## 11 - Security and Administration

School of Computer Science University of Windsor

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### **Announcements**

Final Report

Submission deadline: Sec 1 & 4: Jul 30; Sec 2: Jul 31; Sec 3: Aug 1

• Project presentations – Next Week

• Bonus marks for paper submission to a conference (after my approval) by Aug 7, 2023: 5 marks



## Test 2

•Date: Saturday, August 5

• Time: 10:00 am - 11:00 am. The total time length of the test is 1 hour.

• Location: ER1120

• Maximum credits/points: 100 points (this accounts for 20% of your overall grade).

• Portion: Chapter 7 to 11

- Format: This is an **in-person**, paper-based, closed-book and closed-notes assessment. You are not allowed to use textbooks, your notes, a computer, or any other materials during the test. Cell phones, laptops, and all other devices must be turned off. **Multiple-choice questions and essay questions.**
- The Scantron software and hardware is used for computerized test scoring of MCQs. Don't forget to **bring No. 2 pencil** to fill the scantron sheet.
- Fill in circles on the scantron sheet completely. If you want to change an answer when completing a test, you must erase the answer you provided completely and not simply put an X through it.
- Please notify me before 5th August, if any of your assessment has not been graded. After 5th August no assessment reviews will be accepted.



## Agenda

#### > Lecture

- Introduction
- Threats and countermeasures
- Discretionary Access Control Based on Granting and Revoking of Privileges
- Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Access Control for Multilevel Security
- SQL Injection
- Statistical Database Security
- Flow Control
- Public Key Infrastructure
- Privacy Issues and Preservation
- Challenges

## **Introductory Questions**

Why database security is a serious concern for an organization?

What are the types of threat that can affect a database system?

What are the database counter measures to mitigate the risks?

What are the challenges to maintaining database security?

#### **Database Threats**

**Threat**: Any situation or event, whether intentional or accidental, that may adversely affect a system and consequently the organization.

- Loss of Confidentiality (secrecy): Protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.
- Loss of Integrity: The requirement that information be protected from improper modification
- Loss of Availability: Making objects available to a human user or a program to which they have a legitimate right.

Together known as CIA-triad

Loss of privacy: Need to protect data about individuals. Loss of privacy could lead to legal action being taken against the organization.



## Introduction to Database Security


• **Database security** refers to the range of tools, controls, and measures designed to establish and preserve database confidentiality, integrity, and

availability.









the **Privacy Act**, which covers how the federal government handles personal information; the **Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)**, which covers how businesses handle personal information.

Canadian anti-spam law, Canada's Anti-Spam Legislation, SC 2010 c 23 ('CASL')

## Database Countermeasures —Controls

Types of database control measures

- ✓ **Authentication**: A mechanism that determines whether a user is who he or she claims to be. Identification plus verification
- ✓ Access controls: Controlling who is authorized to accesses the database. Authorized to connect, login, select, delete, update or drop
- ✓ Encryption: The encoding of the data by a special algorithm that renders the data unreadable by any program without the decryption key.
- ✓ RAID (Redundant Array of Independent Disks): the DBMS should continue to operate even if one of the hardware components fails. This suggests having redundant components that can be seamlessly integrated into the working system whenever there is one or more component failures.
- ✓ **Inference control:** Preventing inferring from statistical queries
- ✓ Views: A powerful and flexible security mechanism by hiding parts of the database from certain users.
- ✓ **Backup and recovery**: The process of periodically copying of the database and log file (and possibly programs) to offline storage media, to enable recovery in the event of a failure.
- ✓ Integrity: Maintaining a secure database system by preventing data from becoming invalid, and hence giving misleading or incorrect results. Can be applied through domain, entity Integrity, referential Integrity & key constraints



## Database Security and the DBA

#### **Database administrator (DBA)**

Central authority for administering the database system Major operations of the DBA related to Data Security

- Account creation
- Privilege granting
- Privilege revocation
- Security level assignment



## Database Security Mechanisms

Discretionary (DAC) security mechanisms

Used to grant privileges to users

> Mandatory (MAC) security mechanisms

Classify data and users into various security classes

Implement security policy

Control flow of data

Role-based security

Grant privileges based on various roles



## **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)**





#### **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)**

DAC is one in which the owner of a resource grants permission on that resource to another subject, or to a group of subjects, at his own discretion.

