




# **AITCHISON COLLEGE**

## **MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE VI**

United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency



# **INDEPENDENT BODIES**

## Introduction

Welcome Delegates, to the International Atomic Energy Agency at ACMUN 2014. As you are probably aware, the IAEA this year will be simulated as a crisis committee. While the committee will primarily follow the rules and procedures observed by conventional committees, it will differ in some aspects.

Since there is only one topic, there will be no agenda setting in the committee and debate will commence directly. Each delegate will be representing their own country and will have the country's resources at their disposal. While unilateral military is prohibited, delegates will be free to ask their respective countries to aid them in other means such as providing information or carrying out investigations. Expert witnesses may also be called into the committee to help clarify the situation. Any such requests will be submitted to the dais who will judge whether or not the requested action can be carried out. Delegates are reminded not to ask for unreasonable requests that cannot be carried out in the real world since such requests will be denied and may lead to the delegates being looked upon unfavorably by the dais. The most important aspect of the committee, however, is the fact that it will constantly be receiving updates from the dais. These updates can be in the form of news reports or information from expert witnesses and may come directly from the dais as proceedings in the world outside the committee or as results of the actions requested by individual delegates. Delegates are reminded to keep all the updates in mind while compiling working papers or draft resolutions. These events may make certain documents redundant, requiring them to be rethought and new courses of action to be considered. We hope that delegates employ not only logic but also creativity in order to make the committee as competitive and interesting as possible.

The focal point of the committee, of course, will be the debate itself. Delegates are reminded to argue all aspects of the topic and the effects of updates as well as possible. The individual stances that the delegates take will be dependent on how their country has responded to similar situations in the past, and any stance will need to portray a strong principle link with one adopted by the country previously. Of course, certain situations may call for countries to rethink their stances, but even these changes will need to display some justification. Needless stance changing or a stance that entirely contradicts the principles of the country being represented is discouraged and will be seen as a strategic flaw on part of the delegates.

We look forward to your participation in the committee and encourage a high level of debate within the committee. Delegates will be given the opportunity to showcase their level of research as well as reasoning and public speaking skills. Most of all, we hope you learn from the experience of ACMUN 2014 and have fun.

### Mandate of the IAEA:

- Working towards global food security in partnership with FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of UN)
  - Supporting agricultural water management
  - Developing mutant varieties
  - Reducing risk of trans boundary animal disease
  - Controlling insect pests
  - Promoting traceability for food safety and quality
- Improving healthcare using nuclear techniques
  - Improving diagnosis and treatment of cancer and chronic diseases
  - Building capacities in radiation medicine through education and training programmes
  - Contributing to better nutrition
  - Supporting IMPACT missions, PACT Model Demonstration Sites (PMDS), and national cancer control programmes
  - Enhancing the Joint WHO/ IAEA Programme on Cancer Control
  - Facilitating the creation of training networks
- Enabling Member States to produce and use radioisotopes and deploy radiation technology
  - Enhancing capabilities in using non-HEU technologies for production of radioisotopes
  - Facilitating availability of radiopharmaceuticals for cancer patients
  - Supporting capacity to apply radiation technology for health care, food safety, and industry

- Enhancing sustainable management of water resources
  - Mapping of groundwater by using radioisotopes
  - Assessing surface and groundwater via the IAEA Water Availability Enhancement (IWAVE) project
  - Building Member States capacity to be sustainable and self-reliant in isotope hydrology
  - Ensuring availability of innovative techniques
- Responding to the impacts of environmental changes
  - Establishing approaches, protocols and standards for environmental assessments
  - Assessing the impacts of climate change, ocean acidification and other contaminants on seafood, biodiversity and the marine environment
  - Providing reliable environmental radioactivity concentration data

### Background:

In preparing America for nuclear attack during the Cold War years following World War II, thousands of US citizens became the innocent victims of over 4,000 secret and classified radiation experiments conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and other government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Public Health Service (now the CDC), the National Institutes of Health, the Veterans Administration (VA), the CIA, and NASA.

