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**Section:** A

Assignment submitted to: -

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Part A: Static Analysis of dd Image of An Android Mobile Using Autopsy

Part 2: Live Log Analysis of Your Own Mobile (Android) Using ADB and Logcat Command line Tools

## Suspicious Activity Observed in Orphan Files—Case-Based Analysis

During the forensic examination of the Android mobile image—linked to a suspect involved in the unauthorized purchase of shares using the firm's network—suspicious patterns were identified within the \$OrphanFiles directory.

## **Key findings include:**

#### 1. Mass File Deletion Detected

A total of 985 orphaned (deleted) files were discovered. All these files were marked as unallocated, meaning they were no longer referenced in the file system and likely deleted. This suggests intentional data removal, possibly to eliminate incriminating evidence related to fraudulent stock transactions.

### 2. Uniform File Timestamps

A majority of these files share identical or extremely close access and creation times, specifically around 2015-02-18 16:00–16:10 PKT.

Such a clustered timestamp pattern is unnatural and strongly indicates a bulk operation, possibly a script or wiping tool used to delete multiple files in one go—potentially after the incident to conceal traces.

## 3. Suspicious Modification Times

Several files show invalid or manipulated Modified timestamps—some with years like 2036, or 0000-00-00, which are either futuristic or null.


These anomalies suggest timestamp tampering, likely to disrupt forensic timelines and mislead investigators.

## 4. Consistent File Sizes (16384 bytes)

Numerous files, despite having different names, all have an identical size. This may imply: Use of encrypted containers Application of data padding/wiping tools or files intentionally filled with junk data to obfuscate true content


Shortened Filenames (8.3 DOS Format). Many filenames follow the DOS-style 8.3 convention (e.g., AFTERN~1), a trait commonly seen in: Recovered fragments from deleted

files. Files from removable FAT-formatted storage (e.g., SD cards) This further confirms that the data was likely deleted and later carved or partially recovered.




Suspicious Activity Observed in Orphan Files

Found a locked PDF file (TARGET~2.pdf). This PDF file may contain some valuable information for forensics investigation. Take pwd from mobile phone owner or take serach warrant from court for unlock device or folder.



## Cache Directory and .tmp Files

Android/data/com.cooliris.media/cache



Deeper inspection, many of the .tmp files inside those folders were marked as *unallocated*—indicating that they had been deleted or no longer referenced by the file system.

When attempting to extract and open these .tmp files through Autopsy, the files appeared to be empty or unreadable, despite the folders showing allocated space.

### Suspicious

## 1. .tmp files are unallocated

These were likely deleted intentionally, possibly to remove evidence such as screenshots, cached media, or transaction records.

#### 2. Cache folders still exist

This suggests a partial wipe, where only content inside folders was deleted—not the folder itself, likely to make the deletion less obvious.

#### 3. Files show zero or junk data on export

Strong indication that data was either overwritten or securely wiped using a tool.

#### 4. Relevant App (com.cooliris.media)

This is a media-handling app, commonly caching screenshots, thumbnails, and media previews—exactly the kind of content that could visually confirm stock transactions.

## Suspicious Activity Analysis – Office Document Artifacts

## General Psychopathology.ppt, Mood disorders.ppt, Paraphilias.ppt


These files may relate to **psychological profiling**, possibly for manipulating targets or creating fake identities.

### Child Psychiatry.ppt, Personality Disorders.ppt

Indicates knowledge or use of psychiatric materials, **not expected on a trader's device** unless used maliciously.

## Assessment NCP.ppt, Biochemistry.ppt

If the user is not in the medical field, these are out of context. Could indicate fake credentials or forged medical background.



## Executable File in android phone

## This file is found on an Android device image in your case.

Android doesn't run .exe files.

This file belongs on a Windows OS, not on a phone.

That raises a red flag—even if the file itself is legitimate, its presence on a mobile image is abnormal.

## **Malicious repackaging**

Malware authors often rename legitimate system files to hide payloads.

Highly suspicious unless hash-verified.



