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**Presentation is: -**

**Active Directory Forensics-Case Study for Class Discussion** 

## **Key Found in Scenario:**

## 1. Initial Compromise:

- o **05:56:13:** The "OMAction" user folder was created on the server.
- 05:56:17: An RDP connection was made to the server by "OMAction" from the IP address 10.1.53.78 (belonging to the ERP Terminal Server).
- 05:56:18: OMAction registered to use the Local System Account, gaining full administrative privileges.

## 2. Disabling Security Measures:

 05:56:55 - 05:58:03: OMAction uninstalled multiple security tools, including Microsoft Endpoint Protection, Forefront Endpoint Protection, and Microsoft Security Client, likely to bypass detection and prevention mechanisms.

## 3. File Copying and Execution:

- **07:22:** windows\_encrypt.exe was copied to the C:\Users\ directory.
- o **07:26:** windows32 encrypt.exe was copied to the same directory.
- o 07:37: bat.bat was copied but did not function due to cmd.exe incompatibility.
- 08:38: bat2.bat was created to execute windows\_encrypt.exe using administrative parameters.

### 4. Encryption Process:

- 09:11:28 AM: The encryption process began, starting from the directory SysVol DFSSR/domain/scripts/.
- o It was noted that files were encrypted across the system, and a ransom note was generated.

## 5. Erasure of Logs:

All system and security logs were erased up until January 24, 2023, to cover traces
of the attack.

## **Key Events Leading to the Ransomware Attempt:**

#### 1. **05:56:13 to 05:59:54**:

 User OMAction logged into the system via RDP from the IP address 10.1.53.78 (Terminal Server for ERP).

- System security was compromised:
  - Antivirus (Microsoft Endpoint Protection and MS Forefront Endpoint Protection) was uninstalled by the user OMAction.
  - The system was left vulnerable for further malicious activity.

Record ID: 31507 User name: Omair Jamil

User principal name: ojamil@ad.\*\*\*\*\*.net

SAM Account name: OJamil

SAM Account type: SAM\_NORMAL\_USER\_ACCOUNT

GUID: 39eaa178-3cc0-4960-9e2d-99a151ba4428

SID: S-1-5-21-2595053252-3331221587-625639084-34296

When created: 2014-12-02 13:19:31+00:00 When changed: 2023-01-09 05:56:01+00:00

Account expires: Never

Password last set: 2022-12-17 20:52:07.793235+00:00
Last logon: 2023-01-09 04:40:36.933522+00:00
Last logon timestamp: 2023-01-03 18:06:29.352446+00:00
Bad password time 2022-12-03 09:52:53.785880+00:00

Logon count: 15783 Bad password count: 0

Dial-In access perm: Controlled by policy

User Account Control:
NORMAL ACCOUNT

Ancestors:

\$ROOT OBJECT\$, net, \*\*\*\*\*\*, ad, \*\*\*\*\*\* Office, Users, \*\*\*\*\*Technology, Omair Jamil

```
Record ID:
                        29226
                        Adnan Aslam
User name:
User principal name: AAslam@ad.*****.net
SAM Account name:
                        SAM NORMAL USER ACCOUNT
SAM Account type:
GUID:
                        9533be35-a722-4813-bf21-ebf16dbf71a7
SID:
                        S-1-5-21-2595053252-3331221587-625639084-17834
When created:
                       2011-05-30 06:06:11+00:00
When created: 2011-05-30 06:06:11+00:00 When changed: 2023-01-10 10:31:43+00:00
Account expires: Never
Password last set: 2022-12-19 04:00:34.429185+00:00
                       2023-01-09 05:56:15.480020+00:00
 Last logon:
Last logon timestamp: 2023-01-01 22:12:44.262154+00:00
Bad password time
                        2022-12-28 06:39:33.954134+00:00
Logon count:
Bad password count: 0
Dial-In access perm: Controlled by policy
User Account Control:
         NORMAL_ACCOUNT
Ancestors:
         $ROOT_OBJECT$...pet. ****** and service Office, Users unInforechnology. Adman Aslam
Record ID:
User name:
                       SCOM Action Account
User principal name: OMAction@ad.*****.net
SAM Account name: OMAction
SAM Account type: SAM_NORMAL_USER_ACCOUNT
GUID:
                    db6021a4-9f10-4a6a-9f63-fa1e572dd6f0
When created: 2011-12-26 12:04:57+00:00
When changed: 2023-01-11 04:02:28+00:00
Account expires: Never
                      S-1-5-21-2595053252-3331221587-625639084-31886
Password last set: 2020-01-23 09:16:02.203508+00:00
Last logon:
                     2023-01-11 05:18:22.398667+00:00
Last logon timestamp: 2023-01-06 23:12:39.355945+00:00
Bad password time
                       65535
Logon count:
Bad password count: -1
Dial-In access perm: Controlled by policy
User Account Control:
         NORMAL ACCOUNT
         DONT EXPIRE PASSWORD
Ancestors:
         $ROOT_OBJECT$, net, ******, ad, ServiceAccounts, SCOM Action Account
```

