

# PMUNC 2014

## Security Council

Chair: *Hammad Aslam*

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## Chair's Letter

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Dear delegates,

Welcome to United Nations Security Council, the premier body of the United Nations. My name is HammadAslam and I will be chairing United Nations Security Council at this edition of Princeton Model United Nations Conference 2014.

I am a sophomore at Princeton and I hope to major in public policy. I have been involved in Model UN for the past six years now and I have participated in more than a dozen national and international MUN conferences in high school, winning all of them. Since the last three years, I have chaired MUN conferences all over the world. During this past summer, I chaired Pakistan Model United Nations Conference 2014 in Pakistan and Model United Nations Istanbul 2014. I also chaired at the Princeton Interactive Crisis Simulation (PICSim) conference earlier this year among eight other conferences.

I personally hope that this topic will be interesting to you and spark some comprehensive discussions. As a chair, I will be keeping a close eye on each delegate's individual performance as well as each delegate's ability to raise concerns, form blocs and work with fellow delegates.

I have given some very broad topics to discuss in the committee, and the committee is free to choose exactly what parts of the issue it will tackle during the session. Especially in the second topic area, I have attempted to move away from the short term Gaza Conflict towards the larger picture. Of course, the lack of specific information about the recent conflict does not mean that it cannot be discussed in the committee; rather this background merely serves as a foundation for further research. You may reach me for further questions and queries at [maslam@princeton.edu](mailto:maslam@princeton.edu)

Looking forward to see you in the fall!

## Topic A: The Situation in Latin America

### A. COLOMBIAN DRUG WAR

#### 1) Overview

Colombia suffers from a four decade armed conflict between governmental forces and anti-government armed groups such as FARC, which is mostly funded by the drug trade. Coca, which is the raw material of cocaine, is very widespread and an important part of daily life in Colombia since its climate is perfectly suitable to growing coca. Until 2011, Colombia was the world's largest cocaine producer. Despite international pressure, it is still one of the largest coca producer countries the world.

#### 2) Economic Reasons for Planting Coca

Coca has been planted on the slopes of the Andes since the Incas adopted these territories as their homeland because of

optimal climate. For most parts of Colombia, coca is cultivated more than other plants and vegetables, since coca can be cultivated four times per year. Furthermore, the majority of Colombia's territory farmers can not compete with foreign plants so they are obliged to plant coca. However, the poor farmers still have some incentive to plant legal plants instead of illegal coca, especially considering that Colombia's economic state is shaky. It is therefore crucial for the Colombian Government and



international community to lead the transition of coca production to legal vegetables and plants through concessions, subsidies and economic development projects. Strong links between peasants, clandestine laboratories, guerillas-armed cartels-middle men and state officials need to be severed not only by military forces but also by economic alternatives. If other developed countries such as the US and European Union allowed Colombian plants and vegetables exportation without tariffs and barriers, local farmers would prefer to plant legal plants over coca.

In addition to the agro-politics of Colombia, developing new jobs and industries to replace coca harvesting is an important issue in urban areas.

Despite costly US-backed anti-narcotic programs using satellites, fumigation-spraying aircraft local producers continue to cultivate cultivating in smaller pots and under large trees in order to prevent

detection and destruction of coca, since in these fields, which are located in remote areas, the only eradication method is extreme use of aerial fumigation. In addition, these little coca fields are located in scarcely populated jungles, so that they cannot be easily found by police forces. Moreover, from cultivating these smaller fields, a drug dealer can earn \$175,000 in some markets. Although some peasants choose safe and conservative plants, others plant coca instead of coffee, bananas, rice or coca beans. While the annual profit on a hectare of coca is \$5,000, the equivalent profit from coffee is only \$500. In addition, coca is lighter than coffee and it makes it easier to transport to far ports and countries without huge shipping costs. Furthermore, only a couple of little roads in remote parts of jungles are suitable for transportation of coca to big cities.

### 3) Armed Groups in Colombia

There are two major types of armed groups existing in Colombia. The first group is left-wing organizations such as The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and The National Liberation Army (ELN). The second group is right wing armed groups like The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

i) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is a peasant guerrilla army that follows Marxist-Leninist ideology. In 1948, the populist politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was murdered, an event that led to a series of violence called 'La Violencia,' which lasted until about 1958. More than 300,000 people were killed during the conflict, the majority of whom were peasants. During the 1960s, a plan known as 'Accelerated Economic Development' was put into action, subsidizing large scale farming while

forcing small farmers off their lands. The result was an increase in poverty, and farmers being forced to move to urban centers and work for extremely low wages. The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) was extremely active at the time and, with the new agricultural plan, PCC had access to a vast pool of potential members. In order to protect themselves, members of the PCC organized protests and strikes to prevent the government from taking land from farmers. The most radical measure was the formation of self-defense communities, which led to the formation of the Republic of Marquetita inside Colombian borders.

In 1964, United States ordered the Colombian government to attack the self-defense groups, which led to the formation of the FARC for defense. The forty-eight men who escaped the attack on Marquetita had formed the core of FARC, but their numbers grew quickly to hundreds. Initially, FARC refused involvement in emerging drug trafficking. However, towards the

1980s, it was gradually accepted as a business to fund the group's operations. FARC began by 'taxing' drug operations under its areas while protecting against government interventions. Traffickers valued the involvement of FARC in drug running operations and soon enough established stable relationships with them.

During the 1980s, several ceasefire talks started with the possibility of peace. FARC formed a leftist political body known as the Patriotic Union (UP) that sought political, economic and social reforms. UP performed very well during 1986 elections, but hopes of a political solution did not last long: in 1990, thousands of members of UP were murdered.

Towards the end of 1990, FARC forces attacked a military compound, ending the ceasefire. Dialogue continued but the violence did not end. Drug operations by FARC expanded thereon to fund the escalating conflicts.

In 1999, President Andres Pastrana attempted to establish peace by granting a safe haven to FARC, which had been a long-running demand. The FARC used this safe haven to import arms, export drugs and build up armed forces. After a number of high-profile terrorist incidents, President Pastrana ended the peace talks in 2002 and ordered the armed forces to take the land back.

In 2002, Alvaro Uribe took office as President by running an anti-FARC rally. Between 2002 and 2010, Uribe gained several successes against the FARC, driving them from their land and disturbing their operations. Hugo Chavez during this time called Latin American governments to 'stop branding them

(FARC) as terrorists' but President Uribe quickly responded that there would be no change in their status, noting that they fund their operations through cocaine smuggling.

Until 2010, the Colombian Government refused to negotiate with guerilla groups and initiate peace talks. But after the election in 2010, the aim was to eliminate civil war and armed conflicts by negotiating and compromising with the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

The government was open to imposing softer penalties on the guerillas if they confessed and agreed to lay down their arms. Despite criticism, most of the members of the government agreed on compromising to reach an end in the long lasting civil war in Colombia.

#### ii) The National Liberation Army (ELN)

The ELN is a left-wing group which aims to create a revolutionary Marxist state and is more ideological than the FARC. But for a couple of years, The ELN started to

involve in drug trade and ally with drug cartels.

The ELN lost a part of its power and an important number of members, but it is still recognized as a terrorist organization by Canada, US and EU countries.

#### iii) The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

The AUC is an umbrella group which was established in 1997 with the stated purpose of preventing rebellious groups' kidnappings and extortions.

