

PMUNC 2014

Joint Crisis Committee

Chairs: Elise Backman, Lina Saud, Naomi Lee

Directors: Natalie Fahlberg



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Chair's Letter

Shalom and Salam! Our names are Elise Backman, Lina Saud, and Naomi Lee. We will be your chairs for the PMUNC 2014 Joint Crisis Committee (JCC): Negotiations in the Middle East, Israel-Fatah-Hamas. This three-way joint committee is one of the most ambitious projects that PMUNC has undertaken, and we are thrilled that you have chosen to embark on this important journey with us. Never before has PMUNC attempted a three-way JCC. We feel that this structure will provide delegates with an unprecedented opportunity to represent the three most important stakeholders in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and interact with one another in real-time. This will not only enhance each delegate's conference experience, but also more closely simulate the complex interrelated (and independent) realities on the ground. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most transcendent geopolitical issue that challenges leaders across the globe today. We believe that the mission of Model UN is to allow students the opportunity to engage with the world's most difficult problems. Given the events of this past summer, we find it all the more important for students to have the opportunity to seriously consider the gravity of their decisions. By the end of this conference, we are confident that this three-way JCC will navigate through the multitude of religious, political, economic, and ethnic differences and find a negotiated peace.

This committee is a passion project for us, and one that we wanted to create in this, our senior year at Princeton. Between the three of us, we have over twenty years of experience in organizing, staffing, and competing in Model UN conferences worldwide. **Lina** is a senior in the Woodrow Wilson School focusing on development studies and pursuing a certificate in Near Eastern Studies. She participated in PMUNC as a high school delegate, and since has chaired committees at PMUNC including the Libyan National Transitional Council and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. At Princeton, Lina has devoted much of her time to better understanding the nuances of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through coursework on its history and politics and through her travels in Palestine during several summers in both college and high school. Lina further explored the impact of the conflict on development as an intern at UNCTAD in Geneva, Switzerland this past summer. **Elise** also studies in the Woodrow Wilson School, with a focus on global governance and is pursuing certificates in Latin American Studies and Portuguese Language. She has spent most of her time at Princeton studying international economic development in Latin America and has worked and studied abroad in Brazil for the past three summers. She is current IRC Oversight and former IRC Vice President and Model UN Team Captain. Elise has organized both PMUNC and IRC's college conference, PICSim, as well as chaired several committees at IRC's international conference, the Mediterranean Model United Nations (MEDMUN) in Menton, France. Though Elise has always had an interest in Middle East diplomacy, her concern for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict coalesced after studying in Israel and Palestine in fall semester of her junior year. Thereafter, Elise focused her independent work on the impact of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement in the European Union on negotiations between Israel and Palestine.

She has continued to explore this interest as a student fellow in the Lichtenstein Institute of Self-Determination at the Woodrow Wilson School. **Naomi** is an independent concentrator at Princeton studying linguistics, computer science, and machine learning. She has a passion for the intricacies of language politics, which are particularly salient in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a former U.S. Department of State intern, Naomi focused on crisis diplomacy in the Balkans, particularly with regard to language differences in the Bosnian-Serbo-Croatian complex. Naomi is former IRC President and has also organized and competed at a number of Model UN conferences in the United States, Australia, France, and Brussels.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the most critical geopolitical issues that continues to challenge policymakers around the world. This committee will be centered around the negotiation process that has taken place over the past year in an attempt to create a final framework agreement between Israel and Palestine. The four core issues - borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and security - will be discussed at length during this committee. Violent acts perpetrated during the summer of 2014 have complicated attempts at peace. Further, throughout this struggle, a subset of tensions between Fatah and Hamas has exacerbated issues between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, each committee will be challenged with its own set of domestic political and developmental issues to tackle.

I: Introduction

A little background about the Joint Crisis format for those who are unfamiliar: each of us will chair one committee and work to let all three committees interact, each attempting to demonstrate its superiority and achieve its own goals in the negotiations process. The three of us are excited for the challenging learning experience and occasional tomfoolery that the Joint Crisis will inevitably provide. That being said, the three of us must stress the importance of maintaining decorum and respecting cultural sensitivity during this committee. Use common sense when portraying the ideological stances of the various political representatives in the three committees. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most contentious in today's geopolitical dialogue. As such, be cognizant of the personal sensitivities

of delegates in the committee room. The goal of this committee, and of Model UN as a whole, is a lasting, effective, and just peace.

If you have any questions about the committee, PMUNC, Princeton, or really anything at all, please feel free to reach out. We would love to hear from you (ebackman@princeton.edu, lsaud@princeton.edu, naomilee@princeton.edu). In addition to the information contained in this Background Guide, we will provide you with an Update Paper about one week before PMUNC begins to refresh you on all new issues, as well as to state when the “time-freeze” will be initiated. We are really looking forward to this, our last PMUNC, as well as its flagship committee, the Joint Crisis. Thank you for participating in this endeavor; we look forward to meeting you!

All the best,

Elise Backman '15, Lina Saud '15,

Naomi Lee '15

2. Goal of the JCC

The goal of this committee will be to develop a final framework agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians; such that was pursued until the start of Operation Protective Edge and the 2014 Israeli-Gaza conflict. **As a result, committees will be prohibited from pursuing unilateral or multilateral offensive military action on either of the other two committees.** Though Israel and Gaza officially refuse to acknowledge the authority of the other, the political capital of both parties will be necessary to reach a final framework agreement or any lasting peace. Further, following the end of Operation Protective Edge, Israel and Hamas will

need to discuss the future of the blockade of Gaza, security concerns, and infrastructural ties to the West Bank.

Delegates are expected to be well versed in the following topics as they pertain to their respective committees.

