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reminder - implementation due 10/31
schedule demo with TAs 5-8pm

book does not cover secure coding

rule 1: do not use an ^{"unsafe"} unmanaged
language (C or C++)

rule 2: do not use a language
where data can be
executed (any if you're clever)

public enemy #1 - buffer overflow
only applies to unsafe languages

→ array accesses are unchecked
because languages were designed
when bounds checking was
considered expensive


buffer overflow writes past the
end of a buffer (usually an array
of characters = string), overwriting
whatever else was there

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can cause core dump
can corrupt data structures

if the array is allocated on the program stack, then can overwrite return pointer of stack frame to jump to some memory address where "bad" code is inserted

→ explain stack vs. heap memory



example "bad" code : `exec("/bin/sh");`

Why can't we just close this loophole?

→ rewrite every C/C++ compiler to check array bounds

→ add array bound checking code to every C/C++ program

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another problem:

do not roll your own crypto
~~use a tried~~
use some standard API/library
(altho bad guys are always
working on new attacks
for standard tools)

let's say we're coding in a managed
language & we're using an
authentication package
(and the implementations of the
language virtual machine & the
auth package do not themselves
have ~~exploit~~ bugs that can be
exploited)

→ still lots of other security threats

denial of service (DoS) attacks
malicious ~~user~~ user prevents
your application from serving
its legitimate users

one approach: force application crash
→ make sure all exceptions
are handled in a way that
enables the application to continue

CPU starvation force application to take
"a long time" processing user
input - ~~but~~
→ put a time bound on processing
each request, reject after bound,
remember the bad user input
immediately reject next time
problem with zombie net attack
where ~~the~~ numerous apparently
independent users send that
same bad input

example: application converts
all double '/' inputs to single '/'
send input with n '/'s —
takes n^2 time

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resource
starvation

force application to consume
too many resources
memory
database connections
open files
etc

do not allocate expensive resources
until you know it's a legit user

even for legit users impose quotas
(user may be hacked)

network
bandwidth

do not reply to bad inputs
just quietly ~~reject~~ ignore

always run with "least privilege"
both application & OS level -
even if user is an administrator
need to do something special to
escalate privilege

default to deny privileges

base access on
permissions
~~not~~ exclusion

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NEVER trust user input
even after authenticated

always
validate all
external
inputs

never pass user input directly to
a shell, interpreter, SQL query, etc.

always select components for query
(SQL injection is major
source of attacks)

→ different from input validation since
component does not know its external input

NEVER do security checks client
side since modified client
can approve anything

— always check at server that
you control

for web applications, do not store
sensitive data in cookies,
hidden fields, or anything else
that is sent to client

later
uses will
view

sanitize all user inputs to
HTTP POST - cross site scripting