In reality, drug lords and other leaders in the narcotics trade built up these paramilitary groups in order to carry on their illegal drug trade, since the Colombian Government didn't have enough power to stop the left-wing rebellious groups. In addition, they had some connections with politicians, the military, landowners and



other drug related businessmen, which strengthened their stance against left-wing rebellious groups.

In 2003, a peace deal was signed between Colombian Government and AUC leaders accepted reduced jail terms and protection from extradition. Although the peace deal was signed, dozens of paramilitary leaders were extradited to US since they violated their part of the deal.

During that demobilization of paramilitary process, 32,000 men were demobilized but opponents criticized that lots of people who committed serious crimes get no or applicable punishment.

Canada, United States and the EU countries recognize the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) as terrorist organizations.

Despite demobilization of the AUC, its former members launched or joined new

gangs in Colombia in order to produce and smuggle cocaine without political stance. Thus, these paramilitaries are still a threat to Colombian drug war.

#### Iv) Drug Cartels

During the 1980s Medellin and Cali cartels were very effective and ELN and FARC started to use drugs as a money source for their organization. After their collapse, Notre Del Vale emerged and ELN and FARC increased their authority in drug trade.

As a consequence of years of intense battle, the Colombian Government gained advantage over FARC guerillas and destroyed drug cartels such as Cali and Medellin. But it caused power vacuum, which was filled with different small cartels and armed gangs. Nowadays, drug cartels in Colombia have huge amount of money and power to construct submarines to smuggle tons of cocaine to the US.

#### 4) Domestic Political Climate

Under the Presidency of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Colombian Security Forces confined the FARC guerillas to the jungles, prevailed against the ELN and demobilized the AUC. Under Uribe's leadership, most of the cities in Colombia became safe again. With homicide rates down, economic growth returned.

Until Mr. Santos came into power in 2010, the Colombian Government refused to negotiate with guerilla groups and initiate peace talks. But after the Mr. Santos's election in 2010, the aim was to decrease civil war and casualties and armed conflicts in the country. The Mexican Government mediated the negotiations and compromised with the FARC and the ELN.

In that process, the government sought to impose softer penalties on the guerillas if they confessed and compensated their

victims and agreed to lay down their arms.

Although some opposition group members in the assembly criticized the government since it perceived its actions as demeaning to the government's authority and allowed terrorists to go unpunished, most of the members finally agreed on compromising in favor of the legislation for the sake of reaching an end in a decades long civil war in Colombia.

#### 5) International Politics

Since drug trafficking in the region affected mostly the US, a joint US-Colombian operation known as Plan Colombia was started to decrease coca plantation and drug trafficking in Andean region. The first part of Plan Colombia was increasing military and other types of aid in order to stop drug trafficking between US and Colombia. Secondly, Pastrana's aim was to get more help and aid from every country, especially the US.

In accordance with Plan Colombia, the US and EU have provided financial, logistical, tactical and military aid to the government of Colombia. These aids also aimed to be used as a tool on fighting against leftist military organizations like the FARC that used drugs as a source of money for the organization.

Unfortunately a war on drugs cannot be implemented unless all countries in the region agree to join the fight. Although Uribe showed a strong stance and good determination against drug trafficking, Colombia's neighbors did not. On the contrary, they created new business opportunities for farmers and other people making them a part of cocaine producing. The fact that the Venezuelan Government is very close with the FARC allowed them to control some strategically important rural areas in order to carry on their drug trade. In addition to that, the Venezuelan Government prohibited US radar patrols in 2005. Moreover, the Bolivian Government also

refused US aid for eradication of raw materials of drugs and expelled 60 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers.

#### 6) Balloon Effect

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) tries to control and decrease drug trafficking between countries. Because of their aid, local police forces have caught many illegal drug dealers in the region, especially along the Colombia-Peru border. Since the US poured millions of dollars to Colombia on drug war issue, local producers and dealers have shifted their business and trade routes to alternative countries such as Peru and Ecuador. These shifts in the region because of external pressure are called the “balloon effect.” When one country creates a huge budget and gets help from the international community and fights against guerillas or gangs, these groups decide to shift to safer areas. This war caused in the end the tactics mentioned

above and were short-term solutions instead of long term ones.

When one country starts a war against drugs and decreases that traffic, the price of cocaine starts to increase since demand is still the same or grows annually but supply decreased since the country's operations against it. However, when the price of cocaine starts to increase, more people have more incentive to produce and sell it on domestic and international market. Therefore it causes a vicious cycle.

## **B. PERUVIAN DRUG WAR**

### **1) Overview**

Just like in Colombia, cultivating coca instead of other plants, such as vegetables, yields more profit for the local farmers in Peru. These poor farmers cannot produce vegetables or crops as well and as cheaply as the Western countries. Even if they do

choose to produce them, they do not have the guarantee of it being sold in an appropriate price unlike coca, since the demand in coca is ever rising. Therefore the most viable economic choice for these farmers is to continue cultivating coca, which is very suitable to the area's environment, and has been profitable since ancient times. Therefore it is very crucial to combine the anti-drug policy with subsidizing the local farmers and convincing them not to plant coca.

### **2) Rebellious Groups**

The rebellious group existing in Peru, known as "Shining Path," is responsible for 70,000 deaths and more than 500 terrorist attacks. These militants try to control remote areas where coca is produced and they benefit from the illicit drug trade since coca production gives them huge amounts of money and thus raises the chances of Shining Path gaining power. The military and anti-drug analysts say that the Shining

Path was an old Maoist insurgent group which turned into a drug dealer and bully, operating its own laboratories, extorting fees from the farmers and protecting drug smugglers.

Shining Path already has 500 laborers and 350-armed combatants who are used for carrying on the Peruvian drug trafficking. Despite its low number of combatants, Shining Path is responsible for 70,000 deaths while using only a few hundred people in twenty years, making it a power that should not be underestimated. Following Mr. Guzman capture by police forces, Shining Path has proclaimed that they will not assassinate local officers and/or bomb public areas and terrorize people in general with these tactics; after these incidents, it changed its policies against peasants and actually started to protect them. Unfortunately, consequently, the peasants do not oppose them; on the contrary, they are willing to obey them.

### 3) Continuation of Drug War

Despite huge drug seizures operated by the Peruvian security forces and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), most of the people have some doubts about the success of the war on drugs. It is known not only that the traffickers have better weapons and communication devices, but that they also have connections with some of the Peruvian Army officials who are paid by these traffickers. The peasants' reaction was to continue planting coca and taking special measures in order to hide their actions, such as planting coca among banana trees in order to hide them and making it harder to detect the coca bushes. In addition, although DEA backed Peruvian security forces in capturing huge amounts of coca, the coca only comprised 1% of Peru's total coca production. Therefore, some opponents of the war against drug claim that it is a never-ending war.

In the 1990s, Peru was a success story of reducing coca production to half by having strong and strict policies and by giving incentives to cultivate alternative plants in the region. But the drug dealers have shifted their coca fields' location to other neighboring countries such as Colombia, since cocaine has become a perfect example of how the supply-demand principle always wins in the end. It is easy to understand that when amount of coca produced is decreased, coca's price increases at the same time, making other people having more incentives to cultivate it in a different way or a different place, especially if they live in poverty and see a better future by following this alternative. Therefore, even if they are captured or spent tens of years in prison they still prefer this high-risky choice since they can never ever compare with amount of possible earned money in legitimate ways in their whole life. As a result, unless US customers abandon using cocaine, this war on drugs will be very hard to end.

