This essay provides an alternative framework for interpreting the leadership role of public administrators in governance. It is argued, contrary to the views held by a large band of public administration theorists, that leadership in the administrative state need not and should not be governed solely by the entrepreneurial leadership model. In fact, excessive entrepreneurship is seen as a threat to public institutions. An argument is presented that public administrators are engaged in a special kind of leadership called Administrative Conservatorship. Public administrators are depicted as guardians of public institutions and, in turn, regime values.

LEADERSHIP IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE The Concept of Administrative Conservatorship

LARRY D. TERRY
Radford University

> Statesmen who are unaware of the ideas that shaped the institutions currently in their custody, and uninterested in the ideas that shape the expectations and tolerances of the citizenry, are statesmen governed by forces they cannot comprehend. Such statesmen are apt to think they have more range for effective action than they actually have. And they are apt to have less than they would have were they more aware of the connections between the life of the mind and the life of society. [George F. Will, 1983]

The role of public administrators in governance has received a great deal of attention in recent years. While the legitimacy of this role has been

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the subject of intense debate, a consensus is emerging once again, that public administrators rightly share a *leadership* role in governing our Republic (Rohr, 1986; Wamsley, 1988; Wamsley, Goodsell, Rohr, Stivers, & Wolf, 1987). The precise nature of what this leadership role is or should be, however, requires further clarification. This is an important area of scholarly inquiry that deserves serious consideration.

The purpose of this essay is to offer a perspective that enables us to better appraise leadership in the administrative state. The perspective outlined here provides a different framework for conceptualizing the leadership role of public administrators in governance. It is argued that public administrators are actively involved in a special type of leadership called *Administrative Conservatorship.* Administrative Conservatorship is leadership grounded in the ancient conception of authority and is consistent with our constitutional tradition. The concept of Administrative Conservatorship has a normative quality lacking in most contemporary models of leadership.

As a means of advancing our discussion, dominant themes in the leadership literature are examined briefly with special attention devoted to leadership in the administrative state. We argue, contrary to views held by many public administration theorists, that leadership in the administrative state need not and should not be governed by the "cult" of entrepreneurship. Indeed, the concepts of leadership and entrepreneurship are not inextricably bound as many theorists suggest. Moreover, it is suggested that a preoccupation with entrepreneurship is dangerous. It cultivates a spirit of excessive "opportunism" (Selznick, 1957), which threatens and weakens the integrity of our public institutions.[1]

Next, we introduce the concept of Administrative Conservatorship. An argument is presented that Administrative Conservatorship is a valuable perspective for defining and articulating the leadership role of public administrators in governance. Public administrators are characterized as guardians of governmental institutions and protectors of our democratic way of life.

THE CASE AGAINST ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP: WHEN "DISPLACEMENT" BECOMES "MISPLACEMENT"

The myriad of technological, political, and economic changes occurring in our society is well documented (Drucker, 1980; Masuda, 1980;

Naisbitt, 1982; Toffler, 1980). The precipitous nature of these changes and their influence on organizational performance has prompted attentive observers to issue a call for modifications in administrative leadership practices (Bass, 1984, 1985; Bennis, 1989; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Tichy & Devanna, 1986; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984a; Zaleznik, 1977, 1983). The call has gone out for a "new and improved" brand of leadership, a brand that has as its major ingredients entrepreneurship, innovation, and radical change.

Proponents of the so-called new brand of leadership assert, with a sense of urgency, a need for the development of entrepreneurial type leaders who are capable of radically transforming organizations. These leaders are depicted as heroes who can rescue organizations from the villain known as decline, and return them to their once prosperous growth-oriented status. Entrepreneurial leaders are deemed extremely important as major institutions are finding it more and more difficult to sustain high rates of resource utilization and are forced to retrench (Whetten, 1980).

