Understanding Ethnic Violence

FEAR, HATRED, AND
RESENTMENT IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY
EASTERN EUROPE

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An Emotion-Based Approach to Ethnic Conflict

Although theories of ethnic conflict are rarely emotion based, most of them implicitly utilize some conception of emotion to answer the question of individual motivation.[1] Convincing theories of ethnic conflict must provide some answer to the puzzling question of why any individual would go out and beat, humiliate, or discriminate against another human being. In Eastern Europe, the substantive basis of this work, neighbors have engaged in grotesque acts of violence against their ethnically different neighbors. Why? As Donald Horowitz has argued, explaining the motivation for such action must go beyond ambition to antipathy, past incentives to passion.[2]

Defining Emotion

Emotion is a mechanism that triggers action to satisfy a pressing concern. An emotion operates to meet situational challenges in two ways: (1) An emotion raises the saliency of one desire/concern over others; in other

[1] Walker Connor, for example, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) is well known for his emphasis on the psychological bases of nationalism and ethnic conflict, but has no such theory. Some authors have written emotion-based works about the causes of international wars, a violent but very different phenomenon than the one at hand. See for example, Thomas J. Scheff, *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). Also, Stuart Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of War* (Cornell University Press, 2001), provides an extensive treatment of emotion and its effect on ethnic violence. I will refer to this work later in this chapter.
[2] Horowitz makes such claims in both *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

words, emotion helps select among competing desires.[3] (2) An emotion heightens both cognitive and physical capabilities necessary to respond to the situational challenge.[4] Consider the following example. A man desiring safety, wealth, and self-esteem is walking in a dark wood. All of a sudden, he hears a strange animal noise and becomes afraid. The emotion of fear sweeps over him. Fear pumps adrenalin into his body or produces an instinctive threatening pose that serves to frighten the animal off. Fear (the emotion) acted as a mechanism (an individual level, recognizable pattern) to cause action (fight/flight) to meet a pressing concern (safety). The view here follows Frijda in emphasizing emotions as changes in "action readiness" to satisfy "concerns."[5] Frijda differentiates between "surface concerns" that are connected with the values of a particular human environment and the concerns hard wired in the species' constitution, although the former must derive from the latter to a great extent.[6] To meet these concerns, the individual possesses a repertoire of activation and deactivation mechanisms that change action readiness. These mechanisms are the emotions.[7] They change readiness physically and cognitively, they alert the individual to modify relationships in the environment. In this view, the defining element of emotion is the associated "action tendency."[8] Frijda provides examples of alertness, anger, and craving:

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[3] For a related view, see Ronald DeSousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

[4] Emotion theorists often discuss emotion in terms of six features: arousal, intentionality, cognitive antecedents, valence, action tendency, and expression. The first statement is related to intentionality. The second statement incorporates arousal, expression, and action tendency. Action tendency is explicitly discussed as follows. The question of cognitive antecedents is crucial to the distinction between Rage and the other three emotions and forms a large part of the discussion in the latter pages of this chapter. Valence is not particularly relevant since all of these emotions possess a negative sign. For a brief summary statement of these six elements, see Jon Elster, "Rationality and the Emotions" *The Economic Journal*, 106 (1996): 1386–88. Elster's larger treatment is found in *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[5] Nico H. Frijda, *The Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[6] Ibid., p. 466.

[7] For a broader discussion of social mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[8] There is a long history of viewing emotion in terms of action tendency. In the sixteenth century, Juan Luis Vives saw emotion as a faculty that allowed individuals to seek good and avoid evil. Hobbes wrote of appetites and aversions in much the same vein. In the twentieth century, Frijda is preceded by Magda B. Arnold *Emotion and Personality* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) and followed by Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore, and Allan Collins, *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

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There is a discrepancy or mismatch that initiates the program; decrease in the discrepancy guides and terminates the behavior. . . . If, for instance, the situation is seen as an unfamiliar one, action tendency is generated for actions removing that unfamiliarity: alertness, scanning the environment. If the situation is one that blocks freedom of action, action tendency emerges that aims toward removing that obstruction: anger. If mismatch consists of something desirable not possessed, action tendency is toward possession: craving or desire.[9]

Fear, Hatred, and Resentment are discussed in terms of action tendencies that prepare the individual to change the environment. Rage must be treated differently.

In a closely related point, *many, but not all, emotions are instrumental*.[10] Emotion drives the individual to reach a recognizable goal. Fear is instrumental because it produces actions that directly meet a pressing concern in the form of a threat. While most might recognize the possibility that fear is instrumental, they assume that other emotions, like hatred and resentment, are noninstrumental, if not clearly dysfunctional. In this volume, Fear, Hatred, and Resentment are treated in the same way – as processes centered on an emotional mechanism facilitating individual action to satisfy an identified desire/concern. Fear prepares the individual to satisfy safety concerns; Hatred prepares the individual to act on historical grievance; Resentment prepares the individual to address status/self-esteem discrepancies. Rage, in contrast, posits an emotion that often drives the individual toward self-destructive actions. With Rage, the emotion still addresses pressing concerns, but those concerns are emanating from frustration or a troubled personality. In this case, emotion directs the individual toward actions that may relieve internalized frustration or the problems of a conflicted personality. Given their source, however, Rage often produces cognitive distortions that can lead to irrelevant or counterproductive actions (such as searching for scapegoats). A primary benefit of the emotional approach is that it can accomodate both instrumental and noninstrumental action.

Press, 1988). In the latter work, the authors have differences with Frijda on the issue of treating emotion as action tendency (see p. 11, for example). Still, the similarities in usage outweigh the differences.

[9] Frijda, *The Emotions* pp. 76–77.

[10] Summing up a common view from emotion theory, David D. Franks and Viktor Gecas write that in the face of enormous complexity emotion "allows us to decide what is worth thinking about and what is relevant and irrelevant once we start thinking." See "Current Issues in Emotion Studies and Introduction to Chapters" in David D. Franks and Viktor Gecas, eds., *Social Perspectives on Emotion* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992).

Emotion is a mechanism that explains shifts in motivation.[11] Note that in the example of the man in the woods, the emotion worked to automatically raise the saliency of one desire, safety, over others such as self-esteem or wealth. Here is one of the key benefits of an emotion-based theory of ethnic conflict. A multiplicity of motivations drive individuals to participate in ethnic violence. While economists might plausibly assume that unitary actors (individuals or firms) maximize profits and legislative scholars can acceptably assume that politicians work to maximize chances for reelection, analysts of ethnic conflict are generally more cautious in assuming one fundamental utility consistently driving the actions of perpetrators of ethnic violence. Not only are there multiple plausible motivations at work, but the same individual may be driven to commit ethnic violence by different motivations at different times. The participant in ethnic violence may be acting on revenge at one particular moment, on the desire to help preempt attack on his or her own group at another time, and the wish to "put members of another group in their place" in yet another situation. The emotion mechanism is based on an idea that one desire tends to become dominant and overriding in certain situations. An appropriate metaphor is that of a "switch."[12] Multiple desires are all seen as important, but extremely difficult to compare, or to order, in any general sense.[13]

Emotion produces shifts in motivation by mediating between cognition and desire. There is considerable psychological evidence to show that emotion

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[11] For similar treatments, see Stuart Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds* and Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor, *Social Cognition*, Second Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 456. Note that I am largely avoiding the issue of preference change or adaptive preferences. I am simply positing that emotion helps the individual select an action by heightening one desire among a short list that cannot be convincingly ordered. On the issue of preference change, see Jon Elster, *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[12] In line with Andric's "wild beast" and Djilas' "inebriation," Paul Ekman writes about "emotional wildfires," emotions that produce uncontrollable desires. See Paul Ekman, *Telling Lies* (New York: Norton, 1992).