## C. MEXICAN DRUG WAR

### 1) Historical Background

Mexico geographically is a bridge between USA and Central and South American countries like Colombia, Peru, and Puerto Rico, which produce all kind of drugs like cannabis, methamphetamine, cocaine and opiates. Intensive drug trade generally was started in 1980 and continued without huge threat to Mexican people because most of the drugs went to USA easily until the 9/11. So, when crossing the US borders turned into a really hard situation all these drugs couldn't pass the US-Mexico borders as much as before. As a result, huge amount of drugs started to accumulate in Mexico and its price started to decrease making it more accessible to a continuously rising number of people through its availability and cheapness. Thus, drug usage and drug market in Mexico started to extend while the market grew day-

by-day, new actors started to emerge and gain power. Rivalries started to rise and alliances took place between these actors.

## 2) Status Quo

From 1980 to 2006, the Mexican government did not interfere too much with the actions of the drug dealers in Mexico. This was changed after the election of Felipe Calderon in 2006, who started fighting against the drug cartels. Felipe Calderon's justification was that these drug cartels were trying to impose their own laws and intimidate government's authority in these regions.

Since 2006 more than 50,000 people have died and tens of thousands of people have been kidnapped, imprisoned, or have been victims of extortion. Many of the people in Mexico are against Calderon's policy for fear of the counter-measures and actions taken by the drug cartels leaders;

when government forces kill or capture a cartel's leader, other prominent members start to compete each other and this further worsens the situation. All the leaders of these cartels try to protect themselves from the governmental forces and that in itself leads them to take more aggressive and offensive actions, resulting in a vicious circle where the cartels instead of be limited actually take a turn for the worse. Most Mexican people do not see any concrete benefit from the policies taken in 2006. On the contrary, there are still many and powerful drug cartels in the region. Since they have huge power, these drug cartels affect police and military staff, especially high ranked members in Mexico.

Against this corruption in governmental bodies, Felipe Calderon has started an anti corruption policy to maintain credibility to security forces. Because of ongoing drug wars, Mexico's reputation in the world has decreased and tourism revenues are dwindling. In parts of Mexico, people in the

street cannot walk without fear because of widespread kidnappings, armed clashes and widespread criminal activities in general.

The US supports Mexico in its anti drug war with a subsidy of a \$1.4 billion anti-drug program known as the Merida Initiative. This initiative includes supplying 8 helicopters to Mexican army and training Mexican officials, and also enhancing dialog, which tighten bonds between counterparts.

### 3. DRUG CARTELS:

There are many drug cartels in Mexico (to name just a few: Beltrán, Leyva Cartel,

La Familia Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Juárez Cartel, Knights Templar, Sinaloa Cartel, Tijuana Cartel and Los Zetas). These drug cartels try to convince young people to become members of their organizations using different methods, aspiring to enlarge their turf and increase power and reputation in the region, since every single young recruit counts. Taking into account the ramifications of this, i.e. intimidating other rivals and potential opponents in that region that also security forces through the use of propaganda and psychological campaigns, we can understand the serious impact that the enlarging of these factions has on the overall situation.



Of course, along with the intimidation comes one of the most important power sources of these drug cartels: firearms.

trade between US and drug cartels in Mexico, violence and bloodshed will significantly decrease in Mexico.



Although every Mexican has the right to buy a weapon, it's only after a very difficult and complicated process. Therefore, most gangs get their weapons smuggled in across the US-Mexico border. This trade between borders occurs between the drug cartels and gunrunners in USA or through the black market in Mexico.

There is a consensus in Mexico's public opinion that if US stops allowing weapons

### 3) Possible Solutions And Alternatives

Despite the increasing number of the policemen in the problematic areas from 25,000 to 150,000, there is a consensus that deployment of these municipal police forces is useless, because of the widespread bribery in both normal level police forces and high leveled officers. Thus, Calderon started to

use military power since less corruption was detected there. However security forces need to get evidence and intelligence information by working on the streets, something that the military forces weren't trained to do, and thus they were essentially unable to handle this mission effectively. For this purpose, Calderon Government wanted to take several actions such as rebuilding the federal police structure, establishing new penal law, and creating a transparent criminal system like public trials which can take place in public buildings and building maximum security prisons. Inevitably, it will take time to make these changes possible.

Most of the people are of the opinion that the Mexican government should keep on operating its Kingpin strategy to suppress drug cartels and make them weak, following what the Colombian Government did in the 1990s. The Kingpin strategy pertains of freezing assets of cartels' prominent members, cutting communication between members, and preventing supply and

distribution of drugs and all kinds of chemicals used in production and selling process.

Throughout the last three years, during which Mexican Government used this strategy, approximately 40 cartel leaders got captured, huge amount of assets were confiscated and the roots of money supply were detected.

After the collapse of these cartel leaders, a new leader could not been easily chosen. During these processes, internal conflicts arose and these cartels were divided. That means that the Mexican Government could handle this drug war against drug cartels more easily.

Apart from the Mexican Government's possible solutions, the war against drugs might be more successful combined with US efforts of decreasing internal drug consumption, repealing second amendment, further restricting weapon selling to

Mexican drug cartels and deploying more US troops to US-Mexican borders since Mexican Government cannot protect the whole border line well.

50,000 casualties because of the Mexican Drug War since 2006, Puerto Rico's casualty ratios are proportionally higher than Mexico's. Although Puerto Rico's police power is the second largest among US police forces, they are struggling to succeed in their drug war, since they are ill prepared.

#### **4. PUERTO RICAN DRUG WAR**

##### **1) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Puerto Rico is a transshipment point for drug trafficking between resource countries like Peru and Colombia and huge market of drugs, the US. As a Commonwealth of the USA, Puerto Rico did not have a problem related with drug consumption and drug dealing until the 1970s. These problems slowly emerged at the end of the 1970s and became one of the most important problems for Puerto Rico. In the 1980s, when Colombian drug cartels started to send huge amount of drugs to Puerto Rico, drug usage and drug related crimes are extremely increased. Despite Mexico's more than

##### **2) POLICE CORRUPTION**

Puerto Rico has an ongoing police corruption problem which obstructs drug enforcement officers' operation's success. As a result, thousands of policemen were inspected, charged, arrested and imprisoned by the FBI. In addition to police corruption, many politicians were also charged with corruption.

According to FBI and local police forces, these drug dealers also fund some local lawmakers and politicians who get profits from these drug trafficking. After the operations of Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA), a lot of prominent political leaders and lawmakers were arrested. Puerto Rico's murder rate is five times more than the US's. Therefore Puerto Rican policy making is shaped by anti drug policy.

Despite requests from the Puerto Rican government, the federal government did not send more officials to cover borders and control drug trafficking in the region. Even if the federal government deploys more troops to Mexican borders, these drug carrels use other routes to transmit produced drugs like those of Puerto Rico.