Students of the entrepreneurial leadership school have engaged in trenchant attacks on other modes of administrative leadership. A portrait is presented that condemns other brands of leadership as ineffective during periods of rapid change. Moreover, administrative leaders who do not embrace the principles of entrepreneurship and radical change are depicted as "merely" managers—technocrats conceptualized in an extremely narrow and pejorative sense (Bass, 1985, 1984; Zaleznik, 1977). The message seems to be: Rapidly changing times require that organizations adopt the "new and improved" version of leadership in order to survive. Tichy and Ulrich (1984b, p. 59) certainly make this point when they said:

> To revitalize organizations . . . a new brand of leadership is necessary. Instead of managers who continue to move organizations along historical tracks, the new leader must transform the organization and head them down new tracks. What is required of this kind of leader is an ability to help the organization develop a vision of what it can be, to mobilize the organization to accept and work toward achieving the new vision, and to institutionalize the changes that must last over time. Unless the creation of this breed of leader becomes a national agenda, we are not very optimistic about the revitalization of the U.S. economy. We call these new leaders transformational leaders, for they must create something new out of something old: out of an old vision, they must develop and communicate a new vision and get others not only to see the vision but also to commit themselves to it.

The business management literature is saturated with statements similar to those made by Tichy and Ulrich.[2] While an extensive review of this literature would lead us astray from the task at hand, our purposes are best served by highlighting several dominant themes.

A readily apparent theme is that leaders of private sector institutions are cast in a role larger than life. These leaders are viewed as having (or as those who should have) enormous power derived primarily from charisma, to alter organizational events at their discretion.[3] Lee Iacocca, chairman of the Chrysler Corporation, and Michael Blumenthal, the head of Burroughs Corporation are offered as illustrations (Tichy & Devanna, 1986). Implicit in this romanticized view of leadership is a coercive conception of authority that is based on domination and forced submission (Wilson, 1975).

The second theme relates to the measurement of leadership effectiveness. Leaders are considered effective if they successfully reconstruct the organization's technical, political, and cultural system. A propensity for risk taking, opportunism, and innovation is also factored in the effectiveness equation. Leaders who fulfill these requirements are said to have "made a difference."

The final theme revolves around the concept of tradition. According to Friedrich (1972, p. 18), the term *tradition* has ecclesiastical roots and is defined as "a set of established values and beliefs having persisted over several generations." Contemporary organization theorists tend to portray leaders as "antitraditionalists." Organizational values and traditions that have endured over time are viewed with disdain and suspicion. Leaders are encouraged to abandon tradition in their urgent search for new or innovative ways of doing things.

As has often been the case, public administration theorists have borrowed concepts from our business management brethren. Most, if not all, of the aforementioned themes have surfaced in recent discussions concerning leadership in the administrative state. The work of Doig and Hargrove (1987) is of special interest here.

Doig and Hargrove argue that the social sciences in general and the field of public administration in particular, have ignored the study of leadership. As a consequence, we have been unable to learn more about the contributions made by leaders of public institutions. The authors blame the current state of affairs on scholars who promote what they call, a "pessimistic view," that leaders of public agencies "make very little difference" (1987, p. 2). Herbert Kaufman (1981) is identified as a leading

proponent of this perspective and is sharply criticized as the following passage reveals:

> Whether leaders in public agencies can and do make a difference should be a matter of interest not only to scholars as they seek to understand the dynamics of governmental action and the sources of innovation. When the pessimistic view of Kaufman and his large band of colleagues dominate the scholarly literature, it also influences the texts and teaching of public policy, and is likely to convey a message to society's best potential leaders: If you are interested in using your talents and energies to accomplish challenging tasks, government services is not for you. Thus the position held by Kaufman and his fellow social scientists would tend to become a self-fulfilling hypothesis. (Doig & Hargrove, 1987, p. 2)

In an effort to counteract the pessimistic view that leaders are unimportant, Doig and Hargrove seek to reclaim the intellectual high ground by asserting that leaders do "make a difference." They rely on administrative biographies to accomplish this mission, a useful approach advocated by other public administration theorists (Goodsell, 1986; Lewis, 1980; Brown & Stillman, 1985).[4] Doig and Hargrove adopt a conceptual framework governed by the principles of entrepreneurship and innovation. As such, public leaders are characterized as "entrepreneurs" (1987, p. 8).