[13] There is another feature of emotions worthy of mention that I am less sure about: *Emotion is a mechanism that can switch concerns from the egocentric to the collective.* One of the fundamental questions underlying any type of ethnic political behavior asks why an individual would sacrifice or act on behalf of a group (or against another group). There may be a constellation of emotional mechanisms that help link the individual to the collective. For instance, a cognition of danger leads to the emotion of fear, the cognition that others in one's identifiable ethnic group also feel a similar fear then leads to a second emotion (that needs to be identified) that increases solidarity and changes the focus to the welfare of the collective.

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affects cognition and cognition affects emotion.[14] However, in terms of the present analysis of ethnic conflict, cognition is treated as prior in the causal sequence for Fear, Hatred, and Resentment.[15] Along with many socially oriented theorists, the present approach sees emotion primarily as "thought that becomes embodied because of the intensity with which it is laced with personal self-relevancy."[16] Beliefs about threat lead to fears; beliefs about status inconsistency lead to resentments; beliefs about history and vengeance lead to hatreds. The treatment of Fear, Hatred, and Resentment mirrors that of Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) who write: "Our claims about the structure of individual emotions are always along the lines that *if* an individual conceptualizes a situation in a certain kind of way, *then* the potential for a particular type of emotion exists."[17] There are three elements at hand: (1) the situation, (2) the conceptualization, (3) the emotion. In most instances, all three are occurring almost simultaneously, but for the instrumental emotions in this study they are treated sequentially in the order just provided. It is the first element of this sequence, the situation, that provides the link to the structural half of the "independent variable" of many theories of ethnic conflict.

Several theories of ethnic conflict see structural changes as the engine that leads to ethnic conflict. These structural changes can also be seen as the situations that initiate the cognitive-emotive sequence. As outlined in the introductory chapter, in Eastern Europe two types of structural change produced radically different situations in terms of power and status

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[14] For a more extensive discussion see Cheshire Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?" in C. Calhoun and R. C. Solomon, eds., *What is an Emotion: Classical Readings in Philosophical Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 327–42. For an eloquent argument for the inseparability of emotion and cognition, see Francis F. Seeburger, "Blind Sight and Brute Feeling: The Divorce of Cognition From Emotion" *Social Perspectives on Emotion* 1 (1992): 47–60.

[15] Rage critically reverses the order. With Rage, emotion affects cognition in several identifiable and important ways. This relationship is treated extensively below.

[16] This quote is from the discussion of emotion and cognition found in David D. Franks and Viktor Gecas, "Current Issues in Emotion Studies" in David D. Franks and Viktor Gecas, eds., *Social Perspectives on Emotion: A Research Annual* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), p. 8. Claire Armon-Jones points out that while emotion is dependent upon cognition, cognitions do not constitute emotion because the same belief could produce two different emotions. See Claire Armon-Jones, "The Thesis of Constructionism" in Rom Harre, ed., *The Social Construction of Emotions* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 41–42.

[17] This statement mirrors that of Ortony et al., *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* p. 2.

relations among ethnic groups. First, the forces of modernization – literacy, urbanization, the expansion of the state – worked to form ethnic groups, as well as to produce an acute awareness of which groups were strong and weak, which were high status and which were low status. Second were the abrupt structural shocks that accompanied a century of war, occupation, and the collapse of empires. Indeed, in a few short days the power and status position of groups could radically change. For example, Baltic states switched political realms three times within a very short period. They went from independence to Soviet rule during 1940–41, then to German occupation, and finally back to Soviet domination. With each change, power and status relations among groups shifted.

Emotion results from structural change through the intervening processes of conceptualization and evaluation, perhaps better signified by the term *belief-formation*. When individuals come to believe that the new situation has produced some type of discrepancy among groups, or has produced a perceived threat from another group, an emotion results that generates a change in the saliency of a particular desire. In the example above, the individual's fear of an animal attack heightened the concern for safety. In turn, the emotion generated action tendencies to meet that desire. In regard to ethnic conflict, the sequence of events is roughly the same. Structural change produces information that is processed into beliefs that in turn, and almost inevitably, create emotions and tendencies toward certain actions. The process is summarized in Figure 2.1.

As indicated by Figure 2.1, the emotion, once generated, produces feedback effects on information and belief. For the instrumental emotions, the beliefs that have already been formed become reinforced. For example, once one is in the grip of Fear, reports about danger and threat will crowd out other information. When one is in the clutch of Resentment, indicators of group status constantly infiltrate one's thoughts. Under Hatred, long dormant historical "facts" come to dominate thinking and discussion. For Fear, Hatred, and Resentment information is selected in order to meet the elevated goal. Unlike the noninstrumental Rage, however, emotion only acts to select the information that is most relevant to the elevated goal. In the instrumental paths, emotion impacts cognition through a feedback loop. In Rage, emotion dominates and distorts cognition.

The following two chapters break down three major views of ethnic conflict (Fear, Hatred, Resentment) into the components of this diagram. What kind of structual change starts the process? What are the assumptions about the beliefs that arise from the structural change? How do these

Figure 2.1 Structures, Emotions, and Ethnic Conflict

beliefs lead to emotions and changes in saliency of desires? These are the elements that separate competing theories of ethnic conflict.

Action

The primary dependent variable is ethnic violence. The empirical chapters identify puzzles involving variation in targets and timing of violence. The quality of the violence is also relevant because the nature of violence can often help distinguish among competing explanations. When a religious figure, rather than a political figure, is singled out at a particular time as a target of violence, certain inferences about the perpetrator's motivation may be made. To emphasize a point made earlier, the project is especially focused on violent actions occurring between neighboring ethnic groups during periods of state collapse. The effects of emotion are most stark in these often brief but crucial periods. Isolating the affects of

emotion can be best accomplished by studying periods when the myriad of normal constraints has been lifted.[18]

It is also important to emphasize that the project is not focused on actions directed from outside the region by foreign powers. It is not interested in violence entirely directed by the Soviets or Nazis, for example.

At various points the analysis will shift to institutional discrimination (the focus of Chapter 7, for example). Hopefully this shift will allow for a broader view of the effects of emotion on ethnic politics without detracting from the main goal – explaining variation in ethnic violence.

Predictions

Each instrumental path sees an observable structural change generating an emotional mechanism that in turn heightens the saliency of a desire (safety, vengeance, status) that promotes ethnic violence and conflict. It should be emphasized that the structural changes originating the process are readily observable and their presence or absence varies among cases. The linkages between structure and emotion prevent simply finding evidence of the emotion we seek and attaching it as an explanation of the conflict. Breaking down each of the competing theories in this way facilitates the creation of a testable hypothesis.

Each of these theories produces competing predictions of the *timing* of conflict and the *target* of violence and/or discrimination. Due to the assumption of instrumentality (underlying Fear, Hatred, and Resentment), emotion identifies the target as the group that stands in the way of achieving a blocked desire. The nature of the structural change predicts when another group is likely to be perceived as blocking the desire. The respective hypotheses are straightforward. The next chapters show how these hypotheses were distilled from well-known literatures and how they can predict discrimination and toleration as well as violence. Here, hypotheses for each of the three instrumental emotions are given in their most stark and violence-oriented forms:

[18] Not all emotions lead to action. Claire Armon-Jones has listed four conditions qualifying emotions as capable of motivating an agent. These conditions include the conviction of belief, the vividness of the cognitions, the intensity of the attitudes underlying the emotion, and the emotion's consuming nature. See Armon-Jones, "The Thesis of Constructionism" p. 49. The violent and semianarchic conditions underlying many of the cases in this book exhibit these four conditions and are an excellent laboratory to study how emotions lead to action.

