clear norm against simply continuing with thoughtless expansionism. What happens if replacement of products is already too much, like replacement of the human population? In other words, there has to be much dialogue about the level that should be replaced.

4 *Local market as primary focus*. Any local market is limited. If the first priority is to meet local demands, not aiming for national and world markets, but trying to turn the trend from local to world economies, then production would be limited.

5 *The carrying capacity of the planet*. The Green school as such has asked the question, the Blue and Pink schools are now doing the same. As a result, a world dialogue is today evolving.

## 2.5 The Pink School: Blue, Red, and Green

The reader is now invited to place the three schemes in Tables 2.1–3 on top of each other, trying to derive from that an economic theory and an economic practice. That exercise will not be carried out here. Obviously, we are talking about the social democratic economies of the high North of the Americas and Europe – Canada and the Nordic countries.<sup>31</sup> The economic practice can certainly be described, as it has often been, as a mixed economy or a negotiation economy, the former term pointing to its eclectic nature, the latter to a major mechanism: elite dialogues between the private (market) and public (state) sectors.

But in that short formula, what is missing is the Green element of small scale, cooperatives, human equality, respect for nature and also a certain (non-specified) spiritual development. That Green element has probably survived partly because these countries are far away from the major arenas of economic, political, military, and cultural action, and partly because they are small societies compared to such Blue/Red giants as the USA and the former Soviet Union. The Pink economy is here seen as being located at the intersection of all three. It is mixed – but is it also mixed-up, too contradictory? On the other hand: what does not work in theory may work in practice.

The formula Pink = Light Blue + Light Red + Light Green might be useful.<sup>32</sup> A basic idea is to avoid the extremes: of all actors craving for capital and things, of states exercising power to discipline people, and of withdrawal into isolated and static communes. The three schools can be used by Pink to modify each other, playing on the diversity, seeking to build symbiosis.

## 2.6 The Yellow School: Blue and Red

What we have in mind here is the economic system currently attracting most attention in the world: the economic practice<sup>33</sup> of Japan and other countries in East Asia, China, and the mini-Japans/Chinas: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.<sup>34</sup> The reader is now invited to a simpler exercise: putting Blue and Red, Tables 2.1 and 2.2, on top of each other.

The Yellow School differs from the Pink in not having the Green element of localism and small scale as a modifying factor. Two alpha structures are combined, Market and State, Capital and Power.<sup>35</sup> What is very strong is the sum of these two, working in harmony, not only unimpeded by the Green but unimpeded by each other. In one simple formula that is the secret of the phenomenal growth of Japan yesterday, China today and tomorrow, the others all the time, more or less.<sup>36</sup>

How can Blue and Red work together if each is the negation of the other? Only if the

culture permits contradictions,<sup>37</sup> not only in theory but also in practice, demands hard work<sup>38</sup> and dedication,<sup>39</sup> and the structure produces elites capable of cooperation.<sup>40</sup> The state can then plan optimal conditions for the market to function, with incentives here and disincentives there, using capital as power – not the vulgar force of Red as still practiced in the Chinese version of Yellow. Plan for need, and market for greed – these do not exclude each other.

But nor do the more negative aspects listed under ‘verticality’, ‘expansion’, and ‘nature’. One theory might be that if the positive forces add up, so do the negative. This, however, will be developed further in the next chapter.


## 2.7 The Eclectic School: Green, Pink, and Yellow

The intellectual strategy of this chapter should be clear: Blue, Red, and Green are the building blocks. All three have a certain purity and theoretical coherence, and that is exactly what makes them problematic. They are vulnerable. The world market collapses – and an export-import dependent Blue economy is helpless, with no strong state or self-reliant local level to fall back upon. That state, in a Red economy, suffers the inevitable: popular support, or discipline, collapses and there is no mature market or local economy to fall back upon. The Pink school sees this and derives strength from combining all three; if one fails, there are always the other two. The Yellow school also ‘walks on two legs’, to use the Chinese formulation. Both are vulnerable, but they are hardly likely to collapse together.

The Eclectic, or ‘Rainbow’, school indicated here and developed more fully in Chapter 4 below goes one step further, combining Green, Pink, and Yellow. With more and highly diverse components in symbiotic interaction, the economy should become more resilient. If the most vulnerable systems are Blue and Red, then they should not be used directly – only indirectly through other combinations, as building blocks. Never Market, State or Local alone; combine them for resilience and for synergy. This is the famous ‘more than the sum of the parts’.

Blue is represented by the USA; Red by the former Soviet Union; Green by parts of the Third World, most of human history and in this century by ideologies/experiments gradually taking shape; Pink by Nordic and EU countries (not UK), and Yellow by East Asia. But Eclectic has no clear representative – a challenge indeed!

### Appendix: The Six Schools: a Diagram



The Eclectic, pantheistic/polytheistic, school includes the main diagonal of the diagram – Green–Pink–Yellow. The Blue and the Red, trusting in one god only (market or plan), are too vulnerable alone; this also applies to the pantheist Green. The concrete geographical references are only indicative and should not be taken too literally. Any concrete economy will always have some elements of the non-dominant colors, like Red for the US military sector and Blue, Red, or Pink in the center of Third World economies. An overview:

	<i>Blue</i>	<i>Red</i>	<i>Green</i>	<i>Pink</i>	<i>Yellow</i>	<i>Eclectic</i>
Individualism/collectivism	Individu-alism	Indivi-dualism	Collecti-vism	Both/and	Collecti-vism	Both/and
Verticality/horizontality	Verticality	Verticality	Horizontal-ity	Both/and	Verticality	Both/and
Monetization/specificity	Monetiza-tion	Monetiza-tion	Specificity	Monetiza-tion	Monetiza-tion	Both/and
Processing/naturality	Processing	Processing	Much less	Processing	Processing	Less
Expansion/stability	Expand No stop	Expand No stop	Stop signs	Expand No stop	Expand No stop	Some stop
Nature	Master	Master	Partner	Both	Master	Both

## Notes

1. Many other variables could be used. But these variables can be used directly to describe basic patterns in economic systems. They can be read vertically as descriptions of ‘modern’ (in the usual sense of ‘Western’) versus, not so much ‘traditional’, as ‘primitive’ social formations, such as nomadic tribes. There is some similarity to Talcott Parsons’ pattern variables (*The Social System*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1951), also five in number. But they did not capture verticality/horizontality or expansion/stability.

2. Not to be confused with ‘nationalization’ or ‘collectivization of means of production’ as a way of organizing the economy or parts of the economy. ‘Collectivism’ as conceived of here is a much deeper trait embedded in the culture. A problem of the former Socialist countries was that they collectivized parts of the economy within an individualizing culture (in Russia, the Brothers Karamazov can still be found, and they are hardly ideal for state-run farms or factories). A problem for many indigenous peoples is the opposite pattern: individuation of parts of the economy when the culture is deeply collectivist.

3. In analogy with Marxism, honoring the author, not tying him down to one aspect of a rich body of thought only.

4. See Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), particularly Part I.

5. The title of Adam Smith’s famous book was *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, first edition London 1759.

6. The title of Adam Smith’s best-known book, first edition London 1776.

7. See Johan Galtung, ‘Two Perspectives on Society’, pp. 41–61 in *The True Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

8. The colors chosen to name the economic schools are taken from European politics: ‘Blue’ for conservative, ‘Red’ for communist, ‘Green’ for green. ‘Pink’ or ‘Rose’ is often used about social democrats, with less connotation of blood and revolution. ‘Yellow’ for the Japanese system is not intended to be racist but, perhaps, to invoke the idea of ‘yellow peril’ in the sense of ‘yellow challenge’. ‘Golden’ might be more descriptive of reality, but breaks the color scheme. As the constituents of the Yellow school are the Blue and the Red, another term might be ‘Purple’, darker, less diluted, than Rose or Pink.

9. These terms come very close to the Marxist terms 'means' and 'modes' of production. The fundamental Marxist thesis about a possible contradiction between evolving means of production and more rigid modes of production can be applied to the first two columns of Table 2.1, but that is not our focus here. Moreover, Marxist theory tends to focus on means as independent and modes as dependent variables, which limits considerably the fruitfulness of that paradigm of *rupture* (when one variable is rigid and one is dynamic). In Marxist thought, technology becomes the engine dragging the social organization. How about strong social forces for some new social organization, carrying in its wake new technologies compatible with that organization?

10. Historically this pattern must have a predecessor. If Market is one of the secular successors to God (another being the State, with the Emperor/King, the *rex gratia dei*, in between) then one might assume that the new priests, the entrepreneurs, will have habits and operate within structures similar to the old priests. In church, one-way communication is still the rule, even in democracies that in principle should be settings for dialogue.

11. The idea that differential remuneration in an organization – meaning in practice a firm, with farms and shops as special cases – is due to differential risk-taking borders on the absurd. Who takes more risks today: the worker who can be summarily declared redundant and dismissed, or an entrepreneur who may go bankrupt but is protected against the claims of the creditors by 'limited liability', '*begrenzter Haftung*'? The thesis here is that differential remuneration is more related to differential problem-solving: those on top not only get the benefits from problem-solving but also are better paid.

12. It may be argued that they are so different that we are actually dealing with two Blue systems, not one. However, the thesis is that the Blue system invariably will produce a Center and a Periphery. Just as the two sides of a coin do not make two coins, the two aspects of the Blue system do not make two systems. Talk about introduction of the 'free market system' in the ex-socialist or Third World countries when in reality only the periphery aspect of the Blue system is being introduced is essentially propaganda.

13. Labor has a price as slave labor, serf labor, or wagelabor. And capital has a price when made mobile in time (interest) or space (commissions, particularly across currency borders).

14. Which should not be confused with mirroring economic reality. If we assume reality to be filled with contradictions, then the question arises whether contradictory reality (the economy) can be adequately mirrored by a non-contradictory language such as mathematics. See Johan Galtung, 'Contradictory Reality and Mathematics: a contradiction', pp. 162–175 in *Methodology and Development* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988). At a less philosophical level, what happened was that the economists defined variables and formulated questions in such a way that calculus and linear algebra could be applied directly. The six or seven spaces in these pages are too fuzzy to be treated with such demanding mathematical tools.

15. See R. H. Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost', *Journal of Law and Economics*, no. 3, 1960, pp. 1–44.

16. There is an implicit four-variable model here, with increasing processing of factors, organizations, products, and markets, assuming no variable to be the driving, independent variable. Thus, more sophisticated engineers will demand the right to research, design, and develop more sophisticated products; the market makes more sophisticated marketing possible, demanding more sophisticated salespeople, etc. And so we get causal arrows in all six possible directions, a web of variables spiraling itself upwards in sophistication or downwards in simplification. An example: why was the Volkswagen 'Beetle', the *Käfer*, suddenly discontinued? Because the engineers demanded new, challenging tasks (private communication from one of them).

17. To a given quantity of some factor(s) corresponds a certain quantity of other factors to obtain equilibrium for production. Theoretically one might equilibrate downwards, getting rid of any factor in excess. When that factor is labor the word for excess is 'redundance' and the result is unemployment. Nature, capital, technology, and management are not destroyed; interestingly, and scarcely by chance, labor is the factor used to balance the accounts downwards in case of disequilibrium. But the general tendency would be to equilibrate upwards, expansion being a sign of success.

18. More recently the crisis has been more evident in the Red school, and there has been a turn toward the Blue school. But the Blue school did not develop for that reason, it was already there. As the Romanian political scientist Silviu Brucan points out, 'from underdeveloped capitalism to underdeveloped socialism and back again', in his book *The Wasted Generation: Memoirs of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). The term 'socialism' covers the essence of this school as poorly as 'capitalism' does for the Blue school. The term points to efforts to turn individualism as an ethos into collectivism. But these schools are highly complex and quite coherent, so let us rather use simple labels in terms of (political) colors.

19. See Johan Galtung, 'Sobre alfa y beta y sus muchas combinaciones' pp. 19–95 in Eleonora

Masini & Johan Galtung, eds, *Visiones de sociedades deseables* (Mexico: CESTEEM, 1979). Both are structures of interaction. Alpha is the pyramid structure, more vertical, often very large, and Beta is the wheel structure, more horizontal, smaller, dense with everybody interacting with everybody, often in many ways. In the case of Red all these alpha hierarchies, the ministries, the *kombinat* were then parts of a super-alpha hierarchy, the *gosplan*, the state planning agency, and ultimately the party. At the formal level there is nothing quite corresponding to this in the capitalist world; capitalism is organized more like Protestantism (as one would expect, following Weber), socialism in the sense of the Red school more like the Orthodox Church, more single-peaked (as one should also expect).

20. Both classical Egypt and China had state-run economies with giant public works at the center of the economy; in addition there are Red components in the Pink social democrat school. Also, given current trends after the Blue takeover of Red economies in the former socialist countries, there may be a backlash; one possibility being state-run economies, but fascist this time.

21. But this was not expected from everybody. A labor aristocracy arose under socialism, the *Stakhanov* movement of super-workers, faked or not, based on very hard work rather than on superior technology, as for Lenin's well-paid labor aristocracy under capitalism.

22. A useful question to ask of managers in any economy, Blue, Red or any color, is 'how was last year', to get information, and also to get to know their criteria. Typical and frequent Red statement: 'last year was good; we were able to double the number of employees'. Blue managers will invariably refer to sales volumes, turn-over, balance, market share; and if they mention workers it will be more in the sense of labor productivity. This could lead to pride at having been able to reduce the number of workers, 'we were able to halve the number of employees'.

23. The assumption is not that an overblown, oversized finance economy image of the real economy is better. The two should ideally reflect each other, and expand and contract in synchrony.

24. One ruler alone may be willing though, being accountable to nobody but his God, and he probably assumes God to be on his side. With the type of collective leadership that by and large has characterized the Red economies, we know they may only be accountable to each other, but that means running risks. One wrong step and you are out, exactly because the leadership is collective: get rid of him before people start doubting the whole leadership or, still worse, the whole system (which ultimately they did). In the Blue system, with more individualized and decentralized leadership, the wrong step may, with more justification, be attributed to the wrong CEO, or bad luck.

25. Thus, according to some estimates heard at the time (in Moscow) life expectancy around Moscow decreased ten years during the 1970s and 1980s due to environmental degradation.

26. Modern society is then seen as having three components: Capital, State, and then people with all their associations and organizations, constituting Civil Society. In the social sciences these are explored in a fragmented way by economics, political science and sociology/anthropology respectively, this division impeding a holistic view of society.

27. A person can hold many jobs and integrate them more or less successfully, blending them, even with his/her own personality. There is also the possibility of rotating between different jobs, canceling over time the differences between challenge and routine, high and low status, high and low remuneration, etc. And jobs can be reconstructed, like combining sales and accounting functions, or (well known to university professors): teaching, research, and administration (a professor of medicine or engineering would add practice to this list).

28. This multiple approach is reflected in the slogans of the various Green parties: ecological balance, human rights, emancipation and participation, peace and nonviolence.

29. See Romesh Diwan & Mark Lutz, eds, *Essays in Gandhian Economics* (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1985); and Amritananda Das, *Foundations of Gandhian Economics* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1979).

30. More precisely, the Blue system continues as long as the cycles are self-reproducing, self-sustaining. When they are not there is a crisis, and some effort to find new ways of making them self-reproducing at higher levels of expansion (for instance by equilibrating the factor profiles upward.) The result is non-stop. Not even bankruptcy for companies or countries is taken as a stop signal; rather, their economic lives are prolonged, often artificially. A Red system idea like 'catching up and overtaking' builds the non-stop of Blue into Red. Easy access to credit from the same employer, the state, is another mechanism.

31. Actually, most of the fifteen countries of the European Union (1 January 1995), or, indeed, the whole European Economic Area, with the exception of (post-)Thatcherite UK, from the North Cape to Gibraltar can be said to belong in this category. But the Nordic countries satisfy some conditions that no doubt are relevant: they are small, homogeneous in race and nation and relatively egalitarian (partly as a cause, partly as an effect of the welfare state). Solidarity is not eroded by too steep gradients inside society, as seems to be the case in the USA.

32. Except as real colors: it turns out more like muddy brown. The metaphor breaks down. On the other hand, few systems have so consistently stood up against fascism as social democracy.

33. The Japanese may be better as practitioners than as theoreticians. In economics two important names are Kaname Akamatsu and Saburo Okita. See, for instance, Saburo Okita, 'Japan, China and the United States: Economic Relations and Prospects', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 57, no. 5, Summer 1979, pp. 1090-1110, with reference to Akamatsu (p. 1102).

34. Of course, Singapore is not in East Asia, but the Chinese majority is. North Korea could also have been mentioned, and Viêt Nam. Together these four – united Japan (with the South Kurile islands), united Korea, united China (with Hong Kong and Taiwan one way or the other) and (already united) Viêt Nam – all of them Mahayana Buddhist and Confucian countries, may one day become the world's clearly dominant common market.

35. A *gosplan* (the state planning commission in ex-Soviet Union) functionary, commenting in January 1968 on his study of the Japanese economy: 'Und diese verdammten Japanischen Kapitalisten machen den Sozialismus besser als bei uns!' A US economist could answer: 'And those damned Japanese socialists are better at capitalism than we are!'

36. For one effort at analyzing the Japanese approach, see Johan Galtung, 'Japanese Industrialization Model', pp. 25-41 in Sung-Jo Park, ed., *The 21st Century – the Asian Century?* (Berlin: Express Edition, 1985).

37. This is found in the Daoist and Buddhist elements in the cultures, very different from Aristotelian/Cartesian logic.

38. This is covered by the Confucian aspect of East Asian culture, perhaps with the two Koreas as the most Confucian of them all. South Korea is probably the only place in the world where one can hear the Japanese sometimes referred to as 'lazy', but promising, once they really start working.

39. All four are Confucian + Mahayana Buddhist + one more 'dedication element': Shintoism in Japan, Christianity and Marxism in the two Koreas, the general idea of China as the chosen Kingdom in the Middle for China, and fervent nationalism for Viêt Nam.

40. In Japan as graduates of a few leading universities, in South Korea the same, in China as party cadres, in North Korea the same, and in Viêt Nam probably as a mix of the above.

# 3

## The Externalities

### 3.1 Defining Externalities

This chapter is devoted to the externalities, the side-effects,<sup>1</sup> and side-causes, of economic activity.<sup>2</sup> What we are aiming at is an inventory of externalities.<sup>3</sup> To what extent these externalities apply to a concrete case is an empirical problem. The inventory serves as a checklist of hypotheses; the basic hypothesis *not* being that they will all apply in all cases. Moreover, between the general formulation ‘economic activity’ and a specific ‘economic cycle’, our unit of analysis, there is the level of ‘economic schools’ or ‘economic systems’ of the preceding chapter; with each one of them in principle generating some types of economic activities rather than others. But that means that the externalities affected will vary from system to system, with some overlaps; and that will be one focus of the analysis toward the end of this chapter.

The basic reason for paying much attention to externalities is worth restating. Mainstream economics discourse<sup>4</sup> makes much of what happens around economic activities opaque by excluding many dimensions from serious consideration. By also focusing on externalities, these aspects become as transparent as the aspects highlighted by the mainstream economics discourse.

This is important in connection with all economic activity, but particularly in the context of ‘development’, for the following simple reason. So much of the development theory and practice of recent decades has been based on a highly simplistic assumption: given profitable investment, there will be economic growth; given economic growth, the society will become more like ‘modern’, ‘Western’ societies. Usually things do not work that way. The society to be developed easily becomes a sink-hole where any amount of investment disappears and yet no appreciable economic growth follows.<sup>5</sup> Even with economic growth, the result is a caricature of a society – neither what it was, ‘traditional’ or not, nor ‘modern’, ‘Western’.<sup>6</sup>

The position taken here is that this happens not because the investment level was not right or some other adjustment within the mainstream economics discourse should have been made, nor because more time would have been needed for the positive effects to show up. This has also been the classical position of mainstream Marxist analysis: the revolutionary inputs were not right or did not come at the right time; besides, more time is needed for the positive effects of socialism to show up.<sup>7</sup>

The position taken here is that those positive effects will never show up, neither in the Blue, nor in the Red case, for the simple reason that the theory is wrong; and the theory is wrong because it is too simplistic, based on a too narrow discourse. In no way does this mean that the variables of those two economic discourses are irrelevant. They are necessary, but not sufficient, and the purpose of exploring externalities is to contribute to a broader, more adequate discourse.<sup>8</sup>

The first task is obviously to define ‘externality’, and the twin concept (used here), ‘internality’. As a point of departure consider the following definition:<sup>9</sup>

*Externalities are bipolar variables reflecting positive and negative inputs and outputs to parties in an economic cycle*

- *not considered in mainstream economic theory, and/or*
- *not accounted for in usual economic practice, and/or*
- *not monetized (or the monetization is illegitimate).*

The three points may be seen as alternative or complementary, identifying the same variables. *Internalities*, then, are variables explicitly considered in economic theory and taken into account in practice; for instance describing prices and quantities of factors and products, what goes on in factor and product markets, and constructs based on such variables.

The definition is by no means unproblematic. How does one decide what is mainstream economic theory? The economics of Nobel Prize laureates? Standard textbooks?<sup>10</sup> Economics as taught by leading Departments of Economics? Moreover, however defined, mainstream theory will always be changing in the never-ending dialectic with the counter-trends. The same applies to economic practice. Do we mean the practice of big actors, usually quite different from the ‘Mom-and-Pop’ corner store?

Monetization may seem less problematic. But since one major mainstream way of internalizing the externalities – meaning bringing them into both theory and practice – is through monetization, we get into a vicious circle here. If the criterion is non-monetization, then the set of externalities shrinks as the economists monetize ‘costs and benefits not accounted for’, and practitioners, corporate or state, work that into their calculus.

The last resort is the final point above: ‘illegitimate monetization’. But who decides what is illegitimate? Mainstream or counter-trend economists? Both or neither? If monetization of ‘depletion’ is illegitimate, then maybe also the monetization of ‘land’ and ‘labor’?<sup>11</sup> If all three are legitimate, then maybe also monetization of ‘human life’?<sup>12</sup> All problematic, but the definition may still serve as a guide to get started.

### 3.2 Maps of Externalities in the Six Spaces

One way of getting started is by listing some desiderata for a set of externalities. What do we want, what do we need?

1 *All six spaces – Nature, Human, Social, World, Time, Culture – have to be represented; no reductionism to less than six will work.* The importance of this is seen very clearly in contemporary debate on the economy. The critical debate jumps from one space to the other, from concern for the environment (Nature), to human enrichment (Human), to more social justice, equality, and equity (Social), to the predicament of the Third World (World), to sustainability (Time), to why the Japanese are managing so well (Culture, perhaps also structure, i.e. Social). All are important; to introduce any one of them is already a gain relative to a narrow economicistic discourse. But in doing so there is also the trap of dangerous single-factor theorizing. Interestingly, many of those who had a Marxist orientation until recently now have an equally one-sided ecologicistic orientation – a transformation not without justification referred to as political recycling.<sup>13</sup> The position taken here is holistic.

2 *A low number of externalities should be identified, perhaps 2–5 per space.* Each space will call to mind one or more disciplines; acquaintance with those disciplines can trigger any number of dimensions. The point is not a complete catalogue, but rather to identify key variables outside mainstream economics discourse.<sup>14</sup> Any such list will obviously have to be revised, consensus being neither possible nor desirable. The point is explicitness: here

are the variables which we consider important, how far do they carry in understanding what goes on.

*3 Externalities must be key value-dimensions for that space.* In the definition we used the expressions positive/negative, inputs/outputs, not considered/accounted for. In other words, the externalities are not neutral; they are not just any variable in the discourse of some discipline. Moreover, they have to be key value-dimensions, but not necessarily formulated the same way as in any mainstream political discourse.<sup>15</sup>

*4 Externalities must have positive and negative regions.* A value-dimension should identify what is good/to be pursued, as well as what is bad/to be rejected, possibly with a neutral zone in between. The externality should do the same.

*5 A distinction should be made between externalities that are shallow, reflecting manifest, observed aspects of key values; and deep, reflecting latent, inferred aspects of key values.* The shallow externalities can be used for data-collection and possibly for indicator-formation, whereas the deeper externalities would be appropriate for theory-building. A good example is nature space, where the current debate is usually in terms of depletion and pollution, both of them measurable and suitable for indicator-formation. But diversity (in the sets of abiota and biota) and symbiosis (among abiota and biota) may prove far more useful for theory-formation.

*6 Deep externalities should serve cross-space theory-building.* This is, of course, the intellectual's dream: to arrive at variables that can be used in an interdisciplinary way and yet say something non-trivial in all spaces.

*7 Externalities must span the critical/constructive gap,* being useful not only for critique, but also for alternatives.

Let us then make a first attempt at a set of externalities, in accordance with the desiderata above (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 *Externalities I: Shallow and Deep Externalities*

Space	Value-dimension	Shallow	Deep
Nature	<i>Ecological balance</i>	Depletion Pollution	Diversity Symbiosis
Person	<i>Basic human needs</i>	Somatic needs Spiritual needs	Diversity Symbiosis
Social	<i>Development: abolish misery meet basic needs</i>	Reduce and contain direct violence structural violence	Diversity Symbiosis
World (Space)	<i>Peace Synchronic solidarity</i>	Reduce and contain direct violence structural violence	Diversity Symbiosis
History/ Future (Time)	<i>Sustainability Diachronic solidarity</i>	Reduce and contain direct violence structural violence	Diversity Symbiosis
Culture	<i>Adequatio</i>	Reduce and contain cultural violence	Diversity Symbiosis

The general philosophy behind this proposal runs as follows: Ecological balance and basic human needs are autotelic values, ends; development/peace/sustainability/adequacy

are heterotelic: they are means to serve the needs of human and non-human nature. In saying this an ideology has actually been made explicit. The purpose of human activity, including economic activity, is to enhance life – reducing *dukkha* and increasing *sukha*, in Buddhist parlance.<sup>16</sup> Economistic pain/pleasure does a poor job at that.<sup>17</sup>

The shallow definitions of the externalities in these spaces spell out the general value-dimensions in a way that comes very close to these absolute values. ‘Development’ is given a negative aspect, to abolish misery; and a positive aspect, to meet and develop basic needs. ‘Peace’ and ‘sustainability’ extend this approach in space and time, as synchronic and diachronic solidarity, with those – human or non-human – suffering from needs deficits. There is also in that connection a violence vocabulary where development as commonly thought of focuses on reducing structural violence (exploitation and repression being major manifestations), and peace as commonly thought of on direct violence. The externalities are spelled out negatively in Table 3.1 as three types of violence to be *reduced and contained*; and positively as diversity and (equitable) symbiosis to be *increased and maintained*. Only under these conditions can interaction in the spaces be reproduced. The spaces become sustainable, and commonly shared values can be enacted.

Going back to the desiderata above: all spaces are represented; there are only two externalities per space (but they are rather thick, being syndromes, more like meta-externalities); they are certainly value-dimensions and even very frequently found in common discourse (with the exception of ‘adequacy’, perhaps the most basic of them all, but perhaps more a concern of intellectuals); there are positive and negative regions on these dimensions; and there are two sets, shallow and deep.

How about theory-formation across the spaces? The argument would be that this condition is satisfied, that the twin concepts of diversity and symbiosis can be used to develop non-trivial theories in all spaces. The assumption is that the twin concepts touch deep realities in all six spaces. Put differently: they are also key concepts from the point of view of system theory. The tenability of such claims has to be confirmed. This can be done, at least at the level of cross-space comparative theory.<sup>18</sup> The concept of development covers all spaces, so should theory.

And the critical/constructive aspect? When economic cycles pass through the negative regions of an indicator, a basis has been established for critique, severe if basic needs have been deeply affected. The constructive aspect consists not only in pointing to the positive region, but in indicating how to get there, defining strategies, whether they are called economic, political or social. One criterion for an externality to be recognized would be a theory, and if possible a proven practice, of how to get into the promised land. And here the various economic schools become highly meaningful: what is unattainable within the logic of one may be attainable within another, raising the eclectic question of how schools can be combined.<sup>19</sup>

So far the focus has been on externality dimensions, with *Externalities I* giving an overview of possibilities. But the definition above defines externalities not only as positive and negative, but in relation to parties in an economic cycle, meaning by virtue of the fact that they are located on such cycles, whether as actors, with goals and strategies, or merely as sites which the cycles pass through. The word ‘parties’ is intended to cover all cases. The linkage between various aspects of economic systems and the externality dimensions is what has to be established, at least as hypotheses to be tested.

Externalities will now be organized under the same headings as for the schools: individualism vs. collectivism, verticality vs. horizontality, monetization, processing, and expansion. We shall start with externalities imputed to the Blue economy for the same reason as we started with the Blue school above: it is the Mother of all contemporary economic schools.

Table 3.2 *Externalities II: Externalities of the Blue Economy*

Space	Individualism	Verticality	Monetization	Processing	Expansion
Nature				Depletion Pollution	Depletion Pollution
Person	Loneliness Alcoholism Rootlessness Divorce Split family	Alienation Drug-ism Boredom Misery Death	Materialism Consumerism Corruption Prostitution Criminality	Challenge Uncertainty Creativity Accidents Diseases	Challenge Risk-taking Excitement Trade war Death
Social	Fragmentation Marginalization	Segmentation Penetration Exploitation Repression Inequality Internal debt Violence Internal war Verticality – age, gender, race, class, culture	Commodity culture Internal arms race	Challenge Dynamism Research Education General competence	Challenge Dynamism Military power Knowledge General power
World (Space)	Fragmentation Marginalization	Segmentation Penetration Exploitation Repression Inequality External debt Violence External war Verticality – age, gender, race, class, culture	Commodity culture External arms race	Challenge Dynamism Research Education General competence	Challenge Dynamism Military power Knowledge General power
History (Time)	Fragmentation Marginalization	Colonization of the future	Commodity culture	Total degradation	Total revolt
Culture	Epistemological atomism	Epistemological deductivism	Cost-benefit analysis	Means-ends orientation	World monoculture

A presentation like Table 3.2 can be read horizontally, summarizing the hypotheses about damage done in the six spaces, and vertically, summarizing the externalities attributed to one particular aspect of the Blue economy. The total scheme breaks the Blue economy into five components, summarizing their impact in the six spaces. Most of the deficits of ‘capitalism’ are in the scheme, with an effort to trace them back to the components (the ‘syndromes’). However, the term ‘capitalism’ captures badly the complexity of the Blue economy, ‘Smithism’, as argued above.

Is this scheme not too negative? First, it should be noted that the internalities are not here. There is no denial that the Blue economy produces an astounding quantity of goods

and services with an astounding diversity and high quality, thereby making possible a material standard of living undreamt of in earlier ages. Moreover, in the Table, in the impact of processing and expansion in personal, social, and world space, some of the major attractions of the Blue system are mentioned (in addition to the rather obvious one, profit, but that is an internality): challenge, uncertainty, creativity, risk-taking, excitement in general. *Capitalism is fun*, to put it that way. Of course, it may be less fun for workers killed in industrial accidents, also mentioned. And the research, education, knowledge, military power, general power, and competence noted here may also be mainly for elites.

But even if there is a common cultural code in the Blue school's individualism–verticality–scientism (measurement) – dominion over nature (processing)–world expansion, the Blue school remains accused. What do we seek in an alternative?

Table 3.3 *Externalities III: Positive and Negative Externalities*

Space	Positive	Negative
Nature	Diversity Symbiosis	Depletion Pollution
Person	Survival	Death, accidents
	Health	Modernization diseases
	Well-being, livelihood	Misery, deprivation
	Challenge, fun	Monotony, boredom
	Identity, self-actuation	Alienation, self-contraction
	Freedom	Repression
Social	Horizontality, equity	Verticality, exploitation
	Autonomy	Penetration, conditioning
	Integration	Segmentation
	Solidarity	Fragmentation
	Participation	Marginalization
	Mobility, dynamism	Stasis
	Social justice	Social injustice
World	Horizontality, equity	Verticality, exploitation
	Autonomy	Penetration, conditioning
	Integration	Segmentation
	Solidarity	Fragmentation
	Participation	Marginalization
	Mobility, dynamism	Stasis
	Social justice	Social injustice
Time	Sustainability	Degradation
Culture	Pluralism	Singularism

The positive column in Table 3.3 is one answer. There is a simple logic behind that column. For Nature space the two conditions for ecological resilience have been used; for Person space the four needs categories (but adding explicitly health to well-being, and challenge to identity); for Social space the five factors defining structural peace/development have been used, but adding dynamism and social justice; for World space exactly the same has been done since this is also a social space, only at a higher level of complexity; for History/Time sustainability or reproducibility; and for Culture, pluralism as opposed to world monoculture as a cause and consequence of the Blue system.<sup>20</sup>

The list is still complicated. Table 3.4 is simpler. The externalities are all in Tables 3.2 and 3.3; but this short version may serve as a check on how economic flows erode the stock.<sup>21</sup>

**Table 3.4 Externalities IV: Positive and Negative Externalities**

Nature	Human	Social	World	Time	Culture
Diversity Symbiosis	Well-being Challenge Identity	Horizontality Solidarity	Horizontality Solidarity	Reproducibility	Holism Idealism
Depletion Pollution	Misery Monotony Alienation	Verticality Individualism	Verticality Nationalism	Degradation	Atomism Materialism

A look at Tables 3.1–3.4 should help convince those familiar with economics as a discipline that these are not variables generally considered in mainstream economics discourse. Nor are they taken explicitly into consideration by major economic actors, such as the TNCs. Nor are they monetized. An exception to these points would be the externalities in Nature space: they are being internalized in the form of depletion and pollution, into theory and practice; and they are being monetized by costing the retrieval of what has been depleted, and of cleaning up what has been polluted. Why these, of all externalities, should have been internalized will be explored later.

There is an enormous literature seeking to document the relation between an economic system and these or other externalities. Most of the hypotheses follow from the definition of the schools – which does not mean that they should not be tested. But such tests are difficult in practice, given the complexity of concrete cases. Here our concern is more with the causes and consequences of keeping these important variables outside economic theory, and that forms the topic of the next section.

### 3.3 Twenty Theses on Externalities

#### *Thesis No. 1*

*Variables are externalities not because they are insignificant, but because taking them into account would have major impact on both economic theory and economic practice.*

The costs to either of taking them into account would be considerable: a meta-externality. Externalities become like the invisible part of the iceberg, present all the time but not to be mentioned explicitly. If economic theory were to take explicitly into consideration anything like what is hypothesized in Tables 3.1–3.4, to the point of giving some of them – for instance the basic needs of human and non-human nature – a position in the core of economic theory, that theory would have to be rebuilt completely, and would no longer be economic theory in the usual narrow sense. The same holds for the economic practice of major actors. However, smaller economic actors may be much more externality-conscious, and so may politicians, since negative externalities will tend to backfire on them, and often with a vengeance. Thus, it is not to be expected that mainstream economists will be capable of carrying the costs of that meta-externality themselves. Rather, they will postpone the task, do it in a haphazard manner, or redefine, change the focus of the externalities to fit the theory rather than vice versa. Reconstruction will probably have to come from the outside, by producing broader discourses and more comprehensive theories.

*Thesis No. 2*

*Externalities are not necessarily negative but may also be positive; and internalities are not necessarily positive but may also be negative.*

For the externalities, this point has been made part of the definition; it is worth repeating because of the tendency (in left-wing criticism) to portray capitalism as always running up a profit, and the side-effects as only being negative. A more balanced view on both is required. The histories of all economies are also written in red ink, not only black: there are bankruptcies and tragedies, not only well-lined wallets and fat bank accounts. Non-applauded aspects of economic reality, and in economics as a science, should be found together with the celebrated aspects; in externalities as well as internalities. The products of economic activity are both goods and bads, both services and disservices. To focus solely on 'goods and services' is propaganda, but so is the opposite pattern.

*Thesis No. 3*

*Externalities are not only consequences and effects and outputs, but also conditions and causes and inputs.*

More particularly, there are *cultural dispositions* to be taken very seriously – some applauded, some not. This is shown in tabular form in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5 *Externalities V: Positive/Negative; Input/Output*

	Positive		Negative	
Inputs	Hard work	Savings	Greed	Inconsiderateness
Outputs	Challenge	Dynamism	Depletion	Pollution

The Table serves a very simple function: to illustrate the danger in focusing on only one row or only one column, not to mention only one element in the Table. All these factors interact to constitute the totality of the economic cycles, in Myrdal's famous 'cumulative and circular causation'.

*Thesis No. 4*

*The lower the number of internalities, the higher the freedom of the economic actor, as there are fewer variables to take into account. Correspondingly, the lower the number of internalities, the easier the construction of contradiction-free, even mathematized economic theories based on a low number of variables, a low number of axioms and possibly with high explanatory power.<sup>22</sup>*

In both cases, designating a variable as an externality serves to exonerate the economic practitioner and theoretician, entitling them not to take it into consideration. Evidently, it is in the interest of both to keep the set of internalities very limited relative to the set of externalities – provided they can persuade the rest of society that action within the pseudo-reality of internalities makes sense and is in the interest of the rest of society (or at least its elites).

As a corollary of this comes a rather important point: a certain predictive power of an economic theory based on a small number of internalities is no proof of the irrelevance of externalities, because self-fulfilling prophecies may have been at work. People trained in taking only internalities into account will act accordingly, and will register consequences

only in terms of internalities. If told sufficiently often ‘we are in this game for profit’ they will believe that considerateness – here interpreted as sensitivity to negative externalities – reveals weakness of character, and inadequacy in the job. Externality-blind economic theory is, of course, an abstraction from a very complex reality, but this pseudo-reality within which *Homo oeconomicus* acts, can then become real in its consequences.<sup>23</sup>

### *Thesis No. 5*

*The division in internalities/externalities is reflected in, and is a reflection of, the cognitive maps carried subconsciously in the heads of economic practitioners and theoreticians, downgrading of some sectors of the spaces of Nature, Person, Social, World, Time, Culture, and upgrading of economic sectors defined by the internalities.*

Much of those maps derives from Western cosmology with its downgrading of nature, deep split between body and soul (letting merchants/economists service the body and priests/artists service the soul); social and world individualism/verticality; the idea of progress in time; and a culture with but one truth, valid forever and everywhere, making all other systems irrelevant.

The downgrading of some sectors can also be expressed as a division of the six spaces in an inner (core) and outer sectors, as shown in Table 3.6. The left-hand column reflects the center of global reality in this construction; the right-hand column the periphery. And mainstream economics is made *of, for, and by* the center.

Table 3.6 *A Division of the Spaces in Inner and Outer Sectors*

	Inner sector	Outer sector
Nature	Homosphere ( <i>we</i> )	All other spheres ( <i>it</i> )
Person	Body/material ( <i>I</i> )	Soul/non-material ( <i>it</i> )
Social	Upper/middle classes Secondary/tertiary sectors Male, adult economies In-group ( <i>we</i> )	Working/lower class Primary sector Female, child economies Outgroup ( <i>they</i> )
World	First/Fourth Worlds <i>here; MDCs</i>	Second/Third Worlds <i>there; LDCs</i>
Time	Present <i>now, accounting</i>	Future <i>then, discounting</i>
Culture	Mainstream, <i>ours</i>	Counter-trend, <i>theirs</i>

### *Thesis No. 6*

*Externalities are sector-conscious, with the implicit understanding that negative values will hit outer sectors, and positive values will accrue to the inner sector.*

This inner, in-group sector is where externalities are implicitly or even explicitly taken into account. ‘Internalities only’ approaches are for transactions with the outer sector. Like in the social sciences: questionnaires are not for inner use. Asking one’s spouse ‘Last night, how did you sleep? Very well, well, badly, very badly, don’t know, no answer’ may backfire.

*Thesis No. 7*

*The division of spaces into sectors gives the inner sector two ways in which economic systems may malfunction:*

*Error Type I: when negative externalities hit inner sector; and*

*Error Type II: when positive externalities come to outer sector.*

Error Type I may lead to internalization of the externality, and/or to political action. A clear example is the First World, upper/middle-class *eco-crisis* of the 1970s, with strong political demands for a new practice, to the point that economists provided openings in economic theory to admit depletion and pollution. Of course, eco-crisis and eco-disasters had always been the plight of lower classes and the Second and Third Worlds, and this had never had any deep implication for economic practice and theory.

The First World *economic crisis* of the early 1990s also hit the upper and middle classes with bankruptcies, the exposure of shady practices, and threats to social security and retirement funds. Economic insecurity is nothing new; but the debate opened up, the discourse became broader and the unmentionable – some of the externalities – were mentioned. The virtual reality illusion that the economy is only economics was cast aside for a while.

Error Type II may lead to restructured practice, the example here being the effort to destroy Socialist and other self-reliant economies, e.g., by the USA in the Americas. The hypothesis would be that this was not only to re-open them as markets dependent on First/Fourth World products. It was/is also done to ensure that they would not benefit from a major positive externality: the challenge of having to solve difficult processing problems themselves, thereby developing themselves by steady improvement.

*Thesis No. 8*

*By excluding externalities from the analysis at the same time as they affect the inner and outer sector deeply and differentially, mainstream economics and economy are protected, because the criticism cannot be formulated within the dominant, and hence legitimate, discourse.*

The bluff consists in the following: pretending that economic transactions are only what passes across the table (tip of the iceberg), not what passes under the table (invisible part of the iceberg). As an example of an internality we could take the terms of trade, the ratio between the quantities of products traded in a deal.<sup>24</sup> As an example of a positive externality we could take challenge, and for negative externality depletion–pollution. If a deal is set up whereby raw materials are exported from LDCs to MDCs, three things may happen: the terms of trade may be bad, even deteriorating for the LDCs; the challenge may go to the MDCs that set up the facility for raw material extraction; and in addition serious depletion may be the result. If only the internality is made visible by economic theory (and this theory, associated with the names of ECLA – the UN Economic Commission for Latin America – and Juan Prebisch, has had great difficulty in gaining acceptance), then differential challenge and depletion will be forgotten, and the focus will be on terms of trade only.

From an MDC point of view the situation could hardly be better. The terms of trade – with the exception of hydrocarbons (oil, etc.) – are developing in their favor; and in addition to getting the better market deals the positive externality of challenge accrues to them, while the negative externality of depletion comes to the LDCs. Best of all: being externalities, most of this remains invisible.

*Thesis No. 9*

*Negative externalities can more than cancel out any gain made by positive internalities.*

The world economy today is Blue, with some pockets of the Red and the Green and the Pink, and with the Yellow as a major challenge to the Blue. They all solve some problems, and produce others. There are negative externalities everywhere. How are these negative externalities handled?

- *In the First World*, by having State institutions clean up the mess created by Capital, like hospitals and prisons for the surplus of diseased and criminals; ministries for environmental degradation, social security, employment, war, etc. And export of negative externalities (e.g., waste) to the Third World.
- *In the Second (then Socialist) World*, the lack of democracy made it possible for the Communist leadership to ignore externalities, keeping them invisible; as a consequence they were not attended to with any seriousness. There was also the ideological stance that a Socialist economy could have no negative externalities.
- *In the Third World*, negative externalities are certainly felt, but there is insufficient money to build institutions capable of handling them. The consequence is a general deterioration: little profit made on the internalities, enormous costs incurred by the externalities, hence the reproduction of underdevelopment. And no export possibility of processed, finished goods.
- *In the Fourth World*, the situation is relatively similar to the First World, one major difference being that the state has more impact on corporations, can coordinate relations, and handle negative externalities with adequate economic incentives, and when there is enough political pressure from Red, Pink, and Green.

*Global picture:* inequality reproduced and reinforced, on a relatively permanent basis as long as this is permitted to continue, meaning so far for about 200 years, since Smith-Ricardo.

*Thesis No. 10*

*Positive externalities can more than compensate for any losses made by negative internalities.*

The capacity developed to meet a challenging order may be worth paying for in order to get the order, rather than being paid for the products. The question is how challenges are processed:

- *In the First World*, the challenge comes to the person who handles capital (the finance expert, or the owner), technology (the technical manager) or the manager (the CEO). That person may share some of the challenge with others at the same level. The general effects remain inside the person challenged, who may change jobs and take those effects with him, as private property.
- *In the Second (then Socialist) World*, the challenge went to a very small group of planners who were over-challenged while the rest of the population remained under-challenged. The effects may have stayed within the state planning agencies, but not have been so positive, given the excessive level of challenge.
- *In the Third World*, the challenge very often goes to the outsider, the development assistance expert who finds the task stimulating, particularly if he has more power than at home and can use methods rejected in his home country. When he leaves, the side-effects leave with him, and will benefit his MDC country.<sup>25</sup>

- In the Fourth World, the challenge will probably come to the same people as in the First World, but then be shared in group discussions that would involve workers,<sup>26</sup> all the while remaining inside the company or ministry. As a result, the company benefits from shared processing of a challenge, meaning reducing uncertainty until an answer, a ‘solution’, has been found to the problem. The effects remain.

Of these ways of handling challenges, the individualist approach in the First World and the more collectivist approach of the Fourth World seem clearly superior to letting challenges come to only a handful of people, as in the former Second World, or giving them away to outside experts, as in the Third World.<sup>27</sup>

Summarizing the points made in Theses Nos 8, 9 and 10: it is not strange that the gap between LDCs and MDCs increases. We are not talking about a conscious plot to keep the LDCs down, but of a conjunction between the cultural violence of mainstream economic theory and the structural violence of mainstream economic practice.