Given the conceptual framework employed by Doig and Hargrove, it is no surprise that they emphasize many of the dominant themes found in the business management literature. For example, leaders of public agencies are depicted as individuals who possess "unusual" powers and qualities that enable them to dominate and conquer others. They state:

> Our thirteen entrepreneurs were strongly motivated to place their imprints on the complex world of public policy. For some such as Nancy Hanks and Elmer Staats the personal style was low-keyed but assertive. Others such as Lilienthal and Rickover, were more competitive, even combative reminding us of Schumpeter's characterization of the entrepreneur as a person who has the "will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to others." For all of our chosen leaders, probably the will to conquer was there; some sought to only conquer challenging political and technical problems; while others were motivated as well by the need to dominate people inside and beyond their organization [Doig and Hargrove, 1987, p. 12].

Doig and Hargrove also imply that leadership effectiveness is measured by the leader's ability to reconstruct organizational structures,

functions, and processes. Effective leaders, that is, those who make a difference, "identify new missions and programs"; "create and nourish external constitutions to support new goals"; "create internal constituencies through changes in organizational structures"; and "enhance the organization's technical expertise to implement new goals and programs" (1987, p. 8). The emphasis on "new" can be interpreted to mean that existing organizational structures, functions, and processes are inadequate and thus require radical reconstruction.

The notion that effective public leaders are risk takers and opportunists is central to these authors' conception of leadership. Leaders are viewed as high-stake players in the organizational game who are willing to sacrifice everything to "make a difference." They are said to have a burning desire to throw their "energies and personal reputations into the fray in order to bring about change" (1987, p. 11). The organization's established value system is perceived as a formidable foe that challenges the creation and institutionalization of innovation. As a result, public leaders are encouraged to disassociate themselves with established traditions and reformulate their self-concept in terms of a new value system. In other words, effective public leaders must destroy organizational traditions in order to "make a difference." In quoting Schumpeter, Doig and Hargrove (1987, p. 11) said:

> In one sense, he may indeed be called the most rational and the most egotistical of all . . . and the typical entrepreneur is more self-centered than other types, because he relies less than they do on tradition and connection and because his characteristic task – theoretically as well as historically – consists precisely in breaking up old and creating new traditions.

Our preceding discussion suggests that Doig and Hargrove's conception of leadership is cut from the same cloth woven by business management theorists. While the borrowing or "displacement of concepts" (Schon, 1963) from other fields is a viable strategy for theory construction, it can lapse into what Ramos (1981) refers to as the "misplacement of concepts."[5] It is argued that Doig and Hargrove have "misplaced" the concept entrepreneur in attempting to define the leadership role of public administrators in governance.[6] The concept entrepreneur and its intrinsic characteristics, domination and forced submission, excessive risk taking, and disrespect for tradition is inappropriate for describing leadership in the administrative state. Furthermore, the "misplacement" of this concept is dangerous in several respects.

First, the notion of entrepreneurial leadership tends to perpetuate a romanticized view of leadership that obscures our vision and distorts reality. The view that leaders of governmental institutions must impose their will on the world to " make a difference" is a myth (Kaufman, 1981), a reflection of "poetic exaggeration" better suited for song and legend (Friedrich, 1961). Public administrators are not obliged to accept the challenge of fulfilling unrealistic role expectations that require that they become a "cross between Superman and Knights of the Round Table" (Drucker, 1985, p. 139).

Second, the entrepreneurial perspective advocates the radical reconstruction of institutions that may be performing legitimately defined social functions that are a direct product of social needs and aspirations. In doing so, little attention is devoted to the long-term consequences for these institutions or society in general. We must not subject our valuable institutions to what Edmund Burke (1790) refers to as the "mercy of untried speculations." Poorly conceptualized administrative actions can affect institutions and ultimately society in unintended and unanticipated ways (Merton, 1936). This point was noted by Clark (1956, p. 327) in his discussion of organization adaptation and precarious values: "Where a number of organizations undergo a similar value transformation, the change may shape the value system of the larger society."