Fear   Structural changes such as the collapse or weakening of the political center eliminate institutional constraints and guarantees to produce a situation characterized as anarchy or emerging anarchy. Under these conditions, Fear heightens the desire for security. *The target of ethnic violence will be the group that is the biggest threat.* The theory is not supported if the target of attack is not a threat.

Hatred ("Ancient Hatred")   Structural changes such as the collapse of the center eliminate constraints and produce an opportunity to commit aggression against other groups. *The target of ethnic violence will be the group that has frequently been attacked with similar justification over an extended time period.* If the target has not been a frequently attacked ethnic group, or if the target is attacked with a completely new justification, then the hypothesis is not supported.

Resentment   Structural changes such as the collapse or weakening of the center and/or occupation rearrange ethnic status hierarchies by changing sovereignty relations, composition of political positions and police, and other features such as language policy. *The predicted ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through violence.* If the target group is lower on the ethnic status hierarchy, then Resentment is not supported. If the target group is higher on an ethnic hierarchy but cannot have its position reduced through ethnic violence, then Resentment does not apply. If two possible target groups are higher on an ethnic hierarchy and either one or the other can be brought to a subordinate position, and if the lower group is the target, then Resentment *alone* is not a sufficient explanation. The choice of a suboptimal target would need to be explained in conjunction with another theory (possibly Hatred or Rage) or simply by another theory.

Note that these motivations are not mutually exclusive. Many cases may be "overdetermined" in that multiple motivations are driving the outbreak of ethnic violence. For instance, as shown in the empirical material on Yugoslavia, both Fear and Resentment produce accurate descriptions and predictions for certain events in Croatia and Bosnia.

Indicators

Indicators of threat potential, status hierarchy, and "hated group" are necessary to test these three competing theories.

Ethnic status hierarchy can be linked to observable indicators such as sovereignty, language policy, political position holding, composition of the forceholders. This is not a case of post hoc theory development in the sense that some vague form of resentment is found for any observed ethnic conflict. The structural changes, the indicators of repositionings of ethnic hierarchy, and the conflicts themselves are all observable.

"Hated group" tries to capture the meaning of the "ancient hatred" argument. The same foe is again fought for the same reasons. There has to be a significant history of actual attacks or outright conflict to make such a designation. Here, the target need not really be "ancient" – a consistent history of similar types of attacks against the same ethnic group over several generations can qualify the target as "long hated." The key question is whether the history of interethnic relations has created roles and identities that individuals take on during periods when constraints have been lifted.

For Fear, threat potential requires assessment of the ability of the ethnic group to inflict significant *physical* damage against other groups. Both mobilizational potential and vulnerability of one's group to attack are relevant factors. The former concerns organization while the latter involves geography and demographics.[19]

The Instrumental Emotions and Related Hypotheses in Historical Context

This study links the theoretical ideas of emotion, developed in this chapter, to the history of Eastern Europe, periodized in the preceding chapter. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the two can be brought together.

The numbers and the vertical orderings within the figure represent the indicators described in the preceding section. The vertical order of groups represents relative position on the ethnic status hierarchy which is pegged to observable indicators such as language policy, staffing in the military and police, staffing in the bureaucracy, and land redistribution policy. The numbers themselves represent each group's relative regional abilities to mobilize force – their threat potential. Within each hierarchy, X stands for the empirical power or occupier. A number with X attached represents an

[19] Perhaps the best outline of indicators relevant to the Fear narrative is found in Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival* 35 (1993): 27–47. I will return to Posen's argument in Chapter 4.

Period One: Modernization Under Empire
1. Urbanization
2. Literacy
3. Bureaucratization
4. Conscription

Period Two: WWI and Collapse of Empire

Establishment of Nation-states

Period Three: Interwar Nationalizing States

Institutionalization of Titular Status Dominance

Period Four: Time of Occupations and War

Height of Violence

Period Five: Communist Rule

Communist Ethnic Policies

Period Six: Collapse of Communism

Institutional Change and Violence

Figure 2.2 Predicting Targets in Historical Context

ethnic group favored or associated with the empire or occupying power. The letter H represents a group that is in a relationship of "ancient hatred" with the most powerful regional group in the hierarchy.

Starting with the circle at the top, the period of the modernizing empire, the various groups are shown without a clearly perceived ethnic

hierarchy. During this period, modernization creates a perception of ethnic hierarchy, represented by a straightened vertical ordering. The two boxes following from modernization represent two possible examples of hierarchy. The box on the left shows a hierarchy in which the group associated with the empire or occupier is dominant, followed by the "collaborating" group, followed by the regionally most powerful group, the second most regionally powerful group, the fourth most powerful group (which is the "ancient enemy" of Group 1), and finally the fifth most regionally powerful group.

Notice that there is an overall historical pattern. First, modernization produces the development of group consciousness of status and power hierarchy. Then this hierarchy is reordered at multiple junctures and in multiple ways throughout the century. The pattern in Figure 2.2 shows the power and status hierarchies lining up during the interwar period and then being shaken back to a more mixed pattern by occupation and war. As the empirical studies will show, this was a common pattern, although not all cases followed it to the same extent. Crucially, different countries modernized at different rates and developed a strong sense of ethnic hierarchy at different times. In some cases, this sense of ethnic hierarchy was strong during the period of empire, in other cases, this sense only developed during the interwar period with the policies of the new state. The general pattern in Figure 2.2 forms a useful heuristic that shows how variation tended to develop within the region.

As laid out above, Fear, Hatred, and Resentment predict different targets of violence or discrimination if the empire or occupier collapses. In other words, each predicts a different pattern of targets of violent action in Periods Two, Four, and Six. In Periods Three and Five, times of relative stability, the focus is mainly on institutional changes. If the situation is accurately depicted by the left hand box of Period Two, Fear predicts that Group 1 will attack the greatest threat. Assuming that the power of X has vanished, the predicted action would be 1 against 2. Hatred predicts that given the collapse of constraints, the regionally dominant group, Number 1, would attack 4H, its ancient foe. Resentment predicts that the target would be the group farthest up the ethnic hierarchy that can be subordinated through violence. If X has fled, the predicted target would be 3X.

If the ordering was X, 2XH, 1, 3, 4, 5, a single causal explanation for ethnic conflict could not be determined due to problems of overdetermination. Fear would predict conflict between the two contenders most able

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to inflict damage against one another: 1 and 2. Hatred would predict violence against the ancient foe: 1 against 2. Resentment would predict violence or discrimination against groups farther up the hierarchy: again, 1 and 2.

The hierarchy shown on the right hand side of Period Two exhibits another form of overdetermination. With the collapse of X, Fear clearly predicts conflict among 1 and 2, but Resentment's prediction is more problematic. Resentment holds that violence/conflict will be targeted against the group farthest up the hierarchy that *can* be brought down through this action. Thus, Resentment predicts attack on 2 if possible, but conflict with 3X if 2 is too powerful to bring down through violence. In this case, Groups 1 and 2 might form an alliance to dominate the system. These forces might be separated by a careful analysis of the conflict.

Challenges and Objections: A Comparison with Alternative Approaches

This section confronts four fundamental challenges to the emotions-based approach. I will list these challenges in order before addressing them at length.

1. What about noninstrumental emotions stressed by the psychological literature?
2. How is the emotions-based approach better than a rational choice approach?
3. Don't elites possess the ability to create these emotions? Doesn't the approach, with its structural emphasis, ignore the role of human agency?
4. Why not, for the sake of parsimony, simply link structure and action without the complications involved with emotion?