The structure of committee relations will proceed as follows:

- **TRILATERAL: Israel-Fatah-Hamas,** Final framework agreement (Four core issues in Section III)
- **BILATERAL**
 - **Israel-Fatah:** Concerns particular to West Bank
 - **Fatah-Hamas:** Future of unification agreement
 - **Israel-Hamas:** Negotiations following end of Operation Protective Edge

- **DOMESTIC: All three**

committees (individually),

Relevant domestic issues (see
Section V)

It is important to note that there are many final outcome proposals that have been put forward in recent years to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The “two-state solution” is certainly not the only outcome, but it is the one that has become the most popular and will facilitate negotiations best between the three committees. Thus, the two-state solution will be the focus of this JCC. For reference, other outcomes include a “one-state solution” (i.e. only Israel or only Palestine), or a joint government, with representation of both Israelis and Palestinians. Delegates should be familiar with these other proposals, in case they are discussed during negotiations.

3. Basic Procedure & Decorum Note

The three subcommittees of the Joint Crisis have been structured to parallel each other, with corresponding positions represented in all three. Achieving this balance – and narrowing the size of each to sixteen delegates – has required the exclusion of some minor players and the addition of others who are in reality not committee members, ex/ military advisers and financiers. While this does sacrifice some degree of realism, it is meant to ensure that both committees have an equal chance of negotiating peace successfully and effectively, and that delegates are exposed to a broad range of opinions and avenues of action. Similarly, some characters have been invented to provide diversity of portfolios and round out the often fluid

leadership structure of these organizations.

The committees will be run without parliamentary procedure. Debate will instead rotate between informal moderated caucus and unmoderated caucus. The chairs will call upon and solicit opinions from delegates.

Delegates will receive intelligence, both raw and finished, in addition to news items, and will be required to present their own analyses to the committee.

This committee will be run as an executive body, and not as a voting assembly; the chairs will make all decisions, and there will be no official voting procedure in the committee.

However, delegates may call at any time for a straw poll to gauge the sentiments of the committee, and the chair will, while exercising ultimate discretion, seek to act according to the

recommendations of his ministers. The committees are sizable given their fast pace, and as such, strict regulation by the chairs will be necessary to ensure that the committee remains on task and everyone is heard. As a result, delegates will learn to concisely articulate their points. Each committee may, at times, split into smaller working groups (similar to a caucus environment) to deal with specific aspects of issues, or writing particular parts of a more comprehensive plan.

Delegates will be challenged to participate in committee-wide (and, at some points, bi- and tri-committee) efforts while pursuing unilateral interests. Committee actors will have the power to write action orders, which will affect the crisis-universe if they are sufficiently realistic (i.e. within the powers of the player) and specific.

Delegates also have the ability to submit intelligence requests and write communiqués. However, please keep in mind that all action, unilateral and multilateral, is ultimately at the chair's discretion, and that information can at any time be leaked.

Debate is expected to be intelligent, productive, and at times lively, but always cordial. Given the grave nature of the issues that will be debated over the course of the weekend, delegates are expected to display a high level of maturity and professionalism in dealing with sensitive issues that may have personal overtones for some. Foreign policy decisions have real consequences for real people, and it is critical not to become so engrossed in the simulation of this tragic conflict that one forgets the gravity of what is being contemplated, debated, or executed. That being said,

this committee is meant to be enjoyable and educational, and we encourage an appropriate sense of humor from each of you – the chairs and directors intend to do the same.

The role of the delegates is two-fold.

They are to advise and lobby the chairs in the capacity of the position they are in, as well as to execute the duties and tasks particular to their position and the scope of their individual authority.

While the specific background of your position will give you greater authority and awareness of some issues, your input is required on all matters, and you should not feel bound or limited by the position to which you have been assigned. The purpose of having all the experts in one room is so that they can each weigh in on all issues.

Despite differences in rank or seniority, you are all considered to be of equal standing. One aspect of a crisis committee such as this that delegates often fail to fully capitalize upon is that they possess significant authority and responsibility in the execution of their duties. For example, members are expected to remain in frequent, if not constant, contact with their respective ministries to gain new and pertinent information for the committee. Military officials and operational planners are expected to keep up to date with our capabilities and ongoing operations. It is absolutely imperative that delegates not become so immersed in the simulation that he or she takes to concocting information or initiating unauthorized operations. All information will come through the crisis staff.

It is also crucial that delegates remain “in character.” The positions have been clearly defined and the players’ backgrounds deliberately constructed so as to create a certain balance and atmosphere within the committee. You may be required to take a stance that contravenes your personal feelings or opinions, but it will contribute greatly to the realism of the committee and will give you the opportunity to broaden your own understanding. It is also crucial that no collaboration occur between delegates across committees. To begin with, it will be difficult to conceal such collaboration from the chairs, and moreover, it will reduce the quality of everyone’s committee experience.

On the subject of committee awards and judging: Our assessment will be based on how well you performed within the scope of your position, and how much

you constructively and plausibly contributed to the committee's operations. We will consider your performance given the information available to you at the time, meaning that if you come to a logical and sensible conclusion based on faulty intelligence, you will be rewarded more than if you accidentally stumbled across the right conclusion in a way that wasn't corroborated by the intelligence at hand. As such, there is no advantage to collaborating with the opposing committee. Judging is not necessarily a test of who comes in with the most background knowledge nor who speaks the loudest and longest nor who agrees obsequiously with the chairs.