In the nuclear arms race, government doctors and scientists brainwashed the public into believing low dose radiation was not harmful. Some officials even tried to convince people that “a little radiation is good for you.” Totally ignored was the knowledge that the radiation from nuclear fallout could lead to various harmful consequences.

Only recently have details been revealed about the unethical and inhumane radiation studies conducted during the Cold War years from 1944 to 1974. The extremely dangerous plutonium experiment was performed under the auspices of the government’s Manhattan Project, which brought together a revered group of distinguished scientists to develop and test the atom bomb. The purpose of these secret experiments was to establish occupational standards for workers who would be producing plutonium and other radioactive ingredients for the nuclear energy industry. Some of the classified government experiments included:

- \* Exposing more than 100 Alaskan villagers to radioactive iodine during the 1960s.
- \* Feeding 49 retarded and institutionalized teenagers radioactive iron and calcium in their cereal during the years 1946-1954.
- \* Exposing about 800 pregnant women in the late 1940s to radioactive iron to determine the effect on the fetus.
- \* Injecting 7 newborns (six were Black) with radioactive iodine.
- \* Exposing the testicles of more than 100 prisoners to cancer-causing doses of radiation. This experimentation continued into the early 1970s.
- \* Exposing almost 200 cancer patients to high levels of radiation from cesium and cobalt. The AEC finally stopped this experiment in 1974.
- \* Administering radioactive material to psychiatric patients in San Francisco and to prisoners in San Quentin.
- \* Administering massive doses of full body radiation to cancer patients hospitalized at the General Hospital in Cincinnati, Baylor College in Houston, Memorial Sloan-Kettering in New York City, and the US Naval Hospital in Bethesda, during the 1950s and 1960s. The experiment provided data to the military concerning how a nuclear attack might affect its troops.
- \* Exposing 29 patients, some with rheumatoid arthritis, to total body irradiation (100-300 rad dose) to obtain data for the military. This was conducted at the University of California Hospital in San Francisco.

These experiments were designed to help atomic scientists understand the human hazards of nuclear war and radiation fallout. Because the entire nuclear arms buildup was classified secret, these experiments were all stamped secret and allowed to take place under the banner of protecting “national security.” Most if not all of these experiments resulted in massively detrimental consequences for the ‘victims’ including an increased risk of cancer, heart disease, neurological disorders, immune system disease, reproductive abnormalities, sterility, birth defects, and genetic mutations which could be passed on from generation to generation. Sometimes, gene mutations prevent one or more of these proteins from working properly. By changing a gene’s instructions for making a protein, a mutation can cause the protein to malfunction or to be missing entirely. When a mutation alters a protein that plays a critical role in the body, it can disrupt normal development or cause a medical condition.

The IAEA is the body of the United Nations that serves to monitor and regulate all experiments involving nuclear technology. The IAEA safety standards reflect an international

consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment. Safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security. The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series, which has three categories.

## Safety Fundamentals

Safety Fundamentals present the fundamental safety objective and principles of protection and safety, and provide the basis for the safety requirements.

## Safety Requirements

An integrated and consistent set of Safety Requirements establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment, both now and in the future. The requirements are governed by the objective and principles of the Safety Fundamentals. If the requirements are not met, measures must be taken to reach or restore the required level of safety. The format and style of the requirements facilitate their use for the establishment, in a harmonized manner, of a national regulatory framework. The safety requirements use 'shall' statements together with statements of associated conditions to be met. Many requirements are not addressed to a specific party, the implication being that the appropriate parties are responsible for fulfilling them.

## Safety Guides

Safety Guides provide recommendations and guidance on how to comply with the safety requirements, indicating an international consensus that it is necessary to take the measures recommended (or equivalent alternative measures). The Safety Guides present international good practices, and increasingly they reflect best practices, to help users striving to achieve high levels of safety. The recommendations provided in Safety Guides are expressed as 'should' statements.

