

Time-Memory Trade-Off Attacks on Password Hashes using Rainbow Tables

Cryptography Course Project — IIIT Sri City

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THE PROBLEM: CRACKING HASHES

- Imagine a server is breached. The attacker doesn't get your password, they get this:

```
>_
users.db (Leaked)
alice: 5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592
bob: e175ea4ce0a553260a14bc5e922a935b
charlie: 711185fa17de642583dfd5ecd13442e2
```

- A hash is a one-way function. You can't "un-hash" or "decrypt" it.

THE PROBLEM: CRACKING HASHES

The only way to crack it is to guess:

Is the password '12345'? -> HASH('12345') -> '827ccb...' -> No match.

Is the password 'ab1'? -> HASH('ab1') -> 'e175ea...' -> Match!

TWO "OBVIOUS" SOLUTIONS

Option 1: Brute Force (All Time, No Memory)

- Try 'a', hash it...
- Try 'aa', hash it...
- Try 'ab', hash it...

Problem: Infeasibly slow. The password space is enormous. Cracking one 6-character alphanumeric password could take days or weeks.

Option 2: Giant Lookup Table (No Time, All Memory)

- Pre-compute every password and its hash.
- 'a': `0cc175...`
- 'aa': `96201b...`

Problem: Infeasibly large. A 6-char alphanumeric table has 56.8 billion entries. The table would be terabytes in size.

THE REAL SOLUTION: A TIME-MEMORY TRADE-OFF

We need a solution that is *smarter than brute-force but smaller than a lookup table.*

This is the "Time-Memory Trade-Off"

- Pre-computation (Time Cost): We will spend time once, up-front, to generate a special table.
- Storage (Memory Cost): We will store this table, which is much smaller than a full lookup table.
- Payoff (Success Rate): We can now crack hashes much faster, with a high probability of success.

This is exactly what a **Rainbow Table** does.

WHAT IS A RAINBOW TABLE?

- A Rainbow Table is a pre-computed data structure that cleverly compresses a giant lookup table.
- It does not store every password and hash.
- Instead, it stores only the START (Head) and END (Tail) of long "chains" of passwords and hashes.
- A single chain of 200 passwords and hashes is "compressed" into just two entries, dramatically saving space.

CORE CONCEPTS

1. Hash Function (H)

The one-way function we're attacking (e.g., `SHA1`).

Password -> H() -> Hash

'abl' -> H() -> e175ea...

2. Reduce Function (R)

The "magic" function that turns a hash back into a password.

Hash -> REDUCE -> Password

(It's not "un-hashing", just a consistent way to map a big number to a short string. We use different functions, `R1`, `R2`, `R3`... at each step to prevent chains from merging.)

e175ea... -> R() -> 'Xy3zK'

3. Password Chain

A sequence of alternating Hash and Reduce functions:

(Head) 'aaaaaa' --H()--> hash1 --R1()--> 'pw2' --H()--> hash2 --R2()--> ... --H()--> hash200 (Tail)

In our table, we only store: ('aaaaa', 'hash200')

HOW RAINBOW TABLES WORK: CRACKING

We have a Target Hash from the database. How do we find it?

1. Is Target Hash in our list of "Tails"? (This is a "perfect match", very rare).

4. ...We get a HIT! Our `hash_guess_X` matches a "Tail".

2. If not:

- Run Target Hash through the last reduce function:
 $\text{'R199(Target Hash) -> pw_guess'}$
- Hash that: $\text{'H(pw_guess) -> hash_guess'}$
- Is `hash_guess` in our list of "Tails"?

5. We look up the "Head" password for that chain (e.g., 'aaaaaa').

3. If not:

- Run Target Hash through the last two reduce/hash functions:
 $\text{'R198(...) -> ... -> hash_guess_2'}$
- Is `hash_guess_2` in our list of "Tails"?

6. We regenerate the chain from 'aaaaaa' until we find our Target Hash. The password right before it is our answer!

OUR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

We built a set of Python scripts to demonstrate this entire process:

- `rainbowtable.py`: The main Python class that handles all the logic.
 - `hash_function()`: Implements SHA1 and MD5.
 - `reduce_function()`: The key to our success! A robust function that maps hashes to the password keyspace and avoids collisions.
 - `generate_table()`: Creates the chains and stores the Head/Tail pairs.
 - `lookup()`: Implements the cracking logic from the previous slide.
- `rainbowgen.py`: A command-line tool to build and save new tables.
- `rainbowcrack.py`: A tool to load a table and crack a single hash.
- `analyze_tradeoff.py`: Our experiment script to run the tests and generate the final plots.

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

To prove the trade-off, we designed an experiment to measure how "Memory Cost" affects "Success Rate".

- Algorithm: sha1
- Charset: alphanumeric (62 chars: a-z, A-Z, 0-9)
- Password Length: 1 to 6 characters
- Chain Length: 200 (Constant)

The Test:

1. We generated a fixed set of 100 random "target" hashes.
2. We built 5 different tables with varying numbers of chains: 1k, 5k, 10k, 20k, 40k
3. We ran all 100 target hashes against each table and measured its Success Rate (%).

HANDS-ON: LIVE DEMO

1. Generate a Rainbow Table

```
python3 rainbowgen.py sha1 alphanumeric 1 6 200 10000 my_table.rt
```



2. Crack a Hash

```
python3 rainbowcrack.py e175ea4ce0a553260a14bc5e922a935b40425c1e my_table.rt
```



3. Run the Analysis Experiment

```
python3 analyze_tradeoff.py
```




RESULTS: THE "GENERATION COST" PLOT

First, we measured the "cost" of building the tables.

Finding: The cost is perfectly linear. As we increase the number of chains, the File Size (KB) and Generation Time (s) both increase proportionally.


This proves our `reduce_function` is working and we are not getting collisions.



RESULTS: THE "PAYOFF"

Chains	File Size (KB)	Generation Time (s)	Success Rate (%)
1000	27.5186	1.7888	16.0
5000	122.6064	8.8787	18.0
10000	236.784	16.3868	24.0
20000	459.3545	35.7878	25.0
40000	883.4658	71.2410	30.0

RESULTS: THE TRADE-OFF PLOT



CONCLUSION

- We successfully built a working Rainbow Table generator and cracker in Python.
- We proved that the quality of the `reduce_function` is the most critical part of preventing chain collisions.
- We successfully demonstrated the Time-Memory Trade-off:
 - Time Cost: We paid a one-time, linear "pre-computation" cost.
 - Memory Cost: We traded file size...
 - ...for a "Payoff": A much higher probability of successfully cracking a hash.
- This attack is powerful, but it is defeated by "salting" passwords, which makes pre-computed tables useless.



Thank
You