The countries that have understood this were those of the Fourth World. They had for a long time a very different profile from that of the LDCs of Central and South America and the Caribbean, Africa, the Arab world, West Asia, and South Asia.<sup>28</sup> If they could make it, then so should others – although we do not assume the whole cause of under-development to lie in the transactions. Culture certainly also plays a major role.<sup>29</sup>

The time has now come for a definition of perhaps the key concept of any economy, Blue, Red, Green, etc., as important as growth for mainstream economics: *exploitation* (actually ‘weak’ exploitation), also known as *inequity*, with its negation, *equity*:

*There is (weak) exploitation or inequity in an economic cycle when the totality of the positive and negative effects of internalities and externalities as a result of economic activity are unequally distributed. If not, there is equity.*

The definition is cycle-oriented, not only based on ‘A exploits B’,<sup>30</sup> but also highlighting the exploitation of nature. *Exploitation is to be cheated.* Then comes strong exploitation: *strong exploitation in addition destroys reproduction capacity.*

#### *Thesis No. 11*

*Analysis of externalities must be done holistically; avoiding single-minded emphasis on one space only (and within each space only the suppressed sector) found in such traditions as ecologism (for Nature), human enrichment school (for Person space), socialism (for Social space), Third Worldism (for World space), sustainability (for Time), counter-culture (for Culture): each one is laudable, but combined, not singly.*

A more truthful science of economics would include some knowledge of *all six spaces* in addition to traditional concerns of economists. Since they span ecology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, politology, international relations, history/future studies, and the missing science of culturology (today split between theology, philosophy, history of ideas, cultural anthropology, ethnology, and the humanities) this may seem a rather tall order. But if economists have learnt to use mathematics without being professional mathematicians, then they should also be capable of handling other tall orders.

*Thesis No. 12*

*Analysis of externalities must be done synergistically by looking at the interaction between/among two/more externalities in one, two or more spaces; as well as for chains and cycles in and out of spaces.*

To focus on too low a number or too biased a sample of externalities may be as counter-productive as any single-minded focus on internalities. Moreover, the list of externalities should always be kept open, never ‘final’, to shed new light on economic activity. Lists may come and go, the problems remain.

*Thesis No. 13*

*Externalities cannot and should not be monetized: first, because this is impossible/meaningless; second, to discourage cost-benefit analysis across externalities, searching for trade-offs among entities that are sui generis; third, not to lower the motivation to search for real solutions.*

More particularly, cost–benefit analysis, based on comparability across externalities, neglects absolute negative or positive values – in other words, such moral absolutes as maintenance of bio-diversity, or eradication of misery. These are not to be traded with, nor to be compensated for with money.

Throughout these pages the needs of life are held out as positive absolutes, and of violence as negative absolutes. The rest follows.

*Thesis No. 14*

*The pragmatic function of monetization for trade-offs should not be taken as proof of its validity, but as proof of the power that economism still possesses in capturing agendas and dominating discourses.*

Today all economic actors, insurance companies, policy-makers want to know the price, or monetized expected value. This approach is fatal. *Each externality constitutes its own ethical universe* and has to be dealt with separately and seriously, not monetized to cancel out the others.<sup>31</sup>

*Thesis No. 15*

*The same externalities can and should be compared across actors and across time. Comparability across actors and across time should not be assumed a priori, but be seen as an hypothesis to be tested in practice and in dialogues.*

We have to know how an externality develops over time for the same actor, and be able to make inter-actor comparisons. But operationalization of the externalities must be in units appropriate for each externality, which means that they would not be comparable across externalities.

*Thesis No. 16*

*Internalization of externalities in theory means bringing economics back into the social sciences, sharing the contradictions and general perplexities of those sciences that economics has attempted to avoid by dividing relevant variables into internalities and externalities.*

This is where economics belongs: not with pretensions of being a natural science, some kind of mechanics, particularly today when not even physics pretends to be physics in the

classical sense. As pointed out in Thesis No. 11, this is a major challenge, and not easily met from the inside. But there is nothing so practical as a good theory; and mainstream economics is not good enough to inspire good practice.

Any change from a single-minded focus on internalities to a single-minded focus on externalities should be avoided. The focus should include both, integrated in a broader framework. Which those variables are, will always have to be debated.<sup>32</sup>

### *Thesis No. 17*

*Internalization of externalities in practice implies the following, if the goal is equity in economic cycles:*

- *making externalities explicit, respecting their specificity;*
- *establishing dialogue fora for same kind of economic cycles;*
- *working together to reduce negative externalities; and*
- *working together to share positive externalities equally.*

We have attempted to make this explicit for the dominant Blue system in Externalities I–IV, Tables 3.1–3.4 above. In sections 3.4–3.7 below the focus will be on the externalities of the other economic systems. These lists may be regarded as dialogue agendas for economic actors in search of better economic systems.

Economic actors capable of formulating and pursuing economic goals and strategies can be divided into territorial and non-territorial, and actors at the micro, meso and macro levels. Table 3.7 indicates a typology.

Table 3.7 *A Typology of Economic Actors*

	Territorial actors	Non-territorial actors
Micro level	Households, farms	Tribes; hunter-gatherers
Meso level	Communities	Firms, companies
Macro level	States Super-states Global governance	Corporations Transnational corporations TNC assemblies

The basic actor, the actor atom, is the individual, and this actor is more important, the more individualist and vertical the underlying culture. Collective actors are individualized, with all power given to the boss – the *pater familias*, the chief, the mayor, the owner/manager, the president, the CEO. With almost all of them being men, we are talking about one of the most forceful mechanisms for patriarchies through the economic system. The economy is managed for and by men, with women relegated to the working classes of all actors, starting with households.

Although dialogues of all kinds are useful in participatory social systems (such as democracies), *dialogues among economic cycle parties are indispensable for internalization of externalities, turning parties into partners.* We then conceive of economic cycles as an interaction system linking Nature, Producers, Distributors, and Consumers. In principle all types of actors in Table 3.7 may appear in the last three nodes on an economic cycle, whereas Nature is *sui generis*. A basic problem: how does Nature enter a dialogue? Partly by internalizing Nature's needs in all human actors; possibly by having human actors represent some parts of Nature.<sup>33</sup> Regardless of answer, Nature has to be present in those dialogues (Table 3.8).

Table 3.8 *A Typology of Economic Dialogues*

	Nature	Producers	Distributors	Consumers
Nature	Nature as association			
Producers	Industrial pollution Depletion	Producers', workers' associations		
Distributors	Marketing pollution	Impact statements	Distributors' associations	
Consumers	Household pollution	Impact statements	Impact statements	Consumers' associations

On the main diagonal, actors of the same type meet themselves, the Chambers of Commerce being examples of associations bringing in producers and distributors. Nature is in an everlasting dialogue with itself, symbiotic and anti-biotic and a-biotic; maybe one day we shall understand that dialogue better. Relatively new are the consumers' associations, today the largest international associations in the world, by far above No. 2, the leagues of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.<sup>34</sup>

The content of the dialogues is spelled out in the third and fourth parts of Thesis No. 17: to reduce the negative and share the positive externalities. Of course those hit by negative externalities – basically Nature, Consumers, and Workers – are most motivated to change the status quo, just as those who benefit most, Producers and Distributors, are motivated to maintain, even reinforce it. The line-up is relatively well crystallized today: Producers and Distributors on the one hand against Nature and Consumers on the other, the former alliance much better organized. The position of the (super-)State, in between or siding with one or the other is important, but not crucial.<sup>35</sup>

More original is sharing the positive externalities. That brilliant Danish invention Lego (and the Swedish furniture corporation IKEA or any firm marketing ‘do it yourself’ kits) may serve as metaphors of how Producers and Consumers can share the externality of challenge: the product is not finished. From that point of view the best products are unfinished, ‘imperfect’ in the grammatical sense of production still going on after the product has reached the consumer. This should not be confused with low quality, although that also serves as a challenge.<sup>36</sup>

The key example would be two territorial actors negotiating their economic relations. Typically cooperation is called for to reduce negative externalities like depletion and pollution, and to share the positive ones, like challenge. The key word in Table 3.8 above is ‘impact statement’: all parties declare what they think the impact of their action will be, and what they think will be the impact of the action of others, and from there they proceed to a mutually agreed statement.

No doubt this would have been easier if we could compare externalities, e.g., by monetizing them. In that case the rule would be to calculate the net externalities, then equalize them for the parties, and if possible increase them for both. An example would be compensating for reduced bio-diversity with some challenge, or compensating for depletion and missing challenge with higher prices, because the rule is to increase the net sum of externalities and internalities, and equalize them. This would be easier, but catastrophic in its consequences. Bio-diversity decreases, challenge remains low, and some capital accumulates at the entry points for capital. Result: *Status quo*.

The three basic reasons for ruling out monetization are:

*Anti-monetization I: to rule out comparison*, preventing the relativization of values, emphasizing that the values underlying the externalities are absolute values; and

*Anti-monetization II: to rule out compensation*, trading off one against the other, or equalizing whole packages of negative and positive effects of economic transactions.

*Anti-monetization III: to stimulate innovation*, the search for genuine solutions to the problems of negative externalities.

To compare and then compensate is the lazy way out, letting the rich pay themselves out of the problems they create, or shift the problems from one externality to the other. The challenge is to take each externality as a universe in its own right, demanding solutions in its own terms. Solutions may not come immediately, but when they come they may be deeper, more lasting.

The basic reason for dialogue as the clearing-house for economic transactions is to encourage civil society behavior – as an alternative to the market approach of clearing all problems by using capital and to the state approach of clearing problems by using power, if needed in the shape of force.

#### *Thesis No. 18*

*Taking externalities into account is not antithetical to the market or to competition, but broadens the range of considerations before buyer and seller are willing to make a deal. The goal is ethically conscious market behavior.*

The market becomes a forum for a much broader dialogue, not only over quantity, quality, and price. This is not new. People have always had a broader range of considerations, particularly in making deals within the inner sector (Thesis No. 5), such as buying from families they want to support, or stopping buying slaves, sacrificing economic advantages.

The dialogues do not have to be repeated each time a deal is made. Good dialogues lead to good deals that may last for a while for the ‘same kind of economic cycles’. New rules emerge from the dialogues. People act according to the rules; there is no need to be ethically conscious all the time, if the action is reasonable. Some simplification is needed to decide and to act, provided there is willingness to change again. And again.

#### *Thesis No. 19*

*Taking externalities into account does not necessarily decrease freedom of action, it may also increase that freedom by providing new ideas and by making relations more cooperative, less competitive.*

Take the example of apple imports to country *J* from *A* or *C*. *A* grows apples bio-organically. This means the process is more labor-intensive, the apples somewhat more expensive, but poison-free; in addition the soil on which they grow may be enriched in the process. *C* grows apples in the traditional capital-intensive way, with artificial fertilizer and pesticides, poisoning the apples and degrading the soil. *J*, by importing from *A*, helps develop *A* in the process; *J*, by importing from *C* helps *C* grow economically but also develops *C*. The ethically conscious choice is obvious: paying somewhat more for these effects to take place, potentially making *J* and *A* each other’s inner sector with countless cooperative endeavors following, with positive externalities. *The basic point is how the externalities catalogues can inspire new cycles of production, distribution, and consumption, not only eliminate the old.*

Ideally all three would be nature-conscious, and the basic dialogue would be between consumers and producers, or buyers and sellers, adjusting their supplies and demands to each other. As mentioned, ‘voting with the dollar’, by buying or not buying, is not good

enough; to develop new ideas dialogues are needed.<sup>37</sup> Add to this consumers' dialogue within consumers' associations, producers' within producers' associations, and the three dialogues can be coupled to each other to improve the total system.

The distributors occupy an interesting in-between position: they are close to both, they know consumer tastes better than the producers and producer capacities better than the consumers. And it is certainly in their interest that tastes and capabilities are adjusted to each other.

One interesting approach is *Shopping for a Better World*,<sup>38</sup> as relevant for rich as for poor countries. Products and producers are evaluated according to whether they give to or are involved in charities, women's advancement, minority advancement, animal testing, disclosure of information, community outreach, environment, family benefits, and workplace issues. The catalogue coincides only partly with the externalities considered here, and is much more concrete. But the general idea is the same: a broader range of considerations. When sufficiently many consumers communicate this to the distributor, by entering the shop with this catalogue in hand, evaluating products, dialoguing with the manager, signals cannot but be transmitted to the producers. A cybernetic feedback system is established. Still better is a direct relationship between consumers and producers, like 'shopping on the farm'.

#### *Thesis No. 20*

*Development can be conceived of largely as the progressive accumulation of positive externalities brought about by ethically conscious economic transactions.*

In the same vein, underdevelopment is accumulation of negative externalities. A remarkable aspect of Blue is its ability to export the negative and keep, even import, positive externalities. As a conclusion, Blue, the 'free market' system (more free in the Center than in the Periphery), should never be permitted to carry the economic aspect of development alone.<sup>39</sup>

The consequences of this thesis come in the form of good news and bad news. The good news: *no limits to development!* – but yes, 'limits to growth'. Of course there are limits to, say, equity, but not to cultural and spiritual development. Shifts toward non-material activity might improve the human condition.

The bad news is equally clear: *there are no limits to maldevelopment!* Or, rather, there is a limit, the elimination of all life on earth, whether apocalypse is brought about by massive eco-degradation, massive starvation or migration and massive killing. Unfortunately, with the first leading to the second leading to the third the probability is today not zero.

#### **3.4 Externalities of Red Economics**

The externalities were already pre-programmed in Marxism by being so economicistic, just as the externalities of Blue economics were pre-programmed in Smithism, including the later idea that the sum of egotisms is altruism. This became particularly clear in the 1970s when Marxism lost much of its appeal in the West.

Five big omissions: *ecological balance* (Nature space); *spiritual development* (Human space); *new class-formations and new forms of exploitation*, not to mention the old one, *patriarchy* (Social space); new approaches to *peace*, including among Socialist countries (World space). These were the problems of the 1930–80s; and the anti-alienation, enrichment-through-work discourse of the 1930–40s and the anti-exploitation (in social and world spaces) discourse of the 1950–60s did not compensate. Solutions to Blue problems were not found in the Red discourse. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, negative

externalities were eating up the systems. The focus on national economic activity and little trade had as a consequence scant possibility of exporting negative externalities, by placing polluting industries abroad, or by exploiting 'cheap' labor.<sup>40</sup> In a sense this was more honest, or more stupid, or both: the negative externalities accrued to themselves. Externalities accumulated, the system was unable to handle them, with no debate they could not be planned away. The system collapsed under the burden.

In addition, just as Blue is suffering from consumerism, Red was suffering from producerism – an equally materialist fascination with material production. In terms of cultural materialism the result was probably about the same.<sup>41</sup>

### 3.5 Externalities of Green Economics

The way Green economics is described in Chapter 2.4, as a strong negation of Blue economics, we would expect few of the negative externalities of the Blue school. Green economics should be very soft on Nature, and on Toynbee's inner and outer proletariats. Moreover, being essentially local and non-expansionist, it should also be soft on future generations. With less monetization, given the emphasis on production for direct consumption and barter, comparing and compensating externalities is averted. So, what is wrong? In fact, four negative externalities do stand out in the critique of Green economics, and have to be taken seriously.

First, *self-exploitation*. The pressure is on the individual and the group, the self and the Self, to manage within local space – assuming we are talking about hard, or dark, Green.

Second, *not exploitation, but inequality*. The asymmetries in factor distribution will make some local communities blossom and others wilt, with no transfer mechanisms. Economies more integrated at the national level are like communicating vessels.

Third, *inwardism*. A heavy focus on self and Self will compete with solidarity with the rest of the world, even with neighboring communities. The focus is too centripetal.

Fourth, *lack of dynamism*. Local economies will differ from each other, but each one may be culturally monochromatic, like a monastery. There is diversity, but little symbiosis between them and the opposite within the communities. Much impetus for change comes from the outside, but that source is a trickle. With little pluralism, change is likely to be eruptive and disruptive given the other three negative externalities.

There have been three major experiments with Green economics in the poor parts of the world recently: Gandhi's *sarvodaya* villages, Mao Zedong's *people's communes*, and Nyerere's *ujama'a* villages. Why did they not last longer?

Probably, they were counteracted by their economic environment, meaning the dominant Blue and Red/Yellow (the case of China) schools. But there were also endogenous reasons, built into Green economics.

Thus, one guess would probably be that too much loyalty with the local unit was demanded. The contradiction between the means of communication/transportation and the social mode of local focus becomes too acute, and can be solved only through a level of dedication normally found only among volunteers. But that means Green economics for believers, not as a general formula for the whole society, and we are back to the monastery as a metaphor. Likewise, high producerism can be reconciled with low consumerism only when strong beliefs make self-exploitation bearable.

Add to this the problem of inequality among the local communities: an old phenomenon in human history, evident among Indian villages and Chinese communes. With Tanzania's *ujama'a* villages it is another story if it is correct that plans had to be approved centrally, and that the up and down from village to center (Dar es Salaam) could take two years. No take-off.

The conclusion is the same as for Blue: Green should not carry the great human development project alone. There must be transfer mechanisms, for one thing, and economic interaction between and within nations, in addition to local economies.

### 3.6 Externalities of Pink Economics

There is something bland about the Pink school; hardly a school at all, there being few outstanding philosophers/economists associated with it. With misery abolished through the politics of capitalism modified by socialist redistribution, a grateful population should have returned the political parties responsible into power again and again. And so they did until recently. Why no longer?

Negative externalities, of course. The following are four hypotheses for analyzing them.

First, *blandness*. To excite people, a policy needs to have some sharp edges, at least in mono-faith cultures. Of course, Blue could accuse Pink of being Red and Red could accuse Pink of being Blue, both projecting Pink into the opposite corner, thereby revealing their own biases and lack of subtlety. But they are both strong believers and demand the same of others. Green projects Pink all the way into Yellow, as collusion between Big Blue and Big Red. And Yellow probably sees Pink as a little brother. Thus, Pink is not seen for what it is: not the worst approach to the economics of material livelihood.

Second, *combining the negative externalities of the other four, even if only in a mild version*. There is something to learn here for those arguing eclecticism (as in Chapter 4): be prepared for all possible contra-arguments from all sides.

Third, *Pink was a victim of its own success in eliminating misery*. This made people yearn for less state control, and for greater possibilities of making capital on the market.

And fourth: *Pink looked like a final solution in practice if not in theory and seemed non-dynamic*. People dislike boredom.

### 3.7 Externalities of Yellow Economics

Yellow economics is far from bland; and the accusations of Blue, Red, and Green, invoking the negative externalities of Red and Blue economies, are all valid. But Yellow is so successful in internalities and positive externalities that criticism begins to sound like envy. Are there also non-envy arguments?

First, *State–Capital elite cooperation weighs heavily on Civil Society*. Participation in decision-making becomes almost impossible when there is little or no contradiction between those two pillars of modern society. Japan is run by rolling cohorts of top bureaucrats and top managers. At the same time, people feel the pressure to work very hard, although consumerism sweetens the bitter pill of producerism considerably.

Second, *Capital–Labor cooperation in big companies excludes the smaller companies, and non-lifetime workers*. The exploitation in Yellow economies is less in the form of Capital exploiting Labor than of Capital–Labor combined exploiting the small.

Third, *Yellow economics becomes the victim of its own success economically, creating too many peripheries and too many enemies*. If some day an Association of Japan-damaged Countries (AJC) were to be formed, Yellow might learn what Blue never seems to learn: you may have to pay dearly for exploiting others.

To this could be added the extreme of patriarchy, as the leaders of State, Capital, and Labor are all men. But that is more a part of the core of japanology than of Yellow economics.

Conclusion: Yellow cannot carry the burden of development either, having too many negative externalities in its wake. None of our ‘colors’ can. In Chapter 4 we shall look at some remedies.

## Notes

1. The concept is well known in medicine as 'side-effects' (German: *Nebenwirkung*). Today one can hardly buy any medicine without a long discourse on side-effects, at least when the medicine is marketed in the First World. The reason for that sensitivity can probably be found in Thesis No. 7, Error I: when negative externalities hit the inner sector (the First World) they are taken seriously.

2. I am grateful to the late Kenneth Boulding for a side remark he once made (September 1971 at the International Peace Academy in Vienna, in connection with a discussion of imperialism): we have to learn to take the externalities more seriously! This note was written the day of the funeral of that great man, 28 March 1993. Whether he would have approved of any way of doing the job is another matter, however. Kenneth was never fond of the concept of 'exploitation', which has a central position in the present construction of externalities. See Johan Galtung, 'Only One Quarrel with Kenneth Boulding', Review Essay, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 24, no. 2, 1987, pp. 199–203.

3. Another term sometimes used is 'spinoffs', but the term does not sufficiently highlight how these aspects of economic activity have been neglected. For an early analysis of such 'spinoffs', see Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', pp. 437–481 in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. IV (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980), particularly pp. 447 ff. Another term used in that article is 'spillover', from one side-effect to the other, some kind of second-order externality (pp. 462 ff.)

4. For an exploration of the concept of 'discourse', and narrow/broad, shallow深深 in particular, see Johan Galtung & Richard C. Vincent, *USA Glasnost* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1996), ch. 4.

5. Another useful metaphor, often heard in connection with investment in Communist Eastern Europe: throwing seeds on asphalt. Thus, the idea that the arms race the Soviet Union was forced into by the USA impeded investment for a larger and better consumer goods sector (the guns vs. butter argument) assumes that capital was the bottleneck factor.

6. In using these heavily overworked terms there is no implication that 'modern' is somehow better than 'traditional', or vice versa.

7. The famous principle of 'unripe time' – *the time was not yet ripe* – can be used to explain and excuse everything, anything, and hence nothing. But there may also sometimes be something to this. After all, human society does not function like a mechanism where a button is pushed and there is some immediate result. Society is more like an organism. There is some input, the input is absorbed, processed, and reprocessed; and then there is some result, often very different from what was intended. Hegel referred to this as the transition from quantity to quality, here interpreted as an input in increasing quantity, and then a qualitative leap, like the famous 'quantum leap'.

8. Basically a discourse is adequate when everything we want to communicate about the subject can be correctly formulated within the discourse; nothing is subjugated or repressed or simply absent, like the externalities (see Galtung & Vincent, *USA Glasnost*, ch. 4).

9. Here are two examples of definitions from the literature:

'Economists define an externality as any value or consideration which does not enter a cost–benefit calculus' (Denis Goulet, 'Biological Diversity and Ethical Development', *ICIS FORUM* vol. 22, no. 1, January 1992, p. 29).

'The core of the pollution problem is what the economist calls *externalities*. These are *spill-over costs or benefits*: consequences of action that are not taken into account by the actor and which therefore do not influence his decisions' (Paul Heyne, *The Economic Way of Thinking*, Chicago, IL: Science Research Associates, 1992, p. 253).

Our definition is close to both, except that they use the terms 'cost' and 'benefit' with connotations of monetization we want to avoid by using the broader 'negative value' and 'positive value'. Goulet's focus on 'calculus' presupposes comparability of values (utilities); and monetization provides one, and the most ubiquitous, answer. Heyne's 'spillover' is our 'side-effect'. However, both authors fail to highlight the self-fulfilling nature of the problem: the economists do not take the externalities into account, they set the tone for economic activity by defining the discourse, so of course others do not let them 'enter — a calculus' or 'influence — decisions'. They also focus only on effects ('outputs') and not on causes ('inputs'). An externality can be both.

10. In that case, some consensus might perhaps gravitate around the omnipresent textbook by Paul Samuelson, *Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 13th edition, 1989; with W. D. Nordhaus). At the end of the book there is a useful 'glossary of terms'. Under 'exploitation': nothing, not even mining, sea-bed. Under 'equity': equity capital. Under 'externalities': the usual definition in terms of costs and benefits not paid for (hinting at monetization), and the statement that 'private costs and benefits do not equal social costs and benefits' (hinting at quantification for comparison; mentioning only two of the six spaces).

11. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, these might be positions taken by the Red and the Green schools.

12. Thus, insurance companies might use 'remaining earning capacity' as a price tag on human life, in other words highly dependent on age, gender, race, and class. A major problem is whether this has some implication for the allocation of airplanes at different ages to different routes, those carrying a predominance of young, male, white business executives, as against those carrying a heavy load of old, female, colored employees.

13. On the other hand, *Die Grünen* in Germany, for instance, tend to emphasize a range of values, like ecological balance, female emancipation, general participation, human rights, nonviolence, solidarity with the Third World – spanning at least Nature, Social, World, and Time.

14. In other words, Ockham's razor applies: not more concepts than necessary (*non sunt multiplicanda entiae praeter necessitatem*).

15. This point is problematic. One function of externality analysis is to change economic practice; for that purpose formulations close to, or even identical with, ordinary political discourse may be preferable. Another function is to change economic theory, for that purpose more abstract variables may serve better. The line followed here is to include both types of variables.

16. This may also be used to define progressive and regressive politics and political ideology, or left and right for that matter: progressive is what serves the needs of human and non-human nature, regressive whatever does not. In real life, of course, the consequences of any activity are usually ambivalent. But this approach serves to anchor politics in fundamentals. Whether post offices should be nationalized or privatized becomes less a matter of dogma and more a matter of whether it serves the relevant needs – which seems to be an empirical question with different answers at different points in time and space. A whole humanist ideology can also be built on this basis.

17. Pain and pleasure both refer to the body, and adequately reflect the narrow focus of economic theory and practice. But that somatic/materialist focus is itself one of the most controversial points in mainstream economics, and application of their tools for body-oriented goods and services to the realm of the human spirit is a major negative externality in culture space. To the Nobel Laureate Gary Becker there is no limit: 'The rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available for a unified approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from social sciences' (from his 'The Economic Way of Looking at Life', *Nobel Lecture*, Stockholm, Nobel Foundation, 1992, p. 27).

18. That diversity/symbiosis offers an analytical handle for the problems of nature space resilience is obvious, being basic to ecological theory. But the same goes for the inner persons with many different inclinations that in a mature person should be kept diverse (not too repressed, controlled) and brought to bear on each other (not too divided, like in a split personality). Social space would also be much more resilient, being host to different ways of organizing social life. So would world space. In other words, the concepts are well suited for cross-space theories.

19. The problem is the very idea of being eclectic, meaning serving more than one god, not easy in the monotheistic civilizations of the Occident. An exception would be the Pink school where eclecticism is already built into the school, calling for market or plan remedies depending on the circumstances. The Orient, with a general tradition of eclecticism, also, like social democracy, makes polytheist inclinations their monotheism.

20. The Blue system knows no limit in time and space and social space, at the same time as it is a very powerful carrier of the cultural code of the expansionist Occident. The system sees itself as being universally valid at all time, beyond space and time, being context-free. Of course it takes deeper roots if the cultural soil is already compatible, or has been made compatible, for instance through colonialism.

21. The stock/flow discourse brings in another perspective on externalities: does the flow deplete or replenish stock/capital? The bottom row for negative externalities in Table 3.4 poses the questions for nature, human, social, world, time and cultural capital. More precisely, if depletion/pollution exceeds what nature can handle, then the capital is depleted. If misery, monotony, and alienation, including the simple form of loneliness, exceed what the person can handle, then the capital of vital strength, love, and creativity of that person is eroded. With too much verticality and individual mobility, with people moving out of sight of each other, substituting machine messages, the structural capital of that society is eroded, through destructure. For the world, poorly structured as it is, basically anarchic/feudal, there is not that much capital to deplete, but nationalism certainly erodes whatever exists. Taken together, the result is degradation over time, with, for instance, increasing direct and structural violence. Atomism and materialism alone do not provide adequate culture to exit from these major problems; they have to be tempered by holism and spirituality (to constitute idealism). In other words, the cultural capital is also being eroded, particularly by economics. In addition to destructure there is also deculturation.

22. If the number of axioms is  $n$ , and the number of theorems deduced is  $N$ , then one measure of explanatory power is  $1-n/N$ ; the higher the lower  $n$  and the higher  $N$ . This must have been very important also as a mnemonic device, before printing was developed. All people needed to remember

was a handful of axioms and the rules of deduction, and a vast amount of knowledge could be reproduced. The power of an axiomatic system, however, lies more in its capacity to produce new knowledge by deducing new, surprising insights, checking them with reality. This intellectual form is pyramidal, with a more or less peaked apex (depending on the number of axioms), and could be contrasted with the wheel whereby the theorems are combined in pairs, triples, etc. and examined for possible new, synergistic, insights. See Johan Galtung, 'Back to the Origins: on Christian and Buddhist Epistemology', pp. 15–27 in *Methodology and Development* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988).

23. This is the well-known theorem of sociologists Thomas and Znaniecki about self-fulfilling prophecies. The virtual reality referred to has some similarity to the laboratory of the natural sciences. The difference is that in laboratory virtual reality, relevant conditions for the relation between X and Y, the independent and dependent (sets of) variables, are either kept constant (pressure, temperature) or made irrelevant (noise, wind); in mainstream economics, virtual reality relevant conditions are made irrelevant by dismissing them as externalities.

24. Like the quantity of bananas needed for one barrel of oil, or the quantity of oil needed for one tractor, or the number of tractors needed for one bomber/cruise missile/atom bomb.

25. Of course, he may share some of his learning and experience with a local person, the 'counterpart'. But that person, trying to convert his knowledge into status and power, easily becomes lonely, and may ultimately prefer to follow his master to the MDC country.

26. These are the famous 'quality circles'. See also W.E. Deming, *Out of the Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991).

27. The tragedy of the former Socialist countries is the transformation from one major structural deformation to another. Instead of having challenges monopolized by *gosplan* experts, they are now monopolized by foreign experts.

28. Thus, in 1992 the European Community had 19.9% of the world trade and the USA 16.0%; still a result of the explosive economic growth in the first, Judeo-Christian, growth pole. But then follow: Japan 12.1%, Canada 4.8%, Hong Kong 4.2%, the People's Republic of China 3.0%, the Republic of China 2.9%, South Korea 2.7%, Switzerland 2.3%, and Singapore 2.3%. The countries in East Asia add up to 24.9% (with Singapore from Southeast Asia 27.2%, more than a quarter of the world trade). An East Asian Common Market of the (*Mahayana*) Buddhist–Confucian countries Japan, China (with Hong Kong and Taiwan), (united) Korea and Việt Nam would already today be the largest trade partner in the world, and the USA with Canada (and Mexico, NAFTA) No. 2. Even the EU, unless a major expansion of membership takes place, would then become No. 3, as an indication of world dynamism. (From GATT Secretariat, in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29 March 1993).

29. See Table 3.5 above. Only few cultures incorporate all four elements – hard work, savings, greed, inconsiderateness – postulated as necessary for economic growth.

30. In the earlier version given in 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism' (1971) internalities are referred to as what happens in the pattern of *exchange*, and externalities as what happens in the pattern of *in-change*, as a cause or effect of the exchange. This perspective is too limited: there are both internalities and externalities both within and without.

31. As an example, consider the deal described in Thesis No. 8 above. The LDCs are short-shrifted in three ways. However, the MDCs could say, 'OK, we'll pay you more for commodities and in addition stabilize the prices; the rest remains as it is'. This could be seen as an effort to throw money on the problems of missing challenge and depletion of bio-diversity, a true Operation Impossible.

32. The present text has made extensive use of Q/P, C/N and F/R: Q/P because it reflects exactly what buyers are looking for and sellers try to convince others they are offering; C/N because it is closely related to many of the key externalities; and F/R as a conceptual handle on the total economic system. Operationalization of all three is possible, but that lies outside the scope of the present text. Others will enter the enormous field of economic activity with other key variables.

33. In other words, some kind of *ombudsman* system for selected biota and abiota (they are so numerous that there will not be sufficient humans at any given place to represent them all).

34. The four largest INGOs are the International Co-operative Alliance (663 million members in 86 countries), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (250 million in 117 countries), World Federation of Trade Unions (175 million in 85 countries) and International Federation of Free Trade Unions (113 million in 117 countries). Data from the Union of International Associations, Brussels.

35. In a reasonably free society, economic actors can meet directly and arrive at their own understanding, particularly when or if the major concern of the State is not to facilitate a dialogue but to demonstrate where ultimate power is located.

36. An example from the Cultural Revolution period in China: a basic idea was more challenge to the workers, challenging the monopoly of engineers on the means of production. In the specific Chinese situation this was done by having workers repair the machinery that very often broke down.

Given the age of that machinery there was more than enough challenge to maintain, but not to develop the machinery further. Result: stagnation.

37. Voting with the ballot is not goodenough either; citizen dialogues with politicians, consumers with producers and, preferably, all three together, are essential.

38. 'A Quick and Easy Guide to Socially Responsible Supermarket Shopping', published annually by Council on Economic Priorities, Inc., 30 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003.

39. The current (mid-1990s) period, with the Red system beaten, the Green in hiding, the Pink in disarray, and the Yellow seen as merely Blue with some exotic, Oriental peculiarities offers a bleak economic landscape populated essentially by the Blue system in its Center and Periphery varieties. This will hardly last long. The complexity of the problems calls for complex solutions.

40. 'Cheap labor' refers not only to low wages, but more importantly, to export of negative externalities: boring, hazardous, non-challenging work, etc. that does not have to be accounted for or compensated.

41. In that sense, 70 years of communism prepared them for capitalism. What they are now experiencing is Blue externalities on top of the old Red ones.

## 4

# Ten Theses on Eclectic Development Theory

Now we should try to pull together what has been explored in the three preceding chapters. Chapter 1 opened for a critique of current development theory and practice; there is certainly the obligation to follow up with a more constructive part.<sup>1</sup> In Chapter 2 the building blocks of economic systems – the Blue, Red, and Green systems – were presented, together with more mature systems, the Pink, Yellow, and Eclectic; the idea being that particularly the latter held some promise. And in Chapter 3 we explored unmentionable aspects of economic systems, the externalities, in hopes of arriving at a deeper understanding of the realities of these systems from the perspective of development, indicated in Chapter 1.

Let us now in ten theses sketch a practice that may incorporate the best of the systems without getting too deeply stuck in the negative side-effects (and they are many, as we saw in Chapter 3). We start with a main point from Chapter 2.

### *Thesis No. 1*

*With market (capital) and state (power) as basic dimensions we get five, not just two economic systems: market, not plan (Blue, capitalist); plan, not market (Red, socialist); half/half (Pink, social democrat); both/and (Yellow, Japanese) and neither/nor (Green, traditional, local).*

Only when pure market and plan are seen as opposites on a one-dimensional continuum does it make sense to talk about only two systems (or three, if the Pink social democrat compromise is admitted into a position somewhere in the middle). If one of the two fails empirically, or is excluded ideologically, then there is very little left, whereupon some people start to believe that the survivor, today the Blue system, is the ‘natural’ system. But the condition for arriving at that conclusion is one-dimensional thinking, a kind of epistemological infantilism.

Much more complex typologies than that of Thesis No. 1 can be imagined. But the present typology has the advantage of accommodating relatively well the systems and schools existing in the present world. The Blue system, the market system, comes in two versions: a Center, high on degree of processing of raw materials and on communication-transportation centrality, benefiting amply from the accumulative effect of positive externalities; and a Periphery, low on degree of processing and on communication-transportation centrality; suffering from the accumulative effect of negative externalities. But, as also pointed out: Center and Periphery of the Blue (or of the Red and the Yellow for that matter: all of them are centralizing) are two sides of the same system.

Thus, there is more variety and richness available than often imagined when uni-dimensional discourses close the mind. The problem is how to relate to that ‘window of opportunity’.

*Thesis No. 2*

*Rather than an ideological dedication to one system only, an eclectic use of all five in time, space, and functional space might release positive development synergies.*

This is clearly an argument in favor of the Eclectic school. Above, that school was defined only as an eclectic amalgam of three other schools, two of them eclectic amalgams themselves. What follows is an effort to spell out in greater detail what this might imply.

The basic condition for eclecticism lies not in economic reality but in our heads: a transition from monotheistic faith in one secular, economic god, be that market or plan, to a polytheistic betting on several. And much as in polytheistic systems in general, there is a time for this god, and a time for that one: for the Creator, the Protector, the Destroyer.<sup>2</sup>

The systems that constitute the Eclectic school may be activated serially or in parallel or both, in the same or different places, and for the same or different functions. This school rules out any underlying assumption to the effect that one of the basic schools – Blue, Red, or Green – is more equal than the others, to be realized as the final stage of economic development; or that the role of the others is only to help that stage into being, ultimately to be discarded as crutches.

The most complex of the composite schools is Eclectic. The economic strategies are acted out inside that school, but they are not chosen at random. They activate the structure of the basic systems and the thinking of the corresponding basic schools, but without putting any of them in the driver's seat. In the driver's seat sits Eclectic.

A basic reason why so much of the economic initiative in the world today is found in Daoist–Confucian–Buddhist East Asia is, according to this type of thinking, a much higher ability to think and act eclectically, using both/and rather than either/or thinking. But even if the Occident had managed to combine, say, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the three would still be too similar to prepare the adherent mentally for real economic (or social, cultural, political for that matter) eclecticism.

*Thesis No. 3*

*A necessary condition for development of any kind is decentralized distribution of production factors to all, making everybody a potential participant in some production, not only in consumption.*

The basic point is decentralization – meaningful within all systems, also the Red system. There is no built-in, compelling reason why the Red school as practiced in the Soviet Union could not have taken the form of commune-ism rather than state-ism, or at least republic-ism (how successfully is another matter). The basic reason was probably an unreflected syllogism that ran something like this:

*Premise 1 Basic transformation presupposes central power at the state level.*

*Premise 2 Public ownership is basic transformation.*

*Conclusion Public ownership presupposes central power at the state level.*

The first premise, that absolute territorial control was needed, may be acceptable; likewise the second premise. When the conclusion does not follow and was disastrous in its consequences this is because 'basic transformation' means something different in the two premises. A system based on planning at the municipal level and very weak coordination, incentives, and disincentives from the top is not at all inconceivable.<sup>3</sup>

Much can be said in favor of decentralization and of its concomitant, smaller economic actors, which is compatible with but not the same as privileging local economic cycles.

First, the *mobilization of production factors*. There is human talent anywhere. A

centralized pattern first uses talent in the Center, then fetches talent from the Periphery, thereby overutilizing the Center and underutilizing the Periphery. There is nature, some capital, some technology (traditional, modern, post-modern, indigenous, alternative), and management everywhere. With more sites of creation and production, with everybody producing something, such factors can be better utilized.

This used to mean free access to land and water, communal forests and lakes, seas, oceans (the 'commons'). Today equal or more emphasis would be on improving the quality of labor, through health and education with free access to primary health and education services (polyclinics and schools everywhere); easy access to credit; creation of technologies appropriate to the people using them and to the consumers; and management structures compatible with local culture and social structure. The old and important *land reform* argument – land to those who till the soil – has become a general *factor reform* argument:

Second, from decentralization follows, in principle, *more diversity*, with different types of factors and products flowing in different economic cycles. National-level diversity has not disappeared despite a growing world economy privileged by Blue logic; there is also gender, generation, and class economic diversity. But local diversity tends to disappear within national economies, weakening the total system (see Chapter 5).

Third, decentralization brings *positive externalities to the local level*, counteracting much Center-Periphery formation; particularly important for such a key externality as challenge.

Fourth, with decentralization, *negative externalities hit smaller units*, mobilizing more efforts to counteract them because cause and effect are closer to each other and more easily identified.

#### *Thesis No. 4*

*First production priority is for the basic needs of those most in need; best done at the local level, in a Green economy.*

What is the purpose of the whole economic exercise, as argued in Chapter 1, if not to satisfy basic needs, for survival? Here the point about local production is important. Even if centralized production may produce higher quantities at lower prices (higher quality is more difficult), local production will often be less vulnerable to problems of distribution and supply; and more sensitive to local needs and potentials. Such externalities are more important, the more basic the needs; for non-basic needs risks can be incurred with less penalty.

In practice this means decentralized production of food, clothing, and housing, for local consumption. To this we may add basic health resources (healthy food, clean air and water, exercise facilities, generic medicine for basic diseases, polyclinics, and elementary health facilities in general) and basic education facilities (schoolhouses, a good relation to working life to blend work and education, production of simple education material, teachers, administrators). Local self-reliance in energy conversion could also be argued: after all, biomass, sunshine, wind, tidal water, waves, geothermal and aquathermal potentials, waterfalls, etc. are available everywhere one way or another.

An enormous potential is available at the local level. In addition, promoting the local level everywhere and particularly for basic-needs production makes people less dependent for their survival on far-away factors beyond their control.<sup>4</sup> And, any product that travels less is also a product that pollutes less.

*Thesis No. 5*

*Second production priority is for simple production and consumption tools related to basic needs, best done at the national level, in a Pink economy.*

These would be the pots and pans for food consumption, and the basic tools for the production of food (picks and shovels, hand cultivators, stoves); spinning and weaving tools for clothing; manufacture of bricks and other building materials for housing. Basic medicine also enters the picture, as would school material; although, again, local production for invulnerability against arbitrary or simply wrong central decisions should never be given up completely.<sup>5</sup>

The hardware needed for energy conversion, such as solar converters or more advanced biomass converters, might also be made nationally. We are here somewhat further removed from the most basic needs. But just as the human being is vulnerable if basic needs cannot be met at the local level, the local level is also vulnerable if tools to produce for basic needs are not available near the local level. This does not exclude national power grids – as long as these are not based on environmentally unsound and hazardous, partly irrational, old-fashioned methods such as thermoelectric and nuclear power.

The same applies to mobility needs; symbolically by verbal (oral or written, telephone, telefax) communication, physically by transportation, moving persons and goods. The emphasis on Green economy in Thesis No. 4 does not condemn people to live locally all their lives. But some hardware may be beyond what the national level can produce. As these mobility needs are close to basic needs, crises in the world economy would be counter-productive. Regional level production may be a good compromise.<sup>6</sup>

*Thesis No. 6*

*Third production priority is for export; at ever higher C/N (processing) levels, best done at the national, regional, and international level, in a Yellow economy.*

The basic rule is still never to export raw materials, including raw labor, but to imprint on nature (N) some form, in other words culture (C), always aiming at higher C/N ratios. Export integrated circuits and silicon chips, not to mention computers, etc., never raw metals, not to mention potato chips.<sup>7</sup> But this requires cooperation between researchers and technicians (for high C/N) and workers for good quality of the products at reasonable prices (high Q/P). Management-worker relations have to be good within the companies; and state-capital cooperation would bring in all the resources of the society for the export drive – not for all possible products, but for niches of pride and quality. Those are all the basic features of the Yellow economy.

Some international coordination is indispensable. What is argued here is production of products closest to nature and closest to basic needs locally, and production of the next level nationally. At the national level, the danger is that one or some local communities might dominate the national market. Good national development planning would give to each part of the country, ideally each community, an important economic role to play.<sup>8</sup> In the same vein, each country in the world should have an important role to play in world trade – and not according to the old-fashioned and vertical, inequitable division of labor defined by ‘comparative advantages’.<sup>9</sup> As yet we have no institutions for equitable world trade allocation of economic roles, and only to some extent at the regional level.

This again brings up the old problem, ‘what is development?’. The position taken here is basic-needs production as close as possible to where these products are consumed, which means locally,<sup>10</sup> simply for human and nature survival. The position is not necessarily against world trade, only for reduction of its proportion of total trade, and for giving a role to each country in the world in a horizontal, equitable division of labor.

From this perspective, today's world is highly maldeveloped. In the Third World the national production capacity is not (yet?) developed; it takes time to build the institutions known as State and Market at a national level. In addition, the local level is gradually being eroded, even destroyed. Access to world economic cycles is limited to products that fetch low prices and have very few positive externalities. The recipe for a wasteland.

But the First World is also maldeveloped. Heavy world trade participation creates dependency on the world level and vulnerability to its conjunctures, also where basic-needs products are concerned. National production profiles become increasingly one-sided, if not mono-crop perhaps mono-product. And local-level production for local-level consumption gets squeezed out in the competition.

The consequences are obvious. Basic-needs deficits are translated into basic interests at the national level, and may lead to military action.<sup>11</sup> In other countries basic-needs deficits have another consequence: mass starvation, particularly of the most vulnerable, the children and the old. The two types of problems do not exclude each other.

This reasoning also holds for non-material processing. The end product would be highly educated professionals (processing of raw brains) and highly sophisticated culture (literature, art, science, etc.). Both material and non-material export could be more in C, less in N. To trade in C means cultural exchange, whether C is frozen into an integrated circuit, outstanding professionals,<sup>12</sup> or floating in the air like a song. If trade in N is necessary, then N against N to keep the externalities more equal. The worst trade pattern, C against N, is a colonialist residue, a part of the 500+ year Columbian era of human history. And, imitating some Swiss: 500 years are enough.<sup>13</sup>

Trade is communication, and communicating culture is communication at a higher level than communicating nature. In addition, there is also the environmental argument: in principle, the more C-intensive the economic activity, the less danger to the environment. N-intensive activity depletes and pollutes. Intellectuals may destroy forests to get their books printed; but that also shows how tied we still are to N-intensive forms of communication. Electronic communication may represent a step forward. This is also an argument favoring the finance economy over the real economy: less N-intensive with paper yielding to plastic that can be used again and again, electronic book-keeping taking over. But then *all* countries should participate in a more equitable manner in the world finance economy, eroding the concept of 'the financial capitals of the world'.

Finally: N is limited in a finite world; C is not. There is no limit to culture, no limit to cultural production and exchange. The Middle Ages understood this.

#### *Thesis No. 7*

To get rich, increase Q/P (*quality over price*) levels, maintain or increase C/N (*culture over nature*), and watch the *finance-real economies balance, F/R*.

This is a never-ending endeavor. Lag behind in Q/P and your competitor gets an edge. Lag behind in C/N, and positive (and some of the negative) externalities accrue to someone else. Any major asynchrony between F and R leads to an overheated or undercooled economy, with F neither mirroring nor serving R.

Essentially the Q/P problem is a question of how workers are treated, since they are closest to the actual job of finishing the products. Treat workers like junk and they will do junk work, turning out junk products. The punishment will come fairly quickly, as the US economy is experiencing (although this is only one of many factors behind the decline into a near-depression state of that particular economic system).

Essentially the C/N problem is a question of how scientists and high-level technicians are made use of. Have them work on military projects and their innovations may have

very few civilian spillovers, moreover, they may become classified and hence non-available. One more problem of the US economy.

As to the F/R problem: essentially a question of willingness to work hard, assembling together the five production factors to get production going rather than aiming for quick profits in the finance economy, through speculation. Do the latter, and there will soon be little to speculate on. Again, the US predicament.

Have an overload of CEOs remote from workers, science, and technology, but close to capital and management direct the economy, and all three problems will aggravate each other.