Two levels for assigning privileges to use database system

Α	general	approach	to	DAC	is	that	of	an	access	matrix.	
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	Personnel file	Purchasing records	Contracts	Invoices
John	Owner	Owner	Owner	Owner
Mary	Read, Write, Create		Read, Write	
Sue	Read	Read	Read	Read
Felix			Read, Write, Create	Read, Write, Create, Delete

#### **Account level**

DBA sets the privileges of each account holder independently of the relations in the database

#### Relation(or table) level

The DBA has the option to control the access of each table in the database



## Discretionary Access Control..

#### Relation or table level

Each relation R is assigned an owner of account

Owner of a relation is given all privileges on that relation by the DBA

**GRANT** CREATETAB **TO** A // User A is authorized to create tables by the DBA and let us assume creates(owns) the EMPLOYEE table

Owner can grant privileges to other users on any owned relation

Ex: If EMPLOYEE is currently owned by user A, <u>A can grant</u> the privileges to user B with the following SQL statement:

**GRANT** SELECT **ON** EMPLOYEE **TO** B // UPDATE, INSERT and DELETE privileges can also be given



## Revocation and Propagation of Privileges

#### **Revoking of Privileges**

Useful for granting a privilege temporarily

REVOKE command used to cancel a privilege

IF User A wants to revoke the privileges granted previously to user B

REVOKE SELECT ON EMPLOYEE TO B;

#### Propagation of privileges using the **GRANT OPTION**

If GRANT OPTION is given from user A to user B, User B can grant privilege to other accounts

GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE TO B WITH GRANT OPTION;

User B can now propagate or grant those privileges to other users (ex: user C)

GRANT SELECT **ON** EMPLOYEE **TO C** WITH GRANT OPTION; // From B->C

DBMS must keep track of how privileges were granted if DBMS allows propagation




## Propagation of Privileges ..

- Horizontal and vertical propagation limits
- Limiting horizontal propagation to an integer number :
- Account *B* given the GRANT OPTION (From Account A) can grant privilege to at most *i* other accounts (B->C, B->D,B->E)
  - GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO B WITH GRANT OPTION HORIZONTAL 3;
- · Vertical propagation limits the depth of the granting of privileges
- B->C->D->E is possible if the vertical depth is defined to be 3, however, B->C->D->E is not possible
  - GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO B WITH GRANT OPTION VERTICAL 3
- Both Horizonal and Vertical Limits of Propagation
  - GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO B WITH GRANT OPTION HORIZONTAL 2 VERTICAL 3



## GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO B WITH GRANT OPTION HORIZONTAL 2 VERTICAL 3



User A grants privileges to user B with propagation rights, and with limits on horizontal propagation(=2) and vertical propagation (=3)



## **Examples of GRANT and REVOKE**

- Suppose the DBA creates four accounts—A1, A2, A3, and A4—and wants only A1 to be able to create base relations. To do this, the DBA must issue the following SQL statement.
  - **GRANT** CREATETAB **TO** A1;
- Suppose account A1 wants to grant to account A2(with no propagation rights) the privilege to insert and delete tuples in both EMPLOYEE and DEPARTMENT tables
  - **GRANT** INSERT, DELETE **ON** EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT **TO** A2;
- Suppose that A1 wants to allow account A3 to retrieve information from either of the two tables and also to be able to propagate the SELECT privilege to other accounts. A1 can issue the following command:
  - GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO A3 WITH GRANT OPTION;
  - A3 can consequently grant the SELECT privilege on the EMPLOYEE(or DEPARTMENT) relation to A4 by issuing the following command: **GRANT** SELECT **ON** EMPLOYEE **TO** A4;

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- Suppose A1 decides to revoke the SELECT privilege of A3 on the EMPLOYEE
  - **REVOKE** SELECT **ON** EMPLOYEE **FROM** A3; // However, A3 still has privileges over DEPARTMENT