You will also be judged on your ability to cooperate with the others for the benefit of the committee and the security of the state. Given the importance of the

mission of each committee and what is at stake, taking a hard-line stance is neither necessarily appropriate nor helpful. There are exceptions; certain positions require ideological or doctrinal purity more than others. For the most part, however, ministers understand the value of compromise and settling for a lesser of evils in order to achieve higher goals. The business of negotiation requires pragmatism and operators must be accustomed to disappointment and failure without losing sight of the greater goal. When deciding what actions to pursue, the chairs will give stronger consideration to consensus recommendations. As such, it is helpful if you try not only to persuade the chairs, but also your fellow delegates. Finally, we will also consider the level to which each delegate contributes to an amicable and fun atmosphere in the committee.

4. A Special Note on Specificity

The Trilateral effort of the JCC will form the cornerstone of committee experience for delegates. In an effort to pursue realism to the greatest extent that the Model UN dynamic will allow, we ask delegates to spend a considerable amount of time on <http://ispeacepossible.com/> as well as

other sites (a few helpful ones are listed in the appendix of this guide).

Committee action (unilateral and multilateral) will require specific details that can be furnished by the maps presented on ispeacepossible.com (as well as other sites). **Specificity with regard to maps and border drawing will be imperative in the resolution of this crisis.**

II: History of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (pre-framework Agreement)

The territorial conflict between Israel and Palestine has deep historical roots. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, many European authors with Jewish roots began writing in response to rising anti-Semitism in Europe (especially in France and Russia). They were intellectually motivated by the idea of emancipation from the Enlightenment, which in turn caused an increase in popularity of Jewish nationalism. Later in the century, the First Aliyah (“the ascent”) occurred, and many Jews began to “return” from diaspora (i.e. various European countries) to the land of Palestine, which at the time was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. During the First Aliyah, an estimated 25,000- 35,000 Jews immigrated to Ottoman Palestine;

they were later followed by a wave of 20,000 Jewish refugees escaping the Russian pogroms during the Second Aliyah. As the demographic balance in Palestine began to shift, Palestinians living in the region became increasingly uneasy. This unrest coalesced in the 1920 riots of Old Jerusalem in protest of the Zionist movement.

During this period of intense immigration, the League of Nations came to influence territories previously administered by the then-defunct Ottoman Empire. This mandate system would help the administration of “non-governing territories;” the land of Palestine was one of those territories affected. Overseen by British mandatory authority, the Mandate of Palestine was created in order to secure the advancement of its population and

“facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine-Eretz Israel.”

In the early twentieth century, Jewish and Palestinian communities flourished; they were able to expand their economies and build cultural networks. However, soon after the mandate’s creation in 1922, development and increased Jewish immigration was restricted by the White Papers of 1930 and 1939. The White Papers’ publication reduced the number of Jews that could immigrate to Palestinian territory and become landowners.

Despite the increased number of protests from the Palestinian community and backlash from the international community, many Jews continued to make Aliyah. The Third through Fifth Aliyahs resulted in over 250,000 Jews immigrating to Palestinian territory, largely as a result of World War II and

the Holocaust. The Peel Commission of 1937 heard a proposal of solutions to resolve increased tensions in the region. In that year, the Commission issued a recommendation to abolish the mandate of 1922 and divide the country between Palestinians and Jews. The Commission “did not believe that Jewish immigration was detrimental to the financial well-being of the Arab population and assumed that the issue of Jewish immigration would be resolved within the Jewish state,” indicating the inability of the British to resolve immigration tensions. Ultimately, the representatives of Palestinians rejected the proposal, and it was not implemented (though it is often referenced in modern-day negotiations).

Later, in the Woodhead Commission of 1938, the British government recommended new boundaries that

would “(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment... of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states; (b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa; and (c) enable the British government to carry out its 'Mandatory responsibilities.'”

Knowing that the Peel Commission’s plan was politically untenable, the Woodhead Commission attempted to devise a new plan for the division of territory. However, the plan was again rejected, leaving the international community without an ability to effectively reduce tensions in the region and prevent future violence.

Due to exorbitant debts after World War II, the inevitable independence of India, and the shrinking global economy, the British realized that their control over Palestine was both no longer

geopolitically beneficial or logistically possible. Both Jewish and Palestinian outfits began to fight the British as well as each other in this period of increased ethnic violence. The Palestinians began systematic boycotts of British goods, and many extremist Jewish groups, including the Haganah, were created. These groups attacked British convoys and officers.

After the atrocities of the Holocaust became well-publicized, the international community (particularly through European actors) came to champion the Zionist cause. This culminated in the United Nations’ 1947 partition plan. In addition, the UN created the [United Nations Special Committee on Palestine](#) (UNSCOP) to specifically address the conflict. This committee proposed “an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem” to be

governed under “an International Trusteeship System.”

Representatives of the Jews living in Palestine accepted the 1947 partition plan, but the Palestinians rejected it. This resulted in a war between the Jewish people in Palestine and the Palestinians, who were supported militarily by neighboring Arab states. The significant amount of violence during the 1948 War displaced 700,000 Palestinians, and so began the start of the Palestinian refugee crisis. This civil war eventually led to Israeli independence. After the [UN General Assembly](#) adopted the [resolution to partition Palestine](#), Britain announced the termination of its Mandate over Palestine in 1948. On May 14, 1948, Israel proclaimed itself to be a state, and almost immediately after, Prime Minister Ben Gurion implemented the “One Million Plan.” This plan was

developed in 1944, and sought to bring one million Jews to establish demographic hegemony in the region.

1949 marked the establishment of the Green Line, the armistice line drawn between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In that same year, Jordan annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while Egypt annexed Gaza, furthering tensions between Arabs and Jews in the region.

As tensions between Jews and Arabs increased throughout the Middle East, Jews in states like Yemen, Iraq, and Iran were compelled to immigrate to Israel for fear of their safety. During this time, the linguistic notion of separate statehood came to the fore; Jews living in Palestine became “Israelis,” while Arabs living in this land became collectively known as “Palestinians.”