Finally, the entrepreneurial leadership perspective encourages the abandonment of tradition, the normative anchor that governs the rational action of public administrators. This is especially troublesome for, as Selznick (1987, p. 457) informs us, "the rational action of individuals and groups must be anchored in some way." Consistent with views of Burke (1790), Selznick argues that rational action must be grounded in tradition (1987, p. 458). When public administration theorists encourage leaders to disregard tradition, they are in essence asking them to abandon their rational basis of authority. Authority in this context is defined as the "capacity for reasoned elaboration" grounded in the funded experience, or tradition of the political community (Friedrich, 1972, 1958).

In summary, the entrepreneurial leadership perspective is not useful for clarifying the role of public administrators in governance. The "displaced concept" entrepreneur is "misplaced" when applied to leadership in the administrative state. As we engage in theory building to clarify the leadership role of public administrators, we must keep in mind the comments of Ramos (1981, p. 61): "Any discipline must have a modicum of intolerance in its transactions with other disciplines, otherwise it will

lose its reason to exist. To have identity and character is in a sense to be intolerant."

A CONCEPT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSERVATORSHIP

The entrepreneurial view poses a serious threat to public institutions and the proven leadership practices that have sustained them. It is argued that a type of leadership called *Administrative Conservatorship* must be a central focus of a society contemplating its leadership requirements. Administrative Conservatorship is leadership based upon the ancient concept of authority—authority viewed as the "capacity for reasoned elaboration" grounded in the beliefs, values, and interest of the community (Friedrich, 1958, 1961, 1972). Administrative Conservatorship is statesmanship in the tradition of Edmund Burke, the eighteenth century British politician and philosopher, as it requires "a disposition to preserve and an ability to improve." Administrative Conservatorship is also an intellectual progeny of the institution school in sociology, particularly as manifest by Philip Selznick (1952, 1957).

The term *Conservatorship* was coined to characterize an administrative leadership role that has been seriously neglected by past organization theorists.[7] The term is derived from the Latin word *conservare,* meaning to preserve. Someone who engages in the act of preserving is defined as a conservator. More specifically, a conservator is a guardian, someone who conserves or preserves from injury, violation or infraction. From an institutional perspective, Administrative Conservatorship is a dynamic process of strengthening and preserving an institution's special capabilities, its proficiency, and thereby its integrity, so that it may perform a desired social function.

Administrative Conservatorship is not an attempt to preserve a comfortable or static state. Selective adaptation to changing circumstances is obviously an ongoing necessity. As prudently stated by Selznick (1957, p. 149), "To the essentially conservative posture of the responsible leader we must add a concern for change and reconstruction."[8]

Administrative Conservatorship is also not a process that concentrates solely on fulfilling the needs of organizational members, as it is linked to much broader considerations. Properly conceptualized, Administrative Conservatorship is the willingness of administrative elites, out of traditional loyalty and moral principles, to *preserve* authority and distribution

of power with regards to the propriety of an institution's existence, its functional niche, and its collective institutional goals. In the final analysis, Administrative Conservatorship is concerned with the ever-present question: What are the long-term effects of existing or proposed actions on the preservation of institutional integrity? (Selznick, 1957).

The significance and meaning of the terms "institution," "institutional integrity," and "administrative elites" must be clarified. The term "institution" as conceptualized here is consistent with the definition offered by theorists of the institutional school in sociology and is best represented by the works of Selznick (1957, 1952). For analytical purposes, the institution is differentiated from an organization, which is a rational, means-oriented instrument guided by the "cult" of efficiency (Selznick, 1957). The institution is considered a creation of social needs and aspirations; it is an adaptive, responsive, cooperative system (Barnard, 1938) that embodies cultural values (Selznick, 1957). The cultural values and moral commitments of a society are implanted in its institutions (Selznick, 1952). In short, institutions represent the "ethos of the culture, its particular way of self fulfillment" (Selznick, 1952, p. 295).

While some critics, most notably Perrow (1986), question Selznick's distinction between organization and institutions, their criticisms are rejected for the following reasons. First, Perrow argued that Selznick's distinction was the product of an era [1950s] preoccupied with order and stability. He did not, however, address the substance of Selznick's conceptualization of the institution. Moreover, a careful review of Perrow's overall critique tends to suggest that he may have ignored the original purpose of the organization/institution distinction. Selznick explicitly stated that the distinction is a "matter of analysis and not direct description" (1957, p. 5) and was not intended to suggest that any cooperative system is exclusively one or the other. In fact, it is quite possible for the social entity to be a combination of both. This distinction was offered as an alternative to the rationalist school of organization theory that embraced efficiency as its dominant value (Wolin, 1969).

