# Online Satta VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND PENETRATION TESTING MOBILE APPLICATION TESTING REPORT

# **Business Confidential**

Test Started on: August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2021 Reporting Date: August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2021

Project: Online Satta

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# **CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT**

This document is the exclusive property of online sattaand Abhishek Joshi . This document contains proprietary and confidential information. Duplication, redistribution, or use, in whole or in part, in any form, requires consent of both online satta and Abhishek Joshi.

Abhishek Joshi may share this document with auditors under non-disclosure agreements to demonstrate penetration testing requirement compliance.

# **DISCLAIMER**

A penetration test is considered a snapshot in time. The findings and recommendations reflect the information gathered during the assessment and not any changes or modifications made outside of that period.

Time-limited engagements do not allow for a full evaluation of all security controls. Abhishek Joshi prioritized the assessment to identify the weakest security controls an attacker would exploit. Abhishek Joshi recommends conducting similar assessments on an annual basis.

# CONTACT INFORMATION

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Zeriii Solulions	HR Zeilii Solutions	Email: <u>zehnsolutions@gmail.com</u>	
Abhishek Joshi			
Abhishek Joshi	Penetration Tester	Office: +91 8788295760	
ADMISHER JUSHI	Penetration rester	Email: <u>abhishekjoshi266@gmail.com</u>	

# ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

From August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2021 to August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2019, online sattaengaged Abhishek Joshi to evaluate the security posture of its Mobile Application to current industry best practices that included an external penetration test. All testing performed is based on the NIST *SP 800-115 Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, OWASP Testing and customized testing frameworks*.


Phases of penetration testing activities include the following:

Planning – Customer goals are gathered and rules of engagement obtained.

Discovery – Perform scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities, weak areas, and exploits.

Attack – Confirm potential vulnerabilities through exploitation and perform additional discovery upon new access.

Reporting – Document all found vulnerabilities and exploits, failed attempts, and company strengths and weaknesses.



# ASSESSMENT COMPONENTS

#### **External Penetration Test**

Abhishek Joshi, Pentester attempts to gather sensitive information through open-source intelligence (OSINT), including employee information, historical breached passwords, and more that can be leveraged against external Paths to gain internal network access. The engineer also performs scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities in hopes of exploitation.

# **FINDING SEVERITY RATINGS**

The following table defines levels of severity and corresponding CVSS score range that are used throughout the document to assess vulnerability and risk impact.

Severity	CVSS V3 Score Range	Definition
Critical	9.0-10.0	Exploitation is straightforward and usually results in Path-level compromise. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch immediately.
High	7.0-8.9	Exploitation is more difficult but could cause elevated privileges and potentially a loss of data or downtime. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch as soon as possible.
Moderate	4.0-6.9	Vulnerabilities exist but are not exploitable or require extra steps such as social engineering. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch after high-priority issues have been resolved.
Low	0.1-3.9	Vulnerabilities are non-exploitable but would reduce an organization's attack surface. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch during the next maintenance window.
Informational	N/A	No vulnerability exists. Additional information is provided regarding items noticed during testing, strong controls, and additional documentation.

# **SCOPE**

Assessment	Details
External Penetration Test	onlinesattabet.apk

# **Scope Exclusions**

Per client request, Abhishek Joshi did not perform any Denial of Service attacks during testing.online sattais a vulnerable machine, I have to gather all the flags

# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Abhishek Joshi evaluated online satta's Mobile Application for Penetration testing from August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2021 to August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2021. By leveraging a series of attacks, Abhishek Joshi found critical level vulnerabilities. It is highly recommended that online sattanotices these vulnerabilities as soon as possible.

# **Manifest Analysis and Permission:**

Step	Vulnerabilities
1	Clear Text Traffic is Enabled for Application
2	Service Not-Protected in Application
3	Broadcast Receiver is Found
4	Broadcast Receiver Protection-level
5	Activity is Not-Protected

# **Code Analysis:**

Step	Vulnerabilities
1	Improper Nutralization cause SQL Injection
2	Weak Random Number Generator (RNG)
3	Files may contain hardcoded sensitive information like usernames, passwords, keys etc
4	Weak Cryptography use md5
5	Oracle attack
9	Internal IP Disclouse
10	Javascript enabled in Webview xxs injection possible
11	Webview enables DOM Storage

# **Quark Analysis:**

Step	Vulnerabilities
1	Connect to a URL and read data from it
2	Get last known location of the device
3	Read sensitive data(SMS, CALLLOG, etc)

VULNERABILITIES WITH IMPACT The following chart illustrates the vulnerabilities found by impact:	
PENETRATION TEST FINDINGS ON MANIFEST & PERMISSIONS	

**Clear text Traffic is enabled for Application(High)** 

Description:	The application intends to use clear text network traffic, such as clear text HTTP, FTP stacks, DownloadManager and MediaPlayer. The default value for applications that target API level 27 or lower is "True". The default value for applications that target API level 28 or Higher default to "False".  The key reason for avoiding clear text traffic is a lack of confidentiality, authenticity, and protection against tempering
Impact:	A network attacker can do sniffing and eavesdrop on transmitted data and also modify it without being detected.
Path:	android:usesCleartextTraffic=True
References:	https://support.vuplex.com/articles/how-to-enable-cleartext-traffic-on-android

#### **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

abhishek jsohi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	Satta Bet
Vector:	Sniffing
Action:	~Traffic should be encrypted. ~Apply SSL certifications. ~SSL-TLS should be upto-date.