#### *Thesis No. 8*

To remain rich, *improve production factor quality: nature, labor, capital, technology, management.*

Help nature with eco-balance; work for ever higher levels of health and education to achieve higher Q/P and C/N, never forgetting that the level of education and health of the bottom 50% is as important as the level of the top 5%; watch the finance economy/real economy synchrony; invest in technical creativity and capability of everybody and strive for management structures where everybody feels at home, perhaps by accommodating people in smaller groups, horizontal beta-structures, inside larger, more hierarchical alpha-structures. All of this is actually Yellow, Japanese economics. Some of it comes from Kaname Akamatsu, perhaps the best development economist of the century, although rather unknown in the West. Why not learn from Japan? Why could not others do some of the same, challenging the weight carried in the world economy today by that one, small country?

This point has an element of the obvious. On the one end of the cycle are the factors, on the other the products. They may be at different levels of quality. There is a positive relation between quality of the factors and of the products. Accept invitations to match low-level factors with low-level products in the name of 'comparative advantages', keeping both at low levels, and you run the risk of remaining down there, with the two reinforcing each other. Keep factor quality constant or run it down, and soon your products will lag behind. Produce below your potential and you will not get the positive feedback from high quality. Improve both, qualitative rather than quantitative growth, and you will find that the process becomes sustainable.

#### *Thesis No. 9*

To remain developed, *internalize externalities in the nature, person, social, world, and culture spaces so that all spaces become reproducible (sustainable) over time.*

We are now back to the whole purpose of the exercise in this chapter: to develop, not merely to grow. If development is growth without doing damage, then watch out for negative effects, and build positive effects from the very beginning, into all five spaces. Concretely this means keeping and building as many local cycles as possible so that the link between economic cause and ecological consequence can be acted upon when something goes wrong (example: stop smoking!). And, help nature to improve.

In human space, this goes beyond improving health and education levels. Giving some challenge to everybody was the strength of Western entrepreneurialism as long as it was sufficiently decentralized. But Blue tends to centralize, potentially as much as Red, with Yellow combining the processes. Hence, for development in nature and human spaces, Green and Pink elements are indispensable. Then, the distinction between jobs to make money and work for self-realization. Work is intrinsically creative; whenever it

becomes drudgery, dirty, boring, dangerous, or degrading there is betrayal somewhere.

Further, build horizontal exchange relations between local communities in the national economy and national economies at the world level; diverse, but symbiotic. We are still very far from that today. The catalogue in Table 3.2 gives some hints about the agendas relating to the dangers of the Blue economy. There are similar catalogues for the Red and Yellow economies; Green and Pink are, however, less dangerous.

Then, culture space. In Chapter 1 much was said about a culture of greed and inconsideration as a condition for economic growth. In Chapter 2 the focus was on (excessive) individualism, verticality, monetization, processing, and expansion, and such consequences (developed in Chapter 3) as consumerism, producerism, and inwardism. In Chapter 3 the focus was on (excessive) epistemological atomism and deductivism, cost–benefit analysis as a mentality, means–ends orientation, and world monoculture. And in this chapter (starting in Chapter 3): monotheism as antithetical to an eclectic approach to the economy.

There are many cultural themes to be sensitized to, for development to take place. Culture is that symbolic framework, the mind-set that shapes our thought, speech, and action; thus the search for *adequatio*, for the culture adequate to development, is a never-ending problematique. The moment such a culture has been identified, development according to Definition No. 1 in Chapter 1 will take place, as enactment of that culture, in other words as monoculture, as anti-development. For development to take place there always has to be an element of the imperfect argument for eclecticism.

Our overall conclusion favors Oriental over Occidental cultures for development. Intuitive support for that conclusion is found in the relative age of the countries: two or three times older in East Asia than Western Europe. Higher reproducibility, in other words.

Might that not underestimate Occidental dynamism? Maybe cultural *adequatio* has the same formula as development: using all of them, combining the values of Blue and Red, Pink and Yellow, and Green? Maybe. And then also, maybe not. The search is on.

#### *Thesis No. 10*

*And when if the process fails, never give up but start again where it went wrong, even from the beginning. If it succeeds also start again, e.g. with non-material products.*

Or simply say, this is it, let us enjoy it – always watching that the economy does not degenerate but remains dynamic and reproducible. Replacement is also a formula for development. The old story of the Western expert urging the ‘native’ to work harder instead of enjoying some of nature’s fruits in the shade of a tree, and the ‘native’ repeatedly asking ‘why’ till the expert says ‘so that you’ll have enough money to enjoy life in the shade of a tree in your old age!’ makes an important point. Replacement ethics, like dynamism ethics, cannot be generalized as a universal norm without colonizing maybe half of humanity.

One general formula emerges: *eclecticism*. If human beings possess infinite potential for diversity, not only relative to others, but relative to themselves in their life-cycle, then we are doomed to fail unless society can mirror at least some of that variety.<sup>14</sup> If the shoe pinches, shoes of other sizes should be easily available. Hence the thesis that creative combinations of the schools are stronger than their sum, having them side by side.

The Green is indispensable for basic needs, as we are likely to realize increasingly in the decades to come. The Blue and the Red are too one-sided, too monotheistic. The Pink and the Yellow are better. But best is to spread our bets on them all, as they appear on the main diagonal (Chapter 2, Appendix), Green, Pink, and Yellow. Let anyone find his and her place at any time, weaving life trajectories in and out of the systems – and trying to respect the logic of all five spaces, all the time.

## Notes

1. For the idea of science as a synergistic combination of empiricism, criticism, and constructivism see chapter 2 with that title in Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Ideology* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977), pp. 41–71.
2. The key Hindu deities can be seen in these perspectives.
3. There would be both similarities and differences relative to Yellow. In Yellow (central) state and (central) market go hand in hand, coordinating lower-level territorial and corporate units. In this modified Red there would still be no corporate units but many lower-level territorial units, coordinated by a soft state. In the concrete Russian case that system might have been able to play on the traditional Russian *mir* (village) community, letting the farmers find their own forms of collective ownership, instead of crushing such communities, building artificial ones, and subjecting them all to the will of an omnipotent state. A distinction of this kind, between hard and soft socialism, is made in Johan Galtung, 'Socialism is Dead; Long Live Socialism', pp. 9–15 in George Matthew, ed., *Dignity for All, Essays in Socialism and Democracy* (Delhi: Ajanta Books, 1991). However, to forestall any misunderstanding, let me state that the system which I would tend to believe most in is the system described in this chapter, Eclectic.
4. For more details on local or national self-reliance, see Johan Galtung, 'Self-Reliance', pp. 398–413 in *The True Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1980); 'Self-Reliance: Concepts, Practice and Rationale', in Johan Galtung, Peter O'Brien & Roy Preiswerk, eds, *Self-reliance: a Strategy for Development* (London: Bougle L'Ouverture, 1980); and *Self-Reliance, Beiträge zu einer alternativen Entwicklungsstrategie* (Mir. A. Ferdowsi, ed.) (Munich: Minerva, 1983).
5. An extreme case, but not unrealistic in our world, is central power exercised by a foreign occupying force. The more centralized the system, the easier for them to control the country, as argued in my *There Are Alternatives!* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), ch. 5.4, 'Inner Strength: Towards Less Vulnerable Societies', pp. 192–198.
6. There are in the world today many of these free trade areas, common markets, etc.; presumably among countries positively related to each other by affinity and/or vicinity. However, as mainstream economic thought lumps all economic activity together in one growth measure (gross national or domestic product), with insufficient developmental distinction made between basic-needs production for survival and the rest, priorities may be wrong. Ideally the local level should supply what is needed for basic needs, including the means of production for basic needs. The latter may have to be produced at the national level. If this is impossible, then at least at the regional level, in a friendly environment, with factors and products flowing easily across borders.
7. During the Bush Administration the saying went around that there is no difference between silicon chips and potato chips as long as they bring in money. Pedagogically, an excellent point of departure for a discussion of positive externalities.
8. An example is the Bishop of Quiroga in post-Conquista Mexico, assigning to villages around the Lago de Patzcuaro in Michoacan (Patzcuaro, Tzintzuntzan, etc.) different roles: pottery village, copper village, etc. Some of the pattern is still observable under the heavy layer of 'development' for tourism privileging Patzcuaro.
9. In practice this means that to some countries are allocated production patterns that are highly nature- and labor-intensive, while other countries get (or take) the opposite pattern, capital-, technology- and management-intensive production.
10. This raises the interesting problem of food production in cities, which evidently would have to be done with three-dimensional agriculture, hydroponics, etc., given the limited space. It will take a long time to overcome the idea that cities consume food and the 'countryside' is there to produce.
11. Wars over oil supply, 'the jugular vein of the Western world', would be obvious examples. Wars over water may be around the corner, likewise wars over uncontaminated soil.
12. One country that bases its economy largely on this is Jordan. Very poor in raw materials, with little or no manufacturing capacity, but rich in human beings (refugees), Jordan found the solution was to build universities, exporting professionals against remittances back to the home country. A medical doctor obviously fetches more money than a day laborer.
13. In connection with the 700th anniversary of the Swiss Republic, in 1991, the slogan *Sieben Hundert Jahre sind genug* was heard quite frequently even if the concrete implication was not so clear. More participation in trans- and super-national organizations? Dissolving Switzerland into regions or cantons?
14. The reference is to Sorokin's famous 'principle of limits' (the limits of society relative to individual variety), the basic thesis underlying his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (Boston, MA: Porter & Sargent, 1957).

# 5

## Development Theory: an Approach Across Spaces

### 5.1 Development Theory in Crisis

Development theory has in principle to be a *holistic* approach to the human condition, and *dynamic*, as the very word indicates. Development studies share holism with such approaches as peace studies, environment studies, future studies, and women's studies – all of them relatively recent, and all of them also reactions against the fragmentation of the study of the human condition into a multitude of specialties and disciplines – also disciplining the disciples.

However, practice has become sadly different. Instead of holism, there has been a focus on only the economic aspects of only the Social space of human existence; instead of dynamism in an endogenous sense, there has been a focus on the capacity to emulate certain societies held to be 'developed'. This remarkably tenacious approach ignores Nature space, the setting for nature's own development, or at least the balance on which the human condition is absolutely predicated; it ignores the (inner) Human space of mental/spiritual development; as well as other aspects of Social space, and the whole World space of regions and countries, corporations, organizations, and associations, in conflict and cooperation. Development theory and practice still suffer from excessive intellectual fragmentation.

Leaving out World space has led to absurdities in the theory: if all countries have a global trade surplus and positive balances in general, then obviously there is a problem somewhere. In general, nobody seems to care whether societies held to be 'developed' are mutually compatible in World space.

And only recently has Time become dressed up in sustainability garb. As to Culture: cultures good for economic growth are by definition good for development.

We are left with a 'theory' of development incapable of foreseeing the ecological imbalances, incapable of taking into account the modernization diseases that affect the human *body* (cardiovascular diseases and malignant tumors), the *mind* (mental disorders) and *spirit* (a general sense of meaninglessness); incapable of handling problems of gross social and world maldevelopment (like patriarchy, bureaucratization, militarization, and other forms of top-heaviness; lack of participation in general, flagrant inequalities). The point here is not that the practice was unable to solve these problems: rather that the problems could not be accommodated by that crisis-ridden body of theory.

What follows, then, are some thoughts about alternative theories or theory. This will be a totally different approach, where suddenly India, for instance, stands out as much more developed in basic ways than, for instance, Norway, even though the latter is much richer per capita in conventional economic terms (but not in terms of a concept of wealth developed below).

## 5.2 Four Interaction Spaces and the Assumption of Isomorphism

We keep the assumption of development theory as holistic, and interpret this term so as to cover the four interaction spaces: Nature, Human, Social, and World; we return to Time and Culture later. We also keep the assumption of development theory as dynamic, and interpret this as meaning changes towards betterment of the condition of human and other life – but on its own premises, not assuming any universal definition of ‘good’ and ‘better’, except, perhaps, at a very high level of generality and abstraction. In other words, holism, dynamism, and ameliorism as benchmarks of development theory.

Looking at four interaction spaces we note there is no scarcity of approaches. For *nature* space there is the entire school of ecological balance. For the *human* body there is the medical tradition focusing on somatic health, and on mental health; and then the whole religious tradition focusing on spiritual health and salvation. For *social* space there are all the programs for social betterment built into social structure, culture, and ideology. And for *world* space there are programs built into large ‘chunks’ of humankind, the social cosmologies of civilizations. But for world society as such there is no program. The world *space* – the basic arena where peace is to be achieved – has yet to be mapped with a theory that is *sui generis* at the world-space level, and not some kind of reductionism to social, human and/or nature levels. These, of course, would be included in theories of development, only that the world level will have to play a major role.

Imagine that we now, as a point of departure, assume that there must be some basic similarity in the logic of balance in the four spaces, and that balance is at least a major component in the concept of development. Balance has to do with capacity for *self-generated reproduction*: the system continues on its own engine, so to speak. We are then left with two possibilities: using the theory of balance based on *one* of the spaces, or developing a totally new general systems theory to cover *all* of them as ‘systems’. Both approaches are meaningful, but here I will use the former, trying to enrich it with some concepts from the latter. That raises a second basic question: from which space should we learn?

Three good reasons to try to learn from the nature space:

- 1 *Nature has been around much longer than humans have.* As a whole, nature has changed and differentiated, evolved what is usually referred to as higher forms – we humans arrogating to ourselves the title as the highest. Consequently, there must be some inherent ‘wisdom of nature’, a source of learning about holism, dynamism, and sustainability.
- 2 *Nature space is basic; all the others depend on it.* By contrast, nature can survive without human beings, including their social and world spaces. We depend on nature, but nature does not depend on us. We even destroy nature, as evidenced by the ecological crisis today, and more so than nature has been destroying us (through natural calamities of various kinds). The whole cosmic eco-cycle has the cosmo-, atmo-, hydro-, litho-, and biosphere as its basis, with the homosphere as a highly expendable coda, and the cosmosphere as accommodating context.
- 3 *Perhaps our insight into nature is better than our insight into ourselves.* There is a distance between ourselves and the rest of nature which facilitates abstract and generalizing intellectualism. A priori we might assume even more insight into the other three spaces since we are in them, of them, and by them. But precisely for that reason it may be more difficult to achieve the distance necessary to arrive at some fruitful general conceptualizations. We are too close to see ourselves, there is too much at stake in our subjective values and interests. Moreover: could it also be that natural scientists are simply better at that game, at doing science, than are human and social scientists? Or, as Einstein suggested, natural science is easiest?

However, when nature space, for these three reasons, is used in this context as model for the other three spaces, this is only *one* possible approach, something to be tested for its heuristic value in coming to grips with the conditions for reproducibility-sustainability.

### 5.3 Spaces and Sub-spaces

The point of departure is the general theory of ecological balance, in *nature space* including not only abiotia (the atmo-, hydro-, and litho-sphere), but also biota (the micro-organisms, plants, and animals of the biosphere). Ecological balance can be seen as based on *diversity* and a *symbiosis* stronger than life-destroying anti-biosis. There is a certain plausibility to this. If a part of nature space has sufficient diversity in abiotia and biota (including access to the energy from the cosmosphere and solar energy in particular), and if this diversity is utilized by the system for symbiosis, with the parts relating to each other, interacting with each other, generating new abiotia and biota in exchange cycles, then after some time some kind of sustainable balance should be the result.

This is plausible, also because it is so easily seen how a system in nature space might collapse: through lack of diversity (the abiotia/biota needed are simply not available any longer), or through malfunctioning of the symbiotic mechanisms. The former is seen in monocultural agriculture, which has to be maintained artificially by supplying diversity (for balance) through (artificial?) fertilizers and (toxic) pesticides. And the second is seen in the 'nuclear winter', where the basic assumption is that, due to clouding of the atmosphere, the interaction with the cosmosphere is reduced so that a major form of symbiosis in nature space no longer functions: *photosynthesis*. The thinning of the ozone layer has the same effect, through the opposite mechanism: too much cosmic energy.

We shall refer to the joint functioning of diversity and symbiosis as *system maturity*. The general line of thought for all four spaces will be as indicated in Table 5.1.

The reader will find on top the four spaces, and to the left nine headings, the first two being the four spaces and sub-spaces. There is the obvious subdivision of Nature space. Then comes *human space* divided into body, mind, and spirit. The *mind* is seen as the seat of emotions, volitions, and cognitions, the *spirit* as the seat of reflections on many things, among them emotions, volitions, and cognitions of oneself and of others – in other words of self-reflection. In principle this would also include reflections on one's own capacity for reflection, in other words of self-reflection, and in turn reflection on this self-reflection: philosophy.

It is this complexity that constitutes the *personality*. Here it is not necessary to have any clear view of where to draw the line between the mind and the spirit, or whether the personality also includes aspects of the body in a purely somatic sense. The argument could also be made that the latter is part of nature space.

In *social space* a distinction has been made between the micro, meso, and macro levels. Micro is the small group surrounding any individual, usually based on kinship and/or friendship – in other words, primary relations; meso would be the local level of secondary relations usually based on values and/or interests in a social sense; and macro would be the national level, and tertiary relations; classifications of people in gender and generations, races and classes, nations and inhabitants (of territorial units).

Finally, there is *world space*, of interacting social spaces of all kinds. Much attention is paid to macro social spaces in the sense of nation-states. This is undeniably important, but it leaves out all international, trans-national and sub-national actors also operating in world space. The concept should be kept open. However, regardless of kind of actors, it makes sense to have a distinction between the world system encompassing all actors of

Table 5.1 *Development Goals and Processes: a Systemic Approach*

Space	Nature	Human	Social	World
Sub-space	Cosmosphere Atmo-, hydro-, lithosphere Bio-sphere	Body-soma Mind-psyché Spirit-soul	Micro-primary Meso-secondary, local Macro-tertiary, national	Regional World
Code	Genetic code	Genetic code Personality	Structure Culture	Cosmology World/human cosmology
System maintenance (by definition)	Bio-needs	Somatic needs; Spiritual needs	Social interests	Regional interests World interests
System maturity (diversity with symbiosis)	Several biotopes and exchange cycles	Several homotopes and exchange cycles	Several sociotopes and exchange cycles	Different systems in active, peaceful coexistence
Reproduction (based on maturity)	Renewal Reproduction	Reproduction	Reconstruction	Reconstruction
Resilience to violence	Injury to needs	Injury to needs	Injury to interests	Injury to interests
to exploitation	Injury to reproduction capacity	Injury to reproduction capacity	Injury to reconstruction capacity	Injury to reconstruction capacity
Maintenance goal	Eco-balance	Self-realization	Development	Peace

that kind, and a regional system composed of a subsystem, because the code, the hidden agenda may be more homogeneous regionally. In fact, regions are now crystallizing culturally.

#### 5.4 Development Goals and Processes: a Systemic Approach

*Codes.* In the second row is a very conventional hierarchy of increasing human complexity, starting with a universe without human beings, with cosmic energy and solar rays, and ending with very complex world systems. It is a hierarchy of Chinese boxes: open one and inside you find the roots of the next level, open that one and you find the next one, and so on. But each space is steered by its own logic; each space has what in the third row is referred to as a *code*, or a *program*. The programs are rules of transformations, defining processes of that space as goal-seeking entities, with complex feedback relations.

Thus, each organism in the biosphere in *nature space* is the carrier of a genetic code that can be transmitted through reproduction. The genetic code gives us the upper and

lower limits of the species in terms of differentiation, complexity, etc. This also goes for the somatic aspect of human beings. In addition human beings have deeper selves which we can define as the code for the non-somatic aspect, summarized in the word 'personality'. This is what enables us to recognize one person from one day to the other, since the personality remains more or less the same even if some behavior, even appearance, changes depending on the weather, what happened early in the morning, food eaten late at night, and what-not. A dramatic aspect of the spiritual capacity of a human being is the capacity to reflect on one's own personality, and possibly even change that personality through a spiritual transformation.

Then there is *social space*. The code is here seen as being built into the structure and the culture, in an implicit form as a program, and into the ideology in an explicit form – 'explicit' meaning 'spelled out'.

In *world space* this becomes even more complex since we are dealing with larger systems, bringing together many entities from social space. At this level it makes sense to talk about 'deep structure' and 'deep culture', meaning by that structural and cultural elements held in common by seemingly different societies or systems in a region. They might be seen as the expression of a 'deep ideology', referred to as *cosmology* – the 'personality of a civilization', to put it that way. And that raises the question whether there is such a thing as a code for the total world space, encompassing everything, a deep human ideology beyond the genetic code that most humans have in common.

**Maintenance** The two key concepts in the column 'system maintenance' are 'needs' for *nature* and *human space*, and 'interests' for *social* and *world space*. We shall define them as the *conditio sine qua non* for system maintenance. If the needs of an organism are not satisfied then that organism disintegrates; this also applies to human beings. Our needs can probably best be understood by studying the structure and function of a human being as a biological organism (anatomy, physiology), paying particular attention to the orifices of the body – including the skin – that need to function (air, water, and food should be let in, excrement out; sensory impressions would be let in, mental reactions be permitted to come out; sexual intercourse and birth should take place, if for no other reason than because human bodies are obviously made to function that way), and so on. There is need for rest and sleep, there is need for activity. The list can be made long. Look at the list, put minuses in front of one or more of the items and we have a list of pain techniques well-known to those who inflict punishment or torture in all the social sub-spaces, from time immemorial, including what parents have done to children and men to women.

These bio-needs for human beings fall into two categories. First, the need for *survival*. At the individual level, this means not succumbing to violence – direct or structural – and at the collective level, that the human race will continue. Then there is the need for something more than survival; let us call it *human well-being*, the basic constituent in the World Health Organization's definition of health.

It is readily seen how dependent all of this is on nature. Nature is the space in which we rest and are active. Nature supplies most of the indispensable inputs, and receives (and transforms) some of our outputs. To be able to accommodate, as a host, human beings, nature has to be strong, particularly if human beings act like parasites. And since humans are biological organisms with personalities, they have other needs than bio-needs – needs that may not be compatible with the stability of the nature space in which they are embedded, leading to exploitation of nature, expansionism, etc.

As to spiritual human needs, one possible classification is in terms of *identity* needs and *freedom* needs. They are dialectically related. Identity needs demand some fixed point, some nucleus around which the individual can build and extend unions over and above itself as biological organism. Freedom needs are the needs for space, for somatic,

psychological, and spiritual mobility, for choice, in search of union or away from union. Maybe the freedom needs also include the needs to be able to *escape from oneself* – to change, from time to time, the programs or codes embedded in one's personality?

Next, the complex subject of *interests* in *social space* and *world space*. What would be the interests of a social system or a system of social systems, whether the latter is regional or world-encompassing? How, for instance, could one today conceive of 'national interests'? Cutting through a long debate, the position taken here is that *a social system has but one legitimate interest: that of satisfying the basic needs, biological and non-biological, of its members*. And who are the members, are they only human beings, or could they also include other biological organisms? All animals, or only some of them? I do not claim to have an answer, but I do feel that these questions should never be eliminated from the agenda of a peaceful, developed society.

The same reductionism of interests to needs applies to more complex spaces and ultimately to world space. The global interest is to satisfy the interests of *its* members; the interests of its members are to satisfy the needs of *its* members. But since the latter eventually depends on finite nature space, there is a limit to the bio-needs of all organisms. And since the needs of organisms also depend on abiotia, there is a limit to the extent to which one can destroy them. Ultimately we depend on ecological balance in a super-space comprising all four spaces. In short, the primacy of nature.

*Maturity* In the fifth row, 'system maturity', is where the bold assumption enters. System maturity depends on the level of diversity, combined with the level of symbiosis between the components that constitute the diversity. The higher the level of system maturity, the more resilient is the system, the more able to reproduce both in the sense of maintaining itself and of creating new generations, or withstanding various types of injuries, even of setting goals for itself within the conditions of system maturity.

In all spaces this calls for a diversity of types and symbiosis. Let us refer to these types as *biotopes* in nature space, *homotopes* in human space, and *sociotopes* in the social and world spaces. Let us further assume a Chinese boxes logic: the world space is an extremely rich sociotope, but so far in interaction with no other world. (Otherwise we could have talked about *mundotopes*.) Inside that sociotope there are social systems that may be exemplars of the same or different sociotopes; there may again be, at lower levels of complexity, the same or different sociotopes, until we come down to homotopes, human beings that may or may not be of the same or of different types and may or may not inside them have different homotopes or inclinations, propensities that are more or less developed.

Thus, on the one hand we could imagine a *world space* consisting of a number of societies exactly of the same type, based on exactly the same (and low) numbers of components, populated by human beings of a very uniform kind, who inside themselves have cultivated exactly the same inclinations. Then, on the other hand, we could imagine a world with very different societies that inside themselves would have very diverse components, all of this in highly complex cycles of interactions; populated by very diverse human beings who inside themselves would cultivate a high number of very diverse components or inclinations in very different ways, combining, feeding into each other also in different ways. *A world of very low and very high entropy respectively* – the first image that of a highly underdeveloped system, and the second image as that of a rather developed system. Obviously, 'development' then means complexity and reproducibility rather than single-mindedness and growth.

For *nature space*, these are the general conditions for ecological stability. *But nature is a brutal place*. There are certainly exchange cycles, ecological cycles starting with water, carbon dioxide, and solar energy and ending with water and carbon dioxide (solar energy

going on and on, that bountiful and seemingly endless input). But some of these cycles, when translated into rules of behavior in the human, social, and world spaces, are not what we are looking for. The food chain, with the 'higher' levels consuming the 'lower'; with micro-organisms feeding on abiotia; plants, also on micro-organisms; animals being not only herbivores but also carnivores; we human beings feeding on everything but not wanting anybody to feed on us – not even we on ourselves, branding this as cannibalism. Obviously, we need a strict definition of symbiosis as mutual, and not too unequal benefit. Exchange cycles, yes, but with some basic form of *equity*. In some religious systems this tolerance norm is formulated as *ahimsa*, nonviolence, extended not only to human beings but also to animals (the case for vegetarianism in Hinduism and Buddhism), in some cases also to plants and even micro-organisms (in Jainism). *Ahimsa* was Gandhi's way.

At the level of *human space*, diversity implies respect and tolerance for other personalities, and at the level of *social space*, respect and tolerance for other types of social organization. But that is not enough. Symbiosis is also needed: mutual learning, exchange, mutual benefit. So there we are, in the midst of philosophical wilderness: nature's wisdom translates into moral injunctions, norms, but these are not the norms of social justice or equality. Moreover, the concept is not distributive between more or less endowed entities; social justice and equality are such concepts. Equitable symbiosis is a more relational concept, referring to the interaction between entities, 'equitable' meaning that all parties should get about equally much out of it. The equity should come out of the interaction itself, as structure-generated, not distribution-generated equality.

There is an element of circular reasoning here. On the one hand, we are interested in systems that are developed and peaceful; on the other hand, a condition for a system to be developed is willingness to enter into equitable relations. This need not be so problematic. The hypothesis would be that once the system has attained a certain level of diversity, then diversity will, through symbiosis, generate more diversity. Diversity will feed on itself, so to speak. The result will be an increasingly resilient system, able to withstand injury from within and without. There is a positive dialectic between peace and development, in the sense given to these complex notions.

One conclusion is the image of the strong *human-space* individual: one who encourages several inner tendencies to emerge and interact, develop, mature. *Inner dialogue, inside human beings, is as important as dialogue between humans.* Take Gandhi as an example: the saint and the politician rolled into one, the two interacting with each other in a highly symbiotic way, with neither the saint driving out the politician nor the politician eliminating the saint. And contrast this with the tendencies in many societies, perhaps particularly in modern Occidental civilization, to filter human beings into one particular channel where a limited set of propensities is developed as career-promoting and useful for society, teaching a human being to teach her/himself to suppress other inclinations. The strong soul/body dichotomy dictates either saint or politician, priest or merchant, cathedral or stock exchange, never both.

The way out involves segmentation of the inclinations: being one person at work, a totally different person in the family, and still a different person in leisure/hobby/peer group life. There is something schizophrenic in this formula of missing exchange cycles, of no interaction between the homotopes within that human being. He or she may pay dearly: the price for suppression of important inclinations inside oneself, striving to emerge and develop, may be malignant tumors in somatic terms, schizophrenia or other forms of mental disorders in psychological terms.

From here to *social space* there is but a short step: a strong society according to this type of thinking would combine sociotopes and put them creatively together in exchange cycles. It would not be based on market mechanisms only or planning only, but on both,

at various levels and in various combinations. It would not be based on centralism only or on decentralization only, but on both. The net result would be a society with much more complex economic/political activity than is found in most ‘developed’ countries today, for instance combining a more capitalist and a more socialist sector, both at the local level and at the macro levels of social organization. The Green, the Pink, and the Yellow together, but only insofar as they tolerate each other in relatively soft forms. The authoritarianism of the dark Blue or dark Red alone would be ruled out as against ‘nature’s wisdom’, in favor of economic articulation both at the local and at the national levels, both as market and as plan. And political articulation both as local and national democracy, and as indirect and direct democracy; both as a mechanism for electing representatives or delegates, and as a way of having everybody participate. Participation is one possible input, the output of which is not only social but also human development.

But what about *world space*? Where do we have a theory of this type at the world level? Curiously enough, the closest we come to that is probably the Soviet theory (of the 1930s) of ‘active and peaceful coexistence between the two systems’. The idea is that socialism and capitalism can ‘coexist’ at the world level: in other words, that the world may have more than one sociotope, and that the coexistence should be ‘active’, meaning symbiotic; and ‘peaceful’, meaning tolerant of that diversity. These two components from ecological thinking were all found in the Soviet formula.

But having said that, three critical remarks should immediately be put forward:

- 1 If this is such a good theory for the world, why not also use it *inside* society? Why didn’t the former Soviet Union have both – some capitalist and some socialist republics – even if this might have meant changing the name of the country?
- 2 Why should there be coexistence between only *two* systems? Why not between different systems, instead of assuming that capitalism/socialism exhausts the range of human imagination, which it certainly does not. Is this the usual Occidental fixation on the number 2 as a part of the Manichean fascination with dichotomies (in Russia particularly well known as Bogomolism)?
- 3 Moreover, was this a theory for a goal state of the world, or only for a transition to a world with but one sociotope, socialist countries? Was it simply a formula of convenience because capitalism was still too strong and not yet sufficiently in crisis to dig its own grave?

Despite the validity of these three objections, the formula does point to something very important. Moreover, the formula shows a basis for convergence of thought not only between the four spaces as here indicated, but also between ideological camps in the world of yesterday, combining the avowed tolerance/ pluralism of capitalist/liberal societies with some of the thinking of the socialist camp. If the Soviet Union had practiced its own theory inside its own country it would have been so much better off from 1990 onwards. And the same might also be said about the United States.

*Reproduction* Let us then proceed to row 6: reproduction, making use of system maturity. If in *nature space* the two conditions are satisfied, then there is a natural renewal capability which becomes threatened when diversity and/or symbiotic capability diminish. The same applies in *human space*. It obviously applies to reproduction based on two homotopes, man and woman, and their symbiotic interaction, love, marriage, intercourse, shared child-rearing. Precisely because this is so trivial, it bestows some validity on the scheme. The very condition for the reproduction of human space in a biological scene is already contained in the formula. The theory touches ground in a very basic sense.

This also applies to recovery from states of ill health. The human being who has grown in diversity, letting the various homotopes in him/herself play together, would have a much higher resistance capacity to disease, an immunity system far beyond that attributed to the white blood corpuscles. The highly one-sided athlete dies from over-exertion of the heart in middle age; the intellectual who never in any way takes care of his/her body does the same. Balance is the key to health. But balance is but another word for letting many human flowers grow, inside oneself.

When we then move on to *social space* the logic is the same. A society playing on both market forces and planning forces will be stronger if it has obtained not only diversity in a quantitative sense, but also symbiosis in an interactive sense between the two. It will be stronger both because of the synergy coming out of that interaction, with planning exercising mild guidance on the market and undoing some of the damage resulting from its social Darwinism, at the same time as the market energizes the planning, including giving it something to plan. There is also the second factor: if one of these should fail, for instance because the world market collapses or the planning becomes too rigid, there is always the second one. Walking on two legs is still far better than walking on one; walking on three legs (four, five) better yet when one includes the local basis of the economy.

And the polity? Actually, this whole approach even yields a theoretical basis for democracy – for what is democracy, if not exactly the symbiotic interaction between diverse parties?

It should be noted that both conditions are among the pillars on which democracy is based. If there is no diversity, but only uniformity, homogeneity, not only in terms of attitudes/beliefs but also in terms of actions/structures within the confines of a society, then what is the use of interaction? And if there is only pluralism in attitudes and in the sociotopes, but no interaction between them, then one may get democracy in the sense of counting majorities among the actors, individual and collective – but not the full richness of the system based on give and take, learning and teaching, rubbing attitudes and actions and structures against each other, developing dialectically together, respecting, even enjoying, the right of the other attitude and the other actor to exist. In short, not only love and sexual reproduction, but also the whole basis for democratic thinking will already be embedded in this discourse. Again, that is taken as a confirmation of its validity.

Given these characteristics of a society, reconstruction should in principle come easy. The whole system is vibrant, organic. Hit at some point, there may be injury, but in a mature system there will be plenty of material around for reconstruction. In principle the same applies to the *world space*: the more uniform and devoid of interaction, the more vulnerable; the more diverse and symbiotic, the more capable will the world be of reconstructing itself. In an ever-shrinking world this is an increasingly relevant *problématique*.

**Resilience** And this is where rows 7 and 8 enter the picture. The heading they have in common is ‘Resilience’, to direct violence and structural violence, in the columns referred to as ‘Violence’ and ‘Exploitation’. *Direct violence* is injury to needs, and injury to interests of more complex systems in social and world spaces, meaning to their capacity to satisfy the needs of their members. Needs have been defined in a very broad sense, including both somatic and spiritual needs, and both those hurt by direct violence and those touched by the slow operations, usually unintended, of structures. At the most basic level, this gives us the four types of injury in the world today: the negation of survival needs known as ‘holocaust’; the negation of well-being needs known as ‘silent holocaust’ or structural holocaust – as it may also be called, that dying-out of people, cutting-off of young human flowers, infants, and small children in the Third World; the negation of freedom needs known as the KZ and the Gulag; and the negation of identity needs to the

point where the only focus of identity is one's own ego, one's own needs, not to mention greed – in other words, the 'spiritual death' caused by materialist individualism. Systems with high levels of maturity would have a resilience enabling them to resist such injuries and survive intact.

**Exploitation** Exploitation takes up the same theme but in a more basic way. It goes deeper. The injury is no longer only to one particular need (or at the more complex levels, interest), but to the very capacity for reproduction. The definition of 'exploitation' is any utilization of anything in nature, human, social, or world spaces to the point where that entity is no longer capable of reproducing itself. In *nature space* it is well known what this means: resources have been used beyond their renewal capacity; the result is known as depletion. In *human space* it is also known what this means: a human resource is used beyond its reproduction capacity as an individual: it is simply 'exhausted'. A good night's sleep after enough to eat – this constitutes a basic condition for recovery even from serious strain or injury. One indicator of what is happening would be to take note of the state of the human body, mind, and spirit, every morning, over time, until it is quite clear that recovery is no longer taking place. However, the human reproduction capacity from one generation to the next is extremely resilient, so exploitation in *human space* is ontogenetic rather than phylogenetic, to put it that way. Bio-genetic transmission is robust, even after nuclear genocide on two cities in Japan.

A society no longer able to reconstruct itself is a society deprived of its capacity for autonomous reproduction. There is not only injury to the interests; but also insufficient capacity to undo the injury. In *world space* this also occurs. Civilizations are known to be born, mature, expand, and then contract, becoming senile before they eventually die. The metaphor chosen by Naipaul for India, 'a wounded civilization', is an apt one. On the other hand, it may not apply to India, given the extreme resilience of that particular civilization as evidenced by its existence on earth for at least 3,500 years – more than can be said about most other civilizations.

Injury to reproduction capacity need not necessarily mean death. Reproduction is self-generated, autonomous; but inputs may also come from the outside if the system is not closed. *Nature space* may be artificially kept alive, sustained, through fertilizers and pesticides; *human space* through biochemical and other types of engineering; *social space* in the same way, as today is being done to the Third World through development aid and debt schemes.

A necessary condition is that there are other entities in the four spaces capable of extending this assistance. The outcome is probably that the 'wounded system' will disappear as an autonomous system, to be incorporated into a super-system in which the donor is a part, taking on some of the characteristics of the donor. As an autonomous system it is then dead. In current terminology: this may be sustainability, but it is not reproducibility.

**Maintenance Goal** That brings us to the final row. What is the goal of this entire system maintenance exercise? The goal is not system maturity as such – that is rather a condition on which to build. For *nature space* the goal is ecological stability, meaning a system on which human beings can also draw as a resource without hurting its reproduction capacity. Maturity is a condition for this stability. But stability goes beyond this, and has to be nurtured and developed further.

In *human space* we might stipulate a similar goal: health in the broad sense of the word, that sense of somatic, mental, and social well-being as expressed by the World Health Organization. Again, system maturity is a condition on which somatic, mental, and spiritual health can be built, known as 'human development', or self-realization.

The same applies to *social space*, and to *world space*. System maturity is only a condition for development to take place. It is like a solid foundation, the bedrock on which taller structures can be erected. At the same time it provides us with ideas about how the construction should take place: in a spirit of pluralism. If there are more ideas around, why not practice several of them, not only one; why not let them interact with each other? The history of civilizations seems to indicate that the moment the rulers think they have developed *the* only correct idea and put it into practice with a social order with only one sociotope, then the end of that civilization is in sight. The final solution becomes the terminal solution. The end of history. In the same vein, peace has to be dynamic.

### 5.5 Development: All Countries, All Spaces

The conclusion is clear: development as a program, a theory, a practice has implications for all countries in the world. Instead of the bipolar formula that survived colonialism, MDCs/LDCs (or developed/developing) a better formula would be that all countries are maldeveloped, but in different ways, and that the maldevelopment shows up in the spaces. A great advance forward was made with the focus on nature space after the Stockholm Conference of 1972, the focus on human development in recent UNDP reports, and the focus on social development after the Copenhagen Conference of 1995. The concept of 'sustainability' opens for considerations of reproducibility, even if both theory and practice still leave much to be desired. Very much absent is the concept of world development, how all the efforts can be attuned to each other. And the negative impact of the economicistic culture has so far resisted the many attacks quite successfully.

In short, much work remains – in concepts, theory, and practice. There is no reason to be afraid of holistic approaches. They are total, but they need not be totalitarian. Better small movements forward in all spaces in the direction of development, than giant jumps in only one direction.

# PART IV

## CIVILIZATION THEORY

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### 1

## Cultural Violence

### 1.1 Definition

By ‘cultural violence’ we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.<sup>1</sup> Stars, crosses, and crescents; flags, anthems, and military parades; the ubiquitous portrait of the Leader; inflammatory speeches and posters – all these come to mind. However, let us postpone the examples until section 4 and start with analysis. The features mentioned above are ‘aspects of culture’, not entire cultures. A person encouraging a potential killer, shouting ‘Killing is self-realization!’, may prove that the English language is capable of expressing such thoughts, but not that the English language as such is violent. Entire cultures can hardly be classified as violent; this is one reason for preferring the expression ‘aspect A of culture C is an example of cultural violence’ to cultural stereotypes like ‘culture C is violent’.

On the other hand, cultures could be imagined and even encountered with not only one but a set of aspects so violent, extensive, and diverse, spanning all cultural domains, that the step from talking about cases of cultural violence to violent cultures may be warranted. For that, a systematic research process is needed. This chapter is part of that process.

One place to start would be to clarify ‘cultural violence’ by searching for its negation. If the opposite of violence is peace, the subject matter of peace research/peace studies, then the opposite of cultural violence would be ‘cultural peace’, meaning aspects of a culture that serve to justify and legitimize direct peace and structural peace. If many and diverse aspects of that kind are found in a culture, we can refer to it as a ‘peace culture’. A major task of peace research, and the peace movement in general, is that never-ending search for a peace culture – problematic, because of the temptation to institutionalize that culture, making it obligatory, with the hope of internalizing it everywhere. And that would already be direct violence,<sup>2</sup> imposing a culture.

Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong. Just as political science is about two problems – the use of power and the legitimization of the use of power – violence studies are about two problems: the use of violence and the legitimization of that use. The psychological mechanism would be internalization.<sup>3</sup> The study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable; an example being ‘murder on behalf of the

country as right, on behalf of oneself wrong'. Another way is by making reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent. Obviously this is more easily done with some forms of violence than with others; an example being *abortus provocatus*. Hence, peace studies is in need of a violence typology, in much the same way as a pathology is among the prerequisites for health studies.

## 1.2 A Typology of Direct and Structural Violence

I see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to *life*, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of violence are also violence. Combining the distinction between direct and structural violence with four classes of basic needs we get the typology of Table 1.1. The four classes of basic needs – an outcome of extensive dialogues in many parts of the world – are: *survival needs* (negation: death, mortality); *well-being needs* (negation: misery, morbidity); *identity, meaning needs* (negation: alienation); and *freedom needs* (negation: repression).<sup>4</sup>

Table 1.1 *A Typology of Violence*

	Survival needs	Well-being needs	Identity needs	Freedom needs
Direct violence	Killing	Maiming Siege, sanctions Misery	Desocialization Resocialization Secondary citizen	Repression Detention Expulsion
Structural violence	Exploitation A (strong)	Exploitation B (weak)	Penetration Segmentation	Marginalization Fragmentation

The result is eight types of violence with some subtypes, easily identified for direct violence but more complex for structural violence (see Table 1.1). A first comment could be that this table is anthropocentric. A fifth column could be added at the beginning for the rest of Nature, the *sine qua non* for human existence. 'Ecological balance' is probably the most frequently found term used for environment system maintenance. If this is not satisfied, the result is ecological degradation, breakdown, imbalance. Eco-balance corresponds to survival + well-being + freedom + identity for human basic maintenance. If not satisfied, the result is human degradation. The sum of all five, for all, will define 'peace'.

But 'ecological balance' is a very broad category encompassing abiotia (non-life) and biota (life) alike. Violence defined as insults to life would focus on biota, only indirectly on abiotia. Moreover, there are difficult and important questions, such as 'balance for whom?' For human beings to reproduce themselves? At what level of economic activity and what numbers? Or, for the 'environment' (what an anthropocentric term!) to reproduce itself? All parts, equally, at what level, what numbers? Or for both?

Second, the mega-versions of the pale words used above for violence could well be repeated. For 'killing' read *extermination, holocaust, genocide*. For 'misery' read *silent holocaust*. For 'alienation' read *spiritual death*. For 'repression' read GULAG/KZ. For 'ecological degradation' read *ecocide*. For all of this together read 'omnicide'. The words might sound like someone's effort to be apocalyptic – were it not for the fact that the world has experienced all of this during the last 50 years alone, closely associated with the names of Hitler, Stalin, and Reagan<sup>5</sup>, and Japanese militarism.<sup>6</sup> In short, violence studies, an indispensable part of peace studies, may be a cabinet of horrors; but like pathology they reflect a reality to be known and understood.

Then some comments on the content of Table 1.1 as it stands. The first category of violence, killing, is clear enough, as is maiming. Added together they constitute 'casualties', used in assessing the magnitude of a war. But 'war' is only one particular form of orchestrated violence, usually with at least one actor, a government. How narrow it is to see peace as the opposite of war, and limit peace studies to war-avoidance studies, and more particularly avoidance of big wars or super-wars (defined as wars between big powers or superpowers), and even more particularly to the limitation, abolition, or control of super-weapons. Important interconnections among types of violence are left out, particularly the way in which one type of violence may be reduced or controlled at the expense of increase or maintenance of another. Like 'side-effects' in health studies, they are very important and easily overlooked. Peace research should avoid that mistake.<sup>7</sup>

Included under maiming is also the insult to human needs brought about by siege/blockade (classical term) and sanctions (modern term). To some, this is 'nonviolence', since direct and immediate killing is avoided. To the victims, however, it may mean slow but intentional killing through malnutrition and lack of medical attention, hitting the weakest first, the children, the elderly, the poor, the women. By making the causal chain longer the actor avoids having to face the violence directly. He even 'gives the victims a chance', usually to submit, meaning loss of freedom and identity instead of loss of life and limbs, trading the last two for the first two types of direct violence. But the mechanism is the threat to the livelihood brought about by siege/boycott/sanctions. The Gandhian type of economic boycott combined refusal to buy British textiles with the collecting of funds for the merchants, in order not to confuse the issue by threatening their livelihood.

The category of 'alienation' can be defined in terms of socialization, meaning the internalization of culture. There is a double aspect: to be desocialized away from own culture and to be resocialized into another culture – like the prohibition and imposition of languages. The one does not presuppose the other. But they often come together in the category of second-class citizenship, where the subjected group (not necessarily a 'minority') is forced to express the dominant culture and not its own, at least not in public space. The problem is, of course, that any socialization of a child – in the family, at school, by society at large – is also forced, a kind of brainwashing, giving the child no choice. Consequently, we might arrive at the conclusion (not that far-fetched) that nonviolent socialization is to give the child a choice, e.g. by offering him/her more than one cultural idiom.

The category of 'repression' has a similar double definition: the 'freedom from' and the 'freedom to' of the International Bill of Human Rights,<sup>8</sup> with historical and cultural limitations.<sup>9</sup> Two categories have been added explicitly because of their significance as concomitants of other types of violence: detention, meaning locking people in (prisons, concentration camps), and expulsion, meaning locking people out (banishing them abroad or to distant parts of the country).

To discuss the categories of structural violence we need an image of a violent structure, and a vocabulary, a discourse, in order to identify the aspects and see how they relate to the needs categories. The archetypal violent structure, in my view, has exploitation as a center-piece. This simply means that some, the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs.<sup>10</sup> There is 'unequal exchange', a euphemism. The underdogs may in fact be so disadvantaged that they die (starve, waste away from diseases) from it: exploitation A. Or they may be left in a permanent, unwanted state of misery, usually including malnutrition and illness: exploitation B. The way people die differs: in the Third World, from diarrhea and immunity deficiencies; in the 'developed' countries, avoidably and prematurely, from cardiovascular diseases and malignant tumors. All of this happens within complex structures and at the end of long, highly ramified causal chains and cycles.