## The Impact Of Drugs and Arms Trafficking On Civil Wars


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(<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf>)

In recent decades, Latin America has played a central role in several major global illicit drug markets. Multiple aspects of the

drug supply chain that take place in the region, including drug crop cultivation, drug production, drug trafficking, and, ultimately, drug consumption, make South America the sole producer of cocaine for the global market. Latin America's central role in the illicit drug market stems largely from the Andean region's unique position as the world's only source region for coca and cocaine. Another major factor contributing to the region's prominence in today's drug trade is its proximity to the United States, a major drug consumption market. Underlying factors that have allowed drug trafficking to flourish include poverty, inequality, and a

### **Suspect Maritime Activity CY 2007**



lack of viable economic opportunities for farmers and youth in many countries aside from emigration. At the same time, underfunded security forces and the failure to complete institutional reform efforts have generally left police, prisons, and judicial systems weak and susceptible to corruption. On average, fewer than 5% of murders committed in Latin America result in criminal convictions, which gives drug traffickers the freedom to act with relative impunity.

How does that have a connection with civil wars? The answer is clear when we underline the connection of drug trafficking by Latin American guerrilla or terrorist groups, especially Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) and Peru's Shining Path. Although indigenous Latin American insurgent organizations such as Peru's Shining Path have been diminished, several

others—such as Colombia's United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC) paramilitary groups, the FARC, and the ELN—still pose a dangerous threat to the region's stability.

FARC devotes some 2,800 men (50 percent of its force) to drug-trafficking activities, and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) devotes some 500 men (20% of its force). Alfredo Rangel, a Colombian military analyst, said in 2001 that profits from the drug trade make up 48 percent of the FARC's total income, amounting to nearly \$180 million annually.

Rafael Pardo estimated that the FARC took control of Colombia's coca crops in the second half of the 1990s “and boosted its income to more than \$600 million a year, making it possibly the richest insurgent group in history.”

FARC operations with drug traffickers are often coordinated to avoid local law enforcement and international interdiction efforts. They work together with the traffickers to advance more sophisticated smuggling schemes and multiply smuggling opportunities. In exchange for weapons and financial support, the FARC will protect clandestine drug-related airfields, warn traffickers of impending police or military activity and protect coca plantations and processing laboratories. The FARC often carries out attacks on behalf of the traffickers, attacking organizations and individuals involved in drug interdiction.

It is the symbiotic relationship between the guerrilla /paramilitary forces and the drug cartels that exaggerate the situation thus in Latin America and though violent conflicts and crimes lead to the break of a civil war.

## The Role Of United Nations Security Council On Civil Wars

In the early 1990s, a plethora of Security Council resolutions were adopted in response to active civil wars, and aimed at ending mass violence. In more recent years, the Security Council has increasingly sought to address post-conflict situations, while continuing to remain involved in attempting to resolve active wars. Between 1989 and 1991, less than 5 percent of Security Council resolutions involving civil war parties were issued after the end of fighting. Between 2004 and 2006, however, almost 48 percent of all Security Council demands on warring factions were adopted in the aftermath of civil war. During this three-year period, the Security Council specified more demands on conflict parties in post conflict situations than in the first nine years of the post- Cold War era taken together. This suggests that

after the end of the Cold War the Security Council has gradually become much more active in guiding and sustaining peace processes after the end of fighting.

The decrease in the number of Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars after 1993 masks another significant development: the simultaneous increase in the complexity of those resolutions. The Security Council adopted increasingly detailed resolutions between 1989 and the mid-1990s.

Resolutions dealing with civil war contained only one demand, on average. For every two resolutions the Security Council adopted, it typically issued a single demand to warring factions and another single exhortation to third parties to assist the resolution of the conflict. Six years later, an average resolution specified more than six demands, four of which were addressed to civil-war parties. Since the mid-1990s, the degree of complexity of Security Council

resolutions related to civil wars has remained consistent, though with some significant annual variation.

The Security Council's demands to civil war parties became more numerous and increasingly oriented towards post-conflict peace building between 1989 and 2006. Over the same period, the Council shifted its thematic focus from demands relating to military conduct towards prescriptions on internal political relations, governance issues, and the factions' external affairs. Between 1989 and 2006, the Council issued resolutions containing 1,988 specific demands to warring factions. The IPI Security Council Compliance Database categorizes demands issued by the Security Council to civil war parties into twenty thematic types, which range from "military conduct" to "humanitarian assistance/access to victims of violence," and from "dialogue/reconciliation with internal political actor(s)" to "cooperation with the Security Council or its subsidiary organs."

These twenty thematic types of demands can be arranged into five broad categories: military and law enforcement, humanitarian actions, governance and internal political relations, warring factions' external relations, and cooperation by them with the United Nations.

The Council asked civil-war parties to afford security and freedom of movement to UN peace operations, to assist groups of experts in the verification of compliance with sanctions as well as to work with international criminal tribunals toward bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice.

Between 1989 and 2006, the Security Council, on average, issued its first resolution in response to civil wars in the Americas and in Asia twelve and fifteen years respectively after these conflicts broke out, respectively. In part, the long time lapse can be explained by the fact that most civil wars ongoing in Asia and the Americas after

1989 had in fact started long before the end of the Cold War, at a time when the Security Council adopted few resolutions in response to internal conflicts. Most importantly, the Security Council's smaller—and slower—engagement in managing civil wars in Asia and the Americas may also have been affected by the more marked tendency by many governments in those regions to consider intrastate political violence as a matter to be handled strictly within the jurisdiction of the state in which the violence occurs.

Colombia remained off the Council's active agenda (although it was much discussed in the corridors, and the Secretary-General fielded several high quality special envoys on this violent and complex nexus of conflict) because Latin American countries generally supported Colombia's reluctance to see its problems "internationalized."

The Council, for the most part, dealt with civil wars by employing sanctions,



leading to the 1990's moniker as “the sanctions decade”. The reasons behind it is the double advantage that such a course of action not only gained leverage against the civil-war parties but it also single-handedly drained them of any material or finance aid and political support as the following figures show explicitly.

The Security Council thus collaborated with a number of regional actors and others as a means to gain leverage on civil-war parties through incentives, threats, and sanctions didn't necessarily control access to a range of sources-benefits to civil-war parties since these sources are conditioned by other UN bodies, member states, other international organizations, and even the private sector.

## Arms

Arms smuggling is the illicit trade of weapons including almost all kinds of weapons, such as firearms, ammunition,

explosives, conventional weapons (small arms and light weapons, sea and land mines, non-nuclear bombs, shells, rockets, missiles, cluster munitions and such).

The main types and reasons of arms smuggling may be summarized as: strong demand for the illicit arms trade in order to enable economic and political motives that are achievable by violence, limited scope and effectiveness of arms embargoes, poor and inadequate end-user controls, inadequate control of brokers, poor record keeping and verification, absence of standards for marking, limited capacity or will for tracing, gaps in the regulation of civilian sales and possession, inadequate stockpile management and storage, limited capacity for enforcement, little risk of apprehension or prosecution and the absence of meaningful penalties and inadequate border controls.

In terms of arms smuggling, Latin America is a textbook example of the ill

effects of the arms trade. From street gangs in El Salvador to paramilitaries and armed guerillas in Colombia, illicitly trafficked and manufactured weapons contribute many of the regions problems. According to American researchers Stohl and Tuttle, “The region [Latin America and Caribbean] is a smuggler’s paradise: A vast of coastline, densely frosted mountains, porous borders, clandestine airships, widespread government corruption, a lack of governmental resources and political will to confront the trade and entrenched and powerful narco-traffickers – all have contributed to the unregulated flow of weapons, drugs, and people.”