Noninstrumental Emotions

Because instrumental emotions are all based on one dominant concern, their definition is relatively straightforward. Fear prepares the individual to take action to reduce dangers in the environment; Hatred prepares the individual to attack previously identified enemies; Resentment prepares the individual to rectify perceived imbalances in group status hierarchies. With each of these emotions, the dominant concern is tied to some readily

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observable structural change that is external to the individual. For each of these three emotions, cognitive processes are considered to be able to direct action toward a target that is the source of the concern. With these emotions, there is a coherent flow among structure, cognition, the emotional mechanism, and the timing and target of action.

Not all emotions are instrumental. Furthermore, in contrast to Fear, Hatred, and Resentment, emotion may precede cognition. What if an individual simply wishes to lash out? Fear, Hatred, and Resentment all envision a desire to lash out, but it is a desire linked to a specific source and embedded in a specific context of group relations. What if such a desire arises from general or multiple sources and without a clear direction for action? An emotion heightening a desire to simply lash out would clearly be noninstrumental, even in the sense of relieving psychological tensions. In fact, if the target of aggression is not related to the conditions that created frustration, the negative emotions may continue, or perhaps only temporarily subside. For example, if one kicks the dog after a bad day at work, the frustration may or may not be temporarily relieved. On the other hand, frustration may increase if the dog requires a veterinarian while the problems at work remain. Rather than helping to solve problems, the emotion might deflect the individual from confronting and solving the most pressing concerns.

Despite being noninstrumental, an emotion-based path capturing the essential features of "lashing out" can be modeled by rearranging the elements found in Fear, Hatred, and Resentment. For want of a better term, I label the path found in Figure 2.3 as Rage. In effect, an individual in the grasp of Rage is seeking an outlet for his or her frustration and is looking to take it out on someone, or perhaps even anyone.

Following the links in Figure 2.3, a source generates an emotion that heightens the desire to lash out above any more specific goal. The key feature in this path is that emotion precedes cognition. Building on several strands of social psychology, when emotion precedes cognition, distortions in information collection and belief formation may occur. Most critically, the emotion may distort the way targets are identified. The strong urge to commit violence creates a need to process available information in such a way to find an enemy (victim) and justify violence against that target. One or more of a diverse set of psychological mechanisms (for example, projection and attribution) may come into play to help with this task. With these targeting mechanisms at work, it is likely that some targets will be displaced or substitute targets rather than direct targets. That is, if the

Figure 2.3   Rage

group that is the source of frustration is unavailable for attack, another group will be found to substitute for it.

Given these comments, Rage can be distinguished from the instrumental emotions on the following criteria:

a. Cognitive distortions in the selection of targets
b. The existence of clear substitute targets
c. Incoherent justifications for violence
d. Difficulty in identifying a specific source beginning the process

The purpose of this book is to explain how emotions motivate individuals to commit ethnic violence. The nature of those emotions, whether they are instrumental or noninstrumental, is of critical importance. The purpose of creating Rage is to develop a noninstrumental path to ethnic violence that can be compared to the instrumental paths and distinguished from them. Many social science theories of violence, if not necessarily

ethnic violence, rotate around an assumption that individuals are compelled to lash out. Specific theories often concentrate on parts of the Rage path – some on cognitive distortions, others on the precipitating factors initiating the process. Rage is a general form, an umbrella concept, meant to encompass this range of theories. Certainly, not all of the four characteristics listed above are common to every theory fitting Rage: however, the presence of one or several indicates a process leading to ethnic violence that fundamentally differs from the instrumental paths. I will address the theoretical foundations and application of this explanation in more detail in Chapter 4.

The Rational Choice Alternative

Rational choice provides a clear alternative mechanism to explain shifting actions: rational, maximizing behavior. Thus, the individual can be assigned one stable preference structure (for example, safety > revenge > self-esteem) and action can be predicted from the nature of constraints and incentives. If safety is not at issue, then the individual may commit ethnic violence in order to gain the secondary goal of revenge. Rational choice provides an explanation with reference to information and beliefs about conditions and their change, it needs no reference to emotion.

For several reasons, rational choice is difficult to apply toward participation in ethnic conflict. First, there is the obvious problem related to collective action. Any act by an individual against a large group, in this case an ethnic group, is inherently irrational in the Olsonian sense. One individual's action will not change the power or status position of an ethnic group. With their model of calculation, rational choice theorists must explain why an individual participates in group action with public goods characteristics. If violence against a weaker minority group is a public good, members of many societies seem more than happy to assume the private costs necessary to supply it.

In many instances, rational choice arguments have been stretched to include a value, a selective incentive, for "enjoyment,"[20] or for "partici-

pation,"[21] but this type of selective incentive only leads back to the question of emotion. The "benefit" of this participation makes no sense without reference to emotion. Why does an individual value participation for its own sake? It is impossible to answer this question without reference to love or hate or sense of fulfillment or some other emotional factor.[22] Given this, one must wonder about the conceptual worth of assigning, for example, a hate-filled action a certain participatory "utility" or "value" when the emotion of hate itself is the driving and determinative force (not to mention the conceptual difficulties of such a task). In short, emotions should not be treated as costs. For events of ethnic conflict, the emotional mechanism provides an appropriate alternative to the logic of collective action.

Furthermore, rational choice relies on certain consistency requirements regarding preferences. Two are most fundamental. As in the example above, the agent's choices must be rank ordered. Second, the preferences must be transitive. Underlying these specific consistency requirements is a more general assumption that preferences are stable.

How realistically can preferences relating to ethnic violence and discrimination be rank ordered? Economists regularly order preferences regarding material satisfactions. However, it is one thing to assume that individuals prefer ten dollars today to twenty dollars a year from now, or to draw a curve regarding the trade-offs between guns and butter, and quite another to make assumptions about the relative values of such disparate desires as revenge, safety, and self-esteem. The emotion-based approach does not need to create these dubious rank-orderings. Emotions create a sense of urgency, they dramatically raise the salience of a particular desire, they explain compulsion. The trade-offs between revenge and self-esteem, for example, cannot be realistically calculated or represented with an indifference curve. In rational choice, the stability of preferences is a *simplifying* assumption. Most practitioners of rational choice would probably agree that this simplification is not always useful for every type of human behavior.

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[20] Edward Banfield's "Rioting for Fun and Profit" comes to mind here. While I am addressing the "fun" side of Banfield's work here, there have been recent attempts to reduce ethnic conflict to a matter of profit. See in particular, John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'" *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 42–70. Mueller, in one of his two examples, reduces the 1990s Yugoslav wars to a matter of thugs and soccer hooligans who participate primarily for the selective incentives involved with looting.

[21] In their treatment of collective action in protests against nuclear power, Muller and Opp develop a whole list of selective incentives including "fun," "participation," and so on. See Edward Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action" *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 472–87.

[22] As Donald Horowitz notes in his massive study of ethnic riots, "Whatever leaders may plan, the plans would not come to fruition if the rioters did not find the festive infliction of suffering and degradation thoroughly satisfying. No hidden logic of costs and benefits can explain the violence *tout court*." *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, p. 123.

Finally, as many observers have noted, rational choice has produced its most useful insights in iterative situations or under stable institutional environments. For many of the following cases, the opposite conditions held. The most violent of ethnic conflicts have occurred in periods of state collapse; the conditions under Soviet and Nazi occupations were often historically unique. When addressing discrimination, the relevant question is the creation of new intolerant institutions rather than the functioning of existing and stable institutions. In general, both supporters and critics of rational choice theory agree with this view concerning the conditions appropriate for rational choice methodology. For example, one notable proponent of rational choice, George Tsebelis, has summarized, "actions taken in noniterative situations by individual decision makers (such as in crisis situations) are not necessarily well-suited for rational choice predictions."[23]

Structure versus Agency: The Role of Elites

Perhaps the most obvious objection to the present emotions-based approach is its inattention to the role of elites. Aren't these emotions constructed and manipulated by elites for their own ends? Doesn't the approach above ignore politics?