## General Safety Requirements

Part 1. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety

Part 2. Leadership and Management for Safety

Part 3. Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources

Part 4. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities

Part 5. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste

Part 6. Decommissioning and Termination of Activities

Part 7. Emergency Preparedness and Response

## Specific Safety Requirements

1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations

2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants

2.1. Design and Construction 2.2. Commissioning and Operation

3. Safety of Research Reactors

4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities

5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities

6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material

## North Korea and the IAEA

On 12 December 1985 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 10 April 1992 the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force. Before that, in 1977, the country had concluded a Safeguards Agreement for two nuclear research facilities (the IRT research reactor and a critical assembly).

- Two phases are to be distinguished in the DPRK's nuclear programme. The first started at the end of the fifties and was set up with Soviet assistance. In that period a nuclear complex was constructed at Nyongbyong, where in the 1960s a number of facilities were built. The second - indigenous - phase started in 1979 with the construction of 5



MW (e) natural uranium, graphite moderated reactor in Nyongbyong. In the same period an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication plant were built. By the time the 5 MW (e) reactors became operational in 1986, construction of the first of two larger gas-graphite reactors began and around 1987, also in Nyongbyong, the construction of a Radiochemical Laboratory with a sizeable reprocessing capacity started.

After the DPRK had submitted its initial report to the IAEA under its Safeguards Agreement in May 1992, inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the DPRK's initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that there existed in the DPRK undeclared plutonium. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste. The DPRK, however, refused access to the sites.

- Thereupon, the Director General invoked in February 1993 the special inspection procedure provided for in the Safeguards Agreement. The request for a special inspection was refused by the DPRK and the Board of Governors on 1 April 1993 concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and, in line with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, referred this non-compliance to the UN Security Council. On 11 May 1993, the Council called upon the DPRK to comply with the Agreement. In parallel with these developments, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but in June 1993 "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal.
- During 1993 and 1994 the IAEA was permitted by the DPRK to conduct safeguards activities with a limited scope only (containment, surveillance and maintenance) with the sole purpose of ensuring, as the DPRK phrased it, the "continuity of safeguards" versus "full implementation" demanded by the Agency. The Director General reported as early as December 1993 to the Board that the kind of limited safeguards permitted by the DPRK could no longer be said to provide any meaningful assurance of the peaceful use of the DPRK's declared nuclear installations. Based on the Director



General's report, the UN Security Council, on 31 March 1994, again called upon the DPRK to enable the inspectors to complete their required activities.

- In the context of the special inspection request it was vital for the Agency to ascertain whether the core of the DPRK's 5 MW (e) Experimental Nuclear Power reactor was the first core as claimed by the DPRK. However, in May 1994, the DPRK hastily discharged the fuel from the 5 MW (e) reactors in such a way that the IAEA was not able to conduct the verification activities that could have clarified the history of the core. On 30 May 1994, in his statement, the President of the Security Council called for immediate consultations between the DPRK and the Agency in connection with the further discharge of the core, and, on 10 June 1994, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which concluded that "the DPRK is continuing to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking actions which prevent the Agency from verifying the history of the reactor core and from ascertaining whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in past years". The Board also decided to suspend all non-medical technical assistance to the DPRK.
- On 13 June 1994, the DPRK, which had been an IAEA Member State since 1974, withdrew from its membership in the Agency. Although the withdrawal did not affect the DPRK obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, which in the Agency's view remains binding and in force, the DPRK took the position that it was in a special position with regard to the Safeguards Agreement and that it was no longer obliged to allow the inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards Agreement.

