Robust Reinforcement Learning for Dynamic Risk Measures

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
Motivations 2 / 17

Reinforcement Learning (RL)

- Model-agnostic framework for learning-based control
- Learning optimal behaviors from interactions to minimize a cost signal

Markov Decision Process $(S, A, \pi, \mathbb{P}, c)$

- S State space
- A Action space
- $\pi^{\theta}(a_t|s_t)$ Policy characterized by θ
- $\mathbb{P}(s_0), \mathbb{P}(s_{t+1}|s_t, a_t)$ Transition probabilities
- $c_t(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1})$ Cost function



Motivations 3/17

Robust Risk-Aware RL

Risk-aware RL with static risk measures as objectives instead of a (risk-neutral) expectation:

- Expectation ignores the risk of the costs!
- Optimizing static risk measures leads to optimal precommitment policies!

Risk-aware RL with dynamic risk, e.g.

• Dynamic risk measures [Marzban et al., 2021; Coache and Jaimungal, 2021], Conditional risk mappings [Cheng and Jaimungal, 2022], recursive risk filters [Bielecki et al., 2022]

Robust RL to account for uncertainties, e.g.

• KL divergence [Smirnova et al., 2019], Wasserstein ball [Jaimungal et al., 2022], Bayesian approach [Bielecki et al., 2022]

- accounts for model uncertainty
- accounts for risk in a time-consistent manner

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Dynamic Risk Measures

Consider

- $\mathcal{F}_0 \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{F}_T$ Filtration on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_t, \mathbb{P})$
- $\mathcal{Y}_t := \mathcal{L}_p(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_t, P) p$ -integrable, \mathcal{F}_t -measurable random variables
- $\mathcal{Y}_{t_1,t_2} := \mathcal{Y}_{t_1} \times \cdots \times \mathcal{Y}_{t_2}$ Sequence of random variables

Dynamic risk measure $\{\rho_{t,T}\}_{t}$

Sequence of conditional mappings $\rho_{t,T}: \mathcal{Y}_{t,T} \to \mathcal{Y}_t$

ullet \mathcal{F}_t -measurable charge one would be willing to incur instead of a sequence of future costs

Time-Consistency

Strong time-consistency

 $\{\rho_{t,T}\}_t$ is strongly time-consistent iff for any $Y, Z \in \mathcal{Y}_{t_1,T}$ and $0 \le t_1 < t_2 \le T$, we have

$$Y_k = Z_k, \, \forall k = t_1, \dots, t_2 - 1 \, \text{ and } \, \rho_{t_2, T}(Y_{t_2}, \dots, Y_T) \leq \rho_{t_2, T}(Z_{t_2}, \dots, Z_T)$$

implies that $\rho_{t_1,T}(Y_{t_1},...,Y_T) \leq \rho_{t_1,T}(Z_{t_1},...,Z_T)$.

$$Y_{k} = Z_{k} \qquad \rho_{t_{2},T}(Y) \leq \rho_{t_{2},T}(Z)$$

$$Y_{t_{1}} \qquad Y_{t_{2}-1} \qquad Y_{t_{2}} \qquad Y_{T}$$

$$Z_{t_{1}} \qquad Z_{t_{2}-1} \qquad Z_{t_{2}} \qquad Z_{T}$$

$$\vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots$$

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implies that $\rho_{t_1,T}(Y_{t_1},\ldots,Y_T) \leq \rho_{t_1,T}(Z_{t_1},\ldots,Z_T)$.