Clearly, elites can influence the course of ethnic relations in several ways. Referring back to the links in Figure 2.1, elites can control information through their grip on the media.[24] They can shape beliefs through clever framing of the situation.[25] Elites can appeal to norms as well.[26] With

[23] On the antirational choice side, see Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). George Tsebelis makes this statement in *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 38.

[24] For an extensive discussion of the role of the media, see Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and Marketplace of Ideas" *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 5–40. Also see Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Violence* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2000), especially Chapter 2, "Nationalist Elite Persuasion in Democratizing States."

[25] Norman Schofield believes that the nexus of comparative politics and rational choice theory lies in this shaping of beliefs. The existence of common belief, as shaped by political leaders, helps determine which of multiple possible equilibria will be selected. See Norman Schofield, "Constitutional Political Economy: On the Possibility of Combining Rational Choice Theory and Comparative Politics" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 277–303.

[26] On the appeal to norms, see Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Paul Stern, "Why Do Individuals Sacrifice for Their Nations?" *Political Psychology* 16 (1995): 217–36.

reference to nationalist myths and constant reminders of past and present victimizations, elites can inflame and intensify the emotions themselves.

It is correct to state that the emotion-based approach links structural change and mass behavior without direct reference to elites and their efforts to shape the path of ethnic conflict.[27] This omission is justified for both methodological and empirical reasons. The goal of the present approach is to lay down clear, systematic narratives of social process to serve as baselines for comparison. While elites may influence the course of events, that influence is difficult to treat systematically.[28] Demagoguery is more of an art than a science. To try to incorporate the numerous ways elites might enter into the course of ethnic conflict would entail an unacceptable loss of clarity and parsimony. I am trying to tell clear stories about the path to ethnic conflict, narratives that are generalizable across the entire century. These narratives may not apply: In fact, I expect that this approach may be inapplicable for certain cases. By discerning when and why the present approach fails we will be better positioned to understand the role of influences that it omits. It is better to be clear and wrong than unclear.

In an important sense, the emotions-based approach is a test of the influence of elites. If this structural and mass-oriented approach is able to identify patterns of ethnic conflict, then the critical explanatory role of elite strategy and influence must be questioned. Elites must then be seen as responding to structural change and mass emotion rather than shaping it. Clearly, the influences go both ways, but it is an important matter to determine which direction is dominant. Here lies the question of structure and agency, one of the major methodological dividing points in the social sciences.[29] Moreover, this distinction is central when asking how, and whether, ethnic conflict can be prevented. For if there are social processes with their own progressions and dynamics, then we must ask whether it is wise, or possible, to intervene to change or deflect the course of that progression. The discussion of "prevention" assumes that humans can create political institutions that can positively shape the course of social interactions. Creating institutions that are divorced from "broad social processes" may have unintended, counterproductive, and possibly deadly, results.

[27] See comments on this issue in the first chapter.

[28] In *From Voting to Violence*, for example, Jack Snyder systematically addresses the conditions that favor the success of demagoguery more than the nature of demagoguery itself.

[29] On this issue, see William Sewell, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation" *American Journal of Sociology* 98(1) (1992): 1–29.

Through the identification of similar processes or mechanisms in diverse cases, the study of ethnic conflict will become more of a science with the attendant implications for interventions. On the other hand, the failure to identify common processes and mechanisms will also produce a valuable insight – that the study of ethnic conflict should not be a science, that interventions must be more of an art applied differently to every case. At this juncture in time, this basic question has still not been settled in the scholarly field of ethnic conflict studies. I will return to these issues both in the conclusions and in the last substantive chapter, which discusses the role of Milosevic, Karadzic, and others in precipitating ethnic violence in Yugoslavia.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the elite-led approach must be questioned on empirical grounds as well. In several instances of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, it is difficult to identify leaders. This difficulty clearly presents itself during the wartime years when Soviet and Nazi regimes often eliminated local leadership through deportation and death. In other cases, leaders might be present, but it is difficult to attribute ethnic violence to their actions.[30] Again, elite manipulation can occur, but it cannot be assumed to be the primary influence.

Finally, I am in agreement with the following indignant view: "Portraying millions of individuals in many societies as mindless robots who can easily be duped into assuming fictitious identities and sacrificing their own and others' lives for the purposes of a small group of skillful self-serving manipulators represents an extremely simplistic and condescending view."[31] One senses that the portrayal of events as elite led is well intentioned. It reduces the responsibility of the mass of perpetrators by placing blame on a few evil leaders. Good intentions have little to do with social science, however.

Structural Alternatives

The inclusion of structure in Figure 2.1 immediately raises the question of the purpose of bringing the messy subject of emotion into the study at all. Why not eliminate the middle box above and simply link structural

[30] See, for example, Gordon Bardos, "Balkan History, Madeleine's War, and NATO's Kosovo" The Harriman Review 13 (April 2001): 36–51. See p. 40 in particular.
[31] Ivelin Sardamov, "Ethnic Warriors: Ethnicity and Genocide in the Balkans" Paper presented at the Fourth Annual Convention of the Association of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, April 15–17, 1999.

changes to increased chances of ethnic conflict? The reason is straightforward. The primary goal here is to know why individuals participate in acts of violence against people with whom they have lived in relative harmony for considerable lengths of time. The linkage between structure and conflict does not tell us why because it cannot identify a microlevel causal mechanism. The *mechanisms* and motivations linking structural change and ethnic conflict are found in the emotions.[32]

Furthermore, a particular structural change may produce multiple mechanisms that increase the chances of ethnic conflict. Sometimes, ethnic conflict may result from Fear *or* Hatred *or* Resentment, but other times multiple emotions, all tending toward higher conflict, may be present. Fine-grained, mechanism-based explanations specify when single mechanisms are at work and when cases are overdetermined. Without this level of knowledge, the analyst may attribute too much causal weight to a single variable.[33]

There is one more crucial reason to go beyond the structural variable and carefully examine the links between information, belief, and emotion. While Fear, Hatred, and Resentment all assume a similar causal relationship among these three elements, Rage holds that this path is affected by certain psychological mechanisms operating within the path. Therefore, examining the power and coherence of the Rage argument requires studying the relationship among and between these links. It is necessary to examine the available cases to see if the operation of information, belief, and emotion resembles the relatively straightforward path of Fear, Hatred, and Resentment or the more twisted paths of Rage.

Summary

Emotions are the mechanisms that heighten the saliency of a particular concern. They act as a "switch" among a set of basic desires. In the case of instrumental emotion, certain observable structural conditions and changes can be used to predict when the emotion is likely to be triggered.

[32] Elsewhere, I have discussed the relationship between mechanism and structure at length. See Roger Petersen, "Structure and Mechanism in Comparisons" in John Bowen and Roger Petersen, eds., Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For another view, see Arthur Stinchcombe, "On the Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science" Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1991): 367–88.
[33] I will make this argument about Fear.

The emotions-based approach concentrates on individual motivations. Many factors are important in generating ethnic violence and discrimination, but motivation is certainly one of the most fundamental. Assumptions about motivation underlie most, if not all, social science treatments of the topic. Even lawyers, with a somewhat different approach, must establish some motive if they are going to successfully convict an indictee of a violent or discriminatory crime.

The emotions-based approach is a mass (vs. elite) approach. The everyday interactions of the bulk of the population and the emotional content of those experiences is assumed to constrain elites as well as provide opportunities for rapid and violent mobilization. As many cases will show, little leadership seems to be necessary for ethnic violence.