The mid-1994 crisis was defused by the visit of former President Carter in June 1994 and in the subsequent negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK on 21 October 1994. Under the Agreed Framework the US commits itself to make arrangements for the provision of a LWR generating capacity of approximately 2000 MW (e) in exchange for a DPRK "freeze" and ultimately the dismantlement of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. The arrangements for the LWR project led to the creation, in 1995, of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

- The Agreed Framework stipulates that the IAEA will be allowed to monitor the freeze. At the request of the Security Council (in a statement by the President of the Council of 4 November 1994), and as authorized by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1994, the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence in Nyongbyong to verify the

freeze. In the Agency's view, the activities under the Agreed Framework are a subset of activities to be performed under the Safeguards Agreement. The facilities subject to the freeze are the 5MW (e) reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing), the fuel fabrication plant and the partially built 50 and 200MW (e) nuclear power plants.

Notwithstanding the continuing difference between the Agency and the DPRK as to the status of the Safeguards Agreement, regular technical meetings, about twice a year, have taken place since 1994 in Vienna and the DPRK to resolve outstanding issues. Initially the discussions focused on preserving the relevant information. However, despite 17 rounds of technical consultations, no progress has been achieved on key issues. After the Secretariat had determined, in September 2000, that it would need 3 to 4 years to carry out all the activities required to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial report, the focus has shifted to obtaining full DPRK cooperation to carry out these activities. So far the DPRK has not agreed to even discuss such a programme of work. The last technical meeting was held in November 2001. Repeated efforts in the course of 2002 to convene a technical meeting with "verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial report" on the agenda have not yet been successful.

Factors relevant to the DPRK position are its relations with the US and the progress in the KEDO Project. The conclusion of an internal US review in June 2001 was that improved implementation of the Agreed Framework should be sought. The Agreed Framework aimed at the completion of the first reactor in 2003, but the project has suffered delays for a number of reasons. However, since the start of the construction phase in February 2000, the project has been on schedule. The concrete for the first reactor was poured on 7 August 2002. According to the Delivery Protocol to the 1995 KEDO-DPRK Supply Agreement, which was handed over to the DPRK (and brought to the attention of the Agency) at the end of April 2002, the first key nuclear components will be delivered in mid-2005. This is relevant to the Agency because the Agreed Framework specifies that the DPRK has to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement before key nuclear components can be delivered.

A new phase started on 16 October 2002 with the announcement by the US that the DPRK side had acknowledged, in talks with Assistant Secretary Kelly in early October that it had a "programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons". Subsequently in a number of statements, by the US, by the US together with Japan and the Republic of Korea (28 October

2002), and by KEDO (14 November 2002), the conclusion was drawn that the DPRK's programme was a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the DPRK-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In light of those violations the KEDO Board decided to suspend heavy oil deliveries as of the December shipment.

The IAEA, in faxes of 17 and 18 October, requested information about the alleged programme and offered "to dispatch a senior team to the DPRK or to receive a DPRK team in Vienna, to discuss recent information and the general question of the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DPRK". No reply to these faxes was received. On 29 November the Board of Governors adopted a resolution without a vote in which the Board insisted that the DPRK should reply and cooperate with the Agency. The Board recognized that the programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons "or any other covert nuclear activities, would constitute a violation of the DPRK's international commitments, including the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the NPT".

In his reply to the IAEA Director General (dated 2 December, received 4 December) the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun expressed his disappointment about the Agency's unilateral and unfair approach. The DPRK Government could not accept the resolution, he said. On 12 December the Director General received a further letter, from Mr. Ri Je Son, Director General of the General Department of Atomic Energy in the DPRK, conveying the DPRK decision on that day to lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities as of 13 December in light of the US suspension of the heavy fuel oil supply pursuant to the Agreed Framework. The Director General replied the same day urging the DPRK not to take unilateral steps related to seals or cameras and to agree to an urgent meeting of technical experts to discuss practical arrangements involved in moving from the freeze to normal safeguards operations. However, on 22 December the DPRK started to cut seals and disable surveillance cameras. On 27 December it ordered the IAEA inspectors to leave the country.