Simultaneously, a number of Palestinian *fedayeen* (anti-Israeli guerilla groups) developed in the region. These groups

frequently conducted anti-Zionist raids in the area, which were exacerbated by conflicts in Gaza and the Suez Canal. Following World War II, American foreign policy was preoccupied with the Marshall Plan and stymying Soviet influence around the world; conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians was not a priority. Any small intervention, American or British, during that time generally increased the possibility of conflict between Jews and Arabs.

In the 1960s, tensions escalated further, culminating in the Six Day War. The Six Day War, also known as the June War, occurred in 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In response to continued Egyptian aggression in the war of attrition, Israel launched a pre-emptive military attack that decimated the Egyptian air force. The conflict

rapidly escalated and came to include Syria and Jordan. Within six days, Israel had won a massive land victory, taking control of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The result of this conflict not only proved to the international community and Israel's Arab's neighbors of the power of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), but also precipitated much of the border crisis observed in the modern-day Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This annexation of land only increased tensions in the following decades. During the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Palestinian militants kidnapped and killed members of the Israeli Olympic team, resulting in a huge media spectacle and further heightening tensions. In addition, Israeli special forces bombed the PLO headquarters in

Lebanon at the time, adding to the Palestinian resentment of Israel. In 1973, in an attempt to regain land lost to Israel in the Six Day War, Egypt and Syria launched a simultaneous surprise attack on Israel. Now known as the Yom Kippur War, this conflict led to Israeli retaliation and recapturing of the Golan Heights. Moreover, in July of 1976, the Entebbe Raid occurred when Palestinian militants hijacked a plane headed from Tel Aviv to Paris. The PLO continued to fight Israeli occupation (which it then viewed as the entire land of Palestine) through violent tactics late into the century.

Later in the 1970s, however, Israeli tensions with Egypt decreased with the Egyptian change of power from Nasser to Sadat. Although Sadat launched the Yom Kippur War, his greatest legacy is a landmark peace deal with Israel that

still stands today. The Camp David Accords, facilitated by the United States and signed at Camp David, signaled the first sign of a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world. However, the 1981 Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, in addition to fighting in Lebanon, the Sabra and Shatila massacres, and the bombing of Tunis only decreased the possibility of peace between Israelis and Palestinian people.

1987 marked a new conflict between Israel and Palestine. Allegations of atrocities committed by the Israeli government spread among Palestinians and led to the outcry of the Palestinian people, sparking the First Intifada.

Large riots broke out in Jabalya in December 1987, causing unrest that spread in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. This civil unrest even led to the throwing of a gasoline bomb at the

United States consulate in East Jerusalem, an area of the city then controlled by Israel. During the First Intifada (from 1988 to 1992), over 1,000 Palestinian civilians and over 100 Israeli civilians were killed.

The Oslo Accords of 1993 were a historic turning point in the relations between Israel and its neighbors, because both Israel and Palestine finally acknowledged each others' existence in the region. The Palestinian Authority, headed by Yasser Arafat, gained the right to govern parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the PLO officially recognized Israel's right to exist. Overall, the public response to news of the settlement was mixed.

While many international organizations were pleased with news of this new Israeli-Palestinian "peace," citizens of the respective territories were infuriated. Palestinians were

angry with the continued existence of checkpoints and new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, while Israelis were infuriated by the continuation of Palestinian attacks. Ultimately, the Oslo Accords led to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, in 1995 by right-winged fanatic Israelis. The assassination of Rabin -- someone who many believe was in the process of crafting a lasting peace deal with Palestine -- dealt a big blow to the prospect of peace in the region.

The situation worsened as a result of the Second Intifada. In 2000, Ariel Sharon, soon-to-be Prime Minister of Israel, began to pray on the Temple Mount, known by Arabs as "al-Haram al-Sharif," where the third holiest site in Islam, the al-Aqsa Mosque, is located. Sharon's actions were a symbolic insult to Arabs and

Palestinians alike. Israelis and Palestinians attacked each other in Jerusalem. There was an international outcry, and Yasser Arafat called for both sides to “move immediately to stop these aggressions and any action against holy Jerusalem.” Another Camp David Summit was held in 2000, but it failed miserably. Politicians in the Knesset supported the construction of a wall in Jerusalem. President Clinton's last major attempt at peace before leaving the presidency occurred in 2000 at Camp David. Although the Israelis conceded more than ever before (or ever since), Yasser Arafat still rejected the proposal (the leader of the Palestinians today, Mahmoud Abbas, said that he would have taken the deal). The failure of the talks also precipitated the Second Intifada. Following these events, and the Palestinians’ perception that Fatah

failed to secure statehood, a significant political rift occurred. Fatah, the mainstream Palestinian political party, and Hamas, a militant and extremist party tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, were supported equally in the 2006 Palestinian elections. As internal tensions mounted, Israel (under the authority of Prime Minister Sharon) unilaterally evacuated from Gaza in 2007, leading to the control of the West Bank by Fatah, and Gaza by Hamas. Several hundred thousand IDF forces were needed to evacuate comparatively few Jewish communities in Gaza. In particular, the removal of a graveyard in Gush Etzion, a Jewish community in Gaza, struck an emotional chord in the Israeli national consciousness, and has soured any serious dialogue about the removal of settlements since. In an effort to resolve these issues, the United States

hosted the Annapolis Conference, at the United States Naval Academy, which attempted to facilitate a dialogue between the three parties as a roadmap for peace. Though useful proposals were discussed, the conference failed to produce a long-lasting framework for peace.