## Suspicious Credit Card Entry Analysis

Data Sources

Credit Card

Metadata (1)

Analysis Results


S Accounts Tags

Score

Reports

File Views Data Artifacts

During the forensic analysis of the Android device image, a suspicious entry was recovered from unallocated space under the credit card keyword search. The value 404142434446474849 was identified and, upon decoding, it translated to @ABCDFGHI using ASCII interpretation. This pattern does not correspond to any valid credit card or account number format. Instead, it exhibits characteristics of synthetically generated data—commonly used by carding tools, test scripts, or malware to simulate account records. Furthermore, the entry was surrounded by repetitive symbol patterns (4%4&4'4(4)...), suggesting intentional obfuscation or anti-forensics techniques. Given its location in unallocated space and its artificial structure, this entry is classified as suspicious, potentially part of a card fraud scheme or memory-dump artifact from a malicious application.



All transactions showing fake / no valid credit card numbers of entries

In the forensic investigation of Catherine's case, multiple credit card-like entries such as 28384858687888 were found on the suspect's mobile device. Although this number is not valid, its presence indicates that the attacker may have used fake credit card numbers for testing purchase scripts, spoofing transaction records, or probing the financial system for weaknesses. Given that the mobile was used to commit unauthorized trades and contained signs of antiforensics, these fake numbers may have been a key part of the criminal's technical setup or deception strategy.

This is not valid account type according to my search.

Туре	Value	Source(s)
Account Type	CREDIT_CARD	Keyword Search
ID	203050608090	Keyword Search
Keyword	203050608090	KeywordSearch
Card Number	203050608090	KeywordSearch
Keyword Search Document ID	4013_2145	Keyword Search
Set Name	Credit Card Numbers	Keyword Search
Keyword Preview	%+37;agm\ bege  \_/.«203050608090/« ,43468789/:/  1."\$#%	Keyword Search
Keyword Search Type	2	Keyword Search
Source File Path	/img_Android_Device_Evidence.E01/\$Unalloc/Unalloc_4012_294912_1073741824	
Artifact ID	-9223372036854767468	

## Analysis of IP addresses

Standard IPv4 addresses only go up to 255.255.255.255.

These entries like 1.3.0.0.0, 6.6.1.3.0.0.0 are not valid IPs.

The format is likely not IP addresses — rather, these are structured hardware/platform version identifiers used in ACPI/firmware configs.


## According to my approach

These entries do not contain valid IP addresses, but the structures like 1.3.0.0.0 resemble IP formats. They are ACPI or BIOS identifiers typically seen in Windows-based firmware, not Android. Their presence in a mobile forensic image suggests suspicious activity, possibly involving emulation, spoofing, or malware that includes or fakes PC platform traits. This may be relevant to case involving unauthorized transactions and hidden artifacts.


#### **Device Spoofing or Virtual Environments**


Some Android malware tools (e.g., test carders, payment spoofers) mimic PC environments.

These entries could be from spoofed BIOS tables, injected to fake system info or bypass detection.




## **Timeline Analysis / Details of events**





1. Enable your mobile ADB mode by following the previous method given in assignment 1 Step 2: Turn on USB Debugging through Developer Options on your Android device. If you don't see Developer Options in the settings, navigate to Settings > About phone, then tap the Build Number (or OS version) seven times to unlock it.



#### 2. Download Logcat command line tool on your workstation

After on the debugging option on android phone connect the android device with workstation through USB. After that run command and *adb devices / adb logcat* for live log analysis in workstation command prompt to check device are given response or not.

Connect Use adb shell logcat –version / adb logcat –help to check the existence of logcat within adb tool

```
Command Prompt
:\Users\DELL>adb logcat --help
 Usage: logcat [OPTION]... [FILTERSPEC]...
 General options:
 -b BUFFER, --buffer=BUFFER
     Request alternate ring buffer(s). Options are:
         main system radio events crash default all
     Additionally, 'kernel' for userdebug and eng builds, and 'security' for
     Device Owner installations.
     Multiple -b parameters or comma separated list of buffers are
     allowed. Buffers are interleaved.
     Default is "main, system, crash, kernel".
 -c, --clear
     Clear (flush) the entire log and exit. With -f, clear the specified file
     and its related rotated log files instead. With -L, clear pstore instead.
              Dump the log and then exit (don't block).
 -L, --last Dump logs from prior to last reboot from pstore.
 --pid=PID
              Only print logs from the given pid.
     Sleep for 2 hours or until buffer about to wrap (whichever comes first).
     Improves efficiency of polling by providing an about-to-wrap wakeup.
 Formatting:
 -v, --format=FORMAT
                             Sets log print format. See FORMAT below.
 -D, --dividers
                             Print dividers between each log buffer.
 -B, --binary
                             Output the log in binary.
                             Output the log in protobuffer.
      --proto
```

#### 3. Now I am performing live log analysis by using logcat tool

After on the debugging option on android phone connect the android device with workstation through USB.

