# State machine modelling and property based testing combined with fault injection

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#### Motivation

- ► Failures can always happen (network issues, I/O failures, processes killed, etc...)
- Problem: when we test our system (rare) failures usually don't happen
- In large scale systems rare failures will happen for sure (the law of large numbers)
- ▶ Goal: find bugs related to rare failures before our users!

# Simple Testing Can Prevent Most Critical Failures paper (Yuan et al. 2014)

- ► The authors studied 198 randomly sampled user-reported failures from five distributed systems (Cassandra, HBase, HDFS, MapReduce, Redis)
- ► "Almost all catastrophic failures (48 in total 92%) are the result of incorrect handling of non-fatal errors explicitly signalled in software."
- Example: ... } catch (Exception e) { LOG.error(e);
  // TODO: we should retry here! }

#### Overview

- Property based testing (pure/side-effect free/stateless programs)
- State machine modelling (monadic/has side-effect/stateful programs)
- Fault injection (provoking exceptions)
- Examples using
  - quickcheck-state-machine Haskell library for property based testing
  - ► The principles are general and tool independent

## Recap: property based testing

Unit tests

```
test :: Bool
test = reverse (reverse [1,2,3]) == [1,2,3]
```

Property based tests

```
prop_reverse :: [Int] -> Bool
prop_reverse xs = reverse (reverse xs) == xs
```

## Recap: property based testing

Unit tests

```
test :: Bool
test = reverse (reverse [1,2,3]) == [1,2,3]
```

Property based tests

```
prop_reverse :: [Int] -> Bool
prop_reverse xs = reverse (reverse xs) == xs
```

Running the tests

```
> quickCheck prop_reverse
+++ OK, passed 100 tests.
```

# Recap: property based testing (bad)

```
prop_bad :: [Int] -> Bool
prop_bad xs = reverse xs == xs
```

# Recap: property based testing (bad)

```
prop_bad :: [Int] -> Bool
prop_bad xs = reverse xs == xs

> quickCheck prop_bad
*** Failed! Falsifiable (after 5 tests and 2 shrinks):
[0,1]
[1,0] /= [0,1]
```

## State machine modelling (somewhat simplified)

- Datatype of actions/commands that users can perform
- A simplified model of the system
- ► A transition function explaining how the model evolves for each action
- Semantics function that executes the action against the real system
- Post-condition that asserts that the result of execution matches the model

## Example: CRUD web application

```
data Action = Create | Read | Update String | Delete

type Model = Maybe String

transition :: Model -> Action -> Model

transition _m Create = Just ""

transition _m Read = m

transition _m (Update s) = Just s

transition _m Delete = Nothing
```


## Example: CRUD application (continued)

data Response = Unit () | String String

```
semantics :: Action -> IO Response -- Pseudo code
semantics Create = Unit <$> httpReqPost url
semantics Read = String <$> httpReqGet url
semantics (Update s) = Unit <$> httpReqPut url s
semantics Delete = Unit <$> httpReqDelete url

postcondition :: Model -> Action -> Response -> Bool
postcondition (Just m) Read (String s) = s == m
postcondition _m _act _resp = True
```

# State machine modelling as a picture



#### State machine modelling counterexample

```
> quickCheck prop stateMachine
*** Failed! Falsifiable (after 9 tests and 3 shrinks):
[Create, Update "apa", Read]
Nothing
  == Create ==> Unit ()
Just ""
  == Update "apa" ==> Unit ()
Just "apa"
  == Read ==> String ""
Just "apa"
```

Postcondition failed for Read, got "" from the system but expected "apa".

#### Fault injection

- ▶ Many different tools and libraries, none native to Haskell
- ▶ We'll use the C library libfiu (fault injection in userspace)
- ► Two modes of operation
  - Inject POSIX API/syscall failures
  - ▶ Inject failures at user specified failpoints

## Fault injection: syscall failures

Using fiu-run directly:

fiu-run -x top

```
fiu-run -x -c 'enable name=posix/io/*' ls
```

Via fiu-ctrl in a possibly different process:


# Fault injection: user specified failpoints

```
size t free space() {
        fiu return on("no free space", 0);
        [code to find out how much free space there is]
        return space;
}
bool file_fits(FILE *fd) {
        if (free_space() < file_size(fd)) {</pre>
                return false;
        return true;
}
fiu init();
fiu_enable("no_free_space", 1, NULL, 0);
assert(file fits("tmpfile") == false);
```