Despite the evacuation of Israelis from Gaza, violence between the two entities increased in 2007 to 2008. In response to continued rocket fire from Hamas and the threat of arms smuggling, Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in late 2008. Israel's military action against Hamas in Gaza included airstrikes, naval attacks, and a ground incursion by the IDF. Hamas rocket and mortar attacks reached civilian targets in southern Israel, in Beersheba and Ashdod. Ultimately, this conflict led to nearly 1,500 Palestinian deaths, 13 Israeli deaths, serious infrastructural destruction

in Gaza, and heightened regional tensions. A similar pattern of mutual Israeli-Hamas responsive attacks and significant rocket fire from Gaza precipitated Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense. In November 2012, Israel conducted Operation Pillar of Defense. In it, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spent eight days fighting Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip. During this time, the Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigade orchestrated mortar attacks that were launched at civilian centers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Four Israeli civilians and 102 Palestinian civilians were killed as a result of the week-long operation. It is important to note the lasting effect of the conflicts between Israel and Gaza on the effectiveness of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israelis cite a causal link between their evacuation of Gaza and the subsequent increase in terrorism and violence on their western border, while

Palestinians blame the violence on Israel's policies in the territories, including the blockade of Gaza and use of checkpoints. Following each conflict between Israel and Gaza, both sides claim to have achieved a victory, which further shows the complexity of violence perception in the region.

Against the recommendations of several international leaders, in early 2013, the new U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, announced that a new round of negotiations would occur between Israel and Palestine (i.e. Fatah; Israel and Hamas continue to officially not recognize the authority of the other). However, this round would aim to be an "end of claims," or develop a final framework agreement concerning borders, security, refugees, and Jerusalem; the four most contentious issues involved in the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict. Negotiations were kept extremely secret for fear of the press influencing leaders' ability to come to an effective compromise. Though the talks were extended in early summer of 2014, an outbreak of violence between Gaza and Israel derailed negotiations. In June 2014, in response to missile fire launched by Hamas in Gaza into Israel and the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers, Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip with the objective of destroying Hamas' missile capacity. This recent conflict led to 2,143 Palestinian deaths, 72 Israeli deaths, and further infrastructural damage to an already struggling Gaza. It also significantly injured Israel's reputation in the international community. United Nations representatives have accused both Israel and Hamas of committing war crimes during the seven-week conflict. It is important to note that despite the losses

on both sides, Israel and Hamas each independently view the 2014 conflict as a victory. Though outraged at the deaths in Gaza, Fatah remained relatively quiet during the violence in June-July. A senior advisor to President Abbas in fact stated that Hamas should admit its defeat as a result of Operation Protective Edge. The unification of Fatah-Hamas, let alone any long-lasting resolution of conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, remains very much ambiguous.

Today, the following issues -- known as Final Status Issues -- are those that both sides believe need to be addressed before a peace deal can be reached: settlements, security, refugees, Jerusalem, and borders.

III: Trilateral Focus: Final Issues for Framework Agreement

Borders

One important element of the conflict to be considered by the committee is the border that will encompass Israel and the future state of Palestine. This issue boils down to a disagreement based on Israeli demographics versus the contiguity and viability of the Palestinian state. Both sides of the conflict see the territory as its own. The Palestinians view historic Palestine as its homeland; the combination of the Green Line and 1967 conflict reduced Palestinian territory to 22% of its size before the early twentieth century Jewish immigration waves. During the Oslo Accords of 1988, Palestine accepted a two-state solution that created a Palestinian state along the Green Line. Thus, Palestinians will not

accept anything less than 100% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (22% of their original homeland; their “Historic Compromise,”) or an equivalent (in quality and quantity) amount defined by mutually agreed land swaps.

The Israelis, however, viewed the results of the Six Day War as an arbitrary armistice. Currently, Israeli territory lies between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Israelis are concerned about security issues, and question whether being surrounded by the country’s enemies without a buffer zone will endanger the civilian population. Further complicating the issue is the demographic reality of the West Bank. 12 large population centers lie beyond the Green Line, and any Israeli Prime Minister would have difficulty obtaining the requisite political capital to order the evacuate of such a

great percentage of the Israeli population; let alone coordinate the logistics of such an enterprise.

A current solution to the issue is the idea of mutually agreed-upon land swaps, which would create a contiguous Palestinian state near the 1967 lines.

This solution would theoretically incorporate a majority of the Israeli population, with no major Jewish urban centers relinquished to the Palestinian state. Many proposals offer land swaps that would provide Palestine with empty space for development and potential reintegration of Palestinian refugees.

The solution further proposes a corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza would unite Palestine, but critics argue that would inhibit the use of important Israeli infrastructure. In addition, Palestinian and Israeli representatives disagree over what would define “equal,” and whether

this definition must pertain to both quality and quantity. The oversight of the land swaps is another important issue for consideration. Other more recent proposals to be considered include those suggested by the Geneva Initiative (2003), the Annapolis Institute (2008), the Baker Institute (2010) and the Washington Institute (2011).

<http://www.geneva-accord.org/>

<http://bakerinstitute.org/files/399/>

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport06.pdf>

Security

Another important part of the final framework agreement is the discussion of security. Both Israel and Palestine and a shared interest in protecting their interests and populations. Threats to the region, inflicted by both sides, include conventional military attacks on the

ground and aerial attacks, since the territory is within striking distance of any of the Arab countries in the region. Other threats include terrorism and arms smuggling of arms, through Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Israel should consider ways of combating and preventing these concerns. In particular, Israel needs to think of the strategic depth of maintaining military presence in the Jordan Valley and the area around Jerusalem. The high ground of the West Bank protects airports, the road network, and the seam zone, but Israeli control over this territory is inconsistent with the proposed two-state solution. Israel should also consider the costs of maintaining control over this area, as to whether to support counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency. Israel's perception in the international community has been

significantly injured by the conflict, especially in the European Union (EU), as demonstrated in the recent United Nations Goldstone Report. Further unrest in the region could potentially embolden Iran and cause Israel to become a target for other attacks.