Time-Consistency

[Thm. 1, Ruszczyński, 2010]

Let $\{\rho_{t,T}\}_t$ be a dynamic risk measure satisfying for any $Y, Z \in \mathcal{Y}_{t,T}$

- $\rho_{t,T}(Y) \leq \rho_{t,T}(Z)$ for all $Y \leq Z$;
- $\rho_{t,T}(Y_t, Y_{t+1}, \dots, Y_T) = Y_t + \rho_{t,T}(0, Y_{t+1}, \dots, Y_T);$
- $\rho_{t,T}(0,\ldots,0)=0;$

Then $\{\rho_{t,T}\}_t$ is strongly time-consistent iff it may be expressed as

$$\rho_{t,T}(Y_t,...,Y_T) = Y_t + \rho_t \left(Y_{t+1} + \rho_{t+1} \left(Y_{t+2} + \cdots + \rho_{T-1} (Y_T) \cdots \right) \right),$$

where $\rho_t: \mathcal{Y}_{t+1} \to \mathcal{Y}_t$ are one-step conditional risk measures satisfying $\rho_t(Y) = \rho_{t,t+1}(0,Y)$

Robustifying the Dynamic Risk

Let \check{F}_Y be the quantile function of Y

- 2-Wasserstein distance: $d_2[Y,Z] = \left(\int_0^1 \left| \breve{F}_Y(u) \breve{F}_Z(u) \right|^2 du \right)^{1/2}$
- Distortion risk measure: $\rho^{\gamma}(Y) = \mathbb{E}[Y \ \gamma(F_Y(Y))] = \int_0^1 \gamma(u) \breve{F}_Y(u) du$

We work with 2-Wasserstein-robust distortion risk measures (with piecewise constant γ)

$$\rho^{\gamma,\epsilon}(Y) = \sup_{Y^{\phi} \in \omega^{\epsilon}_{-}} \mathbb{E}\Big[Y^{\phi} \ \gamma\Big(F_{Y^{\phi}}(Y^{\phi})\Big)\Big], \quad \text{where} \quad \varphi^{\epsilon}_{Y} = \Big\{Y^{\phi} \ : \ d_{2}[Y^{\phi}, Y] \leq \epsilon\Big\}$$

- take into account the uncertainty
- allow risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviors
- are elicitable

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Elicitability

We leverage the elicitability to efficiently estimate dynamic risk measures

Elicitable risk measure

 ρ is elicitable iff there exists a scoring function $S: \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$ s.t.

$$ho(Y) = \operatorname*{arg\,min}_{\mathfrak{a} \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim F_Y} ig[S(\mathfrak{a}, Y) ig].$$

Elicitability of (static) spectral risk measures, e.g. $CVaR_{\alpha}$ [Fissler and Ziegel, 2016]

• Proof of elicitability, and characterization of their scoring function

Extension to the class of (dynamic) spectral risk measures [Coache et al., 2022]

- May be approximated to any arbitrary accuracy with NNs
- (SIAG/FME Conference Paper Prize Session, 11:45 AM 1:15 PM)

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Elicitable Mappings

Expectation is elicitable: $\mathbb{E}[Y] = \arg\min_{\mathfrak{a} \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim F_Y} [(\mathfrak{a} - Y)^2]$

 $(VaR_{\alpha}, CVaR_{\alpha})$ is elicitable

$$\left(\mathsf{VaR}_{\alpha}(Y),\mathsf{CVaR}_{\alpha}(Y)\right) = \underset{(\mathfrak{a}_1,\mathfrak{a}_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2}{\mathsf{arg}\min} \ \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim F_Y} \left[S(\mathfrak{a}_1,\mathfrak{a}_2,Y) \right]$$

Distortion risk measures (with piecewise constant γ) are elicitable

Conditional maps are elicitable

$$\rho(Y \mid s_t = s) = \arg\min_{h : S \to \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim F_Y} \left[S(h(s), Y) \right]$$

Any CDF is elicitable

$$F_Y = \arg\min_{F \in \mathbb{F}} \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim F_Y} \left[\int_{\mathbb{R}} \left(F(y) - \mathbb{1}_{y \ge Y} \right)^2 dy \right]$$

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Optimization Problem 10 / 17