Because our society is made up of numerous institutions ranging from private industry to organized religion, it is necessary to define the type of institution with which we are concerned. Administrative Conservatorship relates to government institutions. More specifically, it addresses those "agencies that have grown up in the executive branch of all levels of government and which are the instruments of the pursuit of the public interest" (Wamsley et al., 1987). While government institutions are the

central focus, some aspects of Administrative Conservatorship may apply to other public and private institutions as well.

The next term, "institutional integrity," is central to the concept of Administrative Conservatorship. The preservation of institutional integrity is "one of the most important and least understood functions of leadership" (Selznick, 1957, p. 63). Barnard (1948, p. 89) says:

> The primary efforts of leaders need to be directed to the *maintenance* and guidance of organizations as whole systems. I believe this to be the most distinctive characteristic sector of leadership behavior, but it is the least obvious and least understood. The leader has to guide all in such a way to *preserve* organization as the instrument of action [emphasis added].

Institutional integrity is related to the notion of "distinctive competence," the special capacities, abilities, and proficiencies possessed by the agency in the performance of particular functions (Selznick, 1957). An institution's distinctive competence is developed by a combination of value commitments made by policy makers. Value commitments are decisions that obligate and bind institutional activities and processes to specific courses of action. They are "choices that fix the assumptions of policymakers as to the nature of the enterprise" (Selznick, 1957, p. 55). Administrative decisions relating to institutional purpose, means for its accomplishment, and the social composition of the members are examples of areas bound by value commitments (Selznick, 1957). Value commitments vary in terms of their importance to the formation and maintenance of an institution's distinctive competence. Some value commitments may be considered "hypersensitive" since they provide the structural foundation of an institution's distinctive competence.

The notion of distinctive competence is the core of what we define as "institutional integrity." The term integrity refers to the completeness, wholeness, and intact quality of an entity. In the context of Administrative Conservatorship, "institutional integrity" refers to the completeness, soundness, and persistence of administrative processes and value commitments that determine an institution's distinctive competence. The preservation of institutional integrity is an important area of administrative concern. As noted by Selznick (1957, p. 139):

> The protection of integrity is more than an aesthetic or expressive exercise, more than an attempt to preserve a comforting, familiar environment. It is

> a practical concern of the first importance because the defense of integrity is also a defense of the organization's *distinctive competence.*

Let us use the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to clarify further the notion of distinctive competence and its relationship to institutional integrity. The FBI, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, developed a distinctive competence as an effective investigative and law enforcement agency skilled in apprehending criminals.[9] The slogan "the FBI always gets its man" is reflective of this distinctive competence. Hoover made several value commitments that created this distinctive competence. For example, he controlled the social composition of the agency through the selective recruitment of personnel. Only those candidates with backgrounds in law and accounting were considered desirable, which committed the FBI to the selection and recruitment of individuals from high prestige occupations. It has been documented that lawyers and accountants traditionally tend to rank high in terms of occupational prestige (Stevens & Fetherman, 1981).

Hoover also created a specialized law enforcement training academy to socialize recruits and to expose them to the most advanced techniques in the field of law enforcement. Finally, Hoover instituted strict standards pertaining to dress and supervision (Lewis, 1980). The combination of the aforementioned value commitments produced a distinctive competence as a highly skilled investigative and law enforcement organization.

It is concluded that an institution's integrity is measured by the extent to which its distinctive competence is intact. For example, the FBI's integrity, during the formative years of the Hoover administration, could have been negatively affected if the agency processes and activities that produced its distinctive competence were altered or impaired. If the processes of recruitment, selection, and socialization were corrupted in any fashion, the net result may have eroded (or undermined) the agency's distinctive competence and thereby its integrity as an effective investigative and law enforcement organization. These processes and the assumptions underpinning them were, then, "hypersensitive" value commitments because they were instrumental in producing the agency's distinctive competence. The strength and persistence of these processes performed a significant role in preserving the agency's integrity.