A violent structure leaves marks not only on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit. The next four terms can be seen as parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure. They function by impeding consciousness formation and mobilization, two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. *Penetration*, implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak, combined with *segmentation*, giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on, will do the first job. And *marginalization*, keeping the underdogs on the outside, combined with *fragmentation*, keeping the underdogs away from each other, will do the second job. However, these four should also be seen as structural violence in their own right, and more particularly as variations on the general theme of structurally built-in repression. They have all been operating in gender contexts – even if women do not always have higher mortality and morbidity rates but in fact may have higher life expectancy than men, provided they survive gender-specific abortion, infanticide, and the first years of childhood. In short, exploitation and repression go hand in hand, as violence, but they are not identical.

How about violence against nature? There is the direct violence of slashing, burning, etc., as in a war. The structural form of such violence would be more insidious, not intended to destroy nature but nevertheless doing so: the pollution and depletion associated with modern industry, leading to dying forests, ozone holes, global warming, and so on. What happens is transformation of nature through *industrial activity*, leaving non-degradable residues and depleting non-renewable resources, combined with a *world-encompassing commercialization* that makes the consequences non-visible to the perpetrators.<sup>11</sup> Two powerful structures are at work, indeed, legitimized by economic growth. The buzzword ‘sustainable economic growth’ may prove to be yet another form of cultural violence.

### 1.3 Relating Three Types of Violence

With these comments ‘violence’ is defined in extension by the types given in Table 1.1, using direct and structural violence as overarching categories or ‘super-types’. ‘Cultural violence’ can now be added as the third super-type and put in the third corner of a (vicious) *violence triangle* as an image. When the triangle is stood on its ‘direct’ and ‘structural violence’ feet, the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimizer of both. Standing the triangle on its ‘direct violence’ head yields the image of structural and cultural sources of direct violence. Of course, the triangle always remains a triangle – but the image produced is different, and all six positions (three pointing downward, three upward) invoke somewhat different stories, all worth telling.

Despite the symmetries there is a basic difference in the time relation of the three concepts of violence. Direct violence is an *event*; structural violence is a *process* with ups and downs; cultural violence is an *invariant*, a ‘*permanent*’,<sup>12</sup> remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformations of basic culture. Put in the useful terms of the French *Annales* school in history: *événemmentielle*, *conjoncturelle*, *la longue durée*. The three forms of violence enter time differently, somewhat like the difference in earthquake theory between the earthquake as an event, the movement of the tectonic plates as a process, and the fault line as a more permanent condition.

This leads to a *violence strata* image (complementing the triangle image) of the phenomenology of violence, useful as a paradigm generating a wide variety of hypotheses. At the bottom is the steady flow through time of cultural violence, a substratum from which the other two can derive their nutrients. In the next stratum the rhythms of structural violence are located. Patterns of exploitation are building up, wearing out, or torn down, with the protective accompaniment of penetration-segmentation preventing conscious-

ness formation, and fragmentation-marginalization preventing organization against exploitation and repression. And at the top, visible to the unguided eye and to barefoot empiricism, is the stratum of direct violence with the whole record of direct cruelty perpetrated by human beings against each other and against other forms of life and nature in general.

Generally, a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified. The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage,<sup>13</sup> and counter-violence to keep the cage intact. Ordinary, regular criminal activity is partly an effort by the underdog to 'get out', to redistribute wealth, get even, get revenge ('blue-collar crime'), or by somebody to remain or become a topdog, sucking the structure for what it is worth ('white-collar crime'). Both direct and structural violence create needs-deficits. When this happens suddenly we can talk of trauma. When it happens to a group, a collectivity, we have the collective trauma that can sediment into the collective subconscious and become raw material for major historical processes and events. The underlying assumption is simple: 'violence breeds violence'. Violence is needs-deprivation; needs-deprivation is *serious*; one reaction is direct violence. But that is not the only reaction. There could also be a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation/frustration syndrome that shows up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal. Given a choice between a boiling, violent and a freezing, apathetic society as reaction to massive needs-deprivation, topdogs tend to prefer the latter. They prefer 'governability' to 'trouble, anarchy'. They love 'stability'. Indeed, a major form of cultural violence indulged in by ruling elites is to blame the victim of structural violence who casts the first stone, not in a glasshouse but to get out of the iron cage, branding him as 'aggressor'. The category of structural violence should make such cultural violence transparent. However, the violence strata image does not define the only causal chain in the violence triangle. There are linkages and causal flows in all six directions, and cycles connecting all three may start at any point. This is a good reason why the triangle may sometimes be a better image than the three-tier stratum model. Africans are captured, forced across the Atlantic to work as slaves; millions are killed in the process – in Africa, on board, in the Americas. This massive direct violence over centuries seeps down and sediments as massive structural violence, with whites as the master topdogs and blacks as the slave underdogs, producing and reproducing massive cultural violence with racist ideas everywhere. After some time, direct violence is forgotten, slavery is forgotten, and only two labels show up, pale enough for college textbooks: 'discrimination' for massive structural violence and 'prejudice' for massive cultural violence. Sanitation of language: itself cultural violence.

The vicious violence cycle can also start in the structural violence corner. Social differentiation slowly takes on vertical characteristics with increasingly unequal exchange, and these social facts would then be in search of social acts for their maintenance, and cultural violence for their justification – to generalize 'materialist' (meaning structural) Marxist theory. Or, the vicious cycle could start in combined direct and structural violence, with one group treating another group so badly that they feel a need for justification and eagerly accept any cultural rationale handed to them. More than one thousand years ago Nordic Vikings attacked, cheated, and killed Russians. Might that not be a good enough reason for formulating the idea that Russians are dangerous, wild, primitive – meaning that one day they may come back and do the same to us as we did to them?<sup>14</sup> Even to the point that when Germany attacked Norway in April 1940, the official conclusion became that the Russians are dangerous because they may one day do the same. And here we see the surprise attack trauma. Could there be still a deeper stratum,

human nature, with genetically transmitted dispositions or at least predispositions for aggression (direct violence) and domination (structural violence)? The human potential for direct and structural violence is certainly there – as is the potential for direct and structural peace. In my view, however, the most important argument against a biological determinism that postulates a drive in human nature for aggression and dominance, comparable to drives for food and sex, is the high level of *variability* in aggressiveness and dominance. We find people seeking food and sex under (almost) all external circumstances. But aggression and dominance exhibit tremendous variation, depending on the context, including the structural and cultural conditions. Of course, the drive may still be there, only not strong enough to assert itself under all circumstances. In that case, the concern of the peace researcher would be to know those circumstances, and to explore how to remove or modify them. Here my hypothesis would be that the two terms ‘structure’ and ‘culture’ can accommodate this exploration very comfortably.

Let us reap an important harvest from this taxonomic exercise: we can use it to clarify the concept of *militarization* as a process, and *militarism* as the ideology accompanying that process. Obviously, one aspect is a general inclination toward direct violence in the form of real or threatened military action, whether provoked or not, whether to settle conflict or initiate it. This inclination brings in its wake the production and deployment of the appropriate hardware and software. However, it would be superficial to study militarization only in terms of past military activity records, and present production and deployment patterns;<sup>15</sup> this would lead to facile conclusions in terms of personnel, budget, and arms control only. Good weeding presupposes getting at the roots, in this case at the structural and cultural roots, as suggested by the three-strata paradigm. Concretely, this means identifying structural and cultural aspects that would tend to reproduce the readiness for military action, production, and deployment. This would include mobbing of young boys at school, primogeniture,<sup>16</sup> unemployment, and exploitation in general. Further, the use of military production and deployment to stimulate economic growth and economic distribution; heavily nationalist, racist, and sexist ideologies,<sup>17</sup> and so on. The combination of building military teaching and exercise components into high school and university curricula and structure,<sup>18</sup> and disseminating militarism as culture, should merit particular attention. Yet structure and culture are usually not included in ‘arms control’ studies, both being highly sensitive areas. Those taboos have to be broken.

#### 1.4 Examples of Cultural Violence

We turn now to the listing of six cultural domains mentioned in the introduction – religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science – giving one or two examples of cultural violence from each domain. The logic of the scheme is simple: identify the cultural element and show how it can, empirically or potentially, be used to legitimize direct or structural violence.

<sup>1</sup> *Religion* In all religions there is somewhere the sacred, *das Heilige*; let us call it ‘god’. A basic distinction can be made between a transcendental God outside us and an immanent god inside us, maybe also inside all life.<sup>19</sup> The Judaism of the Torah, founded almost 4,000 years ago, envisaged God as a male deity residing outside planet Earth. A catastrophic idea; a clear case of transcendentalism as a metaphor from which many consequences follow, taken over by the other Semitic or Occidental religions, Christianity and Islam. With god outside us, as God, even ‘above’ ('Our Father, who art in Heaven') it is not inevitable but indeed likely that some people will be seen as closer to that God than others, even as ‘higher’. Moreover, in the general Occidental tradition of not only

dualism but Manicheism, with sharp dichotomies between good and evil, there would also have to be something like an evil Satan corresponding to the good God, for reasons of symmetry. Again transcendental and immanent representations are possible, with God and Satan possessing or at least choosing their own; or with god or satan – not to mention god *and* satan – being inside us. All combinations are found in all Occidental religions. But the focus here is on the hard version, belief in a transcendental God and a transcendental Satan.

Whom does God choose? Would it not be reasonable to believe that He chooses those most in His image, leaving it to Satan to take the others, as indicated in Table 1.2? This would give us a double dichotomy with God, the Chosen Ones (by God), the Unchosen Ones (by God, chosen by Satan) and Satan; the chosen heading for salvation and closeness to God in Heaven, the unchosen for damnation and closeness to Satan in Hell. However, Heaven and Hell can also be reproduced on earth, as a foretaste or indication of the afterlife. Misery/luxury can be seen as preparations for Hell/Heaven – and social class as the finger of God.

Table 1.2 *The Chosen and the Unchosen*

God chooses	And leaves to Satan	With the consequence of
Human species	Animals, plants, nature	Speciesism, ecocide
Men	Women	Sexism, witch-burning
His people	The others	Nationalism, imperialism
Whites	Colored	Racism, colonialism
Upper classes	Lower classes	'Classism', exploitation
True believers	Heretics, pagans	'Meritism', Inquisition

An immanent concept of god as residing inside us would make any such dichotomy an act against god. With a transcendental God, however, this all becomes meaningful. The first three choices listed in Table 1.2 are found as early as Genesis. The last one is more typical of the New Testament with its focus on right belief, not just on right deeds. The other two are found as scattered references to slaves, and to rendering unto the Lord what is of the Lord and unto Caesar what is Caesar's. The upper classes referred to as being closer to God have actually traditionally been three: Clergy, for the obvious reason that they possessed special insight in how to communicate with God; Aristocracy, particularly the *rex gratia dei*; and Capitalists, if they are successful. The lower classes and the poor were also chosen, even as the first to enter Paradise (the Sermon on the Mount), but only in the after-life. The six together constitute a hard Judaism–Christianity–Islam which can be softened by giving up some positions and turned into softer Islam, softer Christianity, and softer Judaism by adopting a more immanent concept of god (sufism, Francis of Assisi, Spinoza). The consequences in the right-hand column of Table 1.2 could also follow from premises other than a theology of chosenness; the Table only postulates contributing, sufficient causes.

For a contemporary example consider the policies of Israel with regard to the Palestinians. The Chosen People even have a Promised Land, the *Eretz Yisrael*. They behave as one would expect, translating chosenness, a vicious type of cultural violence, into all eight types of direct and structural violence listed in Table 1.1. There is killing; maiming; material deprivation by denying West Bank inhabitants what is needed for livelihood; there is desocialization within the theocratic state of Israel with second-class citizenship to non-Jews; there is detention, individual expulsion, and perennial threat of massive expulsion. There is exploitation, at least as exploitation B.

The four structural concomitants of exploitation are all well developed: efforts to make the Palestinians see themselves as born underdogs, at most heading for second-class citizenship by 'getting used to it'; giving them small segments of economic activity; keeping them outside Jewish society both within and outside the Green Line, and dealing with Palestinians in a *divide et impera* mode (as in the Camp David process), never as one people. There is neither massive extermination nor massive exploitation A of the sort found in many Third World countries under the debt burden, which above all hits children. The violence is more evenly distributed over the whole repertory of eight types. To some, who set their sights low, defined by Hitlerite or Stalinist extermination and Reaganite exploitation A, this means that no mass violence is going on, thus proving how humane the Israelis are. Such perspectives are also examples of cultural violence, indicative of how moral standards have become in this century.<sup>20</sup>

**2 Ideology** With the decline, and perhaps death, not only of the transcendental but also the immanent God through secularization, we could expect successors to religion in the form of political ideologies, and to God in the form of the modern state, to exhibit some of the same character traits. Religion and God may be dead – but not the much more basic idea of sharp and value-loaded dichotomies. The lines may no longer be drawn between God, the Chosen, the Unchosen, and Satan. Modernity would reject God and Satan but might demand a distinction between Chosen and Unchosen; let us call them Self and Other. Archetype: nationalism, with State as God's successor.

A steep gradient is then constructed, inflating, even exalting, the value of Self; deflating, even debasing, the value of Other. At that point, structural violence can start operating. It will tend to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: people become debased by being exploited, and they are exploited because they are seen as debased, dehumanized. When Other is not only dehumanized but has been successfully converted into an 'it', deprived of humanness, the stage is set for any type of direct violence, which is then blamed on the victim. This is then reinforced by the category of the 'dangerous it', the 'vermin', or 'bacteria' (as Hitler described the Jews); the 'class enemy' (as Stalin described the 'kulaks'); the 'mad dog' (as Reagan described Qadhafi); the 'cranky criminals' (as Washington experts describe 'terrorists'). Extermination becomes a psychologically possible duty. The SS guards become heroes to be celebrated for their devotion to duty.

Using the six dimensions of Table 1.2, we can easily see how the chosen ones can remain chosen without any transcendental God. Thus, only human beings are seen as capable of self-reflection; men are stronger/more logical than women; certain nations are modern/carriers of civilization and the historical process more than others; whites are more intelligent/logical than non-whites; in modern 'equal opportunity' society the best are at the top and hence entitled to power and privilege. And certain tenets of belief in modernization, development, progress are seen as apodictic; not to believe in them reflects badly on the non-believer, not on the belief.

All of these ideas have been and still are strong in Western culture, although the faith in male, Western, white innate superiority has now been badly shaken by the struggles for liberation by women, non-Western peoples (such as the Japanese economic success over the West), and colored people inside Western societies. The United States, the most Christian nation on earth, has served as a major battleground, inside and outside, for these struggles. Reducing US cultural violence becomes particularly important precisely because that country sets the tone for others.

These three assumptions – all based on ascribed distinctions, gender, race, and nation already given at birth – are hard to maintain in an achievement-oriented society. But if modern society is a meritocracy, then to deny power and privilege to those on the top is to deny merit itself. To deny a minimum of 'modern orientation' is to open the field to any

belief, including denying power and privilege for the meritorious and a strict border between human life and other forms of life. In short, residual chosenness will stay on for a while as speciesism, ‘classism’, and ‘meritism’, regardless of the status of God and Satan.

The ideology of *nationalism*, rooted in the figure of Chosen People and justified through religion or ideology, should be seen in conjunction with the ideology of the state, statism. Article 9 in the postwar Japanese Peace Constitution, that short-lived effort to make some cultural peace, stipulated that ‘The right of belligerence of the [Japan] state will not be recognized’. Evidently Japan had forfeited that right – whereas others, presumably the victors, exited from the war with the right intact, maybe even enhanced.

Where did that right of belligerence come from? There are feudal origins, a direct carry-over from the prerogative of the *rex gratia dei* to have an *ultima ratio regis*. The state can then be seen as an organization needed by the Prince to exact enough taxes (and, after 1793, conscripts) to pay for increasingly expensive armies and navies. The state was created to maintain the military rather than vice versa, as Krippendorff has maintained.<sup>21</sup> But the state can also be seen as one of the successors to God, inheriting the right to destroy life (execution), if not the right to create it. Many also see the state as having the right to control the creation of life, exerting authority superior to that of the pregnant woman.<sup>22</sup>

Combine nationalism with steep Self–Other gradients, and statism with the right, even the duty to exercise ultimate power, and we get the ugly ideology of the nation-state, another catastrophic idea. Killing in war is now done in the name of the ‘nation’, comprising all citizens with some shared ethnicity. The new idea of democracy can be accommodated with transition formulas such as *vox populi, vox dei*. Execution is also done in the name of ‘the people of the state X’; but like war has to be ordered by the State. Much of the pro-life sentiment against abortion is probably rooted in a feeling that abortion on the decision of the mother erodes the power monopoly of the state over life. If anti-abortion sentiment was really rooted in a sense of sacredness of the fetus (*homo res sacra hominibus*), then the pro-life people would also tend to be pacifists; they would be against the death penalty, and be outraged at the high mortality levels of blacks in the USA and others around the world. Of course, the priority for choice rather than life is another type of cultural violence, based on a denial of fetal life as human, making the fetus an ‘it’.<sup>23</sup>

Combine the ideology of the nation-state with a theologically based Chosen People complex and the stage is set for disaster. Israel (Yahweh), Iran (Allah), Japan (Amaterasu-Omikami), South Africa (a Dutch ‘reformed’ God), the United States (the Judeo-Christian Yahweh-God) are relatively clear cases; capable of anything in a crisis. Nazi Germany (the Nazi Odin/Wotan-God) was in the same category. Russia after Gorbachev – who saw himself as the successor to Lenin after 61 years of stagnation – is probably still laboring under its calling as a Chosen People, chosen by History (capital H) for some special mission. And France has the same superiority complex – only that any idea of being chosen by somebody would indicate that there is something above France, an intolerable idea. France chose herself, *un peuple élu, mais par lui-même*, exemplified by the archetypal act when Napoleon was to be crowned by the Pope in 1804. He took the crown from his hands and crowned himself.

**3 Language** Certain languages – those with a Latin vocabulary base such as Italian, Spanish, French (and modern English), but not those with a Germanic base such as German and the Scandinavian languages – make women invisible by using the same word for the male gender as for the entire human species. The important movement for

non-sexist writing is a good example of deliberate cultural transformation away from cultural violence.<sup>24</sup> The task must have looked impossible when some courageous women got started, and yet it is already bearing fruit. Then there are more subtle aspects of language where the violence is less clear, more implicit. A comparison of basic features of Indo-European languages with Chinese and Japanese brings out certain space and time rigidities imposed by the Indo-European languages;<sup>25</sup> a corresponding rigidity in the logical structure with strong emphasis on the possibility of arriving at valid inferences (hence the Western pride in being so ‘logical’); a tendency to distinguish linguistically between essence and apparition, leaving room for the immortality of the essence, and by implication for the legitimacy of destroying what is only the apparition. However, this is deep culture, the deeper layers of that bottom stratum in the violence triangle. The relations to direct and structural violence become much more tenuous.

*4 Art* Let me make just one point, important for the present emergence of a European Union as the successor to the European Community of 1967.<sup>26</sup> How does Europe understand itself? The story tied to the ‘Europa’ of Greek mythology is not very helpful. The understanding of Europe as the negation of the non-European environment carries us much further. And that environment at the time of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Period was the gigantic Ottoman Empire to the east and the south, reaching the walls of Vienna (1683), conquering Syria and Egypt (1517), vassalizing Tripolitania, Tunisia, and Algeria afterwards, leaving only the Sultanate of Fez and Morocco with the small Spanish Habsburg enclaves, two of them still there. The only non-Oriental (meaning Arab, Muslim) environment was Russia, poor, vast in space and time. Sleeping, but giant.<sup>27</sup>

Europe thus had to understand herself as the negation of the enemy to the south and the southeast. Thus developed the metaphor of ‘oriental despotism’, still very prominent in the European mind, to come to grips with the ‘environment’. Typical of the ‘oriental despot’ was callousness and arbitrariness. Like the European Prince he killed: but he ruled by his own whim, not by law. Sexually he enjoyed an access (the harem) which his European colleagues could only approximate by sneaking out at night to violate peasant girls. So did Muslims not constrained by Christian monogamy. In France a school of painting emerged in the 19th century representing oriental despotism in a setting of sex and/or violence. Henri Regnault’s *Execution Without Process* and Eugène Delacroix’s *The Death of Sardanapal* are good examples. Hegel, copied by Marx, also saw oriental despotism and oriental (or Asian) mode of production as negative, homogeneous, stagnant.

It belongs to this syndrome that the non-Arab part of the semicircle around Europe, Russia, also had to be seen in terms of oriental despotism. That ‘despotism’ could fit the tsars as a description is perhaps less objectionable – but ‘oriental’? The figure has probably influenced the European image of Russia and the Soviet Union for centuries, and still does, as intended slurs on either.

*5 Empirical Science* One example of cultural violence would be neoclassical economic doctrine, understanding itself as the science of economic activity. Strongly influenced by the Adam Smith tradition, neoclassical economics now studies empirically the system prescribed by its own doctrines, and finds its own self-fulfilling prophecies often confirmed in empirical reality. One part of neoclassical dogma or ‘conventional wisdom’ is trade theory based on ‘comparative advantages’, originally postulated by David Ricardo, developed further by Heckscher and Ohlin and by Jan Tinbergen. This is the doctrine that prescribes that each country should enter the world market with those products for which that country has a comparative advantage in terms of production factors.

In practice this means that countries well endowed with raw materials and unskilled

labor are to extract raw materials, while those well endowed with capital and technology, skilled labor and scientists, are to process them. And thus it was that Portugal gave up its textile industry and became a mediocre wine producer, whereas England got the stimulus, the challenge needed to develop its industrial capacity still further. The consequences of this doctrine in the form of today's vertical division of labor in the world are visible for most people to see. Structural violence everywhere: among countries and within countries.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, the doctrine of comparative advantages serves as a justification for a rough division of the world in terms of the degree of processing which countries impart to their export products. Since this is roughly proportionate to the amount of challenge they receive in the production process, the principle of comparative advantages sentences countries to stay where the production-factor profile has landed them, for geographical and historical reasons. Of course, there is no law, legal or empirical, to the effect that countries cannot do something to improve their production profile – a basic point made by the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu.<sup>29</sup> But to do so is not easy when there are immediate gains to be made by not changing the status quo, for those who own the raw materials/commodities. And thus it is that the 'law' of comparative advantages legitimizes a structurally intolerable status quo. In short, this 'law' is a piece of cultural violence buried in the very core of economics.

**6 Formal Science** But surely this cannot be said of mathematics? This is not so obvious. If mathematics is viewed as a formal game with one basic rule, that a theorem  $T$  and its negation  $\neg T$  cannot both be valid, then there may be violent consequences. Even when mathematical logic explores polyvalent logic, the tool used is bivalent logic with its strict line between valid and invalid; *tertium non datur*. And it is easily seen that it has to be that way, inference being the mortar of the mathematical edifice, with *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* being the key procedures. No inference can be made with ambiguous truth values for the antecedents or the inference.<sup>30</sup>

This means that mathematics disciplines us into a particular mode of thought highly compatible with black/white thinking and polarization in personal, social, and world spaces. The either/or character of mathematical thought makes it an exciting game: but as a model for a highly dialectic human, social, and world reality it is far from adequate. And *adequatio* is the basic requirement for culture, symbolic space, if it is to guide us in visioning a less violent potential reality.

**7 Cosmology** We return to the problem of the transition from cultural violence to violent culture. As mentioned in section 1.1 above, such global judgements could be arrived at by identifying an extensive and diverse number of cultural aspects, in religious and ideological thought, in language and art, in empirical and formal science; all of them serving to justify violence. However, there is also another approach: to explore the substratum of the culture for its 'deep culture(s)', of which there may be several.<sup>31</sup> We would be looking at the roots of the roots, so to speak: the cultural genetic code that generates cultural elements and reproduces itself through them. That this becomes very speculative is not so problematic; it is in the nature of science to postulate deeper layers, spelling out implications, testing the hard core of the theory around the ragged edges.

The cosmology concept is designed to harbor that substratum of deeper assumptions about reality,<sup>32</sup> defining what is normal and natural. Assumptions at this level of depth in the collective subconscious are not easily unearthed, not to mention uprooted. And yet, it is at this level that occidental culture shows so many violent features that the whole culture starts looking violent. There is chosenness, there are strong Center-Periphery gradients. There is the urgency, the *apocalypse now!* syndrome precluding the slow, patient

building and enactment of structural and direct peace. There is atomistic, dichotomous thought with deductive chains counteracting the unity-of-means-and-ends. There is arrogance toward nature counteracting the unity-of-life. There is a strong tendency to individualize and rank human beings, breaking up the unity-of-man. And there is a transcendental, absolute God with awesome successors. The whole culture possesses a tremendous potential for violence that can be expressed at the more manifest cultural level and then be used to justify the unjustifiable. That there is also peace in the Occident, sometimes even emanating from the Occident, is something of a miracle, possibly due to the softer strands. This is a major theme in the rest of Part IV.

The problem is that this type of thinking easily leads to a sense of hopelessness. Changing the cultural genetic code looks at least as difficult as changing the biological genetic code. Moreover, even if it were possible, 'cultural engineering' might be a form of violence as problematic as genetic engineering is proving. Should it be left to 'chance' – meaning to those with power and privilege?<sup>33</sup> This is a very difficult and important field for future peace research, to be explored in Chapter 5.

### 1.5 Gandhi and Cultural Violence

What did Gandhi himself have to say about these tricky problems, open as he was to exploring alternatives to both direct and structural violence? His answer was to reproduce, from his ecumenism, two axioms that in a sense summarize Gandhism: *unity-of-life* and *unity-of-means-and-ends*. The first follows from the second if it is assumed that no life, and particularly no human life, can be used as a means to an end. If the end is livelihood, then the means has to be life-enhancing. But how do we understand 'unity'? A reasonable interpretation, using the ideas developed in the preceding sections, would be in terms of closeness, against separation. In our mental universe all forms of life, particularly human life, should enjoy closeness and not be kept apart by steep Self–Other gradients that drive wedges in *social space*. Any justification derived from the hard core of a culture, e.g. a calling as a Chosen People, would be rejected when it conflicted with this even higher, even 'harder' axiom.

We can understand unity-of-means-and-ends as bringing other mental elements, such as acts, and facts brought about by acts, close together. They should not be kept separate by long causal chains that drive wedges in *social time*. To initiate long social sequences leading to take-off or revolution, investing in industry or the industrial proletariat, is not good enough. The means must be good, in themselves, not in terms of distant goals, way down the road – as witnessed by the millions sacrificed on the altars of industrialism in the name of 'growth/capitalism' and 'revolution/socialism'. Justification derived from empirical confirmation, 'it works', is rejected when it conflicts with this even higher, even 'harder' axiom.

Any Self–Other gradient can be used to justify violence against those lower down on the scale of worthiness; any causal chain can be used to justify the use of violent means to obtain nonviolent ends. Gandhi would be as skeptical of Marxist ideas of revolution and hard work, of sacrificing a generation or two for presumed bliss the day after tomorrow, as he would of liberal/conservative ideas of hard work and entrepreneurship, of sacrificing a social class or two for the bliss of the upper classes even today.

The conclusion drawn by Gandhi from these two axioms was respect for the sacredness of all life (hence vegetarianism) and acceptance of the precept 'take care of the means and the ends will take care of themselves'. Thus the unity-of-life doctrine is very different from a doctrine of 'ecological balance', since it means enhancing *all* life, not just human life; and all human life, not just the categories chosen by some (to Gandhi, distorted or

misunderstood) religion or ideology. And the unity-of-means-and-ends would lead to a doctrine of synchrony, calling for work on all issues simultaneously<sup>34</sup> rather than the diachrony of one big step that is assumed to trigger the *force motrice*. *Archetype*: the Buddhist wheel where elements of thought, speech, and action tend to be at the same level of priority, not a Christian pyramid with more focus on some than others (e.g. faith vs. deeds).<sup>35</sup>

## 1.6 Conclusion

Violence can start at any corner in the direct–structural–cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners. With the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic, like a vendetta. This triangular syndrome of violence should then be contrasted in the mind with a triangular syndrome of peace in which cultural peace engenders structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and direct peace with acts of cooperation, friendliness, and love. It could be a virtuous rather than vicious triangle, also self-reinforcing. This virtuous triangle would be obtained by working on all three corners at the same time, not assuming that basic change in one will automatically lead to changes in the other two.

But does this inclusion of culture not broaden the agenda for peace studies considerably? Of course it does. Why should peace studies be narrower than, for instance, health studies (medical science)? Is peace easier than health, less complex? And how about biology, the study of life; physics, the study of matter; chemistry, the study of the composition of matter; mathematics, the study of abstract form – all of these are fairly broad. Why should peace studies be more modest? Why draw borderlines at all in a field so terribly important in its consequences, and also so attractive to the inquisitive mind? If culture is relevant to violence and peace, and surely it is, then only the dogmatic mind will exclude it from explorations as penetrating and tenacious as the countless studies devoted to the many aspects of direct and structural violence. The only thing that is new is that the field opens for new areas of competence, such as the humanities, history of ideas, philosophy, theology. In other words, an invitation to new disciplines to join the quest for peace, and to established researchers in the field to retool – a little. In so doing, maybe peace research could even make some contribution to founding a major scientific enterprise still conspicuously absent from the pantheon of academic pursuits, *the science of human culture*, '*culturology*'. Today the field is divided between 'humanities' for 'higher' civilizations and cultural anthropology for 'lower' ones; with philosophy, history of ideas, and theology filling in some pieces. Concepts like 'cultural violence' span all of that, just as 'structural violence' spans the whole spectrum of social sciences. Peace research has so much to learn, so much to take, to receive. Perhaps we shall also in due time have some contributions to make: in the spirit of diversity, symbiosis, and equity.

## Notes

1. 'Cultural violence' follows in the footsteps of the concept of 'structural violence'; see my 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, pp. 167–191. For a more recent and very constructive critique and effort to develop the idea further, see Michael Roth, 'Strukturelle und personale Gewalt: Probleme der Operationalisierung des Gewaltbegriffs von Johan Galtung', *HSFK Forschungsbericht*, no. 1, April, 1988. A similar concept is introduced in Hans Saner, 'Personale, strukturelle und symbolische Gewalt', pp. 73–95 in *Hoffnung und Gewalt. Zur Ferne des Friedens* (Basel: Lenos & Z. Verlag, 1982).

2. There have been many efforts to create the 'new man' (and woman?). In the West each new

branch of Christianity is an effort, so is humanism, so is socialism. But any inculcation in others of any single culture is in itself an act of direct violence (meaning intended by the actor), usually implying desocialization from one culture and resocialization into another – including the very first socialization of the young (defenseless) child. However, if culture is a *conditio sine qua non* for a human being, we are born with none (only predispositions), and inculcation is an act of violence, then we are faced with the basic problem of education: is ‘educate’ a transitive or intransitive verb? Of course it is both, related hermeneutically. Peaceful education, including socialization would probably imply exposure to multiple cultures and then a dialogue, as argued below. Neither Christianity nor humanism is good at this; in fact, we still do not know *how* to do it. It should be noted that to impose a culture on somebody, whether done directly or structurally, is not what is meant here by cultural violence. Cultural aspects legitimizing that imposition, however, for instance because the culture is ‘higher’ (monotheistic, modern, scientific, etc.), would be violence built into that culture, in other words, cultural violence. ‘Empirical or potential legitimization of violence’ is the key to cultural violence.

3. We then schematically divide control mechanisms into internal and external, positive and negative: identifying ‘internal, both positive and negative’ as good and bad conscience respectively; ‘external positive’ as reward and ‘external negative’ as punishment. ‘Internalization’ is conscience deeply rooted in the person system, ‘institutionalization’ is punishment/reward deeply rooted in the social system. Both serve to make the act come forth ‘naturally, normally, voluntarily’. This piece of elementary social science may serve to locate cultural and structural violence centrally in general social science theory construction.

4. On this, see also Johan Galtung, ‘The Basic Needs Approach’, pp. 55–125 in Katrin Lederer, David Antal & Johan Galtung, eds, *Human Needs: a Contribution to the Current Debate* (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschläger, Gunn & Hain; Königstein: Anton Hain, 1980).

5. For an attempt to compare the three systems (not just Hitlerism and Stalinism, which became very common under glasnost revisionism), see my *Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism. Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell* (Norwegian edition, Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984; English edition forthcoming).

6. There are strong similarities built around Shinto themes of chosenness. For an analysis, see Saburo Ienaga, *The Pacific War: 1931–1945* (New York: Random House, 1978), particularly p. 154 for the concept of *hakko ichiu* (the eight corners of the world under one roof).

7. The easy approach is to dump all ‘side-effects’ at the doorsteps of some other disciplines, demanding that they shall clean them up conceptually, theoretically, and in practice – as economists are wont to do.

8. A document consisting of the Universal Declaration of 1948, the two Covenants of 1966, and an Optional Protocol. The Bill has not yet attained the standing it deserves, among other reasons because of US failure to ratify one of the Covenants.

9. See my *Human Rights in Another Key* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), ch. 2.

10. More on this is found in my *Peace and Social Structure. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. III, especially parts I–III (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1978).

11. Hence it is at this level that environmental degradation has to be counteracted, through de-industrializing and de-commercializing processes – not by converting one type of pollution or depletion to another through patchwork approaches to this major global problem.

12. See Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Ideology. Essays in Methodology*, vol. I (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1977), ch. 9.

13. For this, see Hans Ruedi Weber, ‘The Promise of the Land, Biblical Interpretations and the Present Situation in the Middle East’, *Study Encounter*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1–16.

14. Rather, it is almost incredible how peaceful that border high up in the North has been between such a small and such a big country, supposed by some to be eager to fill any ‘power vacuum’.

15. This is the general approach taken by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in the *SIPRI Yearbook* and other publications: very useful as documentation at the surface level, but it does not deepen the understanding sufficiently for any real counter-measures to be imagined and enacted.

16. These factors are very often held to be important in explaining Japanese aggressiveness, e.g. by Ruth Benedict in her *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (London: Routledge; originally published in 1946). Saburo Ienaga also quotes these factors in *The Pacific War: 1931–1945*.

17. When the tram passed the Imperial Castle in Tokyo, passengers used to stand up and bow toward the Emperor. And the Shinto Yasukuni shrine is still a major center of the national and nationalist constructions in Japan. After his party’s defeat in the 23 July 1989 elections, the new LDP Prime Minister, Kaifu, did not visit the shrine on the anniversary of the capitulation 15 August 1945, well knowing that the winds were blowing more from the left.

18. Nowhere have I seen a clearer example of such deep integration of the military into the university as with the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) in the USA, which even permits the military to buy students with scholarships and to give classes filled with militarist propaganda.

19. Another theological distinction of equal importance is whether we are born with original sin (as some Christians would claim), original blessing (as others would claim), both (a Hindu-Buddhist karmaist position?) or neither (an atheist position). The combination transcendental God/original sin has tremendous implications for controlling people, as Luther understood well.

20. For more details, see Johan Galtung: 'The "Middle East" Conflict', ch. 3, pp. 37-57 in my *Solving Conflicts: a Peace Research Perspective* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989); see also my *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989). For an excellent study of the theme of chosenness, see Weber, 'The Promise of the Land'.

21. See Ekkehart Krippendorff, *Staat und Krieg. Das historische Logik politischer Unvernunft* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985).

22. This is a major theme of a fascinating and scary dystopian novel (now also a film), Margaret Atwood, *The Handmaid's Tale* (New York: Ballantine, 1987). I am indebted to Carolyn DiPalma for this reference.

23. My own position, not very original, is this: the fetus is life, hence sacred. Everything possible should be done to avoid a situation where life is destroyed, willfully or not. After all alternatives have been exhausted, the decision belongs to those who created that life, generally a woman and a man, with veto power to the woman and right of consultation to the man.

24. For more on this point, see Casey Miller & Kate Smith, *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing* (New York: Harper & Row, 2nd edn, 1988).

25. See Johan Galtung & Fumiko Nishimura, 'Structure, Culture and Languages: an Essay Comparing the Indo-European, Chinese and Japanese Languages', *Social Science Information*, vol. 22, December 1983, pp. 895-925.

26. This whole question is treated in greater depth in my *Europe in the Making* (New York & London: Taylor & Francis, 1989).

27. As pointed out by Mogens Trolle Larsen, 'Europas Lys' ('The Light of Europe'), pp. 9-37 in Hans Boll-Johansen & Michael Harbsmeier, eds, *Europas Opdagelse* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), esp. pp. 21, 23.

28. See also my 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1971, pp. 81-117; also in *Peace and World Structure. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. IV (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980); and "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" Ten Years Later', pp. 298-310 in *Transarmament and the Cold War. Peace Research and the Peace Movement. Essays in Peace Research*, vol. VI (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988).

29. His basic point is simply this: use all surplus value accumulated to improve the factors of production, not for luxury consumption by the owners of the factors of production, to get out of the trap. Simple and wise, this is what Japan did, but hardly what Japan today would like to see too many others do.

30. See Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Development. Essays in Methodology*, vol. III (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), ch. 4, especially section 4.4.

31. An important poststructuralist position: digging deep, below the surface, is not a transition from multiplicity to simplicity. 'Deep occidental culture', for instance, is not unambiguous. I would, myself, argue that Christianity can be understood only in terms of at least two readings, a hard reading (more transcendental original-sin oriented) and a soft reading (immanent, original-blessing oriented). Others see a more complex variety of deep cultures. The step from one to two is a necessary condition.

32. Cosmology is then defined, roughly, as 'the deep cultural assumptions of a civilization, including the general assumptions underlying the deep structure; defining the normal and natural'.

33. When does the culture, particularly the deep culture, have sufficient plasticity (Scholem) for the culture to be moulded, reshaped? In times of crises? After a deep trauma has been inflicted, including the trauma of inflicting deep traumas on others? We know little except that these are crucial questions.

34. Look at Gandhi's life: The political agenda he took on was staggering - *swaraj*; the exploration of *satyagraha* and *sarvodaya*; the uplift of the Indians in South Africa, the *harijans* in India, the women; and the communal struggle between Hindus and Muslims. At no point did Gandhi say: I will concentrate on one of these, and the rest will follow.

35. See Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Development. Essays in Methodology*, vol. III (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988), ch. 1.1, especially p. 25 ff.

## 2

# Six Cosmologies: an Impressionistic Presentation

### 2.1 The Cosmology Approach to Civilization Theory

The reader is hereby invited on an expedition into the human *collective subconscious*. Pretentious? Certainly, but absolutely indispensable to an understanding of collective human behavior (and also individual behavior, but then many personal factors have to be taken into account). Peace and war, conflict and development depend on how collectivities behave and act. But what collectivities? The approach taken here is ‘collectivity as defined by a shared civilization’, and a civilization is conceived of as a macro-culture, extended in space and time.<sup>1</sup> A culture is conceived of as the symbolic aspect of the human condition, telling us what is true and false, good and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, sacred and profane – to bring in some key dimensions. At a deeper level a culture tells us not only what is true, etc., but also *why*.

This clarifies what is meant by ‘collective’, but how about ‘subconscious’? By this term we refer to assumptions about reality, available on recall. The collective subconscious, then, in a given civilization, would be shared assumptions about reality. They are present in everybody, shared to the point that everybody assumes that others harbor the same assumptions (and may get quite upset when this turns out not to be the case).

By a *cosmology* (of a civilization) we mean the *collectively held subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural reality*. Being shared and obvious, they are not necessarily conscious. Other terms could be ‘deep ideology’, ‘deep culture’, *Weltanschauung*, *cosmovision*, and their equivalents in other languages.

A few remarks before we try to be more concrete, as the controversial assumptions underlying such exercises are many.<sup>2</sup>

First, which civilizations should we choose if we are searching for insight into much of the human condition in space and over time, keeping a macro-perspective? The choice here is in favor of two Occidental, one Hindu, and three Oriental civilizations:

*Occident I*, centrifugal, in expansion (Greco-Roman, Modern);

*Occident II*, centripetal, in contraction (Medieval);

*Indic*<sup>3</sup> (Hindu);

*Buddhic* (Buddhist);

*Sinic* (Chinese);

*Nipponic* (Japanese).

By ‘Occident’ we understand the region characterized by the Semitic-Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam); by ‘Orient’ the region spanned by Buddhism,<sup>4</sup> alone (Buddhic) or combined with other visions (Sinic and Nipponic);<sup>5</sup> and by ‘Indic’ the vast in-between, whether seen as cross-roads or cradle of the other two.

There are two Occidental civilizations, divided by time, not by space, as the differences between the three religions are considered negligible in this macro-perspective. Occident II is partly seen as an Oriental pocket in the history of the Occident.<sup>6</sup> There are reasons for this asymmetry, as will be seen when we come to the time perspective of the civilizations.

Left out of this focus on six civilizations are African, Amerindian, and Asia-Pacific indigenous cultures; and, for instance in East Asia, Viêt Namese and Korean cultures. These are shortcomings, and there will be some references to 'indigenous', and to Viêt Nam/Korea. Yet much can be said.<sup>7</sup>

But about what? The shared assumptions about normal and natural aspects of reality, about what *is*, in the sense of being *true*, being the case; leaving out assumptions about the good and the right, the beautiful and the holy. For this purpose reality has to be subdivided, and the subdivision will be in terms of the six 'spaces': Nature, Self, Social, World, Time, Culture.<sup>8</sup> 'Culture' will be subdivided into Transpersonal Culture and Epistemological Culture, the former being about the nature of transpersonal, religious reality, and the latter about how we can come to grips with, describing and understanding, reality (called Episteme for short).

This gives us a total of seven dimensions,<sup>9</sup> which will be used to characterize six civilizations. Forty-two tasks all together, displayed in Table 2.1, a  $6 \times 7$  matrix. One basic problem once the choice of units (the civilizations) and the variables (the spaces) has been made, is to decide on the values for these variables, the concrete ways of characterizing civilization C in terms of its stand taken on space S.<sup>10</sup> The content of Table 2.1 is the outcome of considerable trial and error.<sup>11</sup> Diagrams have sometimes been found more expressive than words (even if they have to be spelled out in the text with words).

This Table can be read vertically as an effort to catch the essence, meaning the cosmology, of any one of the six civilizations; or horizontally, to compare civilizations in any one space. Comparing two columns should yield some insight into similarities and differences between two civilizations. And comparing two rows could lead to some insight in similarities and differences in how spaces are seen by the civilizations.

But the best is to see the matrix as a *holon*. Good luck.

## 2.2 Six Cosmologies: an Impressionistic Presentation

The cosmology of a civilization is also the socio-cultural *code* of that civilization, carrying essential messages about how reality is constructed. The bio-genetic parallel to the genetic code is obvious and intentional. In-between in terms of complexity and level of organization is the socio-personal code of a person, the essential characteristics of that person's behavior, the personality. The cosmology is to a civilization what the personality is to a person: the basic characteristics that tend to be invariant of oscillations in daily, monthly, annual, life rhythms after the personality has become firmly rooted. The implication is not that the personality, or the cosmology, is unchangeable – only that this happens rarely and is not easily brought about by acts of will (Chapter 5 below.)

First we have to get better acquainted with these characters. The columns in Table 2.1 list hypotheses about how they are coded. These codes have to be spelled out so that the civilizations come alive.

One word of warning: we are painting with a very broad brush indeed, characterizing very macro-cultures, at the level of deep culture. But there is also the level of surface culture, and cultural violence is certainly also found at that level (Chapter 1). The two together should give us a general basis for spelling out the implications we are looking for in terms of peace and war, conflict and development (Chapter 3). Moreover, within any

Table 2.1 *Six Civilizations as Expressed in Seven Spaces*

Occident I	Occident II	Indic	Buddhic	Sinic	Nipponic
<i>NATURE</i>					
Humans over nature <i>Herrschaft</i>	Humans over nature <i>Herrschaft</i>	Humans and sentient life over non-life Vegetism	Sentient life over non-life <i>Partnerschaft</i> Vegetism	Humans over nature Mixed	Humans over nature Mixed
Meatism	Meatism			Mixed	Mixed
<i>SELF</i>					
Weak super-ego	Strong super-ego	Mixed super-ego	Strong super-ego	Mixed super-ego	Strong super-ego
Strong ego	Weak ego	Mixed ego	Weak ego	Mixed ego	Weak ego
Strong id	Mixed id	Mixed id	Weak id	Mixed id	Mixed id
<i>SOCIETY</i>					
Vertical class and gender individual	Vertical caste and gender collective	Vertical caste and gender mixed	Horizontal <i>sangha</i> , but gender collective	Vertical mixed but gender mixed	Vertical mixed but gender collective
Knots	Knot sets	Knot+net	Nets	Knot+net	Nets+sets
<i>WORLD</i>					
Three parts: <i>Center</i>	Many parts: <i>each</i>	One part: <i>unity-of-humans</i>	Many parts: <i>each part a Center</i>	Five parts: <i>Zhong guo N, S, E, W Barbaria</i>	Three parts: <i>Nippon dai-tō-ā Resourcia</i>
<i>Periphery</i>	<i>part a</i>				
<i>Evil</i>	<i>Center</i>				
Unbounded	Bounded	Bounded	Bounded	Unbounded	Unbounded
<i>TIME</i>					
<i>Self</i>					
Bounded Society	Bounded	Unbounded	Unbounded	Unbounded	Unbounded
Bounded	Bounded	Bounded	Unbounded	Unbounded	Unbounded
<i>TRANSPERSON</i>					
Transcendental	Transc. & immanent	Transc. & immanent	Immanent No God	Transc. & immanent	Transc. & immanent
One God	One God	More gods		No God	One/no God
Chosen people(s)	Chosen people(s)				Chosen people
One Satan	One Satan	No Satan	No Satan	No Satan	No Satan
One soul	One soul	One soul	No soul	No soul?	No soul?
Eternal heaven or hell	Eternal heaven or hell	<i>Moksha</i>	<i>Moksha</i>	Rest	Rest
Sing./univ.	Sing./univ.	Reincarnation	Rebirth	Mixed	Mixed
<i>EPISTEME</i>					
Atomistic	Holistic	Eclectic	Holistic	Eclectic	Eclectic
Deductive	Deductive	Eclectic	Dialectic	Eclectic	Eclectic
No contradiction	No contra-diction	Eclectic	Contra-diction	Contra-diction	Contra-diction

macro-culture, specifications are possible, meaningful, even necessary (Chapter 4). And finally we ask: what to do about it, is there any therapy for pathological cosmologies (Chapter 5)?