Running following logcat commands to analysis different categories logs of android device

I. adb logcat: Displays all types of Android logs

```
16 15:32:38.693 4043 4250 I MiuiBubbleController: removeBubble: 772 reason=2
-16 15:32:38.701 2709 4303 D BiometricService/PreAuthInfo: Package: com.whatsapp Sensor ID: 0 Modality: 2 Status: 1
 -16 15:32:38.702 2709 4303 D BiometricService/PreAuthInfo: getCanAuthenticateInternal Modality: 3 AuthenticatorStatus: 1
5-16 15:32:38.702 2709 4303 D AuthService: canAuthenticate, userId: 0, callingUserId: 0, authenticators: results 15-16 15:32:38.702 2709 5929 D BiometricService: canAuthenticate: User=0, Caller=0, Authenticators=15-16 15:32:38.702 2709 5929 D BiometricService/PreAuthInfo: Package: com.whatsapp Sensor ID: 0 Modality: 2 Status: 1
6-16 15:32:38.702 Z709 5929 D BiometricService/PreAuthInfo: Package: com.umarsapp Sensor ID: 0 HoughIty: 2 Status: 1
6-16 15:32:38.702 Z709 5929 D BiometricService/PreAuthInfo: package: com.umarsapp Sensor ID: 0 HoughIty: 3 NathenticatorStatus: 1
6-16 15:32:38.702 Z709 5929 D AuthService: canAuthenticate, userId: 0, callingUserId: 0, authenticatorS: 33023, result: 0
6-16 15:32:38.717 Z709 5929 I BLASTSyncEngine: SyncGroup 4061: Unfinished container:ActivityRecord U0 com.umarsapp/.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity t772}
6-16 15:32:38.717 Z709 5929 I BLASTSyncEngine: isActivitySyncFinished false ActivityRecord U0 com.umhatsapp/.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity t772}
6-16 15:32:38.720 Z709 5929 D WindowManagerService: onSecureChanged, current win = Window(7ca5lac u0 com.umhatsapp/com.umhatsapp/conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity}, hasSecure = true
 -16 15:32:38.720 2709 5929 D WindowManager: wms.Input focus has changed to Window{7ca51ac u0 com.whatsapp/com.whatsapp.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity} display=0 updateInputWindows = true
 -16 15:32:38.720 2709 5929 I MultiSenceManagerInternalStub: getInstance
 -16 15:32:38.743 2709 5929 D WindowManager: wms.finishDrawingLocked: mDrawState=COMMIT_DRAW_PENDING Window{7ca51ac u0 com.whatsapp/com.whatsapp.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity} in Surface(name
om.whatsapp/com.whatsapp.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity#61359)/@0x11dbc24
 -16 15:32:38.749 2709 2884 D miuiBarFollowAnimation: BarFollowAnimation core services Flag is effective®
  -16 15:32:38.750 2709 2884 D miuiElementAnimation: ElementAnimation core services Flag is effective®
 -16 15:32:38.751 2709 2884 I WindowManager: wms.showSurfaceRobustly mWin:Window(Zca51ac u0 com.whatsapp/com.whatsapp.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity)
i-16 15:32:38.752 2709 2884 D WindowManager: Final targets: [ActivityRecord
                                                                                                                                                   u0 com.whatsapp/.Conversation t772 f}}, ActivityRecord{2cc6e67 u0 com.whatsapp/.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivit
[772]]
5-16 15:32:38.755 2709 2884 D WindowManager: Calling onTransitionReady info={id=4061 t=CLOSE f=0x0 trk=0 opt={t=FROM_STYLE} r=[0@Point(0, 0)] c=[{null m=CLOSE f=IN_TASK_WITH_EMBEDDED_ACTIVITY|FILLS_TASK_leash-Surface(name=ActivityRecord{651455e u0 com.whatsapp/.Conversation t772}#(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(1306)/(
onslist.LockedConversationsActivity t772}#61336)/@0xaa92ad8 sb=Rect(0, 0 - 1080, 2400) eb=Rect(0, 0 - 1080, 2400) d=0 bc=fffafafa component=com.whatsapp/.conversationslist.LockedConversationsActivity} info.get
    6 15:32:38.760 4043 4250 D SoScStageCoordinator: inCloseTransition:false pairsStartedWithCloseTransition:false isRequestCloseTriggerTask:false inSingleSoScState:false inSoScUnactivie:true closeStage:null
```