The central route of the illicit arms entrance is the US-Mexican border. Approximately 2,000 guns are crossing this border daily, according to a study conducted by the Mexican government. (Stohl, R., & Tuttle, 2008)

Additionally, Colombia and Brazil are among the most impacted countries that play

host to an illicit arms trade. It is indicated that Colombia is a transit-point because of “its position as a geographic bridge between Central and South America. Its borders that are porous and difficult to monitor provide access to both the Caribbean Sea and Federal Police of Brazil indicated that arms enter to the country from Argentina, Paraguay (from the Igazu Falls, which is a part of the “tri-border” region that links those states), Colombia, Bolivia and Suriname.

There is some evidence that links terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda to the gray and black small arms and light weapons market of Latin America as well as the Western Hampshire markets in general. As an example; in a July 2002 report, Paraguayan authorities found evidence of illegal activities at the apartment of FajkumarSabnani (an alleged Hezbollah associate living in Ciudad de Este, Paraguay). According to the press reports, police found bomb-making materials, a

letter of authorization for Sabnani to use \$30 million for arms trafficking and other letters detailing transfers of assault rifles and military equipment.

## Actors of Arms Smuggling and Diversion of Arms

There is no agreement on the definition of illicit arms trade. Existing international definition is not coherent with the definitions stipulated in national regulations, however, uncertified weapons and weapons acquired, exported or imported by gangs, terrorist groups, crime organizations are commonly accepted as illicit. On the other hand, weapons that produced by states and other state-held weapons are generally considered as licit, as long as there is no contraction with international law regarding arm production, import and export. Additionally, licit arms refer to those weapons possessed by civilians under provisions of international and national law.

Because of the disagreement on the definition of arms trade, the definition of the actors involved in arms trafficking is also controversial. One of the approaches defends that, illicitness of trade depends on recipients' behavior. If an actor uses or is expected to use weapons in human rights abuses, acts of aggression and in contradiction to the law of war, the trade through which that actor acquires the weapons should be considered illegal. Second approach aims to single out certain actors as illicit recipients of arms, instead of taking certain behaviors as a base to determine illicitness. In this regard, armed and terrorist groups, private security services, individual criminals, mercenaries are considered as potential "clients" of illicit arms trafficking. On the other hand, trade takes place among governments or legal entities authorized by governments to sale their manufacture are implied to licit actors of arms trade in the report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms.

In a nutshell, it may be said that dealers, criminal groups and other states, individuals or non-state actors, may all supply illicit arms. But it should be born in mind that governments are responsible from fulfilling obligations; produce the weapons and conduct their import and exports in compliance with international law.

In some cases, states may choose violate the embargoes directly or indirectly or to facilitate illicit arms trade to pursue their political and economic aims. Arms, transferred to Latin America during the Cold War, were supplied both by the Soviet Union and the United States to their Latin American allies with mass quantities. While the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies sent weapons to Cuba while the US and Israel provided weapons to Nicaraguan contras, El Salvador, Mexico, Honduras and Panama. (Federation of American Scientist, n.d.)

Corrupt states agents may also be motivated by private gain to circumvent legal controls; it is alleged that one of the corrupt agents from Bogota was caught on wiretap in 2004 discussing his involvement and criminal activities of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) which is recognized with its involvement in narco-trafficking and arms dealing at highest levels. After passed through a chain of private brokers and transport contractors under the auspices of US Department of Defense, hundreds of thousands of small arms, light weapons and ammunition were shipped to Iraq between 2004 and 2005.

Another example is case of Vladimiro Montesinos, the former chief of Peru's intelligence service, who was charged



in 2004 for providing assault rifles to rebels in Colombia.

The negligence of states has been seen as the main reason of the illicit trade. Although some countries establish a strict control policy for possession of arms, they are still vulnerable to the diversion of arms from licit to illicit, which takes place in other countries. As an example, it can be said that the US is the largest supplier of illicit arms to Latin America, since the guns are highly available in the US, the smugglers take advantage of the situation and loose US gun control policies. Besides that less than three per cent of shipments crossing from the US to Canada are actually checked. (Cukier, 2008)

Although states regulate the manufacture of weapons, enforcement of regulations and/or verifications systems are usually weak, therefore manufacturers may manufacture or overproduce weapons without necessary authorization or even use

some components that have been illegally imported or stolen. Moreover, deactivated weapons may be reassembled and reactivated by taking advantage of weak deactivation standards or verification processes.

Canada's only handgun manufacturer, Para-Ordnance, was implicated in a trafficking ring when unmarked handguns reassembled from parts stolen from the plant were found on the streets of Toronto, according to several reports. The weapons were considered "attractive" for criminals to use, since several of those seized arms had no serial number.

Up to 100 deactivated machine pistols that are legally exported by collectors to reactivate and sell to criminals in Britain can be seen as another example.

Besides covert methods of distribution, the arms, especially small arms and light weapons in government arsenals, may be subject to theft and loss. Once acquired by

traffickers, these weapons enter into trafficking market and are smuggled across national borders. In fact, according to several reports by the RAND Institute, *“Arms flowing into Colombia from Ecuador and Peru emanate mostly from stolen military stocks or supplies that have been illegally resold by members of private security firms.”*

As an example; certain weapons are traced back from Colombia to the Venezuelan armed forces; it is estimated that sympathetic individual members of the military have supplied weapons and ammunition to FARC, since there is no definite evidence that links the administration of the Venezuelan government to Colombian guerrillas.

Civilians with clean records may buy weapons legally, but then sell or give them to a second owner. Especially in jurisdictions without strong licensing and registration regimes governing sale and

resale, secondhand purchases of weapons becomes a huge problem.

The majority of arms recovered in crime appear to have been at one time legally owned by civilians, but then stolen: “As many as 500,000 small arms are stolen each year from the US, by definition falling into the hands of criminals.”

## Impacts of Arms Smuggling

The conventional arms, especially small arms and light weapons, have been broadly used in majority of armed conflicts in last two decades, so that they are directly responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 people every year through armed conflict, homicides and suicides.

In this sense, illegal transmission of those weapons, especially the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, constitutes not only a huge threat to the stability and

safety of the populations of states around the world, but they are also implicated in drug smuggling, organized crime, terrorist activities, guerrilla warfare and other types of low intensity conflict. Since the weapons are cheap, widely available, easy to cross a border with, and to carry and use, they are well purposed to contribute to the illegal actions of most underground groups. Small arms and light weapons account for an estimated 60-90% of the 100,000+ deaths caused by conflict each year.

Organized crime organizations in conflict-prone areas provides arms from illicit trade and arm violence and conflicts that they create with those weapons causes civilian casualties, human right abuses, humanitarian crisis and missed social and economic opportunities necessary for development. Besides the money required in conflict-related activities, such as peacekeeping, delivering food aid, improving public health, building safer cities, protecting refugees, eradicating

poverty or fighting crime and terrorism, governments spend billions of dollars, in order to combat arms trafficking and to eradicate crime fueled by arms trafficking.

The illicit trade also damages economic and social development. “Indirect effect of small arms use and availability are graver still, and include inquiry, disease, poverty, trauma and underdevelopment for millions,” says Nicholas Florquin who is a researcher from Small Arms Survey. Arms violence reduces productivity, discouraging investment and burdens communities with higher health care costs. Productivity losses are estimated at \$10 billion in Brazil and \$4 billion in Colombia, while gun violence exacts almost \$90 million and \$40 million for those countries, respectively.