*Occident I cosmology* Let us start with Column 1. What kind of ‘person’ is Occident I?

Starting with Nature, we are evidently dealing with somebody who conceives of him or herself as the ruler over nature, to the point of being omnivorous, including carnivorous, eating fellow life, at least some of it. The term ‘meatism’ is introduced as a parallel to humans who limit themselves to being herbivorous, in Table 2.1 shortened to ‘vegetism’. This may exclude eating animal protein, and also everything that nature does not freely offer, such as the abundance of fruits, seeds; but not live plants that can also be seen as parts of fellow life.

For the space of Self, a simplistic application of Freud’s tripartite architecture for the human psyche depicts Occident I with a very strong ego and a strong id, but with weak super-ego steering of the greed of the former and the needs of the latter. Here the Person is not a metaphor, but a Self, an hypothesis of how the Occidental person is coded or programmed, of course relative to the other five, and with tremendous variations.

The construction of Society provides space for such persons, leaving individuals free to act out their need and greed. The knot metaphor, taken from Panikkar,<sup>12</sup> plays on a (fishing) net with only the knots visible – the strong individuals, not the net, the social glue that holds them together. Another expression of the same would use terms like ‘actor-oriented’ vs. ‘structure-oriented’ perspectives on society,<sup>13</sup> with Occident I enacting the former (and the Buddhic cosmology the latter).

When strong, relatively unconstrained individuals encounter each other, hierarchies will tend to emerge. Occident I provides for that with the verticality of a class society, meaning that mobility is possible, adjusting to the strength of the egos. As a result there will be *elites* (upper classes), *people* (middle and lower classes) hoping to move up, and *outcasts*, those who are marginalized by the system, and are deeply feared. Women have been marginalized, but are now increasingly entering the class system.

The construction of World space can be seen as a reflection of this. World space (not the universe, the ‘world system’) has a *Center*; it also has a *Periphery* hoping to be accepted by and become more like the Center, as well as a margin where *Evil* is located. The evil forces reject the Center and all it stands for, being their own Center. As Evil has no boundary, the world is unbounded and not only in geographical terms.

Time is super-dramatic in Occidental cosmology. There is *khrónos*, the flow of physical ('objective') time, from the beginning (Genesis) to the end (Apocalypse), meaning that time is bounded in Occident I.<sup>14</sup> But there are also time capsules of *kairos*, organic ('subjective') time: the *Fall*, after the flow of Paradise time, the *Light*, after the flow of Darkness time, the *Crisis*, after the flow of Progress time – with stark dichotomies, heaven or hell, salvation or damnation ('make it or break it') all wide open. After that there is the flow, forever, of eternal bliss or eternal suffering. And all of that in the short span between birth and death in the biography (micro-history) of the individual person, in the history of a society, in the macro-history of a civilization, or of the whole world, from Genesis to Apocalypse. What could be more dramatic, particularly when imposed on the whole world?

The Transpersonal is clearly dichotomous, with individual persons, all equipped with one permanent and immortal soul between the one God and the one Satan, both transcendental, living above and below what in other religions might be Mother Earth, fighting for possession of that soul for nothing short of eternity; having a split second of that eternity, the human life-span, at their disposal for the struggle. The concrete faith or religion is the only Truth (singularism), valid throughout space and time (universalism),<sup>15</sup> as expressed in the Mission Command.<sup>16</sup> What could be stronger?

The *Episteme* is based on atomism and deductivism, ‘dividing each of the difficulties – into as many parts as might be possible and necessary in order best to solve it – beginning with the simplest objects and easiest to know’.<sup>17</sup> Through this, an enormous amount of detailed knowledge will emerge about parts, the atoms (assumed to be indivisible so that they can be used as building blocks for knowledge about reality). This knowledge, in the form of propositions, is then woven together more or less deductively in theories, verbal constructs using the inference, the ‘if P, then Q’ formula. But for this to work P has to be true or false, and Q has to be true or false (although we cannot have ‘P true and Q false’ if the inference is true). In other words, ambiguities, contradictions are not permissible: they are thought errors. *Contradiction = error* also in the sense that it makes deductive thinking impossible. Reality is subdivided, then propositions are established about the parts, then this knowledge is woven together in theories: and all of this according to strict rules if valid, ‘scientific’, knowledge is being pursued.

We sense an inner coherence in the seven spaces: centralism. Man (not humankind) is on top of the pyramid of life, the Ego is on top of the pyramid architecture of the Self, the Elites are on top of society, the Occident is on top of the world, the Crisis is on top of Time, God is on top of the transpersonal and on top of the Episteme is that ultimate Axiom, eluding us, from which the rest can be deduced. For all seven spaces the pyramid would be an adequate geometry.<sup>18</sup>

*Occident II cosmology* This is conceived of as the latent or recessive Occident in the contemporary West, and as the manifest or dominant Occident in the medieval period, from when the Western Roman Empire started its downward slope till the manorial/feudal system yielded to the city-states, later to become nation-states and world-states, empires.<sup>19</sup> But it is still present, in the deeper recesses of the Occident, carried by nature more than humans, by women more than men, by the young and the old more than the middle-aged.<sup>20</sup>

As this is a departure from Occident I, which in turn became a departure from Occident II according to this view of Western macro-history,<sup>21</sup> and as an alternative cosmology dwelling inside dominant Occident I, there have to be similarities, not only dissimilarities. Even in the two major discontinuities in Western history, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire and of the medieval period, there were major continuities. But in both cases, the dominant cosmology was unable to solve the enormous problems within itself. The strength of the Occident lies in its reserve cosmology, to be invoked when the other failed.

Thus, in Table 2.1 the construction of Nature is seen as generally Occidental, as is personal (Self) Time. The Transpersonal differs at one point insofar as Christianity also conveys a message of an immanent God, for instance in the tradition of St Francis of Assisi.<sup>22</sup> This means that close to Nature and to God, life was not that different; with the agony over the crisis *kairos* as a major organizer of personal life. Now let us turn to the dissimilarities between Occident I and II.

The knot model of Society is heavily modified. The concern with the individual soul is there, but the collective aspect of social organization is far more pronounced: the congregation, the monastery, the village, the local community in general. Sets of knots, in other words. The Community becomes a Center in addition to God and Crisis, something stable, as expressed in the flat construction of Social Time. In fact, the community becomes the world, bounded, the assumption being that others also have their Centers, their stages for unfolding their personal drama, and that too much social change will impede salvation, not promote it. This also applies to the vertical dimension. Social positions become frozen in a caste system, organizing Clergy, Aristocracy, Burghers and workers/serfs in that order, continuing with outcasts (Jews, Moors, Gypsies, etc.) and then down to animals, plants, minerals, water, air, and space.

All of this becomes highly compatible with a strong super-ego built into the Self, suppressing the ego (the sociologist would talk in terms of strong social control in the local community, and particularly from God's representative, the local clergy.) But id remains far from quiet. Is this due to heavy meatism?

Except for the drama of personal time, Occident II is a social construction of stability, and Episteme contributes to this cementation of reality. Descartes' atoms partition reality, just as individualism partitions society. But in so doing they also open for dynamism,<sup>23</sup> not being kept firmly together in the straitjacket of some *holon* constructed by the scholastic predilection for holism. Holism can also be made dynamic by assuming contradictions operating inside, as Buddhism does, and as developed particularly in Daoism. The holism of Occident II epistemology is highly deductive, taxonomic, and syllogistic – and static. The basic idea is to capture what is within one general classificatory scheme. This is a cosmology for stability, exemplified by the way Roman Law developed.

*Indic cosmology* Traveling East from the two Occidents, expressed in the three Abrahamic religions, we encounter Indic space. Again, as there are continuities in time (Western macro-history) there are also continuities in space (world macro-geography). Thus, we find much of the same construction of Society, even with the same castes of humanity, and in the same order: *Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra*, and then the outcasts, the *Pariah*. The construction of Self is also similar, but with more flexibility the way it has been described in Table 2.1. The weak and the strong side by side, more eclectic in other words, a theme of increasing significance as we move further East. This is particularly pronounced in the Episteme, which combines the atomistic with the holistic and the deductive with the dialectic.

But then the dissimilarities! Perhaps the basic one is found in the construction of the Transpersonal, and more particularly in the disappearance of Satan (in the sense of Western mono-Satanism) as we move from the Islamic to the Hindu areas of the world. The objection may be that Hinduism did not need Satan, as it instead constructed hell on earth, for the casteless, the *pariah*. But Occidental hell is for eternity, whereas a life as *pariah* is only for one life. After death reincarnation offers a second, third, etc. chance – in the more generous forms of Hinduism, for all forms of life. That also means reincarnation to all forms of life – up, the same, or down, in about the same hierarchy as that of Occident II.

Where will depend on the *karma*, effect, of the accumulation of merits and demerits.<sup>24</sup> *Karma* is not destiny, but like a school grade that can be improved through effort, stay the same, or get worse through neglect. As a result Social Time is undulating with the cycles of transmigration (*samsara*), but with a general upward turn as *moksha*, liberation or salvation, is attained through the realization of the oneness of the individual soul (*atman*) with the absolute soul (*Brahman*).<sup>25</sup>

Nature space has to be constructed differently to enable this transmigration of souls or *metensomatosis* (the changing of bodies) to take place. There has to be more continuity with animals and plants. And yet the unity-of-humans rather than the unity-of-life is a dominant concept. Vegetism starts with the Indic civilization, although perhaps not so absolute as in Buddhic space. The cow, that (by and large) highly nonviolent animal, is chosen as the symbol of unity-of-life.

Society is constructed as a mix of knots, with strong individuals, and nets, best translated as networks among invisible individuals. Both Occident I individualism and Buddhic structuralism, emphasizing the network as such, are at home here, an expression of the Indic ability to harbor so many cosmologies. The oneness of the World is basic to the total construction. The Sanskrit saying *vasudaiva kutumbakam* (the world is my family), encapsulates this. However, that unity is probably seen as having a base not only

in social interaction, making all of us increasingly dependent on the Other, including on the Other of the past and the Other of the future. The basis is probably also an assumed, imputed similarity. ‘Scratch any human being and you will find a Hindu’?

If so, there are good reasons. Hinduism as a set of religious faiths is possibly the richest reservoir of archetypes and metaphors among all the world religions, converting such dilemmas as mono-poly-pan or a-theism into a resounding *and*, harboring all such ideas, including the element of agnosticism. Cradle or cross-roads, Hinduism embraces them all. From that point of view the world is indeed one, perhaps with more of a center being located in India than elsewhere. Indic cosmology operates with a rather bounded view of world space; in a sense just the opposite of the Occident I construction, claiming that the nation-state is their home, yet trying to fill the whole universe. According to the Indic construction the universe may be their home, and the home of all, yet they stick to their own, often very local, place, by and large. There are Indians all over the world, but they are not there on behalf of India.

There may be good reasons for this: Social Time is also bounded. After one *kalpa* cycle (2,000 *mahayugas*, great ages, each one lasting 2,160 years, total 4,320,000 human years, ‘a day in the life of Brahma’), the universe, the gods and Brahma are all destroyed, with lesser destruction after the shorter cycles. A downward trend is normal, then apocalypse, some quiet and everything starts all over again after an upward jump, the *Avatars*.

*Buddhic cosmology* We have now moved about half way around the world, from Occident I, to the area of Southern, Northern and Eastern Buddhism, stretching from Sri Lanka to Mongolia, and to Japan. Buddhism takes on a pure form in the Hinayana countries of Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, and in the Lamaist countries of Tibet and Mongolia.<sup>26</sup> But in the four Mahayana countries, Việt Nam, China, Korea, and Japan, Buddhism comes in an amalgamated form of *san fa* (three teachings), together with Confucianism, and then with something specific: nationalism (Việt Nam), Daoism (China), Christianity (South Korea), Juche (North Korea), and Shintoism (Japan).

Buddhist cosmology can be found all over, as explored in the modern classic of Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*.<sup>27</sup> The present exercise assumes that a Buddhic cosmology can be characterized, but not invariantly of cultural context. That ‘pure’ Buddhic cosmology, however, certainly represents the cosmological antipode of Occident I. Further East, the dissimilarities with Occident I are less pronounced – one more reason for leaving so much to the Christ and the Buddha.

The construction of Nature is already radically different. If the Occident is homo-centric, then the Buddhic cosmology is bio-centric. Sentient life, everything capable of experiencing a gradient from suffering (*dukkha*) to bliss (*sukha*), is in principle sacred. Partnership with (live) nature is a foregone conclusion. So is vegetism.

The construction of Self is also like a negative copy of Occident I, strong where the latter is weak, and vice versa. This is closely related both to the construction of Society and the Transpersonal. Of the six cosmologies the Buddhic is the only one that can claim, in principle, to favor a horizontal social construction. The basic social component is the *sangha*, the community of equal and like-minded believers, focused on the Temple and the Tank (the well), with enough for everybody’s need, but not for somebody’s greed. If there is social stratification, then it does not come from Buddhism but from one or more of the many other cosmologies with which Buddhism cohabits. When it comes to gender, Buddhic cosmology also has a tendency to marginalize women. Indeed all six cosmologies fail here, but Buddhism perhaps less than the others.<sup>28</sup>

But the basic point in the construction of society is the net construct whereby the individual as something equipped with an immutable and permanent self is (almost) made

invisible. A person is his and her relations to Other, including people dead, not yet born, non-people. *The net is all, the knot is nothing* is an extreme but indicative formulation. But in that case the net, with the *sangha* as a point of concentration, becomes the strong super-ego, the ego by definition weak, and the id tamed.

This unity-of-life has as its obvious companion nonviolence, *ahimsa*, including non-violence to Self and to Others like family members, neighbors, colleagues. As ignorance and craving, greed, are considered to be the source of *dukkha*, the process toward *moksha* is paved with the struggle against them and against the illusion of a permanent and immutable self. However, this is not seen as the same liberation as in Hinduism, where the individual soul becomes absorbed by the absolute soul; nor the Occidental union of a person with the Father in the sky. The Buddhist union comes with the full realization of the net, not the knot, as ultimate reality.

Buddhic cosmology shares with Occident II the view of World space as consisting of many centers, in their own right, and the view of Social Time as flat, uneventful, the backdrop for the micro drama, in the Buddhist case not only inside the individual but in the net, such as the *sangha*. Thus, for Buddhism (particularly Mahayana) *karma* becomes more collective, our *karma*.

This can all be traced to the Buddhist construction of the Transperson and the Episteme. The non-existing God is immanent, and the non-existing soul is reborn; both good exercises in contradictions, or *koans*, riddles. So God dies one cosmology east of the burial place for Satan. With Satan dies the raw material for enemy-images: enemies are Satan's chosen tools. With God dies an even more important raw material for friend-images: friends are chosen by God. When friends and enemies are both well defined a *friend-enemy gradient* emerges, and along that gradient any amount of direct and structural violence can flow, legitimized culturally by that gradient.

The Buddhic Episteme is also a negative copy of Occident I: holistic, dialectic, and filled with contradictions. There is unity of reality, the *holon* of everything, although the world view is bio-centric. And there is dynamism related to the contradictions, e.g., between the human longing for *sukha*, and the human ignorance and craving that lead to *dukkha*. This contradiction is inside each human, not transcendentalized as a reflection of a struggle between God and Satan.

*Sinic cosmology* Further East we enter the sophistication of the *sanfa*, in the Chinese version of the Daoism–Confucianism–Buddhism combination. Each one of them left its imprint on Sinic cosmology, leading to a very sophisticated world-view, probably a major reason why China has lasted so long, even more so than frequently invaded India. Daoism takes the Bu'dhic focus on a holistic-dialectic-contradictory Episteme even further, building on the ancient *yin/yang* perspective on reality. The focus on *holon* is kept, but made even more dynamic under Daoism. Thus, a major work published under Mao Zedong's name was *On Contradiction*, building on the Chinese tradition even if it is not referred to specifically – not necessarily because it is neglected but more because it is simply taken for granted, as 'normal and natural'.

Daoism blends with the pragmatic empiricism of Confucianism, also emphasizing the avoidance of extremes, staying in the middle;<sup>29</sup> hence the frequent use of 'mixed' and 'eclectic' to describe Sinic cosmology. The Chinese might have preferred the more value-loaded term 'balanced', which I have avoided.

This shows up in the construction of Nature: humans are in command, but not *that* much. In Chinese pair:tings nature is depicted as colossal, even overwhelming, relative to tiny human figures. And as to meatism/vegetism: why not both? Meat as condiment, then a lot of rice, and vegetables, and soups.

Confucianism left its major imprint on the construction of Society and the World.

Society is constructed in terms of the Chinese de facto feudal system of four castes with rights and duties for all groups: *shi'h* (intellectuals/bureaucrats), *nung* (farmers), *kung* (artisans), and *shang* (merchants). This leaves out the outsiders, the foreigners, the *barbarians*, who are also divided into four groups: North, East, South and West barbarians, each one of them with less-than-flattering characteristics, particularly for the North Barbarians (currently the Russians) on the other side of the Great Wall.

Barbarians disappear into the mists of geography, the world is unbounded. What matters is that the Chinese know where they are and can maintain their distance. On top of this entire construction are the top *shi'h*, ruling the Kingdom in the Middle, the *zhong guo*, in other words the mandarins of whatever dynasty, including the present dynasty in the name of Communism. A rather central position to hold in the world.

The construction of the Transpersonal flows from the three teachings, combining and rejecting from this rich pluralism, giving rise to many highly particularistic belief systems. But the overarching belief system is that eclecticism itself. How radical this is can best be understood by trying to imagine the Occident as being based on Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, inviting every individual and collectivity to construct its own combination. Perhaps this is the key to the difference between Occident and Orient: Occident is the *Land of either/or*, Orient the *Land of both/and*.

The reason is clear: the three Oriental cosmologies explored do not hold humans accountable to a personal God, who in Occident I is very jealous, demanding unconditional devotion to Him and Him alone. There is no threat of a Satan tormenting souls gone astray, for eternity. In the Buddhic version there is not even any soul. That which is reborn can metaphorically be understood as life energy, quanta, which may be given not only to one but to several forms of life after death. In the Sinic version, as in the Nipponic, there may be souls in search of rest after death, at least metaphorically. But the afterlife is not endowed with the stark realism of celestial bliss and infernal torture.

The Sinic Self is neither so pronounced as in the Occidental knot, nor so subdued as in the Buddhic net; rather, it is a kind of eclectic combination. Where the Occident uses the first person singular, for Anglo-Americans even capitalized ('I'), and very frequently, the first person plural may be more frequent in Chinese. There are collective elements, but hardly so strong as in Nipponic cosmology. Super-ego, ego, and id come out as 'mixed', in between, avoiding Occident I excesses.

A mild optimism is hypothesized: ups and downs, but in general progress, both for Personal Time and Social Time. There is neither dramatic occidental time, nor the flat social time of Occident II or Buddhic cosmology. Time is unbounded. The Kingdom in the Middle lies in the center, and is in it for the long haul.

*Nipponic cosmology* The basic difference as we move still one cosmology further to the East is in the re-emergence of some type of monotheism in the Transpersonal, with a transcendent god, the Sun Goddess, *Amaterasu O-Mikami* who has the Japanese (or rather, the Emperor, the *tenno*) as her Chosen People. Shintoism is also highly local, with countless village *kami*, gods, and blends with Confucianism and Buddhism in particularistic and pluralistic ways.

State Shintoism constructed, after the Meiji Revolution (or Restoration as it is commonly referred to, giving an impression of continuity) a World with Japan at the center. Surrounding Japan were Japan-similar countries, meaning particularly the Mahayana Buddhist/Confucian countries Viêt Nam, China and Korea, key countries in the *dai-tō-ā* construction, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere; of the Pacific War of 1931–45.<sup>30</sup> And outside that we find something reminiscent of the Barbaria in Sinic cosmology: Resourcia. Whereas the Chinese might disregard Barbaria, except as a potential threat, this third part of reality, also unbounded, is to the Japanese one vast Resource, a

place to seek knowledge and raw materials and to sell products of increasing sophistication. *Gaikoku*, outside-country.

The construction of Society in Nipponic cosmology shares with Sinic cosmology the feudal four-caste system, in Japanese known as *shi-no-ko-sho*, with the important difference that the *shi*, as opposed to the Chinese *shi'h*, would also include the military aspect of the *samurai*,<sup>31</sup> with their *bushido* spirit.<sup>32</sup> Thus, in Nipponic cosmology the military come on top of society whereas in Sinic cosmology they are more marginal.<sup>33</sup>

The most important aspect of the Nipponic social construction is its combination of the structuralism of the Buddhic *net* and the collectivism of the *set*, also known from Occident II. This is then related to the construction of the Self, with a strong super-ego and weak ego similar to the Buddhic construction, yet with a more explosive id, less under Buddhist discipline. The construction of Nature, however, is more similar to the Sinic construction, possibly less overwhelmed by nature.

As in Sinic cosmology there are ups and downs in Time: the downs as normal as the ups and hence nothing to be hysterical about. But there is also an overall optimism, some version of an 'idea of progress', for Personal as well as for Social Time.

### 2.3 A Bird's-eye View

If the six civilizations were persons with personalities like the cosmologies, how would we like them after getting better acquainted? Since our own personalities are shaped by the cosmologies of our civilizations, it depends on who is involved. So let me state my own prejudices.

First, I am profoundly impressed by how different they are: the same *Homo sapiens*, yet that tremendous span in the construction of the reality within which they live.

Second, I tend to find Occident I energetic and innovative, but basically a bully; Occident II too withdrawn from the world; Indic too complacent given its richness; Buddhic rather nice but also withdrawn; Sinic about as arrogant as Occident I but less of a bully; and Nipponic extremely impressive, but also arrogant and withdrawn. No good world citizens among them. But this is the world in which we live.

### Notes

1. Any person (P) in any situation (S) possesses a certain culture, but not a civilization by this definition. The civilization is shared, synchronically and diachronically, and the focus here is on vast ranges in space and time; not only P in S. The term 'civilization' carries no connotation of high and low or good and bad relative to anything.

2. They will be spelt out, to some extent, in my forthcoming *A Theory of Civilizations*.

3. Indic, Buddhic, Sinic, and Nipponic are terms imitating Toynbee's terminology, found useful because they are all ideal types in Weber's sense. Thus, there is much of Nipponic cosmology in Japan, but also, for instance, an overlayer of Occident I. Hence, the six cosmologies to be explored are theoretical constructs relating to concrete space-time regions, but not identical with them.

4. Alice A. Bailey, in *The Reappearance of the Christ* (London: Lucis Press, 1948), has a similar perspective on the Occident/Orient divide: 'The Avatars (defined as 'divine Messengers', p. 7) most easily known and recognized are the Buddha in the East and the Christ in the West. Their messages are familiar to all, and the fruits of Their lives and words have conditioned the thinking and civilizations of both hemispheres' (p. 10; I am indebted to Cliff Goalstone for alerting me to this fascinating author). Of course, for Islam Mohammed would be the Avatar and for Judaism there are many, being multi-prophetic as opposed to the mono-prophetism of Christianity (Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant) and Islam (Suni or Shia). And it matters whether Buddhism – Southern (Hinayana, Theravada), Eastern (Mahayana), or Northern (Lamaist) – comes alone or amalgamated with other world-views.

5. The Philippines (Catholic/Muslim) and Indonesia (Muslim) belong to the Occident by this definition in cultural rather than geographical terms.

6. Thus, there is Occident in the Orient (like the Philippines, Indonesia and the overlayer of Occident I) and there is Orient in the Occident (like the medieval period, say, +250 – +1250 in Western Europe. In other words, the point of departure for this entire exercise is not a simplistic geographic division West/East.

7. One simple reason for the exclusion has to do with the limitations of the present author: some acquaintance with the six civilizations selected for exploration, almost none with indigenous cultures. What I want is some direct contact, not via anthropologists as communicators across social space. To this the objection might be that there is some reliance on historians as communicators across social time. But life in the Occident exposes the historically conscious to the ways of the past, sedimented in layers in our mind, mirrored all around us at least in history-rich regions.

8. The reader will recognize the spaces from Part II: Development Theory, the difference being that the term 'Self' has been preferred to 'Human', or 'Person', to emphasize that the focus is more on the inner person. Other analysts use some of these categories, and add others, for instance Florence R. Kluckhohn & Fred L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1961). The logic behind the present scheme is inspired by Kant (space, time, and knowledge, space is here called World, and knowledge is called Episteme), and the rather obvious context of any human being: Nature, other persons (here called Society) and god (here called the Transpersonal not to be tied to theistic, even monotheistic interpretations of the transpersonal). Self had to be added as something anyone relates to, knowingly or unknowingly. There is much trial and error behind a scheme that can be used both for peace and conflict, for development and civilization.

9. In earlier explorations of the assumptions underlying civilizations I started with five (Space, Time, Knowledge, Person-Nature, Person-Person), then added No. 6 (Person-Transcendental), and finally No. 7 (Self). Many more could be added to get a richer grid for description and theory-formation, but then a basic goal might recede even further: an overview, yet rich enough to have some specificity.

In the original lists the first three, space, time and knowledge, were the categories for Kant's a priori assumptions, and the next three seemed equally necessary if we want to describe a civilization: the relation to nature, to other persons and to the transpersonal (a broader formulation than 'God', a term with personalistic, anthropomorphic, and hence Occidental connotations). But 'relation to' was dropped since all dimensions try to capture how those inhabiting a civilization and sharing its discourse relate to something. Moreover, in the Person-Nature, Person-Person and Person-Transpersonal list either Self or Society disappeared (depending on how 'Person-Person' is interpreted), hence the present distinction.

10. Others would do this differently, but I myself have found the following discourses useful:

*Nature*: how humans relate to other life, including food habits.

*Self*: Freud's super-ego-ego-id triad.

*Society*: vertical/horizontal and individual/collective.

*World*: how civilizations divide the world geopolitically.

*Time*: how ups and downs distribute over time.

*Transperson*: immanent vs. transcendent, and transcendental structure.

*Episteme*: atomistic/holistic and deductive/dialectic.

11. In saying that, there is the implication that whereas the lists of civilizations and spaces are closed (for the present author; this is what I have found interesting to work on) the value discourse is open. *Lavori in corso* – work in progress.

12. See Raimundo Panikkar, 'La notion des droits de l'homme, est-elle un concept occidental?', *Diogenes*, no. 120, 1982, pp. 87–115.

13. See Johan Galtung, 'Two perspectives on society', ch. 2.1, pp. 41–44 in *The True Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1980), and the following two sections in that chapter.

14. The basic text of the Occident (the Book, *kitab* in Arabic), the Bible, and particularly the Old Testament, is constructed according to this formula.

15. Judaism is an exception to this in not being universalistic. It has to be particularistic, for Jews only, restricting conversion. Having a Chosen People, the Jews, and a Promised Land in the eastern part of the Mediterranean as core beliefs, Judaism as the only faith (singularism) is possible, but not for all (universalism). The Promised Land, described with a high level of geographical precision in the Old Testament (Genesis 15:18, Genesis 17:5–14, Numbers 34:1–12) is simply not big enough to accommodate everybody.

16. Matthew 28: 19–20: 'Go ye therefore, and teach *all* nations . . . Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with you *always*, even unto the end of the world' (my italics).

17. From Descartes, *Discourse on Method and the Meditations*, translated by F. E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 41; originally from 1637.
18. With one comment: the pyramid is too continuous. Evil, whether in Nature, Self, Society or the World, is not seen as continuous with the rest but has its own existence and logic.
19. The European Union, with the 70 ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) countries as defined by the Maastricht Treaty, is an effort to make a world-state, not encompassing the whole world, but spanning it. Is this then the final effort of Occident I?
20. How cosmology relates to the total social formation is a major problem to be explored in *A Theory of Civilizations*, but omitted here for reasons of space. More particularly, the thesis *Man : Woman = Occident : Orient* is to a large extent found to be valid, with such implications as a potential alliance of women everywhere with the Orient, against the present domination of the world by Occident I males with Occident I cosmology.
21. See John Galtung, Erik Rudeng, & Tore Heiestad, 'On the Last 2,500 Years in Western History. And Some Remarks on the Coming 500', pp. 318–361 in Peter Burke, ed., *New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume*, vol. XIII, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
22. See the wonderful book by Leonardo Boff, *Saint Francis: a Model for Human Liberation* (New York, Crossroad, 1984).
23. Cassirer's *Funktionsbegriff* gradually replacing the Aristotelian *Substanzbegriff*. See Ernst Cassirer, *Substance and Function* (New York: Dover, 1953) (the original, in German, is from 1910).
24. Observed in the early 1980s on The Wall in Berlin, among countless graffiti:

Karma: 'Whatever you say, and whatever you do;  
sooner or later, comes back to you'.

25. Sikhism, a very interesting compromise, if that is the word, between Islam and Hinduism, has reincarnation – but only for some generations, whereupon the soul becomes admitted to Paradise.
26. The argument can be made that Lamaism, based as it is on the concept of a live God, the Dalai Lama, and the lineage of reincarnation rather than rebirth, is not Buddhism.
27. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1964. Nakamura compares the Buddhsisms of India, China, Tibet, and Japan in order to understand better the non-Buddhist aspects of their belief systems.
28. For a critical and well-informed view, see Diana Y. Paul, *Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in the Mahayana Tradition* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).
29. *Zhong dao*, The Middle Way.
30. This construction suffered some decline for a short time after the Japanese capitulation in 1945. There were also other countries involved, but they were of minor significance.
31. Actually the Japanese reading of *shi*. Chinese characters have often one reading similar to the Chinese, and one reading which is only Japanese.
32. *Bushido* is a code of the warrior, or broadly *samurai* caste or class, emphasizing fearlessness, obedience to authority, kindness and ethical virtue toward the lower classes.
33. On the other hand, there is also the element of 'knight' in the translation of *shih*.

# 3

## Implications: Peace, War, Conflict, Development

### 3.1 Cosmology and the Ideas of Development and Peace

The problem to be explored in this chapter is as follows: given the postulates in Table 2.1 in the previous chapter about the deep culture, or *cosmology*, of six civilizations – Occident I, Occident II, Indic, Buddhic, Sinic, Nipponic – and particularly how they construct Nature, Self, Society, World, Time, Transperson, Episteme, what are we to expect in terms of ideas, theories, and practice, of *peace* and *development*? Not as a deductive exercise with an already given answer, knowing, for instance, the theory and practice of Occident I in both fields. This is more a question of articulating the postulates in the direction of our concerns, although much of that comes close to deduction.

From the perspective of peace studies, ‘peace’ stands for the ‘reduction of direct, structural, and cultural violence’. We can also use the more narrow definition of ‘negative peace’ as ‘reduction of direct violence’, and then identify the ‘reduction of structural violence’ with ‘development’. But such definitions are unrealistic, out of touch with the realities of deep culture.

More realistic definitions might read as follows:

*Development is the unfolding of a cosmology over time.<sup>1</sup>*  
*Peace is the condition in space for nonviolent development.<sup>2</sup>*

‘Realistic’ (not to be confused with the ‘realism’ of the theory and practice of force) means ‘in accordance with the primacy of culture thesis’, meaning in accordance with the code. And that makes development a more basic concept than peace. The function of peace is that nothing shall stand in the way.

Taking as our point of departure Table 2.1, what developments (plural) follow?

*Occident I* In the construction of Time there is an Idea of Progress, at both the Personal and the Social levels, building strong persons and strong societies, under an impending Crisis confronting Occident I with ‘make it or break it’. Strong people who have made it become social Elites, and strong societies that have made it come to the World Center. In the process Nature is subdued, also by an anti-holistic and anti-dialectic Episteme in the service of development as nature, personal, social, and world engineering. Guiding development is one, singular, universally valid Principle: to realize the Rule of God, personally and socially in the religious version (with Clergy on top), and to realize the Rule of Growth (with Money on top), personally and socially, in the secular version. The social and world Periphery consists of those people and societies that accept the guiding Principle; others, who do not accept the Principle, are Evil. Peace implies their elimination/incapacitation/marginalization, so that development can proceed unimpeded by evil forces. And this may have catastrophic implications for Other.

*Occident II* Progress and Crisis are there, but serving the Rule of God, the spiritual development of the person, and as entry into the Elite for the clergy and the occasional saint. The unfolding of the person takes place locally and does not presuppose social change. The space perspective defining Center is bounded, limited to the local level. The Episteme, mainly theological, serves this development – neglecting Nature, possibly with catastrophic implications for Nature, for Society and ultimately for Self: the decline and fall of Occident II.

*Indic* The focus for development would have to be at the personal level, given the Idea of Regress inherent in the cyclical (*kalpa*) theories of Society and the World, apparently unavoidable. At this point the four basic guiding principles in Hinduism – *dharma* (moral duty), *artha* (wealth, sustenance), *kama* (pleasure) and *moksha* (liberation) – enter as guiding lights for development. Life is divided into four phases. As life unfolds *moksha*, liberation as a mode, is itself liberated. In the first phase the focus is on *dharma* alone, in the second the individual is fully launched in this world, in the third the focus is on service, in this world, and in the final phase on self-realization. *Moksha*, implicit all the time, is maximum in the last phase. Social life should conform to this, perhaps with those in the last phase imparting their wisdom to those in the first, and *arthalkama* not standing in the way of *dharma/moksha*. Two epistemes are operating: one serving *arthalkama*, more like Occidental science, and one serving *dharma/moksha*. Standing in the way of *moksha* (and a better reincarnation) is only Self, not some evil Other: peace is basically with oneself.

*Buddhic* Development would serve personal growth in the sense of *moksha*. Since this takes place at the local level, alone or in the company of others in the *sangha*, the unfolding of the cosmology does not imply Social or World changes beyond what is needed for the local level to provide neither too little nor too much for everybody's needs. The Episteme serves this function, including a relation to Nature that makes possible locally based satisfaction of the needs of humans and other forms of life. Peace is with oneself and with all other beings.

*Sinic* Development is Personal and Social, both of them with ups and downs. There is one over-arching concern: the preservation and strengthening of the Kingdom in the Middle. Development is above all development of China. If internal social transformation is needed for that purpose, so be it. If China is seriously threatened by Barbarians of any kind, the ultimate means of defense will have to be a part of the social construction. With the Transpersonal weakly articulated, the purpose of personal development cannot be individual salvation, reincarnation or rebirth. Continuity through Time rests with the survival of the clan, the local community and China. The Episteme shall serve this purpose, being China-centered.

*Nipponic* This cosmology shares transcendental chosenness with the Occident (I and II), and positive, defensive chosenness with China (China being, like France, *un peuple élu, mais par lui-même*), against intrusion, but not identifying Evil, such as Muslims, pagans, communists, around the world to be eliminated offensively wherever they are in the name of peace (by Occident I seeing itself as Christian, civilized, democratic). The focus here is on development of Japan, but less self-reliant than China, also based on exchanges with Resourcia, and a certain Japanization of *dai-tō-ā* countries. Development is Personal and Social, with its ups and downs. Again, since salvation, reincarnation, and/or rebirth are weakly articulated, the burden of continuity is placed on the family and society. The personal and social accumulation of wealth needed to bring this about would be part of

the development concept. The Episteme will have to serve this, being essentially Japan-centered.

Let us now focus on Nature, the 'environment'. Regardless of cosmology, Nature is the setting in which development as code unfolding takes place. The construction of Nature in the first row of Table 2.1 divides the six cosmologies into three groups. However, the relation to Nature is also a consequence of the construction of Time and (World) Space, and more particularly of whether Time and Space are seen as bounded or unbounded.<sup>3</sup>

This gives us four possibilities, as shown in Table 3.1. As usual, the extremes are Occident I and Buddhic. Occidental cosmologies construct secular time as finite, with a beginning and an end, hence the drama, the telescoping of time, the crises. The consequence is 'we are not in it forever anyhow', *après nous le déluge*, there will be either Redemption (a First or Second Coming of the Messiah) to solve the problems, or Apocalypsis, which will also 'solve' everything.

Table 3.1 *Cosmologies in Terms of Time and Space Boundedness*

	Space unbounded	Space bounded
Time bounded	Occident I	Occident II
Time unbounded	Sinic Nipponic	Indic Buddhic

With only bounded space at its disposal, Occident II destroyed itself. Occident I, however, constructs space as unbounded and destroys Other instead, all over, trying to save itself ecologically. As opposed to the Buddhic (and to some extent the Indic) view of good housekeeping locally as 'we shall be here forever'. Sinic and Nipponic are in between, and could move in the Occident I or the Buddhic directions.

Let us now bring in *peace* as reflected by the cosmologies, exploring peace concepts around the world,<sup>4</sup> testing hypotheses of intrinsic cosmology links between development and peace. We start in Occident I, with the Roman Empire concept of *pax*. This *pax* interprets peace narrowly as *absentia belli*, the absence of warfare, organized violence between groups as defined by class, race, culture (nation, including language, religion, ideology) and territorial location. International or external peace is the absence of external wars; inter-country, inter-state, or inter-nation (meaning inter-cultural). Social or internal peace is the absence of internal wars; with class, race, national, or territorial groups challenging central governance, or such groups challenging each other. As central governance came late in human history, so did wars among and against governments. Hence, wars are in fact avoidable, and peace is in principle achievable.

The Latin *pax* is related to pact, as in *pacta sunt servanda*, 'treaties must be observed'. The implicit theory – that peace is a contractual, conscious, and mutually agreed relationship – is the source of the Western international law tradition. But the Roman legacy is also expressed in *si vis pacem, para bellum*, 'if you want peace, prepare for war', a source of the Western military tradition and another strand in mainstream Occidental peace theory: peace through deterring any potential aggressor. The aggressor will be countered at home with defensive defense and/or abroad with offensive defense, or plain aggression. Mainstream Occidental thought about peace has changed little during the past 2,000 years, apart from some Oriental-type elements during the medieval, Occident II, period.

Broader definitions of peace usually include the concept of *pax*, but then extend it by asking three questions: 'What type of violence?', 'Violence by whom?', and 'Peace with whom?'.

The first question leads to a distinction between violence to the body and violence to the mind and spirit. An example of the latter is life under the threat of extermination in a war in which weapons of mass destruction are used (like a nuclear war), extending the definition of peace from absence of war to include the threat of war. The implication is peace by peaceful means.

The second question tries to identify the actor capable of inflicting damage and motivated to do so. It leads to distinctions between direct and structural violence.

The third question broadens the whole perspective by bringing in peace with non-human Others, and peace with oneSelf.

Moving eastward from the Roman *pax*, we encounter the Greek *eirene*, the Hebrew *shalom* and the Arab *sala'am*. All three pick up the second question. Peace becomes 'peace with justice', combining the absence of direct and structural violence. The question is which part has priority.

The third question, 'peace with whom', is picked up still further to the East, outside the Occident, by the Indic/Buddhic *shanti* and *ahimsa*, which are also usually translated as 'peace'.

*Shanti* means 'inner peace', *peace with oneSelf*, with no part of body–mind–spirit doing violence to other parts. *Shanti* can be seen as complementing the Occidental focus on 'outer peace', and as a necessary condition for 'outer peace'; the argument being that only persons with inner peace will be capable of bringing about outer peace.<sup>5</sup>

*Ahimsa* means 'no-harm', including to Self (inner peace) and to Nature, bringing in the ecological dimension generally missing in the Occident (an exception is St Francis of Assisi). *Ahimsa* was the peace concept of the leading peace practitioner of our times, M.K. Gandhi, used as the basis for nonviolent struggle, *satyagraha*, against such structural violence as sexism, caste, racism, industrialism, and colonialism, and as an alternative to communal, social, and international direct violence. Gandhi also sought to create an ecumenical peace culture, counteracting the cultural violence expressed in and by many religions.

Still further East the Chinese *ho p'ing/p'ing ho*, or in Japanese *heiwa/wahei*, point to inner, social, and world harmony; complementing the concepts of outer and inner peace, seeing harmony *between* the international, social, and personal spheres as a condition for all of them to come true. Here we have a very holistic meta-concept across personal and social organization.

Coming full circle, we then return to the narrow *pax*, well institutionalized and internalized in the Occident. Missing in that concept is attention to structural violence, inner peace, nonviolence, and harmony between the spheres of the human condition. But the concept of peace is open, like freedom and justice, with no culture having any monopoly on its definition. All of them are aspects of a more universal concept of peace not yet defined. As if there once was a universal peace concept and humankind was one, and then there was a fission along all the fault-lines, particularly culture (nation, civilization), each one of them guarding one fragment of peace. Obviously, one task of peace studies is to bring them together again.

### 3.2 Peace and Development as Conceived by Occident I

Today there is an overlayer of Occident I practically speaking everywhere, like a veil; *maya*. The other concepts are subjugated underneath, struggling like seeds under asphalt.

On top is the Occident I theory and practice of peace and security: a world with its center in the West and a vast non-Western periphery waiting to be influenced, converted; to be civilized.<sup>6</sup>

From this point on two possibilities emerge, depending on whether one is operating with a division of *space* into two parts, Center and Periphery, or three parts, Center, Periphery, Evil. The first conceptualization of space is compatible with the universalism of organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations, with built-in executive power favoring Western countries, constructed around Western theories and practice, for instance in connection with international law (The Hague system).<sup>7</sup> And the second concept, correspondingly, gives rise to a system of treaties and alliances against Evil, centered on the major Western power, for the time being the United States (with its NATO, TIAP, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, AMPO, and so on). All of them tie the Periphery to the Center, in an alliance against such Evils as 'international communism', 'terrorism' or 'Muslim fanatics'. A reflection of this was found in the system built around what was once the major power in the Eastern part of the Occident: the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, against 'fascism' and 'imperialism', the Evil in their world construction.

The Principle of Evil has been organized around two axes in history as seen from the Occident: one national, one ideological. Nations singled out as candidates for this important position in the Occidental construction of the world are above all the 'barbarians and savages', the Jews, Arabs, Turks, Russians; and the corresponding ideologies, Paganism, Judaism, Islam (for Arabs and Turks), Orthodox Christianity and Communism (even 'atheistic communism'). 'Western imperialism' would be the Eastern version. Both of them may add the 'yellow peril' to the repertory. Thus, the Evil has been located in the non-Occident on the one hand, and in competitive religions and ideologies within the Occident on the other. The amount of violence exercised in the name of peace and security against these 'evil forces' in history is incredible: Jews killing the Christ, Jews killing Muslims, Muslims killing Jews, Muslims killing Christians, Christians killing Muslims, Christians killing Jews in pogroms and the Holocaust.<sup>8</sup> The stage was set for the secular follow-up: liberalism-capitalism versus Marxism-socialism, each killing the other.<sup>9</sup> Later on, reconciled, they may both decide to turn against Islam (or the Yellow Peril?) as a common evil.

When it comes to *time*, we would expect an Occidental peace and security order compatible with the Idea of Progress, and also an Idea of Crisis that might lead either to *der ewige Frieden*, perpetual peace, or to total disaster: in other words, an apocalyptic vision. Compatible with both ideas is reliance on military means in general, and *offensive* military means in particular, whether for retaliatory deterrence or simply for aggressive attacks in order to get at the evil at its roots.

On the one hand there is painstaking work to build alliances and a perfect balance of power; on the other hand, playing with fire. To the majority within the species referred to here as *Homo occidentalis* the warning so often given by all kinds of peace movements through the ages – that armament policies are dangerous and not only destructive but also self-destructive – carries no news. On the contrary, such policies may be accepted precisely because they are dangerous and danger is seen as *normal and natural*, compatible with the general idea of progress through crisis, even apocalypse. Disarmament, if it should ever take place, not to mention a *disarmament race*, would run against the natural course of affairs; and would probably be counteracted. Peace should come like a conversion, a sudden transformation, brought about by crisis; perhaps even by providential grace, an epiphany. And who is in need of conversion? Evil, of course – not the Occidental Center. Hence, stay strong, stay vigilant!

The Occidental episteme enters here: a couple of simple ideas on the top, and a lot of

highly concrete and more or less logical satellites, at the bottom of the thought system. Ideas like 'if you want peace, prepare yourself for war', and 'attack is the best defense' attain axiomatic character, never to be falsified, not even falsifiable. If war breaks out despite all the work done to deter Evil, that is only taken as one more proof that ours is a dangerous world, not that Evil was provoked. And in that world, balance comes to mean 'superiority', which, when pursued by both parties, closes the circle of conflict and arms race. To object that the 'peace through strength' theory is simplistic misses the point: it should be simplistic. Obviously, warfare is compatible with the biblical four-classes society, with God on top, then humankind divided into two parts, men and women, and nature at the bottom. To possess overwhelming force and intelligence is a manifestation of *omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience*: godly characteristics and not only for Occidental gods. But how can warfare be compatible with *benevolence* or the good, a fourth major characteristic of *god*? War itself is malevolent, in its consequences, for everybody. Benevolence in a war can manifest itself only through the assumption that war is being fought for some higher principle, far above the untold suffering on the battlefield and in the war aftermath. Such principles indeed exist: the *Triumph of the Lord* would be the religious version; the *Fight for Freedom for the Glory of the Nation, or the Class*, would be ideological versions. From such principles theories of just war, *iustum bellum*, easily emerge, in the name of Occidental religion or ideology, be it of Judaism/Christianity/Islam or of liberalism/Marxism.

At the same time, military organization is deeply vertical, except in the transitory non-hierarchical form of the guerrilla, which is usually disbanded after use. It is individualistic in the sense that there are great chances of rising high in these hierarchies, through risk-taking, and even attaining eternal life as a monument in the Christian Occident, or in Paradise in the Islamic (Shi'ite) Occident. War loosens up rigid class structures and provides new opportunities as a reward for patience in peace, and heroic sacrifices in war, if sometimes only *post mortem*.