The emotions-based approach posits a realistic and complex actor, one motivated by both instrumental and noninstrumental· emotions. The approach conceives an actor that can be motivated by group-based concerns. In the emotions-based approach, the individual cares about multiple aspects – safety, status, vengeance.

The emotions-based approach specifies a mechanism and allows for prediction. It also provides a certain descriptive realism. Human beings are undeniably emotional, especially when commiting violence or discrimination against other human beings. To try to incorporate emotion into a study carries certain costs, but to eliminate emotion from study involves the loss of realism. Indeed, humans are both the most emotional and the most rational of all beings.[34] Francis Seeburger supports the marriage of emotion and rationality in vivid fashion:

Something more than merely strange has happened to the very idea of "reason" or "logic" when a character such as Mr. Spock of *Star Trek*, whose Vulcan heritage requires him to restrict himself to judgements wholly free of emotion, is presented as the paradigm of "rationality." It is no accident that Spock's struggles to confine himself to such affectless cognitions invariably end in comic failure. Someone who could succeed in such a thing would be, not a thoroughly rational being, but a psychotic. In interviews given shortly before his execution, Ted Bundy appears to reflect just such a defect. He strikes us as someone who has mastered all the right formulas, in effect, but does not really have any understanding of their inner meaning, someone who could never penetrate through the letter to the spirit. This is precisely what emotion permits.[35]

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[34] For an early and forceful discussion of this point see, D. O. Hebb and W. R. Thompson, "Emotion and Society" in Leon Bramson and George Goethals, eds., *War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology and Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 45–64.

[35] Seeburger, "Blind Sight and Brute Feeling" p. 55.

This chapter has laid out basic definitions and processes. The next two chapters expand on each emotion through conceptual clarification, connection of the basic hypothesis to the ethnic conflict literature, and, in some cases, additional hypotheses.

6

In the Wake of Barbarossa

On the 22nd of June, 1941, the Germans launched a blitzkrieg war into Soviet territory. Avoiding urban areas, reconnaissance detachments rushed ahead moving at speeds of up to twenty-five miles per hour. A column of mechanized infantry and artillery followed.[1] Thus began the war on the Eastern Front – the largest and most brutal battle of modern history ending only after the deaths of tens of millions of human beings.

While the main event was the mechanized war fought mainly by Germans and Russians, many highly significant sideshows occurred among other peoples and nationalities. This chapter covers one of them: violence in the Baltic states and eastern Poland in the anarchic days of the last week of June 1941. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided northern Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Germans. Stalin's regime incorporated the eastern half of Poland (henceforth called Poland B) in 1939 and then annexed the Baltic states in 1940. This ethnically diverse region thus encountered a rapidly changing political environment moving in a short period of time from independent states to Soviet occupation and then German occupation.

This project aims to isolate the effects of mass-based emotion on ethnic violence. There is perhaps no better period in twentieth century Europe to isolate this force than in the days immediately following the launch of Barbarossa. These few days approximated a Hobbesian state of anarchy with a thorough disintegration of social and political control. The Soviet occupation had done much to wipe out the longstanding elites and organization of independent Lithuania. In two sizable and merciless waves, the

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[1] Perhaps the best book on Operation Barbarossa is Alan Clark's *Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941–45* (New York: Quill, 1965).

Soviets killed or deported most identifiable political leaders of the independence period. The newly installed Soviet leadership fled, if it was fortunate enough to escape being killed by the locals. Given the speed of blitzkrieg warfare, political control lagged behind military victory; the Germans would not establish any semblance of control for several days, and full control would take even longer. In short, a rapid lifting of constraints produced masses of leaderless individuals milling around in the streets, celebrating the end of the hated Soviet occupation, looking to even scores with collaborators – and most relevant to this project, sometimes looking to commit violence against other ethnicities. Most critically, the variation in this ethnic violence was sometimes striking.

Lithuanians, Jews, and June 1941

During the World War II German occupation, roughly 200,000 of Lithuania's 240,000 Jews would perish. As is well known, elements of the Lithuanian population took advantage of the chaos in the opening days of the German-Soviet war to engage in pogroms against Jews after the Soviets had been routed but before the Germans took control. Commonly cited figures put the number of Jewish dead, in Kaunas alone, during this brief period at about 3,800.[2]

[2] This figure is mentioned by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, among others. Goldhagen's account, however, like many others, attributes too much control and initiative to the Germans and is misleading. See Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), pp. 151, 191–92. Zvi Gitelman provides a figure of seven to eight thousand Jewish deaths in all of Lithuania during the initial days of German occupation. See Zvi Gitelman, "The Soviet Union" in David S. Wyman, ed., *The World Reacts to the Holocaust* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 305.

    This event has been a relatively recent subject of controversy. See particularly, Benjamin Frankel and Brian D. Kux, "Recalling the Dark Past of Lithuanian Nationalism" *Los Angeles Times*, April 29, 1990, p. M2. This article brought numerous letters of reply published in the May 5 *Los Angeles Times*. Some responses went unpublished. One unpublished letter, "An Open Response to the Editorial Board of the *Los Angeles Times*, written by the Lithuanian Research and Studies Center of Chicago, questions Frankel and Kux's selective use of SS documents. Additionally, in the immediate aftermath of Lithuanian independence, *The New York Times* published several articles concerning possible amnesties to former Nazi collaborators which included references to the June 1941 events. On September 5, 1991, the *Times* ran a front page story entitled "Lithuania Starts to Wipe Out Convictions for War Crimes" and followed up on the story in proceeding editions. In the same paper on September 10, A. M. Rosenthal commented on Lithuania in an editorial entitled "Absolutions for Killers" (p. A19) and the *Times* editorial board itself followed with its own view on September 14. Alan Dershowitz also weighed in on the issue in his *Contrary to Popular Opinion* (New York: Pharos Books, 1992), p. 338–40.

The pogrom involved more than just killing Jews – at times the persecution took on the aura of public humiliation.[3] One of the most infamous such events was the slaughter at Lietukis garage on Vytautas Prospect in Kaunas. There, apparently in the presence of onlookers, Jews were forced to clean manure from the floor with their bare hands and then were beaten with shovels, crowbars, and pipes. Water hoses were shoved in mouths and turned on as a form of torture. When one group of Jews had died, another

On the scholarly side, Tomas Venclova's "Jews and Lithuanians" *Cross Currents* 8 (1989): 55–73, is a key piece. For an excellent article on Polish-Jewish relations of the same time, see Jan T. Gross, "Polish-Jewish Relations During the War: An Interpretation" *European Journal of Sociology* 27 (1986): 199–214.

    The most recent work centering on these events are two articles found in Zvi Gitelman, ed., *Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997). See Sara Shner-Neshamit, "Jewish-Lithuanian Relations during World War II: History and Rhetoric" pp. 167–85 and Sima Ycikas, "Lithuanian-Jewish Relations in the Shadow of the Holocaust" pp. 185–213.

    The first discussions of the days immediately after Barbarossa were held in Munich in 1947. Much of the debate, especially Jewish charges of Lithuanian collaboration with Nazis and Lithuanian countercharges of Jewish collaboration with the Soviets, has remained the same for fifty years.