The screenshot shows **Android logcat logs** with system and app activity. Key events include:

- WhatsApp Process Activity: A misspelled package (com.whitsap) suggests WhatsApp-related operations, possibly background tasks or transitions.
- Task Management: MultiBodiesController logs indicate a task removal (reason code 772), while MultiskleinflashRepository tracks task changes ([5, 4]  $\rightarrow$  [772]).

- **Activity Transition**: Unimodemnger logs a transition with type **LOSE** (likely an app being backgrounded or closed).
- **UI/Usage Check**: BidUserInterface checks permissions for "Usage, Callers, AnthemInterests."
- Corrupted Data: A long string of zeros appears to be malformed binary data (not meaningful).
- II. adb logcat -v threadtime: Displays all the Android logs with date and time

```
80-16 17:02:50.650 2700 270:1 Talcoes : Talcoes = Talcoe
```


This logicat snapshot shows real-time system events on an Android device. Key highlights:

- TelecomServiceImpl repeatedly reports that the device is not in an emergency call.
- The system handles **foreground/background app transitions**, especially for apps like com.google.android.gms, com.miui.msa.global, and com.snapchat.android.
- Services like MR2ServiceImpl and DownscaleImpl are invoked, likely to manage power or display.

- A wake lock is acquired due to background processing by Snapchat's JobScheduler service.
- Several apps (including Snapchat and Mi apps) start/stop processes in response to broadcast intents like ACTION\_SCREEN\_OFF or DREAMING\_STARTED.
- The log confirms that some services failed to start due to component errors (not found) or configuration (e.g., disabled).


Overall, this is a typical Android system reacting to screen state changes and background service execution involving system and third-party apps

III. adb logcat -v > logfile.txt: Exports Android logs into logfile.txt.



IV. adb logcat -f <file\_name>: Saves all the Android logs into the android path's specified file.

```
C:\Users\DELL>adb logcat -v time -f /sdcard/Android/androidlogs.txt
^C
C:\Users\DELL>
C:\Users\DELL>
```



#### **Purpose of command**

- Captures all Android system logs (logcat)
- Adds timestamps (-v time)
- Saves logs in my Android device at:
- Path: /sdcard/Android/androidlogs.txt
- A text file androidlogs.txt is continuously written while the command runs.
- V. adb logcat "\*:E": Displays only error and fatal log messages.

The command adb logcat "\*:E" filters and displays only **error-level logs** from all system and app components. These logs include **crashes, exceptions, and critical failures**, helping developers or analysts troubleshoot issues quickly. It excludes all lower-level logs like warnings, info, and debug, making it useful for focusing on serious problems in the system or specific apps. **Use this when you're troubleshooting:** (App crashes, System failures, Security violations, Android app development issues)