Women have generally been denied this opportunity. They are on the margin of the system, serving as victims, also of the particular anti-woman violence known as rape, and as the little helpers not only engaged in reproduction of the species (including as nurses, repairing the men for more war), but also by taking over productive tasks left unattended by the males who have gone off to war. And these are not the males of a professional warrior caste only, but in principle the entire male population, except for some individual objectors. In fact, the more universal the conscription, the more ideology has to enter as a motivating force.<sup>10</sup> Since conscription is imposed by the nation-state, nationalism will be the motivating ideology used by the state for war in a world construed as an inter-state system. Paradoxically, the more human rights the nation-state grants, the more human duties can be exacted from the population, for instance as taxes and military service.<sup>11</sup>

To this picture we need only add the image of war as devastation and rape of nature. The picture that emerges is one of total lack of consideration demonstrating the ascendancy of human beings over the lower levels of life and the environment in general. The cosmology is now fully articulated.<sup>12</sup>

*Conclusion:* Anybody who in one way or another is opposed to the Occidental war establishment and the military approach to peace and security should realize that this is a fight at the level of deep ideology and deep culture, the level of cosmology. It is not merely a question of an ideological debate and struggle, like between the ideological Right and Left in domestic Occidental politics, or between liberalism and Marxism.

Much more is at stake: the whole military approach is an almost perfect articulation of cosmological assumptions, and for that reason rooted in Occidentalism itself. Preparation for war, and war itself, fit only too well into the general code. A change in attitude is very

unlikely to occur unless the cosmology itself is not only challenged but to some extent altered. In the last 2,500 years of Western history that probably happened only twice: during the transitions from the Roman Empire (in the West) to the Medieval Period, and from the Medieval to the Modern Period.<sup>13</sup>

Unfortunately, the same applies to the Occidental theory and practice of *development*. *Development = economic growth* is not one random choice by *Homo occidentalis* among many development concepts. It is *truth*, in the sense of being *normal and natural*, compatible with Occidental cosmology, and for that reason not a subject of serious debate. The development discourse is already defined by the cosmology, largely within the economic growth approach, and for peace within the balance of power approach.

Let us then focus on *time* and *space* together. 'Development' is a special case of the more general *idea of progress*, defined in such a way that the West comes out as 'more developed countries' (MDCs) and the non-West as 'less developed countries' (LDCs), even as underdeveloped/undeveloped. There has to be Center and Periphery, both of them 'developing' since there is a universal dynamism in these matters. There is the promise of progress for everyone who accepts the basic parts of the Western code.<sup>14</sup> In this, however, there is also contradiction: if the non-West might catch up with the West, LDCs may catch up with MDCs, and MDCs even with Washington, DC (WDC). Ominous indeed.

This is precisely where the other aspect of Occidental time cosmology comes in: the '*idea of crisis*'. Yes, there may be a crisis: the LDCs may catch up (like China). From this follow two possibilities: either that the developed countries will have to continue to develop along the same line as before, or perhaps along some new line; or that the non-West will take over and force the West out of its central position. Precisely this frightening possibility, to some extent realized because of the rapid development of Japan and neighboring countries, confirms Occidental development theory as normal and natural, through the strong identification of the Occident with Crisis. A non-Western Center defined by development is anti-cosmological, a crime against nature. The West has to be the model, not the non-West.

Regarding the episteme we are in a situation similar to that connected with peace and security. Simple ideas, like 'economic growth' and 'labor productivity' are on top of a thought system that guarantees development for all within a mathematized theory of economics. The bottom line is promising: progress. There are variations of this theme, different schools of thought with different assumptions; but the basic idea remains the same. The process is devastating with regard to nature, but environmental degradation has become a familiar part of contemporary reality. It is compatible with verticality and individualism, with women being allocated an inferior position (reproduction rather than production) and with great opportunities, like in the military, for rapid personal mobility through risk-taking, even sacrifice. Essential for this type of development are entrepreneurs and other players on the 'market', and they are usually male.

There is also a god-like principle, the secular successor to striving in one's daily work to the glory of God: individual well-being in the sense of a high standard of individual material life, comfort; and if not eternal afterlife, at least longevity and good health. Material standards of living play very much the same role for development as freedom in connection with the pursuit of peace: the overriding goal that justifies the negative side-effects, such as eco-crisis, misery, repression, and war.

It can be argued that freedom<sup>15</sup> and comfort/health are things specific which people pursue, not something abstract like peace and development. But that is at the individual level. At the national level, security and growth become goals in their own right as collective conditions for satisfying individual needs for freedom and well-being as understood in the Occident.<sup>16</sup> Peace and development are system characteristics, not

dependent on individual persons and nations only. But epistemological atomism is central to the Occident, focusing on individuals, not systems.

There are cases of success. Military ascendancy has created a space in which some type of peace and freedom can be worked out in the center, although at the expense of the periphery, not to mention the forces of evil. Likewise for the material standard of living. Our present world shows considerable amounts of well-being at the center. There is less at the periphery, since the whole exercise is tied to patterns of colonialism and exploitation, particularly through unequal exchange relations between center and periphery, construed as instrumental to development.

In practice we end up with the four worlds so useful in understanding peace and development across the world.<sup>17</sup> The First World, the Center, the world Northwest, defines development and sees itself as a model; the Second World, the ex-socialist world, the world Northeast, was evil because it claimed to have an alternative approach and is now a new Periphery; the Third World, the world Southwest, is the old Periphery and continues to remain *the* periphery; and the Fourth World, the world Southeast in East and Southeast Asia was once like the Third World but is now threatening to overtake the First World. Hence, there are problems, just as there are for the pursuit of peace. All these problems are already implicit in the Occidental cosmology, and are not necessarily unwelcome, since they spell crisis.

*Conclusion:* We have exactly the peace and development theory and practice we deserve. Anyone who disagrees will have to understand that the struggle for 'another peace' or 'another development' is not only a struggle for another ideology, or between Right and Left. When another kind of peace or development is launched from the Left, for instance within a Marxist frame of reference, it tends in practice to turn out very much like what has been indicated above.<sup>18</sup> Why? Because there has not been sufficient awareness of the cosmological aspect of the problem. The struggle for another development, like the struggle for another peace, has to be conducted also as a challenge, even a transformation, of Occidental cosmology, of all those deeply held beliefs that serve to define peace in terms of arms, and development in terms of money.<sup>19</sup>

### 3.3 Peace and the World as Inter-Civilizational Interaction

So far we have explored the implications of the codes or cosmologies of civilizations for peace and war, conflict and development in theory as well as in practice. But we have explored them one at a time, not in interaction. And peace, war, and conflict are certainly about interaction, bringing in all six aspects of the codes, Nature, Self, and so on. However, that exercise, important as it is, lies outside the scope of the present section; they are explored in the other chapters.

Instead we will undertake a more limited exercise here, making use of only one aspect of the civilizational codes, the construction of *world space*. After all, it is in world space that peace and war take place, so the construction of world space must be a major aspect, although the other six spaces are also important and will be alluded to, more or less systematically.

The civilizations to be considered are as usual the Occidental civilization in the expansion mode, Occident I; Occidental civilization in the contraction mode, Occident II; Indic civilization, Buddhic civilization, Sinic civilization, and Nipponic civilization. In addition to these six, we have added 'Indigenous civilization'. Of course there is no cultural unity to the latter, except in the crucial sense which will be employed here: it is relatively small-scale and part of a multi-centric network.

For easy recall, let us repeat the construction of space by the six cosmologies, adding

'indigenous' at the end, in this effort to understand how much of peace and war can be understood as enactment of the *world-space aspects* of the cosmologies.

*Occident I*: the world is divided into three parts – an Occidental Center, a Periphery waiting to become occidentalized, and a recalcitrant, marginal, outer periphery of Evil.

*Occident II*: the world is divided into many parts, each a center in its own right; a multi-centric world.

*Indic civilization*: the world is seen as one big unit, inspired by the fundamental unity-of-humans doctrine, although this doctrine has been better comprehended in India than anywhere else.

*Buddhic civilization*: there is a basic unity-of-humans assumption, but also a multi-centric construction of space, each center being its own center of concern rather than of control by and of others.

*Sinic civilization*: the world is first divided into two parts – the Center in China, and non-China or *Barbaria*, which, in turn, is divided into four, North Barbarians (the worst), East Barbarians, South Barbarians (probably the best) and West Barbarians.

*Nipponic civilization*: the world is divided into three parts – a Center which is Japan, an inner Periphery consisting of some countries in the world Southeast, roughly speaking the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (*dai-tō-ā kyoiken*), and an outer Periphery, the rest of the world, seen as a vast *Resourcia* for raw materials and other production factors, and as a vast market.

*Indigenous civilization*: the world is again seen as multi-centric, with more or less explicit knowledge of the other centers. In this multi-centric construction there may also be elements of other cosmologies mentioned.

Let us now simplify to five civilizations by combining the Occident II, Buddhic and Indigenous civilizations, since they all operate with the same multi-centric space configuration of small societies. They are not truly world-encompassing compared to the other four civilizations, where some structure is imputed to the world as a whole. Rather, they see the world as divided into many parts basically relating to themselves – not assuming that others are a peripheral part of oneself, are necessarily antagonistic to oneself, or are something to be used by oneself. There may be elements of such ideas, but not as basic and long-lasting conceptualizations. So we shall combine the three as civilizations with multi-centric world-space constructions.<sup>20</sup>

The matrix to be explored can be found in Table 3.2 (the exclamation signs stand for danger):

In this Table the main diagonal is clearly visible: the intra-civilizational encounters. All combinations have been numbered in the order in which we will explore them, yielding a total of fifteen bilateral relations. It may be objected that the matrix is not symmetric, that a bilateral relation can always be seen from both sides, and this is of course correct. But the nuances to be gleaned from such considerations are of minor significance in this context. And so there are now fifteen tasks to be done, fifteen relations to be explored.

[1] *Occident I – Occident I* This is what is considered normal international relations in the West, the primordial base for the theory of 'international relations' in particular.<sup>21</sup> Look at an Occidental 'pentagon' – USA–UK–Germany–France–Russia – and there has been *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Occident I logic has been projected on all others, taking expansionism for granted for all states as natural and normal. Empty space is filled and non-empty space is conquered, until the costs outrun the benefits. At that point a more-or-less stable border is drawn, if it can be adequately protected through balance-of-

Table 3.2 *The World as Inter-civilizational Interaction*

	Occident I	Multi-centric	Indic	Sinic	Nipponic
Occident I	[1]! War	[6]! Absorption; Extermination	[7]! Penetration	[8]! Penetration; war, defense	[9]! War
Multi-centric		[2] Live, and let live	[10] Tolerance; expulsion	[11] Tolerance; expulsion	[12]! Absorption
Indic			[3] Horizontal tolerance; vertical violence	[13] Vacuum	[14]! Distance but war
Sinic				[4] Only one	[15]! War, defense
Nipponic					[5](!) Only one

power mechanisms. Of course, that system will tend not to be stable; the offensive arms used for deterrence through the threat of retaliation engender arms races, and arms races sooner or later end with wars.<sup>22</sup> However, as crisis is also enshrined in the cosmology, the wars are also considered normal and natural, as something embedded 'in human nature'. Thus, a cosmology becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, bringing about the circumstances foreseen by the cosmology (for instance, 'the world is a dangerous place').

It is difficult to calculate what percentage of human belligerent activity is found in this first Occident I – Occident I combination, but it must be considerable. The alternative is obvious: associative peace politics within Occident I, like the European Union, to the point of federations and unitary states, opening for the problem of how Occident I relates to the rest of the world (Nos [6], [7], [8] and [9] in Table 3.2). Is Occident I at all capable of imagining egalitarian relations to others?

[2] *Multi-centric – Multi-centric* Here we are dealing with a quite different geopolitical logic. Ideally speaking, each one of the centers can regard all others as parts of a multi-centric world, and carry on, inspired by a doctrine of 'live and let live'. In practice, however, there was warfare in the medieval period, although much of it was ritualistic. Towards the end of that period expansionism set in, but then, it may be argued, they were already entering Occident I civilization. Similarly, there have been Buddhist kingdoms with considerable belligerent activity (Burma, Thailand).<sup>23</sup> But the argument can also be made that these are aberrations and in any case trifling relative to the Occident I–Occident I constellation. Probably much more can be learnt about a peaceful world from the promise of [2] than from the rather well-proven failures of [1], producing two world wars in the first half of this century. Yet it is one of the prerogatives of Occidental civilization in expansion to display unconcern for its belligerent history, believing itself to be the center of any peaceful construction the world can obtain. The logic is simple: only the good (Occident I) can be the cause of a good effect (peace).

[3] *Indic – Indic* A distinction has to be made between the way ‘Indic’ is used here, for the Hindu civilization, and India with its present and British *raj* borders, before partition. Within those areas inter-nation wars and threats of war have been, and are, rampant. But the focus here is on the Hindu part. And there is only one relatively cohesive Hindu country, in India, and only one world. In modern times the parts of the Hindu world, inside or outside India, cannot be said to have engaged in any consistent warfare against each other. There is nothing there reminiscent of World Wars I and II in the Occident, nor of the preparation for a possible world war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 1949–89, with allies. It may be objected that this is because most Hindu lands have been under foreign domination until recently (British rule, Mogul rule before that) and that this has had a pacifying effect. But this argument is not quite convincing. Rather, it looks as if Hindu India as an inter-state system bringing together a number of Hindu nations speaking languages as different as those found in Europe, and in about the same total numbers, has been far more successful in achieving peace than has Christian Europe. Of course, there are conflicts, but there is nothing like a division of the Indian Union into two alliances, with a handful of neutral, nonaligned states in between. This is not to say that there is no violence in India, only that it takes the form of sporadic direct violence linked to the inter-communal system, and institutionalized structural violence linked to the caste system.<sup>24</sup> The remarkable fact is the stability of the overall system.

[4] *Sinic – Sinic* There is basically only one China, but it has a long history of warlordism and internal divides.<sup>25</sup> The brutality of the Nationalist-Maoist civil war is notorious, so was the Cultural Revolution and the massacre in connection with the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, 3–4 June 1989. There is no doubt about the readiness to use violence, but much more against themselves and their close neighbors (Tibet, Việt Nam, Korea) than against others. Is this a consequence of the Han-Chinese/Barbarian divide, where the Barbarians do not even qualify as worthy objects of violence?

[5] *Nipponic – Nipponic* There is only one Japan, and it is remarkably cohesive today, although that cohesiveness dates only a little more than one century back in time. Some aspects of relations before that time might be indicative of what would happen if there were more than one Japan in the world system. Two Japans, economically, and potentially also militarily and politically, expansionist, trying to capture the other as a resource, or at least as a periphery, might create a rather intolerable situation for each other, somewhat similar to combination [1] with Occidental, expansionist countries trying to make peripheries out of competing centers they have chosen to regard as evil. But all pre-Meiji Japanese *han* (clans) have been included in present day Japan at the highest level of association, the unitary state. The rest is the problem of how Nipponic relates to the rest of the world (Nos. [9], [12], [14] and [15]). And that concludes our exercise in intra-civilizational relations.

*Conclusion:* The key danger zone is the Occidental civilization in the expansionist mode. One particular reason is that the nation-state, itself a construction emerging from that civilization, is a very adequate instrument for the relations already embedded in that civilizational code. The nation-state constitutes purified Occident I world actors. It is expansionist in inclination, identifying expansion with progress, heading for crises of its own construction and seeing them as normal, inspired by simplistic theories about how to expand, inconsiderate to nature, eager to expand its Periphery by conquering other peoples, politically, militarily, economically and/or culturally driven either by Occidental

gods (Yahweh, God the Father, Allah) whose Chosen Peoples (Jews, Germans, English, Boers, Americans, Soviets, Muslims) they are, or by such secular versions as nationalism. Today this coheres toward a tripartite Europe as implementation of Occidental cosmology, in the form of a (Catholic-Protestant) European Union (EU), against a (Slavic-Orthodox) Russian Union, both against a (Muslim) Turkish Union.

Since Occident I has been relatively successful in bringing this construction to the Periphery through colonialization and deep neo-colonialization, there is little doubt that much of this today characterizes the world in general. The Occident has been exporting its self-destructive inclination.

At the other end of the spectrum we note another danger zone: Japan. The danger stems from the same basic civilizational characteristics. The Japanese also think of themselves as a Chosen People; moreover, they tend to regard other parts of the world as Periphery or Resource.

That a major war in this century, the Pacific War, should have been between Japan and the United States is no wonder. This was a fight on behalf of God and the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu O-mikami, for the control over Peripheries, each side projecting the other as Evil. God won that one.

In between are the other three cosmologies; considerably less dangerous except, possibly, to themselves. But they are non-dangerous for three very different reasons. In the Sinic and Indic cases there is only one of them around; they have already achieved super-state status. But there is more to it than that: in the Sinic case Barbarians might not even be worth going to war against, being too inferior. All that is needed is to maintain a credible deterrent through highly defensive defense measures. In the Indic case, a major war may not be worth the effort since Hinduism is already at the center of the religious universe, the richest of all religions found in human society. And the others, as mentioned, with all their differences, might have 'live and let live' as their basic doctrine.

Let us now pursue these ideas further, looking at inter-civilization relations.

[6] *Occident I – Multi-centric* This is, of course, the long history of Occident I penetration into what it considers its rightful Periphery, both in the Greco-Roman period and in the Modern Period, the age of Western Imperialism. Some of this activity may be taken to prove that the balance-of-power theory cannot be that wrong: most of the indigenous peoples were and are simply too weak to stand up against the massive Occident I onslaught; consequently they end up peripheralized and/or exterminated, as happened in large parts of the Americas. However, simple logic informs us that from the possible validity of the statement 'absence of balance of power leads to unpeace' (in any possible interpretation of that word) it does not follow that 'balance of power leads to peace'.

The other two categories, Occident II and Buddhic civilizations, present us with alternative versions. The manorial and feudal constructions typical of the medieval period have been absorbed into the equally typical construction of Occident I in the expansion mode in the 'modern period' of the nation-state. The euphemism for this process is 'nation-building'. This process has taken a remarkably long time, and is certainly not yet completed. There may not have been much military resistance, but there has certainly been considerable cultural, economic, and political resistance.<sup>26</sup> The same applies to Buddhic civilization: maybe precisely because of its non-violence it was not beaten; because of its ability to withdraw into the *sangha*, Buddhism has shown remarkable resilience against cultural, economic, and political absorption. We are dealing here with more refined inter-civilizational relations. However, it also helped that Occident I saw neither Occident II nor Buddhism as evil 'savages'. By contrast, the indigenous were seen as evil, or at least as belonging to a neighboring category to Evil, 'primitive'.

[7] *Occident I – Indic* One of the ‘Chosen People’ of the Occident, the British, conquered India; they left behind indelible imprints and were then finally forced, largely by Gandhian nonviolence, to withdraw in 1947. India, however, also absorbed from its conquerors what it could use, assimilating Occident I elements into that incredibly rich Indic culture. And now the British have become almost as marked by India as the Indians by Britain. Britain conquered India; India to a large extent conquered Britain and Britons through migration, evident to any visitor to Albion’s shores. India may even do it again, serving as a receptacle of the cultures of conquering civilizations, and emerging culturally richer than ever before. Who is stronger, he who is out to create a periphery of others, or he who already sees others as encompassed, absorbed in his own universe? Two different ways of relating to each other: military conquest, economic penetration, cultural imprinting, political institutions on the one hand; and on the other hand absorption, selecting what can be used, kicking out the conqueror, waiting for the next.

[8] *Occident I – Sinic* This one is different. When Occident I in its Western (Christian) manifestation came to China (and the USA certainly belonged to the West from this point of view) its emissaries entered the slot prepared for them as Western Barbarians. They behaved accordingly, and were perceived accordingly. In no sense does this mean that the Chinese cannot also learn from Barbarians what they want to learn, as they certainly did from the North Barbarians, the Russians, during the first years of the communist dynasty. But whereas Indic civilization has managed to absorb and encompass with an almost incredible tolerance, Sinic civilization was greatly wounded by the attack. It retaliated and even exorcised the foreign devils.

We are here dealing with an asymmetric relation. Occident I wants to penetrate and expand; and all the Chinese (and the Viêt Namese) did was to behave according to the old French adage:

*Cet animal est très méchant;  
quand on l’attaque, il se défend.*

The Chinese do not expand outside their traditional domain – which unfortunately seems to include Tibet. This is different from Occident I, which regards the whole world as its domain.

[9] *Occident I – Nipponic* This relation is considerably more symmetric. China is not out to peripherize other parts of the world as Japan is, although it may be argued that they do so to the outer periphery, Resourcia, even if ‘only’ in the economic sense. But the inner periphery was treated in a way relatively similar to the way Western imperialism tried to treat almost the whole world.

The collision possibilities are obvious. They have certainly not been removed by declaring Japan a part not only of the Occident but of Western Occident, because this is simply an empty declaration with little factual basis, and even if it were true, intra-Occidental I relations are not known historically as being peaceful. On the one side we have the powers of the Occident with the expansion mode built into the definition of a big power; on the other, Japan, which is of the same kind. The Pacific War US–Japan chapter was pre-programmed, as was the Japanese war against Occidental colonialism, unfortunately also to establish its own. This is one of the most dangerous combinations of them all now that Occident I is becoming increasingly associative in the West (another danger zone is Occident I in tripartite Europe).

[10] *Multi-centric – Indic* At this point another aspect of Indic civilization is brought

out very clearly. That civilization has exhibited an almost incredible tolerance to small Occidental groups such as Jews, Christians and Parsees,<sup>27</sup> and even to large Occidental groups such as Muslims, and for long periods at a time, provided these ‘communities’ do not offend each other, and particularly do not offend the host country’s religion. Relations to that important in-between religious community, the Sikhs, have also until recently been marked by much of the same tolerance.<sup>28</sup> However, the same has not been the case for the indigenous peoples, the ‘tribals’, Nagaland being an important example. This would indicate that there is also in Indic civilization a dividing line between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ cultures, similar to the dividing lines between high castes, low castes, and the casteless. As to the latter: this is where Indic violence shows up at its worst, directed downwards rather than outward, as structural rather than direct violence.

Buddhism was, like Gandhism, a basic challenge to that aspect of Indic civilization, and had (also like Gandhism) to be expelled. Indic civilization seems to be tolerant as long as the caste structure is either left untouched or can be reproduced across social transformations, even when social change is imposed from the outside. A Brahmin will remain a Brahmin even if his God changes from *Ram* ('God') to RAM (Random Access Memory), and he himself is transformed from priest into computer specialist.

[11] *Multi-centric – Sinic* In general, Sinic civilization has been tolerant to small pockets of non-Han people that do not constitute any basic threat. Occident I wants to peripherize, absorb, change, and ‘develop’ them. Sinic civilization is probably more likely to regard them as some kind of Barbarians, and leave them in relative peace, for instance in the vast expanses for non-Han peoples in Western China. The Cultural Revolution was certainly an exception to this, attacking pockets of Occidentalism, Buddhists and their temples, and also indigenous peoples, but as far as one can judge short of extermination, even if the attacks were violent. Clearly there are deep conflicts in China after the long period of Western domination initiated by the opium wars, and 2,500 years of domination by the *shih*.

[12] *Multi-centric – Nipponic* This tolerance is not found in Japan, which is more similar to Occident I. Japan may, of course, be visited. But to live in Japan, to settle down there, presupposes a willingness to become Japanese, at least in such external manifestations as taking a Japanese name which will then become the official name, and to sit at the bottom end of the table (as opposed to the visitor who might be seated at the top end, and interprets that as a sign of reverence where it may actually, like honorifics, be a sign of distance). And thus it is that Buddhism has become ‘Japanized’ and, particularly in the form of Zen Buddhism, has become a part of the expansionist nature of Nipponic cosmology. Indigenous peoples have been absorbed and Japanized, to the point of virtual disappearance – the case of the Ainu.

[13] *Indic – Sinic* Two great civilizations, large groups of humankind, in fact the two largest, even neighbors – and yet so little relationship! The Chinese count the Indians among the South Barbarians, not dangerous, except in autumn 1962, in Ladakh.<sup>29</sup> To the Indians the Chinese are ‘up there’, but as they have never conquered India, there is not that traditional Hindu basis for a contact. Fortunately, neither of these great nations is really expansionist, for if India were Occidental expansionist and China had Nipponic cosmology we would have had major wars in the Himalayas. It is also interesting to note that this, at least so far, has held true even though both countries have two instruments of Occidental expansionism, the nation-state with many of its trimmings, and powerful armies with atom bombs. The state of non-war is remarkable and to their honor. But this is negative rather than positive peace, and essentially vacuous.

[14] *Indic – Nipponic* What has kept this relationship peaceful is probably a simple geographical circumstance: India is too far away from Japan, at least to date, to be seriously included in *dai-tō-ā*. Japan tried during World War II, but the war was unsuccessful. Had Japan been a border country the logistical difficulties would probably have been overcome. Many high-caste Indians would by now have developed patterns of Japanese efficiency, and many Japanese would have been absorbed, even transformed by the Indian *mystique*. In a sense India is fortunate: there are in Asia two other big countries, one of them very close and non-aggressive, and the other one quite aggressive but not very close.

[15] *Sinic – Nipponic* China was not so fortunate. For the Chinese the Japanese are the East Barbarians, and they behaved accordingly, from 1931 and particularly 1937 onwards. The Japanese attack on China was a case of pure aggression with no hint of a defensive purpose – quite similar, albeit on a smaller scale, to Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, designs for social transformation, even revolution, in a socialist-communist direction were being made in Moscow, which certainly could have affected Germany. Japan did not even have this pretext. Whether that aggressiveness toward China is still present in Japan, in latent form, is too early to judge. After all Japan has been beaten once, and that was not long ago.<sup>30</sup> Much more likely than a new Sino-Japanese war is probably East Asian associative politics, aiming for something similar to the West European integrative efforts from the Monnet-Schuman plan via the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Maastricht (so far).

And that concludes our exploration of inter-civilizational interaction.

Let us now look at Table 3.2 again, summarizing what has been said. Exclamation signs have been placed where danger is expected, partly because it has been observed in the past, and partly because it follows from cosmology analysis. All signs refer to two of the five civilizations: Occident I and Nipponic; the big and the small families of Chosen Peoples. There is only one exception: Japan is not seen as dangerous to itself, and is, in fact, the best integrated of the five. Again the reason, like for China, is negative: there is only one Japan around today.

The danger zones in Table 3.2 are of two different kinds: strong-strong, and strong-weak, 'weak' meaning multi-centric.

Militarily strong and expansionist civilizations pitted against each other spell war: to peripherize each other, to use each other as resources, or to mark each other as a periphery off limits for other power(s) in the center.

But then there is the second emanation from the danger centers: penetration, sometimes accomplished by absorption and extermination, administered to the militarily weaker civilizations. The latter may have two defensive strategies, though: to strike back through a system of entirely defensive defense; and/or to retreat, to refuse to be absorbed, and try to outlive the conquest. Whether this succeeds or not, it presupposes a long time perspective, patience, and perhaps also a conscious policy of nonviolence: three characteristics absent from Occident I and, although less so, from Nipponic expansionist civilizations.<sup>31</sup>

And thus it is that the center of the Table, six of the fifteen cells, exhibits a remarkable number of relatively positive or at least non-negative relations. Upon further scrutiny more violence can be detected, but not the large-scale violence seen in the nine cells on the margin of the Table (but in Nipponic–Nipponic only in latent form, hence the exclamation sign in parenthesis).

By and large Table 3.2, based on simple assumptions in the cosmologies of the civilizations, reproduces the geopolitics of war and peace relatively well. This becomes even more clear when more cosmology dimensions are included (see Chapter 5).

### 3.4 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?

Assuming that there is sufficient validity to this type of analysis of the deep structure of the geopolitics of peace (and also of development, although it has only been spelled out in the first section), the question of course arises: What can we do about it? Is it possible to remove harmful civilizations? Is it possible to change pathological civilizations? These are entirely legitimate questions, crucial to peace studies.

The candidates for removal would certainly be Occident I and Nipponic. But leaving aside moral and practical considerations, there is a major problem. Removal may have as a consequence that the remaining three civilizations (actually there are five, since three were combined into one group) might acquire some of the characteristics of the now-removed expansionists. Indic might become like Occident I and Sinic like Nipponic. There may be a group dynamic at work here, with civilizations playing roles relative to each other, to the point of filling empty role-slots. The world is a *system* (not only a set) of civilizations in interaction, where the attitudes and behavior of one actor may be determined not only by its code, but also by the attitudes and behavior of the other actors.

This may work both ways, however: with top expansionists removed there may be less expansionism to imitate; less nation-state building to do; also, 'modernization' with its concomitant, a heavy military–bureaucratic–corporate–intelligentsia complex, would be less influential. A more practical consideration is that these expansionist civilizations *cannot* be removed.

Precisely because of their characteristics they are at the top of the world community of civilizations rather than at the bottom, having paved the way for themselves by exterminating considerably less expansionist civilizations. Had they been at the bottom and been relatively small, they might have been given the same treatment as that meted out to delinquents: arraigned into court and indicted; a sentence would have been passed and adequate institutionalization would have followed. The process would work better for individual than for general prevention, just as in the theory of punishment in general.

But we are not in that situation. Almost all the world's nuclear powers are in Occident I (US, UK, France, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan). India and China are not, but they are less dangerous according to the analysis above. The Cold War superpowers are there, so are the 'big powers' (but again China is included, unnecessarily so). The most important of the most important industrial nations, the G7, are all Occident I or Nipponic. Removing them is not easy. Hence the second question: can civilizations be changed? Not in the superficial sense of signing some treaties/conventions, entering some regimes or organizations – but in the sense of having their codes changed, transforming their cosmologies?

The answer is by no means clear. But this question is probably one of the most important that can be formulated in peace studies. We know that civilizations do change, in the sense that the deeper aspects, cosmology, can be said to be transformed. But such changes have been brought about by a number of historical circumstances, not by voluntary design. Today we have only the vague beginnings of a therapy for excessively belligerent civilizations, as will be explored in Chapter 5 below. However, first we need to look at three serious special cases of Occident I in Chapter 4: Hitlerism, Stalinism and Reaganism (American fundamentalism).

Pointing out that much, even most, of the belligerence is rooted in the civilization itself, is already a beginning. Change can come about, but probably only by going to the roots. The superficiality of believing that mere transfer of ownership of means of production from private to public hands should liberate humankind from the scourge of war becomes evident in the light of this type of exploration: whether in public or private hands, the

means of production can still be used for expansionist aims if this is in the cosmology, by producing means of destruction. The same applies to the superficiality of believing that democratization of nation-states will bring about peace. To the contrary: it may serve better to articulate the cosmology, the collective subconscious, of the civilization.

Hence, we need analyses using civilizations rather than states, or economic systems, or political systems, as units, in the spirit of seeking solutions rather than making condemnations. There is certainly never going to be any last word on this vital subject. It can be good to remember that research means *re*-search. Even if deep roots of violence and war are in the cosmology, which in turn is collective and subconscious, there may be ways of breaking the collective crust into sub-collectives and individuals, and ways of making the subconscious conscious.

## Notes

1. This is the definition from Thesis No. 1, in Part III, Chapter 1.1.
2. This is very close to the more dynamic definition of peace in Part I, Chapter 1.1, only that there the emphasis is on conflict.
3. This is explored in more detail in Johan Galtung, *Buddhism: a Quest for Unity and Peace* (Colombo: Sarvodaya International, 1993), Chapter 4 on nature.
4. For more detail, see A. C. Bouquet & K. S. Murty, *Studies in the Problems of Peace* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), and Takeshi Ishida, 'Beyond Traditional Concepts of Peace in Different Cultures', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1969, pp. 133–145.
5. This is, in fact, a very interesting hypothesis that could be tested empirically. Whether those who put forward such hypotheses are interested in any test of the hypothesis, is another matter. A factor in favor of the hypothesis would be that a person with inner peace has less unprocessed conflict material that may be projected on the conflict formation and lead to a conflict deformation. A factor against the hypothesis might be that a person with unresolved inner conflict may have a deeper understanding of what conflict is about and more experience with how to transform conflicts non-violently. There is a parallel to illness: a person with little or no personal experience with illness may not understand in time the early warnings, symptoms, of a more serious disease.
6. This idea is developed further in Johan Galtung, 'Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace', part II of ch. 15, pp. 415–436 in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. V (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980).
7. See Chad Alger, 'The United Nations in a Historical Perspective: What We have Learned about Peace Building', (Tokyo: UNU, 1985).
8. The threat-to-peace problem in the Abrahamic religions, it seems, is not monotheism but the idea of being in possession of the single valid faith for the whole universe, in other words singularity *cum* universalism for Christianity and Islam, and singularity *cum* particularism, the particular Promised Land, for Judaism.
9. For an exploration of how this theme is used in order to maintain a conflict see Johan Galtung, *There Are Alternatives!* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), ch. 2.1.
10. For a fine exploration of this theme, see J.E.C. Fuller, 'The Rebirth of Unlimited War', ch. II in *The Conduct of War 1789–1961* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972).
11. In other words, the fine print on the back of any human rights declaration, the human duties, to those who are the presumed guarantors of the rights, the states (meaning the governments). This theme is developed in my *Human Rights in Another Key* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), ch. 1.
12. See A.H. Westing, *Warfare in a Fragile World* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1980); and Johan Galtung, *Environment, Development and Military Activity* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982).
13. This is one of the basic themes explored in Johan Galtung, Erik Rudeng & Tore Heiestad, 'On the Last 2,500 Years in Western History. And Some Remarks on the Coming 500', pp. 318–361 in Peter Burke, ed., *New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume*, vol. XII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
14. Of course, there is more than one Western code, and the point made is as valid for Marxism/socialism as for liberalism/conservatism/capitalism.
15. Of course, 'freedom' can be the subject of highly abstract philosophical analysis. But there is also a very concrete interpretation, particularly important in the USA: freedom to own property, and to use property to make more property.
16. See Johan Galtung, 'The Basic Needs Approach' pp. 55–125 in K. Lederer, ed., *Human Needs* (Königstein: Anton Hain, 1980).

17. They are: the world Northwest (capitalist), the world Northeast (ex-socialist), the world Southwest (Third World) and the world Southeast (Japan, China, and other countries in East and Southeast Asia). I also find it useful to refer to them as the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Worlds, respectively.

18. For one very interesting exploration of this theme, see R.N. Batra, *The Downfall of Capitalism and Communism* (London: Macmillan, 1972), esp. chs 8 & 9.

19. This is actually a typical example of economism trying to come to grips with such major, complex externalities as peace and development by conceiving of them in terms of decreasing arms budgets and increasing technical assistance budgets. See Part III, Chapter 3 on externalities in general.

20. This certainly does violence to a diversity too rich to accommodate within the present scheme, but I see no other possibility in the present context.

21. And that all other countries, by implication, are aberrations from the US as a norm. For some preliminary explorations of this theme, see Johan Galtung, 'The United States in Indo-China: the Paradigm for a Generation', ch. 8, pp. 219–228 in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. V (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980), And for the impact of cosmology on the US, see *The United States Foreign Policy as Manifest Theology* (San Diego, CA: University of California, IGCC, 1987).

22. This is a basic theme in Johan Galtung, *There Are Alternatives!* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), ch. 3.2.

23. The imperialism of, say, the Inca and Aztec Empires in South America, or the Zulu Empire in Africa, is not mentioned here. They were not 'indigenous' in any other sense than being non-Occident, and probably shared many of the aspects of Occident I cosmology.

24. An unfinished research project that somebody should take up: *India as an international system*, with systematic comparison of India with Europe. About the same size in population and territory (or not that different), yet India is doing so much better with the same order of magnitude of nations, *inter-nationally*; but so much worse *intra-nationally*. They both have a universal religion so it is very tempting to relate some of these differences to the tolerance of Hinduism as opposed to Christianity where other teachings are concerned, yet intolerance to the point of massive structural violence inside the system. I am indebted to K.P. Misra for giving me good opportunities to do some preliminary work on this during my stay as Visiting Professor at the School of International Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1971.

25. For an excellent introduction to Chinese history also from this angle, see A. Cotterell & D. Morgan, *China, An Integrated Study* (London: Harrap, 1975).

26. Few persons have explored this theme so well as the late Stein Rokkan, e.g. in 'Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: a Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe', in Charles Tilly, ed. *The Formation of National States in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) and his 'Territories, Centers, and Peripheries: Toward a Geoethnic-Geoeconomic, Geopolitical Model of Differentiation within Western Europe', in Jean Gottmann ed., *Centre and Periphery, Spatial Variations in Politics* (London: Sage, 1980). I have also found Charles Tilly's 'Stein Rokkan's Conceptual Map of Europe' (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1981) very useful.

27. See the chapter on Hinduism in Huston Smith, *The Religions of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).

28. With the trauma inflicted on that religious community by an act of sacrilege, the anti-terrorist invasion of the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984, the situation certainly changed, and probably for generations, even centuries. Imagine a Muslim act of sabotage against St Peter's in Rome!

29. They were seen by the Chinese as having transgressed the ambiguous McMahon line, a legacy of British imperialism and outdated cartographic techniques in very difficult terrain in the Himalaya mountains. The two parties have different perceptions of what happened, and an anti-Communist West has perhaps believed more in the Indian interpretation: that the Chinese suddenly and unprovoked annexed large parts of Indian territory in the north and northeast. The war was over almost as soon as it started. More than 30 years later, both sides sat down to determine the line of actual control, LAC, marking actual troop deployment, as a first step to agree on a border (*Global Times*, 30 July 1994).

30. Not exactly this idea, but the potential for renewed violence must have been a basic consideration inspiring the Japanese historian Saburo Ienaga to write his book *The Pacific War 1931–1945* (New York: Random House, 1978), very useful in this context (see particularly pp. 135–139, 154–155, 188–189, 200–201).

31. And yet, with all obvious and not so obvious shortcomings, there is also the soft undertone of Occidental civilizations, witnessed, for instance, in the acts of nonviolence in the Philippines in 1986, in the Civil Rights struggle in the United States, etc.

## Specifications: Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism<sup>1</sup>

### 4.1 Homo teutonicus = Homo occidentalis in extremis

30 January 1933. *Machtergreifung*, brown totalitarianism. The task is to describe the roots that gave rise to that day, and that were to last far beyond capitulation 7–8 May 1945. The general thesis is the following: there is a German deep culture, as a part of general Occidental civilization, but as an extreme version, an Occident *in extremis*. It differs from Occidental civilization in general, but is also to a considerable extent continuous with it. *Homo teutonicus* = *Homo occidentalis in extremis*. And then there is a Nazi deep culture which is an extreme version of German culture: *Homo hitlerensis* = *Homo teutonicus in extremis*. Thus, Nazism is seen as a branch on a branch, far out, but still on that expansionist Occidental tree.

Let us take one dimension at a time, starting with the crucial categories of Space (World) and Time.

*World:* Colonialism was a clear manifestation of the general Occidental space perspective. The Germans wanted to take part in colonialism, but were not very successful ‘overseas’. So the German *Drang nach Osten* became an aspect of Western colonialism in general. However, two factors made German colonialism stand out: *it was directed against white people*, themselves of Occidental stock, and *it came late in history*, fifty to one hundred years after its most recent predecessors, four centuries after the more precocious ones, the Spanish and the Portuguese. It could no longer be legitimized the same way as for Western colonialism in general. Some new legitimization had to be invented.

Racism and paganism were not enough to serve as a basis for the construction of an Other to be subjugated. A new ideology had to be born, building on the old, and be internalized in the collective subconscious, *quickly*. Nazism was the answer. A theory of *Herrenvolk* (master race) had to be invoked, seeing others, also people in the white Occident, as born underdogs, *Untertanen*, even as vermin, so that they could be deprived of the right to be in public service, of access to public space, then of citizenship, then of their soul, all of this making it easier to kill them. Logical consequences: Wannsee, Auschwitz.

*Time:* Extraordinarily dramatic. There is the vision of a Germanic past, hinged on to Nordic mythology, intermixed with medieval features, Germanic sagas, Valhalla, Wagnerian mystique. There is the Fall and the Dark Period, brought about by the mixing of blood, by racial impurity. There is the Savior, He Who Saw: Adolf Hitler, with the Holy Script, *Mein Kampf*. There is the expansion both in the sense of racial purification and in the territorial sense, certainly leading to a crisis. *Blut und Boden*, both of them together, as basic themes of German history. And there is the vision of a highly dichotomous future, very much as envisaged in the Bible, both in the Old and the New Testaments: either complete *catharsis*, a perfect contradiction-free existence (paradise); or total damnation, apocalypse, destruction of everything (hell). Nazism stands out as

a latter-day incarnation of general Occidental time cosmology, including eschatological aspects. It sprang forth from the fertile soil prepared by Lutheran eschatology and German nostalgic aspirations.

*Episteme*: In the Teutonic type of Occidental thinking theory-pyramids become so important as to become largely detached from contact with empirical reality. Deductive reasoning from a low number of axioms, ideally only one, becomes the paramount task of intellectuals. Essentialism unhampered by reference to examples or empirical analysis in general, dominates the style.

Again, it is not difficult to recognize Hitlerism in this. There is a leading principle: the contradiction between the pure and the impure, between the Aryans on the one hand and on the other hand first of all the Jews with the *Verjudung*, then the *Bolsheviks*, the 'Bolshevisten', then the money people, the 'Plutokraten'. The Germans had been made impure not only by the Jews but also by Bolshevik influence, on the communists, then also on the social democrats. The contradiction is, in Maoist terms, 'antagonistic' – it can be resolved only through violence.

Epistemologically, in the meantime, the contradiction serves considerable intellectual functions: *it explains everything*. Nazi theory is the theory of how all evils derive from the non-Aryans or non-Aryan elements. Not all Bolsheviks and Plutocrats were Jews. But their thoughts were non-Aryan. The Other is an enemy. The image of that enemy, the *Feindbild*, is not only a social dichotomy with fatal consequences, but also a prime intellectual principle, the axiom from which all insights flow. *Hitler becomes a Teutonic intellectual*, a person capable of handling the language masterfully in his essentialist way of running up and down his own thought pyramid – with that crucial contradiction on top, illuminating the evils of present-day German society and the promises of the future at the bottom.

*Nature*: General Occidental cosmology puts human beings, persons, firmly on top of nature. Nature is an instrumentality for a profoundly anthropocentric undertaking. But there is also another strand in the pattern: nature as beautiful, as resort, not only resource. Nazism picked up both: the total destruction of nature through the workings of industrialism and militarism (maneuvers and warfare); and the cult of nature, the romanticism of the *Wandervögel*, the Bavarian mountain and forest nature mysticism that seemed to go so well together with Prussian statism in the amalgam that became Nazism. And the skillful administration of sexuality in camps, with women as parts of nature, pure, immaculate, receiving the seed in the sacramental act of reproducing the Aryan race.

*Selbst*: A very strong super-ego, partly (mainly?) from a Christianity taken very literally, makes the ego a weak battlefield between moral authority and the id. Germans become easily mobilizable by those who can claim moral authority and make use of the strong forces of the id for their purposes.

*Society*: The general, modern, Occident I cosmology is vertical and individualist. It is a struggle of everybody against everybody to secure a position in a vertical hierarchy, with varying numbers of layers, more or less pyramidal, more or less broad at the bottom, and more or less permeable.

#### 4.2 Homo hitlerensis = Homo teutonicus in extremis

Nazism carried this a considerable step further. The principle of 'verticality' expressed itself between individuals as social Darwinism, the survival of the fittest, in a jungle less and less reminiscent of human civilization, ultimately becoming purely *terrorist*.

It became the right, indeed the duty, of the strong to rule over the weak; Aryans over Jews; men over women; the middle-aged over the young and the old; the 'normal' over the

'abnormal'. Between nations it took the form of *Herrenvolk* versus others, of *racial supremacy* with not only the right but also the duty of the *Herrenvolk* to exercise its supremacy to the fullest, including eradication of those at the very bottom, as one does to vermin. Between states it took the form of *extreme Center-Periphery relations with the German state as the Herrenstaat*. Within states, it took the form of party dictatorship.

*Transpersonal*: Nazism as an extreme version of the relation to God paves the way for an understanding of general German or teutonic thought. It spans the gulf between the sacred and the secular. It is sacred in its relation to a mythical and mystical past and future, and in proclaiming the *Führer* and the *Führerprinzip* as standing above ordinary humans. *Der Führer* is close to the '*Vorsehung*', Providence; an expression of generalized religiousness, a bridging figure of thought could make it easier for Christians to accept an essentially non-Christian, even anti-Christian, Nordic-pagan, Nazism.

But this means that the *Führer* had in his hands what no other mortal has: *the divine control over life and death*, and not only for individual human beings, but for whole groups, races, nations, peoples. He even had the power of *Vernichtung*, being an ultimate Destroyer of whatever has been created.

In the period of Nazism this applied only to the homosphere, to human beings and human settlements, human societies. The *Führer* was not only God-like, but a real God, arrogating to himself such divine powers. With the technology of the atom bomb he could have gone one step further, from destruction of humans and human things to the destruction of nature, of bio-, litho-, hydro-, and atmosphere, all the way to the biblical *Verwüstung*, desertification. Had he had atomic weapons, this would also have fallen under the purview of the *Führer*, as the embodiment of God and anti-God, entitled also to undo the work of the Creator.

*Vernichtung* and *Verwüstung* can be combined under the heading of exterminism, *Exterminismus*, a relation between a transpersonal *Führer* on the one hand and ordinary human beings on the other. The *Führer* is the successor to the Creator, himself a Creator and Destroyer. He fills a gap shaped by a dying Christian god. Mysticism is needed for this to take hold: a union bordering on identity between the *Führer* and other higher forces on the one hand; and a union between ordinary humans and the *Führer*, in extreme forms of devotion on the other.

We may detect a chain of historical succession here. There is Judaism with Yahweh on top, then the Divine Prince, Israel as the Chosen People with other peoples subservient to it; via Christianity with Jesus Christ destroying the position of Israel as a Chosen People, placing himself as the Divine Prince and declaring himself to be the only road to God, the Father; and via Islam with Mohammed destroying the position of Jesus Christ as the intermediary, establishing a direct relation between Allah and the believing Muslim with Mohammed as the guide.