In light of developments, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution 6 January 2003 that called upon North Korea to cooperate fully and urgently with the Agency. The Board affirmed that unless the DPRK takes all required safeguards measures, it would be in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT effective as of 11 January 2003. No agreed statement on the matter has been issued by the NPT States Parties, or by the NPT

depository States (Russia, UK and USA), or by the UN Security Council. (Article X.1 of the NPT says that a State Party in exercising its national sovereignty has the right to withdraw from the *Treaty*... it shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the *Treaty* and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance... [and] shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.) The IAEA is not a party to the NPT and hence it is not in the position to determine the status of any State Party's membership of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*. NPT States Parties' comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA provide that such agreements would remain in force as long as the State is party to the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*.

Expressing "deep concern" over North Korea's actions, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution 12 February declaring North Korea in further non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations, and referring the matter to the UN Security Council, as the IAEA is required to do in such circumstances under its Statute. The Board called upon North Korea to "remedy urgently" its non-compliance, and fully cooperate with the Agency. It also stressed its desire for a peaceful resolution.

Following consultations 9 April, the UN Security Council expressed its "concern" over the situation in North Korea and said it will keep following developments there. UN Secretary-General Annan additionally has appointed a Special Advisor on the North Korea issue.

The Agency has never been able to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial report of the DPRK under the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Since 1993 it has drawn the conclusion that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under the Agreement. In other words, the Agency has never had the complete picture regarding DPRK nuclear activities and has never been able to provide assurances regarding the peaceful character of the DPRK nuclear programme. Between 1994 and 2002, the Agreed Framework has been a tool that was aimed at bringing the DPRK into compliance with its safeguards obligations. However, the reports about a clandestine uranium enrichment programme, the end of the "freeze" pursuant to the Agreed Framework, and the expulsion of the IAEA inspectors have brought this phase to an end.

The IAEA remains committed to securing full safeguards compliance by the DPRK through peaceful means. In March 2005, the IAEA Board emphasized the importance of continued dialogue to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue, and attached great importance to the crucial role played by the six party talks in this regard. The

35-member policymaking body expressed the hope that such a resolution would ensure the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and provide the IAEA with the authority necessary for it to provide credible assurances regarding the nature of the DPRK nuclear programme.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed a Joint Statement from the latest round of Six Party Talks that said the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would abandon its nuclear program in exchange for economic aid and security guarantees. The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, and included representatives from the DPRK, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States from 26 July to 7 August and 13-19 September 2005.

In a resolution condemning ballistic missile launches by the DPRK, the Security Council strongly urged the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement.

North Korea is reported to have carried out a nuclear test on 9 October 2006. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei expressed deep regret and serious concern about the reported carrying-out of the test. On 14 October, the UN Security Council adopts a resolution imposing sanctions against the DPRK, and demanding that Pyongyang cease its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. It further demanded that the DPRK return to the NPT and accept safeguards through the IAEA.

Parties to the Six Party Talks announced agreed actions following their latest round of discussions in Beijing. Among the agreed actions is that "the DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility" and that the DPRK "will invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK." Dr. ElBaradei welcomed the outcome as "a step in the right direction."

On 23 February 2007, IAEA Chief Dr Mohamed ElBaradei accepted an invitation from the DPRK to visit for talks. He expressed hope that discussions would further progress toward improving relations and resolving issues of mutual concern. The DPRK letter of invitation came from Mr. Ri Je Son, Director General of the DPRK General Department of Atomic Energy

In March 2007, a high-level IAEA delegation headed by Dr. ElBaradei visited the DPRK for two days of talks on issues of "mutual concern". Dr. ElBaradei welcomed the visit as a "the

first step in a long process" toward the normalization of the relationship between DPRK and the Agency. The visit preceded the visit of an IAEA delegation to the DPRK in June 2007 for talks on verification and monitoring the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In July, Dr. ElBaradei submitted a report on *Monitoring and Verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* to the IAEA Board of Governors. The report outlines agreed arrangements for monitoring and verification by the IAEA of the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the reactor under construction in Taechon.