#### 2. 07:22:11 to 07:37:00:

- Three suspicious files were copied into the C:\Users\ directory:
  - windows\_encrypt.exe
  - windows32 encrypt.exe
  - bat.bat
- o These files were likely prepared as part of the ransomware attack.

## 3. **08:38:00**:

- bat2.bat was created and modified using WMIC process calls.
- This batch file was used to activate windows\_encrypt.exe in administrative mode with the required credentials.

#### 4. **09:11:28 AM**:

- o The ransomware (windows encrypt.exe) began encrypting files on the server.
- o The encryption process started from the directory SysVol DFSSR/domain/scripts/.

# When Was the Ransomware Attempted?

The **actual ransomware attempt** began when the windows\_encrypt.exe file was executed, triggered by the bat2.bat file. This happened at **08:38 AM**, when bat2.bat was created, and the encryption process started shortly afterward at **09:11:28 AM**.

#### **How the Ransomware Was Executed:**

- The attacker (OMAction) had administrative privileges and created bat2.bat to pass the necessary commands to windows\_encrypt.exe.
- The ransomware file started encrypting data at 09:11:28 AM, marking the onset of the ransomware attack.

## **Conclusion:**

The ransomware attempt can be considered to have started between 08:38 AM (bat2.bat creation) and 09:11:28 AM (encryption began) on January 9, 2023.

If two accounts ("Omair Jamil" and "Adnan Aslam") were created in the DUSERS during the timeframe 05:56:13 to 05:59:54, this suggests additional malicious actions alongside the ransomware attack preparations. Here's the potential significance of this activity:

## **Analysis of the Account Creation in DUSERS**

## 1. Purpose of Accounts:

- o These accounts could have been created as **backdoors** to maintain persistent access to the system in case the primary attack (via OMAction) was disrupted.
- Such accounts are often given administrative privileges to bypass security measures or restore access if one method fails.

#### 2. Timeline Correlation:

- o These accounts were login and after modified during the same session when OMAction accessed the server (05:56:13) and started uninstalling security software.
- This aligns with the attacker's intent to prepare the system for the ransomware deployment.

#### 3. Role in the Attack:

- o If these accounts had administrative privileges, they might have been used for:
  - Running additional malicious scripts.
  - Ensuring the encryption process could continue without interruption.
  - Hiding traces of the primary attack by creating confusion or redundancy.

# 4. Connection to Ransomware Attempt:

Although the ransomware encryption started later (08:38 to 09:11 AM), the
activities on these accounts at this early stage indicates the attack was well-planned
and systematic.

## **Potential Implications of the Created Accounts:**

- These accounts suggest that **OMAction** might not have been the only user involved in the attack.
- Alternatively, the attacker might have used these newly created accounts for redundancy or to disguise their primary account's involvement.