VI. adb logcat "application\_or\_tag\_name:\*" "\*:S": Displays the Android logs of a given application

```
19 01:18:17.496 31314 31314 W chromium: [WARNING:chrome/browser/android/compositor/compositor_view.cc:376] Child process died (type=6) pid=17257)
19 01:18:17.496 31314 31314 W chromium: [WARNING:chrome/browser/android/compositor_view.cc:376] Child process died (type=6) pid=17257)
19 01:18:20.184 31314 31314 I MIUIInput: [MotionEvent] ViewRootImpl windowName 'com.android.chrome/org.chromium.chrome.browser.customtabs.CustomTabActivity', { action=ACTION_DOWN, id[0]=0, pointerCount=1, ev
5-19 01:18:20.184 31314 31314 I MIUIInput: [MotionEvent] ViewRootImpl windowNlame 'com.android.chrome/org.chromium.chrome.browser.customtabs.CustomTabActivity', { action=ACTION_DOWN, id[0]=0, pointerCount=1, eventIme=256455476, downTime=256455476, phoneEventTime=01:18:20.179 } moveCount:0
5-19 01:18:20.485 31314 31314 I MIUIInput: [MotionEvent] ViewRootImpl windowNlame 'com.android.chrome/org.chromium.chrome.browser.customtabs.CustomTabActivity', { action=ACTION_UP, id[0]=0, pointerCount=1, event
ime=256455744, downTime=256455476, phoneEventTime=01:18:20.447 } moveCount:60
5-19 01:18:20.993 31314 31314 W cr_BotControlsStacker: Using mTotalPleight before initialization
5-19 01:18:20.994 31314 313306 W chromium: [WARNING:net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc:119] Not implemented
5-19 01:18:20.995 31314 31337 E JavaBinder: *** Uncaught remote exception! Exceptions are not yet supported across processes. Client PID 5669 UID 10156.
5-19 01:18:20.995 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at org.chromium.bese.task.PostTask.e(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:21)
5-19 01:18:20.995 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at org.chromium.bese.task.PostTask.e(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:213)
5-19 01:18:20.995 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at org.chromium.chrome.browser.customtabs.CustomTabsConnection.M(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:958)
5-19 01:18:20.995 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at 2U0.q(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:958)
  19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder:

19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder:

19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder:
                                                                                                                                at hVO.onTransact(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:958) at android.os.Binder.execTransactInternal(Binder.java:1507)
                                                                                                                                   at android.os.Binder.execTransact(Binder.java:1451)
   19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: Caused by: java.lang.ClassCastException: android.view.ViewStub cannot be cast to android.widget.ImageButton
19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at org.chromium.chrome.browser.customtabs.features.toolbar.CustomTabToolbar.a0(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:14)
  19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder:
                                                                                                                                 at TUO.call(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:316) at java.util.concurrent.FutureTask.run(FutureTask.java:264)
                                                                                                                                at org.chromium.base.task.TaskRunnerImpl.runTask(chromium-TrichromeChromeGoogle6432.aab-stable-715108933:31) at android.os.MessageQueue.nativePollOnce(Native Method) at android.os.MessageQueue.next(MessageQueue.java:355)
  -19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder:
-19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder:
                                                                                                                                at android.os.Looper.loopOnce(Looper.java:203)
at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:337)
  19 01:18:20.999 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at android.app.Ac-
19 01:18:20.999 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at android.app.Ac-
19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at java.lang.reflu-
19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at com.android.in
19 01:18:20.959 31314 31327 E JavaBinder: at com.android.in
19 01:18:21.329 31314 31314 D UserSceneDetector: invoke error.
                                                                                                                                 at android.app.ActivityThread.main(ActivityThread.java:9593)
                                                                                                                               at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run(RuntimeInit.java:593)
                                                                                                                                at com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main(ZygoteInit.java:936)
  -19 01:18:21.329 31314 31314 I or=EZE_DCController: Invoke error.
19 01:18:21.481 31314 31314 I cr_EZE_DCController: setSafeAreaConstraint: false
19 01:18:21.561 31314 31408 W chromium: [WARNING:net/spdy/spdy_session.cc:3009] Received WINDOW_UPDATE for invalid stream 1
19 01:18:21.853 31314 31408 W chromium: [WARNING:net/spdy/spdy_session.cc:3009] Received WINDOW_UPDATE for invalid stream 1
   19 01:18:21.870 31314 31408 W chromium: [WARNING:net/spdy/spdy_session.cc:3009] Received WINDOW_UPDATE for invalid stream 1 19 01:18:22.864 31314 31397 W chromium: [WARNING:net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc:119] Not implemented
```

#### adb logcat --pid=31314

running: adb logcat --pid=31314

This command shows only logs **from the Chrome process** (PID 31314). The screenshot captures real-time output of that command.