Problem Setup

Problems of the form

$$\min_{\theta} \rho_{0,T}^{\gamma,\epsilon} \Big(\{c_t^{\theta}\}_t \Big) = \min_{\theta} \rho_0^{\gamma_0,\epsilon_0} \left(c_0^{\theta} + \rho_1^{\gamma_1,\epsilon_1} \left(c_1^{\theta} + \dots + \rho_{T-1}^{\gamma_{T-1},\epsilon_{T-1}} \left(c_{T-1}^{\theta} + \rho_T^{\gamma_T,\epsilon_T} \left(c_T^{\theta} \right) \right) \dots \right) \right)$$

where $c_t^{ heta}$ are \mathcal{F}_{t+1} -measurable random costs and $ho_t^{\gamma_t,\epsilon_t}$ are robust distortion risk measures

DP equations for the *value function*, i.e. running risk-to-go, for $s \in \mathcal{S}$

$$V_t(s;\theta) = \sup_{Y_t^{\phi} \in \varphi_{v\theta}^{\epsilon_t}} \mathbb{E} \Big[Y_t^{\phi} \ \gamma_t \Big(F_{Y_t^{\phi}|_{s_t=s}}(Y_t^{\phi}) \Big) \ \Big| \ s_t = s \Big],$$

with
$$Y_t^{\theta} := c_t^{\theta} + V_{t+1}(s_{t+1}^{\theta}; \theta)$$

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DP equations for the *value function*, i.e. running risk-to-go, for $s \in S$:

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Optimization Problem 11 / 17

Policy Gradient

We wish to optimize the value function over policies θ via a policy gradient method:

$$\theta \leftarrow \theta - \eta \nabla_{\theta} V(\cdot; \theta)$$

- ullet requires maximizing the worst case risk over ϕ
- $\nabla_{\theta} V(\cdot; \theta)$ depends on $V(\cdot; \theta)$ itself due to the DP equations

Adversary-actor-critic style algorithm composed of 3 interleaved procedures:

- Adversary estimates the distribution of the costs-to-go
- Critic calculates the value function of the given policy
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- We parametrize the components we optimize by NNs

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Step 1: Distribution of Y_t^{θ}

We aim to estimate the distribution $F_{Y^{ heta}_t}(\cdot|s_t)$, where $Y^{ heta}_t:=c^{ heta}_t+V_{t+1}(s^{ heta}_{t+1}; heta)$

• Estimation of $F_{Y_+^{\theta}}$ with the elicitable framework:

$$F_{Y_t^{\theta}}(\cdot|s_t) = \underset{F \in \mathbb{F}}{\arg\min} \ \mathbb{E}_{\substack{a_t^{\theta} \sim \pi^{\theta} \\ s_{t+1}^{\theta} \sim \mathbb{P}}} \left[\int_{\mathbb{R}} \left(F(y|s_t) - \mathbb{1}_{y \geq Y_t^{\theta}} \right)^2 dy \right]$$

- Additional monotonicity penalty to discourage increasing NN functions
- Mini-batch of realizations Y_t^{θ} induced by π^{θ}

This requires an estimation of $V_t(s; \theta)$...

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Step 2: Value function $V_t(s; \theta)$

We aim to estimate
$$V_t(s;\theta) = \sup_{Y_t^{\phi} \in \varphi_{Y_t^{\theta}}^{\epsilon_t}} \rho_t \Big(Y_t^{\phi} \ \Big| \ s_t = s \Big) = \sup_{\check{F}_{\phi} \in \varphi_{\check{F}_{\gamma\theta}(\cdot|s)}^{\epsilon_t}} \int_0^1 \gamma_t(u) \check{F}_{\phi}(u|s) \mathrm{d}u$$

• Pefermulation of the problem with quantile function

Proposition

The entimal quantile function in V(s; A) is given by

$$\breve{F}_{\phi}^*(\cdot|s) = \left(\breve{F}_{Y_t^{\theta}}(\cdot|s) + \frac{\gamma_t(\cdot)}{2\lambda^*}\right)^{\uparrow}, \quad \text{with } \lambda^* > 0 \text{ such that } \int^1 \left|\breve{F}_{\phi}^*(u|s) - \breve{F}_{Y_t^{\theta}}(u|s)\right|^2 \mathrm{d}u = \epsilon_t^2.$$