**Service Not-Protected in Application(High)** 

Description:	Service is found to be shared with other applications on the device, therefore leaving it accessible to any other application on the device. The presence of intent-filter indicates that the service is explicitly exported.
Impact:	Ways to exploit this issue may vary, depending on the intent of the attacker  If the user is logged in malicious application can display pop-ups in the shopping app and use it to launch attacks. The attacker may craft the malicious application to display pop-ups that lead to malicious links or other malicious apps.
Path:	(com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.FireBaseMessagingService) is not Protected. [android:exported=true]  (com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.FirebaseInstantId) is not Protected. An intent-filter exists.  (com.google.firebase.messaging.FirebaseMessagingService) is not Protected. [android:exported=true]  (com.google.firebase.iid.FirebaseInstanceIdService) is not Protected. [android:exported=true]
References:	https://github.com/aws-amplify/amplify-js/issues/5283

## **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

abhishek jsohi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	Satta Bet
Vector:	Service
Action:	-Service should be protected.

-Do not implement intent-filter.

#### **Broadcast Receiver is Found(High)**

Broadcast Receiver is a canalinging	
Description:	A broadcast receiver is found to be shared with other
	applications on the device, therefore, leaving it accessible to
	any other applications on the device.
Impact:	The presence of the intent filter indicates that the broadcast
	receiver is explicitly exported.
Path:	(com.razorpay.RzpTokenReceiver) is not protected.
	An intent filter exists.
References:	https://oldbam.github.io/android/security/android-vulnerabilities-
	<u>insecurebank-broadcast-receivers</u>
	https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Broadcast Receiver
Action:	-Broadcast Receiver should be protected.
	-Do not implement intent-filter.

**Broadcast Receiver Protection level(High)** 

Description:	A breadcast receiver is found to be shored with other
Description	A broadcast receiver is found to be shared with other
	applications on the device, therefore, leaving it accessible to
	any other applications on the device.
	It is protected by permission which is not defined in the
	analysed application.
	analysed application.
	As a result, the protection level of the permission should be
	checked where it is defined.
Impact:	If it is set to normal or dangerous, a malicious application
•	
	can request ansd obtain the permission and interact with
	the component.
	If it is set to signature-only applications signed with the
	same certificate can obtain the permission.
Path:	(com.google.firebase.iid.FirebaseInstanceIdReceiver) is
	protected by a permission, but the protection level of the
	permission should be checked.
	Permission: com.google.android.c2dm.permission.SEND
	[android:exported=true]
References:	https://github.com/phonegap/phonegap-plugin-push/issues/2208
	пироли динавлении рионодари рионодар риони распиносасол 2200
	https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9528608/restricting-android-broadcast-
	receiver-from-specific-app
	https://www.futurelearn.com/info/courses/secure-android-app-
	development/0/steps/21594
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## **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Broadcast Receiver
Action:	-Broadcast Receiver should be protected.

**Activity is Not-Protected(High)** 

Activity is Not-Frotected(High)	
Description:	An activity is found to be shared with other applications on
	the device, therefore, leaving it accessible to any other
	applications on the device.
Impact:	The presence of the intent filter indicates that the activity is
	explicitly exported.
Path:	(com.razorpay.CheckoutActivity) is not protected and intent filter exists.
References:	https://commonsware.com/blog/2014/04/30/if-your-activity-has-intent-filter-
	export-it.html
	https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/926.html

#### **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

online satta
Activity
-Activity should be protected.
-Do not implement intent-filter.
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# PENETRATION TEST FINDINGS ON CODE

**Improper Neutralization Cause SQL Injection (Critical)** 

Description:	The seftment constructs of an COL common d
Description.	The software constructs all or part of an SQL command
	using externally-influenced input from an upstream
	component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly
	neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended
	SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component.
	Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-
	controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause
	those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary
	user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass
	security checks, or to insert additional statements that
	modify the back-end database, possibly including execution
	of system commands.
	SQL injection has become a common issue with database- driven web sites. The flaw is easily detected, and easily exploited, and as such, any site or software package with even a minimal user base is likely to be subject to an
	attempted attack of this kind. This flaw depends on the fact
	that SQL makes no real distinction between the control and
	data planes.
Impact: Files:	Attacker can perform sql injection
	com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/cont/DBHelper.java
References:	https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	SQL Injection
Action:	Abhishek Joshi recommends that online satta:
	Database should be secure and data should be encrypted so attacker can
	not read easliy and use strong querries