The final term, "administrative elites," does not necessarily mean or imply aristocrats in the traditional sense. Rather, it refers to those individuals or groups who are responsible for the promotion and conservation of

social values (Selznick, 1957). While egalitarians may find the term "elite" somewhat unsettling, the position advocated here is that elites are essential to the perpetuation and preservation of our society as they are the bearers and conservators of cultural values (Gardner, personal correspondence. April 8, 1986; Mannheim, 1940; Michels, 1949; Mosca, 1938; Pareto, 1935; Selznick, 1952).

In the context of Administrative Conservatorship, elites are public officials who are neither elected nor politically appointed, but who hold administrative positions by virtue of a merit system. These officials have some influence on public policy through the exercise of their administrative discretion (Rohr, 1978). Administrative elites are "bureaucrats" as honorably defined by Rohr (1978) or those "near the top" (Corson & Paul, 1966). As administrative elites, public administrators are responsible for the perpetuation and conservation of "regime values," that is, "values of the political entity that [were] brought into being by ratification of the Constitution that created the present American republic" (Rohr, 1978, p. 59). Equity, freedom, property, and the general welfare of the citizenry are examples of regime values (Rohr, 1978). The Constitution is the foundation of our society, and symbolizes its frame of mind. As stated by Will (1983, p. 79):

> The Constitution does not just distribute power, it does so in a cultural context of principles and beliefs and expectations about appropriate social outcome of the exercise of those powers . . . A constitution not only presupposes a census of "views" on fundamentals; it also presupposes concern for its own continuance. Therefore, it presupposes efforts to predispose rising generations to the "views" and habits and dispositions that underlie institutional arrangements. In this sense, a constitution is not only an allocator of power; it is also the polity's frame of mind.

When public administrators take an oath to uphold the Constitution, they are not pledging allegiance to a system of radical change (Will, 1983). Rather, they are making a moral commitment to the continuance of constitutional processes that encompass particular values, beliefs, and interest (Rohr, 1986, 1978; Will, 1983).[10] This commitment is expressed in practical terms through their fidelity to duty in the administration of governmental institutions, as such institutions are a repository of values embodied in our Constitution. It is through such institutions that the authoritative allocation of resources is made to sustain our Republic's cohesion and moral balance (Wamsley & Zald, 1976; Will, 1983). As a

repository of regime values, governmental institutions must be conserved as the strength of cultural values is contingent upon the capacity of primary institutions to transmit them without serious distortion (Selznick, 1952).

The perpetuation of cultural values is dependent upon the security of key institutions (Selznick, 1952). Security in this context implies stability, strength, and overall integrity. Ensuring security of governmental institutions is, to a large extent, the responsibility of public administrators because they are instrumental in providing continuity and stability. This role is especially important in a democratic system where political appointees are merely temporary custodians of governmental institutions (Seidman, 1980; Heclo, 1977).

The efforts of public administrators to preserve the integrity of governmental institutions affords them the distinction of being called Administrative Conservators. As conservators of governmental institutions, public administrators are active and legitimate participants in "statecraft." Statecraft, as aptly suggested by Will (1983), is "soulcraft" as it involves the "conservation of values and arrangements that are not subjects of day-to-day debate" (1983, p. 156). "Soulcraft" does not imply the conservation of values espoused by a particular political party nor does it suggest the preservation of passing whims. Rather, "soulcraft" entails the conservation of "regime values," which is a natural and moral obligation. The preservation of governmental institutions and, in turn, regime values reflects the normative quality of Administrative Conservatorship; a quality sorely needed and lacking in most contemporary views of leadership.

It must be noted that because some regimes are fundamentally unjust and even immoral, it is difficult for the public administrator to be a "good human being and a good citizen at the same time" (Rohr, 1978). Germany's Third Reich is a case in point. It is also possible for public administrators to circumvent regime values as illustrated by the actions of J. Edgar Hoover at the end of his reign (Lewis, 1980) and Anne Burford during her tenure as administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Their actions did not constitute Administrative Conservatorship.