Hitlerism fits in perfectly. There is monotheism, with the *Führer*, himself, on top. There is a Chosen People, resurrected as *Deutschland über alles*, with the lesser peoples of the world subservient to Germany, except those heading for extermination. There is both the blind faith in the *Führer*, and Hitler as guide. Nazism is simply a part of the Occidental family of religious thought, extreme but not alien to the family. There is one Chosen People trying to exterminate the Other, through crusades and invasions, inquisition and witch processes, pogroms. Logical consequence: Wannsee, Auschwitz.

When all these seven aspects of Nazism are combined in one package a particularly vicious combination ensues. Expansionism built into the construction of world space is justified by a *Feindbild* explaining the problems of the world in general and Germany in particular; a people easily mobilized with a strongly vertical image of social relations; even to the point of legitimizing exterminism; and with its eschatological conclusion in terms of catharsis/apocalypse.

Result: *Götterdämmerung*, heaven or hell, *Tausendjähriges Reich* or *Vernichtung*, including *Vernichtung* of Self. The last point cannot be stressed enough as a key aspect of Nazism. There is not only the right, but even the *duty* to exterminate others, the vermin. But even so triumph is not guaranteed. Hence there is also the *duty* to sacrifice oneSelf, or rather ourSelves in plural, not only in singular. If the enemy wins, the world is not worthy of our presence. The Germans have not fulfilled their duty, hence their lives are not worth living. The *Volk* has betrayed the *Führer*.

Self-sacrifice, *Opferbereitschaft*, becomes an essential aspect of the total ideology. If the goals are not obtained, the enemy not eradicated, expansionism not effectuated – then the sacrifice of ourselves follows, and not only as a result of the logic of warfare. Others have been sacrificed. Those headed for extermination, or at least subjugation as *Untertanen* for eternity, were informed that their unfortunate fate simply was like that. Some kind of law of nature had to be enacted; ‘there is nothing personal about it’, the SS man might say. Extermination was a God-like act, a question of setting the universe straight, with SS as the instrument of the New Order. The enactment of apocalypse.

#### 4.3 **Homo russicus/sovieticus = Homo occidentalis in extremis**

‘Stalinism’, or right-wing national Bolshevism, as a social phenomenon is not historically limited to the period in which Stalin was the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union, 1925/29–1953. One may discuss when it started. But it ended neither with Stalin’s death in March 1953 nor with the famous Khrushchev speech at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow February 1956, denouncing Stalin and claiming that Stalinism had cost the Soviet Union millions of lives. Forty years after Stalin’s death there may still be some Stalinism somewhere.

*What are the roots of Stalinism?* The question calls for definitions and for an effort to come to grips with Stalinism historically, structurally, culturally in such a way that it can be better comprehended – including how it could be brought under control, perhaps even put to an end.

Which would be the adequate ways of thinking about the Soviet Union? What would be the necessary and sufficient factors to take into account if we should try to describe it as a ‘macro-culture’? There seem to be at least three answers that would have to be put into the necessary and sufficient nucleus: the *Russian* element, trying to incorporate some of the more fundamental aspects of history and social structure; the *Orthodox* element, trying to characterize a branch of Christian theology; and *Marxism*, to build into the thinking some basic elements of that particular ideology. And, as with Germany, we would focus on the common roots among the roots, on the least transient elements. If we disregard Marxism as more transient we might get a description of *Homo russicus*; if we include Marxism, a description of *Homo sovieticus*, also transient.

So we combine the first two building blocks for insight into what might constitute the background for *Homo sovieticus* in a more systematic manner, following again the sevenfold scheme for cosmology description of *Homo russicus*.

*World:* Russia as the *real* center of the Occidental center of the world, the place where the true faith has survived, faithful to its roots, the home of the Third Rome after first one and then the other part of the Roman Empire had collapsed. Vulnerable, because pagans and heretics and other enemies believe its periods of weakness to be a perennial condition. They attack, underestimating the tremendous resilience of the people of these vast spaces. They mistake the real center of the world for its periphery. They do not understand that Russia is waiting for her time to come, the sleeping giant.

*Time:* Russia is waiting, with tremendous patience, and time perspectives as vast as its

geographical space, supported by the double catharsis/apocalypse promised both in Orthodox Christianity and in Orthodox Marxism. The *revolution* becomes the occasion for the last to become the first, for the Periphery to be restored to the Center, for the New Age (*novaya vremja*) to be ushered in on that patient but very fertile Russian soil, which deserves a better deal from history.

*Episteme*: But this can take place only in fundamental discontinuity with the past, with 'before revolution/after revolution', 'during communism/after communism' becoming latter-day versions of the Hell/Paradise dichotomy. A very dichotomous, even Manichean thought structure, or, to refer to the Slavonic version of this type of black-white good-evil thinking: *bogomil*. There were fits of dialectic in the way of approaching social history, inspired by the weak dialectical tendency in Marxist/Hegelian thought. But that trend very soon disappeared in favor of seeing Soviet society in all essentials as a final state, an *Endzustand*, with no autonomous inner dialectic, only minor operations still to be carried out in a technocratic manner from above, inspired by the scientific-technical-revolution. Dialectical materialism became a-dialectic, and the 'materialist' aspect became the label for a civilization systematically repressing the memory of its own cultural, even idealistic roots. Thus, stifled knowledge becomes castrated, incapable of producing new, fertile thoughts. And Soviet society became as stable, and unchangeable, as tsarist Russia. For some time. The Marxist aspect was transient. And we are back to *Homo russicus*.

*Nature*: Nothing particularly original appears here not found in *Homo occidentalis* in general. It is the right, and under socialism indeed the duty, of man to make use of, even exploit, nature to the utmost. As in teutonic cosmology this is combined with nature romanticism: lush Russian summer nature, birch trees, the little lake, the Orthodox church mirrored in its waters, the sky with drifting white clouds, the *dacha*. Highly accommodating nature, even addictive. To spoil and even desecrate a beloved object is, however, nothing new in the Occident. Soviet people made their contribution, as all Occidentals (and some others) do.

*Self*: A weak super-ego combined with a strong ego and a strong id produces individualistic and emotional people. Soviet collectivism was institutional, not based on a collective Self. To organize the Brothers Karamazov in a *kolkhoz* was never very meaningful, and certainly not easy. And they have survived; the *Kolkhoz* not.

*Society*: The basic structure was old Russian feudalism in its perverted form, with rights at the top and duties at the bottom, to the point that individuals at the bottom were owned like cattle, the possessions of those at the top. The latter may make the former disappear, with or without traces. This was replicated in a peculiar four-class structure in Soviet society. At the bottom were the *farmers/peasants*, producing the food for the sustenance of all, yet treated so badly that even with those vast territories they were not able to feed the population. The task was to produce food at minimum cost to the state, so that the next class from the bottom, the *workers*, also could be paid at minimum costs to the state because they could be fed so cheaply.

Combined, these two classes formed the majority of the population. Then, on top came two non-manual, intermeshing formations: the *party-military-police complex* (PMP) and the *bureaucracy-state corporation-intelligentsia complex* (BCI). The former were the producers of ideology and control, reward and punishment, particularly the latter. The latter produced planning, goods, and services. But the party-military-police complex was on top, the *troika* running Soviet society.

*Transpersonal*: Orthodox God becomes orthodox History as interpreted by Marx; the Bible becomes *das Kapital*; Jesus Christ the revealer/redeemer is shared between Marx the revealer and Lenin the redeemer, lying in the Red Square mausoleum in 'arisen' form, the holy tomb; symbolic of Moscow as the capital of the Chosen People.

Joining the church becomes joining the party; conversion remains conversion; salvation becomes revolution; all presumably irreversible. God's meaning with creation, to give a chance to humanity, the ultimate gift of eternal life, becomes the meaning of History: the promise of a final/eternal social formation. The church/priests interpret God, the party/officials interpret History and even ride in front of everybody else, on top of that huge wave, through time, symbolic of the promised future. The splendor of the top prelates represents *paradise*, the splendor of the top party life the secular homologue, *communism*. And just as true Christians were chosen for paradise, the Soviet Union was chosen as the first country to enter socialism.

So much for *Homo russicus* and the related *Homo sovieticus*. What, in addition to this, can be said about *Homo stalinensis*?

#### 4.4 **Homo stalinensis = Homo russicus/sovieticus in extremis**

Stalinism is an extreme version of what has been said in the preceding section. Maybe Stalin can be said to have taken the idea of Russia as the chosen people, and the Soviet Union, one of Russia's creations, as the chosen country, still one step further. Not chosen by God, of course; but by History as the first country to enter Socialism. *Socialism in one country* became his big slogan, as opposed to Trotsky's call for a world socialist revolution. How could Russia/the Soviet Union remain the chosen people/country, the vanguard of History, if all the others were to go the same way, right now? Stalin wanted the position as the first socialist country to be a Russian/Soviet monopoly. He wanted to consolidate the position so that those who came later (and he was in no doubt there would be many) would look to the Soviet Union as the homeland of socialism, with Mother Russia at its roots, and pay adequate tribute to her.

Stalin was able to personify the 'periphery-becoming-center'. A Georgian, born in insignificant Gori not far from Tbilisi, the son of a former serf, he nevertheless became the father of the peoples of the Soviet Union, in the Kremlin itself. The last became the first, as a model for that vast landmass.

Overshadowed by Lenin, Stalin needed his own apocalypse, his own re-birth. He got it in *The Great Patriotic War* of 1941–45. Whether he expected Hitler to attack or not can be disputed. The important point is how he exploited the situation to catapult himself into the position as successor redeemer, the person who could solidify the work initiated by the Great Redeemer Lenin himself, like Paul the Apostle for Jesus Christ.

Stalin also sought to telescope the revolutionary process in a burst of tremendous impatience, trying to get things done not only as quickly as possible, but more quickly than possible so that it became an impossibility, thereby creating his own incessant crises. He must have had tremendous faith that the dawn was coming: it was just a question of unleashing the mechanisms, of casting off the shackles; pushing, kicking a screaming population into the 'paradise' of socialism, whether they had earned it or not, by triggering off what to him were the right mechanisms.

Even nature had to be forced, far beyond its capacity. Genetics was not very helpful as a science, so it had to be changed to Lysenko genetics, promising that acquired characteristics could be inherited, conjuring up a nature that did not exist. Likewise with society. Industrialization was to be initiated everywhere. Nothing should get in the way of the regimentation and organization of the peasants/farmers for the purposes mentioned: no independent peasanthood, nothing however faintly reminiscent of landlordism. All resistance or impediments were lumped together as *kulaks*, to be exterminated. And nothing should stand in the way of the PMP and BCI complexes either: by 1939, two-thirds of the central committee of the party in the 15th Congress of 1927 had been killed. The same

with the intelligentsia: anybody who was not orthodox/loyal was to disappear, whether socially in the Gulag, and/or biologically by being exterminated. Any opposition was opposition to History as such, any person opposing History was not only anti-historical but a-historical, a-human.

How could it be otherwise? How could any normal, sane human being oppose the New Age, paradise on earth? How could anything but vermin act in such a way? Was that not in itself a sign, almost a guarantee that they were vermin and deserved to be exterminated?

To make the blessing irreversible was not a question of fighting an opposition, of your view vs. ours/mine, but of correct opinion vs. an insanity. Ultimately insanity is to be eliminated just as one gets rid of dirt in general: extermination, Gulag, or political psychiatry. The cure lasts till correct opinion has been achieved.

From this fascist attitude to other human beings, like real fascism not only massively violent but justified by some kind of transcendental ideology, the final step was short: *Stalin as God*, the 'personality cult'. Stalin certainly made himself *omnipotent* through the terrifying power-over-others he commanded, and to a large extent *omniscient* through his system of informers, with the police spying on his own population. He was *omnipresent* on virtually every wall in that ubiquitous photo. But Stalin failed, of course, in one rather important regard. God is also supposed to be at least partly benevolent, not always malevolent. God is supposed to deliver goods, not only bads; services, not only dis-services. There has to be grace and Grace. The balance, for the Stalin period, became too negative. So he ended up more as the interpreter of Lenin, the theologian/bureaucrat. As St Paul only, not as God, as successor, not superior. Till he meets his apocalypse with the implosion of the whole Soviet system.

#### **4.5 Homo americanus = Homo occidentalis in extremis**

For any analysis of Reaganism, or the broader category American fundamentalism, we need a texture of the cosmology of American faith in general, the make-up of *Homo americanus*; seen as a *Homo occidentalis in extremis*.

*World* has a clear center in the West, more particularly in the USA, as proven to the satisfaction of so many Americans by the millions of immigrants in search of a *new beginning; born again*, further confirmed by the circumstance that what is American tends to spread radially outward, all over the world.

*Time* comes equipped with an upward arrow; from being a not very significant colony far away – to becoming the mightiest power in the world, although the last statement needs modifying in the light of experiences like the stalemate in Korea 1950–53, the defeat in Indochina, 1961–75, the Iran hostage crisis 1979–80.

*Episteme*: in few places in the Occident, with the possible exception of the former Soviet Union, are science and technology and the scientific and technological revolution so firmly established as the basis for progress, questioned only by a few, instilling in *Homo americanus* the idea that to any problem there is somewhere a scientific/technological solution.

And God is over Man, Man is over Woman, some men and women are over other men and women, and they are all over *Nature*. Because that is the way it is, *Society* is organized by combining gender and class, race and nation, injecting some achievement and competition to place each *Self*, with a mixed super-ego, strong ego and strong id, where it belongs. All to the glory of God and His successors: the *state*, the *market*, *science* and the *nation*.

In short, *Homo americanus* was and is a rather successful case of *Homo occidentalis*,

not only in his own eyes but also in the eyes of others. Starting from scratch the United States, the first modern nation, populated by plebeians; almost exterminating the Native American population through genocide; importing a new black under-class as slaves; establishing a mix of slave society and some kind of feudalism with instant, fake aristocracy on top; then plunging into capitalism and importing a third under-class of fresh immigrants annually. *And then, what?*

Well, the world changes. We are dealing with two important geopolitical facts: the dislocation of the point of gravity inside the United States from Yankee Northeast to the mixed Southwest (from Texas westward), and at the same time a dislocation of the point of gravity in the world economy from the Judeo-Christian World Northwest to the Buddhist-Confucian World Southeast. From the Atlantic Hemisphere to the Pacific Hemisphere; from a white-white Christian relation USA-Europe to a white-colored relation, across a considerable culture gap.

Reaganism was an expression of and a reaction to both. These two changes in point of gravity are intimately related to each other. The USA Southwest, potentially the South in general, is the part of the US that represents the modern industry and the new initiatives, presumably more capable of competing with the world Southeast. Kennedy, epitome of the Northeast, was killed in the South, home to all elected presidents after him: Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton (and Newt Gingrich). But the South(west) is also a depository of reactionary, self-righteous, crusading ideologies and movements. To that we now turn.

#### **4.6 Homo reaganensis = Homo americanus in extremis**

The same analytical framework will be used for Reaganism as has been used above to analyze Hitlerism and Stalinism as macro-cultures. Reagan is not seen as ‘a realist’ who just wanted to look ‘credible’ and ‘determined’, but as an ideologist of major significance because of the strong American fundamentalist, Christian element. Hence, the cosmology will be run backwards, starting with the *Transpersonal*, asking about Reagan’s relationship to God, the Guiding Light, and Reagan as the Great Communicator.

Reagan’s conception of god may be conceived of as a Trinity – *Market, God, and Democracy*, and exactly in that order. More precisely expressed: belief in the *magic of the market-place* in a classical sense, with market forces expressing themselves ‘freely’, meaning that the strong can dominate the weak. Of course, the free trade doctrine is no longer unconditionally valid: when a country like Japan proves more skillful than the United States, then that country has to exercise ‘voluntary restraint’. Free trade has to be ‘managed’. When developing countries can produce something less expensively because labor is inexpensive and raw materials are close at hand, then there will be tariff and non-tariff import limitations. Moreover, the market forces have to operate bilaterally, from the USA (corporations) to each country separately and lead to trade surplus bilaterally (or at least not deficit). And they have to be private, as opposed to public.

Reagan’s God is a very fundamentalist God, not so far removed from the Judaic Yahweh. A God of revenge and punishment, appearing on the world scene using the American military as an instrument, and appearing nationally as capital punishment, and as ‘God bless America’ at the end of any presidential speech. The old expression ‘Judeo-Christian’ is frequently used; emphasizing the integration of Jews in US society and a linkage between the two which certainly is correct historically. But ‘Christian-Islamic’ is not heard of, although this might be even more correct historically; the two religions being more similar.

The Jews and the state of Israel are on the side of the fundamentalist God of the

United States. The Muslims, usually referred to as 'Muslim fanatics', 'fundamentalists' or 'terrorists', and the Muslim countries in general and particularly Iraq and Iran, are certainly not (although they were 'heroic freedom fighters' only some miles away, in Afghanistan). In short, that very conception reinforces the Western front against Islam.

Reagan's God is similar to Khomeini's Allah in setting very narrow limits for sexuality. Despite political disagreements, it nevertheless looks as if *Reagan is the West's answer to Khomeini*, with much of the same inclination towards revenge and punishment, holding strong norms regulating sexuality and the position of women in society.

There is also a softer element in Reaganism: a belief in democracy, or more precisely expressed, a faith in elections and a certain democratic ritualism. There is no problem about having elections: if elections really are free then people will of their own free choice prefer a society where market forces are the most important forces in society. In other words, economic freedom is the most basic freedom. If they do not have this preference then they have been brain-washed, exposed to 'politicization' by 'ideologues', and have to be brought into the fold again.

Important now are the consequences of this ideological-theological stance. Obviously there are considerable implications for the conceptualizations of World space found in Reaganism. The most important element is, of course, that the United States is closer to God than all other countries. For that reason the USA is not only *entitled* to play a central role – it also has this as a *duty*. The USA appears on the world stage as *God's own country*. On coins and bills it is clearly printed, *In God we trust*; establishing a mutual relation.

As an instrument of God this means that the USA, as also the US president, has the duty of assuming god-like features. Among these are the duty not only to be omnipotent, but also to be omnipresent, and omniscient. In order to be omniscient the country simply *must* have spy satellites in space, as well as spy organizations all over the world, such as FBI, CIA, NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office. In order to be omnipotent, the country simply *has to* be superior in all possible war theaters and in all weapon systems. In Reagan's period there was one gap in all of this: land-based, middle-range missiles in Europe, the 1979–83 theme, till God got His will. The Soviet 'monopoly' (disregarding sea-based and air-based missiles, and the missiles of the UK and France) was eliminated, with the zero-zero solution as the only acceptable alternative, and eventually that was to come about.

All of this is related to the circumstance that a monolithic conceptualization of God also implies a monolithic conceptualization of Satan. The Devil is the one who rejects all three elements in the Reaganesque Trinity. The Soviet Union was a socialist country with planning instead of the market, officially atheist, and a dictatorship with no freedom of choice in general elections. This means that the world had two extreme countries: the Soviet Union, only black and bad, and in a famous speech by Reagan even defined as the Center of Evil; and the United States, only white and good, and for that reason with a crucial guiding role to play in world history. This does not mean that one cannot also in the United States find evil elements; people who believe in 'big movements', people who do not believe in God, and totalitarian, anti-democratic forces. *Communists* in a broad sense, are, like Satan, also omnipresent.

It would seem that Reagan himself in his life had two major traumatic experiences: 'communists' in the trade union of actors so much wanting power; and, as he had more success, Big Government so much wanting his money as taxes. Reagan probably saw himself, in his own life, as an embodiment of the experience with Evil, an experience necessary and sufficient in order to understand the workings of the Devil.

To see the Soviet Union as 'equal', as 'one of two superpowers', was simply blasphemy. How could Evil be equated with Good? Moreover, the Devil plays a game; *dominoes*. He

tries all over the world to take over countries, initiating chain reactions that could reach the USA and even end in Washington, DC, unless the United States remains sufficiently omniscient and omnipotent.

From this very clear conceptualization an equally clear policy follows. In the world there is only one enemy. Just like Hitler, Reagan believed that one should not confuse the population with a complicated enemy image. 'It is the same enemy we are facing in Grenada and Lebanon', he says: not, for instance, 1,000 million Muslims and 2 billion poor people, or 300 million poor South Americans. It was the Soviet Union, or more precisely Moscow, or even more precisely the Kremlin.

The God-given role of the United States is to know everything and exercise punishment where justified, in order to protect people against the workings of the Devil. This attitude is similar to what could be found during the Crusades between 1095 and 1291. There were at least eight of them, partly even enacted in exactly the same part of the world, where Reagan was active, and Bush: in West Asia (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq). Also back in those days, Muslims were the devils. However, in the meantime the Devil had managed to expand his theater of operations so that the United States had to be busy in the Caribbean (Grenada, Cuba, Panama), in Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua), in North Africa (Libya, Chad), in the Gulf region (for oil and also against Iran and Iraq). Tomorrow?

*The devil is active.* It is not easy to be the instrument of God. A lot of money is needed even if the consequences are budget deficits and/or high interest rates, even an economic crisis. These economic calamities are also the workings of the devil, even if indirectly, by forcing the good forces to overextend themselves.

All of this touches the conceptualization of Time. Reagan was never an unconditional optimist. Being apocalyptic, he also believed that Armageddon could come; in this he differed from other US presidents after World War II. They had all been of the opinion that communism is an evil, but that there is another evil that is still worse; a world nuclear holocaust.

The epistemology of Reaganism can be understood only in the light of the Trinity. In fighting the Devil the military has, of course, the first and most important mission, the exercise of God-like power up to the possibility of desertification (*Verwüstung* in the sense of the Martin Luther Bible): exterminism with nuclear weapons, if that should be necessary.

For that whole fundamentalist image of the world, with God, people, and nature, all we need is actually the study of Creation according to the Christian Bible, Genesis. Clearly this points to a four-class society. God is on top, omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent. He has understood everything and created everything. At the bottom is Nature, and in-between people, divided into two, men and under them women. Where is Reagan himself? Very high up, among the men, as the First in the First nation of the world, and thus quite close to God himself. He also believes that women are more a part of nature, and that men are more divine.

Just as God can do with nature what he wants, so does Reaganism, being anti-ecological and anti-ecologist. Society was constructed according to Darwinism, competition for strong egos with a weak social security net. If this nevertheless leads to misery, then the remedy should be Christian charity. Whether that system functions or not is not an empirical problem. The system just simply *is* right, and what follows in the wake of that system is also right even if it may be disagreeable for many people. That is their fault, not the system's. Work hard, that is all. Don't work, get sick, homeless, or whatever – and you deserve to suffer the consequences.

There is a certain consistency to all of this. Reaganism is an elaboration of basic US tenets adjusted to nuclearism and US relative economic decline. Most important are the

guiding lights for economic, social, political, and military action, how World space is organized in terms of good and evil, and the idea that holocaust may not be avoidable, and not necessarily the worst of all possible evils. On top are the 'magic of the market', a fundamentalist conceptualization of God, and democracy.

During his Presidency, Ronald Reagan gave the United States a complete, American fundamentalist, ideology. Of course, he was never an ideologist in the sense of being an intellectual, but in the more important sense of using the right metaphors for the American people. Leading ideology in a very anti-intellectual country has itself to be anti-intellectual. This is a country where intellectuals, mostly living in the Northeast, are marginalized on a social side-track, in a ghetto called campus, viewing what happens with fear, dismay, and to some extent also with awe.

The United States is a very Other-directed country, where individuals have much respect for the majority; a super-ego for many. Protests must be directed not against the majority, but against concrete persons or anonymous forces and structures, inviting the majority to join in the struggle. In single-issue movements of short duration many people may participate, but not in movements that challenge majority belief.

Reaganism is clearly compatible with that structure: a clear articulation of the forces already built into US structure and culture. For that reason it was a mistake to assume that all this would disappear the moment Reagan disappeared from the political scene. Reaganism was a fundamentalist expression of both tendencies, both of an empire in decline, and of the new momentum taking shape inside the country through the dislocation of the economic and demographic point of gravity to fight that decline. It is so new, and so raw, what is taking place in the American Southwest. It is the mutiny of the periphery of the country against the old center in the Northeast.

And precisely as a periphery, the people developed fundamentalist periphery ideology under the sign of Reaganism, with absolutist categories of good and evil, white and black, very exaggerated, and a will to power with superiority as the guiding principle, presenting the other side as evil and oneself as perfect, or at least very close to perfection. To the structure of militarist, corporate, capitalism, with its greed for (strategic) raw materials, markets, and profits was added an ideological, even theological element, irreconcilable in its struggle with Evil. Bush and Gingrich follow in the footsteps.

Even the American Southwest will come to lose this type of absolutism with time, and develop ideologies more typical of the center, more discreet, more gradualist, softer, less self-righteous, but certainly aimed at maintaining the status quo. Reaganism, however, is not satisfied with the status quo. Not only the United States but the world in general, and the United States quite particularly, should become a materialization of his Trinity, steered by market forces, inspired by the Judeo-Christian God, with the legitimacy of the people, backed up through free elections.

Compare this to all the other political dimensions mentioned above, the categories that many people are concerned with, such as anti-imperialism, anti-neocolonialism, liberation from misery and hunger, the effort to become master of one's own house, to be self-reliant, the effort to have an egalitarian society, to have a society where fundamental needs, autonomy, and equality play a role as important as Reagan's Trinity. Nothing of this is found in Reaganism. And it even has a certain connotation of the workings of the Devil, because the Devil also talks about such matters. This makes Reaganism not only anti-human, but intellectually rather ridiculous: and it was precisely for that reason that it was inconceivable that Reaganism would be dominant for a very long period.

However, American fundamentalism, *Homo americanus fundamentalis* = *Homo americanus in extremis*, is a broader category than Reaganism, and was also to a large extent carried by his successor. It will remain as latent cosmology, and will probably manifest itself again, in periods of crisis.

#### 4.7 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?

We are dealing with deep culture, and I see this as the most important border area of peace research. Whereas problems of political, military, and economic power are manageable, at least to some extent, and on paper;<sup>2</sup> the problems of deep cultural power are not in that category. Chapter 5 will explore this,<sup>3</sup> but it falls miserably short of the magnitude of the problem.

However, much has to do with how we approach that problem.

First, this is not about the biography of these three particular persons; they are only the embodiments of a deeper phenomenon. *Homo stalinensis*, for instance, as constructed here, is not Stalin, nor is it Stalinism as an explicit ideology, but the type of person whose deep culture makes Stalin and Stalinism appear natural and normal, worthy of active support.

Second, again the point is not that all three of them were playing God, had extremely Manichean world views and threatened or carried out genocide. The point is that they could operate in cultural climates where such ideas were not only condoned but considered politically correct, and accepted enthusiastically.

Third, the term 'in extremis'. These are extremist versions of extremist versions of Occident I. But at the same time they are not that different. The basic logic of Occident I and the six 'more extreme, most extreme' deep cultures explored here is the same. Internalize Occident I deeply, and a step in the more extreme direction may not even be noticed; internalize that one, and the next step is not perceived either. The mistake is to identify extremisms only with bad periods and persons in history. The same soil may bring forth the same weeds again. And again.

#### Notes

1. This chapter is based on my *Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism: Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell* (Norwegian edition Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984; Spanish edition Alicante: Gil Albert, 1985; German Edition, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987; revised English edition forthcoming (under the title *Hitlerism, Stalinism and American Fundamentalism: Dark Variations of Western Civilization*). The reader is referred to the book for more details.

2. For an example, see Table 1 in the Introduction to this book. Incidentally, to have a solution on paper should not be underestimated; that is where it usually starts.

3. Much more will be said in *A Theory of Civilizations*, forthcoming.

## Explorations: Are There Therapies for Pathological Cosmologies?

### 5.1 Introduction: the Geopolitical Setting

The reader is invited to have a look at Table 5.1 where our present world is seen as divided into seven spheres or regions, six of them headed by well-known hegemons. In another context<sup>1</sup> the argument has been made that this image of a world of international feudalism is a good guide to the successor system to the Cold War, the *New World Order*. The East–West system was a bilateral system; this system consists of six or seven parallel unipolar systems with their multipolar involvements. One hegemon is *primus inter pares*, the hegemons' hegemon, the United States of America. And region No. 7, the Arab/Islamic world, does not have a hegemon on top. Did Iraq/Saddam try?<sup>2</sup>

In the Table an effort is made to describe the *motivations* of these superpowers, three of them with global reach (US, EC/EU and Japan), three of them only regional (Moscow, Beijing, India); three of them Christian, one Shinto, one Confucian, one Hindu, and one Muslim. Generally, certain motivational syndromes embedded in the collective subconscious referred to as the *cosmology* (as opposed to consciously present ideology) will carry in their wake the usual capabilities, economic and military.<sup>3</sup> In other words, there is the general thesis of *primacy of culture*, or civilization – not the Marxist assumption of economic primacy, the ‘realist’ assumption of military primacy, or the liberal assumption of the primacy of political institutions (e.g. as conceptualized in the democracy/dictatorship dichotomy).<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the civilizations are now characterized in terms of chosenness, myths, and traumas.<sup>5</sup>

To repeat: the cosmology is the code, the program, of a civilization. It is usually better seen from the outside than by the insiders to whom all of that is too normal and natural, like the air around them, to verbalize it. A civilization is a macro-culture, spanning considerable regions in space and time, such as the Occidental civilizations with their basis in the religions of the Book, *kitab*: Judaism, Christianity, Islam. The distinction between expanding Occidental civilization or Occident I (the Greco-Roman period and the Modern Period), and contracting Occidental civilization or Occident II (the medieval period) may be more interesting, however, since this distinction makes sense for all three Abrahamic religions with their hard and soft aspects. And then there are the Indic (Hindu), Buddhic (Buddhist), Sinic (Chinese), and Nipponic (Japanese) civilizations.

The problem is how the civilizations program the nations in general, and the national leaders in particular, for patterns of international behavior, not meaning that other aspects are unimportant, only that culture is the focus of the present chapter. Three dimensions of a culture have been selected here:

- *Chosenness*, the idea of being a people chosen by transcendental forces, above all others, endowed, even anointed, to be a light unto others, even with the right *and duty* of governing them.

Table 5.1 *Geopolitics: Cultural Factors in a 7-Polar World*

The poles	Chosenness	The myths	The traumas
I. US pole	by God as New Canaan	Post World War II unipolarity	Viêt Nam syndrome Tehran hostages
II. EU pole	Cradle of civilization	Europe as world center	World War II Nazism Fascism, communism Loss of empires US junior partners
II. Japan pole	by <i>Amaterasu-O-mikami</i>	<i>dai-tō-ā</i>	Pacific War defeat Nuclear holocaust
IV. Moscow pole	by History (betrayed)	Bipolarity Russia	World War II Stalinism Implosion of the USSR
V. Beijing pole	Simply <i>is</i>	Perfect autonomy	Humiliation of 1840s–1940s
VI. India pole	Cradle of civilization	Hindu <i>raj</i> British <i>raj</i>	Colonialism Underdevelopment
VII. Islam pole	by Allah	Islamic past Arab nation Ottoman Empire	Crusades, zionism Communism, consumerism <i>divide et impera</i> Inner divisions

- *Traumas*, of being a people hit and hurt by others, possibly out of their envy, by enemies lurking anywhere, out to hit again.
- *Myths of past and future glories*, near or distant, but *real*.

Others would focus on other factors. But these three, rooted in religion and concrete history, are bound to be crucial, as concrete expressions of the seven basic cosmology dimensions.<sup>6</sup> Together they form a syndrome, here simply referred to as the ‘chosenness-myth-trauma’-complex, CMT-complex for short, or with a more evocative term: the *collective megallo-paranoia syndrome*. Chosenness induces collective sentiments of grandeur relative to all others. This is then built into the myths of a glorious past to be recreated, the present being suspended between the glorious past and the glorious future. The myth is the bridge between the transcendentalism of being chosen,<sup>7</sup> that moment when the deity pronounced *Thou art mine*, and concrete utopia, on this earth. The history can be used as its own validation: ‘because we had that past we must have been chosen’, in addition to ‘because we were chosen we had that past’. But the traumas can also be used as validation of the idea of chosenness: ‘we have suffered so much, there must be a deeper meaning to that suffering, to be revealed in a positive, even glorious future’. New traumas are then expected for the future, with a mixture of fear and the lustful anticipation of self-fulfilling prophecies coming true.<sup>8</sup>

The three parts of the syndrome reinforce each other socially, not only as ideas. People chosen to be a light unto others,<sup>9</sup> even to rule them, will experience an endless chain of

traumas. After an initial period of success, providing raw material for myths, resistance will set in, leading to traumas. Others might not be interested in that light, to be conditioned by others, preferring to be their own light and their own cause. They do not accept that transcendental forces should rule through some other chosen people, not being party to that covenant, or being chosen themselves, or because they see the whole chosenness idea as morbid at best and a power strategy at worst.<sup>10</sup>

The chosen people will sulk, *my lord, why hast thou betrayed me*, and find reasons for the traumas inflicted upon them anywhere but in their own idea of chosenness, brushed aside as 'blaming the victim'.<sup>11</sup> How could they bear traumas without that consolation? In a Manichean framework the negation of being chosen, in a drama with a transcendental author, is to be the *unchosen, even the rejected people*. A people like that will not survive long, having ready-made explanations for traumas, and self-fulfilling myths of predestined decline and fall.<sup>12</sup>

People suffering from the CMT-complex will have two standard non-contradictory explanations why transcendental will is not fulfilled and the glory not ushered in: 'equal but opposed forces are at work',<sup>13</sup> and 'the Chosen People have strayed away from the transcendental will', no longer having that backing.<sup>14</sup> If transcendental will is to rule others, then returning to the path of righteousness will lead to even more trauma; the vicious circle which hegemons (and Israel) have built for themselves.<sup>15</sup>

The focus here is on chosen people with positive myths and negative traumas, giving them a sense of rights and duties. The diagnosis of collective megallo-paranoia is based on chosenness and myths feeding the megalomania and trauma feeding the paranoid side of that coin; that metaphor indicating their inseparability. The megalomaniac is always on the alert for signs of disrespect, avoiding situations that might serve to falsify the illusions of grandeur.<sup>16</sup> The paranoid has to justify being the focus of so much hostility and so little appreciation of his extraordinary talent. Such people(s) may become very dangerous when they demand instant confirmation that their talents are recognized.<sup>17</sup>

## 5.2 Individual-centered Therapy

Individuals socially defined as suffering from mental disorders have one thing in common: *social incompetence*, as defined by mainstream culture in that society. Incompetence is a socially unacceptable form of deviance seen as unwilling, meaning that the individual cannot by an act of will become competent. If the incompetence is willed, then the individual is seen as wicked, a criminal in for punishment; if unwilling, he is a patient in need of therapy.<sup>18</sup> But willed/unwilling is a matter of judgement, in our days sometimes by a jury. There is no sharp distinction, nor are the two reactions very different.

Let us divide the standard repertory of reactions to mental disorder into *socio-therapy* (changing the social status of the deviant), *soma-therapy* (changing the body of the deviant) and *psycho-therapy* (changing the mind of the deviant). Clearly the three categories do not exclude each other, reactions of any one of the three kinds having effects in the other two arenas.

Standard *socio-therapy* would include killing, banishment, and institutionalization; in other words physical elimination and two forms of social elimination.<sup>19</sup> But then there is the more subtle and for our purposes more important restructuring of the relation. Inserting the deviant in a socio-therapeutic community of other deviants is one approach, like a half-way house. Many primitive/traditional societies are themselves that tolerant therapeutic community. Even more important is 'kicking the deviant upstairs', deciding that his deviance is competence at higher levels, like identifying the *shaman*.<sup>20</sup> At the top of hierarchies there is no need to meet people, only words.<sup>21</sup>

Imagine a megallo-paranoid person in a megallo-paranoid civilization. The person suffers from delusions of grandeur and persecution. So does the civilization. This does not immediately qualify for high positions; there are some additional conditions. The person has to speak the idiom of the cosmology, has to give voice to the chosenness, the myths, and the traumas of the society in terms understandable to the people and acceptable to the elites, *and never ever utter any doubt of such beliefs.*<sup>22</sup> Self-centered talk of own chosenness alone will not qualify. There has to be an acceptable link between individual and collective megallo-paranoia. The individual has to be seen as a chosen representative whose personal myths and traumas came about on behalf of the society, as individual manifestations, or projections, of collective destiny. Ideally the individual should be a micro-representation of the macro-level collectivity, past–present–future.<sup>23</sup> Ontogenesis should mirror phylogenesis. Jesus Christ is one example here, so is Mohammed. Likewise Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Ronald Reagan.<sup>24</sup>

With this self-presentation a psychopath equipped with megallo-paranoid syndromes may be seen as the strong leader, not suited for daily interaction with equals but ideal for the higher rungs of impersonal, paper-oriented bureaucracies of the ministerial, corporate, or military varieties. Empathy with others would be very low, another way of saying ‘socially incompetent’. The adequacy for vertical organization may be high because of the lack of considerateness for others, found more in males than in females.<sup>25</sup> The steeper the bureaucracies and the more advanced the mental disorder, the worse the situation.<sup>26</sup>

Something in this sheds some light on how to explain Nazi Germany. Hitler alone and his possible ‘madness’ fail to explain why he attracted so many followers. Explanations in terms of the German people alone disregard the need for a competent executive, the people being incapable of long-term self-management of megallo-paranoia. Mass phenomena like the hysterical crowd or mob are short-term phenomena.<sup>27</sup> Far from being socially incompetent, Hitler was rather pleasant in private company regardless of how ruthless he was politically. His basic traits were really believing what he said, and pushing a sickening ideology with relentless energy.<sup>28</sup> In the end he developed psychosomatic symptoms, as would anybody under that stress. He saw himself as chosen, his own past richly endowed both with trauma and myths of glory. In other words, his psycho-character was isomorphic to the point of identity with the socio-character of the German people. That point is missed by saying that the Germans were authoritarians in search of a leader, and that he was an authority in search of a people to rule. Rather, *they recognized themselves in each other*, ‘you and I, we are of the same kind’, *specifcae* of the same *genus*. Perfect fit.

In the periphery of that system, the Germanic *Neuordnung*, a mini-Hitler took shape: the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling. He had the personal CMT-complex well installed in his personality, and made a call for status as *fører*, Norwegian for *Führer*. Unlike Hitler he would never have won free elections, his CMT-complex not being mirrored in the Norwegian cosmology.<sup>29</sup> A large-scale Norway, ten times bigger, might have evolved that cosmology and applauded. Quisling was merely a dictator with the wrong script.

Moving to *soma-therapies*, the first point is the implicit idea of reversibility. Therapy is possible, as opposed to the socio-therapeutic idea of healing not the deviant but the society by ridding itself of the deviant, or by using those extraordinary talents. And the second point is the implicit individualism in the approach. The context is not changed, only the individual body. Any intervention is in principle conceivable; physical-mechanical (lobotomy), physical-electrical (electro-shock), bio-chemical (ataraxia) and so on and so forth. From one angle they can be divided into two: those that are openly painful and hence carry elements of punishment, and the others. If the therapists are instruments of social control on behalf of the social order, they will, like other authorities, tend to prefer apathy to revolt, and organize their ‘therapies’ accordingly. An apathetic

patient, like a non-crying baby, is 'good'. Lobotomy and ataraxia induce that state; as with killing, banishment, and institutionalization the patient is rendered powerless, and punished. Apathy-inducing approaches are seen as more humane.<sup>30</sup>

All of this should then be contrasted with the *psycho-therapeutical* approaches. Unlike the other two here we are only at the beginning of something; one century after Freud opened the individual subconscious notwithstanding. Schools are proliferating, a good sign of pluralism. They see mental disorder as more or less reversible. Some approaches are individual-centered and some more socio-therapeutic, shading into the therapeutic communities hinted at above. Soma-therapy has to be individualistic given the lack of interbody connection; psycho-therapy is not forced into that assumption.<sup>31</sup>

The focus here is on individual-centered psycho-therapy. There is a general *Paradigm I* underlying the approach of high relevance to the problem stated in the title of this chapter, a process with overlapping, but distinct, necessary phases:<sup>32</sup>

- Phase 1:* Individual recognizing and accepting being in *crisis*.
- Phase 2:* Individual accepting crisis as pre-programmed in Self.
- Phase 3:* Individual accepting need for help by competent Other.
- Phase 4:* Individual accepting entering a Patient–Healer relation.
- Phase 5:* Patient–Healer cooperating in identifying hidden program.
- Phase 6:* Patient–Healer cooperating in changing program of Self.
- Phase 7:* Patient being *Born Again* with new Self, *catharsis*.

The isomorphism between this paradigm and Judeo-Christian spirituality is obvious. The crisis is the sin. Pre-programming means at some stage having strayed away from God, even having given oneSelf to Satan, or, still more basic: *original sin*. The competent Other is Jesus Christ, and the acceptance of entering into a relation with Him is a necessary condition for union with God, i.e. salvation/purification.<sup>33</sup> Catholic Christianity would add the Church as a necessary condition for entering the relation with the Supreme Healer: *extra ecclesiam, nulla salus*. The forces behind the acts of sin must be seen through confession and then exorcised through repentance, expiation, and submission, asking for forgiveness, accepting new guidance, being reborn *in Christ*. *Catharsis*. If not: the *apocalypse* of eternal damnation.

No wonder psychoanalysis was resisted. The Christian paradigm was secularized, with the individual psychoanalyst in the role of the priest, Freud in the role of the Christ, even endowed with God-like features. Promising rebirth, on earth!

This Judeo-Christian inspired *Paradigm I* can now be contrasted with a more Buddhist-oriented *Paradigm II*.

First, an element of *consciousness-formation*, or with the term made popular by Paulo Freire, *conscientization*.<sup>34</sup> The subconsciously known but consciously unknown becomes consciously known, available and explicit, to be countenanced and confronted. The general formula would be self-knowledge through *meditation*. Second, there is an element of *mobilization*, the individual Self becoming increasingly aware. There is a faith in the capacity of Self to provide its own Others for *inner dialogue*, e.g., with one internal Other being some super-ego, another id, a view which would also be compatible with some medieval and protestant christianity. With an external Other there would be the difference between the Other above and the Other at the same level. Christianity in Occident I sees God as transcendent and above, rather than as immanent and within. The need for human beings to be guided from above is reflected in classical psychoanalytical insistence on an Other-directing psychoanalyst as indispensable, as opposed to client-centered, Self-directed therapy and humanistic psychology.<sup>35</sup> Paradigm II is neither, but welcomes *outer dialogues with others in the same situation*.

Third, there is the element of *confrontation*, of challenging those subconscious forces that have been driving Self, picking one particular crisis as exemplar. Fourth, there is the *struggle*, the dialectic of liberating oneself from the old Self while at the same time creating the new Self. And this ends, fifth, with *moksha*, *satori*, *self-reliance*, born again, a new beginning, capable of conscious self-causation, not driven by hidden codes.

Paradigm II shows close similarity to a paradigm for revolutionary struggle, also from below, to overcome structural violence.<sup>36</sup> In that case the conscientization is aimed at understanding not the inner forces hidden in the deeper layers of the *personality*, but the forces hidden in the deeper layers of *society*. In both cases the word *structure* is useful: the personality has a structure, and so does society. A structure can do violence not only *in* society, *to* human beings – body, mind, and spirit – but also *in* personality. And this opens for the question of whether there could be structural violence present in any personality merely by virtue of being a personality, and in any society by virtue of being a society. The answer would indicate limits to inner and outer peace.<sup>37</sup>

The relation to the problem of pathological cosmologies can now be spelt out. In this case, the pathology is rooted neither in the structure of the personality, nor in the structure of society, but in both. There are similar elements in the subconsciousness of elite members of the society ('the ruling cosmology being the cosmology of the ruling class', to paraphrase Marx), and others, *and* in the deep culture of that society, such as the CMT syndrome. The cosmology concept links the structure of that culture to the structure of the personalities, the deeper aspects of culture being institutionalized in the society as carriers of the cosmology,<sup>38</sup> and internalized in the individuals as assumptions about what is normal and natural. The *collectively shared subconscious*, in other words. The double-level nature of the collective megallo-paranoia, both in society and in personalities, makes therapy, healing, very difficult.

### **5.3 Are Individual-level Paradigms Applicable to Collectivities?**

Two positions can be rejected from the very beginning: automatic applicability, and automatic non-applicability. Let us rather proceed step by step, applying the types of therapeutic approaches given above to collectivities, particularly nations, and their relations, in other words to international relations.

*Socio-therapies* There is no difficulty in translating the approaches, and their violent nature becomes even clearer when interpreted as international relations. What was the Nazi extermination of European Jews about? Not the pettiness of some economic and cultural competition between Jews and other Germans, but the idea that there was room for only one chosen people on German soil, the 'Aryans'. Hitler compared Jews to micro-organisms,<sup>39</sup> and applied the search and destroy strategy known not only from the 'eradication' of contagious diseases, but also from the US approach to 'communism' in Indochina. Each single Jew was seen as a vector for the disease of non-Aryan chosenness and hence to be eliminated. The process is very similar to the (Spanish) Inquisition<sup>40</sup> effort to eradicate heresy by eliminating heretics, even if they had abjured their faith.<sup>41</sup>

But Hitler, like the Inquisition, also used banishment and institutionalization. Eradication was instrumental to the goal of making Germany and occupied Europe *Judenrein*; the world came second. Exile was an alternative, whereby the Nazis made money on that alternative,<sup>42</sup> obviously preferable to potential victims if affordable (as usual, class enters). And prison was used, not only before execution, both by one chosen people to eliminate another, and by the chosen persons eliminating others.