## **Artifacts and Malware Indicators:**


## • Primary Malware:

- o windows\_encrypt.exe:
  - This file encrypted the system and generated the ransomware note.
  - It was compiled on January 6, 2023, and executed on January 9, 2023.

# • Supporting Artifacts:

- windows32\_encrypt.exe: Another file copied but likely not used for encryption.
- bat.bat: An initial attempt to execute the malware but failed due to compatibility issues.
- bat2.bat: Successfully used to execute windows\_encrypt.exe in administrative mode.





#### **Conclusion:**

The ransomware attack was executed using the windows\_encrypt.exe file, facilitated by the bat2.bat script. The OMAction account was the primary actor, which:


- 1. Gained RDP access to the server with administrative privileges.
- 2. Disabled security measures to allow malware execution.
- 3. Deployed and executed the ransomware (windows\_encrypt.exe) that encrypted system files.

#### **Malicious Files:**


- 1. windows encrypt.exe Primary ransomware file.
- 2. bat2.bat Script to execute the ransomware.
- 3. windows32 encrypt.exe Copied but unused.

# Uninstalled and Installed MS endpoint protection

MS Endpoint MS / forefront Protection and was uninstalled for copies or copy the malware files (window\_encrypt.exe) and cmd file to run the malware bat2.bat file.




# MS forefront Endpoint Protection was uninstall showing an indicator to suspicious activity.




#### **MPCMDRun.exe**

The file **MPCMDRun.exe** was found on the system. This executable is associated with Windows Defender and typically used for malware scanning. When a security application like Microsoft Defender is unregistered in the Windows Security Center (WSC), it means that Windows does not officially recognize it as the active antivirus program. This status could occur due to improper installation, corruption of the program, or intentional tampering by a malicious actor.




# Again, MS Security Client was uninstalled to create a vulnerable system so that system can be exploited easily



A new installation of Microsoft Endpoint Protection Management, Microsoft Security Client version, MS Endpoint Protection Management is displayed in this step, presumably to restore the earlier uninstalled security measures to cover tracks so that system administrator may not note the suspicious activity by the malicious actor.


# Install Microsoft security client



# Installed MS endpoint protection

```
SOFTWARE.txt - Notepad
<u>File Edit Format View Help</u>
LastWrite: 2023-02-06 09:56:31Z
LastLoggedOnUser = AD\administrator
LastLoggedOnSAMUser = AD\administrator
LastLoggedOnUserSID = S-1-5-21-2595053252-3331221587-625639084-500
licenses v.20200526
(Software) Get contents of HKLM/Software/Licenses key
macaddr v.20200515
(System, Software) --
Microsoft\Windows Genuine Advantage not found.
(Software) Determine MSI packages installed on the system
Classes\Installer\Products
LastWrite Time 2023-01-09 02:07:35Z
2023-01-09 02:07:36Z
Microsoft Forefront Endpoint Protection 2010 Server Management;d:\02bfa10a62ed60b7258d3e\amd64\FEPClient.msi 2023-01-09 02:07:35Z
                        ection Management Components;d:\02bfa10a62ed60b7258d3e\amd64\EppManagement.msi
  Microsoft Security Client;d:\02bfa10a62ed60b7258d3e\amd64\epp.msi
2022-08-18 06:43:417
 Microsoft Silverlight;d:\df6137d3f98fad84a43608cbdc80e406\silverlight.msi
2022-06-17 06:36:392
Microsoft Monitoring Agent;C:\Windows\422C3AB1-32E0-4411-BF66-A84FEEFCC8E2\MOMAgent.msi
2020-09-10 05:32:18Z
 MegaRAID Storage Manager;C:\Users\Unawaz\Desktop\MegaRAID\MSM.msi
```

# Installed MS forefront endpoint protection



# Mprun.exe

A suspicious entry **mprun** was identified in the system's autostart configuration. Autostart entries often indicate persistence mechanisms used by malware or unauthorized programs to execute on system startup. The **mprun** entry could potentially be related to malicious software aiming to gain persistence.