#### **Weak Random Number Generator (RNG) (High)**

	i Number Generator (RNG) (Fign)
Description:	It is fundamentally impossible to produce truly random
	numbers on any deterministic device. Pseudo-random
	number generators (RNG) compensate for this by producing
	a stream of pseudo-random numbers - a stream of numbers
	that appear as if they were randomly generated. The quality
	of the generated numbers varies with the type of algorithm
	used. Cryptographically secure RNGs generate random
	numbers that pass statistical randomness tests, and are
	resilient against prediction attacks (e.g. it is statistically
	infeasible to predict the next number produced).
	Mobile SDKs offer standard implementations of RNG
	algorithms that produce numbers with sufficient artificial
	randomness. We'll introduce the available APIs in the
	Android and iOS specific sections.
Impact:	it may be possible for an attacker to guess the next value
	that will be generated, and use this guess to impersonate
	another user or access sensitive information.
Files:	com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/Adapter/AdapterStarLineBazar.java
1 1103.	com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/Adapter/AdapterStarLineBazarResults.java
	com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/paymero/PaymeroUserDetailsActivity.java
References:	https://github.com/MobSF/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x04g-
	Testing-Cryptography.md#weak-random-number-generators
	https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/330.html
	Titipo.//owestimec.org/acta/acminiono/oosinim

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	RNG
Action:	Abhishek Joshi recommends that online satta:
	Phase: Architecture and Design
	Use a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be
	strong by experts in the field, and select well-tested
	implementations with adequate length seeds.
	In general, if a pseudo-random number generator is not
	advertised as being cryptographically secure, then it is
	probably a statistical PRNG and should not be used in security-sensitive contexts.
	Pseudo-random number generators can produce predictable
	numbers if the generator is known and the seed can be
	guessed. A 256-bit seed is a good starting point for
	producing a "random enough" number
	Phase: Implementation
	Consider a PRNG that re-seeds itself as needed from high
	quality pseudo-random output sources, such as hardware
	devices
	Phase: Testing
	Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of
	weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis
	to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a
	perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not
	feasible

Files may contain hardcoded sensitive information like usernames, passwords, keys etc.(Medium)

etc.(Mealum)	
Description:	Files may contain hardcoded sensitive information like usernames, passwords, keys etc.  The application stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.  Because the information is stored in cleartext, attackers could potentially
	read it. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
Impact:	This vulnerability impacts directly to the user's privacy.
Files:	com/razorpay/AnalyticsConstants.java com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/pojo/Data.java com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/pojo/Detail.java com/razorpay/BaseConstants.java com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/cont/Constants.java
References:	https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html  https://github.com/MobSF/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x05d- Testing-Data-Storage.md#checking-memory-for-sensitive-data-mstg- storage-10

## **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

#### Remediation:

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Privacy impact
Action:	Abhishek Joshi recommends that online satta: hide sensitive data on those file attacker can steal the data and which directly impact to the user's privacy because it tends to privacy check the file and code thoroughly if there is any sensitive data contains or not


# Javascript enabled in Webview xxs possible (Medium)

	<u>*</u>
Description:	Cross-site scripting is a type of security vulnerability typically found in web applications. XSS attacks enable attackers to inject client-side scripts into web pages viewed by other users. A cross-site scripting vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls such as the same-origin policy.
Impact:	Attacker can inject the malicious script and perform injection base attack .
Files:	com.idreams.project.onlinesatta
References:	http://developer.android.com/guide/practices/security.html

## **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from Manual testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