[3] Three separate memoirists describe nearly identical events: Avraham Tory, *Surviving the Holocaust: The Kovno Ghetto Diary* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 9; Frieda Frome, *Some Dare to Dream: Frieda Frome's Escape from Lithuania* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1988), pp. 24–25; Walter Mishell, *Kaddish for Kovno: Life and Death in a Lithuanian Village, 1941–1945* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 1988), pp. 18–19. A few comments about the reports of SS commanders, an alternative source of information on these events, should be made. I am familiar with the reports of SS commander Stahlecker who led Einsatzgruppe A, and those of Karl Jager, chief of Einsatzkommando 3. The problem with these reports are twofold. First, they are contradictory; second, they may have been written with certain political motivations in mind. For instance, in the aforementioned article by Frankel and Kux (see the first footnote), the authors state "Internal SS memos marveled at what they called the Lithuanian 'self-cleaning action.'" Yet, at another point in these documents, Stahlecker writes "It was astonishingly difficult at first to set into motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews." Arno Mayer, in *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The Final Solution in History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), also recognizes that Stahlecker and Jager may have had motivations to "spin" their accounts of the June 1941 in a certain way. Mayer, recognizing the fact that Stahlecker and Jager claimed a great deal of credit for the Lithuanian actions (contrary to Lithuanian "self-cleansing") but not believing them, speculates on reasons they had for inaccurate reporting: "Since by the time they drafted their reports the brutalization of war, including the mass killings of Jews, was official policy, probably both Stahlecker and Jager claimed excessive credit for what the Lithuanians were inclined and able to do on their own, especially as there was neither army nor police to restrain them (p. 259)." I would prefer not to speculate on the motivations and possible inaccurate reporting of these SS commanders, and don't feel it necessary given the consistency of the memoirs of Jewish survivors.

group of Jews was forced to clean up the mess before being executed themselves. Several times during the pogrom, religious Jews had their beards publically shaved, jerked, or set on fire.

There is some debate about the organization of these pogroms. The Lithuanian Activist Front, with contacts in Berlin, did plan and organize the assault on the Soviet government that coincided with the beginning of Barbarossa. Some have assumed that this organization also directed the pogroms that followed in the wake of this assault. In previous work, I have thoroughly researched the formation of local units of the LAF.[4] It is my strong impression that the LAF rapidly lost any control over the events of late June 1941.[5] It is also my strong impression that the Germans did not control events in Lithuania until several days after Barbarossa began. In all my reading of cases of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, this case (comprising only the few days in June before the establishment of German rule) comes as close to anarchy as one can expect to see. Yet despite the general chaos, in many locations significant segments of the Lithuanian population focused their aggression against one particular target. How did this happen? As put forth in the introduction, widespread emotional antipathies can substitute for leadership in these situations.

[4] See Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The third and fourth chapters of this book deal extensively with the formation of the LAF. My theoretical and substantive focus in these chapters was almost entirely on the formation of local cells, not elite politics.

[5] This impression is gleaned from approximately two dozen interviews and conversations, both with former LAF members and non-LAF members. My finding was that the LAF never had firm control over local cells. These cells formed in various communities without much outside direction and were incorporated, often very loosely incorporated, into the LAF. Given the nature of Soviet control, with its early decapitation of leadership, it would have been difficult to form such a widespread organization in any other way. It should also be kept in mind that the organization existed for only a matter of months; it had little time, especially in the face of Soviet police control, to become a tight, centrally directed organization. In terms of personal political ideologies, the members of the LAF covered the spectrum, although my research indicates that local resistance cells often had foundations in prewar Catholic organizations – more so than prewar right-wing nationalist organizations.

The assumption of LAF direction and control is often based on documents written in Berlin. I find these documents to be a dubious source for understanding what went on in the streets of Kaunas and other towns. First, these documents were likely more for the Germans than anyone else. Lithuanians knew that regaining independence depended on German goodwill so they were inclined to tell the Germans what they wanted to hear. Second, the Lithuanians in Berlin were not necessarily representative of the LAF in Lithuania. The former were comprised of many Voldemarists, a Lithuanian fascist group; the latter were based to a greater extent on Catholic networks that had been at odds with the

As the Germans began their relentless advance under Operation Barbarrossa, there was great regional variation in attacks on Jews. The events in Kaunas were by no means the rule. Five specific "puzzles" based on variation in timing, ethnic target, and the nature of ethnic violence are outlined below.

Five Puzzles

Lithuanian-Jewish Violence over Time Contrary to common opinion today, one of the most significant aspects of Lithuanian-Jewish relations prior to June 1941 was the relative lack of major mass violent action against Jews.[6] Anarchic conditions held in the post-World War I era, but mass violence by Lithuanians against Jews is seldom recorded.[7] Even after the democratic government was suspended in 1926 the mild authoritarian government of Smetona did not carry out or encourage violent actions against Jews.[8] Ezra Mendelsohn, the author of a major comparative study on Central European Jewry, sums up the situation in the following words:

But the "Jewish question" in Lithuania never was the subject of obsessive attention, as it was in Poland, Romania, and Hungary, and no Lithuanian government

Voldemarists. Documents written by Voldemarists in Berlin were not likely to be taken as a hard and fast matter of policy direction in Kaunas or Vilnius. Third, and most importantly, I argue that no group had control over events in the immediate wake of Barbarossa. Soviet deportations had begun one week prior to the invasion sending thousands into hiding and the entire society into disruption. When the invasion began, prisoners were freed from jail who had their own agendas, there was a great deal of alcohol consumption, tens of thousands of previously unorganized individuals flooded the streets. As I mentioned above, the LAF was not a tightly centralized organization. This type of organization was not in a position to control events, or even the bulk of its own membership, in the situation that unfolded after Barbarossa. This certainly does not mean that members of the LAF did not commit atrocities against Jews. It does mean that these actions were likely done primarily on the perpetrators' own volition rather than as a matter of following orders from the LAF. Finally, I would note that this commentary is certainly no apology for Lithuanians. Its implication is that a significant segment of Lithuanian society was oriented to attack Jews. I will make a similar argument about Serbs in Chapter 10.

[6] Martin Gilbert, in his *Atlas of Russian History* (Great Britain: Dorset Press, 1972), pp. 69–70, 75, lists one pogrom occurring in the region from 1871–1906: Dusiata, in northern Kovno in 1905–06.

[7] There were actions against Jews in Vilnius, but that city was Polish controlled and populated at the time. It is possible to find scattered reports of isolated actions. For example, there is mention of a pogrom in Panevyzys in 1919. However, the conclusion that Lithuanian-Jewish relations were nonviolent, especially in comparison with neighboring regions, is generally noncontroversial.

[8] Smetona often visited a synagogue on high Jewish holidays.

attempted to revoke Jewish emancipation. Moreover, Lithuania suffered little of the anti-Semitic violence endemic to Poland.[9]

Joseph Rothschild has stated that Jews "were relatively the best-treated of the country's interwar minorities."[10]

Vilnius versus Kaunas   Compared to Kaunas and many other cities in Lithuania, Vilnius witnessed little action against Jews in the wake of Barbarossa. As Yitzhak Arad sums up:

> During the brief period of joint German-Lithuanian administration, no mass executions of Jews in Vilna nor any anti-Jewish pogroms were carried out. There were persecutions and molestations and Jews were murdered, but these were not the type of pogroms and massacres that occurred in those days in the other cities of Lithuania, especially in Kovno (Kaunas) and Shavli (Sauliai).[11]

This difference is even more interesting when seen in historical context. During the immediate post-World War I period, Vilnius, under Polish control and with a largely Polish population, witnessed several pogroms while Kaunas remained relatively quiet. The evaluation of the Jewish leader Vygodski on the general experiences of Jews in Kaunas and Vilnius sets up a basic puzzle:

> Taking into account the experience we had with Kovno Lithuania (that is, with the independent Lithuanian state) and with Vilna Lithuania (that is, with the Poles), it was entirely clear to us that Kovno Lithuania was a paradise in comparison with Vilna Lithuania.[12]

Shortly more than twenty years later, Lithuanians beat Jews with iron bars in the "paradise" while neither Lithuanians nor Poles committed massive riotous acts against Jews in Vilnius.