Not accepted by Hitler were the marginalized communities that would let Jews

associate with themselves, defining their apartness as normal: the *ghetto* system in use since the early 16th century. Nor, indeed, the tolerance of assimilating Jews into society, the liberal approach since the 19th century; and certainly not allowing them leadership positions. More recently, that has been the US approach, one interpretation being that the early USA had emulated the Jewish chosenness as archetype, as *raison d'être* for their own social construction.<sup>43</sup> After an initial period of rejection and anti-Semitism, the Jews are now to a large extent used as executive agents of that archetype.<sup>44</sup> There is an ambiguity, however, given the intellectual brilliance of the Jews and the high level of US anti-intellectualism, seeing intellectuals as people seeing themselves as chosen, the deviance being mental ('eggheads'), and the ghetto being the campus.<sup>45</sup> Leaving the Holocaust illustration aside, banishment, even institutionalization, is used defining the marginalized as *pariah* nations, isolating them through diplomatic and economic sanctions (against socialist countries, South Africa, Nicaragua, Cuba, Iran–Libya–Syria, Iraq, Israel, Serbia; all with blossoming CMT-complexes). They are then supposed to contemplate the conditions for readmission. There has been change in five of them.<sup>46</sup>

How about kicking upstairs? This is exactly what the Western countries are doing with the United States! *You are our leader* – recognizing in the USA themselves *in extremis*, as a more powerful expression of their own inner yearnings.<sup>47</sup> Could Nazi Germany have obtained the same recognition, had it exercised its violence only outside (Western) Europe, and retained parliamentarism?<sup>48</sup>

*Soma-therapies* The US-led anti-Iraq coalition was an effort at lobotomy and electro-shock combined, trying both to cut the C<sup>3</sup>I functions of that society, civilian as well as military, exorcising the evil, making them apathetic, punishing them for individual and general prevention, forcing them out of Kuwait. A tall bill,<sup>49</sup> demanding a rich spectrum of approaches. The ataraxia approach would correspond to the introduction of TV and consumer society, making people passive or even apathetic, inner-directed, concerned with their own material comfort and not with social change induced by their ideas. We would expect ataraxia to follow lobotomy/electro-shock, as in Grenada and Panama.<sup>50</sup>

*Psycho-therapies* This is where the applicability starts breaking down. Paradigms I and II can only be applied to a heavily CMT-imbedded nation if it is willing to *undergo* (I) Other-directed, or to *undertake* (II) Self-directed therapy. The glaring dissimilarity is obvious: the power relation. Society as a whole can handle, literally speaking, a minority of megallo-paranoid deviants, but the international community only as long as the deviant is small and relatively isolated, not when grown up to full regional or global status, overpowering the rest. Then they are more likely to be elected leaders, with elites successfully repressing any change.

This does not mean that we should commit the 'realist' fallacy of thinking only of therapy using coercive power. The problem is the Chosen People's recognition only of the Almighty as authority. Willingness to undergo therapy would be on His order. But therapy in the name of common values, promising rewards after successful therapy might still be possible.<sup>51</sup>

Imagine, nonetheless, a nation willing to undergo therapy, following Paradigm I.

The first condition would be people collectively recognizing a tendency to 'get into trouble', indeed crises, at least partly of their own making. The problem is how that may happen. There may be parallel rumblings in the individual subconsciousnesses, rejecting not only mainstream overt ideology but also the covert assumptions in the cosmology. The parallel rumblings may even be consciously shared. But this would at most lead to subversive subcultures within society, with a counter-cosmology gradually taking the shape of an ideology with transformation potential, like working-class socialism, female

feminism, or the peace movement. But our concern is not with new power groups, or alternative ideology and cosmology, but with transformation of mainstream cosmology.

One key to how that could happen is as simple in theory as it is difficult in practice. If the leading cosmology is the cosmology of the leading class, then it is from the leading class, and more particularly from The Leader, that the leading transformation must come, *as the transformation of the Leader*. The usual elite circulation is not good enough; that is outer, not inner change. In order to become leader, the leader did not always have to confirm the cosmology, only never to reject it; now he has openly to reject it and never covertly to confirm it. For signals to reach deep down they have to come from high above. But they can work only if they encounter sufficient resonance deep below in the collective subconscious. The formula for successful therapy is the same as the formula for contracting the pathology: transforming leader(s) and followers alone are only necessary causes, together they are sufficient.

What is needed, then, is the recognition and acceptance by the Leader of being in a Self-rooted crisis (meaning individual and collective Self). This is not the same as conceding defeat, e.g. after an election. In that case, neither cosmology nor ideology is wrong; what went wrong was only the failure of people to become followers. Nor should it be confused with some recent convert to a new ideology, like a turncoat crossing the floor of a national assembly. We are talking about the recognition of something as fundamentally wrong.

The best example in modern times is probably the change-of-heart initiated by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU(B) February 1956, followed by Gorbachev, in a process still going on, some 40 years later. This can probably be seen as a recognition by stages. Khrushchev essentially rejected Stalinism, including what may be called the deep structure of Stalinism; Gorbachev in addition rejecting the deep structure of Leninism. From being ideologies they had both sedimented as cosmologies in the Soviet collective subconscious of many, perhaps most; mixing with left-overs from the cosmology of the tsarist formations, located deep down also in many dissidents.<sup>52</sup>

Why did they do this? Obviously because the whole system was in a crisis; equally obviously because that crisis was rooted in their own program, cosmology. Efforts at blaming Others, such as interventionist wars, counter-revolution, hunger and misery after World War I, sabotage, the horrors of the Nazi attack of World War II (the Great Patriotic War), bad harvests – all had some explanatory power. But an unexplained residual remained, after all other explanations and remedies had been tried.<sup>53</sup>

Socialist formations make crisis for themselves; capitalism is better at making crisis for others (not to be confused with Russian/Soviet imperialism, which is tsarist more than socialist). Socialism kills upwards in efforts to control middle and upper classes, including those of its own creation; capitalism kills downwards in efforts to control restless workers, including those created by its own dynamism. Capitalism displaces its crises downwards, exploiting the inner proletariat in the working class, the outer proletariat in the periphery countries, and nature; socialism exploits all three in addition to itself. After all, Khrushchev spoke mainly of the Stalinist victims in the Communist Party, meaning his own kind.

A ‘clear and present’ crisis, then, is one precondition; the other is an enlightened, honest, courageous leadership taking the moral risks of recognition and acceptance of deep failure. Then comes the problem of healing, of own capacity for doing so, of the possible need for the Other, even that ultimate Other. The USA tried to be that Other to defeated Germany and Japan after World War II, today more than willing to play the same role for the Soviet Union, administering the triple medicine of pluralist democracy, free market economy, and Christianity by governmental action, corporate investment and US missionaries respectively. But the Germans lacked the inner readiness; that was to come

through the youth revolt one generation later. Japanese elites probably never underwent any basic inner change. And US-induced change in the Soviet Union presupposes submissiveness to the USA – a condition satisfied in the other cases. Hence the partial failures of the attempts; but Soviet self-healing continues.<sup>54</sup>

Let us then try Paradigm II as being closer to real politics, assuming that the problem of conscientization has been solved in the way indicated above. The figure of ‘mobilization’ is important because it has a concrete collective interpretation: organizing the people who have been transformed to work on the rest. This is a well-known figure from religions and ideologies, but not so easily applied to the individual level unless we can assume consciously conducted inner dialogues, something many people do as Self-therapy, even by writing a diary. But that process may smack of schizophrenia. In the case of a nation that has developed pathological character traits, we are talking about something very concrete: a new gender, generation, race, class or nation, or any other group, carrying *a new message*.

Next, the formula of ‘confrontation’. The crucial point is the selection of the test case, the exemplar, well chosen for its pedagogical value in contrasting the way it was done in the old days with the way it will be done under the new Dispensation. Both the old and the new are to be tested. Thus, a test case for the former Soviet Union was, is, and remains independence for the republics, and for the nations encased inside the republics, causing change as well as resistance. Another test case is the peaceful transfer of power through secret ballot; privatization a third. All three are efforts, from the inside and from the outside, to implant Western ideology in Soviet cosmology, thereby changing the cosmology. The Soviet leaders were exposed to pressure both from above and below, and fell. An effort to return (probably ritualistic, 19 August 1991) also failed. But the initiator of the whole process, Gorbachev, was felled as well.

A basic question is whether this is basic enough. Thus, the question that flows from the argument here would be whether the ex-Soviet peoples in general, and the Russians in particular, still see themselves as a chosen people with the rights and duties this implies. If they do, then a new cause is sure to be found, propagated with the same missionary zeal, legitimized by reference to myths and trauma, including the more recent traumas.

Then, the formula of ‘struggle’, to become independent of what was before. Quick or slow, violent or nonviolent; the slow and nonviolent being the preference of the peace researcher exploring conditions for peace by peaceful means.<sup>55</sup> Killing, exiling, imprisoning or otherwise marginalizing all those who might carry the seeds of the old order deep down in their subconscious as was done by Nazi Germany (and a micro-fraction of that, but with the same structure, by zionist Israel) is enacting megallo-paranoia, not to engage in transformation. Only through deep transformation can the inner coherence of a new cosmology be achieved, leading to self-reliance, autonomy, meaning independence of any outside healer, sufficiently equipped with a self-healing process, as when democracy is firmly rooted. An example might be Germany, where democracy fifty years after Nazism seems firmly rooted if high political participation and the pluralism of the parties, with a real choice among more than two alternatives are valid criteria. But then the test will also be whether there still are expansionist and domineering tendencies in the German nation, and here the way West Germans are treating their own nation in the former DDR, with full-scale economic, cultural, and political penetration, makes one wonder.

#### 5.4 Conclusion: What Can We Do About It?

Evidently something succeeds, since many of the empires driven by CMT-complexes are no longer with us. Probably they became exhausted, fell victim to their own success, or

were simply beaten. Whether the latter approach leads to the kind of deep Self-reflection demanded by both paradigms is another matter. The outcome of the German case, as indicated above, is far from clear; so is the Japanese case. And the USA, beaten in the Viêt Nam War, made use of the Gulf War to 'beat the syndrome', meaning to cleanse itself of any doubts about its right *and duty* to engage in violent international relations when their leaders deemed it necessary.

But a nation may also come to see itself as more normal, the hard way of socio/soma-therapy or the soft way of psycho-therapy. Spain today, for instance, is rather different from the *España, una, grande, libre* propagated by the Franco regime, and Spain after the *decadencia* very different from Spain before.<sup>56</sup>

Something works: otherwise we would not have that much historical change. It would probably be greatly to the advantage of humankind if the gentler rather than the tougher types of therapy could be engaged in. Even so, the German, Japanese, and Soviet examples, and the US non-example, are indicative of what a painful process this is.<sup>57</sup> And how difficult it is to practice the old admonition to know yourself, *gnothi seauton*. For that is the condition for any therapy, whether of the Other-oriented Paradigm I (authoritarian and more dialogical varieties) or the Self-oriented Paradigm II varieties. Or any combination of them, in series or parallel. At any rate, we have much to learn.

## Notes

1. 'The Emerging Conflict Formations' in Majid Tehranian & Katharine Tehranian, *Restructuring for World Peace* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992).
2. Like most other people he had probably more than one motive at the same time, as Avicenna noted. But the rivalry in the Arab/Islamic world between the old empires rooted in Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Tehran; Istanbul and, to a lesser extent, in Saudi Arabia, was no doubt important. Iraq borders on four of them, being more centrally located than any other Muslim country.
3. This is a basic theme in the author's *World Politics of Peace and War*, forthcoming, focusing on power balances, power profiles, and the relation between the two.
4. However, states tend to behave about the same way if they have the same position in the international system, regardless of domestic political formation. Possibly democratic elites have to be more imaginative when trying to legitimize bellicist intentions.
5. In order to be closer to contemporary geopolitics.
6. Nature, Person, Society, World (Space), Time, Transpersonal, and Episteme are more 'philosophical' categories, three of them from Kant; chosenness, traumas, and myths are more psycho-political. Obviously, chosenness is related to the transpersonal in the sense of relating the chosen persons and societies directly to the transpersonal whereas traumas and myths root a culture and its carriers, the nation, in concrete points in space and time, the where and the when of that nation.
7. The Occidental archetype is Jewish chosenness, the Oriental archetype Japanese chosenness.
8. Leo Baeck, the famous German rabbi, comes close to defining Jewish specificity in terms of 'chosen for suffering', in his *The Essence of Judaism* (New York; Schocken Books, 1961). What did this mean for a German Jew abducted by the SS? Time has come to suffer?
9. Like Israel (Leo Baeck, 1961 p. 67: 'All Israel is the messenger of the Lord, the "servant of God", who is to guard religion for all lands and from whom the light shall radiate to all nations', or simply Numbers 23:9 or Exodus 34:24), the USA (John Winthrop's, and Ronald Reagan's 'City Upon a Hill'), Nazi Germany.
10. In my own experience in the Middle East these are the three major Palestinian interpretations. In addition, Palestinians prefer to be their own light.
11. A frequently encountered argument in American-Jewish political discourse.
12. The Sumerians seem to be in this category, convinced of their own excellence, but also of their coming demise.
13. As a consequence Satan has to be strong, like God possibly with many apparitions, but unified. The only countervailing force that can effectively balance monotheism is monosatanism.
14. The defeat in Viêt Nam played into that kind of thinking for fundamentalist Americans; the Gulf War was then the confirmation that they still enjoyed God's favor.

15. Of the six hegemons three are global (USA, EU, Japan) and three are regional (Moscow, Beijing, India). Israel has only some of the military characteristics of a sub-regional hegemon.
16. This is a basic point in the Dantziger psychotherapy, according to which many patients (1) have the idea that they are better than others in some way, (2) suffer tremendously when evidence to the contrary comes up, and (3) do their best to avoid such situations, which makes social life difficult. See S. & R. Dantziger, *You Are Your Own Best Counselor* (Honolulu, HI: Self-Mastery Systems, 1989).
17. The Gulf War was a good war in that regard, giving ample occasion both to Saddam Hussein and to George Bush, to Iraq and the USA.
18. This was a basic point in the late Norwegian sociologist Vilhelm Aubert's exploration of similarities and differences between the criminal and the patient.
19. However, for this to happen the social definition of the deviant is essential, as explored in such a masterly way by Michel Foucault in his many books, such as *Archaeology of Knowledge, Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punishment: the Birth of the Prison*.
20. Lewis Yablonsky, *Robopaths* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972) has explored this theme.
21. Bureaucracy is generalizing, not individualizing, as pointed out repeatedly by Weber. The personal is always singular.
22. In other words, the negative faith may be what is called for. A US presidential candidate does not have to say every day that 'America is a chosen country'; but if he says 'America is just an ordinary country like any other', not to mention 'America is a sick society', he is out (Carter?).
23. Thus, if the country is poor but educated the (prospective) leader should have the same profile. I am indebted to the late Swiss sociologist Peter Heintz for this important insight.
24. See Johan Galtung, *Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism: Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell*, for a short version. Available in Norwegian (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984); in German (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987); in Spanish (Alicante: Gil Albert, 1985); revised English version forthcoming.
25. A basic theme in the writings of Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
26. A theme explored in my forthcoming *Health and Development*.
27. These are very high temperature forms of behavior that cannot possibly be sustained over a longer period.
28. A basic point made by Dr D.M. Kelley, the US army psychologist who examined the Nuremberg war criminals. See Douglas M. Kelley, *22 Cells in Nuremberg* (New York: MacFadden, 1961).
29. Norwegian cosmology would have elements of myths of glory; the golden Viking age, and traumas; the Black Death, the period under the Danes and under the Swedes. But most Norwegians would take neither statement too seriously at any consciousness level.
30. If the alternative is incarceration for life or banishment there may be something to this; but why define it that way?
31. There certainly is inter-personal connection at the level of the mind and the spirit; how it works and how it is relevant to psychotherapy is another question. In Western cosmology individualism is a basic assumption, so the inter-personal is usually constructed as traces left on the mind by significant others, such as the parents. In Japanese cosmology collectivism implies that the inter-personal is open to a more synchronic, less diachronic interpretation. Western psychotherapy would typically try to uncover the traces of the past, the Japanese might typically try group therapy.
32. This is partly inspired by Talcott Parsons' work on medical sociology.
33. 'I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but by me' (John 14:6) – very strong words.
34. In the celebrated *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum, 1981).
35. Associated with the names of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow.
36. For one exploration, see Johan Galtung, 'From Violent to Nonviolent Revolution', ch. 4.2, pp. 139–149 in Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1980).
37. The problem is to find an open window between the 'too much' and 'too little' of vertical structural violence, and the 'too tight' and 'too loose' of horizontal structural violence. This is a balancing act in personal, social, and world space, with difficulties lurking in all corners.
38. Such as language and religion, food and sex, science and technology.
39. He actually made comparisons between the 'discovery' of the role of Jews in the social organism and Robert Koch's discovery of the role of the TBC bacteria for tuberculosis.
40. In criminology this is known as punishment for individual prevention.
41. Of course, in this there was also an element of using punishment for general prevention, to scare others.
42. In that traffic there is also an implicit message of the spiritual quality of 'abroad'; impure anyhow, so impure and impure belong together.

43. This is elaborated to some extent in my *United States Foreign Policy as Manifest Theology* (San Diego, CA: University of California, IGCC, 1987).
44. The archetypal example of this being, of course, Henry Kissinger.
45. See Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
46. But exactly how that works is not so easily decided. What happened in Europe 1989 happened essentially in the relation between ruler and ruled inside the countries. But the rulers had been weakened as a result of marginalization; and the ruled had been strengthened through their contacts with outside actors. Economic sanctions may have been less important.
47. And in these inner yearnings there are fascist elements, enjoying the USA doing to a country like Iraq what they might have liked to do themselves but never dared to. For an analysis of the underlying structures, see Johan Galtung, 'The Cold War as Autism', *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. VI, pp. 81–106 (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1988).
48. Certainly: it would probably have been recognized as a normal democracy sacrificing itself to maintain law and order.
49. The expressions 'blood-letting' and 'surgical cut' bridge the two arenas, making both of them metaphors of the other.
50. The problem is, of course, that the goodies of consumer society are mostly available for the well-to-do; and the well-to-do are not the source of the problem for law-and-order oriented therapists.
51. This seems to have been the approach of the Group of Seven to the Soviet Union: first exorcism (of communism), then aid.
52. And the basic question now is how that will come out after the exorcism of communism; will there be a New Age of Russian chosenness, recreating myths of the *mir*, as in Solzhenitsyn?
53. This is a basic explanatory formula for fundamental macro-historical transformations in Johan Galtung, Erik Rudeng & Tore Heiestad, 'On the Last 2,500 Years in Western History. And Some Remarks on the Coming 500', ch. 12, pp. 318–361 in Peter Burke, ed., *New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume*, vol. XIII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
54. On the other hand, the little-known work by the 'German Youth Administration', teaching democracy to Germans in the late 1940s, may have played a certain role. As a student hitch-hiker June 1949 in the (then) American zone I had the occasion to join one of the teachers of democracy, a very enthusiastic and dedicated young American.
55. However, Europe 1989 also shows that nonviolence may work very quickly, at least in the last phase. In general, however, the comparison to traditional herbs relative to antibiotics may be a good one: the latter are quicker, but may also be more destructive.
56. The question is, of course, whether Spain is now making the same mistake again, gambling so much on tourism rather than the difficult job of sophisticated processing and industry.
57. Thus, when are we going to hear a speech from Washington, DC apologizing for the belligerence behind more than 200 military interventions around the world?

# CONCLUSION: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION

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We cannot do with less than all four parts of this book: peace and conflict, development and civilization. If dynamic peace, as process, is what we have when a conflict – the Destroyer and the Creator – can be transformed nonviolently and creatively, then structure and culture must enter. Most important are the deep structures and cultures because they are unreflected, even unknown. Lying in the human collective subconscious, they are the lowest common denominators, something everybody can rally around.

Positive terms, like ‘development’ and ‘civilization’, have been used to introduce discourses about structure and culture. Development covers not only economic factors, but also political and institutional ones. And throughout this book the reader will find the four spaces – Nature, Self, Social, World – and then Time and Culture. Violence and peace are relevant concerns in all six, because life can suffer and be enhanced from all of them. The problems of pain-avoidance, panetics, and human betterment are ubiquitous. Causal cycles wind their ways through all spaces, with violence and peace in their wake.

Peace research is now broadening, encompassing all spaces, including intra- and inter-personal peace, and deepening by reaching into the individual and collective subconscious. There we find Freud and Jung; just as we find Smith and Marx and Locke and Mill in economic and political development; and Weber and Nakamura, Toynbee and Sorokin in civilization. And yet theory-building is not the goal: action to reduce violence and enhance peace is the goal. But: for accuracy in diagnosis and prognosis, and adequacy in therapy, we need both broad and deep theory.

## 1 Defining Peace: A Never-ending Process

I have long argued for an expanded peace concept, building on a violence concept beyond direct violence so as to include structural (indirect) and cultural (legitimizing) violence. *Peace = direct peace + structural peace + cultural peace.* But this definition has a basic shortcoming: it is too static. Hence, a dynamic peace concept was introduced: *Peace is what we have when creative conflict transformation takes place nonviolently.* Hereby peace is seen as a system characteristic, a context within which certain things can happen in a particular way. The proof of the pudding is in the eating; the test of a marriage is when the going gets rough; the test of peace is in the ability to handle conflict. Three points are made in this definition: the conflict can be transformed (conflicts are not (re)solved) by people handling them creatively, transcending incompatibilities – and acting in conflict without recourse to violence.

This puts some demands on the conflict system and the actors embedded in it. The actors have to be nonviolent and creative. And the transformation (inside and outside parties, dialogues and conferences, etc.) should be peaceful in itself, meaning low on structural and cultural violence. When a transformation process is underway, vertical,

elitist structures should be avoided (or at least not be sustained). The process should take place within a peace culture legitimizing creative, nonviolent handling of conflict, ruling out physical and verbal violence.

Peace is a *revolutionary* proposition. Needed is not only a peace culture, but also a peace structure: the two peace system characteristics, shaping the actors nonviolently and creatively, and vice versa.

## **2 In the Name is the Message**

Peace researchers are now progressing from such typical university activities as peace research, with a certain distance to the phenomena involved, and peace education, communicating the results of peace research, to peace action, practicing the findings of peace research, relating directly to at least one party in an ongoing conflict. What should such people be called?

People doing research are obviously researchers; the more modest 'peace studies' presumably being what students do (and of course professors also continue studying . . .). People doing education are educators – teachers or professors. But how about the people doing peace action – what are they?

'Actor' smacks of theater, or sociology. 'Peace-keeper- maker-builder-promoter' are fine as descriptors of activities, but if they are taken as a contract with the public, it may lead the practitioners into promising more than they can deliver. Thus, in Yugoslavia today even the modest 'peace-keeper' at best sounds like a joke, at worst like a fraud. 'Peace activist' covers all of this, but also has a touch of the naive and unskilled. 'Conflict manager' would be ruled out by anybody with a sense of structural violence as non-peace; 'conflict helper' or 'conflict assistant' reek of false modesty. 'Conflict facilitator' could be interpreted as meaning 'conflict enhancer', really getting the violence going. And 'conflict transformer': too electrifying.

So I would suggest *peace worker*, and *conflict worker*. These terms are modest and carry no built-in promise that may fall short of what is delivered. The workers should be skilled; but the unskilled are not ruled out. The point is to do an honest job, not to claim fame or to call a press conference – rather like the Catholic nun who acts but is neither seen nor heard.

Social workers seem to see themselves that way; health workers, at least in the lower echelons of the health professions, likewise. There is also a connotation of quantity: there could be many, even very many of them. Like a swarm of conflict and peace workers, unleashed upon a conflict until parties with violent inclinations give in, if for no other reason than to get rid of them. This may sound slightly violent, but far better than the naive alternative: some empty agreement signed at the top level, usually binding only on some highly forgettable 'statesmen' trying to substitute structural for direct violence.

## **3 Realism of the Brain, Idealism of the Heart**

Much is needed if the task of the peace worker is to reduce suffering (*dukkha*) and enhance life (*sukha*), for all life, also as peace with nature. The brains will have to absorb, produce, and store *knowledge* – holistic, not only transdisciplinary, and global, not only transnational – and the knowledge must be realistic to be adequate. Nobody does anybody any favor by projecting unwarranted optimism or pessimism on reality.

There is the danger of apodictic 'knowledge', the synthetic *a priori*, true by fiat, needing no check against empirical reality. In the West layers of 'apodicticity' can be found in

the successor sciences to theology as carrier of unfalsifiable knowledge, when God started dying during the Enlightenment, leaving behind State and Capital: jurisprudence in general and diplomacy in particular for the State; economics for Capital.

Such knowledge may hold in an ideal reality with perfect individual 'rationality' and perfect insight into consequences of possible actions pursued, and maximization of product-sums of probabilities and utilities so as to abstain from all crimes, and to make optimal choices in the market. If people do not behave according to theory they tend to be blamed as irrational, not the theories. Perfect individuals would fit the predictions perfectly, in a seamless union of the prescriptive and the predictive. Such quasi-science, so basic in our civilization, can also be found in a Gandhi, or in any peace worker whose 'knowledge' can be encapsulated as: 'perfect nonviolence works perfectly'. And indeed it does: in ideal reality.

And yet, empirically based knowledge is far from sufficient. The struggle for peace is usually a struggle to transcend that empirical reality precisely because it does not permit nonviolent, peaceful conflict transformation. This means that new realities must take shape in people's minds, as potential, even ideal realities. The right to entertain and pursue modest utopias is a basic human right – but not the right to pursue totalitarian utopias encompassing all aspects of everybody, except as pure phantasy. Nor do we have a right to believe that we already live in partial or total utopias, and that empirical evidence to the contrary can be dismissed as irrelevant.

The capacity needed to transcend empirical reality is known as *imagination*; it is related to knowledge, but not identical with it. But, however imaginative our hypotheses about how a potential reality would be and how to obtain it, under no circumstance should we fall into the trap of protecting our hypotheses in the way the three producers of apodictic knowledge have done. Falsifiability remains an important guide (but is that guide itself falsifiable?).

Then, we would like our hearts to absorb, produce, and store *compassion*, with suffering, as well as with joy and enhancement. Like negative peace, com-suffering is only part of the story; there is also the need for com-happiness with the joys of others.

And yet this is far from sufficient. This all has to be so deeply rooted in the peace worker that it can survive setbacks and backlashes. In short, *perseverance*, the capacity to go on despite no positive feedback or no feedback at all. This, of course, raises the problem of apodicticity again. How can I know I am on the right track with no or even negative feedback? You can't. You have only your intuition and the guidance of others to steer you.

Knowledge, imagination, compassion, perseverance . . . The argument that they add up to skills, a syndrome of mutually reinforcing faculties, can be posited against the argument that 'this is demanding too much'. Role-models do exist. There are such easily recognized models as the monks and nuns of any religion, fully dedicated to serving other human beings on the basis of brain and heart. There are doctors and nurses; social workers, etc. And there are models so close that we often do not see them: our own mothers, other family members, at our best ourselves, in circles of kinship and friendship.

At best, the university caters only to knowledge, in the positivist tradition, leaving out the other three; and at worst it is so high on apodicticity that the knowledge is useless. No doubt the families of origin and procreation are the major universities and laboratories; that is where we learn the basics (or fail to learn them), that is where we are tested. But the primary group is not the only place, nor the only test.

We are now facing the concrete problem of the inadequacy of universities for training peace workers. There is probably much to learn from monasteries and from military schools: both take in much more of the person. Of course, the military imparts knowledge of how to increase suffering and decrease life, with compassion only for their own kind,

and hatred of the other side. But imagination and perseverance are key ingredients. Put a manual for soldiers – essentially teaching how to commit murder without suffering the same fate – next to manuals in nonviolence; identifying the dissimilarities is easy, but the similarities go much deeper. There is space for much mutual learning here as the military become gradually weaned from their violence, from attacking other nations and other social classes.

#### **4 State System and Peace System: Compatible or Not?**

One reason why the state system today is basically incompatible with peace lies in the state patriarchy, in the arrogance and secrecy, in the *causa sua* mentality of being their own cause not moved by anybody else (and certainly not by democracy), in having a monopoly on the ultimate means of violence and being prone to use them ('to the man with a hammer the world looks like a nail'). All this is bad enough, even if generally less pronounced in smaller states, more in the larger ones, and even more so in super-states.

But in addition states are also sustaining themselves by a specific belief system that runs roughly as follows:

- the world system is basically a system of states;
- states are represented in the world system only by the heads of states/governments, foreign ministers and diplomats;
- the representatives have a monopoly on defining the state interests (national interests), and their task is to promote them;
- state interests are sometimes incompatible; the instrument for removing incompatibilities is negotiation; the inputs are state interests and the outputs are ratifiable treaties/conventions;
- the sum of mutually adjusted state interests is the world and human interests (like male interests = human interests).

The problem rests with the first and the last propositions. Both are blatantly wrong, probably tenable mainly to people with the mind-set described in the opening sentence of this section. The belief that people trained in promoting national interests (and even paid to do so) are *ipso facto* adequate for the promotion of world and human interests is an act of faith (apodicticity again).

#### **5 Paradigm I: Balance of Power (mainly inter-system)**

Peace research, as it became institutionalized in the late 1950s, was obviously in part a child of the Cold War (Peace!). The balance of power paradigm – which the West interpreted as superiority and the East as parity – was not rejected by peace researchers as a descriptive model of what actors were pursuing, but as a normative paradigm of peace.

One line of critique focuses on 'balance', claiming that the term has no operational counterpart and thus becomes vacuous. Neither the actors nor others would ever agree on the meaning of 'balance', except under the highly unrealistic assumption of two countries/alliances, both equally endowed, with qualitatively identical weapons systems, and then as quantitative identity. Remove only one such assumption and all parties can claim a deficit – and the paradigmatically built-in right to quantitative and/or qualitative armament, even in the name of peace.<sup>1</sup>

Concerning 'power', the critique focuses on what may lie waiting at the end of the arms

race spiral: war ‘with all necessary means’. The subjective probability of nuclear war held by nuclear planners may have been low, but it was not zero lest the credibility of a second strike also become zero. Planners were, in fact, contemplating a holocaust, exterminating, say, 500 million in the NATO–WTO ‘theater’. Most of these planners are still at large today.

But there was no war, so ‘deterrence worked’? Leaving aside that this presupposes that either, or both, in fact were planning a nuclear war but were afraid of the consequences, there is the basic problem of how this brutalized both planners and planned, legitimizing mega-violence.

Imagine an Auschwitz, complete with gas chambers and the crematorium, but built to scare people, including Jews, to deter ‘deviance’. Would we condone that as innocent? Or, would we see the enormous psychological violence perpetrated on potential victims even if the threat was not carried out, and the brutalization of all those engaged in such a monstrous exercise?

## 6 Paradigm II: Rule of Law (mainly intra-system)

The Cold War over, Paradigm II entered fully, a paradigm for handling inner conflict by punishing those inside the system who break the rules, rather than by deterring those outside. The paradigm starts with rules legitimately produced, and proceeds to their use to classify acts as infraction, infractions as a reason to arraign actors into court, the use of courts to acquit or sentence, the use of sentences to impart pain, the use of pain to satisfy the victims’ presumed need for revenge, and to serve the functions of individual and general prevention. This is a paradigm with religious roots, now with the State in God’s place. There is no room for reconciliation between perpetrator and victim, but for a clean slate after punishment has been delivered

Internationalization of this paradigm means international rules (law), and the conceptualization of the world system as an inner system. In the wake of that follow UN Charter Chapters 6 and 7, from diplomatic and economic sanctions via peace-keeping to peace-enforcement. This gives license to isolate countries, marginalize and stigmatize them as pariah, slowly killing the old and the sick, the women and the children – in short, killing along the margins of patriarchic/meritocratic societies, ultimately bombing ‘them’ back into pre-industrial or stone ages. From a military point of view this means a chance to unleash violence with impunity since the other party is weaker – if not, Paradigm I would have been used. For the more violence-prone this must be marvelous, a chance to practice what they have learned but were not allowed to do during Paradigm I time, like a monastery having sex education, but yearning for some practice.

This violent, revenge-loaded Paradigm II – with apodictic knowledge of the Rule of Law – should not be hailed as a peaceful alternative to Paradigm I. Empirical studies of the individual and general prevention theses in connection with domestic legal systems indicate that punishment works badly intra-state; how can we then assume that it should work at the inter-state level, where norms are even less internalized? Diplomatic sanctions isolate the actor with whom we need most dialogue. Economic sanctions are a slow way of killing everybody except those able-bodied males who may be killed by direct violence. The two together stigmatize a country as a pariah country, readying it as a recipient of ‘all necessary means’, abetted by the mass media.

War crime tribunals, like the International Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) in The Hague with its 24 prison cells, are also a way of creating martyrs. Actors are punished for ghastly deeds when they are low-class people from low-class countries (“the Balkans”) and murder directly, face to face, often torturing and raping first – as

opposed to the cool killing from a distance, and as opposed to those high up who give orders from the outside or manipulate political situations from the inside. The fateful premature recognition mid-December 1991 made by the European Union (then Community) Council of Ministers was a mistake possibly of 3V magnitude, V being the Versailles Treaty mistake of 1919 (another mistake of the same magnitude being the failure to honor the Algerian election in favor of FIS, some weeks later, at the end of December 1991). Whether by the EU or the rulers in Algeria, these were autocratic decisions welcomed by manipulating and manipulated media.

But should we let individual crimes pass, focusing only on the bad, collective *karma*, through dialogue and reconciliation exercises, focusing on the sinking ship and its holes rather than on guilt-attribution? Are the victims not entitled to the exercise of justice? Are the co-nationals of the authors of these hideous crimes not entitled to acquittal from collective guilt by having fingers pointed in the right direction?

These are valid questions, and there are no perfect answers that I can see. So, just as for Paradigm I above, I am not rejecting Paradigm II completely; but position myself as a critic under the obligation to come up with constructive answers.

Some of that can be found in the very promising instrument of the Truth Commissions operating in post-dictatorship Central and South America, and in South Africa. Let us assume that they have the empirical job of assessing what happened, *wie es eigentlich gewesen*; the critical job of evaluating this in no uncertain terms in the light of basic values, sacred and secular; and the constructive job of addressing two basic questions: what should and what could we have done at this and that cross-road in the past (the therapy of the past), and, what can we do now.

Tall orders. But the documents already emerging are very promising, particularly when there are many and diverse citizens making depositions. Even if done without names, everybody will know who they are: and, they will know. But they are also less stigmatized, more free to draw the same conclusions as the rest of society. If a dialogue is organized between them and the victims and the bereaved, instead of creating prison walls in between, a much deeper peace might – just might – be possible.

## **7 Peace by Peaceful Means: Three Points**

If Violence = Direct + Structural + Cultural violence, then exactly what can a peace worker do to prevent and undo violence? Diagnosis, Prognosis, and Therapy no doubt, but how?

Much direct violence can be traced back to vertical structural violence, such as exploitation and repression, for liberation, or to prevent liberation. In the background is cultural violence legitimizing both the structural violence and direct violence to undo it and to maintain it. The prognosis is bad: *violence breeds violence*; partly through the simple mechanisms of revenge, and partly because acts of violence are utilized to cancel any bad conscience arising from one's own use of violence.

One approach would be to increase the space for actors to proceed nonviolently in conflict by building more nonviolent (or low violence) roles into *peace-keeping*.

Military training is indispensable: to contain violence. Knowledge of the means of violence and the mentality behind their use is needed. But, for 'crowd control' police training may be better, more based on a show of authority and minimum use of violence. And in addition would come active nonviolence training, also training to train the local population, and training in conflict mediation techniques, knowing what to say, what to do when suddenly in a room with the conflict parties present, filled with mutual and well-justified hatred.

Then, if women are better at relating and less inclined to use hardware, make sure that 50% of the peace-keepers are women. Peace-keeping is 40 years old: the next 40 could be still better.

*Peace-making* activities can be identified with the search for creative, and at the same time acceptable and sustainable, outcomes of the conflict. There is one mistake which is no longer pardonable: the single-shot ‘table at the top’, the high table, for the ‘leaders’. Rather, let one thousand conferences blossom, use modern communication technology to generate a visible flow of peace ideas from everywhere in society. Proposals may be contradictory – but why should peace look the same at all places? Tap the insights all over, marginalizing nobody, making peace-making itself a model of structural peace. To believe that a handful of diplomats can do it alone is like the (post-) Stalinist belief that 400 apparatchiks can plan the economy for 400 million. Or, look at Israel/Palestine in the hands of the political leaders on both sides, peace movements apparently being deactivated. These issues are so terribly complex that mass participation in their solution is needed. And creativity can be found all over, when properly stimulated.

*Peace-building* activities can be identified with building structural and cultural peace. Ability to identify the non-articulated structural conflicts throughout society is needed, not necessarily trying to solve all of them (which would be impossible anyhow), but to recognize them – a very important step toward positive transformation. This means identifying exploitation, repression, and marginalization (vertical structural violence) as well as groups that are too close to be comfortable with each other, or too far apart to interact symbiotically (horizontal structural violence). The vertical should be made more horizontal, and the horizontal more optimal.

Undoing cultural violence is even more difficult. Again the ‘hidden part of the iceberg’ metaphor is useful, as it was for structural violence. But now the hidden is not deep down in social structure, but in the culture, hidden in the collective subconscious. When diplomats negotiate, four layers can be identified: the national interests they are supposed to represent (like obtaining bases abroad), the individual interests (like displaying negotiating brilliance for career purposes), the individual subconscious (like overcoming a sense of inferiority), and the collective subconscious, with implicit assumptions about what is normal/natural (cosmology, cultural codes, deep culture).

One example: the DMA (Dichotomization, Manicheism, Armageddon) syndrome. The world is seen in bipolar terms (like the West against an Islamic/Confucian alliance),<sup>2</sup> one is seen as good and the other as bad (guess which one), and there will be a battle (so better get ready). With DMA as the shared collective subconscious of negotiating, a natural next step is diplomats drawing lines on maps, with rulers (note the double meaning of that word). Any such line may be a line of armistice. It may stick, and may even one day become a line of peace if it is based on real self-determination. But it may also become a line of war, an invitation to ethnic cleansing on either side of the line to solidify the territory for the nation.

Thus, a collective subconscious may be particularly dangerous if those shared unstated assumptions are bello- rather than paxogenic. Negotiating elites, impeding transparency not only of the outcome (secret) protocols, but also of the process (secret ‘sensitive’ negotiations) are major obstacles to peace.

## 8 Legitimizing Peace Action: the Principle of Reversibility

‘Because it leads to peace’ is not good enough; we cannot know that in advance, that would be apodicticity. ‘Because it is intended to lead to peace’ is not good enough either; everybody can say that; even the military ready to spread death around may protest,

'peace is our profession'. 'Because there is a demand and we deliver the supply', or 'because we are the supply and create the demand' are the two sides of market logic, but not good enough either, placing the responsibility with the demand side. If that demand comes from the state system, this may be seen by some as solving the problem of legitimacy, particularly if the government is democratic, and if the UN were democratic. The UN system will probably change toward global democracy, but not quickly.

The right of everybody to act out of compassion, according to their best knowledge, to reduce suffering and enhance life, should not be disputed. But human beings are imperfect: so is our compassion, so is our knowledge. This principle of general human fallibility should, then, have one very basic consequence: *Act so that the consequences of your action are reversible*. Prefer action that can be undone. Proceed carefully. You may be wrong. Your knowledge may be inadequate, your compassion misguided.

But is that not counter-intuitive? Why not engrave peace in stone, even in steel? Because it may be the wrong peace, and even if it is right it may prove too static. Peace is a process. We can assume a general inclination of human beings toward life enhancement, or at least away from suffering. Adequate peace, an ever better peace, or an ever better peace process, will attract support. But there is no perfect recipe, no panacea.

Of course, irreversibility is a question of degree. Physical death is recognized by most as irreversible for the body, as final; a strong argument not only against capital punishment, but against lethal violence of any kind. It cannot be undone. Moreover: you may kill the wrong person. Such arguments are stepping-stones toward a more general position on nonviolence; an argument that certainly can also be rooted in the assumptions of immanent religion, 'there is that of God in everybody'. Be cyclical, not linear, in thought and action.

This also applies to physical violence to artifacts: a building destroyed can never be rebuilt. It can only be imitated, as anyone who has experienced European reconstruction after the violence of World War II can testify. Anything blown to smithereens suffers the high entropy of violence and death, the total irreversibility. Violence is so irrational.

But how about the violence that may harm and hurt, but stops short of death? This is known as trauma, and even the best job performed by the specialists in physical traumas to the body, and spiritual traumas to the soul, can never undo them completely. Scars remain – also on the bereaved, those left behind after an unacceptable death of a beloved one. To assume that all scars can be removed is to assume bodies and souls without memory, reparable by substituting spare parts.

Can learning of the techniques of direct violence (military training), and of structural violence (like aspects of mainstream economics and jurisprudence) be unlearned, or is the damage, such as knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons, irreversible? Maybe, but that does not mean all knowledge has to be enacted.<sup>3</sup>

There is an entropy of war and violence; there is an entropy of peace.<sup>4</sup> I have argued for some time that chaotic, highly diverse structures – and cultures! – with all kinds of linkages, are much better carriers of peace by peaceful means than clearcut structures (e.g., polarized alliances) and cultures (with DMA-syndromes) low on entropy but high on energy; ready for the final battle. A contradiction? No, the entropy of peace presupposes intact, even enhanced life, but then organized so as to increase the spiritual entropy of a complex Self, and a social entropy of super-complex social and world disorders. The entropy of peace is a barrier against the physical and spiritual entropy of death and violence. And there is an entropy of nature known as mature eco-systems, based on the diversity and symbiosis of deep ecology. Again the formula is the same: high entropy.

The task of creative, positive conflict transformation is not only to avoid violence, to abstain from the irreversible, but to increase the entropy by emerging from that phase of conflict with more mature selves and more mature social formations around. Conflict,

then, becomes the Great Teacher, a spiritual gift to all of us. But conflict transformation may also be negative, leaving enormous irreversibilities in homosphere, biosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, cosmosphere, and damage to the soul not easily reversed: hatred, cravings for revenge and restitution, building one's future life around the desire to exchange one irreversibility for the other. A spirit of forgiveness on top of complex, creative conflict transformation may be helpful, as practiced by that second giant of this century after Gandhi: Nelson Mandela. Like Gandhi, a gift to us all.

## 9 A Therapy for the Past: Versailles and Yugoslavia

A useful approach, in simple and complex conflict formations, is to ask the participants to identify turning points in the past and then ask: what should, what could still have been done? Counterfactual history, in other words. That exercise for World War II invariably brings up the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Of course it was reversible. There could have been a second, review, conference five years later, undoing this highly violent collective humiliation, exploitation, repression, and marginalization of a country whose sin had been to engage in a favorite pastime of European nations (if history is a guide): killing each other. The reward might have been considerable: depriving Hitler of his major argument, avoiding World War II. Those who did not think such thoughts, or, having thought them, did not implement them, share responsibility with the Nazis. In fact, responsibility is always shared, in a collective *karma*.

A more recent case: what should have been done instead of the premature recognition of parts of Yugoslavia as independent states? Self-determination is not problematic, but where are the selves and how do they relate to each other after determination? Self-determination for Croats implies the same for Serbs in Croatia; with the same reasoning for Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, and for Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia. And so on. The instrument may be vote by district like in the Danish-German process of 1920; the independencies emerging may then be confederated afterwards. But a mistake committed by the EU, the USA and the Security Council is not easily reversed: there are claims to infallibility at stake, meaning irreversibility.

## 10 A Therapy for the Future: Non-territorial Federalism

More promising is another proposal addressing the major theme of inter-cultural, meaning inter-nation, conflicts. Nations are cultural constructs built around the *kairos* of sacred time and sacred space, the times and places of trauma and glory, weaving them into religion/ideology and language. The spatial component – to protect the sacred places with enough contiguous territory to be self-sustaining over time – leads to incompatibilities when the entropy is high, when all nations within the territory have claims on those same square kilometers, and nobody wants to move. When the representatives of a state system, which itself embodies the DMA syndrome, start ruling by rulers, drawing lines on the map, or in the desert sand,<sup>5</sup> the D- job of separation has been done. M and A are then around the corner, thereby keeping the diplomats in business. If there are 2,000 nations in the world capable of articulating such claims, but only 200 countries and 20 nation-states,<sup>6</sup> then there are 1,980 more battles to fight, a suicide recipe given the quality and quantity of arms there are around. D and M have to go.

An alternative would be to keep the high entropy of living next to each other, building autonomy around one parliament for each national constituency, with a monopoly on the administration of the sacred points in space and time, on language, religion, ideology, and

idiom (meaning most of education), on policing and courts for self-policing and self-adjudication, and for some aspects of the economy. The way US Democrats and Republicans do when voting in the primaries, or the Sami in Norway do when they vote for the Sami parliament.

Peace is a revolutionary idea; 'peace by peaceful means' defines that revolution as nonviolent. That revolution is taking place all the time; our job is to expand it in scope and domain. The tasks are endless; the question is whether we are up to them.

I have argued above for deep insertion into conflicts, invited or uninvited, basically bypassing the state system, deriving legitimacy partly from the right that stems from compassion with victims (which ultimately could be all of us as conflicts become ever more indivisible), and partly by advocating a basic principle for peaceful action: reversibility, doing only that which can be undone as we may have been in the wrong. That, needless to say, also presupposes that rare commodity, the ability to admit mistakes, and the ability to listen to the verdict of the empirical world rather than to the 'self-evident', apodictic, truths in our mind, in our *ratio*.

But peace is also an exercise in perseverance. Decades may pass before a good idea is implemented, if at all; and even if it is implemented the author may never know. For one thing, he may be dead by then; or the idea was co-opted by somebody who 'had always been of that opinion'. Peace work is not a pathway to immediate gratification. The goal is peace, not publicity.

Sooner or later this will lead peace-workers – regardless of which of the many established or potential peace professions they exercise (and there are many taking shape right now) – to the problem of establishing a code of conduct. If they do not do so, for sure somebody else will, like a state system highly jealous of its presumed monopoly on conflicts. This is a major task – and one to be taken on sooner rather than later.

## Notes

1. This is explored in some detail in my *There are Alternatives!* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), chs 3 & 4.
2. One of the destructive phantasies in Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis.
3. Thus, the knowledge of how to make pyramids is still there or can easily be recovered: yet very few pyramids have been built recently.
4. For one exploration of this, see my 'Entropy and the General Theory of Peace', pp. 47–75 in *Essays in Peace Research*, vol. I (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1975).
5. An example would be the line drawn by Sir Percy Cox in 1922, in the desert sand, as the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
6. I am indebted to Håkan Wiberg for these approximate but easily remembered figures.

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