Estimation of V(s; A) with the elicitable framework

$$\min_{h:\mathcal{S}\to\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E}_{a_t^{\theta}\sim\pi_{\infty}^{\theta}} \bigg[S\Big(h(s_t);\ Y_t^{\phi}\Big) \bigg], \quad Y_t^{\phi}\sim \breve{F}_{\phi}^*(\cdot|s_t)$$

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• Estimation of $V_t(s; \theta)$ with the elicitable framework:

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$$\breve{F}_{\phi}^*(\cdot|s) = \left(\breve{F}_{Y_t^{\theta}}(\cdot|s) + \frac{\gamma_t(\cdot)}{2\lambda^*}\right)^{\uparrow}, \quad \text{with } \lambda^* > 0 \text{ such that } \quad \int_{0}^{1} \left|\breve{F}_{\phi}^*(u|s) - \breve{F}_{Y_t^{\theta}}(u|s)\right|^2 \mathrm{d}u = \epsilon_t^2.$$

• Estimation of $V_t(s; \theta)$ with the elicitable framework:

$$\min_{h:\mathcal{S} o\mathbb{R}} rac{\mathbb{E}_{oldsymbol{a}_{t}^{ heta}\sim\pi^{ heta}}}{s_{t+1}^{ heta}\sim\mathbb{P}} igg[S\Big(h(s_{t}); \ Y_{t}^{\phi} \Big) igg], \quad Y_{t}^{\phi}\sim reve{F}_{\phi}^{st}(\cdot|s_{t})$$

This requires an estimation of $F_{Y^{\theta}}(\cdot|s_t)$...

Step 3: Gradient $\nabla_{\theta} V_t(s; \theta)$

We aim to update the policy π^{θ} via a policy gradient method

• Optimization problem is convex over the space of quantile functions

Proposition

The gradient of $V_t(s;\theta)$ wrt policy parameters θ is given by

$$\nabla_{\theta} V_t(s;\theta) = -2 \mathbb{E} \left[\lambda^* \left(Y_t^{\phi,c} - Y_t^{\theta} \right) \frac{\nabla_{\theta} F_{Y_t^{\theta}}(x|s)}{f_{Y_t^{\theta}}(x|s)} \Big|_{x = Y_t^{\theta}} \right]$$

where $(Y_t^{\phi,c}, Y_t^{\theta})$ is comonotonic with marginals $\breve{F}_{\gamma^{\theta}}^*(\cdot|s)$ and $\breve{F}_{\gamma^{\theta}}(\cdot|s)$.

- Mini-batches of observed costs Y_t^{θ} (from π^{θ}) and distorted costs $Y_t^{\phi,c}$ (from \check{F}_{ϕ}^*)
- Optimization of the policy parameters θ wrt $\nabla_{\theta} V_t(s;\theta)$

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```
Input: ANNs \pi^{\theta}, V^{\phi}, F^{\vartheta}, numbers of epochs K's
1 for each iteration k = 1, ..., K do
        while convergence is not achieved do
 2
             for k^{\vartheta} = 1, \dots, K^{\vartheta} do
 3
                  Adversary: minimization of the expected scoring rule for F;
 4
                  Update \vartheta via Adam optimization;
 5
             for k^{\phi} = 1, \dots, K^{\phi} do
 6
                  Critic: minimization of the expected consistent score;
                  Update \phi via Adam optimization;
 8
        for k^{\theta} = 1, \dots, K^{\theta} do
 9
             Actor: policy gradient;
10
             Update \theta via Adam optimization:
11
   Output: Optimal policy \pi^{\theta}, its value function V_t(s;\theta), and the CDF F_{V\theta}
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```

Contributions & Future Directions

A flexible, practical framework for robust risk-aware RL with dynamic risk measures

- Efficient estimation method utilizing elicitable mappings
- Robustification to protect against model uncertainty

Future directions

- Alternative uncertainty sets, e.g. KL divergence
- Multi-agent settings, e.g. MFGs

Thank you!

More info and slides: anthonycoache.ca

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