   In Vilnius, Lithuanians were much more concerned with solving the "Polish problem" than with the Jews. In the period before the Germans

[9] Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 236.
[10] Joseph Rothchild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 378.
[11] Yitzak Arad, *Ghetto in Flames: The Struggle and Destruction of the Jews in Vilna in the Holocaust* (Jerusalem: Ahva Cooperative Printing Press, 1980), p. 46. In a footnote contained within this passage, Arad refers to the murders of Jews along with Soviet soldiers on June 24 in the garden of the Franciscan Church.
[12] Quoted in Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe* pp. 221–22.

established control, Lithuanians targeted Poles by closing down Polish cultural institutions and trying to implicate Poles in anti-German activities. As an Einsatzgruppe report stated: "In the view of the Lithuanian population in the Vilna district, the Jewish question takes second place after the Polish problem."[13]

Belorussia, Estonia, and Latvia   In each of these cases, Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent Soviet withdrawal introduced a period of anarchy. In Latvia, events resembled those in Lithuania.[14] Again, Latvians and Jews had lived without violence during the interwar period; the Latvian government, like the Lithuanian, supported Jewish education; again, Latvians committed pogromlike violence against an unwitting and defenseless Jewish population. Scholarly summaries of Lithuania and Latvia sound very similar. As one scholar describes, the Latvians "wasted no time in 'getting even' with the helpless Jews, who had lived on Latvian soil for centuries. In cities, towns, and villages all over Latvia, whole groups of Jews were murdered even before the arrival of the Germans. It came as a shock to Latvian Jews, who had never thought that their erstwhile neighbors hated them with such passion."[15]

   In Estonia, mass public anti-Jewish action on the scale seen in Latvia and Lithuania did not occur. In neighboring Belorussia, there was again an absence of aggression. In fact, as the leader of the Minsk ghetto, Yefim Stolerovitch, was to state, "Though the Germans found their individual collaborators among the Byelorussians, these were the exception and not the rule. The dominant characteristic of the Byelorussian population was one of friendship and sympathy toward the Jews."[16]

[13] Einsatzgruppe A, Report of October 15, 1941, YVA, 0-51/57-1, p. 112. This passage is cited by Arad on p. 49.
[14] Events in Latvia are discussed and interpreted in Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, "'Inventing' the Holocaust for Latvia: New Research" in Zvi Gitelman, ed., *Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR* pp. 104–22. In the first pages of this article, Wilhelm summarizes Berhard Press, *Judenmord in Lettland, 1941–1945* (Berlin, 1988). Press, a Latvian Holocaust survivor wrote, "a bloody, drunken orgy seized the land and whoever did not raise his hand to kill, at least tried to browbeat us. No one comforted us, no one stood up for us. Suddenly we became strangers in our own homeland . . ." (p. 17).
[15] Gertrude Schneider, "The Two Ghettos in Riga, Latvia, 1941–1943" in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey Gurock, eds., *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 182–83.
[16] Yuri Suhl, ed., *They Fought Back: The Story of the Jewish Resistance in Nazi Europe* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1967), p. 153. Cited in Jan Zaprudnik, *Belarus: At a Crossroads in History* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 97.

Part Two: Comparisons

Other Minorities within Lithuania Although the June 1941 outburst followed the withdrawal of the hated Soviet regime, Lithuanians apparently committed little violent action against the Russian minority. Commonsense might hold that Russians would have been likely targets of Lithuanian wrath in this period, yet they and other minorities, such as Belorussians, were largely left alone.

Rabbis and Religious Jews There is evidence that Rabbis and religious Jews were especially targeted.[17] As this outburst had anti-Soviet and anti-Communist overtones, why were these religious figures targeted? Dov Levin states that thirty six rabbis were "brutally tortured."[18]

The Background of June 1941

These puzzles exemplify the variation in targets and actions that occurred in the beginning of the fourth period profiled in the introduction – the time of occupation and war. In order to address these puzzles and assess the explanatory power of the four emotional paths, it is necessary to outline the evolution of power and status relationships throughout Periods Two (the collapse of empire) and Three (interwar nationalizing states). In effect, the following historical narrative continues where the previous chapter left off.

Before the First World War, both Lithuanians and Jews were simply two groups within the Russian Empire, neither having the capacity to challenge Russian political dominance. With the onset of war and the collapse of the tsarist regime, all this changed. Encouraged by their German occupiers, a significant number of Lithuanians and Jews saw the creation of an independent Lithuanian state as a chance to free themselves from Russian, and possible Polish, hegemony. Jewish leaders believed that in this new state terms of Jewish autonomy could be arranged that would free Jews from outside political dominance. In effect, Jews believed that a consociational system could be established with elite-bargained cultural autonomy and a great deal of political autonomy as well. Mendelsohn sums up the logic of the Lithuanian-Jewish political alliance:

[17] See Zvi Kolitz, "The Physical and Metaphysical Dimensions of the Extermination of the Jews in Lithuania" in Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey Gurock, eds., *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union* p. 199; Mishell, *Kaddish for Kovno* pp. 20–21. Rabbi Osowski is specifically mentioned.

[18] Dov Levin, "Lithuania" in David S. Wyman, ed., *The World Reacts to the Holocaust* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

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In the Wake of Barbarossa

What seemed a good bargain from the Lithuanian side appeared no less attractive to many Jews. If the Ukrainians were not the most desirable of partners because of the fierce anti-Semitic tradition in the Ukraine (and the Jews needed no reminder of this tradition during 1918–20), the Lithuanians, as we know, were a different case. If the Poles refused to consider Jewish national demands in eastern Galicia and Congress Poland, the Lithuanians promised them everything they desired. Moreover, Jewish nationalists welcomed the idea of an independent Lithuanian state because the Jews living in such a state would not be tempted to assimilate into the dominant culture, but would (so it was assumed) concentrate on developing their own national life. . . . It made sense, therefore, for the Jews to support a Lithuanian state which would be by definition a multinational, federal state in which all the nationalities – Jews, Poles, Belorussians, and the majority Lithuanian people – would band together against the imperialist powers to create a kind of East Europe and Switzerland.[19]

In avoiding political control by outside great powers, Jews and Lithuanians became allies and the ethnic boundary between them had few overtones of subordination or domination despite Jewish economic concentration (which was probably more pronounced in 1920 than in the late 1930s) and despite any religion-based animosity stemming from Lithuania's intensely Catholic population. The ethnic boundary, it seems, was shaped by the goal of reducing common political subordination.

For the first several years, extraterritorial national automony appeared to have a chance of implementation. On August 5, 1919, a nonbinding declaration on the status of the Jewish minority promised proportional Jewish representation in the legislature, a special minister for Jewish affairs, autonomy in "religion, welfare, social help, education, and culture in general," state-paid education in Jewish schools, free use of Jewish languages in the government and courts, and recognition of the authority of Jewish national institutions to levy taxes and administer other governmental functions binding on all Jews. Similar promises were made to Poles and Belorussians. In the beginning, the chances for actual legal enactment of these proclamations seemed promising. Some Jewish deputies addressed the parliament in Yiddish, and Hebrew street signs appeared in Kaunas. As Dov Levin sums up, "Lithuanian Jewry could feel the hope for a new era of cooperation between their two newly liberated peoples."[20]

[19] Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe* p. 218. Also see John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, *The Baltic States and Europe: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longman,1994), p. 146 ff. for an overview of the minority rights and roles established in the constitution, as well as the minority role in the parliamentary politics.

[20] Levin, "Lithuania" pp. 326–27.

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