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                                                                      🛛 🌖 File | /home/abhishek/mobilepentesttool/qark/build/qark/procyon/com/idreams/project/onlinesatta/PanelC... | 🔻
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            · *
 //
// Decompiled by Procyon v1.0-SNAPSHOT
package com.idreams.project.onlinesatta;
import android.os.AsyncTask;
import android.webkit.WebViewClient;
import android.as.Bundle;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.view.View;
import android.webkit.WebChromeClient;
import android.webkit.WebCsttings$ZoomDensity;
import android.webkit.WebView;
import android.webkit.WebView;
 import android.webkit.WebView;
import android.os.Handler;
 import androidx.appcompat.app.AppCompatActivity;
 public class PanelCharts extends AppCompatActivity
{
          private Handler handler;
private WebView panelChartWebView;
ViewDialoque viewDialoque;
          private void inComponent()
                  vate void inComponent() {
   final WebView panelChartWebView = this.findViewById(2131297325);
   this.panelChartWebView = panelChartWebView;
   panelChartWebView.getSettings().setLoadsImagesAutomatically(true);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setDefaultZoom(WebSettings$ZoomDensity.FAR);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setDefaultZoom(WebSettings$ZoomDensity.FAR);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setLoadWithOverviewMode(true);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setBuplitInZoomControls(false);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setBuplitInZoomControls(false);
   this.panelChartWebView.getSettings().setBuplitInZoomControls(false);
   this.panelChartWebView.setWebChromeClient(new WebChromeClient());
   this.panelChartWebView.loadUrl("http://sattaresults.co/web/site/chartp");
}
          public void back(final View view) {
   this.finish();
::: Menu 🔑 [./run.sh 127.0.0.1:8... 🦁 PanelCharts.java - B... 📵 [*Unsave
```



## Remediation:

Who:	online satta
Vector:	XXS
Action:	Abhishek Joshi recommends that online satta:
	-dont allow to put any javascript
	-apply filter and sanitization

Weak Cryptography use md5(Medium)

Description:	The use of a broken or righty ement of raphic algorithm is an
	The use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm is an
	unnecessary risk that may result in the exposure of sensitive

	information.  The use of a non-standard algorithm is dangerous because a determined attacker may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected. Well-known techniques may exist to break the algorithm.
Impact:	Attacker can Steal Sensitive Information risk that may result in the exposure of sensitive information.
Files:	com/razorpay/BaseUtils.java
References:	https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html  https://github.com/MobSF/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x04g- Testing-Cryptography.md#identifying-insecure-andor-deprecated- cryptographic-algorithms-mstg-crypto-4

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Weak Cryptography Algorithm
Action:	Abhishek Joshi recommends that online satta:
	Sensitive Information should be encrypted.
	use strong cryptographic algorithm

# **Oracle attack (High)**

Oracle attack (riigh)	
Description:	The software uses obfuscation or encryption of inputs that
	should not be mutable by an external actor, but the software
	does not use integrity checks to detect if those inputs have
	been modified.

	When an application relies on obfuscation or incorrectly applied / weak encryption to protect client-controllable tokens or parameters, that may have an effect on the user state, system state, or some decision made on the server. Without protecting the tokens/parameters for integrity, the application is vulnerable to an attack where an adversary traverses the space of possible values of the said
	token/parameter in order to attempt to gain an advantage. The goal of the attacker is to find another admissible value that will somehow elevate their privileges in the system, disclose information or change the behavior of the system in some way beneficial to the attacker. If the application does not protect these critical tokens/parameters for integrity, it will not be able to determine that these values have been tampered with. Measures that are used to protect data for confidentiality should not be relied upon to provide the integrity service.
Impact:	Insufficient Cryptography. The Application uses encryption mode CBC with PKCS5/PKCS7 padding. This configuration is vulnerable to padding oracle attack.
Files: References:	com/razorpay/B_\$q\$.java https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Cryptogarphy
Action:	Abhishek Joshi recommends that online satta:
	Use strong encryption method.

#### **Private IP Disclouse (High)**

Private in Disciouse (nigh)	