Palestine should consider contiguity and viability while meeting its security concerns in the region. Proposals stipulate that the Palestinian Authority would have a monopoly over the use of weapons in the new Palestinian state, which would have no standing army. The Palestinian force, whose training has been assisted by American specialists, has done much to thwart potential terrorist attacks in recent years. There would be a prohibition on alliances with Israeli enemies and heightened border controls, which could work towards ending pervasive and increasing

international anti-Semitism. Israel wants access to airspace, early warning stations, control over the electromagnetic spectrum, and security over the West Bank/Gaza corridor.

Israel is concerned that if it were to fully pull out its army from the West Bank, the territory would just become a hub for terrorists and arms smuggling. Currently, the multi-layered missile defense system called the “Iron Dome” is being used to fortify a border in the sky between Palestine and Israel. Most believe there must be a plan put in place that either allows for a gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank (especially on the Jordanian border) or for an international military force to be put in place -- all until a point at which the Palestinian security force is aptly trained and equipped.

Jerusalem

Jerusalem, the most sacred city of Christianity and Judaism and a major holy site in Islam, is envisioned as the capital of both Israel (Yerushalayim) and Palestine (Al-Quds). The administration of the capital of the two states is complex, and must also navigate the city’s delicate religious and historical infrastructure. Delegates should consider what body would secure access to religious sites, monitor compliance, and deal with border crossings.

Jerusalem also needs to be considered in any negotiations in the final framework agreement, because of the massive religious and political significance it has in the region. The Church of Holy Sepulcher, Temple Mount, Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Western Wall all play an important religious role for Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Any proposal would need to feature two

viable, contiguous cities with effective security measures that do not compromise the urban fabric of Yerushalayim and Al-Quds. This proposal should draw a distinction between Municipal Jerusalem and the Old City (which is complicated by the presence of both state and religious functions in the Historical Basin). Jerusalem is already a divided city: in West Jerusalem, there are a vast majority of Jews, while in East Jerusalem there are a vast majority of Palestinian Muslims and Christians. Options for the division of Jerusalem include an Open Plan: the construction of border outside of city. This plan would require economic cooperation, while a “Divided City” would be architecturally difficult. This city would need to feasibly both be separate and connected.

There are multiple options that can be pursued in a final framework agreement to resolve the issue surrounding Jerusalem. Territorial sovereignty (i.e. Jewish/Armenian, guaranteed access to Temple Mount and Hasmonean tunnel, Palestinian over Muslim sites) minimizes creeping demographic and hegemonic concerns. Though the plan lends itself to an end of claims., this proposal requires waiving key equities, minimizes Israel/Palestine cooperation, and will result in physical division and logistical challenges. A special regime, using a third party, multilateral, or joint management could defer end of claims but would be complicated and in the long term cause even more resentment amongst Israelis and Palestinians. Finally, a hybrid government with no physical boundaries, based on international involvement (focused and sensitive areas) could be a viable option.

Refugees

Another important stumbling block to peace is the issue of refugees. The 1948 War displaced over 700,000 Arabs living in Palestine. The Palestinians today blame Israel for this refugee crisis. Israel blames the Palestinians for leaving of their own accord during the conflict, and further argues that many Jews were displaced as a result of the war as well.

One important question includes the definition of a modern-day refugee. Most agree that the first generation of Palestinians who themselves left their homes during the initial conflict are refugees. The UN committee in charge of the question of Palestinian refugees, United Nations Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), still considers all descendants of the original refugees to

themselves be refugees -- that would qualify 914,221 people (60% of whom live in either Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon).

The Palestinian leadership demands the right of return to Israel for the refugees and monetary compensation for their displacement. The Israelis have shown a willingness to allow in the first generation refugees, but fear that allowing all refugees would create a huge demographic problem for the Israelis (see domestic considerations below). Israel also believes it would be unfair for them to have to compensate the Palestinian refugees if the Arab nations that expelled hundreds of thousands of Jews in the twentieth century do not have to do the same.

On the other hand, Israelis do not believe in a right of return and do not wish to take responsibility for the refugee crisis.

They demand that Palestinians recognize that Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people and end their claims to the territory. However, United Nations Resolution 194 presents the potential for Jews to become minority in their state. Israel has allowed symbolic recognition of the Palestinian refugee plight with minimal implementation of actual right of return. Currently, the Palestinian Authority is softening its stance by pursuing a “just solution” instead of a hardline right of return. Compromises will have to be met in other areas, which delegates should address. These areas include citizenship, permanent residence, compensation, and choice of solution.

costs of rehabilitation and compensation in the areas of health and education. A new solution must consider property loss and refugee status. In addition, the conflict may need a new implementation body (as the UN perceived as biased against the Israelis).

Options for resettlement include offering all Palestinian refugees citizenship in new state of Palestine. Other issues delegates should consider include the

IV. Other Stakeholders' Opinions to Consider

This is a useful site for better understanding the complex network that connects state and non-state stakeholders in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

<http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/the-middle-east-key-players-notable-relationships/>

There are many important actors that delegates will need to consider during the simulation. First, delegates must consider the more extreme domestic factions that are not represented in committee, such as hardline members of Hamas, as well as extremely conservative Likud members and the orthodox rabbinate in Israel. In addition, the committee must take into account the opinions of key nations and intergovernmental organizations

involved in the conflict, including the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. Their support will be crucial in the upcoming months, and it is the responsibility of the delegates to obtain it.