#### **Examples**

- Over-the-air updates of cars (my workplace)
- Adjoint Inc's libraft (consensus algorithm)
- ► IOHK's blockchain database

# Over-the-air updates (picture)



#### Over-the-air updates

```
data Action = Check | Download | Install | Reboot
           | Inject Fault | DisableFaultInject
data Fault = Network | Kill | GCIOPause | ProcessPrio
           | ReorderReq | SkewClock | RmFile | DamageFile
           | Libfiu (Either Syscall Failpoint)
inject :: Fault -> IO () -- Pseudo code
inject Network = call "iptables -j DROP $IP"
inject Kill = call "kill -9 $PID"
inject GCIOPause = call "killall -s STOP $PID"
inject ProcessPrio = call "renice -p $PID"
inject ReorderReq = call "someproxy" -- Which?
                  = call "faketime $SKEW"
inject SkewClock
inject RmFile
                  = call "rm -f $FILE"
inject DamageFile
                  = call "echo 0 > $FILE"
inject Libfiu
                  = call "fiu-ctrl -c $FAULT $PID"
```

# Over-the-air updates (continued)

```
data Model = Model { fault :: Maybe Fault, ... }
transition :: Model -> Action -> Model
transition m (Fault f) = m { fault = Just f }
transition m DisableFaultInject = m { fault = Nothing }
transition m ...
postcondition :: Model -> Action -> Response -> Bool
postcondition m act resp = case (fault m, act) of
  (Nothing, Download) -> resp == Ok
  (Just Network, Download)
     -> resp == TimeoutError
  (Just (Libfiu (Right InstallFailure)), Install)
     -> resp == FailedToInstallError
```


# Over-the-air updates (continued 2)

```
prop reliable :: Property
prop_reliable = forAllActions $ \acts -> do
  (device, update) <- setup
  scheduleUpdateToDevice update device
  let model = initModel { device = Just device }
  (model', result) <- runActions acts model</pre>
  assert (result == Success) -- Post-conditions hold
  runActions [ DisableFaultInject
             , Check, Download, Install, Reboot ]
             model'
  update' <- currentUpdate device
  assert (update' == update) -- Always able to recover
```


## Adjoint Inc's libraft

- Raft is a consensus algorithm
- Simplified: how do we get a bunch of nodes to agree on a value?
- Simplified:
  - 1. The nodes elect a leader
  - 2. All requests get forwarded to the leader
  - 3. Leader makes sure changes get propagated to the followers
- Complications (faults we inject):
  - Network traffic loss
  - Nodes joining and parting
  - Network partitions
  - **.** . . .


# Simplified consensus in pictures




# IOHK's blockchain database (picture)



# IOHK's blockchain: testing part 1



# IOHK's blockchain: testing part 2



#### Further work

- ► Fault injection library for Haskell, c.f.:
  - ► FreeBSD's failpoints
  - ▶ Rust's fail-rs crate
  - ► Go's gofail library
- Jepsen-like tests: parallel state machine testing with fault injection and linearisability
- ► Lineage-driven fault injection (Alvaro, Rosen, and Hellerstein 2015)

#### Summary

- ► Fault injection can help causes exceptional circumstances
- Exceptional circumstances are by definition rare and hence less likely to be tested
- Exceptional circumstances are often edge cases and hence less likely to be considered when writing the program
- Exceptional circumstances will nevertheless occur in any long running system
- By combining fault injection with property based testing we force ourselves to consider these exceptional cases, before our users report them as a bug!

#### References

Alvaro, Peter, Joshua Rosen, and Joseph M. Hellerstein. 2015. "Lineage-Driven Fault Injection." In *Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data*, 331–46. SIGMOD '15. New York, NY, USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/2723372.2723711.

Yuan, Ding, Yu Luo, Xin Zhuang, Renna Guilherme, Xu Rodrigues, Yongle Zhao, Pranay U Zhang, Michael Jain, and Michael Stumm. 2014. "Simple Testing Can Prevent Most Critical Failures — An Analysis of Production Failures in Distributed Data-Intensive Systems," October. doi:10.13140/2.1.2044.2889.