It is estimated that per capita GDP in Latin America would be %25 higher if crime rates were more on par with the rest of the world. (Stohl& Tuttle, 2008)

## Prohibitions on Arms Possession and Possession of Arms for the Purpose of Security

According to international law, states have the right to possess, use, import and export small arms and light weapons, although there are prohibitions regarding chemical, biological and nuclear weapons under certain international conventions. States generally exercise this right by means of their state security forces, such as police, military, border police and customs officials. These personnel account for about one fourth of the global small arms stockpile.

Both military and law enforcement forces may misuse the weapons allocated to their use; they may violate human rights or, sale or smuggle state's weapons in the absence of adequate and detailed standards

and procedures attached to the management and security of state's stockpile of weapons.

States' rights to possess, use, import and export arms may be restricted by international and regional organizations, however the implementations of those restrictions, such as arms embargoes, are weak and prone to violation. States must have appropriate measures to prevent such violations, especially which may be committed by authorized manufacturers and sellers.

It may be found necessary to acquire arms for protection in some areas, especially at conflicts zones where government forces perceived to be as ineffective to protect individuals from organized crime and armed violence. The

US (with 270,000,000), Mexico (with 15,500,000) and Brazil (with 14,840,000 privately owned firearms) are the countries which are in top ten list of estimated civilian



firearms according to Small Arms Survey conducted in 2011.

Governments regulates the provisions of acquiring or possessing weapons by individuals, in some countries even fully automatic firearms are legally possessed by civilians, however, since the guns are not consumed but are durable, without a proper monitoring system or in absence of appropriate controls, generally those guns are resold or reused by others; therefore the gun that is licit at the point of manufacture or possession becomes an illicit one.

In order to prevent such a diversion of weapons owned by civilians, states must implement the necessary precautions including strengthened border control, generating a strong monitoring system, enacting laws that regulate meaningful penalties.

## Preventing Arms Possession of Combatants, Terrorists and Armed Drug Cartels

States and governments may use some private intermediaries such as brokers and traders in order to conduct a legal arm trade, however, in some cases, brokers are the ones who conduct the communication between arms-owners and illegal groups, thus, the key to eliminate further armament of those groups is combating unscrupulous arms brokers.

Arms brokering may be defined as “activity carried out by individuals or companies to mediate, arrange or facilitate an international transaction between buyer and seller in return for a fee or material reward or benefit.”

The brokering activities does not necessarily involve the actual purchase of weapons, it may be only facilitation of documentation or payment between buyer

and seller or the arrangement of transportation, finance and insurance for delivery of an arms cargo. (Wood, 2003)

Although brokering itself is not illicit, to arm non- state actors, violating arms embargoes, transferring arms to conflict zones are considered as illicit, as well as the other transactions which are against national or international laws governing arms brokering.

International criminal organizations often use techniques of robbery and arm brokering activities to acquire weapons, and unregulated or poorly regulated arms brokering activities facilitates the proper environment for these actions, therefore states need to govern the area with adequate legislations in order to prevent such activities. However, *“To date, only twelve countries on the world have legislation against [illicit activities of] arm brokers...[and] laws that define and enunciate the legal requirements of arm brokers...Without an international regime to*

*address this loophole, brokers are largely free to play their lethal trade with latitude and impunity.”*

It should be kept in mind that the arms brokers' primary motive in supplying arms to illegal groups is mainly economic; generally, arms procurement by such groups are limited by their economic sources, so cutting into their financing could also be a solution that may enable states to prevent illegal groups from acquiring weapons.

Preventing illegal groups from acquiring materials and technological knowledge related to the manufacture of arms is also vital, because the illegal groups which acquire such materials and information may manufacture their own weapons or re-activate the deactivated ones.

In addition to marking the arms that are manufactured by states, preventing manufacturing, stockpiling or transfer of unmarked weapons by others is highly

important in order to mitigate the possession of guns by illegal groups.

It is key importance to hinder the diversion of licit guns to illicit markets considering the fact that proper marking systems coupled with a stronger system of national border controls would allow investigators to identify the sources and routes of weapon flows.

In a nutshell, by enacting strong export and border controls, safeguarding or destroying stockpiles, dismantling trafficking networks, and addressing the root causes of the civil conflicts and soaring urban crime rates, governments may reduce the supply of these weapons to crime organizations.

## **Points that the SC's Resolution can Address**

### **Military and Law Enforcement**

1. **Military conduct, including orchestrated political violence**
2. **Police and other law-enforcement conduct**

### **Humanitarian Actions**

1. **Humanitarian access and assistance, including provision of security to humanitarian personnel**
2. **Protection of civilians or protection of specific groups (beyond humanitarian access)**
3. **Freedom of movement of local populations**

### **Governance and Internal Political Relations**

1. **Implementation of peace agreements**
2. **Internal political/organizational reconfiguration of local or national government structures**
3. **Dialogue/reconciliation with internal political actor, including release of political prisoners**
4. **Conduct related to elections or referenda, including election campaigns**
5. **Economic and social policy, including preservation of natural resources**
6. **Media relations and operations, public declarations**
7. **Transitional justice, including truth and reconciliation commissions**

### **External Relations**

1. **Dialogue/reconciliation with another state.**
2. **Provision of political, financial, or military assistance to resolution of conflict**
3. **Respect for sanctions**
4. **Monitoring of behavior of other actors**

### **Cooperation with the United Nations**

1. **Provision of security and freedom of movement for UN mission or peacekeeping force**
2. **Cooperation with UN actor (e.g., peace operation, International Atomic Energy Agency, or UN**

- Security Council or one of its subsidiary organs)
3. Report to the Security Council or advise the Security Council
  4. Report to the Secretary-General

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## The Middle Eastern Question:

### THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

#### BACKGROUND – (1897-1936)

Since people of the Jewish ethnicity are currently spread across the world, they do not have a nation-state. But Palestine, historically and traditionally a holy place for the Jewish people, has always been a main aim for them, especially in light of the anti-Semitism they've historically faced in Europe. Therefore, with the intentions of protecting themselves and establishing a Jewish state in Palestinian territory, the Zionist Organization was founded in 1897. The main function of that organization was initially to provide a home for Jewish people in Palestine. The British Government, which was maintained political rule in the Palestinian territory between 1920 and 1947, officially recognized Jewish People's right

to live in Palestinian territory via the Balfour Declaration. But while supporting the Jewish People, the British Government did not want to offend Arabic People since the UK had also promised to assist in the establishment of Arab states in Middle East. However, a huge immigration influx went to Palestine and started to live there, demanding their rights.

While the Nazi's power was rising and WWII was approaching, the British Government abandoned their Jewish supporting policy, because it was more beneficial to be ally with Arab states to get their help in Middle East. Therefore, in 1939, the White Paper was published, which affirmed that one state would be established and that state would run by Jewish and Arab People; further, the government would be based on population rates in 1939. Moreover, the British Government limited the Jewish population's immigration to Palestine to 75,000 and also limited land purchases. Thus the British Government was

blamed and held responsible for Jewish people's suffering during WWII, since they did not allow them to go to Palestine, thus causing them to face inhuman conditions in Europe or British detention camps in Cyprus. The international community also criticized the UK's immigration policy of Jewish people.