Description:	RFC 1918 specifies ranges of IP addresses that are reserved for use in private networks and cannot be routed on the public Internet. Although various methods exist by which an attacker can determine the public IP addresses in use by an organization, the private addresses used internally cannot usually be determined in the same ways.
Impact:	Discovering the private addresses used within an organization can help an attacker in carrying out network-layer attacks aiming to penetrate the organization's internal infrastructure.
Files:	http://192.168.19.137/billpay/checkout/post/submit
References:	https://portswigger.net/kb/issues/00600300_private-ip-addresses-disclosed

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from automation testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Private IP Disclouse
Action:	There is not usually any good reason to disclose the internal IP addresses
	used within an organization's infrastructure. If these are being returned in

service banners or debug messages, then the relevant services should be configured to mask the private addresses. If they are being used to track back-end servers for load balancing purposes, then the addresses should be rewritten with innocuous identifiers from which an attacker cannot infer any useful information about the infrastructure.


# Webview enables DOM Storage (High)


Description:	DOM Storage enabled for this WebView, there is a potential for caching
	sensitive information.
Impact:	Attacker can steal sensitive data .
Files:	com.idreams.project.sattabet
References:	https://stackoverflow.com/questions/5858760/what-does-enable-dom-
	storage-api-mean


# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from Manual testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    · *
 //
// Decompiled by Procyon v1.0-SNAPSHOT
 package com.idreams.project.sattabet;
import android.view.MenuItem;
import android.webkit.WebSettings;
import com.google.gson.Gson;
import android.coment.SharedPreferences;
import android.coment.SharedPreferences;
import android.webkit.WebSettings$LayoutAlgorithm;
import android.webkit.WebSettings$LayoutAlgorithm;
import android.webkit.WebSettings$RenderPriority;
import retrofit2.Converter.gson.GsonConverterFactory;
import retrofit2.converter.scalars.ScalarsConverterFactory;
import retrofit2.tonverter;
import com.google.gson.GsonBuilder;
import okhttp3.Interceptor;
import okhttp3.Interceptor;
import okhttp3.UshtpClient;
import android.osp.Activity;
import android.osp.Mettley.import android.osp.Activity;
import android.content.pm.PackageMenager$NameNotFoundExcepti
import android.asp.Activity;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.content.pm.PackageManager$NameNotFoundException;
import android.content.pm.PackageManager;
import org.json.JSONException;
import android.widet.Tost;
import retrofit2.Response;
import retrofit2.Call;
import retrofit2.Call;
import retrofit2.Callback;
import android.widet.Tost;
import android.content.Intent;
import android.content.Intent;
import android.content.Context;
import android.content.Context;
import android.content.Sontext;
import com.idreams.project.sattabet.DataModel.Root;
import com.idreams.project.sattabet.DataModel.Request;
import android.widget.LinearLayout;
import android.widget.LinearLayout;
import android.widget.LinearLayout;
import android.widget.LinearLayout;
import android.widget.LinearLayout;
::: Menu 🕟 [./run.sh127.0.0.1:8... 🦁 ActivityWebView.ja... 📵 [*Unsaved Docu
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                E G
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    *
 public class ActivityWebView extends AppCompatActivity
{
         LinearLayout layout_view;
Request request;
RetroApi retroApi;
RetroApi retroApiWeb;
Root root;
          String type;
String url_web;
String user_id;
ViewDialoque viewDialoque;
WebView webview_content;
          public ActivityWebView() {
    this.url_web = "";
    this.type = "";
          public static Intent getOpenFacebookIntent(final Context context) {
                            l context.getPackageManager().getPackageInfo("com.facebook.katana", 0); return new Intent("android.intent.action.VIEW", Uri.parse("fb://profile/254175194653125"));
                   ,catch (Exception ex) {
    return new Intent("android.intent.action.VIEW", Uri.parse("https://www.facebook.com/arkverse"));
         private void getProfileView() {
   this.layout_view.setVisibility(0);
   this.webview_content.setVisibility(8);
                    this.retroApligetProfileViewithis.getSharedPreferences("my_app", 0).getString("sp_emp_id", (String)null)).enqueue(new Callback<String>() {
                            s.retroApl.getProfileVlew(this.getSharedPreferences("my_app", 0).getString(":
@Override
public void onFailure(final Call<string> call, final Throwable t) {
    final ActivityWebView this$0 = ActivityWebView.this;
    final StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
    sb.append("");
    sb.append(t.getMessage());
    Toast.makeText((Context)this$0, (CharSequence)sb.toString(), 0).show();
```







