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| Education | | | |
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|  | Ph.D. Candidate, Economics, University of Texas at Austin, May 2021 (Expected) | | |
|  | Dissertation Title: *“Essays on the Effects of Information Provision*” | | |
|  | M.A., Economics, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, 2014  M.S., Applied Economics and Finance, Athens University of Economics and Business, 2010 | | |
|  | B.S., Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, 2008 | | |
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| References | | | |
|  | | | |
|  | Robert Town (Chair) | | Daniel Ackerberg |
|  | Department of Economics | | Department of Economics |
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|  | 512-475-8542 | | 512-475-9538 |
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|  | Eugenio Miravete | |  |
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| Teaching and Research Fields | | | |
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|  | **Fields:** Industrial Organization, Health Economics, Microeconomic Theory | | |
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| Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships | | | |
|  | | | |
|  | 2020 | University of Texas at Austin Graduate Summer Fellowship | |
|  | 2019 | College of Liberal Arts Summer Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin | |
|  | 2018  2012 - 2013 | College of Liberal Arts Summer Fellowship, University of Texas at Austin  William Haber Graduate Fellowship, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor | |
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| Research Experience and Other Employment | | | |
|  | | | |
|  | 2018 - 2019 | Research Assistant for Professor Robert Town, University of Texas at Austin | |
|  | Summer, 2018 | Research Assistant for Professor Eugenio Miravete, University of Texas at Austin | |
|  | Spring, 2015 | Research Analyst, applEcon, LLC, Ann Arbor | |
|  | Summer, 2013 | Research Assistant for Professor Ryan Kellogg, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor | |

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| Teaching Experience | | | |
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|  | Spring, 2020 | Economics of Entrepreneurship, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professor Daniel Ackerberg | |
|  | 2016 - 2019 | Microeconomic Theory (M.A. level), University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professor Svetlana Boyarchenko and Dr. Stephanie Houghton | |
|  | Spring, 2018 | Industrial Organization (M.A. level), University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Professor Eugenio Miravete | |
|  | 2015 - 2017  Spring, 2016  2013 - 2014  Spring, 2014 | Introduction to Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Dr. Helen Schneider and Dr. Dima Shamoun  Introduction to Macroeconomic Theory, University of Texas at Austin, Teaching Assistant for Dr. Shalah Mostashari  American Industries, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Teaching Assistant for Professor William Adams  Government Regulation of Industry, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Teaching Assistant for Professor William Adams | |
| Professional Activities | | | |
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| **Conferences:** | | | |
| June, 2020 | | | American Society of Health Economists Annual Conference, (*JMP accepted*) |
| May, 2020 | | | International Industrial Organization Conference, *(JMP accepted)* |
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| **Schools:** | | |  |
| Summer, 2018 Israel Institute for Advanced Studies, 29th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory  Spring, 2013 Center for Research on Teaching & Learning, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor  Summer, 2012 Competition and Regulation European Summer School, (CRESSE) | | | |
| Computer Skills and Languages | | | |
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| **Computer Skills:** Matlab, Stata, Mathematica, Latex | | | |
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| **Languages:** English (Fluent), Greek (Native) | | | |
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| Working Papers | | | |
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| “The fault in our stars!”*(Job Market Paper)* | | | |
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| In markets where consumers are imperfectly informed about the quality of products, governments intervene with quality disclosure policies and financial incentive mechanisms on the demand and the supply side, respectively, to help consumers make more informed choice decisions and to encourage quality improvement. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of quality disclosure and quality subsidies in the Medicare Advantage market. On the demand side, consumers receive information on the quality of health insurance plans through a Star Rating System (SRS). On the supply side, higher-rated insurers receive a quality-linked subsidy through a Quality Bonus Payment (QBP) program. I build and estimate a full demand and supply equilibrium model that accounts for the possibility of consumers who are unaware of the SRS. To identify consumer awareness with respect to the SRS, I survey Medicare-eligible individuals and I find that 80% of the population is unaware of it. After I inform all respondents of the rating system, I conduct a conjoint experiment to elicit preferences on quality. My estimates show that respondents who reported they were *aware* of the SRS value an extra star per month for $25, while the ones who reported they were *unaware* value an extra star per month for $20. Not taking into account the possibility of the *unaware* types underestimates the value of a star by 85%. I combine my unique survey Stated Preference with Revealed Preference choice data and I estimate a Bayesian learning discrete choice model. On the supply side, firms endogenously choose price and quality endogenizing the different consumer types and the financial incentives they are offered. In my counterfactual analysis, I investigate the equilibrium outcomes that arise under scenarios of fully informed consumers, perfectly informative star ratings, and different bonus schemes. Lastly, I investigate what combination of those two policies can maximize welfare. | | | |
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| “When to behave badly and when to behave well under disagreement,” with David Miller | | | |
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| In a repeated principal-agent problem in which the agent has private information about her i.i.d. cost of effort (`a la Levin 2003), we analyze relational contracts that the parties can renegotiate in a way that respects their relative bargaining power. We show that if a disagreement arises in a state in which she was to be rewarded, then it is optimal for the agent to destroy surplus, exerting costly effort to hurt the principal. In such an event, her counter-productive effort is optimally constant regardless of her effort cost, the principal does not fire her, and both parties anticipate agreeing to reward the agent in the next period. In contrast, on the equilibrium path as well as under disagreement in a state in which the agent was to be punished, the agent exerts productive effort that is decreasing in her effort cost. | | | |
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| **Other Working Papers** | | | |
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| “Productivity in multi-input/multi-product firms: evidence from the Texas hospital industry,” with Austin Bean  “Quality rating systems in the health insurance exchange: effects on enrollment decisions” | | | |
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