Administrative Conservatorship may be regarded as a kind of statesmanship. It requires balancing the inherent tension in our political system between the need to *serve* and the need to *preserve.* Public administrators must be responsive to the demands of political elites, the courts, interest groups, and the citizenry, while at the same time preserving institutional integrity. Public administrators must not be weak or subservient. Nor must

they be "empire builders" or public entrepreneurs conceptualized in a pejorative sense. Rather, public administrators must honorably hold up the administrative side of the governance equation. As stated by Paul Appleby (1949, p. 119):

> Administrators share with all others in places of special responsibility the special obligation of *leadership*. They can, in all innocence, contribute to organizational practices and form elements that are inimical to popular government. They can help "take things out of politics"—or take themselves too far out of politics. They, like citizens and legislators, are capable of yielding too much to the prestige of military or other experts, too little to the politician who is the central factor in civilian control and popular government. By dealing with the legislature too directly, they may undermine and confuse executive responsibility; by the same tactics they may inadvertently substitute control by members of Congress for control by Congress as a body. By failing to be imaginative about legislative needs, attitudes, and prerogatives, they may overburden, and thus degrade the legislature. Their *special duty* is in part to help clear the way so that other parts of government and the other political processes may function well [emphasis added].

The concept of Administrative Conservatorship provides a valuable perspective in which public administrators and others may view their role in the governance process. It is offered as a means of restoring respectability to public administrators and the public service. The concept of Administrative Conservatorship is also offered as an alternative framework in which to measure administrative leadership effectiveness. Such a perspective is sorely needed, for the importance of conserving public institutions has been virtually ignored by public administration theorists.

NOTES

1. Selznick (1957, p. 143) defines opportunism as the "pursuit of immediate, short-run advantage in a way inadequately controlled by consideration of principle and ultimate consequences."

2. In addition to the sources cited here, the interested reader should see Schein (1985), Peck (1985), Kanter (1983). Maidique (1980), Spector (1987), and Kouzes and Posner (1987).

3. The term *charisma* as used by many contemporary organization theorists, especially students of private institutions, is based on the definition offered by Weber. As Friedrich (1961, p. 15) points out, Weber defines *charisma* as "a quality of a person which is believed to be unusual . . . and on account of which such a person is valued as (equipped) with supernatural or superhuman or at least with specifically unusual powers and qualities which are not accessible to others". Friedrich argues that Weber's conception of charisma is "value-free" and inconsistent with the term's original meaning. He suggests that "charisma" had religious connotations and meant "leadership based upon a transcendent call by a divine being believed in both the person called and those as to whom he had to deal in exercising his call" (1961, p. 14).

4. According to Goodsell (1986, p. 9), administrative biographies are useful for teaching history, conveying values, and instilling a "sense of dedication and commitment."

5. According to Ramos (1981, p. 63), the "misplacement of concepts takes place when the extension of a theory model or concept of phenomenon A to phenomenon B does not hold up after a thorough examination because phenomenon B belongs to a peculiar context whose specific characteristics correspond only in limited ways to the context of phenomenon A."

6. These authors seemed to have ignored the public-private distinction in organization theory. For a discussion of this point, see Perry and Rainey (1988), Perry and Kraemer (1983), Rainey (1983), Rainey, Backoff, and Levine, (1976), and Appleby (1945).

7. Carl J. Friedrich (1961) in his essay on political leadership uses the term *conservator* in discussing what he refers to as "maintaining leadership." Administrative Conservatorship is consistent with Friedrich's concept applied at the institutional level.

8. Edmund Burke (1790) makes a similar point when he says: "We must all obey the law of change. A state without some means for change is without the means for its conservation" (p. 19).

9. J. Edgar Hoover, The FBI's controversial director, is merely used as an example to demonstrate how the selection of value commitments contribute to the development of an institution's distinctive competence. Hoover does not fit the description of the Administrative Conservator advanced here.

10. See John A. Rohr (1986) *To Run A Constitution* for an insightful discussion on the oath of office.

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Larry D. Terry is Associate Professor of Management at Radford University in Virginia. He received his Ph.D. in public administration and policy from the Center for Public Administration and Policy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.