#### Remediation:

Who:	online satta
Vector:	Information disclosuer
Action:	Do not disclouse any type of information

# PENETRATION TEST FINDINGS QUARK


Connect to a URL and read data from it(Low)

<b>Description:</b>	app can connect the url and read the data
Impact:	mainly impact on user privacy
Path:	com/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer.smali -> run()V com/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzhz.smali -> run()V
References:	https://blog.codavel.com/how-to-integrate-httpurlconnection

## **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from Manual testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

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                                                                                                                             🗓 127.0.0.1:8000/view_file/?file=com/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer.smali&md5=b658e2ff... | 🦁
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                                                              iget-object\ v1,\ p\theta,\ Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer; -> zza: Lcom/google/and
                                                              invoke-virtual~\{v1\},~Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzgn; -> zzaw(~) V
                                                             const/4 v1, 0x0
                                                            const/4 v2. 0x0
                                                              iget-object\ v3,\ p\theta,\ Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer; -> zza: Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzes; -> zza: Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer; -> zza: Lcom/google/and
                                                              iget-object\ v4,\ p0,\ Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer; -> zzb: Ljava/net/URL;
                                                              invoke-virtual {v3, v4}, Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzes;->zzc(Ljava/net/URL;)Ljava/net/HttpURLConnection;
                                                             move-result-object v3
:try_end_11
.catch ljava/io/IOException; {:try_start_9 .. :try_end_11} :catch_129
.catchall {:try_start_9 .. :try_end_11} :catchall_ea
                                                              iget-object v4, p0, Lcom/google/android/gms/measurement/internal/zzer;->zzf:Ljava/util/Map;
                                                             if-eqz v4, :cond_39
                                                              invoke-interface {v4}, Ljava/util/Map;->entrySet()Ljava/util/Set;
                                                              invoke-interface {v4}, Ljava/util/Set;->iterator()Ljava/util/Iterator;
                                                               move-result-object v4
  Menu
                                                            [./run.sh 127.0.0.1:800... 🔯 zzer.smali - Brave 📄 [zehn mobile apk project] 🦍 Zehn's_Project rai
```



#### **Remediation:**

Who:	online satta
Vector:	privacy
Action:	-App connect the url and read the data -you can allow the filter and sanitize the code -you can use alternative method to solve this issues


#### Get last known location of the device(High)

	oution of the device (ingh)
Description:	Get last known location of the device now days privacy should be matter many application banned because of privacy you canot allow and capture the location
Impact:	location of the device should gather the last known location
Path:	androidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager.smali -> isNight()Z androidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager.smali -> getLastKnownLocationForProvider(Ljava/lang/String;)Landroid/location/Loc ation;
References:	https://developer.android.com/training/location/retrieve-current https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/javascript/geolocation

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from Manual testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

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                                                                                                       🛘 🌓 127.0.0.1:8000/view_file/?file=androidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager.smali&md5=b658e2ffb8d44d45... | 🦁 👭
                                                    iget-object \ v0, \ p0, \ Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager; -> mTwilightState: Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager$TwilightState; \\ Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightState; \\ Landroidx/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/appcompat/
                                                    invoke-direct {p0}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager;->isStateValid()Z
                                                    move-result v1
                                                  if-eqz v1, :cond_b
                                                   .line 84 iget-boolean v0, v0, Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager$TwilightState;->isNight:Z
                                                    invoke-direct~\{p0\},~Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager; -> getLastKnownLocation() Landroid/location/Location;\\ invoke-direct~\{p0\},~Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager; -> getLastKnownLocation() Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager; -> getLastKnownLocation() Landroidx/appcompat/app/Landroid
                                                    move-result-object v1
                                                  if-eqz v1, :cond_17
                                                    .line 90 invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager;->updateState(Landroid/location/Location;)V
                                                    iget-boolean v0, v0, Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager$TwilightState;->isNight:Z
                                                   return v0
                                                    const-string v0, "TwilightManager"
                                                    const-string v1, "Could not get last known location. This is probably because the app does not have any location permissions. Falling back to hardcoded sunrise/sunset
                                                                                                                    v1}, Landroid/util/Log;->i(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)
.... Menu
                                                 . [_/run.sh 127.0.0.1:800... 🦞 TwilightManager.smali ... 🔝 [zehn mobile apk project] 🦍 Zehn's_Project rahul .d... 🔞 [*Unsaved Document 1
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            cond 35
                                                    if-eqz v1, :cond_38
                                                    move-object v0, v1
                                      :cond_38
return-object v0
.end method
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                                       . \\ method private getLastKnownLocationForProvider (Ljava/lang/String;) \\ Landroid/location/Location; \\
                                                    invoke-virtual {v0, p1}, Landroid/location/LocationManager;->isProviderEnabled(Ljava/lang/String;)Z
                                                    move-result v0
                                                  if-eqz v0, :cond_17
                                                    iget-object v0, p0, Landroidx/appcompat/app/TwilightManager;->mLocationManager:Landroid/location/LocationManager;
                                                  invoke-virtual\ \{v\emptyset,\ p1\},\ Landroid/location/LocationManager; -> getLastKnownLocation(Ljava/lang/String;) Landroid/location/Location; landroid/location/Location; landroid/location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/Location/
                                                    : try\_end\_e \\ .catch \ Ljava/lang/Exception; \ \{: try\_start\_\theta \ .. \ : try\_end\_e\} \ : catch\_f
                                                    return-object p1
                                                    :catch_f
                                                    move-exception p1
                                                  const-string v0, "TwilightManager"
[./run.sh127.0.0.1:800... 😻 TwilightManager.smali... 📗 [zehn mobile apk project] 🦍 Zehn's_Project rahul.d... 🔞 [*Unsaved D
```



## Remediation

Who:	online satta
Vector:	privacy
Action:	-dont violate the use privacy.

Read sensitive data(SMS, CALLLOG, etc (High)


Read sensitive data(SMS, CALLLOG, etc (High)	
Description:	Read sensitive data SMS,Callog etc
Impact:	directly impact to the user privacy
Path:	com/bumptech/glide/load/data/MediaStoreThumbFetcher\$ImageThumbnail
	Query.smali ->
	queryPath(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/net/Uri;)Landroid/database/Cursor;
	androidx/appcompat/widget/SuggestionsAdapter.smali ->
	getSearchManagerSuggestions(Landroid/app/SearchableInfo;Ljava/lang/String;I)Landroid/database/Cursor;
	androidx/documentfile/provider/DocumentsContractApi19.smali ->
	queryForString(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/net/Uri;Ljava/lang/String; Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
	com/bumptech/glide/load/data/MediaStoreThumbFetcher\$VideoThumbnail Query.smali ->
	queryPath(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/net/Uri;)Landroid/database/Cursor;
	androidx/documentfile/provider/DocumentsContractApi19.smali ->
	queryForLong(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/net/Uri;Ljava/lang/String;J
	androidx/core/provider/FontsContractCompat.smali ->
	getFontFromProvider(Landroid/content/Context;Landroidx/core/provider/Fo
	ntRequest;Ljava/lang/String;Landroid/os/CancellationSignal;)[Landroidx/cor
	e/provider/FontsContractCompat\$FontInfo;
	androidx/documentfile/provider/DocumentsContractApi19.smali ->
	exists(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/net/Uri;)Z
	com/google/android/gms/dynamite/DynamiteModule.smali ->
	zzc(Landroid/content/Context;Ljava/lang/String;Z)I
	androidx/documentfile/provider/TreeDocumentFile.smali ->
	listFiles()[Landroidx/documentfile/provider/DocumentFile;
References:	


# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

Abhishek Joshi gathered this vulnerability from Manual testing using testing tools with proper path and parameters.

```
Applications Places System

Applications Place Stock Applications Place Applications P
```







```
Applications Places System


Applications Places System


MediaStoreThur X == DocumentsContral == FontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == PontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == DocumentsContral == FontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == DocumentsContral == DocumentsContral == FontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == FontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == FontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == PontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == PontsContractCom == DocumentsContral == PontsContractCom == PontsContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractContractC
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                               🗓 127.0.0.1:8000/view_file/?file=androidx/documentfile/provider/DocumentsContractApi19.smali&md5=b65... | 🦁
                                                                                                                                                                  6
               .line 207
throw p0
               :catch_8
                :cond 8
           :goto_8
return-void
.end method
           .method public static exists(Landroid/content/Context;Landroid/net/Uri;)Z .registers 9
               invoke-virtual~\{p0\},~Landroid/content/Context; -> getContentResolver() Landroid/content/ContentResolver;\\
               move-result-object v0
               const/4 p0, 0x0
               :trv start 6
               const-string v1, "document_id"
               filled-new-array {v1}, [Ljava/lang/String;
               move-result-object v2
               const/4 v3, 0x0
🚻 Menu 🕟 [./run.sh 127.0.0.1:800... 🦁 [*Unsaved DocumentsContractApi... 📗 [zehn mobile apk project] 🦙 Zehn's_Project rahul.d... 💿 [*Unsaved Document 1 ..
```





# INFORMATION GATHERING

## SIGNER CERTIFICATE

APK is signed v1 signature: True v2 signature: True v3 signature: False

Found 1 unique certificates

Subject: C=IN, ST=Maharastra, L=Nagpur, O=playsatta, OU=s/w, CN=ajay bagdi

Signature Algorithm: rsassa\_pkcs1v15 Valid From: 2019-12-11 09:54:25+00:00 Valid To: 2044-12-04 09:54:25+00:00

Issuer: C=IN, ST=Maharastra, L=Nagpur, O=playsatta, OU=s/w, CN=ajay bagdi

Serial Number: 0x4c925f8f Hash Algorithm: sha256

md5: ae8b5ec62f353d52941d99cd70d0b4e1

sha1: ff6bda8ff0dcd376abf145f1098d1697a95f2aa4

sha256: 92c8f7b5d0772a2101fd35097b43c751044e23f06e1e8effc349521f45527ffe

sha512:

fe16d313076aa1191b00c07297fbdcfd20e825cabd8d152c5cbd900f319d642393647ac36f658eb

5a98528ae70716841f73a89a5c10410c45b92d0c25a46822e

PublicKey Algorithm: rsa

Bit Size: 2048

Fingerprint: 8eb91df7b271684820a0c52029d3e3b15eb1848cb12d4cabc6b924b06cc990c9

## Activity:-->

com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.MyProfileActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityBankDetails com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityWacGameProviderList com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityWacGameList com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivitySsgGameList com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityWacGameWebView com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.OurUpiActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.SUpiGatewayActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityLiveChat com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityFeedback com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityXMLParser com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityRemoveWallet com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentDepositOptions com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityWallet com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityWinnerOfTheDay com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityNoticeBoard com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityDashboard com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityChoicePanna com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityDPMotor com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivitySPMotor com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityDigitBasedJodi com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityRedBracket com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityGameHistory com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityWebView com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ui.PaymentUiActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityGame1 com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineResults com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineGame com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineBazarList com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineReports com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingGameFirstDigit

com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingGameSecondDigit com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingGameJodi com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineGameSingleDigit com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineGameSinglePatti com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityStarLineGameTriplePatti com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingBazarList com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingGame com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingGameSangam com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ActivityKingGameReports com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.SplashScreen com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.Sign\_in com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.Sign\_Up com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.MainActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.GuestLog com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.DashBoard com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PlayGames com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.GameAppC com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.JodiGamesEX com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.SangamGame com. id reams. project. on lines atta. Triple Patti Gamecom. id reams. project. on lines atta. Reports Fragmentcom.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PayrollFragment com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.DepositMoney com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentWithdrawOption com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.WalletsReport com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentApcoDeposit com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentApcoRedirectUrl com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentRupeeDeposit com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentRupeeRedirectUrl com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentRupeeWithDraw com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentYarDeposit com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PaymentYarRedirectUrl com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.MoreFragment com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.HowToPlay com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.MyProfile com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.MyMonthlyReports com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ContactUs com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.DailyBhav com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.Results com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.JodiCharts