The United States has shown support of Israel in the past, so Israel should maintain a dialogue with the United States regarding all potential outcomes of the negotiations as well as unilateral actions taken in the region, especially with respect to Gaza. Following the eruption of violence in Summer 2014, the international community is especially weary of Israeli military action, as well as any strikes by Hamas against Israel. Hamas is still considered a terrorist organization by the majority of the global powers. However, international actors will seek to limit intolerance and violence on both sides. While Israel will

seek to maintain its sovereignty, secure its borders, and protect the lives of its citizens, it is imperative that Israel collaborates with international actors.

This committee will be restricted to discussions concerning a final framework agreement between Israel and Palestine, which will require the political capital of Fatah and Hamas.

In addition, involved parties should look towards the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for assistance. Though Israel has historically perceived the UN as biased against Israeli interests, a resolution of the conflict will need the blessing of the UN. The Security Council could use its power to compel the end of a stalemate, or pressure either side.

Other nations in the region may come into play during committee, such as Iran,

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt; regional bodies such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council will also be important for delegates to analyze. ISIS and Hezbollah are non-state actors that continue to significantly influence geopolitics in the region. International terrorist coalitions will seek to destabilize the peace process. Though Egyptian and Jordanian officials have emphasized that Hamas does not serve Arab interests through its attacks on Israeli targets, other Arab nations, such as Qatar, still maintain a positive relationship with Hamas.

V. Bilateral and Domestic Issues

Bilateral Issues

Fatah/Hamas Unification: Issues yet to be decided by a future committee include the division of security responsibilities, as Fatah and the PA continue to control the West Bank and Hamas Gaza under the current arrangement. This, among other issues, was discussed during the June 2011 follow-up negotiations. However, these discussions fell apart over the central issue of the Prime Ministership following the rejection of Salam Fayyad, current PA Prime Minister, by Hamas. No further meaningful progress towards an interim coalition government has been made. Today, many Palestinians harbor a general distrust of Fatah, paradoxically considering Arafat both a

heroic symbol and an unsuccessful leader that abused their negotiating position and foreign aid for his own personal enrichment. By contrast, Hamas executes a number of social programs that help the severely impoverished in the Palestinian territories. While Fatah and the PA's power has diminished, Hamas has increased its stronghold in Gaza and other Arab nations. The Western world and Israel refuse to recognize Hamas as anything but a terrorist organization until it accepts Israel's right to exist and forswears violence.

Blockade of Gaza & End of Operation

Protective Edge: Over the course of the summer of 2014, action taken by the IDF through Operation Protective Edge and rockets fired by Hamas resulted in the deaths of over 2,220 people. During the seven-week period, several ceasefires,

organized by the U.S. and Egypt, were rejected by Hamas and/or subsequently violated by both sides. On August 24th, the two sides agreed to an indefinite ceasefire. Israel agreed to ease the blockade on Gaza, open border crossings for more aid to pass through and extend the fishing limit off the coast to six miles, according to a senior Egyptian government official interviewed by CNN. However, larger issues still need to be resolved, and both Israel and Hamas leaders have promised to return to Cairo for future talks. This process will be complicated by tensions between Hamas and many powerful international actors, as well as the severe economic, infrastructural, and human loss in Gaza. Hamas's demands include a seaport, an airport, and the release of prisoners held in Israeli jails. Israel demands the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Negotiators may discuss the potential

return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip to take responsibility for the crossings between Egypt and Israel, as well as overseeing reconstruction.

Domestic Issues:

Delegates are expected to have some knowledge of the following issues (pertaining to their specific committee). Over the course of four days the focus of the committees will be on trilateral and bilateral issues (as described above), but these issues will also become important and will help to inform the political realities of delegates' decision-making.

Israel:

- **Changing Demographics:** Arab-Israelis (not including Palestinians living in contested areas) comprise around 20 percent of the Israeli population. They are also the fastest growing

demographic in Israel. One the greatest existential challenges Israelis will face in coming years is the question of Israel's status as a "Jewish" state if the majority of the state is not, in fact, Jewish. As a democratic state that inherently respects majoritarianism, how can Israel, with a shrinking Jewish population, remain the "homeland for the Jewish people?" This challenge complicates the peace process as well; Prime Minister Netanyahu has stipulated that Palestinians must not only recognize Israel's right to exist, but its right to exist as a *Jewish* state. Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, has stated that Palestine already recognized Israel's right to exist

as a state in the Oslo Accords (1993). He argues that no other nation with diplomatic relations with Israel is required to recognize Israel's religious identity, and that an additional burden should not be imposed on Palestinians, who also have a democratic duty to their Arab (non-Jewish) Israeli neighbors.

- Political blowback from conservative Israelis living in settlements in West Bank
- Marriage laws and role of secular Judaism in Israeli politics
- Haradeem participation in IDF
- Negev/Bedouins
- Water issues in the Jordan Valley
- Rise of anti-Semitism / anti-Zionism in international community
- Relationship with U.S.

Fatah

- Water shortages in the West Bank
- Economic development:
 - Overcoming building/land restrictions imposed by Israel in the West Bank
 - Overcoming limitations on movement imposed by Israel in the West Bank
 - Developing trade relations and systems of trade (requires that Israel lift restrictions on border and internal movement)
- Releasing prisoners held by Israel
- Ending settlement construction
 - How to deal with settlements that block the geographic continuity of the West Bank

- Relations with Jordan
- Relations with the GCC
- Building an airport in Ramallah
- Visa procedures
- Ending the siege on Gaza

Hamas

- Aftermath of Operation Protective Edge
 - Humanitarian assistance
 - International law violations / use of human shields
- Ideology / identification as terrorist organization by majority of global powers
- Siege and blockade of Gaza / dealing with bifurcated state
- Water issues, infrastructural development
- Building job market
- Relationship with GCC (especially Qatar)

- Relationship with Hezbollah and
other terrorist organizations

VI. Questions to consider/ position files

1. How does the unification of Fatah and Hamas affect negotiations between Israel and Palestine?
2. Please discuss some of the potential outcomes of negotiations between Israel and Palestine (e.g. joint government in one state, two separate states, etc.), and the costs/benefits of each scenario.
3. How can Israel balance its stated desire to be formally recognized by the international community as a “Jewish state” with its constitutional commitment to democracy? How does this impact the negotiations process?
4. Could Jerusalem serve as capital of both Israel and Palestine? What are some policy options that could be pursued to achieve this goal?
5. What are the political and ideological constraints that affect all three parties and will inform their stance at the negotiating table?
6. What are some opportunities for cooperation between any two or three of the represented parties outside of formal negotiations?