## Update, Delete and Insert (Grant and Revoke)

- Suppose A1 wants to allow A4 to update any attribute of EMPLOYEE; A1 can issue the following command:
  - GRANT UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE TO A4 // REVOKE UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE FROM A4
- Suppose A1 wants to allow A4 to update <u>only the Salary</u> attribute of EMPLOYEE; A1 can issue the following command:
  - GRANT UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE (Salary) TO A4; // REVOKE UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE(Salary) FROM A4
- Suppose A1 wants to allow A3 to delete any tuple of DEPARTMENT; A1 can issue the following command:
  - GRANT DELETE ON DEPARTMENT TO A3; // REVOKE DELETE ON DEPARTMENT FROM A3
- Suppose A1 wants to allow A3 to insert tuples into DEPARTMENT; A1 can issue the following command:
  - GRANT INSERT ON DEPARTMENT TO A3; // REVOKE INSERT ON DEPARTMENT FROM A3



## Specifying Privileges Through the Use of Views

#### Consider owner A of relation R and other party B

A can create view V of R that includes only <u>attributes</u> A wants B to access

CREATE VIEW V AS

SELECT SIN, Fname, Lname

FROM EMPLOYEE

**GRANT SELECT on V to User B**;

Can define the view with a query that selects only those <u>tuples</u> from R that A wants B to access

CREATE VIEW V AS

SELECT \*


FROM EMPLOYEE

WHERE Dno=101;

**GRANT SELECT on V to User B**;



## MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)





## Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

#### Mandatory access control

In MAC, subjects(users) are assigned a security clearance and objects (data) are assigned a security level.

Security policy that classifies data and users based on security classes

#### Typical security classifications

Top secret

Secret

Confidential


Unclassified




## Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

The Bell-LaPadula model was the first successful attempt (1973!) at mathematically describing an access control paradigm based on two simple rules: no read up and no write down.

Top secret
Secret
Confidential
Unclassified





Read Access (simple security property)

Write Access (\*-property)



#### **Mandatory Access Control...**

#### Simple security property

Subject S is not allowed read access to object O unless  $class(S) \ge class(O)$ 

//S could be any user or program that wants to read from object O

#### **Star property**

Subject not allowed to write into an object unless  $class(S) \le class(O)$ 

//Information can be written from Lower to Higher(Ex: Unclassified to

Confidential) and not Higher to Lower (Ex: Confidential to Unclassified)

Prevents information from flowing from higher to lower classifications

Attribute values and tuples are considered as data objects



# A multilevel relation to illustrate multilevel security

(a) The original EMPLOYEE tuples

A Subject **S** (Program) designated at a particular security classification can read from database objects **O** if:

Class(S)>=Class(O)

#### (a) EMPLOYEE

Name	Salary	JobPerformance		TC
Smith U	40000 C	Fair	S	S
Brown C	80000 S	Good	С	S

(b) Appearance of EMPLOYEE after filtering for classification C users

#### (b) EMPLOYEE

Name	Salary	JobPerformance	TC
Smith U	40000 C	NULL C	С
Brown C	NULL C	Good C	С

(c) Appearance of EMPLOYEE after filtering for classification U users

#### (c) EMPLOYEE

Name	Salary	JobPerformance	TC
Smith U	NULL U	NULL U	U



Top secret (TS)

# Comparing Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control

#### **DAC**

- Provides high degree of flexibility
- Least restrictive model
- It does not scale very well
- It needs to assign trust to each owner in the system

#### MAC

- Ensures high degree of protection
- Prevent illegal information flow
- Declassification is a manual process. Someone has to do it manually



## Role-Based Access Control

- Maintaining large number of authorizations becomes a task that is very hard to do well. Other models do not scale very well.
- Instead of assigning privileges directly to individuals, privileges are granted to roles and roles are played by users.
- Roles can also be ordered in a hierarchy, where each role may inherent the permissions from its master roles.
- It reduces overhead





## **SQL INJECTION**



## **SQL** Injection

One of the common threats to a database system.

An injection attack injects untrusted code into an environment via some input channel.

Web programs and applications that access a database can send commands and data to the database, as well as display data retrieved from the database through the Web browser.

In an **SQL injection attack**, the attacker injects a string input through the application, which changes or **manipulates the SQL statement** to the attacker's advantage.