com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.PanelCharts com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.SinglePattiGamesEX com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ResetPassword com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.ForgetPassword com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.OtpVerification com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.OtpVerfications com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.LiveResultActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroGatewayActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroWalletActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroWalletSelectionActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroUserDetailsActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroUPIFormActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroUPIActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroBankSelectionActivity com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.paymero.PaymeroNetBankingActivity dev.shreyaspatil.easyupipayment.ui.PaymentUiActivity com.razorpay.CheckoutActivity com.cashfree.pg.ui.web\_checkout.CFPaymentActivity com.cashfree.pg.ui.upi.CFUPIPaymentActivity com.cashfree.pg.ui.amazonpay.AmazonPayActivity com.cashfree.pg.ui.gpay.GooglePayActivity com.cashfree.pg.ui.phonepe.CFPhonePayActivity com.google.android.gms.common.api.GoogleApiActivity

#### Services:-->

com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.FireBaseMessagingService
com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.FirebaseInstantId
com.idreams.project.onlinesatta.SessionService
com.google.firebase.messaging.FirebaseMessagingService
com.google.firebase.components.ComponentDiscoveryService
com.google.android.gms.measurement.AppMeasurementService
com.google.android.gms.measurement.AppMeasurementJobService
com.google.firebase.iid.FirebaseInstanceIdService
com.google.android.datatransport.runtime.backends.TransportBackendDiscovery
com.google.android.datatransport.runtime.scheduling.jobscheduling.JobInfoSchedule
rService

#### Recevers:-->

com.razorpay.RzpTokenReceiver com.google.android.gms.measurement.AppMeasurementReceiver

com.google.firebase.iid.FirebaseInstanceIdReceiver com.google.android.datatransport.runtime.scheduling.jobscheduling.AlarmManagerS chedulerBroadcastReceiver

Emails Collected : android.studio@android.com photopecker@gmail.com

Telephony Identifiers Leakage

This application reads the MCC+MNC of the provider of the SIM

This application reads the SIM's serial number

This application reads the numeric name (MCC+MNC) of current registered operator

This application reads the operator name

This application reads the radio technology (network type) currently in use on the device for data transmission

Telephony Services Abuse

This application makes phone calls

#### Code Execution

This application executes a UNIX command

#### **Permissions**

Asked: ['android.permission.ACCESS\_NETWORK\_STATE',

'android.permission.INTERNET',

'android.permission.READ EXTERNAL STORAGE',

'android.permission.REQUEST INSTALL PACKAGES',

'android.permission.WAKE LOCK',

'android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE',

'com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE',

'com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND GET INSTALL REFERRER SERVICE']

Implied: []

Declared: []

apk leakes:-->

===========

[Google\_API\_Key]

- AlzaSyDFAO0clBOSZWrXuDDhc\_6LeON1A2IRum4

[Google\_Cloud\_Platform\_OAuth]

# - 320227347610-fhdc0opdpf89n1prhlmirtehc2o2flm7.apps.googleusercontent.com

#### [IP Address]

- 0.0.0.0
- 192.168.19.1

#### [LinkFinder]

- /...
- -/10000000
- /OS1/OnlineSatta.apk
- /cancel?
- /cancel?platform=android sdk
- /cmdline
- /index.html
- /index.php/api/yaar-pay-return
- /metadata
- /proc/
- /proc/meminfo
- /proc/self/fd/
- /proceed\
- /status?
- /system/app/Superuser.apk
- /system/xbin/su
- /system/xbin/which
- /topics/
- /v1/checkout
- AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding
- Asia/Calcutta
- activity\_choser\_model\_history.xml
- amazonpayment/checkstatus
- config/app/
- content://com.google.android.gms.phenotype/
- content://com.google.android.gsf.gservices
- content://com.google.android.gsf.gservices/prefix
- data.xml
- http://playsatta.co/index.php/site/chartmain
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- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.appdata
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.apps
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.file
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.activity.read
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.activity.write
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- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.blood\_glucose.write
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- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.body.read
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.body.write
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.body\_temperature.read
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.body\_temperature.write
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- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/fitness.location.write
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- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/games.firstparty
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- magic.is
- otpelf.js
- overrides.txt
- phonepepayment/checkstatus
- share history.xml

- upi/checkStatusPayRequest- upi/droppedUserStatus- version.json

# TOOL'S:

- MOBSF(Mobile Security Framework)
- ImmuniWeb
- QuickXXI
- Qark(Quick Android Review Kit)
- AndroBugs Framework
- AndroWarn
- **APKLeaks**
- RMS(Run-Time Mobile Security)