VII. Position Files

1. Israel

To obtain a better understanding of Israel’s views on the peace process, especially in the aftermath of this summer’s events in Gaza, please take a moment to watch this video of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressing the United Nations General Assembly (29 September 2014):

<http://www.c-span.org/video/?321761-2/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-addresses-un-general-assembly>.

(Chair) Prime Minister: Benjamin Netanyahu

Israeli Negotiator and Minister of Justice: Tzipi Livni

Chief Negotiator: Yitzhak Molcho

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Avigdor Lieberman

Israeli Ambassador to U.S.: Ron Dermer

Minister of Defense: Moshe Ya'alon

Minister of Industry, Trade, Labor &

Minister of Religious Affairs: Naftali Bennett

Minister of Development of Negev and Galilee, Regional Cooperation: Silvan Shalom

Minister of Finance: Yair Lapid

Head of Arab-Israeli MK Bloc &

Deputy Speaker of Knesset: Ahmed Tibi

Chief of Staff of Israeli Defense Forces: Benny Gantz

Leader of the Opposition & Chairman of Labor Party: Isaac Herzog

Minister of Intelligence and Strategic Affairs: Yuval Steinitz

Director of Mossad: Tamir Pardo

Minister of Housing and Construction: Uri Ariel

2. Fatah

(Chair) PNA President: Mahmoud Abbas

Chief Palestinian Negotiator: Saeb Erekat

Palestinian Negotiator; Dean of Student Affairs at Birzeit University;

Minister of the Palestinian Economic

Council for Research and Development: Mohammad Shtayyeh

Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council; Advisory Board Member to the World Bank-MENA and the International Human Rights Council: Hanan Ashrawi

Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council; Member of PLO Central Council: Mustafa Barghouti

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Iyad al-Malki

Minister of Prisoners Affairs: Issa Qaraqa

Minister of National Economy: Hasan Abu Libdeh

Minister of Planning and Development: Ali al-Jarbawi

Minister of Labor: Ahmed Majdalani

Minister of Transportation: Saadi al-Krunz

Prime Minister of the new Palestinian consensus government: Rami Hamdallah

3. Hamas

Deputy Chief of the Political Bureau: Mousa Abu Marzouq

Co-Founder of Hamas and Current Foreign Minister, Prime Negotiator in Gaza Ceasefire Agreement: Mahmoud al-Zahar

Interior Minister, Negotiator in Gaza Ceasefire Agreement: Said Saim

Former Prime Minister of Gaza and Former Head of Hamas: Ismail Haniyeh

Speaker of Palestinian Parliament and Former President of the PNA: Aziz Dweik

Senior Leader in Hamas: Sheik

Muhammad Abu Tir

Senior and Spiritual Leader in

Hamas: Hasan Yousef

Isra al-Modallal: Spokesperson for

Hamas

Head of Qassam Brigades: Mohammad

Deif

Head of Special Missions, Qassam

Brigades: Marwan Issa

Head of Qassam Brigades, West

Bank: Saleh al Arouri

VIII. Recommended Sources

Though this guide has at this point made the complexities and contentiousness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plain, it is important to note that academia concerning this conflict too is fraught with controversy. Scholars opinions' can be as strong (if not stronger) than political operators'; as such, proceed with caution when conducting your research. Biases in academia can be challenging to detect. It is important for delegates to read perspectives from all sides of the issue to become well-informed and prepared for committee. That being said, the Chairs and Directors are at your disposal, please contact us if you have any concerns or questions. A few sources are listed below:

- **Haaretz**
(<http://www.haaretz.com/>) - Left-of-center Israeli paper, frequented by academics and considered the standard for journalistic integrity; excellent editorials; also publishes in Hebrew.
- **Ma'an News Agency**
(<http://www.maannews.net/en>) – Independent Palestinian news outlet, among the most frequently browsed websites in the Palestinian territories; also publishes in Arabic and Hebrew.
- **Al-Jazeera's Middle East coverage**
(<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/>) – Middle East's premier satellite news coverage, based in Qatar; publishes in English and Arabic, though the

slant can vary vastly between the two.

- **BBC News's Middle East coverage**

(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/middle_east/) – Reliable and unbiased, if not general, coverage of events; also publishes in Arabic.

<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/mandate3.html>
<http://www.fofweb.com/History/HistRefMain.asp?iPin=EPAL341&SID=2&DataBaseName=Modern+World+History+Online&InputText=%22Peel+Commission%22&SearchStyle=&dTitle=Woodhead+Commission&TabRecordType=All+Re>

<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/peel.html>
<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/2248AF9A92B498718525694B007239C6>
<http://www.haaretz.com/misc/tags/Green%20Line-1.477795>
<http://www.history.com/topics/yom-kippur-war>
<http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/battleswars1900s/p/entebbe.htm>
<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intifada.html>
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/negotiations/>
http://www.myjewishlearning.com/israel/Contemporary_Life/Israeli-Palestinian_Relations/Second_Intifada.shtml