## What's Happening in the Screenshot

### 1. Warning & Info Logs from Chromium

#### Example:

W chromium: [WARNING:net/cert/ev root ca metadata.cc:119] Not implemented

- These are Chrome internal network/security logs
- This one is a warning about missing certificate metadata support
- Not a problem for normal users just developer diagnostics

## 2. User Input Detected (Touch Events)

Example:

I MIUIInput: [MotionEvent] ViewRootImpl windowName='com.android.chrome...CustomTabActivity'

- Chrome received touch input (ACTION\_DOWN / ACTION\_UP)
- Indicates user tapped on a custom tab or link

#### 3. Runtime Crash — Java Exception

E JavaBinder: java.lang.ClassCastException: android.view.ViewStub cannot be cast to android.widget.ImageButton

- This is a **runtime error** caused by bad code in Chrome or a custom tab extension
- It's trying to cast a ViewStub (placeholder UI element) as an ImageButton which fails
- It shows the exact class and method:
- at org.chromium.chrome.browser.customtabs.features.toolbar.CustomTabToolbar

#### 4. Thread Execution / Stack Trace

- All the lines after the error are stack traces showing the internal Chromium/Android classes where the crash propagated
- This is very useful for debugging or reverse engineering

## 5. Performance Monitor Warnings

W MessageMonitor: PerfMonitor: Slow Operation...

- Chrome's UI thread took too long to pause/start activity
- Indicates performance lag, possibly due to the crash

# Types of Data Shown (from adb logcat --pid=31314)

Туре	Description	
W (Warning)	Non-fatal issues like unimplemented features or slow performance	
E (Error)	Fatal exceptions or crashes (e.g. ClassCastException)	
I (Info)	Informational logs like touch input and Chrome state	
D (Debug)	Optional diagnostics (not visible in this part but included in logcat)	

## VII. adb logcat -b events "gsm\_service\_state\_change" "\*:S"

```
\Users\DELL>adb logcat -b events "gsm_service_state_change" "*:S"
 daemon not running; starting now at tcp:5037
 daemon started successfully
 ----- beginning of events
06-18 21:45:41.760  4028  4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0
06-18 21:55:30.793 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 21:55:30.881 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 22:36:04.575 4028 4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 22:36:04.669 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 22:55:37.777 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 22:55:38.003 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
6-18 22:58:00.833 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 22:58:01.054 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 23:39:48.553 4028 4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 23:39:48.687  4028  4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 23:57:13.722 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 23:57:13.929 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 23:57:18.392 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-18 23:57:18.601
                 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:04:26.298
                 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:04:27.061
                 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:04:30.054 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:04:30.091 4028 4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:06:45.425 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:06:49.214 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:06:49.357 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:07:10.728 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:07:11.853 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0,0]
06-19 00:09:17.831 4028
                      4028 I gsm_service_state_change:
06-19 00:09:39.386 4028
                      4028 I gsm service state change:
06-19 00:10:01.297 4028 4028 I gsm_service_state_change: [0,0,0
```

The gsm\_service\_state\_change entries in your logcat output represent changes in the **GSM network service state** on your Android device. These logs are generated by the telephony subsystem and indicate different states of cellular connectivity.

Reason why and how the signals show a variation?
Before, During & After Call Signal Changes
Before Call (Idle State)

• **Signal**: [0,0,0,0]

- Meaning:
  - Voice: In service (0)
  - Data: Disconnected (0)
  - No Roaming (0,0)

## **During Call (Active Call)**

- Signal: [0,0,0,1]
- Meaning:
  - Voice still active (0)
  - Data roaming activated (1)
- Possible Reasons:
  - Your phone switched to a roaming network temporarily for the call (common in 2G/3G fallback).
  - Carrier might have network handover issues.

### **After Call (Terminated Call)**

- **Signal**: [0,1,0,0]
- Meaning:
  - Voice normal (0)
  - Data reconnected (1)
  - Back to home network (0,0)

### Why Did [0,0,0,1] Happen?

#### Non-VolTE Call (2G/3G Fallback):

- If your phone doesn't support VolTE, it must switch to older networks (2G/3G) for calls.
- Some carriers **roam temporarily** during this switch.

#### **Network Handover Glitch:**

• A weak signal may force your phone to roam briefly before stabilizing.

## **Carrier-Specific Behavior:**

• Some carriers **share towers**, causing false roaming flags.

#### VIII. Adb logcat -b radio: Display all radio events

This log shows network-related events:

- Your device is connected to Telenor LTE with good signal.
- It's checking VolTE feature support (and supports Dual VolTE).
- Time zone and SIM details are being parsed.
- Google Services are requesting cell tower information.
- There are no errors, and logs indicate normal modem and radio activity.