IAEA inspectors arrived and confirmed the shutdown of five nuclear facilities in Yongbyon: the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant No. 1, the Radiochemical Laboratory, the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, the Yongbyon Nuclear Power Plant No. 2, and the Nuclear Power Plant at Taechon. The team applied the necessary seals and other surveillance and monitoring measures as appropriate.

In June 2008, IAEA Director General ElBaradei briefed the Board of Governors on the Agency's verification activities in North Korea, and raised some matters that require guidance from States Parties to the NPT. As he had done in March 2008, he further noted that the additional funds are needed for the IAEA to carry out its monitoring and verification activities in North Korea for the rest of 2008.

In September 2008, IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to the Board that DPRK had asked the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance from the reprocessing plant in Yongbyon. The work was subsequently done, after which no more IAEA seals and surveillance equipment were in place at the reprocessing facility. The DPRK stated that IAEA inspectors would have no further access to the reprocessing plant.

IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities removed safeguards equipment and left the country on 16 April 2009, following the DPRK decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA.

## Crisis

Certain countries were intrigued by the fact that gene mutations can be made to occur in human beings through radiation exposure. The world has only recently found ways to alter DNA of bugs in order to make their bodies produce artificial protein. Soon these countries

began carrying out similar, less regulated experiments underground. The lack of monitoring and regulation in North Korea made it easy for North Korean scientists to carry out these experiments without any interference. Decades of development of such mutation techniques finally yielded results. Scientists were able to control the gene mutation process and were able to enhance humans both physically and mentally, aiming to create an army superior to that of any other country in the world, along with its nuclear weapons program. Since the experiments were entirely secret, the details of such experiments are unknown.

In June 2014, the latest experiments were apparently a huge success and the subjects showed no signs of illness or other medical problems. In fact, the physical and mental capabilities the exhibited were far greater than those of normal humans. Further experiments and advertising within the country's slums and under developed areas led to large numbers of subjects, each of which was then enhanced and made to join a special military force unknown to the rest of the world, called the "*Ulbeolin*". Once the *Ulbeolin* numbered over 10000 strong, they carried out a coup d'etat, taking control of the Korean government and its nuclear stockpiles. The whereabouts of the Korean supreme leader, Kim Jong-Un are unknown. Meanwhile, the *Ulbeolin* were able to use the existing system of control in the country to establish their own reign without much resistance. The few revolts or parties that rose against them were promptly crushed, allowing the *Ulbeolin* to establish a military rule in the country. They continued human experiments, coercing the Koreans to undergo the process through various means. Now, the country has aimed its weapons at South Korea, intending to use force to gain control over its southern counterpart and expand their own land. Whether or not the *Ulbeolin* will resort to actually using nuclear weapons is still in question. However, some scientists believe that the mutant forces' own immunity to radiation from these weapons may make the government more willing to use the the destructive weapons in order to take control of South Korea as well. The degree of this immunity is unconfirmed and therefore the global community has no assurances of exactly what means the North Koreans will employ. Some countries are suggesting using similar experiments to create suitable soldiers to fight with the *Ulbeolin* "and level the playing field". Others suggest that now that war has openly been declared on the South, North Korea has given up its own sovereignty and should be dealt with accordingly. Suggestions include using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to take out the threat in North Korea as quickly as possible. Again, since the degree and exact nature of the mutations is unknown, it is difficult



to predict the effect chemical weapons will have on the actual forces within the country. The safety of civilians in the country who are non-mutants is also a major concern.

Delegates will receive further updates within the committee. Delegates are reminded not only to argue the humanitarian aspects of experiments such as human mutation but also the political and military problem faced by the global community and formulate reasonable recommendations as to how this problem may be dealt with. Delegates are also expected to come up with ways to monitor and further regulate all Atomic research within North Korea, and the rest of the world if need be. Position papers will be expected by the second day.