Throughout that immigration process, some high-tensioned conflicts emerged in Palestine. In 1929, bloody clashes happened and Palestinians killed 133 Jews and 110 Palestinians were killed by British police forces. Moreover in 1936, while Arabs were protesting and striking, a militant Zionist group ordered attacks against Muslims and British police forces.

### PALESTINIAN ROYAL COMMISSION – 1936

The Palestinian Royal Commission was established in 1936, in order to investigate possible causes of violence in Palestine.

After their investigations Palestinian Royal Commission claimed that best solution for both parties was to live in two separate states since these parties could not live together in Palestine peacefully. Actually both of the parties claimed authority in whole Palestine and it made things difficult for British government to implement its promises to both Arabs and Jewish people. In 1939, St. James Conference was organized in order to convince both parties to the division of territory. However, none of them accepted that plan again and problem continued without finding any solution.

### UN PARTITION PLAN – 1947



After the conclusion of WW2, Britain finished its mandate on Palestine since the UN's new Trusteeship System contradicted with the mandate. Therefore it was crucial to solve this problem without leaving this it to these two states. After the end of Britain's mandate over Palestine, the UN Special Committee on Palestine was established in order to search for the best options to create peaceful a Palestine. According to the UNSCOP, Jewish people suffered too much in Europe yet they could not flee to a safer place. Juxtaposed against that issue was the fact that, although their population was one third of the Palestine, they only had 6% of the land. After its investigations, UNSCOP stated that two different states could be the best solutions for both sides and Jerusalem would be internationalized.

After the proposition of the plan, the Jewish side accepted it since it would grant them recognition from Palestinians. Although the Jewish State (excluding

Jerusalem) covers 56.47% of Palestinian territory, in that state, there were 498.000 Jews and 325.000 Arabs. On the other hand, Arabs did not agree with the plan. Their argument was that, although they had more population than Jews they did not have more territory to rule. While Arabs had 43.53% of Palestine (excluding Jerusalem), there were 807.000 Arabs and 10.000 Jews within their state.

#### **JEWISH STATE OF ISRAEL -1948**

Jews unilaterally declared Jewish State of Israel with the Independence Declaration at the same time with UK's date of termination of mandate over Palestine.

After that declaration; Palestinian Arabs, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon declared war against Israel which is known as 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Israel won that war and controlled more territory than the UN Partition Plan gave to it. On July 20, 1949 an armistice agreement were signed



between Israel and Arab states. As a result of these military clashes, 700.000 Arabs fled from their lands and turned into refugees. These people's problem could not be solved yet and they still live in borders of Jordan , Egypt and Lebanon. Therefore Israel offered to Arab states that Palestinians could come back their homes as long as Israel gets more territory than UN Partition Plan gives. But it is rejected by Arab states.

Immigration of Jewish people continued between 1949-1956 for living in Israel. On the other hand, Palestinian immigrants also moved to Jordan since Jordan Government gave to every Palestinian a citizenship. After the nationalization of Suez Canal, UK, France and Israel attacked and invaded that canal. It is important that, Palestinian guerillas also fought in that war on behalf of Egypt.

#### **PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) – 1964**

Since 1948, all neighbor Arab states have acted against Israel. Palestinian Arabs could want to establish new and independent body to oppose Israeli action in Palestine. In 1964, Palestinian Liberation Organization was established and designated as representative of Palestinian people. After its establishment it started armed attacks again Israeli military and political power.

#### **SIX-DAY WAR – 1967**

While the number of Palestinian guerillas, which were located in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan started to increase and being a potential threat to Israel, Israel made a surprise attack and bombed West Bank. After that bombing these operations turned into a war, which is between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. Although Arab states were advantageous in number of soldiers, the war ended just in 6 days and Israel was defeated. Israel seized Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, West Bank from Jordan, pushed Syrian Forces back to

the Golan Heights, took control of Gaza Strip and had full control over Jerusalem.

### YOM KIPPUR WAR – 1973

Following the UNSC's Resolution 242 and a few years later in Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur War started and Egypt and Syria attacked Israel simultaneously. During that war, while Israel was aided from US, Syria and Egypt was aided by USSR. However Israel did not lose that war although it had some problems meanwhile. After UNSC's Resolution 338, Geneva Conference summoned but parties could not reach a solution. However, it started a dialogue and resulted the signing of Sinai Interim Agreement and Camp David Accords. Furthermore it provided returning Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and started normalization between Israel and Egypt.

### FIRST INTIFADA – 1987

Palestinian youths abandoned their passivity and faced with the Israeli Defense



Forces. During the clashes the youth preferred mostly civil disobedience, rallying in the squares and throwing Stones. In a short term, these demonstrations spread all over the Palestine. All people acted together and adopted being a citizen of Palestine. However, Israeli Defense Forces suppressed the protests heavily. As a result, young groups started to use Molotov cocktails and

to perform suicide bombings. According to BTselem, although 1124 Palestinian people were killed and approximately 16.000 Palestinian were imprisoned less than 50 Israeli civil were killed.

### **DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE – 1988**

On November 15, 1988 PLO announced Palestinian Declaration of Independence which, implicitly recognized Israel as a state. Furthermore State of Palestine recognized all resolutions after 1947 Partition Plan and especially pointed out of Resolution 242 and 338. According to Declaration of Independence, State of Palestine's borders will be based on 1947 UN Partition Plan. Moreover they called for an international conference to settle the 40-

year-old conflict. Some of the PLO officials also stated that this declaration initiated a peace process.

### **MADRID CONFERENCE – 1991**

In order to reach a solution and to end the 43-year-old armed conflict between Palestine and Israel, USSR and US invited Palestine to Madrid Conference. Because of the recognition problem, Palestine participated within the Jordan delegation. Although it did not reach a concrete solution, it was considered as

a good attempt and gesture for this conflict; since it was the first time these issues were discussed directly by Israel and Palestine.

### **OSLO ACCORDS – 1993**

Palestine and Israel for the first time started secret negotiations in Oslo. During the signing ceremony,



parties gave each other letters of mutual recognition. That means, PLO recognized State of Israel and Israel recognized PLO as legitimate representative of Palestinian people. As a result of these talks, an interim government, which would function for a 5 year term, would be established in order to find a way to end this conflict with Israel. After this recognition, a liaison committee was established in order to improve communications between parties. In these accords, economical issues, jurisdiction of Palestinian Interim Government, future elections of the Palestinian government were elaborated on.

Despite these accords, Israeli settlement expansion and armed conflicts continued and both sides could not fulfill their duties properly. Therefore these accords were criticized for not being affective.

#### **SECOND INTIFADA – 2000**

In 2000, al-Aqsa intifada started and continued for 5 years because of Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon's visit to Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and statements against Palestinian people. It leaded to widespread-armed attacks and protests. As a reaction to these attacks, Israel suppressed severely and used violence such as bombings with F-16 warplanes. After one year, Palestinians performed suicide bombings. During the Second Intifada, 6,371 Palestinians and 1,083 Israelis were killed in bloody conflicts.

#### **ROAD MAP PLAN – 2003**

Road Map plan was proposed by the Quartet in order to end armed clashes between Palestine and Israel. According to the plan, two-state solution would be the best choice for both sides. US, UN, EU and Russia proposed this plan, under three main phases.

1) Ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions (June 2003-December 2003)

2) Transition (June 2003-December 2003)

3) Permanent status agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2004-2005)

Nevertheless Israel did not accept the original plan and imposed 14 reservations to sign that plan.

#### **ARAFAT'S DEATH – 2004**

Arafat's death was a turning point for Palestine. After Arafat's death, Mahmoud Abbas was elected as president of Fatah and Palestine. In 2005, Israel started unilateral Disengagement Plan to separate Israel and Palestine borders clearly.

According to this plan, even Israeli citizens who wanted to live in same place

would be detached. That plan was criticized for not being decided on after bilateral negotiations with Palestinians and only comprising four West Bank settlements.

In 2006, Hamas won elections again and started an armed attack to Israeli troops in Gaza Strip since they aimed to destruct Israeli state and refused all previous agreements between Israel and Palestine. It was a trigger between these two parties and this conflict still continues. Because of the Hamas ruling, Western countries imposed sanctions and cut aiding to Gaza Strip. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by Israel, US, UK, Canada and Japan. On the other hand China, Russia and Turkey do not accept Hamas as a terrorist organization.

In addition, Israel inspects Gaza Strip borders strictly and continue Naval blockade due to Hamas's ongoing armed attacks. On the contrary, West Bank border is not inspected strictly and there is no embargo against Fatah since Fatah accepts Israel's

right to exist and makes an effort for peace talks between two parties in Palestinian territory. In 2007, domestic clashes started between Hamas and Fatah since Hamas victory in national elections in 2006 and Hamas militants attacked Fatah members in Gaza. After that, PLO Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas annulled Hamas Government in Fatah. Today there are two different governments in Palestine: one Hamas rules in Gaza and one Fatah rules in West Bank.



Between December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009 Israel started military operations in Gaza, in order to stop launching rockets to southern Israel,

preventing arm smuggling from borders and destruct terrorist bodies, which located in urban areas of Gaza. Therefore huge amounts of civilians died during these attacks.

### CAIRO AGREEMENT-2011

In 2011 Hamas and Fatah signed the Cairo Agreement to unify both Gaza and West Bank administrations in order to end conflict and create a more powerful

Palestine. On the other hand, Israel totally opposed that unification. Following that, in November 2011, leaders of the Hamas and Fatah met to solve problems to join the elections together as Interim Unity Government. But they failed again.

In 2011, The Palestinian Authority, which is used for West Bank administration since the 2006 election, tried to get recognition from UN, but because of the US's veto warning in Security Council, Palestine could not get recognition.

However, PA did get an observer status from General Assembly which also benefits PA. Moreover, PA also requested from UNESCO to be a full member. Despite US's threat of cutting donation, UNESCO recognized Palestine as a full member in November 2011. After that success, PA tried to be a full member from other UN bodies. On the other hand, US and Israel think that the only way of normalization is direct talks not unilateral UN initiatives.

In 2011, US government offered Palestinian and Israeli sides to define their borders according to 1967 borders. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority might adopt these borders if they could not agree with Israel in the negotiations. But Israel did not accept the "Green Line" since it is hard to defend themselves.

Since 2002, Israel had been constructing West Bank Barrier of hundreds of kilometers, because of security concerns. Its route is generally along with pre-1967 and

West Bank borders. In fact, 6-8% of West Bank territory is inside of the route. According to the Israel, Barrier will decrease terrorist attacks and suicide bombings in the region. But Palestinians argue with that, this barrier is totally illegal and it makes Palestinians life harder.

It prevents full access of their socially and economically needs behind of the wall like school, work and land. Even the US still has concerns about the effects of the permanent and divisive wall. Moreover UN also condemned construction of wall in its 2003 report and stated that construction of barrier is totally illegal and it annexes Palestinian territories. Lastly, ICJ ruled against the barrier and stated: West Bank Barrier violates the right of self-determination of Palestinians and it is tantamount to "de facto annexation".

But, Israel has kept constructing the wall since ICJ's decision is advisory. In late May 2012, according to Israel's defense minister

Ehud Barak, Israel should take into consideration to unilateral actions and imposing borders for future Palestinian state. On the other hand, Palestinian Authority opposed that offer, since they believed that the negotiations should be carried on and unilateral steps should not be taken. But Israeli Government also criticized the UN recognition efforts of Palestinians since they also are unilateral actions. Moreover, Israel started to evacuate its citizens from illegal settlement areas, which cause huge controversies between Fatah and Israel.

In 2014, Israel launched yet another operation aimed to stop rocket attacks from Gaza. Started on July 8, the operation has led to the loss of lives of more than 1900 Palestinians and 60 Israelis so far. There have been strong protests all over the world, especially in the Muslim world against Israel and in support of Hamas and Gaza. Several reports have confirmed the killing of civilians, children and innocent people during the operation. UN-run civilian

facilities have been attacked and widespread loss of property has been observed. The situation remains tense and with every passing day, the region descends into further chaos.

## SECURITY COUNCIL'S INVOLVEMENT

The UNSC has produced a span of over 200 resolutions during a span of 40 years. While it is obvious from the sheer amount of resolutions produced that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a subject discussed and looked over and over again (actually the SC has a monthly debate on the situation in the Middle East), the progress of the situations leaves a lot to be desired. Nevertheless, there are SC resolutions cornerstones that established the pattern about a possible settlement: Resolution 54-15/07/ 1948, which ordered all parties to call a cease-fire in the strongest possible terms, stating that any violation of this cease-fire would qualify as a 'breach of the peace' under Chapter 7 of



the United Nations Charter and trigger further action. However, no such action was taken.

Resolution 242-22/10/1967 was a mediation proposal, following the Six-Day-War. The text refers to a withdrawal from territories, termination of all claims and the independence of all states involved. Israel accepted it, but insisted on addressing the withdrawal from occupied territories through direct negotiations, thus excluding the United Nations. Egypt and Jordan accepted this proposal, whereas Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) strongly rejected it, saying that the resolution had, in essence, concluded that the Palestinian issue was merely a refugee issue. The resolution was not enforced and is still controversial to this day.

Resolution 338-22/10/1973 " ...calls for a cease fire" in Yom Kippur War and "the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts",

and "Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

As understood, even in the first years and decades of the conflict, the United Nations was often sidelined in peacemaking efforts in the region. Although the Security Council has 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' according to the Charter, it has not been able to address the Israel-Palestine conflict. The General Assembly, on the other hand, has taken a more active role in the conflict, repeatedly calling on parties to respect human rights. Although in theory it is possible for the General Assembly to 'overrule' the Security Council under the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution, this rarely happens. The Assembly is unable to compel the parties to work towards peace since its resolutions only have moral and

symbolic weight and are not legally binding.

The United Nations' practical role in recent decades, therefore, has been restricted to the activities of the Secretary-General and his envoys, supported by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which was established in 1992 and has come to play a central role in conflict prevention. The DPA is responsible for policy toward the Middle East peace process and provides support and guidance to the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), based in Gaza, Jerusalem and Ramallah.

What is interesting, lastly, to note is that both sides of the conflict are disappointed with the actions taken by the UN, with Israeli believing that they are prejudiced against and the Palestinians feeling that the SC Resolutions are merely there to placate them since their spirit has never seemed to be implemented.

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