welcome!

X86, memory safety vulnerabilities

slides
bit.ly/cs161-disc

feedback
bit.ly/extended-feedback

about me — abhi

- abhi (he/him/his)
- from st. louis, missouri
- love writing and film photography (recently)
- i’m here to be your point of contact!
  - 1-hr disc: M/W 5-6pm Wheeler 202
  - abhiganesh@berkeley.edu

hack of the day

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- RealTek Jungle SDK vulnerability led to 134 million IOT device exploit attempts

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

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-ID	CWE Name	Source
CWE-787	Out-of-bounds Write	NIST
CWE-77	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')	NIST

hack of the day

- RealTek Jungle SDK vulnerability led to 134 million IOT device exploit attempts
  - done through buffer overflow injecting shellcode
  - IOT devices potentially executed malware

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-ID	CWE Name	Source
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general questions, concerns, etc.

X86 review

no, it’s not RISC-V

the registers



calling convention



calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
   - adjust esp



calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
2. remember eip
   - like `ra` in RISC-V



calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
2. remember eip
3. remember ebp
   - to restore to top of previous stack frame



calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
2. remember eip
3. remember ebp
4. adjust the stack frame
   - update ebp, esp, eip



calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
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

calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
2. remember eip
3. remember ebp
4. adjust the stack frame
5. execute the function
   - and move local variables onto stack



calling convention

1. push arguments (reverse order)
2. remember eip
3. remember ebp
4. adjust the stack frame
5. execute the function
6. restore everything
   - use rip, sfp to restore eip, ebp
   - esp naturally moves up via popping



memory safety vulnerabilities

stack smashing,
signed/unsigned, etc.

overwriting the rip

```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```



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

overwriting the rip

- we have 12 bytes of shellcode

```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```



overwriting the rip

- we have 12 bytes of shellcode
- what input can I provide `gets`?




```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```

overwriting the rip

- we have 12 bytes of shellcode
- what input can I provide `gets`?
- `SHELLCODE + 'A' * 12 + '\x40\xcd\xff\xbf'`

```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```



overwriting the rip

what if i have a very large shellcode?

overwriting the rip

- we have 28 bytes of shellcode

```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```



overwriting the rip

- we have 28 bytes of shellcode
- place shellcode AFTER rip




```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```

overwriting the rip

- we have 28 bytes of shellcode
- place shellcode AFTER rip
- `'A' * 24 + '\x5c\xcd\xff\xbf' + SHELLCODE`




```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```

mitigating the `gets` vulnerability

```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char name[20];
    gets(name);
}
```

```
void safe(void) {
    char name[20];
    ...
    fgets(name, 20, stdin);
    ...
}
```

specify length!

unsafe C functions (not extensive)

- **gets** - read a string from stdin
  - use **fgets** instead
- **strcpy** - copy a string
  - use **strncpy** (more compatible, less safe) or **strlcpy** (less compatible, more safe) instead
- **strlen** - get the length of a string
  - use **strnlen** instead (or **memchr** if you really need compatible code)

signed/unsigned vulnerabilities

signed

```
void func(int len, char *data) {
    char buf[64];
    if (len > 64)
        return;
    memcpy(buf, data, len);
}
```

-1 -1

```
void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
```

unsigned

printf vulnerability

```
void func(void) {
    int secret = 42;
    printf("%d\n", 123);
}
```

two arguments



printf vulnerability

```
void func(void) {
    int secret = 42;
    printf("%d\n", 123);
}
```

two arguments

what if there's only one?



printf vulnerability

```
void func(void) {
    int secret = 42;
    printf("%d\n");
}
```

one argument

what if there's only one?



mitigating printf vulnerabilities

```
char buf[64];

void vulnerable(void) {
    if (fgets(buf, 64, stdin) == NULL)
        return;
    printf(buf);
}
```

```
void vulnerable(void) {
    char buf[64];
    if (fgets(buf, 64, stdin) == NULL)
        return;
    printf("%s", buf);
}
```



only accept trusted input!

heap vulnerabilities

- heap overflow
  - writes to buffers within objects in heap unchecked, can buffer overflow the vtable pointer of another object to point to shellcode
- use after free
  - free() memory, attacker writes to it, the freed object is used, which accesses malicious pointers

NOP sleds

- “no operation”, landing anywhere in a sequence of `noop`s (an x86 instruction) leads to your shellcode



worksheet

(on 161 website)

feedback

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