It can possibly lead to:

- Unauthorized privilege escalation
- Privilege abuse
- Denial of service
- Weak authentication



## **SQL** Manipulation

- sql\_query= "SELECT ItemName, ItemDescription FROM Item WHERE ItemNumber = " & Request.QueryString("ItemID")
- http://www.estore.com/items/items.asp?itemid=999
  - SELECT ItemName, ItemDescription FROM Item WHERE ItemNumber = 999
- An attacker wishing to execute SQL injection manipulates a standard SQL query to exploit **non-validated** input vulnerabilities in a database.
  - http://www.estore.com/items/items.asp?itemid=999 or 1=1
  - SELECT ItemName, ItemDescription FROM Item WHERE ItemNumber = 999 or 1=1
- Combine two unrelated SQL Queries which have not been validated
  - SELECT ItemName, ItemDescription FROM Items WHERE ItemID = '999' UNION SELECT Username, Password FROM Users;



# STATISTICAL DATABASE SECURITY



## Statistical Databases

- Statistical databases are used mainly to produce statistics about various populations.
- The database may contain confidential data about individuals; this information should be protected from user access.
- However, users are permitted to retrieve statistical information about the populations, such as averages, sums, counts, maximums, minimums, and standard deviations.
- In many cases, **inferences** can be drawn from statistical operations that can **violate privacy**




## Examples

- SELECT AVG(Salary) FROM EMPLOYEE where Position='Sr.Manager' AND Gender='F'
  - There might be only one female Sr. Manager in the organization
  - Despite this being a statistical query, it leads to very specific information that can violate privacy
- How do we deal with it?
  - **Prevent statistical operations**/aggregate functions when the number of tuples under consideration(Selected by the query) is less than a threshold value



## Encryption



## **Encryption and Public Key Infrastructure**

#### **Encryption converts data into cyphertext**

Performed by applying an encryption algorithm to data using a prespecified encryption key

Resulting data must be decrypted using adecryption key to recover original data

#### **Data Encryption Standard (DES)**

Developed by the U.S. Government for use by the general public

#### **Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)**

More difficult to crack

#### **Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)**

It is frequently used to encrypt data transferred over the internet and depends on a public key to do so.



# Encryption and Public Key Infrastructures (cont'd.)

#### Symmetric key algorithms

Also called secret key algorithms. Need for sharing the secret key

Can apply some function to a user-supplied password string at both sender and receiver

#### **Public key encryption (Asymmetric)**

Involves public key and private key Private key is not transmitted

Two keys related mathematically

Very difficult to derive private key from public key



## Encryption and Public Key Infrastructures..

#### Public (asymmetric) key encryption steps

Each user generates a pair of keys to be used for encryption and decryption of messages

Each user places public key in a public register or other accessible file

Keeps the other key private

Sender encrypts message using receiver's public key

Receiver decrypts message using receiver's private key

#### RSA is a public key encryption algorithm



## Asymmetric (Public Key Encryption Ex:)

- Communication between A and B (Bi-directional)
- A and B both generate their public and private keys which are related.
- If A wants to send a message to B, A uses the public key of B to encrypt the message
- Upon the receipt of the message, **B uses its own private key** to **decrypt** the message
- If B wants to send a message to A, B uses the public key of A to encrypt the message
- Upon the receipt of the message, A uses its own private key to decrypt the message

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## Privacy Issues and Preservation (of Data Privacy)

- 1. Growing challenges for database security
- 2. Limit performing large-scale mining and analysis
- 3. Central warehouses for vital information Violating security could expose all data
- 4. Distributed data mining algorithms can be more secured
- 5. Remove identity information from released data
- 6. Mobile device privacy and access control

## Challenges to Maintaining Database Security

#### **Data quality**

Quality stamps

Application-level recovery techniques to automatically repair incorrect data (Out-dated Data)

#### Intellectual property rights

Digital watermarking techniques can be used to provide copyright protection, tamper detection, traitor tracing, maintaining integrity of relational data. Hence it can increase data security.



## Challenges to Maintaining Database Security..

Database survivability //Databases must have at least minimum functionality in the event of an attack, and make attempts to repair and recover:

Confinement

Damage assessment

Reconfiguration

Repair

Fault treatment



## **Conclusion and Summary**

- Introduction
- Discretionary Access Control Based on Granting and Revoking of Privileges
- Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Access Control for Multilevel Security
- SQL Injection
- Statistical Database Security
- Flow Control
- Public Key Infrastructure
- Privacy Issues and Preservation
- Challenges to Maintaining Database Security



## **Any Questions**

